



CS201 DISCRETE MATHEMATICS FOR COMPUTER SCIENCE

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Applications of Number Theory in Cryptography

- Introduction
- Symmetric cryptography
- Asymmetric cryptography
- RSA Cryptosystem
- DLP and El Gamal cryptography
- Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol
- Cryptocurrency, e.g., bitcoin



Fermat's Little Theorem

- **Theorem (Fermat's little theorem)** : Let p be a prime, and let x be an integer such that $x \not\equiv 0 \pmod{p}$. Then

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$$\{1, 2, \dots, p-1\} = \{x, 2x, \dots, x(p-1) \pmod{p}\}$$



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Primitive Roots

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Example: 3 is a primitive root of \mathbb{Z}_7 . 2 is **not** a primitive root of \mathbb{Z}_7 .

Theorem * There is a primitive root modulo n **if and only if** $n = 2, 4, p^e$ or $2p^e$, where p is an odd prime.

Q : proof? The number of primitive roots? *



Cryptography

- History of almost 4000 years (from 1900 B.C.)

Cryptography = kryptos + graphos



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(secret) (writing)




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The term was first used in *The Gold-Bug*, by Edgar Allan Poe (1809 - 1849).




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“Human ingenuity cannot concoct a cipher which human ingenuity cannot resolve.” – 1941



Cryptography


- One-sentence definition:

“Cryptography is the practice and study of techniques for secure communication in the presence of third parties called *adversaries*.” – Ronald L. Rivest



Some Examples

- In 405 BC, the Greek general LYSANDER OF SPARTA was sent a coded message written on the inside of a servant's belt.



Some Examples


- The Greeks also invented a cipher which changed **letters** to **numbers**. A form of this code was still being used during *World War I*.

	1	2	3	4	5
1	A	B	C	D	E
2	F	G	H	I/J	K
3	L	M	N	O	P
4	Q	R	S	T	U
5	V	W	X	Y	Z



Some Examples

- Enigma, Germany coding machine in *World War II*.



Cryptography History

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Q: What if Bob could send Alice a “special key” useful only for **encryption** but no help for **decryption**?




Cryptography History

- History (from 1976)

- ◇ W. Diffie, M. Hellman, “New direction in cryptography”, *IEEE Transactions on Information Theory*, vol. 22, pp. 644-654, 1976.

“We stand today on the brink of a revolution in cryptography.”



Bailey W. Diffie



Martin E. Hellman


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2015 **Turing Award**



Bailey W. Diffie



Martin E. Hellman

2015	Martin E. Hellman Whitfield Diffie	For fundamental contributions to modern cryptography . Diffie and Hellman's groundbreaking 1976 paper, "New Directions in Cryptography," ^[39] introduced the ideas of public-key cryptography and digital signatures, which are the foundation for most regularly-used security protocols on the internet today. ^[40]
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Public Key Cryptography

- Alice wants to send a message to Bob



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
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
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Ronald L. Rivest



Adi Shamir



Leonard M. Adleman

R. Rivest, A. Shamir, L. Adleman, "A method for obtaining digital signatures and public-key cryptosystems", *Communications of the ACM*, vol. 21-2, pages 120-126, 1978.



RSA Public Key Cryptosystem

- Rivest-Shamir-Adleman 2002 **Turing Award**

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Pick two **large** primes, p and q . Let $n = pq$, then $\phi(n) = (p - 1)(q - 1)$. Encryption and decryption keys e and d are selected such that

- $\gcd(e, \phi(n)) = 1$
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$$C = M^e \bmod n \text{ (RSA encryption)}$$

$$M = C^d \bmod n \text{ (RSA decryption)}$$



RSA Public Key Cryptosystem

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Theorem (*Correctness*) : Let p and q be two odd primes, and define $n = pq$. Let e be relatively prime to $\phi(n)$ and let d be the multiplicative inverse of e modulo $\phi(n)$. For each integer x such that $0 \leq x < n$,

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Q : How to prove this?



RSA Public Key Cryptosystem: Example

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	5	11	55	40	7	23



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5	11	55	40	7	23

Public key: (7, 55)

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Encryption: $M = 28, C = M^7 \bmod 55 = 52$

Decryption: $M = C^{23} \bmod 55 = 28$



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$p, q, \phi(n)$ must be kept **secret**!



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Comment: It is believed that determining $\phi(n)$ is **equivalent** to factoring n . Meanwhile, determining d given e and n , appears to be at least as time-consuming as **the integer factoring problem**.



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CS 208 – Algorithm Design and Analysis



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Q : Consider the RSA system, where $n = pq$ is the modulus. Let (e, d) be a key pair for the RSA. Define

$$\lambda(n) = \text{lcm}(p - 1, q - 1)$$

and compute $d' = e^{-1} \bmod \lambda(n)$. Will decryption using d' instead of d still work?



Applications of RSA

- SSL/TLS protocol




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
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


Key exchange/agreement and authentication

Algorithm	SSL 2.0	SSL 3.0	TLS 1.0	TLS 1.1	TLS 1.2	TLS 1.3
RSA	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
DH-RSA	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
DHE-RSA (forward secrecy)	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
ECDH-RSA	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
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
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CS 305 – Computer Networks

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CS 305 – Computer Networks

CS 403 – Cryptography and Network Security



Using RSA for Digital Signature

$$S = M^d \bmod n \text{ (RSA signature)}$$

$$M = S^e \bmod n \text{ (RSA verification)}$$

Why?



The Discrete Logarithm

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This is very hard!



El Gamal Encryption

- **Setup** Let p be a prime, and g be a generator of \mathbb{Z}_p . The **private key** x is an integer with $1 < x < p - 2$. Let $y = g^x \bmod p$. The **public key** for *El Gamal encryption* is (p, g, y) .



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El Gamal Encryption: Pick a random integer k from \mathbb{Z}_{p-1} ,

$$a = g^k \bmod p$$

$$b = My^k \bmod p$$

The ciphertext C consists of the pair (a, b) .

El Gamal Decryption:

$$M = b(a^x)^{-1} \bmod p$$



Using El Gamal for Digital Signature

$$\begin{aligned}a &= g^k \bmod p \\b &= k^{-1}(M - xa) \bmod (p - 1)\end{aligned}$$

(El Gamal **signature**)

$$y^a a^b \equiv g^M \pmod{p}$$

(El Gamal **verification**)



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(El Gamal **verification**)

Q : How to verify it?



An Example

Choose $p = 2579$, $g = 2$, and $x = 765$. Hence
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► **(Public key)** $k_e = (p, g, y) = (2579, 2, 949)$

► **(Private key)** $k_d = x = 765$

Encryption: Let $M = 1299$ and choose a random $k = 853$,

$$\begin{aligned}(a, b) &= (g^k \bmod p, My^k \bmod p) \\ &= (2^{853} \bmod 2579, 1299 \cdot 949^{853} \bmod 2579) \\ &= (435, 2396).\end{aligned}$$

Decryption:

$$M = b(a^x)^{-1} \bmod p = 2396 \times (435^{765})^{-1} \bmod 2579 = 1299.$$



Security of the El Gamal Cryptosystem

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Attack 1: Use $M = by^{-k}$. However, k is **randomly** picked.

Attack 2: Use $M = b(a^x)^{-1} \bmod p$, but x is **secret**.



Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange Protocol

User A

User B

Generate random

$$X_A < p$$


calculate

$$Y_A = \alpha^{X_A} \bmod p$$

Calculate

$$k = (Y_B)^{X_A} \bmod p$$

Y_A



Y_B

Generate random

$$X_B < p$$

Calculate

$$Y_B = \alpha^{X_B} \bmod p$$

Calculate

$$k = (Y_A)^{X_B} \bmod p$$



Next Lecture

- induction ...

