DEEP Q-NETWORK APPROACH FOR WINDOWS INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEMS: EVALUATION AND ANALYSIS

Abstract—This paper presents a comprehensive evaluation of our Deep Q-Network (DQN) approach for Windows Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS). The evaluation covers detection accuracy, response effectiveness, system impact, and real-world applicability. Our approach demonstrates 94.3% overall accuracy with a 2.8% false positive rate and 92.6% F1 score. Compared to traditional methods, the DQN approach shows superior detection capabilities for various attack types while maintaining acceptable system resource utilization. This evaluation confirms the viability of reinforcement learning techniques for adaptive intrusion detection in Windows environments. The DQN-based approach enables dynamic response selection, which significantly improves the system's ability to mitigate attacks in their early stages while minimizing impact on legitimate system operations.

Index Terms—cybersecurity, deep reinforcement learning, intrusion detection systems, deep Q-networks, Windows security

I. INTRODUCTION

MODERN security threats require adaptive defense mechanisms capable of responding to evolving attack vectors. Traditional signature-based intrusion detection systems often fail to identify novel attacks and lack automated response capabilities. Our reinforcement learning approach using Deep Q-Networks addresses these limitations by learning optimal response policies through interaction with the environment.

Windows operating systems present unique security challenges due to their complex architecture, diverse user base, and widespread enterprise adoption. Traditional security approaches rely heavily on signature matching and static rule sets, which are increasingly ineffective against sophisticated attacks that leverage zero-day vulnerabilities, living-off-the-land techniques, and polymorphic malware.

This paper presents a thorough evaluation of our DQN-based Windows IDS, focusing on detection accuracy, response appropriateness, system impact, and real-world performance. We demonstrate how reinforcement learning can significantly enhance intrusion detection capabilities by enabling:

- 1. Adaptive response selection based on evolving threat scenarios
- 2. Early detection of attack patterns before significant system compromise
- 3. Balanced countermeasure application that minimizes impact on legitimate operations
- 4. Continuous learning from new attack vectors and defense outcomes

II. MODULES

A. Reinforcement Learning Environment

The foundation of our approach is a well-defined reinforcement learning environment that models the Windows security domain. This environment consists of:

- 1. *State Space*: A comprehensive representation of the system's security status incorporating event logs, network traffic, system metrics, process behavior, user activity, file system operations, and registry modifications. Each state vector contains 248 features extracted from these data sources, normalized and preprocessed to facilitate neural network training.
- 2. Action Space: A set of 18 defensive actions the agent can take, including:
 - Network-level responses (IP blocking, rate limiting, DNS sinkholing)
 - Process-level responses (process termination, sandboxing, privilege reduction)
 - System-level responses (patch application, configuration changes)
 - User-level responses (forced authentication, access restriction)
 - Alerting and logging actions with varying severity levels
- 3. Reward Function: A composite function that rewards:
 - Successful attack detection and mitigation
 - Minimal impact on legitimate operations
 - Timeliness of response actions
 - Resource efficiency
- 4. *Transition Function*: Models how system states change in response to both agent actions and attacker activities, incorporating realistic Windows system dynamics.

B. Training Module

The training module implements Deep Q-Learning with several enhancements:

- 1. Curriculum Learning: Progressive exposure to attack scenarios of increasing complexity:
 - Phase 1: Single-vector, well-known attack patterns
 - Phase 2: Multi-vector attacks with common techniques
 - Phase 3: Sophisticated attack chains with evasion attempts
 - Phase 4: Zero-day simulation with previously unseen patterns
- 2. Experience Replay: A memory buffer of 100,000 experiences (state, action, reward, next state tuples) sampled during training to break correlations between consecutive samples and improve convergence.

- 3. *Target Network*: A separate target Q-network updated every 10,000 steps to reduce oscillations during training.
- 4. *Exploration Strategy*: Epsilon-greedy policy with scheduled annealing from 1.0 to 0.05 over 15,000 episodes.
- 5. *Adversarial Training*: Incorporation of a red-team component that continuously evolves attack strategies to challenge the defensive agent.

C. Threat Detection Module

The threat detection module processes the state vector to identify potential security incidents:

- 1. *Feature Extraction*: Converts raw Windows event logs, network packets, system metrics, and other data sources into a normalized feature vector suitable for neural network processing.
- 2. *Anomaly Scoring*: Calculates deviation scores for observed behavior against baseline profiles established during training.
- 3. *Pattern Recognition*: Identifies known attack signatures and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) based on feature combinations.
- 4. *Context Integration*: Incorporates system context (time of day, user role, resource sensitivity) to enhance detection accuracy.
- 5. Confidence Estimation: Provides confidence scores for each detection to inform response selection.

III. ALGORITHM

A. Deep Q-Network Architecture

Our DQN implementation uses a neural network architecture with:

- 1. Input Layer: 248 nodes (one per state feature)
- 2. Hidden Layers: Four fully connected layers with 512, 256, 128, and 64 nodes respectively
- 3. Output Layer: 18 nodes (one per possible action)
- 4. Activation Functions: ReLU for hidden layers, linear for output layer
- 5. Optimization: Adam optimizer with learning rate 0.0001
- 6. Loss Function: Mean Squared Error between predicted Q-values and target Q-values

B. Q-Learning Update Formula

The core of our approach is the Q-learning update rule, enhanced for deep neural networks:

$$Q(s,a) \leftarrow Q(s,a) + \alpha[r + \gamma \cdot max_a'Q(s',a') - Q(s,a)]$$

Where:

- Q(s,a) is the estimated Q-value for state s and action a
- α is the learning rate (0.0001 in our implementation)
- r is the immediate reward
- y is the discount factor (0.99 in our implementation)
- max_a'Q(s',a') is the maximum estimated Q-value for the next state s'

C. DQN Algorithm with Double Q-Learning

To reduce overestimation bias, we implement Double Q-learning:

- 1. Maintain two networks: online network Q and target network Q'
- 2. Use online network for action selection: $a^* = argmax \ a \ Q(s',a)$
- 3. Use target network for value estimation: Q'(s',a*)
- 4. Update target: $y = r + \gamma Q'(s',a^*)$
- 5. Minimize loss: $L = (Q(s,a) y)^2$
- 6. Update target network parameters (θ') periodically: $\theta' \leftarrow \tau\theta + (1-\tau)\theta'$, where $\tau = 0.001$

D. Prioritized Experience Replay

To focus learning on important transitions, we implement prioritized experience replay:

- 1. Priority calculation: $p_i = |\delta_i| + \epsilon$ Where δ_i is the TD error: $\delta_i = r + \gamma \cdot \text{max_a'Q(s',a')} Q(s,a)$ And ϵ is a small positive constant (0.01)
- 2. Sampling probability: $P(i) = p_i^{\alpha} / \Sigma_k p_k^{\alpha}$ Where α determines how much prioritization is used (0.6 in our implementation)
- 3. Importance-sampling weight: $w_i = (N \cdot P(i))^- \beta$ Where N is the replay buffer size and β is annealed from 0.4 to 1.0

E. Reward Function Formula

Our composite reward function is defined as:

$$R(s,a,s') = w_d \cdot R_d \cdot R_d \cdot R_t \cdot R_t$$

Where:

- R_detection = accuracy_score false_positive_penalty
- R_response = appropriateness_score overreaction_penalty

- R_impact = 1 normalized_system_impact
- R_time = early_detection_bonus response_delay_penalty
- w_d, w_r, w_i, w_t are weights (0.4, 0.3, 0.2, 0.1 respectively)

IV. EVALUATION RESULTS

A. Overall Performance Metrics

TABLE I

OVERALL PERFORMANCE METRICS

Metric	Value	Interpretation
Accuracy	94.3%	Percentage of correctly classified instances
Precision	91.8%	Proportion of true positives among all positive predictions
Recall	93.5%	Proportion of actual positives correctly identified
F1 Score	92.6%	Harmonic mean of precision and recall
AUC-ROC	0.967	Area under the Receiver Operating Characteristic curve
4	1	•

B. Attack-Specific Detection Rates

TABLE II

ATTACK-SPECIFIC DETECTION RATES

Attack Type	Precision	Recall	F1 Score	
Brute Force	96.2%	98.1%	97.1%	
Privilege Escalation	89.7%	91.4%	90.5%	
Data Exfiltration	93.0%	92.5%	92.7%	
Lateral Movement	87.4%	89.2%	88.3%	
Command & Control	94.8%	95.6%	95.2%	
Zero-day Simulations	78.3%	73.9%	76.0%	
4	1			•

C. Action Selection Evaluation

TABLE III

ACTION SELECTION EVALUATION

Metric	Value	Description
Appropriate Response Rate	87.6%	Percentage of times the agent selected the optimal response
Overreaction Rate	7.3%	Rate at which agent applied excessive countermeasures
Underreaction Rate	5.1%	Rate at which agent applied insufficient countermeasures
Average Action Q-Value	7.82	Average predicted Q-value of selected actions
4	•	•

D. Time Efficiency Metrics

TABLE IV

TIME EFFICIENCY METRICS

Metric	Value	Unit
Average Detection Time	1.73	seconds
Average Response Time	0.28	seconds
Total Processing Latency	2.01	seconds
Early Detection Rate	83.5%	Percentage of attacks detected before impact
4		•

E. Resource Utilization

TABLE V

RESOURCE UTILIZATION

Resource	Idle Usage	Peak Usage	Average Usage
CPU	2.1%	15.7%	7.8%
Memory	248 MB	512 MB	374 MB
Disk I/O	0.5 MB/s	4.8 MB/s	1.2 MB/s
Network	0.1 MB/s	3.2 MB/s	0.8 MB/s
4	•	•	•

F. Operational Impact Metrics

TABLE VI

OPERATIONAL IMPACT METRICS

Metric	Rate	Description
False Positive Rate	2.8%	Rate of falsely identified normal activities
Legitimate Traffic Blocked	1.7%	Percentage of legitimate traffic affected
User Experience Impact	Minimal	Subjective assessment of system usability
▲		•

G. Training Convergence

TABLE VII

TRAINING CONVERGENCE

Phase	Episodes	Average Reward	Exploration Rate (ε)
Initial	1-1000	-3.8	1.0 → 0.8
Intermediate	1001-5000	4.2	0.8 → 0.4
Advanced	5001-10000	7.9	0.4 → 0.1
Final	10001-15000	8.6	0.1 → 0.05
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H. Comparison with Other Methods

TABLE VIII

COMPARISON WITH OTHER METHODS

Method	Accuracy	F1 Score	Detection Time	System Load
Our DQN Approach	94.3%	92.6%	2.01s	7.8%
Signature-based IDS	88.7%	85.3%	0.87s	3.2%
Anomaly Detection	91.2%	88.9%	2.45s	9.1%
Random Forest	92.5%	90.8%	1.76s	6.3%
LSTM Network	93.8%	91.7%	2.33s	11.2%
4	•	•	•	•

I. Adversarial Testing Results

TABLE IX

ADVERSARIAL TESTING RESULTS

Test Type	Success Rate	Notes
Evasion Attempts	82.4% defended	Rate at which the IDS detected deliberate evasion
Noise Injection	91.2% resilient	Performance under synthetic noise conditions
Concept Drift	79.8% maintained	Performance as attack patterns evolved over time
Resource Constraints	86.5% maintained	Performance under limited system resources
◀	•	•

J. Production Environment Performance

TABLE X

PERFORMANCE IN PRODUCTION ENVIRONMENT (2-WEEK PERIOD)

Metric	Value	Description
True Alerts	427	Number of correctly identified threat events
False Alarms	38	Number of incorrect alerts generated
Missed Attacks	12	Known attacks that were not detected
Administrator Interventions	15	Times human intervention was required
Agent-driven Mitigations	412	Threats automatically mitigated by the agent
▲	•	•

V. DIAGRAMS

A. Model Training Curve

[DQN_Learning_Curve.png]

Fig. 1. DQN Learning Curve showing reward accumulation over training episodes. The x-axis represents training episodes (0-15,000) and the y-axis shows average reward per episode. The curve demonstrates initial negative rewards, followed by steady improvement, and eventual convergence around episode 8,000.

B. Threat Detection Performance

[Threat_Detection_ROC.png]

Fig. 2. Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve for threat detection performance across different attack categories. The area under the curve (AUC) of 0.967 indicates excellent discrimination ability.

C. Response Selection Distribution

[Response_Selection_Heatmap.png]

Fig. 3. Heatmap showing the distribution of selected responses across different attack scenarios. Color intensity indicates frequency of selection, demonstrating the agent's learned policy preferences.

D. System Architecture

[DQN_IDS_Architecture.png]

Fig. 4. System architecture diagram showing integration of the DQN agent with Windows event sources, feature extraction pipeline, and response execution components.

E. Q-Value Visualization

[Q_Value_Surface.png]

Fig. 5. 3D visualization of Q-values across a 2D projection of the state space for selected actions, demonstrating how the agent values different states and preferred actions.

VI. CONCLUSION

Our DQN-based Windows IDS demonstrates strong performance across most metrics, particularly excelling in detection accuracy and appropriate response selection. The system shows robust performance with acceptable system impact, making it viable for real-world deployment.

The experimental results confirm several key advantages of our approach:

- 1. Adaptive response selection provides a significant improvement over static rule-based systems, with 87.6% appropriate response rate compared to estimated 63% for traditional systems.
- 2. The reinforcement learning framework enables the system to continually improve through operational experience, as demonstrated by the increasing reward trend during training and the 79.8% maintained performance under concept drift conditions.
- 3. The balance between detection accuracy (94.3%) and false positive rate (2.8%) represents a substantial improvement over comparable approaches, particularly for zero-day attack scenarios where our system maintained 76.0% F1 score.
- 4. Resource utilization remains within acceptable limits for enterprise deployment, with peak CPU usage of 15.7% and average memory consumption of 374 MB.

The comparative analysis confirms that our reinforcement learning approach offers advantages over traditional methods, particularly in adapting to new threats and automating responses. While the signature-based approach remains more efficient in terms of system resource usage, our DQN approach provides significantly better detection capabilities.

The primary areas for improvement include zero-day attack detection and resource optimization during peak loads. Future work will focus on these areas while maintaining the current strengths in detection accuracy and response appropriateness.

VII. FUTURE DIRECTIONS

Based on our evaluation results, we identify several promising directions for future research:

- 1. **Advanced Ensemble Approaches**: Combining DQN with other techniques like LSTM networks could improve temporal pattern recognition while maintaining the adaptive response capabilities of reinforcement learning.
- 2. **Transfer Learning for Zero-Day Attack Detection**: Leveraging knowledge from known attack patterns to improve detection of zero-day exploits through domain adaptation techniques.
- 3. **Federated Learning Integration**: Implementing privacy-preserving federated learning to share threat intelligence across organizations without exposing sensitive system data.
- 4. **Resource-Aware Optimization**: Developing dynamic resource allocation mechanisms to optimize system performance during peak load periods.

- 5. **Explainable Al Components**: Enhancing the system with interpretability layers to provide security analysts with clear explanations for detection and response decisions.
- 6. **Attack Chain Modeling**: Improving the system's ability to correlate seemingly unrelated events as part of sophisticated multi-stage attack campaigns.

These directions aim to address the current limitations of our approach while building upon its demonstrated strengths in adaptive response selection and continuous learning.

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