## SHANGHAI JIAO TONG UNIVERSITY DEPARTMENT OF COMPUTER SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING

## Game Theory with Computer Science Applications

Homework 1

## Due by April 9, 2024

**Problem 1.** Show that the two-player game illustrated in the following has a unique equilibrium. (Hint: Show that it has a unique pure-strategy equilibrium; then show that player 1, say, cannot put positive weight on both U and M; then show that player 1, say, cannot put positive weight on both U and D, but not on M, for instance.)

$$\begin{pmatrix} L & M & R \\ U & 1, -2, & -2, 1 & 0, 0 \\ M & -2, 1 & 1, -2 & 0, 0 \\ D & 0, 0 & 0, 0 & 1, 1 \end{pmatrix}$$

**Problem 2.** Let X and Y be subsets of some vector space. Let f(x, y) be a function from  $X \times Y$  to  $\mathbb{R}$ . Show that

$$\sup\nolimits_{x\in X}\inf\nolimits_{y\in Y}f(x,y)\leq\inf\nolimits_{y\in Y}\sup\nolimits_{x\in X}f(x,y).$$

**Problem 3.** Find a saddle point and the value of the following zero-sum game:

$$\begin{pmatrix} 4 & 3 & 1 & 4 \\ 2 & 5 & 6 & 3 \\ 1 & 0 & 7 & 0 \end{pmatrix}$$

Please show all the steps you used in obtaining the saddle point, such as the relevant LPs. If you used a computer program, please attach a copy of the program.

**Problem 4.** Repeat Problem 3 for the following matrix:

$$\begin{pmatrix}
0 & 5 & -2 \\
-3 & 0 & 4 \\
6 & -4 & 0
\end{pmatrix}$$

**Problem 5.** Find all the NE of the following two-person nonzero-sum game

**Problem 6.** Consider the following nonzero game. Let  $(x^*, y^*)$  and  $(\hat{x}, \hat{y})$  be two mixed strategy Nash equilibria of this game. Show that  $(x^*, \hat{y})$  and  $(\hat{x}, y^*)$  are also Nash equilibria. (Hint: Consider the sum of the payoffs of the two players.)

**Problem 7.** Prove Farka's Lemma. Let  $A \in \mathbb{R}^{m \times n}$  and  $b \in \mathbb{R}^{m \times 1}$ . Then exactly one of the following two conditions holds:

- (1)  $\exists x \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times 1}$  such that AX = b,  $x \ge 0$ ;
- (2)  $\exists y \in \mathbb{R}^{1 \times m}$  such that  $A^T y \ge 0$ ,  $y^T b < 0$ ;

**Problem 8.** Prove Brouwer fixed-point theorem for one-dimensional case. Let  $C \in \mathbb{R}$  be a convex, closed and bounded set. Let  $f: C \to C$  be a continuous function. Then f has a fixed point, i.e.,  $\exists x \in C$  such that x = f(x).