

# H-CON HackPlayers Conference



24 y 25 FEBRERO

MADRID 2023



WHAT THE (WNF)UCK?!

*NACHO GÓMEZ AKA NAGOMEZ*



## About Me

- Offensive Security Researcher
- (Ex) Red Team
- Windows Internals, EDR/AV evasión
- C/C++/C# <=
- Informática + Matemáticas
- @\_nag0mez



<https://pwnedcoffee.com/>






TOC



- INTRODUCCIÓN
- USER/KERNEL
- WNF STATE NAMES
- WINDOWS APIs
- WNF STRUCTURES
- WNF POTENTIAL
- (POC) PROCESS INJECTION
- (POC) DATA PERSISTENCE
- (POC) HIDING THE MICROPHONE







What the (WNF)uck?!

Nacho Gómez aka *nagomez*

**H-CON**  
**HACKPLAYERS**  
**CONFERENCE**



24 y 25 FEBRERO

MADRID 2023

# INTRODUCCIÓN





# INTRODUCCIÓN




## N WTF?


- Windows Notification Facility
- Componente kernel (ntoskrnl.exe)
- Sistema de notificaciones entre user y kernel basado en subscripciones introducido en Windows 8.
- Cualquier proceso puede suscribirse a un evento, incluso si este no existe todavía.
- Notificaciones basadas en un **StateName**
- Payloads de hasta 4KB, DACL para controlar RW
- [“Windows Notification Facility: Peeling the Onion of the Most Undocumented Kernel Attack Surface Yet”](#), Alex Ionescu + Gabrielle Viala, Black Hat 2018.





# INTRODUCCIÓN





What the (WNF)uck?!

Nacho Gómez aka *nagomez*

**H-CON**  
**HACKPLAYERS**  
**CONFERENCE**



24 y 25 FEBRERO

MADRID 2023

USER/KERNEL MODES








## User Mode

- Windows asigna un **proceso** a cada aplicación User Mode.
- Cada proceso tiene su propio **espacio de direcciones virtuales** y una tabla privada de **handles** (identificadores de objetos en kernel)
- Aislamiento entre procesos








## Kernel Mode

- Todo el código ejecutado en Kernel Mode tiene un único espacio de direcciones virtuales
- Objetos representados por **handles**
- **NTDLL** sirve como punto de “salto” entre User y Kernel.





# USER/KERNEL MODES



```
__int64 __fastcall ExQueryWnfStateData(
    _WNF_SUBSCRIPTION *subscription,
    __int64 changeStamp,
    __int64 outputBuffer,
    unsigned int *outputBufferSize)
{
    struct _KTHREAD *CurrentThread; // rax
    _WNF_NAME_INSTANCE *subscriptionName; // rax
    ntdll!NtQueryWnfStateData:
    00007ffe`9d011ba0 4c8bd1      mov     r10,rcx
    00007ffe`9d011ba3 b86e010000  mov     eax,16Eh
    00007ffe`9d011ba8 f604250803fe7f01 test    byte ptr [SharedUserData+0x308 (00000000`7ffe0308)],1
    00007ffe`9d011bb0 7503        jne     ntdll!NtQueryWnfStateData+0x15 (00007ffe`9d011bb5) Branch
    ntdll!NtQueryWnfStateData+0x12:
    00007ffe`9d011bb2 0f05        syscall
    00007ffe`9d011bb4 c3          ret
    StateData = 0;
    ExReleaseRunDownProtection_0(v9 + 1);
}
else
{
    StateData = -1073741772;
}
KeLeaveCriticalRegionThread(KeGetCurrentThread());
return (unsigned int)StateData;
}
```






## WNF DATA

- Kernel Object (almacenado en Kernel Pool) identificado por un StateName
- Se copia la información en la memoria de cada proceso (Query/Publicación)
- ACL/Security Descriptors
- Structs más adelante







What the (WNF)uck?!

Nacho Gómez aka *nagomez*

**H-CON**  
**HACKPLAYERS**  
**CONFERENCE**



24 y 25 FEBRERO

MADRID 2023

WNF STATE NAMES





## State Names

- 64-bit integer que “esconde” un struct
- StateName XOR 0x41C64E6DA3BC0074 →
- **NameLifetime**
  - Well-known - HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Notifications
  - Permanent - HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\ CurrentVersion\Notifications
  - Persistent - HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\WindowsNT\CurrentVersion\VolatileNotifications
  - Temporary - Misma vida que el proceso que los crea

```
lkd> dt nt!_WNF_STATE_NAME_STRUCT
+0x000 Version           : Pos 0, 4 Bits
+0x000 NameLifetime      : Pos 4, 2 Bits
+0x000 DataScope         : Pos 6, 4 Bits
+0x000 PermanentData     : Pos 10, 1 Bit
+0x000 Sequence          : Pos 11, 53 Bits
```

```
lkd> dt nt!_WNF_STATE_NAME_LIFETIME
WnfWellKnownStateName = 0n0
WnfPermanentStateName = 0n1
WnfPersistentStateName = 0n2
WnfTemporaryStateName = 0n3
```





# WNF STATE NAMES



C:\Windows\System32\ContentDeliveryManager.Utilities.dll

```
IDA View-A  Hex View-1  Strings  Structures  Enums  Imports

.rdata:0000000180116878      text "UTF-16LE", 'WNF_BOOT_DIRTY_SHUTDOWN',0
.rdata:00000001801168A8      align 10h
.rdata:00000001801168B0 aNotificationTh_4:          ; DATA XREF: .rdata:00000001800F4EA0↑to
.rdata:00000001801168B0      text "UTF-16LE", 'Notification that a Call URI (scheme:id) command ha'
.rdata:00000001801168B0      text "UTF-16LE", 's been recieved from the remote Call Control Client'
.rdata:00000001801168B0      text "UTF-16LE", '. BthAvctpSvc can publish anytime.',0
.rdata:00000001801169C2      align 10h
.rdata:00000001801169D0 aWnfBlthBluetoo_1:          ; DATA XREF: .rdata:00000001800F4E98↑to
.rdata:00000001801169D0      text "UTF-16LE", 'WNF_BLTH_BLUETOOTH_CCP_SERVER_DIAL',0
.rdata:0000000180116A16      align 20h
.rdata:0000000180116A20 aTheStateReflec:          ; DATA XREF: .rdata:00000001800F4EE8↑to
.rdata:0000000180116A20      text "UTF-16LE", 'The state reflects memory partiton restoration stat'
.rdata:0000000180116A20      text "UTF-16LE", 'e (nothing to restore, restore in progress, restore'
.rdata:0000000180116A20      text "UTF-16LE", ' completed, failure)',0
.rdata:0000000180116B16      align 20h
.rdata:0000000180116B20 aWnfBootMemoryP:          ; DATA XREF: .rdata:00000001800F4EE0↑to
.rdata:0000000180116B20      text "UTF-16LE", 'WNF_BOOT_MEMORY_PARTITIONS_RESTORE',0
.rdata:0000000180116B66      align 10h
.rdata:0000000180116B70 aTheStateIsPubl:          ; DATA XREF: .rdata:00000001800F4ED0↑to
.rdata:0000000180116B70      text "UTF-16LE", 'The state is published if system time is initialize'
.rdata:0000000180116B70      text "UTF-16LE", 'd with a backup time source.',0
.rdata:0000000180116C10 aWnfBootInvalid:          ; DATA XREF: .rdata:00000001800F4EC8↑to
.rdata:0000000180116C10      text "UTF-16LE", 'WNF_BOOT_INVALID_TIME_SOURCE',0
.rdata:0000000180116C4A      align 10h
.rdata:0000000180116C50 aBackgroundWork_0:          ; DATA XREF: .rdata:00000001800F4F18↑to
```







## Data Scopes & Permissions

- Quién puede acceder
- *System, session (sess ID), user (SID), process (EPROCESS address) o machine scopes*

```
lkd> dt nt!_WNF_DATA_SCOPE
WnfDataScopeSystem = 0n0
WnfDataScopeSession = 0n1
WnfDataScopeUser = 0n2
WnfDataScopeProcess = 0n3
WnfDataScopeMachine = 0n4
WnfDataScopePhysicalMachine = 0n5
```

StateName		Security Descriptor
00840B3AA3BC0075	REG_BINARY	01 00 04 80 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 14 00 00 00 02 00 00 00 03 00 00 00 00 00 14 00 03 00 00 00 01 ...
00840B3AA3BC1075	REG_BINARY	01 00 04 80 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 14 00 00 00 02 00 88 00 05 00 00 00 00 00 14 00 03 00 00 00 01 ...
0096003DA3BC0875	REG_BINARY	01 00 04 80 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 14 00 00 00 02 00 34 00 02 00 00 00 00 00 18 00 01 00 00 00 01 ...
0096003DA3BC1035	REG_BINARY	01 00 04 80 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 14 00 00 00 02 00 34 00 02 00 00 00 00 00 18 00 01 00 00 00 01 ...
0096003DA3BC1875	REG_BINARY	01 00 04 80 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 14 00 00 00 02 00 34 00 02 00 00 00 00 00 18 00 01 00 00 00 01 ...





# WNF STATE NAMES



WNF State Name	Data Scope	Lifetime	Permanent	Perms	MaxSize
WNF_WEBA_CTAP_DEVICE_STATE	SYSTEM	WELL_KNOWN	False	RO	12
WNF_WEBA_CTAP_DEVICE_CHANGE_NOTIFY	SYSTEM	WELL_KNOWN	False	RO	4
WNF_PNPA_DEVNODES_CHANGED	SYSTEM	WELL_KNOWN	False	RO	0
WNF_PNPA_DEVNODES_CHANGED_SESSION	SESSION	WELL_KNOWN	False	RO	0
WNF_PNPA_VOLUMES_CHANGED	SYSTEM	WELL_KNOWN	False	RO	0
WNF_PNPA_VOLUMES_CHANGED_SESSION	SESSION	WELL_KNOWN	False	RO	0
WNF_PNPA_HARDWAREPROFILES_CHANGED	SYSTEM	WELL_KNOWN	False	RO	16
WNF_PNPA_HARDWAREPROFILES_CHANGED_SESSION	SESSION	WELL_KNOWN	False	RO	16
WNF_PNPA_PORTS_CHANGED	SYSTEM	WELL_KNOWN	False	RO	64
WNF_PNPA_PORTS_CHANGED_SESSION	SESSION	WELL_KNOWN	False	RO	64
WNF_CMFC_FEATURE_CONFIGURATION_CHANGED	SYSTEM	WELL_KNOWN	False	RO	8
180147483945210165	PHYSICAL_MACHINE	WELL_KNOWN	False	N/A	8
WNF_AUDC_CPASET_ID	PROCESS	WELL_KNOWN	False	RO	16
WNF_AUDC_PHONECALL_ACTIVE	SYSTEM	WELL_KNOWN	False	RO	4
WNF_AUDC_TUNER_DEVICE_AVAILABILITY	SYSTEM	WELL_KNOWN	False	RO	4
WNF_AUDC_HEALTH_PROBLEM	SYSTEM	WELL_KNOWN	False	RO	16
WNF_AUDC_CPASET_ID_SYSTEM	SYSTEM	WELL_KNOWN	False	N/A	4
WNF_AUDC_RENDER	SYSTEM	WELL_KNOWN	False	RO	4096
WNF_AUDC_VOLUME_CONTEXT	SYSTEM	WELL_KNOWN	False	RO	4096
WNF_AUDC_CAPTURE	SYSTEM	WELL_KNOWN	False	RO	4096
WNF_AUDC_RINGERVIBRATE_STATE_CHANGED	SYSTEM	WELL_KNOWN	False	RO	4
WNF_AUDC_SPATIAL_STATUS	SYSTEM	WELL_KNOWN	False	RO	4096
WNF_AUDC_DEFAULT_RENDER_ENDPOINT_PROPERTIES	SYSTEM	WELL_KNOWN	False	RO	256
WNF_AUDC_CHAT_APP_CONTEXT	SYSTEM	WELL_KNOWN	False	RO	4096
WNF_AUDC_VAM_ACTIVE	SYSTEM	WELL_KNOWN	False	RO	4
WNF_AUDC_POSTURE	SYSTEM	WELL_KNOWN	False	RW	128
WNF_AUDC_ORIENTATION	SYSTEM	WELL_KNOWN	False	RW	4
WNF_EXEC_OSTASKCOMPLETION_REVOKED	SYSTEM	WELL_KNOWN	False	RW	8





# WNF STATE NAMES



Administrador: Símbolo del sistema

```
C:\Users\Nacho\Desktop\WNFuck\WNFuck\WNFGetStateNameInfo\bin\Debug>WNFGetStateNameInfo.exe
```

WNF State Name	Data Scope	Lifetime	Permanent	Perms	MaxSize
WNF_WEBA_CTAP_DEVICE_STATE	SYSTEM	WELL_KNOWN	False	RW	12
WNF_WEBA_CTAP_DEVICE_CHANGE_NOTIFY	SYSTEM	WELL_KNOWN	False	RW	4
WNF_PNPA_DEVNODS_CHANGED	SYSTEM	WELL_KNOWN	False	RO	0
WNF_PNPA_DEVNODS_CHANGED_SESSION	SESSION	WELL_KNOWN	False	RO	0
WNF_PNPA_VOLUMES_CHANGED	SYSTEM	WELL_KNOWN	False	RO	0
WNF_PNPA_VOLUMES_CHANGED_SESSION	SESSION	WELL_KNOWN	False	RO	0
WNF_PNPA_HARDWAREPROFILES_CHANGED	SYSTEM	WELL_KNOWN	False	RO	16
WNF_PNPA_HARDWAREPROFILES_CHANGED_SESSION	SESSION	WELL_KNOWN	False	RO	16
WNF_PNPA_PORTS_CHANGED	SYSTEM	WELL_KNOWN	False	RO	64
WNF_PNPA_PORTS_CHANGED_SESSION	SESSION	WELL_KNOWN	False	RO	64
WNF_CMFC_FEATURE_CONFIGURATION_CHANGED	SYSTEM	WELL_KNOWN	False	RO	8
180147483945210165	PHYSICAL_MACHINE	WELL_KNOWN	False	N/A	8
WNF_AUDC_CPUSET_ID	PROCESS	WELL_KNOWN	False	RO	16
WNF_AUDC_PHONECALL_ACTIVE	SYSTEM	WELL_KNOWN	False	RO	4
WNF_AUDC_TUNER_DEVICE_AVAILABILITY	SYSTEM	WELL_KNOWN	False	RO	4
WNF_AUDC_HEALTH_PROBLEM	SYSTEM	WELL_KNOWN	False	RO	16
WNF_AUDC_CPUSET_ID_SYSTEM	SYSTEM	WELL_KNOWN	False	N/A	4
WNF_AUDC_RENDER	SYSTEM	WELL_KNOWN	False	RO	4096
WNF_AUDC_VOLUME_CONTEXT	SYSTEM	WELL_KNOWN	False	RO	4096
WNF_AUDC_CAPTURE	SYSTEM	WELL_KNOWN	False	RO	4096
WNF_AUDC_RINGERVIBRATE_STATE_CHANGED	SYSTEM	WELL_KNOWN	False	RO	4
WNF_AUDC_SPATIAL_STATUS	SYSTEM	WELL_KNOWN	False	RO	4096
WNF_AUDC_DEFAULT_RENDER_ENDPOINT_PROPERTIES	SYSTEM	WELL_KNOWN	False	RO	256
WNF_AUDC_CHAT_APP_CONTEXT	SYSTEM	WELL_KNOWN	False	RO	4096
WNF_AUDC_VAM_ACTIVE	SYSTEM	WELL_KNOWN	False	RO	4
WNF_AUDC_POSTURE	SYSTEM	WELL_KNOWN	False	RW	128







# WNF STATE NAMES




WNF State Name	Data Scope	Lifetime	Permanent	Perms	MaxSize
WNF_AUDC_CAPTURE	SYSTEM	WELL_KNOWN	False	RO	4096
Security descriptor: D:(A;;CC;;;AU)(A;;CC;;;LS)(A;;CC;;;SY)(A;;CCDC;;;S-1-5-80-2676549577-1911656217-2625096541-4178041876-1366760775)(A;;CC;;;AC)					

WNF\_AUDC\_CAPTURE únicamente tiene RW para el servicio AudioSrv

```
C:\Windows\System32>sc showsid AudioSrv  
  
NOMBRE: AudioSrv  
SID DE SERVICIO: S-1-5-80-2676549577-1911656217-2625096541-4178041876-1366760775  
ESTADO: Activo
```





What the (WNF)uck?!

Nacho Gómez aka *nagomez*

# H-CON HackPlayers Conference



24 y 25 FEBRERO

MADRID 2023

## WINDOWS APIs





## Publishing Data

```
[DllImport("ntdll.dll", SetLastError = true)]
public static extern NTSTATUS NtUpdateWnfStateData(
    in ulong StateName,
    byte[] Buffer,
    int Length, // Less than MaximumSize, always less than 4096
    IntPtr TypeId,
    IntPtr ExplicitScope,
    int MatchingChangeScope, // Last TimeStamp
    int CheckStamp); // If 1, publish only if MatchingChangeScope is valid
```

Check Client Demo. Also NtDeleteWnfStateData







## CAUTION WHEN POKING AROUND!



- WNF se usa activamente en Windows 10/11.
- Al publicar una notificación, sobrescribes su estado previo (puede que aún no haya sido consumido).
- También aumenta el stamp, por lo que si algún proceso intenta publicar comprobando el stamp previo, fallará.
- Es posible dejar el SO en un estado difícil de recuperar! (Especialmente EXPLORER.EXE)





## Querying Data

```
[DllImport("ntdll.dll")]  
public static extern NTSTATUS NtQueryWnfStateData(  
    in ulong StateName,  
    IntPtr TypeId,  
    IntPtr ExplicitScope,  
    out int ChangeStamp,  
    byte[] Buffer, // Output  
    out int BufferSize);
```

Check Consumer Demo





## Creating Names

```
[DllImport("ntdll.dll")]  
public static extern NTSTATUS NtCreateWnfStateName(  
    out ulong StateName,  
    WNF_STATE_NAME_LIFETIME NameLifetime,  
    WNF_DATA_SCOPE DataScope,  
    bool PersistData,  
    IntPtr TypeId,  
    int MaximumStateSize,  
    SafeMemoryHandle SecurityDescriptor);
```

Check CreateTemporaryName Demo. Also NtDeleteWnfStateName







## Subscribing To State Changes

```
[DllImport("ntdll.dll")]  
public static extern NTSTATUS RtlSubscribeWnfStateChangeNotification(  
    out IntPtr Subscription,  
    ulong StateName,  
    int ChangeStamp,  
    IntPtr Callback,  
    IntPtr CallbackContext,  
    IntPtr TypeId,  
    int SerializationGroup,  
    int Unknown);
```

Check Server Demo





## Callback Prototype

```
[UnmanagedFunctionPointer(CallingConvention.StdCall)]  
private delegate NTSTATUS CallbackDelegate(  
    ulong StateName,  
    int ChangeStamp,  
    IntPtr TypeId,  
    IntPtr CallbackContext,  
    IntPtr Buffer,  
    int BufferSize);
```






## Unsubscribing

```
[DllImport("ntdll.dll")]  
public static extern NTSTATUS RtlUnsubscribeWnfStateChangeNotification(  
    IntPtr Subscription);
```







What the (WNF)uck?!

Nacho Gómez aka *nagomez*

**H-CON**  
**HACKPLAYERS**  
**CONFERENCE**



24 y 25 FEBRERO

MADRID 2023

WNF STRUCTURES






# WNF STRUCTURES



```
//0xa8 bytes (sizeof)
struct _WNF_NAME_INSTANCE
{
    struct _WNF_NODE_HEADER Header;
    struct _EX_RUNDOWN_REF RunRef;
    struct RTL_BALANCED_NODE TreeLinks;
    struct _WNF_STATE_NAME_STRUCT StateName;
    struct _WNF_SCOPE_INSTANCE* ScopeInstance;
    struct _WNF_STATE_NAME_REGISTRATION StateNameInfo;
    struct WNF_LOCK StateDataLock;
    struct _WNF_STATE_DATA* StateData;
    ULONG CurrentChangeStamp;
    VOID* PermanentDataStore;
    struct _WNF_LOCK StateSubscriptionListLock;
    struct _LIST_ENTRY StateSubscriptionListHead;
    struct _LIST_ENTRY TemporaryNameListEntry;
    struct _EPROCESS* CreatorProcess;
    LONG DataSubscribersCount;
    LONG CurrentDeliveryCount;
};
```

```
lkd> dt nt!_WNF_STATE_NAME_STRUCT
+0x000 Version          : Pos 0, 4 Bits
+0x000 NameLifetime     : Pos 4, 2 Bits
+0x000 DataScope        : Pos 6, 4 Bits
+0x000 PermanentData    : Pos 10, 1 Bit
+0x000 Sequence         : Pos 11, 53 Bits
```

```
//0x10 bytes (sizeof)
struct _WNF_STATE_DATA
{
    struct _WNF_NODE_HEADER Header;
    ULONG AllocatedSize;
    ULONG DataSize;
    ULONG ChangeStamp;
};
```






# WNF STRUCTURES



```
if ( a1->StateData || !a1->PermanentDataStore )
    return 0i64;
MaxStateSize = a1->StateNameInfo.MaxStateSize;
allocSize = MaxStateSize + 16;           // Size of Data + sizeof(_WNF_STATE_DATA)
while ( 1 )
{
    Pool2 = (_WNF_STATE_DATA *)ExAllocatePool2(0x100i64, allocSize, 543583831i64);
    if ( !Pool2 )
        return 3221225626i64;
```







## \_WNF\_SUBSCRIPTION\_TABLE

```
public struct WNF_SUBSCRIPTION_TABLE64_WIN11
{
    public WNF_CONTEXT_HEADER Header;
    public long NamesTableLock;
    public RTL_RB_TREE64 NamesTableEntry;
    public LIST_ENTRY64 SerializationGroupListHead;
    public long SerializationGroupLock;
    public int[] Unknown1;
    public int SubscribedEventSet;
    public int[] Unknown2;
    public long Timer;
    public ulong TimerDueTime;
}
```

```
[StructLayout(LayoutKind.Sequential)]
internal struct WNF_CONTEXT_HEADER
{
    public short NodeTypeCode; // 0x911
    public short NodeByteSize;
}
```

WNF\_NAME\_SUBSCRIPTION[] (Win10)  
RTL\_RB\_TREE, Red-Black Tree (Win11)



Para encontrar la tabla podemos recorrer el Heap de NTDLL leyendo estructuras sizeof(WNF\_SUBSCRIPTION\_TABLE) y comparando el valor del NodeTypeCode con 0x911





## \_WNF\_NAME\_SUBSCRIPTION

```
public struct WNF_NAME_SUBSCRIPTION64_WIN11
{
```

```
    public WNF_CONTEXT_HEADER Header;
```

```
    public ulong SubscriptionId;
```

```
    public ulong StateName;
```

```
    public uint CurrentChangeStamp;
```

```
    public RTL_BALANCED_NODE64 NamesTableEntry;
```

```
    public long TypeId;
```

```
    public long SubscriptionLock;
```

```
    public LIST_ENTRY64 SubscriptionsListHead;
```

```
    public uint NormalDeliverySubscriptions;
```

```
    public uint[] NotificationTypeCount;
```

```
    public long RetryDescriptor;
```

```
    public uint DeliveryState;
```

```
    public ulong ReliableRetryTime;
```

```
}
```

← \_WNF\_SUBSCRIPTION\_TABLE -> NamesTableEntry -> Root

→ \_WNF\_USER\_SUBSCRIPTION List



La propiedad NamesTableEntry es un nodo balanceado que apunta a las siguientes \_WNF\_NAME\_SUBSCRIPTIONS, por lo que podemos recorrer el árbol. Todas las referencias apuntan a esta propiedad, así que es necesario restar el offset.





## \_WNF\_USER\_SUBSCRIPTION

```
internal struct WNF_USER_SUBSCRIPTION64
```

```
{  
    public WNF_CONTEXT_HEADER Header;  
    public LIST_ENTRY64 SubscriptionsListEntry;  
    public long NamesSubscription;  
    public long Callback;  
    public long CallbackContext;  
    public ulong SubProcessTag;  
    public uint CurrentChangeStamp;  
    public uint DeliveryOptions;  
    public uint SubscribedEventSet;  
    public long SerializationGroup;  
    public uint UserSubscriptionCount;  
    public ulong[] Unknown;  
}
```

```
[+] Trying to get WNF subscriptions for process EXPLORER  
  
[+] Subscription table at 0x00000000051BD20  
[+] Root Name Subscription at 0x000000000051C190  
  
[+] WNF_CMFC_FEATURE_CONFIGURATION_CHANGED @ 0x000000000051C190  
    -> Callback @ 0x140727445220768 | Context @ 0x140727446089184  
  
[+] WNF_DWM_DUMP_REQUEST @ 0x0000000000523670  
    -> Callback @ 0x140701565362432 | Context @ 0x5368464  
  
[+] WNF_CDP_CDPUSERSVC_READY @ 0x000000000037A7360  
    -> Callback @ 0x140726640557488 | Context @ 0x203406672  
    -> Callback @ 0x140726640557488 | Context @ 0x330979296  
  
[+] WNF_DX_MODE_CHANGE_NOTIFICATION @ 0x0000000000367FCF0  
    -> Callback @ 0x140727411869296 | Context @ 0x56536304  
    -> Callback @ 0x140727123607488 | Context @ 0x140727124111200  
    -> Callback @ 0x140727123753392 | Context @ 0x61134048  
    -> Callback @ 0x140727123753392 | Context @ 0x390264192  
  
[+] WNF_SPI_LOGICALDPIOVERRIDE @ 0x00000000003680740  
    -> Callback @ 0x140727411869296 | Context @ 0x56536304  
  
[+] WNF_HOLO_USER_DISPLAY_CONTEXT @ 0x000000000037645F0  
    -> Callback @ 0x140726347204288 | Context @ 0x57074416  
    -> Callback @ 0x140726347204288 | Context @ 0x57075280  
    -> Callback @ 0x140726347204288 | Context @ 0x55965504  
    -> Callback @ 0x140726558496400 | Context @ 0x61050208  
  
[+] WNF_IMSN_MONITORMODECHANGED @ 0x00000000003765460  
    -> Callback @ 0x140726523357968 | Context @ 0x54891008
```



Estructura que almacena los callbacks y sus contextos. SubscriptionsListEntry contiene un flink apuntando a la siguiente \_WNF\_USER\_SUBSCRIPTION. El proyecto BasicDemo-CallbackParser puede enumerar las callbacks para un proceso.









# WNF STRUCTURES



## PROCESS





What the (WNF)uck?!

Nacho Gómez aka *nagomez*

# H-CON HackPlayers Conference



24 y 25 FEBRERO

MADRID 2023

## WNF POTENTIAL






## What?

- DoS: por ejemplo, EXPLORER.EXE
- Activar/Desactivar Windows Insider Features (<https://github.com/riverar/mach2>)
- Forzar comportamientos inesperados (ocultar icono del micrófono, entre otros)
- Obtención de información por vías alternativas (WNF\_EDGE\_LAST\_NAVIGATED\_HOST)
- Inter-Process Communication
- Process Injection evitando la secuencia Alloc-Protect-CreateThread (Demo)
- Persistencia de datos fuera de memoria (Demo)
- Fuzzing para encontrar DoS, LPEs o incluso Kernel bugs







What the (WNF)uck?!

Nacho Gómez aka *nagomez*

# H-CON HACKPLAYERS CONFERENCE



24 y 25 FEBRERO

MADRID 2023

## WNF INJECTION





# WNF INJECTION



## How?

1. Encuentra UserSubscriptions para el StateName que uses como trigger
2. VirtualAllocEx(RX) + WriteProcessMemory para copiar shellcode al proceso objetivo
3. Modifica los callbacks para el stateName que quieras usar para que apunten a tu shellcode
4. NtUpdateWnfStateName para comenzar el trigger
5. Cleanup

**DEMO**





## Características

- Evita el uso de CreateThread u otras técnicas de ejecución comunes
- Se ejecuta en threads creados legítimamente
- No ETW!
- Difícil de “trazar”
- Es posible “publicar” el shellcode para que lo reciba un callback del proceso objetivo, por lo que podría llegar a ser posible evitar el VirtualAllocEx + WriteProcessMemory (requiere más research)








## Detección

- Shellcode no respaldado en disco

0x2f70000	Mapped: Commit	56 kB	R	C:\Windows\System32\en-US\dsreg.dll...	
0x2f80000	Private: Commit	4 kB	RX		← Injected callback
0x2f90000	Image: Commit	12 kB	R	C:\Windows\System32\imageres.dll	
0x7ffc034e0000	Image: Commit	4 kB	R	C:\Windows\SystemApps\MicrosoftWindows.Client.Core_cw5n1h2tx...	
0x7ffc034e1000	Image: Commit	3,952 kB	RX	C:\Windows\SystemApps\MicrosoftWindows.Client.Core_cw5n1h2tx...	← Original callback
0x7ffc038bd000	Image: Commit	672 kB	R	C:\Windows\SystemApps\MicrosoftWindows.Client.Core_cw5n1h2tx...	
...					

- VirtualAllocEx + WriteProcessMemory sigue siendo algo habitual





What the (WNF)uck?!

Nacho Gómez aka *nagomez*

**H-CON**  
**HACKPLAYERS**  
**CONFERENCE**



24 y 25 FEBRERO

MADRID 2023

WNF DATA PERSISTENCE





# WNF DATA PERSISTENCE



## How?

1. Crea tantos temporary State Names como necesites para abarcar todo el conjunto de datos
2. Elige un WellKnown StateName para almacenar la lista de temporary StateNames generados
3. Divide el conjunto de datos en chunks de 4096 bytes y usa NtUpdateWnfStateData para publicarlos
4. Cuando quieras acceder a los datos, lee la lista de temporary StateNames desde el WellKnown que hayas elegido y usa NtQueryWnfStateData para obtener los chunks uno a uno
5. Cleanup

WNF\_XBOX\_ACHIEVEMENTS\_RAW\_  
NOTIFICATION\_RECEIVED

0x41C64E6DA78A10C5  
0x41C64E6DA78AD0C5  
0x41C64E6DA78AD8C5  
0x41C64E6DA78AE8C5

0x41C64E6DA78A10C5

data\_chunk\_1

0x41C64E6DA78AD0C5

data\_chunk\_2

0x41C64E6DA78AD8C5

data\_chunk\_3








# WNF DATA PERSISTENCE



## Características

- Almacenamiento de datos en “kernel” (no toca disco, no ocupa memoria de proceso)
- “Difícil” de detectar
- Es posible Comprimir/Cifrar
- Puedes usar distintos WellKnown StateNames
- Inter-Processes





What the (WNF)uck?!

Nacho Gómez aka *nagomez*

**H-CON**  
**HACKPLAYERS**  
**CONFERENCE**



24 y 25 FEBRERO

MADRID 2023

# HIDING THE MICROPHONE





# HIDING THE MICROPHONE




## How?

1. `WNF_AUDCAPTURE / WNF_CAM_MICROPHONE_USAGE_CHANGED`
2. Explorer está suscrita a estos dos eventos. Los callbacks son los encargados de mostrar el icono del micrófono.
3. Si “cruzas los cables” y apuntas en los callbacks a otros, no hagan nada”, el icono nunca aparecerá
4. Siempre hay que advertirlos







What the (WNF)uck?!

Nacho Gómez aka *nagomez*

**H-CON**  
**HACKPLAYERS**  
**CONFERENCE**



24 y 25 FEBRERO

MADRID 2023

REFERENCIAS






# REFERENCIAS



## Referencias

- [“Windows Notification Facility: Peeling the Onion of the Most Undocumented Kernel Attack Surface Yet”](#), Alex Ionescu + Gabrielle Viala, Black Hat 2018.
- <https://blog.quarkslab.com/playing-with-the-windows-notification-facility-wnf.html>
- <https://modexp.wordpress.com/2019/06/15/4083/>
- <http://redplait.blogspot.com/2019/01/wnf-ids-from-w10-build-18312.html>
- <https://github.com/riverar/mach2>





What the (WNF)uck?!

Nacho Gómez aka *nagomez*

# H-CON HackPlayers Conference



# THANKS!



24 y 25 FEBRERO

MADRID 2023





## Hackplayers cOnference

Sending SIGKILL to all processes.  
Please stand by while rebooting the system.  
[64857.521348] sd 0:0:0:0: [sda] Synchronizing SCSI cache  
[64857.522838] Restarting system.

—

[www.h-con.com](http://www.h-con.com)