

# System & Software Security

## Software Bills of Materials

Davide Baggio - s4426428

João Pereira - s4443322

Nuno Pereira - s4443330

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We confirm that this report was fully produced by the team members **Davide Baggio, João Pereira and Nuno Pereira** and we are jointly responsible for all content presented in this work. All used sources were attributed properly.

# 1 Introduction

Software systems, now more than ever, outsource parts of application logic to first- or third-party *dependencies* — pieces of code that are used in conjunction or as a part of the application’s business logic but that are not part of the application itself.

Keeping track of dependencies can be an arduous task, which can be more easily managed using software tools and components such as *package managers* that keep track of an application’s dependencies and their versions [1], like *npm* or *cargo* [11, 12].

SBOMs (Software Bills of Materials) [2], proposed by the U.S. National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA), are a formal way of describing the software dependencies of an application and the relations between these dependencies. Other metadata can be attached to SBOM entries for a more comprehensive outline of the software components being depended upon.

Currently, there are 3 SBOM standards used in practice: OWASP CycloneDX [9], Software Product Data eXchange (SPDX) [10] and Software Identification Tagging (SWID) [8]. However, little consensus exists between these 3 standards, making for one of the many challenges against general SBOM adoption [3].

To ensure widespread practice of SBOM, potential challenges and their solutions must be known and categorized beforehand in order to mitigate issues during development that might arise from a lack of understanding of the software components that make up a product. However, since the topic of SBOMs is still relatively new, there is not much research made into the topic that provide for a standardized view of the common practices in place, and thus further work is required.

## 2 Overview of reviewed papers

To assess the state-of-the-art with respect to SBOMs and their industry-wide use, we conducted a critical review of some examples from the literature, which are enumerated and described below:

**Software Bills of Materials Are Required. Are We There Yet?** [4] In this paper, written by Zahan et al. and published in the *IEEE Security & Privacy (Volume: 21, Issue: 2, March-April 2023)*, the authors conducted a Grey Literature (GL) review of 200 internet articles, 100 for ”challenges to adopt SBOM” and 100 for ”benefits to adopt SBOM” in order to assess the biggest upsides and downsides experienced in practice regarding SBOM adoption. Grey literature was chosen as the majority of content regarding SBOMs in practice cannot be found in literature but rather in online articles and blog posts. The authors came up with 5 reported benefits from SBOM adoption and 5 challenges preventing SBOM adoption.

**BOMs Away! Inside the Minds of Stakeholders: A Comprehensive Study of Bills of Materials for Software Systems** [7] The paper, written by Stalnaker et al. and published in *ICSE ’24: Proceedings of the 46th IEEE/ACM International Conference on Software Engineering*, investigates the current state of Software Bills of Materials (SBOMs), which are recognized as vital tools especially after important incidents like the two mentioned ones: SolarWinds breach and Log4J vulnerabilities. The

study identifies 12 major challenges related to SBOM creation and use, such as: insufficient tool support, SBOM maintenance difficulties and standard incompatibilities across different industries (as highlighted by the 138 interviews with stakeholders). The study identifies key SBOM standards (SPDX, CycloneDX, SWID) and emphasizes the need for better tools to facilitate SBOM creation, verification, and maintenance. Furthermore, it proposes 4 actionable solutions to overcome these critical problems and outlines future research directions aimed at maintaining SBOM accuracy over time and dealing with legacy systems.

**An Empirical Study on Software Bill of Materials: Where We Stand and the Road Ahead** [3] In this paper, written by Xia et al. and published in the *ICSE '23: Proceedings of the 45th International Conference on Software Engineering*, the authors aimed to understand the state of SBOM usage and adoption in practice, conducting 17 interviews and performing a survey based on the interviews. The authors gathered information about current SBOM practitioners and what these might feel is lacking in the industry regarding SBOM practices. The study is recent, provides a systematic methodology and provides perspectives from the Software Engineering standpoint.

**On the Way to SBOMs: Investigating Design Issues and Solutions in Practice** [5] This paper, written by Bi et al. and published in the *ACM Transactions on Software Engineering and Methodology, Volume 33, Issue 6*, explores current practical uses and concerns/problems of SBOM in "the wild". The authors gathered data by mining several GitHub repositories and, out of those, discussions pertaining to the topic of SBOM. It was found that, generally, there are 4 phases to the SBOM lifecycle: planning, development, publication and maintenance.

**Charting the Path to SBOM Adoption: A Business Stakeholder-Centric Approach** [6] The paper, written by Kloeg et al. and published in the *Proceedings of the 19th ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security*, analyzes the slow adoption of SBOM in improving transparency and security within software supply chains. The research identifies four key stakeholder groups—system integrators, software vendors, B2B customers, and individual developers, and also examines how their roles affect SBOM adoption. Through interviews with 16 representatives from these groups, the authors analyze the incentives, concerns, and barriers related to SBOM. System integrators and software vendors are more likely to adopt SBOMs, driven by compliance requirements and the potential to improve their reputation and the quality of supplied software. On the other hand, B2B customers and individual developers show less interest because they struggle to see its immediate value and face challenges in resources and complexity. The study reveals that the main obstacles to adoption include a lack of expertise, concerns over the time and effort required to maintain SBOMs, vulnerability misclassification, and financial costs. The paper recommends targeted regulatory interventions and improvements in SBOM tools to align incentives across stakeholders. The research concludes that while SBOMs have significant potential to enhance software security, widespread adoption will require external pressures and better tools to support stakeholders.

### 3 Metrics defined

To effectively compare the reviewed papers, objective metrics should be used to rank them based on those specific criteria.

Since SBOM is a relatively novel concept, comparing literature on this topic should focus on finding out and exposing the most common challenges pertaining to SBOM widespread adoption and how those can be mitigated. Other interesting aspects relevant for SBOM adoption is how generalized these problems are, since problems that are too specific to a certain domain only provide value for that domain and cannot be reused in other contexts. As such, the metrics we have devised for the critical comparison of the papers we reviewed are:

#### Metrics of Quality

1. **Aims:** are the aims/research questions of the paper clearly defined? This can help guide future work/development on the topic of SBOMs.
2. **Conclusions:** are the conclusions drawn from the study findings valid and do they align with the aims of the paper? Same reasoning as stated above.

#### Metrics of Quantity

3. **Number of SBOM adoption challenges:** the number of challenges an organization or system integrator needs to face before extracting value out of the use of SBOMs directly correlates to how eager they might be to adopting SBOMs in their processes: if the benefits don't outweigh the challenges, it is not valuable, and thus not desirable, to put in the effort required to correctly adopt and practice SBOM development.
4. **Frequency of challenges:** the number of times challenges appear across different research papers, either quantitatively or qualitatively, shows how common those challenges are between different industry domains (since we can attest that research populations vary between industry domains), which can shed a light on how important it is to face and solve those challenges.
5. **Number of solutions to standardize SBOM use:** the number of solutions proposed by the paper to standardize SBOM use is a good indicator of how much thought the authors have put into the topic and how much they have researched the topic.

#### Metrics of methodological soundness

6. **Sampling:** is the sampling of participants clearly defined and does it provide a representative sample of the population the paper is studying? This can help generalize the findings to multiple domains and contexts, allowing findings to be reused across the industry and practitioners.
7. **Analysis of study findings:** are the analytic methods clear, systematic and reproducible? This can help guide future research work based on the papers mentioned.

## Metrics of result transferability

8. **How much can a solution for challenges of a certain population be applied to challenges of another population:** by studying how "inter-population" the solutions to a challenge might be, less redundant work can be made since efforts may be applied in different contexts.

With the exception of quantitative metrics, scores will be given based on a five-point scale, where 1 means the metric is not met at all and 5 means the metric is met perfectly. The quantitative metrics are used to numerically compare the papers.

### 3.1 Considerations on the defined metrics

Although we believe these metrics to be valid comparison points between the papers discussed, there are some potential issues which could hinder the validity of the comparisons made with them:

- For the **Number of SBOM adoption challenges** metric, one shortcoming of simply counting the challenges presented by each paper is that different authors might group their findings in different ways, so what would be, for example, 1 challenge for one author could become 2 for a different author. The same reasoning applies to the **Number of solutions to standardize SBOM use** metric. We did our best to analyze the papers with as much scrutiny regarding these issues as possible.
- Quantitative metrics might suffer from our bias/misunderstanding of the reviewed papers in the sense that different people might consider different results as a valid unit of measurement, leading to different results of the quantitative metrics. This can be mitigated by having all papers examined thoroughly by everyone and handling any disagreements that might appear.

## 4 Analysis and Comparison of reviewed papers

With a set of relevant metrics defined for the topic of SBOMs, we analyzed and compared the papers based on these criteria. Our findings are summarized in Table 1 A value of *N/A* means that the relevant metric is not applicable to the paper in question or that there isn't enough data/evidence that can sustain a scoring on that metric.

Zahan et al. [4]

- 1.
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
- 5.
- 6.

7.

8.

**Stalnaker et al. [7]**

1. This study's aims are clearly defined through well-articulated research questions, focusing on identifying the current challenges practitioners face in SBOM adoption and usage, as well as exploring solutions to enhance the practicality and reliability of SBOMs. (5/5)
2. The authors provide a clear link between the research questions and the conclusions, making the study's findings valid. However, the range of insights tailored to specific stakeholders is occasionally generalized, resulting in some conclusions being somewhat superficial. (4/5)
3. The paper identifies the following challenges: (12)
  - A. Complexity of SBOM specifications;
  - B. Determining data fields to include in SBOMs;
  - C. Incompatibility between SBOM standards;
  - D. Keeping SBOMs up to date;
  - E. Insufficient SBOM tooling;
  - F. Inaccurate and incomplete SBOMs;
  - G. Verifying SBOM accuracy and completeness;
  - H. Differences across ecosystems and communities;
  - I. SBOM completeness and data privacy trade-off;
  - J. SBOMs for legacy packages and repositories;
  - K. Inability to locate dependencies for SBOMs;
  - L. Unclear SBOM direction and low adoption.
- 4.
5. The researchers identified the following solutions: (4)
  - A. Multi-dimensional SBOM specifications;
  - B. Enhanced SBOM tooling and build system support;
  - C. Strategies for SBOM verification;
  - D. Increasing incentives for SBOM adoption.

However, these don't account for challenges A, J and K, as they require additional research to be addressed effectively, as mentioned in the paper.

6. The sampling of participants is well explained and included 5 groups: SBOM Community and Adopters, Developers of Critical Open Source Systems, CPS Developers and Researchers, AI/ML Developers and Researchers, Legal Practitioners. They sent 4.4k surveys and received 229 responses, which after filtering resulted in 150 valid ones. The authors also conducted 8 interviews with respondents who gave detailed replies highlighting interesting use cases, challenges, and potential solutions; demonstrated experience in their field; diversified the interviewee pool in terms of their role. The sampling method is really good, but the number of participants is not enough to generalize the results for the whole industry. (4/5)
7. The researchers conducted their studies and designed the questionnaires considering previous literature on SBOMs and guidelines for survey design. Hence, the methodology is well-founded and reproducible. (5/5)
- 8.

**Xia et al. [3]**

1. The aims of this study are clearly defined when defining the research questions, and the potential (and effective) contributions of the study reflect this. (5/5)
2. Since the survey data was compared against interview results and conclusions were drawn from analyzing both, we are confident in their validity. The link between research questions and conclusions is logically sound, so this paper scores a 5 on this metric. (5/5)
3. Lack of standard format extensibility, potential for attackers to use SBOMs as an attack "guide" or lack of SBOM education by industry professionals are identified as the 3 main concerns analyzed. (3)
- 4.
5. The defined 3-goal model outlines steps that the authors believe are crucial to practice if SBOMs are to see more widespread adoption. (3)
6. The study included 82 participants from diverse backgrounds and countries. Most expertise categories have over 10 participants, with some exceptions, such as Researchers. However, each Researcher has at least 10 years of experience in software engineering, making their assessments highly representative (4/5).
7. The data analysis methods used for both the interviews' and online surveys' responses are backed by literature articles, so they are easily reproducible. (5/5)
- 8.

**Bi et al. [5]**

1. The aims/research questions of this study are extensively discussed and clarified (5/5)
2. Since conclusions are drawn from the authors' analysis of the collected data and they help answer the defined research questions we can confidently say they are valid and thus this paper scores a 5 on this metric. (5/5).

3. The paper identifies three categories of SBOM issues, with the second and third categories further divided into subcategories, resulting in a total of eight distinct SBOM issues. Notably, issues are reported as percentages, while solutions are presented as measurable counts. Despite these differing metrics, we believe the reviewed papers can still be compared effectively as is. (8)
- 4.
5. The authors explicitly state that they found "33 high-level solutions for the SBOM-relevant issues and their main design problem". It can be argued whether these are actual solutions or steps towards solutions but we will respect the author's own assessment. (33)
6. Even though the data collection method is clearly outlined, it comes from repository mining, not participant interactions. (N/A)
7. The data collection process is thoroughly explained and the analysis method is backed by literature references based on *Grounded Theory*. (5/5)
- 8.

**Kloeg et al. [6]**

- 1.
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
- 5.
- 6.
- 7.
- 8.

Paper	Quality		Quantity			Methodology		Transf.
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Zahan et al. [4]	–	–	5	–	–	–	–	–
Stalnaker et al. [7]	–	–	12	–	–	–	–	–
Xia et al. [3]	5	5	3	–	3	4	5	–
Bi et al. [5]	5	5	8	–	33	N/A	5	–
Kloeg et al. [6]	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–

Table 1: Comparison of reviewed papers



## 5 Conclusion

Supply Chain Security is an increasingly important factor of modern Software Development. Ensuring that companies adopt good practices in regards to the code they outsource is a pivotal step in ensuring the security requirements of software products. SBOMs [2] are an example of such a technology that promotes good secure software engineering practices.

In this paper, we analyzed 5 examples of the state-of-the-art with regards to SBOMs and conducted a critical review of these papers according to our own metrics:

- Metric 1
- Metric 2
- ...

We found out that ...

Future work can expand on the methodology and results of this paper by ...

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