

claim If φ_i is strictly increasing then (ii) is satisfied by our allocation rule

If $\pi_i(\theta_i, \theta_{-i}) > 0$, then $\pi_i(\hat{\theta}_i, \theta_{-i}) = 1$, if $\hat{\theta}_i > \theta_i$.

$$\Rightarrow \pi_i(\hat{\theta}_i, \theta_{-i}) \geq \pi_i(\theta_i, \theta_{-i})$$

If $\pi_i(\theta_i, \theta_{-i}) = 0$ then

$$\Rightarrow \pi_i(\hat{\theta}_i, \theta_{-i}) \geq \pi_i(\theta_i, \theta_{-i}) \quad \forall \hat{\theta}_i \geq \theta_i$$

$$\alpha_i(\theta_i) = \mathbb{E}_{\theta_{-i}} [\pi_i(\theta_i, \theta_{-i})] \text{ is non-decreasing}$$

Revenue

$$\mathbb{E} [\max(\varphi_1(\theta_1) \varphi_2(\theta_2) \dots \varphi_N(\theta_N), 0)]$$

$$r_i(\theta_i, \theta_{-i}) = \min \{ z_i : \varphi_i(z_i) \geq 0 \text{ and } \varphi_i(z_i) \geq \max_{j \neq i} \varphi_j(\theta_j) \}$$

r_i is the smallest valuation of the bidder i such that she is guaranteed to win the item.

$$\pi_i(\theta_i, \theta_{-i}) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } \theta_i > r_i(\theta_{-i}) \\ 0 & \text{if } \theta_i < r_i(\theta_{-i}) \end{cases}$$

$$q_i(\theta_i, \theta_{-i}) = \theta_i \pi_i(\theta_i, \theta_{-i}) - \int_0^{\theta_i} \pi_i(\theta_i, \theta_{-i}) d\theta$$

$$= \theta_i \mathbb{I}_{\theta_i > r_i} - \int_0^{\theta_i} \mathbb{I}_{\theta > r_i} d\theta$$

If $\theta_i > r_i(\theta_{-i})$ then

$$q_i(\theta_i, \theta_{-i}) = \theta_i - (\theta_i - r_i) = r_i$$

If $\theta_i < r_i$

$$q_i(\theta_i, \theta_{-i}) = 0$$

Revenue - optimal Mechanism.

① the bidder with the largest virtual valuation $\varphi_i(\theta_i)$ wins

$$\text{If } \max_j \varphi_j(\theta_j) \geq 0$$

If $\max_j \varphi_j(\theta_j) < 0$ the seller does not sell the item.

② the winner (if there is one) pays a amount equal to the smallest value that would still win

Example If f_i are all identical

$$\varphi(\theta_i) = \theta_i - \frac{1 - F(\theta_i)}{f(\theta_i)}$$

$$\begin{aligned} r_i(\theta_i) &= \min \{ z_i : \varphi(z_i) \geq 0, \varphi(z_i) \geq \max_{j \neq i} \varphi(\theta_j) \} \quad \text{由单增得到} \\ &= \min \{ z_i : z_i \geq \varphi^{-1}(0), z_i \geq \max_{j \neq i} \theta_j \} \end{aligned}$$

This is like a second price auction with a reserve price of $\varphi^{-1}(0)$.

A: $\varphi(\theta_i) < 0$

B: $\varphi(\theta_i) > 0, \varphi(\theta_i) < 0 \quad i \neq 1$