

Application Under Test: Swag Labs (https://www.saucedemo.com/)

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## 1. Executive Summary

The security audit was conducted on the Swag Labs web application to assess its resilience against common web-based threats and industry standard vulnerabilities.

The assessment focused on key user-facing features such as login, product search, product details, cart, and checkout.

The objective of this audit was to:

- Identify vulnerabilities that could be exploited by attackers.
- Assess the application's security posture in relation to secure coding practices and best practices for web applications.
- Provide actionable recommendations for strengthening the application's defense.

### **Key Findings:**

- Authentication and session handling were functional but lacked strong protections against brute-force attacks and automated login attempts.
- Multiple missing or misconfigured HTTP security headers were detected, including
  the absence of Content Security Policy (CSP), Anti-Clickjacking headers, and
  Strict-Transport-Security (HSTS). These weaknesses increase the risk of crosssite scripting (XSS), clickjacking, and SSL stripping attacks.
- Cross-Domain Misconfigurations were noted, potentially allowing untrusted origins to interact with the application in unintended way.
- Information disclosure was observed through JavaScript comments, caching policies, and header configurations, which may aid attackers in reconnaissance
- No critical vulnerabilities such as SQL Injection or Remote Code Execution were identified.

#### Overall Posture:

The application demonstrates a **moderate security level**, which is acceptable for a demo or training environment but would not meet enterprise-grade security standards in production. While the core functionality works as expected, the reliance on default or missing security configurations leaves the system vulnerable to common web attacks.

**High-priority improvements** include enforcing strict HTTP headers (CSP, HSTS, X-Frame-Options), strengthening authentication controls, and tightening cross-domain access. Addressing these issues will significantly improve the resilience of the application and reduce its exposure to common exploitation techniques.

# 2. Scope

### In-Scope:

- Frontend application at <a href="https://www.saucedemo.com/">https://www.saucedemo.com/</a>
- Features tested: User login/logout, Product catalog & search, Product details page, Shopping cart, Checkout workflow

### Out-of-Scope:

- Backend APIs (not directly accessible)
- Payment gateway integrations (simulated only)
- Administrative interfaces (not available in demo app)

# 3. Methodology

The security audit was performed using a **structured approach** that combined manual inspection, automated scanning tools, CI/CD pipeline integration, and AI-assisted analysis. The process followed these phases:

### 1. Environment Setup

- The Swag Labs application (<a href="https://www.saucedemo.com/">https://www.saucedemo.com/</a>) was selected as the target for assessment.
- Initial scans were executed locally to validate tool configurations and confirm that security reports were generated correctly.
- Once validated, the testing workflow was containerized and integrated into a **GitHub Actions CI/CD pipeline** to ensure repeatability and automation.

#### 2. Tools and Frameworks

- OWASP ZAP (Zed Attack Proxy): Used for automated Dynamic Application Security Testing (DAST), including active and passive scans against the web application.
- AI Assistants (ChatGPT & Claude): Utilized to interpret scan findings, explain vulnerabilities in plain language, and support report drafting.
- **GitHub Actions:** Configured to run ZAP inside a Docker container on every push/PR, automatically generating HTML reports.
- **GitHub Pages:** Configured to host the generated ZAP report publicly for review.

### 3. Testing Techniques

### Automated Scanning:

- **Passive Scans** to detect misconfigured HTTP headers, information leaks, caching issues, and SSL/TLS weaknesses.
- Active Scans (limited scope) to probe for XSS, SQL injection, CSRF, and authentication flaws.

# • Pipeline Integration:

- After successful local validation, scans were executed automatically as part of a GitHub Actions workflow.
- o Reports were exported and published to GitHub Pages:
  - **ZAP Report**

## 4. Test Categories

- Input validation and injection attacks (XSS, SQLi).
- Authentication and session management (brute force attempts, cookie security).
- Authorization controls (basic checks on user-level access).
- Transport security (HTTPS enforcement, HSTS, TLS configuration).
- Error handling and information disclosure.

## 5. Documentation & Analysis

- Findings were compiled from both local and pipeline-based ZAP scans.
- AI tools (ChatGPT, Claude) were leveraged to summarize vulnerabilities, prioritize risks, and provide remediation recommendations.
- Final results were documented in this structured security audit report for supervisor review

### 4. Vulnerabilities

ID	VULNERABILITY	DESCRIPTION	EVIDENCE	IMPACT
V-01	Content Security	The application does not set	ZAP Alert: CSP Header	Medium – Allows
	Policy (CSP)	a CSP header, increasing	Not Set (GET	potential XSS and
	Header Not Set	exposure to XSS and data	https://www.saucedemo.	data injection.
		injection.	com/)	
V-02	Missing Anti-	The app does not set X-	ZAP Alert: Missing Anti-	Medium – Enables
	Clickjacking	Frame-Options or CSP	clickjacking Header (GET	clickjacking
	Header	frame-ancestors directive.	https://www.saucedemo.	attacks.
			com/)	
V-03	Cross-Domain	Overly permissive CORS	ZAP Alert: Cross-Domain	Medium – May
	Misconfiguration	policy allows access from	Misconfiguration	allow cross-site
		untrusted origins.		exploitation of app
				functionality.

V-04	Strict-Transport-	The application does not	ZAP Alert: HSTS Header	Low - Weakens
	Security (HSTS)	enforce HSTS, exposing	Not Set	transport security
	Header Not Set	users to SSL stripping.		
V-05	X-Content-Type-	The app does not prevent	ZAP Alert: X-Content-	Low – Could allow
	Options Header	MIME type sniffing by	Type-Options Header	content-type
	Missing	browsers.	Missing	spoofing
V-06	Information	Suspicious comments in	ZAP Alert: Suspicious	Informational –
	Disclosure -	JavaScript files could reveal	Comments	May help attackers
	Suspicious	internal logic.	(static/js/chunk.js)	understand app
	Comments			behavior.
V-07	Retrieved from	Content retrieved from	ZAP Alert: Retrieved from	Informational -
	Cache	shared cache may expose	Cache	Risk of data
		sensitive data.		leakage in shared
				environments.
V-08	Modern Web	ZAP identified the app as a	ZAP Alert: Modern Web	Informational - No
	Application	modern SPA (Single Page	Application	direct risk, but
		Application).		requires AJAX
				spider for crawling.
V-09	User Agent	Responses differ based on	ZAP Alert: User Agent	Informational -
	Fuzzer	user agent header, may	Fuzzer	May allow
		expose fingerprinting		attackers to
		issues.		fingerprint
				users/systems

#### 5. Risk Assessment and Prioritization

# **Test Results and Risk Summary**

- ✓ Medium Severity (3 findings)
  - V-01: Content Security Policy (CSP) Header Not Set
  - V-02: Missing Anti-Clickjacking Header
  - V-03: Cross-Domain Misconfiguration
- ✓ Low Severity (2 findings)
  - V-04: Strict-Transport-Security (HSTS) Header Not Set
  - V-05: X-Content-Type-Options Header Missing
- √ Informational (4 findings)
  - V-06: Information Disclosure Suspicious Comments
  - V-07: Retrieved from Cache
  - V-08: Modern Web Application
  - V-09: User Agent Fuzzer.

#### **Remediation Priorities**

1. High Priority (Fix Immediately)

- Implement CSP headers (V-01) to reduce risk of XSS and data injection.
- Add Anti-Clickjacking protections (V-02) to prevent UI redress attacks.
- Review and tighten CORS configuration (V-03) to prevent cross-site abuse.

### 2. Medium Priority (Next 2-3 sprints)

- Enforce HSTS headers (V-04) to mitigate SSL stripping risks.
- Add X-Content-Type-Options headers (V-05) to prevent MIME-type spoofing.

## 3. Low Priority (Ongoing monitoring)

- Review JavaScript comments and code disclosures (V-06).
- Control caching (V-07) for sensitive endpoints.
- Consider spider tuning for SPA crawling (V-08).
- Mitigate user-agent fingerprinting issues (V-09).

#### **Overall Risk Posture**

The Swag Labs demo app demonstrates moderate security with weaknesses mainly in HTTP response headers and cross-domain configuration. While no critical vulnerabilities were found, remediation should be prioritized around CSP, anti-clickjacking, and CORS settings to reduce exposure to common attacks.