

Bindesi-Iwari Prasad Singh vs Kali Singh on 5 August, 1976

Equivalent citations: 1977 AIR 2432, 1977 SCR (1) 125, AIR 1977 SUPREME COURT 2432, (1977) 1 SCC 57, 1977 PATLJR 208, (1976) 3 CRI LT 632, (1976) 12 DLT 328, 1976 CRI APP R (SC) 214, 1976 MADLW (CRI) 190, (1977) 1 SCR 125, 1977 SCC(CRI) 33, 1978 ALLCRIR 36

Author: Syed Murtaza Fazalali

Bench: Syed Murtaza Fazalali, P.N. Bhagwati

PETITIONER:
BINDESI-IWARI PRASAD SINGH

Vs.

RESPONDENT:
KALI SINGH

DATE OF JUDGMENT 05/08/1976

BENCH:
FAZALALI, SYED MURTAZA
BENCH:
FAZALALI, SYED MURTAZA
BHAGWATI, P.N.

CITATION:
1977 AIR 2432 1977 SCR (1) 125
1977 SCC (1) 57
CITATOR INFO :
F 1986 SC1440 (5,11,14)

ACT:
Code of Criminal Procedure 1908--Whether Magistrate has jurisdiction to recall dismissal order/sms-203--Appli-cation for recalling dismissal order whether amounts to fresh complaint.

HEADNOTE:
The respondent's complaint against the appellant regarding a trivial matter was tossed for three years between various magistrates for inquiry and report without conclusive results, and was ultimately dismissed section 203 Cr.P.C. Thereafter on an application by the respondent for recalling his dismissal order, the Magistrate again sent/the

case for inquiry ultimately issued process against the accused.

The appellant contended before this Court that the Magistrate had no jurisdiction to recall his order of dismissal. According to the respondent, his application for recalling the dismissal-order, would amount to a fresh complaint.

Allowing the appeal, this Court,

HELD: (1) There is absolutely no provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1908 (which applies to this case) empowering a Magistrate to review or recall an order passed by him. Section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code, the subordinate criminal courts have no inherent powers. After having passed the order, the Sub-Divisional Magistrate became functus officio and had no power to review or recall that order on any ground whatsoever. [126 G-H; 127 A]

(2) There was no fresh complaint and it is now well settled that a second complaint can be only on fresh facts or even on the previous facts only if a special case is made out. [127 C-D]

Pramatha Nath Taluqdar v. Saroj Ranjan Sarkar, [1962] (2) S.C.R. Supp. 297, followed.

JUDGMENT:

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal of 1976.

Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and 'Order dated 28-7-75 of the Patna High Court in Criminal Revision No. 1046 of 1972.

A.K. Sen and A.K. Nag for the Appellant.

D. Gobrudhan, for the respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by FAZAL ALI, J. This appeal by special leave exhibits the careless and cavalier manner in which the Sub-Divisional Magistrate appears to have dealt with the complaint filed before him as far back as 21st February, 1966. The complaint itself contains allegations of a very petty nature, of which hardly any cognizance could have been taken and which would be a trivial act under Sec. 95 of Indian Penal Code for which no criminal proceedings could be taken. There were proceedings under Section 107 between the parties and both parties applied for copies of these proceedings on the 20th December, 1965. It is alleged in the complaint that the appellant got the copy which was meant for the complainant, by signing his name. The complainant also got his copy a few days after eventually. Such a small matter could have been resolved by the Magistrate himself if he had pursued the complaint carefully and was certainly not a matter for which a detailed inquiry under section 202, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1908 was called for. It appears, however, that the Magistrate tossed the complaint from one Magistrate to another for inquiry and report, without conclusive results, starting from 21st February 1966 to 23rd November

1968, that is, for a period of more than two years. Ultimately, on the 23rd November, 1968 the complaint was dismissed under section 203 of the Criminal Procedure Code on the ground that the complainant was absent and did not show any interest in the inquiry ordered by the Court.

On the 7th of December, 1968 the respondent appeared before the Magistrate and filed an application for recalling his order. The Magistrate passed no orders on this application but he sent the case for inquiry to Mr. K.P. Sinha, another Magistrate. Thereafter, the matter was sent to Mr. S.N. Dube on 30th of October, 1969. Mr. Dube reported that the inquiry had been completed and hence he returned the papers of inquiry to the Magistrate. On 9th of December, 1970, the Magistrate recalled the inquiry from Mr. K.P. Sinha and transferred to Mr. A.R. Ansari and on the basis of his report, the learned Magistrate passed the order taking cognizance of the case and summoned the accused by his order dated 3-5-1972, and issued processes against the appellants. It would thus appear that a very petty matter was allowed to have a long and chequered career because the Magistrate refused to apply his mind either to the allegations made in the complaint or to control the proceedings before him.

In support of the appeal Mr. Nag has submitted a short point. He has contended that the Magistrate had no jurisdiction to recall the order dated 23-11-1968, by which he had dismissed the complaint under Section 203 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In fact, there was no express order recalling the order dismissing the complaint, but by a process of deeming fiction the Magistrate thought that the order dismissing the complaint stood recalled.

We might mention that the order dated 23rd November, 1968 was a judicial order by which the Magistrate had given full reasons for dismissing the complaint. Even if the Magistrate had any jurisdiction to recall this order, it could have been done by another judicial order after giving reasons that he was satisfied that a case was made out for recalling the order. We, however, need not dilate on this point because there is absolutely no provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1908 (which applies to this case) empowering a Magistrate to review or recall an order passed by him. Code of Criminal Procedure does contain a provision for inherent powers, namely, Section 561-A which, however, confers these powers on the High Court and the High Court alone. Unlike Section 151 of Civil Procedure Code, the subordinate criminal courts have no inherent powers. In these circumstances, therefore, the learned Magistrate had absolutely no jurisdiction to recall the order dismissing the complaint. The remedy of the respondent was to move the Sessions Judge or the High Court in revision. In fact after having passed the order dated 23-11-1968, the Sub-Divisional Magistrate became functus officio and had no power to review or recall that order on any ground whatsoever. In these circumstances, therefore, the order even if there be one, recalling order dismissing the complaint, was entirely without jurisdiction. This being the position, all subsequent proceedings following upon recalling the said order, would fall to the ground including order dated 3-5-1972 summoning the accused which must also be treated to be a nullity and destitute of any legal effect. The High Court has not at all considered this important aspect of the matter which alone was sufficient to put an end to these proceedings. It was suggested by Mr. D. Goburdhan that the application given by him for recalling the order of dismissal of the complaint would amount to a fresh complaint. We are, however, unable to agree with this contention because there was no fresh complaint and it is now well settled that a second complaint can lie only on fresh

facts or even on the previous facts only if a special case is made out. This has been held by this Court in Pramatha Nath Taluqdar v. Saroj Ranjan Sarkar⁽¹⁾. For these reasons therefore, the appeal is allowed. The Order of the High Court maintaining the order of the Magistrate dated 3-5-1972 is set aside and the order of the Magistrate dated 3-5-1972 summoning the appellant is hereby quashed. M.R. Appeal allowed.

(1) [1962] 2 Supp. S.C.R. 297.