

# Fictitious Play by Python

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# Today's contents

- ① Fictitious Play
- ② General Settings
- ③ Programming codes
- ④ Graphical outcome
- ⑤ Further improvements

# Fictitious Play

- A dynamic learning rule where each players rationally behaves based on the belief for the opponents' strategy.
- At  $t$  round, each player presumes that the opponents follows *the empirical frequency of strategies* from round 1 to  $t - 1$
- The learning process can be replicated by programming. In this excersise, two types of games below are covered.
  - Matching Pennies
  - $2 \times 2$  coordination game

# Fictitious Play in a case of 2 players

- Difference equation of the belief

$x_0(t)$  can be recursively written as

$$x_0(t+1) = x_0(t) + \frac{1}{t+2}(a_1(t) - x_0(t))$$

where  $x_0(t)$  is the player 0's belief about the player 1's behavior at time  $t$  and  $a_1(t)$  is the player 1's action at time  $t$ .

# Basic Algorithm

- A payoff of all the players are give in the form of a matrix.
- Build a best response function which
  - takes the payoff matrix and belief about the opponent's action as inputs
  - returns the action that maximize the expected payoff as an output
- For  $t = 0, 1, 2, \dots$ , iteratively compute each player's action and belief and make a list of belief over the whole procedure.

## Example games

- One example of Matching Pennies game is defined as below:

	Action 0	Action 1
Action 0	1, -1	-1, 1
Action 1	-1, 1	1, -1

- One example of  $2 \times 2$  coordination game is defined as below:

	Action 0	Action 1
Action 0	4, 4	0, 3
Action 1	3, 0	2, 2

- Note that  $2 \times 2$  coordination game is a symmetric game, where each player has the same payoff structure.

# Programming codes 1

- Extracted codes for Matching Pennies game with brief comments

```
pay = ((1,-1),(-1,1),  
       (-1,1),(1,-1))
```

```
def sep(p, pay):  
    return ((pay[0][a], pay[1][a]),  
           (pay[2][a], pay[3][a]))
```

- First, input the payoff structure in the form of matrix called pay
- Then set up the function `sep(a, pay)`, which
  - takes the index of the player and payoff matrix as inputs
  - returns the each player's individual payoff matrix dropping the opponent's payoff. (For later use.)

## Programming codes 2

- Construct the best response function.

```
xmat = np.empty((len(players), len(players)))
```

```
def br(p,x):  
    xmat[p] = (1-x, x)  
    expay = np.dot(np.array(sep(p, pay)), xmat[p])  
  
    if expay[0] == expay[1]:  
        return random.randint(0,1)  
  
    else:  
        return expay.argmax()
```

- $p$  indicates  $p$ th player and  $x$  denotes his belief about the opponent's action.  $xmat$  is a empty  $2 \times 2$  matrix where  $p$ th row has player  $p$ 's expectation for opponent's each action.
- $expay$  is a vector obtained by calculating the product of player  $p$ 's individual payoff matrix and belief vector.
- Finally, returns the biggest element of  $expay$  if there is only one (Not very general).



## Programming codes 3

- Compute the games iteratively.

```
def playgame(trials):  
  
    x0 = random.uniform(0,1)  
    x1 = random.uniform(0,1)  
  
    for i in range(1000):  
        a0 = br(0, x0)  
        a1 = br(1, x1)  
        x0.append(x[i]+(a[1]-x[i])/(i+2))  
        x1.append(x[i]+(a[0]-x[i])/(i+2))
```

- Here, I used a function so that I can easily try different number of trials.
- Choose the action utilizing `br(p, x)` and put it into the difference equation.
- This part can be neatly summarized by using `for` loop for each player. (but I gave up)

# Matching Pennies: Transition of belief




Figure : Transition of belief in Matching Pennies game for 200 times

# Matching Pennies: Histogram of the terminal belief




Figure : 200 iterations of Matching Pennis game for 200 times

## $2 \times 2$ coordination game: Transition of belief pattern 1




Figure :  $2 \times 2$  coordination game for 200 times

## $2 \times 2$ coordination game: Transition of belief pattern 2




Figure :  $2 \times 2$  coordination game for 200 times

## $2 \times 2$ coordination game: Histogram of the terminal belief




Figure : 200 iterations of  $2 \times 2$  coordination game for 200 times

# Summary

- OOP can be introduced. I intentionally often used functions so that the transition is smooth. (But not tried yet.)
- Introducing `for` loop for players is a bit clumsy. In the loop for `p`, I sometimes have to use `p` as a index for matrices, so end up with messy codes with tons of indexed matrices and vectors.