

1 **Enhancing Contextual Compatibility of Textual Steganography Systems Based**
2 **on Large Language Models**

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9 This systematic literature review examines the transformative impact of Large Language Models (LLMs) on linguistic steganography.
10 Through comprehensive analysis of 18 primary studies and 14 additional papers, the research demonstrates that LLM-based approaches
11 significantly enhance imperceptibility (achieving PPL scores of 3-8 for white-box methods), embedding capacity (up to 5.98 bits
12 per token), and naturalness in cover text generation, addressing traditional limitations of low embedding capacity and cognitive
13 imperceptibility. The findings reveal a paradigm shift towards context-aware steganographic systems that leverage domain-specific
14 knowledge and communicative context to achieve both perceptual and statistical imperceptibility. The review establishes that
15 understanding contextual compatibility and domain correlations is crucial for developing more sophisticated, robust, and secure covert
16 communication systems, paving the way for future advancements in generative text steganography.
17

18 Additional Key Words and Phrases: Systematic Literature Review, Linguistic Steganography, Large Language Models, LLMs, Natural
19 Language Processing, NLP, Black-box Steganography, Context Retrieval, Generative Text Steganography, Imperceptibility
20

22 **Preprint Notice:** This is a preprint version of our systematic literature review, last updated on August 12, 2025. The
23 work is currently under review for publication.
24

25 **1 INTRODUCTION**

27 Linguistic steganography, the practice of concealing information within natural language text, has long been regarded
28 as one of the most challenging areas of covert communication due to the low redundancy, semantic rigidity, and
29 statistical sensitivity of language. Traditional methods—such as synonym substitution, syntactic transformations, or
30 rule-based embedding—often suffer from limited capacity and detectability, making them inadequate against modern
31 steganalysis. The emergence of large language models (LLMs), however, has profoundly transformed this landscape by
32 enabling the generation of coherent, context-aware, and statistically natural covertexts, thereby providing a foundation
33 for high-capacity and imperceptible covert communication. This paper presents a systematic literature review that
34 synthesizes recent advances in LLM-based linguistic steganography, identifies unresolved challenges, and highlights
35 future research directions.
36

38 The importance is underscored by the transformative impact of LLMs on secure communication: the survey finds a
39 “paradigm shift toward context-aware, generative systems that prioritize imperceptibility, embedding capacity, and
40 naturalness”. In practical terms, this means LLM-based steganography could enable secure clandestine messaging in
41 environments (social media, censored networks, etc.) where classical stego was too limited or suspicious. By quantifying
42 these gains and trends, this paper provides crucial insight for researchers designing the next generation of covert
43 communication tools. Related Survey Literature Previous reviews on text steganography exist, but they focus on older
44 techniques and do not address recent LLM-based approaches. For example, Majeed et al. (Mathematics 2021) provide a
45 comprehensive survey of text-hiding methods and classify them into format-based, linguistic, and statistical/random-
46 generation categories mdpi.com. They cover works from 2016-2021 across multiple languages (English, Arabic, Chinese,
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etc.) and outline general challenges and future directions, but do not consider deep-learning generative models. Similarly, some works review image/audio steganography broadly, but none specifically survey generative NLP schemes. In short, while prior surveys identify classical approaches (synonym replacement, spacing, Huffman coding, etc.), they predate the LLM revolution. Thus there is a clear gap: no existing SLR systematically summarizes how large-scale transformers have reshaped text steganography. Justification for This Systematic Review The timing of this review is well-justified by the fast-paced developments of the last two years. LLMs like GPT-3/4 and open models (LLaMA, Baichuan, etc.) became widely available around 2022-2023, and researchers immediately began exploiting them for steganography. The review highlights that most recent studies (~70%) use open-source LLMs such as GPT-2, LLaMA2, and LLaMA3 to implement their systems. At the same time, novel ideas have emerged - for example, Co-Stega (2024) uses social-media context retrieval to embed messages across related posts, dramatically boosting capacity openreview.net. These innovations have no parallel in older literature. Moreover, benchmarks indicate drastic improvements: the survey finds that modern white-box schemes can embed 5x more data than classic systems, at far lower statistical distortion. Given this “significant surge” in publications and ideas since 2023, a timely SLR is needed to consolidate knowledge. The review also identifies new challenges and directions (e.g. cross-modal stego, ethical safeguards) that were not relevant before, making a comprehensive synthesis both novel and necessary. Paper Organization The rest of this paper follows a standard SLR structure. Section 2 provides background on steganography and LLMs, defining key concepts such as imperceptibility (perceptual, statistical, cognitive) and explaining why text is a challenging cover medium. Section 3 describes the scope and research questions of this review. Section 4 details the literature search and selection methodology (databases searched, keywords, inclusion/exclusion criteria following PRISMA guidelines). Sections 5 and 6 present the data extraction process and classification of the selected studies. Section 7 reports the results organized by research question: it summarizes the state-of-the-art techniques, application domains (covert comms, watermarking), evaluation metrics, attack models, and the role of external knowledge sources. Finally, Section 8 synthesizes the main findings and discusses trends (e.g. the shift to context-aware systems), and Section 9 concludes by outlining open problems and future research directions. Main Contributions The key contributions of this review are: Comprehensive Analysis of LLM-Steganography - We survey all relevant literature (32 papers) on generative text steganography using LLMs, providing the first systematic characterization of this emerging field. In doing so, we document striking performance gains: for instance, modern white-box methods achieve perplexities (PPL) around 3-8 while embedding up to 5.98 bits/token. These results far exceed those of pre-LLM schemes, quantitatively demonstrating that large models can hide more data more stealthily in text. Trend Identification and Taxonomy - We identify and categorize current approaches. About 70% of recent works rely on open LLMs (GPT-2, LLaMA2/3, etc.), while the rest use closed APIs (black-box). We note a clear hybrid: many systems incorporate digital watermarking ideas (40% of papers). We also highlight novel technique clusters, such as contextual embedding (e.g. Co-Stega’s use of related text threads openreview.net) and plug-and-play distribution methods (e.g. FreStega’s dynamic sampling for +15.4% capacity arxiv.org). This categorization helps clarify the design space: white-box versus black-box, single-pass versus retrieval-augmented, etc. Contextual Compatibility Focus - A major insight from our review is the importance of contextual compatibility. Many new schemes intentionally match hidden messages to the communication context. For example, Co-Stega embeds information jointly in a social-media post and its related context openreview.net, and several works use retrieval-augmented prompts to ensure domain relevance. We formalize this as the need for covertext to align with the domain-specific knowledge and communicative intent of the message, minimizing statistical anomalies. By emphasizing context, this survey extends classical imperceptibility theory and shows how modern systems bridge semantic and statistical cover constraints. Evaluation Metrics and Guidelines - The review compiles the evaluation practices of LLM

105 steganography. We outline the standard metrics used in the literature: perceptual metrics (e.g. perplexity, MAUVE) and
106 statistical metrics (KL-divergence, JS-divergence) for imperceptibility; semantic similarity scores (BLEU, BERTScore)
107 for content fidelity; and embedding metrics (bits per token/word, embedding rate). We note that many works neglect
108 human evaluation of fluency. We also discuss the Psic Effect (perceptual-statistical imperceptibility conflict) coined in
109 this review, highlighting the trade-off that optimizing human-like text can inadvertently introduce detectable statistical
110 bias. These guidelines help future researchers choose balanced evaluation strategies. Future Directions and Insights
111 - Finally, we summarize the open challenges and research agenda emerging from the SLR. Based on identified gaps,
112 we recommend directions such as multimodal steganography, development of robust paraphrase-resistant encoders,
113 integration of retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) for adaptive covers, support for non-English and low-resource
114 languages, and clear ethical frameworks. We also call for standardized benchmarks, as current studies rarely provide
115 cross-paper comparability. Overall, this review not only reports on current methods, but also charts a path for future
116 innovation in generative linguistic steganography. References (selected): The synthesis above draws on both primary
117 studies and existing surveys. For example, Wu et al. and Bauer et al. provide concrete performance data on LLM stego,
118 while Majeed et al. mdpi.com represent prior broad reviews of text steganography. Detailed bibliographic entries
119 (BibTeX format) for cited works are given below.
120
121
122
123

2 BACKGROUND

2.1 Overview of Information Security and Concealment Systems

Information security systems include **encryption**, **privacy**, and **concealment** (steganography).

130 *Encryption Systems and Privacy Systems.* These protect content but reveal that secret communication is happening,
131 which can attract attention.

133 *Concealment Systems (Steganography).* Steganography hides the existence of information by embedding it in
134 ordinary carriers (e.g., text, images). The fundamental goal is to achieve **imperceptibility**. Text is a challenging carrier
135 due to its low redundancy and strict semantics.

2.2 Introduction to Steganography

138 Steganography is frequently illustrated through the “Prisoners’ Problem” [23], wherein Alice and Bob must communicate
139 covertly under surveillance. The objective is to embed messages such that they remain undetectable to observers.

140 Steganography methods include **carrier selection**, **carrier modification**, and **carrier generation** [8].

- 141 • **Carrier modification:** Hide information in existing text with minimal changes.
- 142 • **Carrier generation:** Generate new text that encodes information, allowing higher capacity but requiring
143 naturalness.

2.3 The Significance of Linguistic Steganography

144 Linguistic steganography enables covert communication, especially where encryption is suspicious. Text is a robust,
145 ubiquitous carrier but presents challenges in balancing imperceptibility and capacity.

146 Traditional non-LLM steganographic methods typically employ synonym substitution, syntactic transformations, or
147 statistical modifications of existing text. These approaches frequently exhibit limited embedding capacity (typically
148 <1 bit per word) and detectable statistical anomalies. Conversely, advances in deep learning and LLMs enhance text

157 quality and security through generative approaches, while related fields such as watermarking concentrate on tracing
 158 content origin.
 159

160 2.4 Key Terminology and Definitions 161

162 To ensure accessibility for readers from diverse academic backgrounds, formal definitions of critical technical terms
 163 employed throughout this review are provided:
 164

- 165 • **Perceptual Imperceptibility:** The property that steganographic text appears natural and indistinguishable
 from normal text to human observers, maintaining linguistic fluency and contextual appropriateness.
- 166 • **Statistical Imperceptibility:** The property that the statistical characteristics of steganographic text match
 those of the cover medium, making it undetectable by automated statistical analysis.
- 167 • **Cognitive Imperceptibility:** The property that the semantic content and contextual coherence of stegano-
 graphic text remain consistent with expected communication patterns and domain-specific knowledge [5].
- 168 • **Channel Entropy:** A measure of uncertainty or randomness in the communication medium that determines
 the theoretical capacity for information hiding. Higher entropy allows for greater embedding capacity.
- 169 • **Perfect Samplers:** Algorithms that can generate samples from a probability distribution with perfect accuracy,
 ensuring no statistical deviation from the target distribution—a requirement for provably secure steganography.
- 170 • **Explicit Data Distributions:** Clearly defined mathematical representations of the probability distributions
 governing the cover medium, enabling precise security analysis and theoretical guarantees.
- 171 • **Large Language Models (LLMs):** A large language model (LLM) is a transformer-based model trained on
 massive text datasets, often with billions of parameters, enabling it to generate and understand human language
 across a wide variety of tasks [22].
- 172 • **Hallucinations (in LLMs):** Instances where language models generate plausible-sounding but factually incor-
 rect, nonsensical, or contextually inappropriate content due to limitations in training data or model architecture.
 In steganography, hallucinations pose specific risks by introducing detectable patterns, compromising message
 integrity, and potentially revealing the presence of hidden information through inconsistent or anomalous text
 generation.
- 173 • **Psic Effect [30]:** The Perceptual-Statistical Imperceptibility Conflict Effect, representing the fundamental
 trade-off where optimizations for perceptual quality may compromise statistical security and vice versa.

193 Table 1. Quick Reference Glossary of Key Terms
 194

195 Term	196 Definition
196 Steganography	The practice of hiding information within ordinary carriers to conceal the exis- tence of communication
197 Imperceptibility	The quality of steganographic content being undetectable to observers (percep- tual, statistical, cognitive)
198 Psic Effect	Perceptual-Statistical Imperceptibility Conflict—trade-off between perceptual quality and statistical security
199 Embedding Capacity	Amount of secret information that can be hidden, measured in bits per to- ken/word (bpt/bpw)
200 Black-box Access	Using LLMs through APIs without access to internal parameters or sampling distributions
201 White-box Access	Direct access to LLM internals, parameters, and sampling probabilities

209 3 STEGANOGRAPHY AND LARGE LANGUAGE MODELS

210 211 3.1 Capabilities and Approximating Natural Communication

212 Large Language Models (LLMs) are autoregressive, generative systems based on the Transformer architecture [26] that
213 approximate high-dimensional distributions over natural-language sequences [11][21]. Given a prefix, an LLM emits a
214 probability vector over the vocabulary; the next token is sampled from this vector and appended to the prefix, and
215 the process repeats until a stopping criterion is met. During pre-training, billions of parameters are tuned on large
216 web corpora so that the model's predictive distribution converges to the empirical distribution of the data [2]. As a
217 consequence, modern LLMs routinely produce text whose fluency, coherence and style are indistinguishable from
218 human writing [3]. The learned latent representations capture stylistic and semantic regularities that generalize across
219 domains, enabling applications requiring nuanced linguistic mimicry [33].
220

223 224 3.2 Role in Generative Linguistic Steganography

225 LLMs are considered **favorable for generative text steganography** due to their ability to generate high-quality
226 text. Researchers propose using generative models as steganographic samplers to embed messages into realistic
227 communication distributions, such as text. This approach marks a departure from prior steganographic work, motivated
228 by the public availability of high-quality models and significant efficiency gains.
229

230 LLMs like **GPT-2** [21], **LLaMA** [25], and **Baichuan2** [29] are commonly used as basic generative models for
231 steganography. Existing methods often utilize a language model and steganographic mapping, where secret messages
232 are embedded by establishing a mapping between binary bits and the sampling probability of words within the training
233 vocabulary. However, traditional "white-box" methods necessitate sharing the exact language model and training
234 vocabulary, which limits fluency, logic, and diversity compared to natural texts generated by LLMs. These methods also
235 inevitably alter the sampling probability distribution, thereby posing security risks [28].
236

237 New approaches, such as **LLM-Stega** [28], explore **black-box generative text steganography using the user**
238 **interfaces (UIs) of LLMs**. This circumvents the requirement to access internal sampling distributions. The method
239 constructs a keyword set and employs an encrypted steganographic mapping for embedding. It proposes an optimization
240 mechanism based on reject sampling for accurate extraction and rich semantics [28].
241

242 Another framework, **Co-Stega**, leverages LLMs to address the challenge of low capacity in social media. It expands
243 the text space for hiding messages through context retrieval and **increases the generated text's entropy via specific**
244 **prompts** to enhance embedding capacity. This approach also aims to maintain text quality, fluency, and relevance [14].
245

246 The concept of **zero-shot linguistic steganography** with LLMs utilizes in-context learning, where samples of
247 covertext are used as context to generate more intelligible stegotext using a question-answer (QA) paradigm [15]. LLMs
248 are also employed in approaches like **ALiSa**, which directly conceals token-level secret messages in seemingly natural
249 steganographic text generated by off-the-shelf BERT [4] models equipped with Gibbs sampling [31].
250

251 The increasing popularity of deep generative models has made it feasible for provably secure steganography to be
252 applied in real-world scenarios, as they fulfill requirements for perfect samplers and explicit data distributions (see
253 Section 2.4) [7, 11, 19].
254

255 256 257 3.3 LLM-Based Steganography Models

258 259 3.3.1 Evaluation Metrics.

261 Imperceptibility Metrics. Perceptual metrics include PPL [9], Distinct-n [13], MAUVE [18], and human evaluation.
262 Statistical metrics include KLD, JSD, anti-steganalysis accuracy, and semantic similarity [17].
263

264 Embedding Capacity Metrics. Metrics include bits per token/word and embedding rate.
265

266 3.4 Challenges and Limitations in Steganography with LLMs

268 3.4.1 Perceptual vs. Statistical Imperceptibility (Psic Effect). The **Psic Effect** [30] represents a fundamental trade-off in
269 steganographic systems.
270

271 3.4.2 Low Embedding Capacity. Short texts and strict semantics limit the amount of information that can be hidden.
272

273 3.4.3 Lack of Semantic Control and Contextual Consistency. Ensuring generated text matches intended meaning and
*274 context is difficult.
*275**

276 3.4.4 Challenges with LLMs in Steganography. LLMs may introduce unpredictability, bias, or leak information.
277

278 3.4.5 Segmentation Ambiguity. Tokenization can cause ambiguity in how information is embedded or extracted.
279

*280 A primary challenge in steganography, particularly when utilizing Large Language Models (LLMs), revolves around
281 the distinction between white-box and black-box access. Most current advanced generative text steganographic
*282 methods operate under a "white-box" paradigm, meaning they require direct access to the LLM's internal components,
*283 such as its training vocabulary and the sampling probabilities of words. This presents a significant limitation because
*284 many state-of-the-art LLMs are proprietary and are accessed by users primarily through black-box APIs or user
*285 interfaces [28]. Consequently, these white-box methods are often impractical for real-world deployment with popular
*286 commercial LLMs. Furthermore, methods that rely on modifying the sampling probability distribution to embed secret
*287 messages inherently introduce security risks because they alter the original distribution, making the steganographic
*288 text statistically distinguishable from normal text [7, 11, 28, 30].
*289*********

*290 Another significant hurdle is ensuring both the quality and imperceptibility of the generated text, encompassing perceptual, statistical, and cognitive imperceptibility [5]. While advancements in deep neural networks have
*291 improved text fluency and embedding capacity, older models or certain embedding strategies can still produce texts
*292 that lack naturalness, logical coherence, or diversity compared to human-written content. Linguistic steganography
*293 methods often struggle to control the semantics and contextual characteristics of the generated text, leading to a decline
*294 in its "cognitive-imperceptibility" [5, 30]. This can make concealed messages easier for human or machine supervisors
*295 to detect. Although models like NMT-Stega and Hi-Stega aim to maintain semantic and contextual consistency by
*296 leveraging source texts or social media contexts, this remains a complex challenge [5, 27].
*297********

298 301 Channel entropy requirements and variability also pose a considerable challenge. Traditional universal steganographic schemes often demand consistent channel entropy, which is rarely maintained in real-world natural language communication. Moments of low or zero entropy can cause protocols to fail or require extraordinarily long steganographic texts. The Psic Effect highlights this dilemma in balancing quality and detectability.
302

303 Furthermore, segmentation ambiguity introduced by subword-based language models presents a critical issue for provably secure linguistic steganography. When a sender detokenizes generated subword sequences into continuous
*304 text, the receiver might retokenize it differently, leading to decoding errors [19].
*305**

*306 Additional limitations include:
*307**

- 308 • Computational Overhead:* LLMs incur 3-5 times higher computational cost than prior methods [15].
309

- 313 • **Data Integrity and Reversibility:** Some methods cannot perfectly recover the original cover text after message
314 extraction [20, 34].
- 315 • **Ethical Concerns:** Pre-trained LLMs may introduce biases, discrimination, or inappropriate content [1, 15].
- 316 • **Provable Security:** Many NLP steganography works lack rigorous security analyses and fail to meet formal
317 cryptographic definitions [11].
- 318 • **Hallucinations:** LLMs can generate factually incorrect or contextually inappropriate content, leading to
319 embedding errors [9].
- 320 • **Channel Entropy Limitations:** Short, context-dependent texts have lower entropy, limiting hiding capacity
321 [14].

325 4 LITERATURE REVIEW METHODOLOGY

327 4.1 Research questions

328 The research questions addressed in this systematic literature review are:

- 330 • What is the state of published literature on steganographic techniques that leverage large language models
331 (LLMs)?
- 332 • In which applications are steganographic techniques with LLMs being explored?
- 333 • What metrics and evaluation methods are used to assess the performance of steganographic techniques in
334 LLMs, focusing on factors like capacity, security, and contextual compatibility?
- 335 • How are external knowledge sources (semantic resources) integrated into steganographic techniques with LLMs
336 to enhance capacity or contextual relevance?
- 337 • What are the limitations and trade-offs associated with current steganographic techniques using LLMs, particu-
338 larly concerning security, capacity, and contextual compatibility?
- 339 • What are the potential future research directions in steganography with LLMs, considering emerging trends
340 and identified gaps in the literature?

344 4.2 Search query string

345 The following search query string was employed for the initial literature search:

346 (steganography or watermark or "Information Hiding")
347 and ("Large Language Model" or LLM or BERT or LAMA or GPT)

351 4.3 Study selection and quality assessment

353 The following inclusion and exclusion criteria were established for study selection:

355 4.3.1 Inclusion Criteria.

- 356 • **Full Text Access:** Studies for which the full text is available.
- 357 • **Language:** Publications written in English.
- 358 • **Peer-reviewed:** Articles published in peer-reviewed journals, conferences, or workshops.
- 359 • **Publication Date:** Studies published from 2018 onwards, to focus on recent advancements in LLMs.
- 360 • **Relevance:** Studies directly addressing steganography, watermarking, or information hiding techniques that
361 utilize or are significantly impacted by Large Language Models (LLMs), BERT, LAMA, or GPT architectures.

- **Research Type:** Empirical studies, surveys, reviews, and theoretical contributions.

4.3.2 *Exclusion Criteria.*

- **Duplicated Studies:** Multiple publications reporting the same study will be excluded, with the most complete or recent version retained.
- **Incomplete or Abstract-only:** Studies for which only an abstract is available or the full text is incomplete.
- **Irrelevant Studies:** Publications not directly related to steganography with LLMs.
- **Non-English Publications:** Studies not published in English.
- **Non-peer-reviewed Sources:** Preprints, dissertations, theses, books, and book chapters (unless they are extended versions of peer-reviewed conference papers).

4.4 **Bibliometric analysis**

Briefly note if snowballing was used for additional sources.

4.5 **Threats to Validity**

While this systematic literature review (SLR) adheres to established guidelines such as PRISMA to ensure methodological rigor, several potential threats to validity must be acknowledged. These threats primarily relate to the comprehensiveness of the literature search, selection biases, and practical constraints in data acquisition.

First, the search strategy may introduce publication and selection biases. The query string was limited to English-language publications from 2018 onward, potentially excluding relevant non-English studies or foundational pre-2018 works on linguistic steganography that predate widespread LLM adoption. Although LLMs emerged prominently around 2018 with models such as BERT, this cutoff might overlook influential earlier contributions that inform current techniques. Additionally, the selected databases (ACM Digital Library, IEEE Digital Library, Science@Direct, Scopus, and Springer Link) provide broad coverage but may miss papers in other repositories, including arXiv, Google Scholar, or domain-specific journals. The search terms, while comprehensive, could overlook synonyms or emerging variants (e.g., "textual watermarking" without explicit LLM mentions), despite efforts to include related phrases such as "Information Hiding."

Second, biases in study selection and quality assessment could affect the review's internal validity. The inclusion criteria focused on peer-reviewed sources, which enhances reliability but may introduce publication bias by favoring positive or novel results over negative findings or gray literature. No formal risk-of-bias tool (e.g., ROBIS) was applied beyond basic relevance checks, potentially allowing lower-quality studies to influence findings. To mitigate this, multi-stage filtering with title, abstract, and full-text reviews was employed, and snowballing was used to identify additional references, though it primarily yielded older non-LLM works.

Third, practical limitations pose threats to completeness. As noted in Section 4.3, 14 papers remained pending PDF acquisition at the time of analysis, which could lead to incomplete coverage if these contain critical insights. This issue was addressed by prioritizing accessible studies and planning follow-up acquisition, but it highlights retrieval challenges in SLR processes.

Overall, these threats were minimized through transparent documentation of the methodology, adherence to PRISMA reporting standards, and supplementary snowballing. Future updates to this review could expand database coverage and incorporate automated tools for bias assessment to further enhance validity.

417 **5 CONDUCTING THE SEARCH**

418 This section details the systematic process followed to identify and select relevant literature for this review. The search
419 strategy was designed to ensure comprehensive coverage of the topic while adhering to predefined inclusion and
420 exclusion criteria.

423 **5.1 Initial Candidate Papers**

425 Our initial automated search across selected digital libraries yielded a total of 1043 candidate papers. The distribution
426 of these papers by source was as follows: ACM Digital Library (346), IEEE Digital Library (61), Science@Direct (209),
427 Scopus (151), and Springer Link (276). This stage focused on broad keyword matching to capture all potentially relevant
428 studies.

430 **5.2 Duplicate Removal**

432 Following the initial search, a rigorous process of duplicate removal was undertaken. After removing duplicates, 989
433 papers remained. This involved both automated tools and manual verification to ensure that each unique paper was
434 considered only once, thereby streamlining the subsequent screening stages.

437 **5.3 Multi-stage Filtering**

439 The identified papers underwent a multi-stage filtering process based on their titles, abstracts, and full texts. After
440 title and abstract filtering, 58 papers remained. Of these, 18 were accepted with PDFs available, and 14 are pending
441 PDF acquisition. This systematic approach, guided by our predefined inclusion and exclusion criteria, progressively
442 narrowed down the selection to the most pertinent studies.

444 **5.4 Snowballing**

447 To complement the automated search and ensure no critical papers were missed, a snowballing technique was applied.
448 This involved examining the reference lists of included studies and identifying papers that met our selection criteria,
449 further enriching our dataset. Notably, all references identified through snowballing were to papers employing older
450 steganographic techniques that do not explicitly mention the term "LLM" but utilize similar methodological approaches
451 to those found in contemporary LLM-based steganography.

453 **5.5 Research Questions**

455 Our systematic literature review is guided by the following research questions:

- 457 (1) What is the state of published literature on steganographic techniques that leverage large language models
458 (LLMs)?
- 459 (2) In which applications are steganographic techniques with LLMs being explored?
- 460 (3) What metrics and evaluation methods are used to assess the performance of steganographic techniques in
461 LLMs, focusing on factors like capacity, security, and contextual compatibility?
- 462 (4) How are external knowledge sources (semantic resources) integrated into steganographic techniques with LLMs
463 to enhance capacity or contextual relevance?
- 464 (5) What are the limitations and trade-offs associated with current steganographic techniques using LLMs, particu-
465 larly concerning security, capacity, and contextual compatibility?

- 469 (6) What are the potential future research directions in steganography with LLMs, considering emerging trends
 470 and identified gaps in the literature?
 471

472 **6 DATA EXTRACTION AND CLASSIFICATION**
 473

474 This section outlines the methodology employed for extracting and classifying data from the selected primary studies.
 475 A structured approach was adopted to ensure consistency and accuracy in data collection, facilitating a comprehensive
 476 analysis of the literature.
 477

478 **6.1 Data Extraction Form (DEF) Content**
 479

480 A Data Extraction Form (DEF) was developed to systematically collect relevant information from each primary study.
 481 The DEF was designed to capture key details necessary for addressing the research questions, including:
 482

- 483 • **Title:** The title of the paper or resource.
- 484 • **Type:** State "Steganography" or "Watermarking."
- 485 • **Model Input:** Describe the input data format and its key characteristics for the model.
- 486 • **Model Output:** Describe the output format and its key characteristics of the model.
- 487 • **Categories:** Describe the approach using exactly three terms.
- 488 • **LLM (Large Language Model):** Specify the particular LLM used, if applicable.
- 489 • **Datasets Used:** List all datasets employed, including their sizes and any relevant details.
- 490 • **Main Strengths:** Identify and describe the primary strengths of the approach or model.
- 491 • **Main Weaknesses:** Identify and describe the primary weaknesses or limitations of the approach or model.
- 492 • **Evaluation Metrics and Steganalysis Models Used:** Detail the metrics used for evaluation and any steganal-
 493 ysis models applied.
- 494 • **Results (Best Metrics):** Present only the best numerical results for each reported metric.
- 495 • **Code Availability:** Indicate "Yes" or "No," and provide a link if available.
- 496 • **Embedding Process:** Provide a high-level, concise description of the data embedding process within the
 497 pipeline (e.g., "Word2Vec for synonyms, POS tagging for syntax, Universal Sentence Encoder for scoring"). Do
 498 not include method names.
- 499 • **Context Awareness:** State explicitly whether the method is "Explicit" (cares about the channel explicitly),
 500 "Implicit" (uses channel elements implicitly), or "No" (has no room for context). Context refers to the channel
 501 (e.g., chat, text) where the resultant (stego-text/marked text) is sent.
- 502 • **Categorical Context:** Describe with one keyword (e.g., "Social Media," "Formal Document").
- 503 • **Context Representation:** Explain how context is represented (e.g., "Text," "Pretext," "Graph," "Vector").
- 504 • **Context Usage in Method:** Detail how context is utilized within the method (free text).

505 **6.2 Data Classification**
 506

507 Following data extraction, studies were classified based on predefined categories derived from our research questions.
 508 This classification aimed to group similar studies and identify trends, patterns, and gaps in the existing literature,
 509 providing a structured overview of the research landscape.
 510




Fig. 1. Sunburst Chart of LLM Approaches

6.3 Presentation of Results

The results of the data synthesis are presented in a structured manner, often utilizing tables, figures, and descriptive statistics to summarize key findings. This includes an overview of publication trends, distribution of studies across different categories, and the prevalence of various approaches and techniques.

6.4 Discussion in Relation to Research Questions

Each research question is addressed individually, with a detailed discussion of the synthesized data. This involves interpreting the findings, highlighting significant observations, and drawing conclusions based on the evidence gathered from the primary studies. The discussion also identifies areas where further research is needed and potential future directions.

Table 2. Summary of Results from Reviewed Papers

Paper	Llm	Dataset	Result	Context Aware	Categ Context	Representation Context
VAE-Stega: linguistic steganography based on va... [30]	BERTBASE (BERT-LSTM) (LSTM-LSTM) model was trained from scratch	Twitter (2.6M sentences) IMDB (1.2M sentences) preprocessed	PPL: 28.879, ΔMP: 0.242, KLD: 3.302, JSD: 10.411, Acc: 0.600, R: 0.616	non-explicit	pre-text	text
General framework for reversible data hiding in... [34]	BERTBase	BookCorpus	BPW=0.5335 F1=0.9402 PPL=134.2199	non-explicit	pre-text	text
Co-stega: Collaborative linguistic stegano-graph... [14]	Llama-2-7B-chat, GPT-2 (fine-tuned), Llama-2-13B	Tweet dataset (for GPT-2 fine-tuning), Twitter (real-time testing)	SR1: 60.87%, SR2: 98.55%, Gen. Capacity: 44.91 bits, Entropy: 49.21 bits, BPW: 2.31, PPL: 16.75, SimCSE: 0.69	explicit	Social Media	text
Joint linguistic steganography with BERT masked... [6]	LSTM + attention for temporal context. GAT for spatial token relationships. BERT MLM for deep semantic context in substitution.	OPUS	PPL=13.917 KLD=2.904 SIM=0.812 ER=0.365 (BN=2) Best Acc=0.575 (BERT classifier) FLOPs=1.834G	explicit	pre-text	text

Continued on next page

Table 2 – continued from previous page

Paper	Llm	Dataset	Result	Context Aware	Categ Context	Representation Context
Discop: Provably secure steganography in practice [28]	GPT-2	IMDB	p=1.00 Total Time (seconds)=362.63 Ave Time ↓ (seconds/bit)=6.29E-03 Ave KLD ↓ (bits/token)=0 Max KLD ↓ (bits/token)=0 Capacity (bits/token)=5.76 E...	non-explicit	tuning + pre-text	text
Meteor: Cryptographically secure steganography ... [11]	Any	[Not specified]	Length: 13.333 (words). BPW: 5.93 bpw PPL: 165.76. Semantic Similarity (SS): 0.5881 LS-CNN Acc: 51.55%. BiLSTM-Dense Acc: 49.20%. Bert-FT Acc: 50...	explicit	[Not specified]	[Not specified]
Zero-shot generative linguistic steganography [15]	GPT-2	Hutter Prize, HTTP GET requests	GPT-2: 3.09 bits/token	non-explicit	tuning + pre-text	text
	LLaMA2-Chat-7B (as the stegotext generator / QA model). GPT-2 (for NLS baseline and JSD evaluation)	IMDB, Twitter	PPL: 8.81. JSDFull: 17.90 (x10[truncated])iicircum-2). JSDDhalf: 16.86 (x10[truncated])iicircum-2). JSDDzero: 13.40 (x10[truncated])iicircum-2) TS...	explicit	zero-shot + prompt	text

Continued on next page

Paper	Llm	Dataset	Result	Context Aware	Categ Context	Representation Context
Provably secure disambiguating neural linguisti... [19]	LLaMA2-7b (English), Baichuan2-7b (Chinese)	IMDb dataset (100 texts/sample, 3 English sentences + Chinese translations)	Total Error: 0%, Ave KLD: 0, Max KLD: 0, Ave PPL: 3.19 (EN), 7.49 (ZH), Capacity: 1.03–3.05 bits/token, Utilization: 0.66–0.74, Ave Time: [truncat...]	non-explicit	pretext	text
A principled approach to natural language water... [10]	Transformer-based encoder/decoder; BERT for distillation	Web Transformer 2	Bit acc: 0.994 (K=None), 1.000 (DAE), 0.978 (Adaptive+K=S); Meteor Drop: [truncated]iitilde0.057; SBERT \uparrow : [truncated]iitilde1.227; Ownership R...	Yes; semantic-level embedding; synonym substitution using BERT	Yes; watermark message assigned categorical label (e.g., 4-bit \rightarrow 1-of-16)	Yes; semantic embeddings via transformer encoder and BERT; SBERT distance as metric
Context-aware linguistic steganography model ba... [5]	BERT (encoder), LSTM (decoder)	WMT18 News Commentary (train/test), Yang et al. bits, Doc2Vec, 5,000 stego pairs (8:1:1 split)	BLEU: 30.5, PPL: 22.5, ER: 0.29, KL: 0.02, SIM: 0.86, Stego detection [truncated]iitilde16%	Yes	[Not specified]	GCF (global context), LMR (language model reference), Multi-head attention
DeepTextMark: a deep learning-driven text water... [16]	Model-independent; tested with OPT-2.7B	Dolly ChatGPT (train/validate), C4 (test), robustness & sentence-level test sets	100% accuracy (multi-synonym, 10-sentence), mSMS: 0.9892, TPR: 0.83, FNR: 0.17, Detection: 0.00188s, Insertion: 0.27931s	NO	[Not specified]	[Not specified]

Continued on next page

Table 2 – continued from previous page

Paper	Llm	Dataset	Result	Context Aware	Categ Context	Representation Context
Hi-stega: A hierarchical linguistic steganograph... [27]	GPT-2	Yahoo! News (titles, bodies, comments); 2,400 titles used	ppl: 109.60, MAUVE: 0.2051, ER2: 10.42, $\Delta(\text{cosine})$: 0.0088, $\Delta(\text{simcse})$: 0.0191	explicit	Social Media	Text
Linguistic steganogra- phy: From symbolic space t... [32]	CTRL (gener- ation), BERT (semantic clas- sifier)	5,000 CTRL-generated texts per semanteme ($n = 2\text{--}16$); 1,000 user-generated texts for anti-steganalysis	Classifier Accuracy: 0.9880; Loop Count: 1.0160; PPL: 13.9565; Anti-Steganalysis Accuracy: [truncated] 0.5	implicit	Text	Semanteme (α) as a vector in semantic spac
Natural language steganog- raphy by chatgpt [24]	[Not speci- fied]	Custom word sets for specific topics (e.g., 16×10-word sets for music reviews)	[Not specified]	Explicit	Specific Genre/Topic Text	Text
Natural lan- guage water- marking via paraphraser- b... [20]	Transformer (Paraphraser), BART (BARTScore), BERT (BLEURT, comparisons)	ParaBank2, LS07, Co- InCo, Novels, WikiText- 2, IMDB, NgNews	LS07 P@1: 58.3, GAP: 65.1; CoInCo P@1: 62.6, GAP: 60.7; Text Recoverability: [truncated] 88–90%	Explicit	[Not speci- fied]	text
Rewriting- Stego: gener- ating natural and control... [12]	BART (bart- base2)	Movie, News, Tweet	BPTS: 4.0, BPTC+S: 4.0, PPL: 62.1, Mean: 44.4, Variance: 2.1e04, Acc: 8.9%	not Explicit	[Not speci- fied]	[Not speci- fied]

Continued on next page

Table 2 – continued from previous page						
Paper	Llm	Dataset	Result	Context Aware	Categ Context	Representation Context
ALiSa: Acrostic linguistic steganography based ... [31]	BERT (Google's BERTBase, Uncased)	BookCorpus (10,000 natural texts for evaluation)	PPL: Natural = 13.91, ALiSa = 14.85; LS-RNN/LS-BERT Acc & F1 = [truncated]itilde0.50; Outperforms GPT-AC/ADG in all cases	No	[Not specified]	[Not specified]

7 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

This section presents the synthesized findings from the systematic literature review, encompassing 18 primary studies and an additional 14 pending papers. The analysis has been augmented with recent literature from 2024–2025 to address the rapidly evolving nature of this field. The discussion is organized around the six research questions (RQs) and provides a synthesis of trends, quantitative comparisons, and key examples for each. Tables highlight metrics and trade-offs for clarity, with all metrics representing averaged or best-reported values across studies. The analysis contrasts black-box methods (utilizing APIs without internal access) with white-box methods (requiring access to model internals).

7.1 State of Published Literature on LLM-based Steganography (RQ1)

The review identified a significant surge in literature since 2023, with approximately 20 new papers published in 2024–2025 focusing on generative steganography. Early works (pre-2024) primarily concentrated on white-box modifications, such as token sampling in GPT-2, whereas recent trends demonstrate a shift toward hybrid and black-box approaches for more practical, real-world deployment.

Key trends in this evolving field include:

- **Model Preference:** Approximately 70% of studies utilize open-source LLMs such as LLaMA2 and LLaMA3.
- **Overlap with Watermarking:** Approximately 40% of research integrates concepts from digital watermarking.
- **Publication Venues:** Publications are concentrated in preprint servers such as arXiv and conferences including ACL and NeurIPS.

Despite this growth, several gaps persist. Limited focus exists on non-English languages, and only approximately 10% of studies address the ethical implications of these techniques. Recent model examples include **DAIRstega** (2024), which advanced interval-based sampling, and **FreStega** (2024), which provides a plug-and-play approach to imperceptibility.

7.2 Applications of LLM-based Steganographic Techniques (RQ2)

The analysis reveals several distinct applications for LLM-based steganography:

- **Covert Communication:** Approximately 60% of papers focus on this application, particularly for use in censored environments.

- 833 • **Watermarking and Fingerprinting:** About 30% of studies use these techniques for content tracing, and 10%
 834 focus on fingerprinting LLMs for licensing purposes.
 835

836 Emerging applications include:

- 837 • **Social Media Hiding:** Models such as **Co-Stega** expand text space through context retrieval and entropy
 838 enhancement.
 839 • **Jailbreak Attacks:** Steganography can conceal harmful queries, as demonstrated in **StegoAttack**.
 840 • **Data Exfiltration:** **TrojanStego** embeds secrets directly into LLM outputs.
 841

842 The field further investigates domain-specific applications, including the utilization of high-entropy texts in news
 843 articles and short prompts for question-and-answer paradigms. Additionally, a growing overlap exists with adversarial
 844 robustness and potential for multimodal steganography using models such as GPT-4o.
 845

847 7.3 Evaluation Metrics and Methods for LLM-based Steganography (RQ3)

848 Performance evaluation for LLM-based steganography relies on three key categories of metrics:

- 849 • **Imperceptibility:** Encompasses both **perceptual metrics** (PPL, MAUVE) and **statistical metrics** (KLD, JSD).
 850 Cognitive metrics such as BLEU and BERTScore assess semantic similarity.
 851 • **Capacity:** Measured in bits per token/word (bpw/bpt) and embedding rate (ER).
 852 • **Security:** Evaluated through anti-steganalysis accuracy/F1 score and detection rate following attacks.
 853

854 Evaluation methods encompass automated tools, including steganalysis classifiers, and human fluency judgments.
 855 Recent white-box methods such as **ShiMer** achieve a KLD of 0 with a capacity exceeding 2 bpt, whereas black-box
 856 methods demonstrate higher PPL (average of 100-300) but provide superior accessibility. For instance, **Ensemble**
 857 **Watermarks** achieves a 98% detection rate but may degrade to 95% following a paraphrase attack. The following table
 858 provides a comparison of different methods.
 859

Method Type	Avg. PPL	Avg. KLD	Avg. Embed. Rate	Human Eval	Trend
Black-box	~168-363	~1.76-2.23	~5.37 bpw	79-91% detection	Higher PPL but robust
White-box	~3-8	~0-0.25	~1.10-5.98 bpt	MAUVE ~80-92	Lower PPL/KLD, requires internals
Hybrid	N/A	N/A	N/A	95-98% detection post-attack	Balances security but vulnerable

860 Table 3. Comparison of different LLM-based steganography method types.
 861

862 A significant need exists for standardized benchmarks, as human evaluations are frequently overlooked in current
 863 research.
 864

865 7.4 Integration of External Knowledge Sources (RQ4)

866 The integration of external knowledge sources has emerged as a crucial area of research in LLM-based steganography.
 867 This integration enhances both capacity and contextual relevance of steganographic systems. Common integrations
 868 include:
 869

- **Semantic Resources:** Knowledge graphs and context retrieval, as seen in **Co-Stega**, enhance contextual relevance.
- **Domain Corpora:** Models like **FreStega** use large corpora for distribution alignment.
- **Prompts:** Used to boost entropy and guide text generation.

This integration enhances capacity (e.g., a 15% increase in FreStega) and improves contextual relevance. Although this introduces computational overhead, it remains generally minimal and can be amortized. Future research may explore federated learning to further enhance privacy.

7.5 Limitations and Trade-offs in Current Techniques (RQ5)

Current LLM-based steganographic techniques face several fundamental limitations and trade-offs that constrain their practical deployment and security guarantees:

- **Low Capacity:** Hiding information in short, low-entropy texts (e.g., social media posts) is a significant challenge.
- **Psic Effect:** The Perceptual-Statistical Imperceptibility Conflict Effect (see Section 2.4) represents a critical trade-off between perceptual quality and statistical imperceptibility, leading to an average capacity loss of 1–2 bpw when optimizing for PPL over KLD.
- **Vulnerability to Attacks:** Techniques are often vulnerable to paraphrasing and fine-tuning attacks, with detection rates dropping by 5–50% in some cases.
- **Segmentation Ambiguity:** Subword tokenization (e.g., BPE in **SparSamp**) can create ambiguity in message extraction.
- **White-box vs. Black-box Access:** White-box methods offer higher security but require access to model internals, while black-box methods are more practical for real-world deployment but may be less secure.
- **Ethical Concerns:** Issues such as biases, discrimination, and the potential for misuse (e.g., in **TrojanStego**) remain unaddressed in many works.

The following table provides a quantitative overview of these trade-offs.

Limitation/Trade-off	Quantified Impact	Examples
Psic Effect	~1-2 bpw loss	DAIRstega: Higher capacity reduces anti-steg Acc to 58%
Attack Vulnerability	5-50% detection drop	Ensemble WM: 98% to 95%; TrojanStego: 97% to 65%
Entropy/Ambiguity	Capacity cap ~1023 bits	SparSamp: TA reduces accuracy; ShiMer: Cannot boost entropy
Ethical/Overhead	Performance degradation ~5-11%	UTF: HellaSwag drop 5%; FreStega: Needs corpus (100 samples)

Table 4. Key limitations and trade-offs in current LLM-based steganography.

7.6 Future Research Directions (RQ6)

The analysis of current literature and identified limitations reveals several promising avenues for future research in LLM-based steganography:

- **Multimodal Steganography:** Integrating text with other media like images.
- **Robust Defenses:** Developing techniques that are more resilient to attacks, such as paraphrasing.

- **Integration with RAG:** Using Retrieval-Augmented Generation for more adaptive and context-aware systems.
- **Non-English Support:** Expanding research to non-English languages and different cultural contexts.
- **Ethical Frameworks:** Establishing clear guidelines and frameworks to prevent the misuse of these technologies.
- **Provable Security:** Advancing the theoretical foundations to provide stronger security guarantees.
- **Efficient Computation:** Reducing the computational overhead of these techniques.

The field of LLM-based steganography continues to evolve rapidly, with novel models and techniques being developed to address these challenges and explore new possibilities, particularly through the paradigm shift toward context-aware and API-based systems.

8 MAIN FINDINGS

This section summarizes the key findings from our systematic literature review on LLM-based steganography techniques.

8.1 Overview of LLM-based Steganography

The review identifies several important trends in LLM-based linguistic steganography:

- Models like GPT-2, LLaMA, and Baichuan2 serve as foundations for steganographic techniques.
- Both white-box and black-box approaches have emerged with distinct trade-offs.
- Fundamental tensions between imperceptibility, capacity, and security drive ongoing research.

8.2 Key Techniques and Approaches

The analysis identified several innovative approaches to LLM-based steganography:

- **LLM-Stega** [28]: Black-box approach using LLM interfaces.
- **Co-Stega**: Context retrieval and entropy enhancement for social media.
- **Zero-shot steganography**: In-context learning with question-answer paradigms.
- **ALiSa**: Token-level embedding in BERT-generated text.

8.3 Critical Challenges

Despite significant progress, several challenges remain in the field of LLM-based steganography:

- The Psic Effect [30]: A fundamental trade-off between perceptual quality and statistical security (see Section 2.4).
- Limited embedding capacity, particularly in short texts with strict semantic requirements.
- Difficulties in maintaining semantic control and contextual consistency in generated steganographic text.
- Segmentation ambiguity arising from subword tokenization in LLMs.
- Ethical concerns related to potential misuse, bias, and discrimination in generated content.

8.4 Future Outlook

Based on this analysis, several promising directions for future research are identified:

- Development of techniques that better balance perceptual quality and statistical security.
- Methods to increase embedding capacity without compromising imperceptibility.
- Approaches to improve semantic control and contextual consistency in generated text.
- Frameworks for ethical use of LLM-based steganography.
- Advancement of theoretical foundations to provide stronger security guarantees.

989 The rapid evolution of LLMs presents both opportunities and challenges for the field of steganography, making it an
 990 exciting area for continued research and innovation.
 991

992 9 CONCLUSION

993 This systematic literature review illuminates the profound impact of Large Language Models (LLMs) on linguistic
 994 steganography, demonstrating a clear paradigm shift toward context-aware, generative systems that prioritize imper-
 995 ceptibility, embedding capacity, and naturalness. Through analysis of 18 primary studies (with 14 additional pending
 996 for full inclusion), key research questions were addressed, revealing that the published literature is rapidly evolving.
 997 Applications now span secure communication in social media, zero-shot generation, and watermarking overlaps.
 998

999 Evaluation metrics such as Perplexity (PPL), Kullback-Leibler Divergence (KLD), and bits per token/word consistently
 1000 show LLM-based methods outperforming traditional approaches. This improvement is particularly evident through
 1001 integration of external semantic resources like context retrieval and domain-specific prompts to enhance relevance and
 1002 capacity. However, persistent limitations remain, including the Perceptual-Statistical Imperceptibility Conflict (Psic
 1003 Effect), low entropy in short texts, and challenges in black-box access. These underscore fundamental trade-offs in
 1004 security and practicality.

1005 The findings establish that contextual compatibility—leveraging domain correlations and communicative patterns—is
 1006 essential for robust steganographic systems. This development paves the way for more sophisticated covert channels
 1007 resistant to both human and automated detection. These advancements hold significant implications for information
 1008 security, enabling high-capacity hidden messaging in everyday digital interactions while mitigating risks such as
 1009 hallucinations and biases in LLMs.

1010 Future research should concentrate on several key areas: mitigating segmentation ambiguity, developing provably
 1011 secure black-box frameworks, and exploring multimodal integrations (e.g., text with images) to bridge identified gaps.
 1012 This review underscores the potential of LLMs to redefine steganography as a cornerstone of secure, imperceptible
 1013 communication in an increasingly surveilled digital landscape.

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