Case Studies as Narratives: Reflections Prompted by the Case of Victor, the Wild Child of Aveyron

Journal of Management Inquiry
2019, Vol. 28(4) 403–408
© The Author(s) 2017
Article reuse guidelines:
sagepub.com/journals-permissions
DOI: 10.1177/1056492617715522
journals.sagepub.com/home/jmi
SAGE

Yiannis Gabriel[1,2]

Abstract

Drawing on a celebrated case study of a feral child in France, the author argues that there are similarities between stories and case studies as types of narrative and that they are both capable of acting as insightful tools of management inquiry. Both case studies and stories call for narrative imagination to develop *meaningful* narratives. Serendipity, the accidental discovery of meaning or purpose in what seems random and purposeless, is an important part of narrative imagination. As meaningful narratives, both case studies and stories follow a structure of interwoven actions and events with beginnings, middles, and ends. However, where storytellers enjoy poetic license to distort facts for effect, case study researchers are more constrained by factual accuracy. The beginnings and ends of case studies are not as clearly defined as those of stories and fictional narratives.

Keywords

case study, story, management learning, narrative, feral children, serendipity, narrative imagination, affordance theory

I am sitting in a friend's office in Berkeley, just prior to delivering a lecture. The topic of my lecture is nostalgia, an emotion that I cannot help but experience as I am revisiting my alma mater. I pick up a book from his library more or less at random, and am interested to notice that the book refers to the case of Victor, the wild child of Aveyron, a 12-year-old boy who was discovered in the wild, ostensibly brought up by wolves, and untainted by the benefits and burdens of human culture.

This is a case that has long interested me. But my fascination with the book increases dramatically when I notice on the book's first page the signature of Herbert Blumer, the book's original owner. In 1975, as a PhD student at Berkeley, I had had a few contacts with Blumer, an impressive figure in American sociology whose symbolic interactionism had fallen behind the then more fashionable and radical trends.

Perusing the book prompted some thoughts on case studies and their uses in social science and management research. It prompted me to reflect on what attracts scientific interest to a case study and some of the strengths and limitations of the cases we use as researchers and also as teachers. In particular, it prompted me to reflect on some of the similarities and differences between case studies and stories, both of which are types of narrative even if they are governed by different rules of narration and different narrative contracts between authors and audiences. Both case studies and stories are capable of yielding considerable insights within the framework of a narrative methodology; in the hands of skilled instructors, they can be powerful instruments for disseminating knowledge. This essay, however, argues that where storytellers enjoy considerable poetic licence to distort facts for effect, factual accuracy remains a vital constraint for researchers who seek to make use of case studies to develop knowledge.

Victor was the most famous of several "feral children," children who were found living in the wild, with no human contact or care. He was discovered in the French region of Aveyron in 1798, a mere 9 years after the French Revolution. He was virtually naked, making wolf-like noises, walking on all fours and apparently having no sense of hot or cold. He quickly generated an interest in the scientific community "as a case," a human animal that had missed out on what philosopher Louis Althusser (1971) once called the "long forced march of becoming human."

Victor was "adopted" by French physician Jean Marc Gaspar Itard who, over a period of 5 years, studied his behavior and conducted a number of experiments with him. This is all described in a detailed report that Itard (1801/2009) compiled for the Government. This was the centrepiece of Herbert Blumer's book and formed the basis for a subsequent

[1]University of Bath, UK
[2]Lund University, Sweden

Corresponding Author:
Yiannis Gabriel, University of Bath, Claverton Down, Bath BA2 7AY, UK.
Email: y.gabriel@bath.ac.uk

film by François Truffaut. Reading the chronicle today reveals as much about Itard as it does about the boy. It tells us what he found interesting as a scientist in the case and what aroused his enthusiasm. The chronicle also reveals Itard's feelings for the boy, his genuine desire to draw him back to a membership of the human family and his increasing exasperation as he "discovered" that the boy had missed out on the process of socialization and would never be able to speak. Victor only managed two words over the entire 5 years, "milk" and "my God."

In Truffaut's film, where the role of Itard is played by Truffaut himself, we have an imaginative fictionalization of the boy's story which seeks to stay loyal to the facts or at least the chronicle—telling it "as it happened." Again, however, looking at the 1970 film, we quickly realize that we are seeing the case through the eyes of a brilliant cinematographer and a New Wave aesthetic.

With every retelling, the case seems to change, the characters of its principal protagonists redefined. So, what attracted scientific attention to the case of Victor in the first place? And what can his case and the way it was investigated teach us about the use of case studies in social science research?

Feral children have long exercised a fascination on people, from Remus and Romulus, the mythical founders of Rome, to Tarzan, and Rudyard Kipling's Mowgli. Scientific interest in these children during the Age of Enlightenment was tied to the idea of the noble savage, a concept that rose in the aftermath of the European "discovery" of America. This concept that can be traced to Michel de Montaigne's (1993) famous essay "Cannibals" and later to the work of prominent Enlightenment figures like Denis Diderot (1963) and more indirectly Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1984). What is it that makes us distinctly human and what differentiates us from other animals? Could Victor, this wild creature making wolf-like noises, be the embodiment of the noble savage who had escaped what was oppressive and rotten about "civilized" society? Or could it be that this boy devoid of culture was just as a complete idiot, a piece of nature, or as Geert Hofstede (1991) might have said a computer with no software? Alternatively, might Victor have been a congenital idiot, unwanted and abandoned by his parents on account of some physical or mental disorder (the boy suffered from a deformed knee)? Above all, perhaps, could the case of Victor help explain what makes a "normal" person human as distinct from other animals?

Itard himself carried out a number of "scientific" experiments and concluded that Victor was neither mute nor deaf, although he found it difficult to recognize particular "cultural" sounds, including voices. He would respond to the rustling of leaves but not to the banging of a door. He was particularly excited by what he saw as his ability to cultivate the boy's moral impulse, his ability to distinguish between right and wrong. In one of the most interesting and revealing sections of the chronicle, he describes inflicting on Victor an unjust punishment and confining him to a dark cabinet. Victor, who had earlier accepted punishments as part of a regime to educate him, rebelled when the punishment was inflicted unjustly and arbitrarily and, in a fit of indignant fury, bit the hand of his instructor.

> How sweet it would have been for me to explain to my pupil that the pain of his bite filled my soul with satisfaction and compensated me for all my troubles! How could I not rejoice? This was a very legitimate act of vengeance; it was incontestable proof that the sentiment of justice and injustice, that eternal basis of the social order, was far from alien to the heart of my pupil. By returning to him this feeling, or assisting in its development, I had just elevated the wild man to the full height of a moral man by the most distinctive of his characteristics and the noblest of his powers. (Itard, 1801/2009, pp. 135-136)

Interest in the case of Victor continues to this day. In 2007, French physician Serge Aroles (2007) analysed virtually every known case of feral or abandoned children and concluded that nearly all of them were abandoned much later than claimed, often on account of some disability.[1] Children of less than six years of age cannot survive by themselves in the wild, he claims, and the likelihood is that Victor was abandoned by his parents and/or his carers at a later stage than originally claimed. His injuries were not inflicted while living in the wild but, much more likely, by those supposedly caring for him. It is for this reason, that Aroles reinvents Victor not as a wild child but as a "martyr child."

From my own point of view, there is a detail of Victor's story that attracted my attention. Victor, we know, lived to the age of 40, long after Itard had moved on to other areas of research. Where did Victor die? In the home of Madame Guerin, the woman who had cared for him while he was under observation by Itard, someone whose compassion and empathy for the boy, unlike those of the scientists, was not motivated by a desire to understand or explain him. She had formed a special bond with the boy notably after the death of her husband, a bond that persisted long after the scientific community and Parisian society had lost interest in him.

This then is the case of Victor. In the first instance, it belongs to the genre of abnormal or atypical cases, maybe even what would count as a revelatory case (Yin, 2003). Its attraction lies in its promise to help understand what is regarded as normal by examining what seems patently abnormal or pathological. As Berlant (2007) noted such a case represents an "irritating obstacle to clarity", a singularity that challenges our tacit assumptions of what is normal (p. 663). But it also represents an opportunity, the starting point of an investigation into a mystery (Alvesson & Kärreman, 2007) whose resolution may restore clarity, albeit under different assumptions.

This is the logic of inquiry that characterized the interest of neurologists and psychologists like Charcot, Janet, and

Freud in various cases of mental disorders as a means of understanding the mental functioning of "normal" people. This is substantially achieved by comparing different aspects of the abnormal and the normal and discovering that the differences between the two are not as extreme as previously thought, or that normal and abnormal instead of being ends of a continuum are ideal types against which actual cases may be measured.

We could even further and argue that the case of Victor epitomizes the logic that can be found in business and management case studies, whether used for teaching or research purposes, where the aberrant or atypical is used as a means of understanding the typical. The atypical case, like the case of Victor, frequently prompts us to question a variety of assumptions, especially assumptions regarding differentiates the normal from the abnormal. This is what makes such cases highly generative in scientific terms. A single aberrant case may prompt greater breakthroughs than large numbers of more conventional ones. In line with Eisenhardt's (1989) arguments, a case like Victor's can help us question some of our core assumptions and sharpen our core concepts (including those of normal and abnormal), identify emergent relations, especially about critical factors that account for the differences between the normal and the aberrant, and test existing theories against more recalcitrant cases.

But what exactly constitutes a case? What makes it part of a class or cluster of cases in spite of the features that make it unique and different from them? For example, does Victor belong to the same type of case as that of Marie-Angelique, another child discovered in the wild in France, who displayed vastly different qualities from Victor and who was the subject of a detailed analysis by Aroles (2007). And how far can the learnings from a single case be transferred or generalized to other cases?

It is telling to probe the meaning of the word "case" in English, a term that has two distinct meanings which overlap but have different etymological origins. A case can be as a singularity, an individual occurrence, an event or a phenomenon. Such a case attracts attention as a deviation from what is seen as routine or normal—an illness, a crime, an accident, a disruptive child can all be viewed as cases. In this way, a doctor, a detective or a social worker may have a caseload, a set of different cases, each with its own peculiarities and challenges but all capable of being handled with the same toolkit of techniques, concepts, and expertise.

A case can also be a container, a box, a briefcase, a suitcase. This has both a fortunate and an unfortunate consequence for case studies. Like a briefcase, a case study contains material that may or may not have value. Discovering such a case immediately announces a mystery—what does it contain, who does it belong to, what does it reveal? The value of a case study, like the value of the contents of a briefcase, relies on the ability of a subject to *recognize* them. An innocent eye may be mistaken in discarding a case as junk when in fact its content is priceless material and may be exploited for historical or other research or indeed for financial or business gain. Recognizing the value of a case requires a particular skill which not all researchers possess—many will miss the deeper significance or value of a particular case until somebody proves capable of unearthing it. Recognizing the value of a case is akin to recognize the potential uses of any empirical material including statistical materials, historical documents, or even random observations.

A case then may be approached not so much as a phenomenon, a fact, an incident, or even a sequence of events, but rather an affordance (Gibson, 1977). Affordances are things and situations that are defined not by what they are but by the uses to which they may be put, especially by a sagacious subject. A hole in the wall to a mouse is a shelter; a case study to a scientist is an opportunity to test a hypothesis; a long-forgotten chronicle by a dead physician is an opportunity for a brilliant cinematographer to tell a moving story. Thus, Itard clearly recognized the potential of Victor, treating him not as a phenomenon but as an affordance, somebody who would help him answer questions like "Am I going to be able to educate this child so that he learns to speak?" "Am I going to be able to introduce him to religion?" "Am I going to be able to turn him into a sophisticated human being?" He could not be sure about the outcome of any of his efforts but he could be fairly sure that the experiments, whatever their outcomes, would offer vital insights into as yet unknown areas, language, socialization religion and so forth. In a similar way, Truffaut used Itard's dusty chronicle as an affordance to tell a story in film, a story that continues to have the power of moving audiences today.

A briefcase or a container has another property: it and its contents can be transferred. In a similar way, the meaning of a case study, like them oral of a story, can be transferred. For example, the meaning of one case of business failure or success can be transferred to another provided, of course, that an appropriate method of translation can be established (Czarniawska, 2013; Czarniawska & Joerges, 1996; Gabriel, 2002). Thus, a single accident may reveal the critical failure that caused it and may highlight the need of bolstering defences against similar failures in the future (see, for example, Starbuck & Milliken, 1988; Weick, 1993).

There is, however, an unfortunate consequence of the coincidence of the two meanings of case as occurrence and container. A container is generally something fixed, something, to be sure, that can be opened, shut, and reopened (as in a legal case), but something static and inert. It does not evolve, it is a closed system. A case study, however, is an evolving, a dynamic phenomenon, something that seems to have a beginning, a middle, and an end, even if some business case studies leave the reader in suspense as to the actual end. The meaning of a case study (including the case of Victor) continues to change and evolve. This raises an immediate question. Where is the beginning, where is the middle

and where is the end of a case? In studying a particular case, for example, an accident, a merger or any historical event, such as the Brexit vote, how far back do we need to go? And at what point can we successfully close a case as having reached a conclusion, a closure?

Case Studies and Stories

The question of beginnings, middles, and ends is one that has long preoccupied narrative theorists as well as storytellers, dramatists, novelists, and other narrators. How does a story begin and how does it end? When does a story begin and when does it end? Organizational theorists who have advocated the use of storytelling as part of research methodology have reached rather different conclusions about what constitutes a story or whether stories must necessarily beginnings and ends. Thus, Boje (1991, 1995) argues that many organizational stories are ephemeral, terse, and synoptic, with unclear plots and characters, while Czarniawska (1998, 2004) and Gabriel (1991, 2000) have tended to emphasize plot and character in stories, including organizational ones. Plots are not random sequences of events, but interwoven events undertaken by purposive characters, even if the outcomes of their actions are at odds with their intentions. In this regard, Czarniawska and Gabriel stay closer to Aristotle (1963) who argued that stories have beginnings, middles, and ends. A story begins when trouble or opportunity arrive, disturbing the normal course of events. Consider, for example, the opening of this essay which started with a serendipitous discovery of a dusty book from a forgotten sociologist's library. Trouble and opportunity also announce a case study. The discovery of Victor opened up, for Itard, sudden possibilities of the discovering the meaning of being human, the meaning of living in society and so forth. The discovery of Itard's chronicle opened up possibilities for Truffaut to depict how a society and later a man of science respond to the discovery of a strange, dirty child that makes wolf-like noises.

We also know what the middle of the story is. It involves various complications, as different characters seek to resolve their problems and take charge of the situations that confront them with actions that frequently have unintended consequence, positive and negative. This is how the "plot thickens" with various crises and resolutions, accidents, misunderstandings, deceptions, serendipities, and so forth. The same may be argued about a case study. In Victor's instance, the middle of the case involves to the various efforts, observations, and experiments carried out by Itard to understand Victor, to educate and humanize him. It also involves accidental events that revealed different aspects of the boy's character. This is what he closely documented and objectively narrated in a "scientific manner" in his chronicle. This is equivalent to the part of the story that Aristotle would recognize as involving partial successes and reversals, complications, tribulations, episodes, in short peripeteia or adventure.

But what about the end of the story? Does this happen when Itard's treatment of Victor came to an end? Or when Parisian society lost interest in him? Or when Victor died? Or maybe even when Itard died in 1838, 10 years after Victor? Or is it when Truffaut takes over the story of Victor turning it into a film? Or maybe is the case still open as Aroles and other scholars, including myself, take up the case of Victor for different purposes? One could configure the end of the story to provide a closure of sorts to the narrative, as Truffaut does in his film, but the story and the case are not the same thing. The audience of a story may lose interest in what happens after a happy end or even a dramatic conclusion, but the case may well go on. How exactly did Victor live the last 23 years of his life when science had lost interest in him? Audiences of stories lose interest once the crisis is over and a resolution of sorts has been reached. For example, the aftermath of an accident like the Challenger disaster or the Deepwater Horizon or of a miraculous escape like the one effected by Captain Sullenberger and the landing of U.S. Airways Flight 1549 in the Hudson River may have little interest to the audiences of a film or a book. Yet, from a scientific point of view the cases in question are far from closed following the immediate resolution of a crisis.

On closer look, we notice that the beginning of a case is not as clear cut as the start of a story—did Victor's story start with his "discovery" or maybe with his abandonment? Or possibly, as some advocates of the rights of nonnormal people may argue, with his systematic abuse, containment, and eventual abandonment by the scientific establishment? Could it even be that the story of Victor starts much earlier, with Remus and Romulus the mythical feral children that not only founded Rome but also established the meaning of "feral" in Western imagination? Does the case of Victor *have* a beginning or does its beginning depend on who has the authority to tell it and how he or she exercises this authority?

Returning to the end of the Victor case, could it be seen as having a happy end with Victor dying in peace, warmly cared by the omni-benevolent Madame Guerin? Or is it an unhappy end, with Victor dying forgotten and abandoned by the scientific establishment, discarded, like Willy Loman in *Death of a Salesman*, as a piece of orange peel? A narrator, whether a film producer or a storyteller, could clearly frame the story in different ways to produce a convincing end, whether happy or sad, but is this prerogative available to the student of the case study?

It seems to me that this is where the trajectories of storytellers and scholars using case studies for their inquiries separate. Storytellers are committed by the nature of their trade to deliver meaningful, stimulating, and emotionally charged narratives to their audiences. All kinds of deviations, embellishments, and obfuscations are acceptable as part of a narrative contract (Czarniawska, 2004; Gabriel, 2004; Todorov,

1978/1990) that allows the storyteller a poetic licence to sacrifice accuracy for effect. The contract tying scientific investigators of a case study, whether it be Itard and Victor the wolf-child or Andrew Pettigrew (1985) and Imperial Chemical Industries to their audiences, is quite different. Here, accuracy cannot be sacrificed for effect, nor can a happy or tragic end be improvised for the purpose of leaving the audience with the satisfaction of a meaningful closure. In this regard, at least, the narratives generated by case study investigators demand a far closer allegiance to factual accuracy than those of storytellers, film-makers and others. Loose ends that would be written out of a story cannot be dismissed as easily, nor can inconsistencies and ambiguities that interfere with a straight plot line. A case study, therefore, is not a work of fiction writing but a work of scientific questioning and probing. In this regard, I would defend the line between fiction and science that has been challenged in recent times (e.g., Czarniawska-Joerges & Guillet de Montoux, 1994; De Cock & Land, 2006; Watson, 2000).

What makes the challenges of case study researchers similar to those of storyteller is that they must both *recognize* the potential of a phenomenon as a dynamic and interconnected sequence of events. Just as Itard recognized the potential of Victor for generating knowledge, Truffaut recognized the cinematic value of a forgotten scientific chronicle of an unsuccessful attempt to humanize a feral child. Recognizing this potential calls for what I can only describe as a narrative imagination—the ability to ask the question "What if?" over and over again. What if Victor had not been abandoned in childhood but had escaped from abuse? What if he had been discovered by some kindly peasants and kept away from the sights of science? What if Itard had tried to teach him sign language instead of French elocution?

In taking empirical or historical material and treating it not as dead matter but as material full of living possibilities, both case study researchers and storytellers must rely as much on method as on *serendipity*. Serendipity, a term coined by Horace Walpole in a letter to a friend in 1758, describes the unexpected discoveries made by three princes from Sri Lanka in a Persian myth through "accident and sagacity". Serendipity is not just happy accident, but the recognition of the potential in an unexpected or accidental observation or event (de Rond & Morley, 2009; Gabriel, 2013). It includes the ability to *recognize* the potential of a single drop of water or of the antibiotic effects of a tiny patch of accidentally growing mould. It includes the ability to recognize a telling exception to a rule. It also includes the possibility of the money-making potential of a simple idea or an accidental remark.

Serendipity also includes the ability to recognise the potential of a good story or a powerful case study. In this way, serendipity is not afraid of accidents but seeks to turn them into blessings in disguise—what seems like a reversal can be revealed as a breakthrough (Gabriel, Muhr, & Linstead, 2014). Was it not serendipity, an accidental contact with a dusty book unopened for years that had once belonged to a distinguished sociologist that set up the reflections included in this essay?

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Note

1. For an illuminating account of the facts and the legends surrounding numerous recorded cases of feral children, see interview with Serge Aroles at http://www.europe1.fr/mediacenter/emissions/au-coeur-de-l-histoire/sons/l-enigme-des-enfants-sauvages-499737.

References

Althusser, L. (1971). *Lenin and philosophy, and other essays*. London, England: New Left Books.

Alvesson, M., & Kärreman, D. (2007). Constructing mystery: Empirical matters in theory development. *Academy of Management Review*, *32*, 1265-1281. doi:10.5465/AMR.2007.26586822

Aristotle. (1963). *The poetics*. London, England: Dent.

Aroles, S. (2007). *L'énigme des enfants-loups : une certitude biologique mais un déni des archives [The enigma of feral children: a biological certainty but a denial of the archives], 1304-1954*. Paris, France: Publibook.

Berlant, L. (2007). On the case. *Critical Inquiry*, *33*, 663-672. doi:10.1086/521564

Boje, D. M. (1991). The storytelling organization: A study of story performance in an office-supply firm. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, *36*, 106-126.

Boje, D. M. (1995). Stories of the storytelling organization: A postmodern analysis of Disney as "Tamara Land." *Academy of Management Review*, *38*, 997-1035.

Czarniawska, B. (1998). *A narrative approach in organizational studies*. London, England: Sage.

Czarniawska, B. (2004). *Narratives in social science research*. London, England: Sage.

Czarniawska, B. (2013). Storytelling: A managerial tool and its local translations. In G. S. Drori, M. A. Höllerer, & P. Walgenbach (Eds.), *Global themes and local variations in organisation and management* (pp. 65-78). London, England: Routledge.

Czarniawska, B., & Joerges, B. (1996). Travel of ideas. In B. Czarniawska & G. Sevón (Eds.), *Translating organizational change* (pp. 13-48). Berlin, Germany: de Gruyter.

Czarniawska-Joerges, B., & Guillet de Montoux, P. (1994). *Good novels, better management: Reading realities in fiction*. Reading, CT: Harwoood Academic Press.

De Cock, C., & Land, C. (2006). Organization/literature: Exploring the seam. *Organization Studies*, *27*, 517-535.

de Rond, M., & Morley, I. (Eds.). (2009). *Serendipity: Fortune and the prepared mind*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Diderot, D. (1963). Blissful Isles [from Supplement to Bougainville's Voyage 1796]. In L. A. Coser (Ed.), *Sociology through literature: An introductory reader* (pp. 3-17). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.

Eisenhardt, K. M. (1989). Building theories from case study research. *Academy of Management Review*, *14*, 532-550. doi:10.2307/258557

Gabriel, Y. (1991). Turning facts into stories and stories into facts: A hermeneutic exploration of organizational folklore. *Human Relations*, *44*, 857-875.

Gabriel, Y. (2000). *Storytelling in organizations: Facts, fictions, fantasies*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

Gabriel, Y. (2002). Essai: On paragrammatic uses of organizational theory: A provocation. *Organization Studies*, *23*, 133-151.

Gabriel, Y. (2004). The narrative veil: Truth and untruths in storytelling. In Y. Gabriel (Ed.), *Myths, stories and organizations: Premodern narratives for our times* (pp. 17-31). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

Gabriel, Y. (2013). Surprises: Not just the spice of life but the source of knowledge. *M@n@gement*, *16*, 719-731.

Gabriel, Y., Muhr, S. L., & Linstead, S. (2014). Luck of the draw? Serendipity, accident, chance and misfortune in organization and design. *Culture and Organization*, *20*, 334-341. doi:10.1080/14759551.2014.967452

Gibson, J. J. (1977). The theory of affordances. In R. Shaw & J. Bransford (Eds.), *Perceiving, acting, and knowing: Toward an ecological psychology* (pp. 67-82). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.

Hofstede, G. (1991). *Cultures and organizations: Software of the mind*. London, England: McGraw-Hill.

Itard, J. M. G. (2009). *Victor de l'Aveyro [Victor of Aveyron]*. Paris, France: Editions Allia. (Original work published 1801)

Montaigne, M. (1993). *The essays: A selection* (M. A. Screech, Trans.). London, England: Penguin Books.

Pettigrew, A. (1985). *The awakening giant: Continuity and change in Imperial Chemical Industries*. Oxford, UK: Blackwell.

Rousseau, J.-J. (1984). *A discourse on inequality*. Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin Books.

Starbuck, W. H., & Milliken, F. J. (1988). Challenger: Fine-tuning the odds until something breaks. *Journal of Management Studies*, *25*, 319-340.

Todorov, T. (1990). *Genres in discourse*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. (Original work published 1978)

Watson, T. J. (2000). Ethnographic fiction science: Making sense of managerial work and organizational research processes with Caroline and Terry. *Organization*, *7*, 489-510.

Weick, K. E. (1993). The collapse of sensemaking in organizations: The Mann Gulch disaster. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, *38*, 628-652.

Yin, R. K. (2003). *Case study research: Design and methods* (3rd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.