

# INF367A: Probabilistic machine learning

## Lecture 5: Bayesian modeling I

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# Outline

Probability interpretations

Bayesian inference

Example: Bernoulli model

What to do with the posterior?

Bayesians vs. frequentists



**Probability theory is nothing but common sense reduced to calculation.** - Pierre Laplace, 1814



# Probability interpretations

Does it make sense to say  $P(A) = 0.7$  or  $0.2$  for the following  $A$ ?

- ▶  $A = \{ \text{A patient recovers from cancer} \}$
- ▶  $A = \{ \text{It will rain tomorrow} \}$
- ▶  $A = \{ \text{It rained this day last year} \}$
- ▶  $A = \{ \text{A coin comes up heads} \}$
- ▶  $A = \{ \text{There is life beyond earth} \}$
- ▶  $A = \{ \text{Finland will win European football championship in 2020} \}$
- ▶  $A = \{ \text{Ålesund has more inhabitants than Molde} \}$



# Uncertainty

- ▶ Aleatory uncertainty
  - ▶ Due to randomness
  - ▶ We are not able to obtain observations which can reduce this uncertainty
- ▶ Epistemic uncertainty
  - ▶ Due to lack of knowledge
  - ▶ We are able to obtain observations which can reduce this uncertainty
  - ▶ Two observers may have different epistemic uncertainty



# Probability interpretations

Two commonly used interpretations:

- ▶ Frequentist, objective
  - ▶ Frequencies from repetitions of experiments (realizable or hypothetical)
  - ▶ Handles aleatory uncertainty
- ▶ Bayesian, subjective, degree of belief
  - ▶ Here  $A$  are propositions and  $P(A)$  is a degree of belief in  $A$  being true.
  - ▶ We may say “I believe to the extent of  $P(A)$  that  $A$  is true”.
  - ▶ Contrast with the frequentist interpretation: there  $P(A)$  is the proportion of times that  $A$  occurs to be true.
  - ▶ Handles both aleatory and epistemic uncertainty

In the earlier slide, which interpretation might be applied to  $P(A)$ ?



# Bayesian inference

- ▶ Interpret probability as a degree of belief
- ▶ Basic idea:
  - ▶ Start with your initial beliefs
  - ▶ Observe evidence
  - ▶ Update your beliefs based on evidence
- ▶ Uncertainty is represented by probability distributions



# Bayes' theorem revisited

- ▶ We want the distribution of the parameters given the observed data:

$$P(\text{model} \mid \text{data})$$

- ▶ We can use the Bayes theorem:

$$P(\text{model} \mid \text{data}) = \frac{P(\text{data} \mid \text{model})P(\text{model})}{P(\text{data})}$$

- ▶  $P(\text{model} \mid \text{data})$ : Posterior probability of parameters after observing data
- ▶  $P(\text{data} \mid \text{model})$ : Likelihood
- ▶  $P(\text{model})$ : Prior probability of parameters before observing data
- ▶  $P(\text{data})$ : Normalizing constant





# Prior distribution

- ▶  $P(\theta)$ : Your belief about plausibility of  $\theta$  before observing data
  - ▶ But contains all of your prior knowledge
- ▶ Subjective: Your prior may differ from mine
  - ▶ Different priors  $\Rightarrow$  different posterior
  - ▶ The more data you have, the smaller the effect of the prior will be
- ▶ Why does it make sense to have a prior?
  - ▶ Incorporate prior knowledge
  - ▶ Regularization



# Different types of priors

- ▶ Cromwell's rule: If  $P(\theta) = 0$ , then the posterior  $P(\theta | D)$  is always zero (similarly, if  $P(\theta) = 1$ , then posterior is always 1)
- ▶ Uninformative/objective/reference prior
  - ▶ Uniform, as “wide” as possible.
  - ▶ Principle of indifference: all possibilities have an equal probability.
- ▶ Informative prior
  - ▶ Not uniform
  - ▶ Assumes that we have some prior knowledge
- ▶ Conjugate prior
  - ▶ Prior and posterior have the same type of distributions (given that likelihood is of certain type)
  - ▶ Simplifies the computations
  - ▶ More later ...



# Likelihood

- ▶  $P(D|\theta)$  is the probability that the model generates the observed data  $D$  when using parameter  $\theta$ 
  - ▶  $L(\theta) \equiv P(D|\theta)$ , with  $D$  held fixed, is called the *likelihood*
  - ▶  $f(y) \equiv P(D|\theta)$ , with  $\theta$  held fixed, is called the *observation model* or the *sampling distribution*



# Maximum likelihood estimation

- ▶ “Standard” machine learning approach
- ▶  $\theta_{ML} = \arg \max_{\theta} P(D|\theta)$
- ▶ Commonly used
  - ▶ For example, linear regression, neural networks
- ▶ A point estimate, does not quantify our uncertainty about  $\theta$



# Normalizing constant $P(D)$

- ▶ Also called *evidence* or *marginal likelihood*
- ▶ Discrete parameters:  $P(D) = \sum_{\theta} P(D, \theta)$
- ▶ Continuous parameters:  $P(D) = \int_{\theta} P(D, \theta) d\theta$
- ▶ Challenge: Typically too complex to be computed



# Posterior distribution

$$P(\theta | D) = \frac{P(D | \theta)P(\theta)}{P(D)}$$

- ▶ Posterior is the result of Bayesian inference
- ▶ Tells of the uncertainty related to the value of  $\theta$  after observing  $D$



## Bayes' theorem as an update rule

- ▶ Exchangeability: A sequence of random variables  $X_1, X_2, X_3, \dots$  is *exchangeable* if their joint distribution does not change when the positions in the sequence are changed
  - ▶ For example, independent and identically distributed variables
- ▶ For exchangeable variables it holds that

$$\begin{aligned}P(\theta \mid D_1, D_2) &= \frac{P(D_1, D_2 \mid \theta)P(\theta)}{P(D_1, D_2)} \\&= \frac{P(D_1 \mid D_2, \theta)P(D_2 \mid \theta)P(\theta)}{P(D_1 \mid D_2)P(D_2)} \\&= \frac{P(D_2 \mid D_1, \theta)P(D_1 \mid \theta)P(\theta)}{P(D_2 \mid D_1)P(D_1)} \\&= \frac{P(D_2 \mid D_1, \theta)}{P(D_2 \mid D_1)} \cdot \frac{P(D_1 \mid \theta)P(\theta)}{P(D_1)} \\&= \frac{P(D_2 \mid D_1, \theta)}{P(D_2 \mid D_1)} \cdot P(\theta \mid D_1) \\&= \frac{P_1(D_2 \mid \theta)P_1(\theta)}{P_1(D_2)}\end{aligned}$$




# Sequential Bayesian updating

- ▶ Several equivalent ways to compute the posterior  $P(\theta \mid D_1, D_2)$ 
  - ▶ Use prior  $P(\theta)$ , observe  $D = \{D_1, D_2\}$ , and compute  $P(\theta \mid D)$
  - ▶ Use prior  $P(\theta)$ , observe  $D_1$  and compute  $P(\theta \mid D_1)$ . Then use prior  $P(\theta \mid D_1)$ , observe  $D_2$ , and compute  $P(\theta \mid D_1, D_2)$
  - ▶ Use prior  $P(\theta)$ , observe  $D_2$  and compute  $P(\theta \mid D_2)$ . Then use prior  $P(\theta \mid D_2)$ , observe  $D_1$ , and compute  $P(\theta \mid D_1, D_2)$
- ▶ “Today’s posterior is tomorrow’s prior”
- ▶ Advantage: you can learn online and do not need to store data





# Effect of the prior



- ▶ When we have little data, the choice of the prior has large effect
- ▶ The more data we have, the smaller the effect of the prior
  - ▶ The stronger the prior, the more data you need to overdrive the prior



## Example: Bernoulli model

- ▶ Jupyter notebook: `Bernoulli_model.ipynb`



# Predictive distribution

- ▶ Prediction in standard machine learning:
  - ▶ Find a model  $\theta$  given data  $D$
  - ▶ Make predictions with  $\theta$
- ▶ Bayesian prediction:

$$\begin{aligned}P(d_{new} \mid D) &= \int_{\theta \in \Theta} P(\theta, d \mid D) d\theta \\&= \int_{\theta \in \Theta} P(d_{new} \mid \theta, D) P(\theta \mid D) d\theta \\&= \int_{\theta \in \Theta} P(d_{new} \mid \theta) P(\theta \mid D) d\theta\end{aligned}$$

- ▶ Bayesian prediction uses predictions  $P(d_{new} \mid \theta)$  from all the models  $\theta$ , and weighs them by the posterior probability  $P(\theta \mid D)$  of the models



# Predictive distribution

- ▶ Often we cannot compute the predictive distribution analytically
- ▶ Solution: Monte Carlo approximation
  1. For  $s = 1, \dots, S$ :
    - 1.1 Sample parameter values from the posterior:  $\theta_s \sim P(\theta \mid D)$
    - 1.2 Sample a data point given the parameter from the sampling distribution (likelihood):  $x_{new} \sim P(x \mid \theta_s)$
- ▶ The predictive distribution is represented by the samples



# Summarising the posterior

- ▶ Sometimes it is not convenient to present the results as a full posterior.
  - ▶ For example, if we have lots of parameters.
- ▶ We may be interested in only a handful of parameters or we will use the results for a particular task.
- ▶ Thus, it may be more convenient to summarize the posterior.



# Point estimates

- ▶ Sometimes we want to collapse the posterior into a single point.
- ▶ Maximum a posteriori (MAP) estimate (the most likely value)

$$\theta_{MAP} = \arg \max_{\theta} P(D | \theta)P(\theta)$$

- ▶ MAP estimate with a uniform prior is equal to the ML estimate
- ▶ Downsides:
  - ▶ No uncertainty measure
  - ▶ May overfit
  - ▶ Mode may be an untypical point



# Confidence intervals

- ▶ 95 % Bayesian confidence interval (or credible interval) is an interval where there is a 95% probability that the parameter is within the interval
  - ▶ Contrast to the frequentist approach where a confidence interval is a range where the statistic is 95% of the samples (assuming ML-estimate is correct)
- ▶ Not unique: may be centered with the median or the mean as a center point



# Why the Bayesian way makes more sense than the frequentist way (my subjective view)

- ▶ Suppose we have a null hypothesis  $H_0$  and an alternative hypothesis  $H_1$ . We want to know which one is true
- ▶ Frequentist way:
  - ▶ Compute  $p$  value: the probability of obtaining test results at least as extreme as the results actually observed during the test, assuming that the null hypothesis is correct.
- ▶ Bayesian way:
  - ▶ Compute posterior probability  $P(H_0 | D)$ : the probability that  $H_0$  is true given the observed data
- ▶ Typically, Bayesians answer the questions that you would like to ask





## Further readings

- ▶ Bishop 1.2.3, 2.1
- ▶ Hall: [Bayesian inference](#)

