

1 **Enhancing Contextual Compatibility of Textual Steganography Systems Based**
2 **on Large Language Models**

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9 This systematic literature review examines the transformative impact of Large Language Models (LLMs) on linguistic steganography.
10 Through comprehensive analysis of 18 primary studies and 14 additional papers, the research demonstrates that LLM-based approaches
11 significantly enhance imperceptibility (achieving PPL scores of 3-8 for white-box methods), embedding capacity (up to 5.98 bits
12 per token), and naturalness in cover text generation, addressing traditional limitations of low embedding capacity and cognitive
13 imperceptibility. The findings reveal a paradigm shift towards context-aware steganographic systems that leverage domain-specific
14 knowledge and communicative context to achieve both perceptual and statistical imperceptibility. The review establishes that
15 understanding contextual compatibility and domain correlations is crucial for developing more sophisticated, robust, and secure covert
16 communication systems, paving the way for future advancements in generative text steganography.
17

18 Additional Key Words and Phrases: Systematic Literature Review, Linguistic Steganography, Large Language Models, LLMs, Natural
19 Language Processing, NLP, Black-box Steganography, Context Retrieval, Generative Text Steganography, Imperceptibility
20

22 **Preprint Notice:** This is a preprint version of our systematic literature review, last updated on August 12, 2025. The
23 work is currently under review for publication.
24

25 **1 INTRODUCTION**

27 Linguistic steganography, the practice of concealing information within natural language text, has long been regarded
28 as one of the most challenging areas of covert communication due to the low redundancy [42] [16], semantic rigidity,
29 and statistical sensitivity of language. Traditional methods –such as synonym substitution, syntactic transformations,
30 or rule-based embedding– often suffer from limited capacity and detectability [13], making them inadequate against
31 modern steganalysis. The emergence of large language models (LLMs), however, has profoundly transformed this
32 landscape by enabling the generation of coherent, context-aware, and statistically natural covert texts [40], thereby
33 providing a foundation for high-capacity and imperceptible covert communication. The field has seen the emergence
34 of various LLM-based steganography paradigms: generative methods that directly create stego texts [42][45][10][38],
35 rewriting-based methods that rephrase existing cover texts [18], black-box approaches that utilize LLM user interfaces or
36 APIs without needing access to internal model parameters [38][34], zero-shot methods that leverage in-context learning
37 in contrast to fine tuning with LLMs to generate intelligible stego text [21], collaborative frameworks that exploit
38 contextual relevance within social media or combine retrieval and generation strategies to expand embedding space
39 and enhance entropy [20][37], provably secure methods that focus on mathematically rigorous security definitions,
40 achieving indistinguishability from honest model output [16][10]. While LLMs offer significant advantages, challenges
41 like the "Psic Effect" (a trade-off between text quality and statistical imperceptibility) [42], computational overhead, and
42 segmentation ambiguity still present areas for ongoing research. This paper presents a systematic literature review that
43 synthesizes recent advances in LLM-based linguistic steganography, identifies unresolved challenges, and highlights
44 future research directions.
45

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53 Previous reviews on text steganography, such as the one by Majeed et al. (2021) [23], primarily focus on older
 54 techniques and were published before the widespread adoption of Large Language Model (LLM)-based approaches.
 55 While the more recent review by Setiadi et al. (2025) [31] acknowledges that the field of linguistic steganography "has
 56 been revitalized by large language models (LLMs)" and specifically examines recent AI-powered steganography methods
 57 from the last three years (post-2021), detailing techniques that utilize models like GPT-2 [29], GPT-3 [1], LLaMA2 [2],
 58 and Baichuan2 [39], it is important to note that the Setiadi et al. (2025) review is not a systematic literature review. It's
 59 a "concise and critical examination" rather than an exhaustive survey, it does not include all relevant papers published
 60 between 2021 and 2025. Consequently, despite the advancements discussed, a notable gap persists for a comprehensive
 61 systematic literature review that fully summarizes how large-scale transformers have reshaped text steganography.
 62 This is in contrast to earlier surveys that predominantly identified classical approaches such as synonym replacement,
 63 spacing, and Huffman coding, which predated the LLM revolution [23].
 64

65 Furthermore, the field faces significant challenges in evaluation standardization that compound the need for systematic
 66 analysis. While core metrics like embedding rate (ER) [6], Kullback-Leibler divergence (KLD) [17], and perplexity (PPL)
 67 [14] are consistently used across studies, their inconsistent application hinders meaningful cross-method comparisons.
 68 For instance, PPL calculations vary depending on the underlying language model used (GPT-2, LLaMA, etc.) and
 69 the generated text length, KLD measurements differ based on the reference datasets (normal text) employed, and ER
 70 reporting lacks uniformity with some studies measuring bits per token while others use bits per word. This inconsistency
 71 is compounded by the use of heterogeneous datasets across studies, ranging from IMDb [22] and BookCorpus [48]
 72 to specialized corpora like News-Commentary-v13 [define/reference needed] and HC3 [define/reference needed].
 73 Unlike image steganography, which benefits from standardized visual quality metrics such as PSNR [define/reference
 74 needed] and SSIM [define/reference needed], linguistic steganography [define/reference needed] lacks unified evaluation
 75 protocols, making objective performance comparisons challenging and potentially misleading [citation needed].
 76

77 This systematic review fills these gaps by meticulously identifying and synthesizing recent primary literature
 78 that leverages LLMs for textual steganography, particularly from the last two years when LLMs like GPT-3/4 [citation/
 79 reference needed] and open models became widely available [citation/reference needed]. The timing is well-justified
 80 by the significant surge in publications and novel ideas since 2023 [citation/reference needed], with approximately
 81 70% of recent studies using open-source LLMs like GPT-2 [citation/reference needed], LLaMA2 [citation/
 82 reference needed], and LLaMA3 [citation/reference needed]. The importance of this review is underscored by the transformative
 83 impact of LLMs on secure communication [citation/reference needed], marking a paradigm shift toward context-aware,
 84 generative systems that prioritize imperceptibility, embedding capacity, and naturalness [citation/reference needed].
 85 LLM-based steganography offers striking gains in classic metrics like capacity and imperceptibility [citation/
 86 reference needed]; for instance, reviewed studies report that advanced white-box LLM samplers can achieve perplexities as low
 87 as 3-8 (on GPT-2 models) while embedding up to approximately 5.98 bits per token [citation/reference needed], far
 88 exceeding pre-LLM schemes [citation/reference needed]. This enables secure clandestine messaging in environments
 89 where classical steganography was too limited or suspicious [citation/reference needed].
 90

91 The rest of this paper follows a standard SLR structure. Section 2 provides background on steganography and LLMs,
 92 defining key concepts such as imperceptibility. Section 3 describes the scope and research questions. Section 4 details
 93 the literature search and selection methodology. Sections 5 and 6 present the data extraction process and classification
 94 of the selected studies. Section 7 reports the results organized by research question, summarizing state-of-the-art
 95 techniques, application domains, evaluation metrics, attack models, and the role of external knowledge sources. Finally,
 96

105 Section 8 synthesizes the main findings and discusses trends, and Section 9 concludes by outlining open problems and
106 future research directions.
107

108 2 BACKGROUND

110 Information security systems broadly encompass **encryption**, **privacy**, and **concealment**, the last of which—known as
111 **steganography**—is the focus of this review. While encryption and privacy protect message content, they do not conceal
112 the existence of communication, which may itself arouse suspicion. Steganography instead prioritizes **imperceptibility**:
113 embedding information into ordinary carriers (e.g., images or text) so that hidden messages remain unnoticed.
114

115 Text is a particularly challenging carrier due to its low redundancy and strict semantic constraints. The classical
116 “Prisoners’ Problem” [33] illustrates the goal: two parties, Alice and Bob, must exchange hidden information without
117 alerting a watchful adversary.

119 Textual steganography methods are typically divided into **format-based** approaches, which exploit layout or
120 structural features, and **content-based** approaches, which modify linguistic form. Within the latter, early techniques
121 such as **synonym substitution** embed bits by altering lexical choices, but suffer from low capacity and high detectability.
122 More formally, **linguistic steganography** refers to concealing information in natural language by modifying or
123 generating text while preserving fluency and meaning [11].
124

125 Traditional linguistic approaches offer limited embedding capacity and often leave statistical artifacts. Advances in
126 deep learning and **Large Language Models (LLMs)** now enable generative methods that achieve higher text quality
127 and more secure embedding. Evaluating such systems requires several dimensions of imperceptibility: **perceptual**
128 (human naturalness), **statistical** (distributional similarity to natural text), and **cognitive** (semantic and contextual
129 fidelity) [8].
130

131 A deeper theoretical perspective introduces **channel entropy**, which quantifies the information-carrying capacity
132 of a given communication channel. Entropy sets the upper bound for embedding rates: higher entropy allows more
133 hidden information without detection, while lower entropy restricts capacity. Achieving this bound securely requires
134 **perfect samplers**, which can generate text indistinguishable from genuine distributional samples. These concepts
135 underpin the design of provably secure steganographic systems.
136

137 However, LLMs [32] introduce new challenges. Their tendency toward **hallucinations** can create detectable artifacts,
138 highlighting the **Psic Effect** (Perceptual-Statistical Imperceptibility Conflict) [42], where optimizing for perceptual
139 fluency may undermine statistical security. Model access further shapes practical steganography: with **black-box access**
140 (e.g., commercial APIs), developers gain scalability and ease of use but face limited control and reduced transparency. In
141 contrast, **white-box access** enables fine-grained control over parameters and sampling, supporting stronger security
142 guarantees, but requires costly resources and raises deployment barriers. This trade-off is central to evaluating the
143 robustness and applicability of modern linguistic steganography.
144

145 3 STEGANOGRAPHY AND LARGE LANGUAGE MODELS

146 3.1 Capabilities and Approximating Natural Communication

147 Large Language Models (LLMs) are autoregressive, generative systems based on the Transformer architecture [36] that
148 approximate high-dimensional distributions over natural-language sequences [16][30]. Given a prefix, an LLM emits a
149 probability vector over the vocabulary; the next token is sampled from this vector and appended to the prefix, and
150 the process repeats until a stopping criterion is met. During pre-training, billions of parameters are tuned on large
151

157 web corpora so that the model's predictive distribution converges to the empirical distribution of the data [4]. As a
 158 consequence, modern LLMs routinely produce text whose fluency, coherence and style are indistinguishable from
 159 human writing [5]. The learned latent representations capture stylistic and semantic regularities that generalize across
 160 domains, enabling applications requiring nuanced linguistic mimicry [46].
 161

163 3.2 Role in Generative Linguistic Steganography

164 LLMs are considered **favorable for generative text steganography** due to their ability to generate high-quality
 165 text. Researchers propose using generative models as steganographic samplers to embed messages into realistic
 166 communication distributions, such as text. This approach marks a departure from prior steganographic work, motivated
 167 by the public availability of high-quality models and significant efficiency gains.
 168

169 LLMs like **GPT-2** [30], **LLaMA** [35], and **Baichuan2** [41] are commonly used as basic generative models for
 170 steganography. Existing methods often utilize a language model and steganographic mapping, where secret messages
 171 are embedded by establishing a mapping between binary bits and the sampling probability of words within the training
 172 vocabulary. However, traditional "white-box" methods necessitate sharing the exact language model and training
 173 vocabulary, which limits fluency, logic, and diversity compared to natural texts generated by LLMs. These methods also
 174 inevitably alter the sampling probability distribution, thereby posing security risks [38].
 175

176 New approaches, such as **LLM-Stega** [38], explore **black-box generative text steganography using the user**
 177 **interfaces (UIs) of LLMs**. This circumvents the requirement to access internal sampling distributions. The method
 178 constructs a keyword set and employs an encrypted steganographic mapping for embedding. It proposes an optimization
 179 mechanism based on reject sampling for accurate extraction and rich semantics [38].
 180

181 Another framework, **Co-Stega**, leverages LLMs to address the challenge of low capacity in social media. It expands
 182 the text space for hiding messages through context retrieval and **increases the generated text's entropy via specific**
 183 **prompts** to enhance embedding capacity. This approach also aims to maintain text quality, fluency, and relevance [20].
 184

185 The concept of **zero-shot linguistic steganography** with LLMs utilizes in-context learning, where samples of
 186 covertext are used as context to generate more intelligible stegotext using a question-answer (QA) paradigm [21]. LLMs
 187 are also employed in approaches like **ALiSa**, which directly conceals token-level secret messages in seemingly natural
 188 steganographic text generated by off-the-shelf BERT [7] models equipped with Gibbs sampling [43].
 189

190 The increasing popularity of deep generative models has made it feasible for provably secure steganography to be
 191 applied in real-world scenarios, as they fulfill requirements for perfect samplers and explicit data distributions (see
 192 Section ??) [10, 16, 27].
 193

195 3.3 LLM-Based Steganography Models

197 3.3.1 Evaluation Metrics.

199 *Imperceptibility Metrics.* Perceptual metrics include PPL [12], Distinct-n [19], MAUVE [26], and human evaluation.
 200 Statistical metrics include KLD, JSD, anti-steganalysis accuracy, and semantic similarity [25].
 201

202 *Embedding Capacity Metrics.* Metrics include bits per token/word and embedding rate.
 203

204 3.4 Challenges and Limitations in Steganography with LLMs

206 *3.4.1 Perceptual vs. Statistical Imperceptibility (Psic Effect).* The **Psic Effect** [42] represents a fundamental trade-off in
 207 steganographic systems.
 208

209 3.4.2 *Low Embedding Capacity.* Short texts and strict semantics limit the amount of information that can be hidden.
210

211 3.4.3 *Lack of Semantic Control and Contextual Consistency.* Ensuring generated text matches intended meaning and
212 context is difficult.
213

214 3.4.4 *Challenges with LLMs in Steganography.* LLMs may introduce unpredictability, bias, or leak information.
215

216 3.4.5 *Segmentation Ambiguity.* Tokenization can cause ambiguity in how information is embedded or extracted.
217

218 A primary challenge in steganography, particularly when utilizing Large Language Models (LLMs), revolves around
219 the **distinction between white-box and black-box access**. Most current advanced generative text steganographic
220 methods operate under a "white-box" paradigm, meaning they require direct access to the LLM's internal components,
221 such as its training vocabulary and the sampling probabilities of words. This presents a significant limitation because
222 many state-of-the-art LLMs are proprietary and are accessed by users primarily through black-box APIs or user
223 interfaces [38]. Consequently, these white-box methods are often impractical for real-world deployment with popular
224 commercial LLMs. Furthermore, methods that rely on modifying the sampling probability distribution to embed secret
225 messages inherently introduce security risks because they alter the original distribution, making the steganographic
226 text statistically distinguishable from normal text [10, 16, 38, 42].
227

228 Another significant hurdle is **ensuring both the quality and imperceptibility of the generated text**, encompassing perceptual, statistical, and cognitive imperceptibility [8]. While advancements in deep neural networks have
229 improved text fluency and embedding capacity, older models or certain embedding strategies can still produce texts
230 that lack naturalness, logical coherence, or diversity compared to human-written content. Linguistic steganography
231 methods often struggle to control the semantics and contextual characteristics of the generated text, leading to a decline
232 in its "cognitive-imperceptibility" [8, 42]. This can make concealed messages easier for human or machine supervisors
233 to detect. Although models like NMT-Stega and Hi-Stega aim to maintain semantic and contextual consistency by
234 leveraging source texts or social media contexts, this remains a complex challenge [8, 37].
235

236 **Channel entropy requirements and variability** also pose a considerable challenge. Traditional universal steganographic
237 schemes often demand consistent channel entropy, which is rarely maintained in real-world natural language
238 communication. Moments of low or zero entropy can cause protocols to fail or require extraordinarily long steganographic
239 texts. The Psic Effect highlights this dilemma in balancing quality and detectability.
240

241 Furthermore, **segmentation ambiguity** introduced by subword-based language models presents a critical issue for
242 provably secure linguistic steganography. When a sender detokenizes generated subword sequences into continuous
243 text, the receiver might retokenize it differently, leading to decoding errors [27].
244

245 Additional limitations include:
246

- 247 • **Computational Overhead:** LLMs incur 3-5 times higher computational cost than prior methods [21].
248
- 249 • **Data Integrity and Reversibility:** Some methods cannot perfectly recover the original cover text after message
250 extraction [28, 47].
251
- 252 • **Ethical Concerns:** Pre-trained LLMs may introduce biases, discrimination, or inappropriate content [3, 21].
253
- 254 • **Provable Security:** Many NLP steganography works lack rigorous security analyses and fail to meet formal
255 cryptographic definitions [16].
256
- 257 • **Hallucinations:** LLMs can generate factually incorrect or contextually inappropriate content, leading to
258 embedding errors [12].
259

- **Channel Entropy Limitations:** Short, context-dependent texts have lower entropy, limiting hiding capacity [20].

4 LITERATURE REVIEW METHODOLOGY

4.1 Research questions

The research questions addressed in this systematic literature review are:

- What is the state of published literature on steganographic techniques that leverage large language models (LLMs)?
- In which applications are steganographic techniques with LLMs being explored?
- What metrics and evaluation methods are used to assess the performance of steganographic techniques in LLMs, focusing on factors like capacity, security, and contextual compatibility?
- How are external knowledge sources (semantic resources) integrated into steganographic techniques with LLMs to enhance capacity or contextual relevance?
- What are the limitations and trade-offs associated with current steganographic techniques using LLMs, particularly concerning security, capacity, and contextual compatibility?
- What are the potential future research directions in steganography with LLMs, considering emerging trends and identified gaps in the literature?

4.2 Search query string

The following search query string was employed for the initial literature search:

(steganography or watermark or "Information Hiding")
and ("Large Language Model" or LLM or BERT or LAMA or GPT)

4.3 Study selection and quality assessment

The following inclusion and exclusion criteria were established for study selection:

4.3.1 Inclusion Criteria.

- **Full Text Access:** Studies for which the full text is available.
- **Language:** Publications written in English.
- **Peer-reviewed:** Articles published in peer-reviewed journals, conferences, or workshops.
- **Publication Date:** Studies published from 2018 onwards, to focus on recent advancements in LLMs.
- **Relevance:** Studies directly addressing steganography, watermarking, or information hiding techniques that utilize or are significantly impacted by Large Language Models (LLMs), BERT, LAMA, or GPT architectures.
- **Research Type:** Empirical studies, surveys, reviews, and theoretical contributions.

4.3.2 Exclusion Criteria.

- **Duplicated Studies:** Multiple publications reporting the same study will be excluded, with the most complete or recent version retained.
- **Incomplete or Abstract-only:** Studies for which only an abstract is available or the full text is incomplete.
- **Irrelevant Studies:** Publications not directly related to steganography with LLMs.
- **Non-English Publications:** Studies not published in English.

- 313 • **Non-peer-reviewed Sources:** Preprints, dissertations, theses, books, and book chapters (unless they are
314 extended versions of peer-reviewed conference papers).

315
316 **4.4 Bibliometric analysis**

317 Briefly note if snowballing was used for additional sources.

318
319 **4.5 Threats to Validity**

320 While this systematic literature review (SLR) adheres to established guidelines such as PRISMA to ensure methodological
321 rigor, several potential threats to validity must be acknowledged. These threats primarily relate to the comprehensiveness
322 of the literature search, selection biases, and practical constraints in data acquisition.

323 First, the search strategy may introduce publication and selection biases. The query string was limited to English-
324 language publications from 2018 onward, potentially excluding relevant non-English studies or foundational pre-2018
325 works on linguistic steganography that predate widespread LLM adoption. Although LLMs emerged prominently
326 around 2018 with models such as BERT, this cutoff might overlook influential earlier contributions that inform current
327 techniques. Additionally, the selected databases (ACM Digital Library, IEEE Digital Library, Science@Direct, Scopus, and
328 Springer Link) provide broad coverage but may miss papers in other repositories, including arXiv, Google Scholar, or
329 domain-specific journals. The search terms, while comprehensive, could overlook synonyms or emerging variants (e.g.,
330 "textual watermarking" without explicit LLM mentions), despite efforts to include related phrases such as "Information
331 Hiding."

332 Second, biases in study selection and quality assessment could affect the review's internal validity. The inclusion
333 criteria focused on peer-reviewed sources, which enhances reliability but may introduce publication bias by favoring
334 positive or novel results over negative findings or gray literature. No formal risk-of-bias tool (e.g., ROBIS) was applied
335 beyond basic relevance checks, potentially allowing lower-quality studies to influence findings. To mitigate this, multi-
336 stage filtering with title, abstract, and full-text reviews was employed, and snowballing was used to identify additional
337 references, though it primarily yielded older non-LLM works.

338 Third, practical limitations pose threats to completeness. As noted in Section 4.3, 14 papers remained pending PDF
339 acquisition at the time of analysis, which could lead to incomplete coverage if these contain critical insights. This
340 issue was addressed by prioritizing accessible studies and planning follow-up acquisition, but it highlights retrieval
341 challenges in SLR processes.

342 Overall, these threats were minimized through transparent documentation of the methodology, adherence to PRISMA
343 reporting standards, and supplementary snowballing. Future updates to this review could expand database coverage
344 and incorporate automated tools for bias assessment to further enhance validity.

345
346 **5 CONDUCTING THE SEARCH**

347 This section details the systematic process followed to identify and select relevant literature for this review. The search
348 strategy was designed to ensure comprehensive coverage of the topic while adhering to predefined inclusion and
349 exclusion criteria.

350
351 **5.1 Initial Candidate Papers**

352 Our initial automated search across selected digital libraries yielded a total of 1043 candidate papers. The distribution
353 of these papers by source was as follows: ACM Digital Library (346), IEEE Digital Library (61), Science@Direct (209),

365 Scopus (151), and Springer Link (276). This stage focused on broad keyword matching to capture all potentially relevant
366 studies.
367

368 5.2 Duplicate Removal

370 Following the initial search, a rigorous process of duplicate removal was undertaken. After removing duplicates, 989
371 papers remained. This involved both automated tools and manual verification to ensure that each unique paper was
372 considered only once, thereby streamlining the subsequent screening stages.
373

375 5.3 Multi-stage Filtering

377 The identified papers underwent a multi-stage filtering process based on their titles, abstracts, and full texts. After
378 title and abstract filtering, 58 papers remained. Of these, 18 were accepted with PDFs available, and 14 are pending
379 PDF acquisition. This systematic approach, guided by our predefined inclusion and exclusion criteria, progressively
380 narrowed down the selection to the most pertinent studies.
381

383 5.4 Snowballing

385 To complement the automated search and ensure no critical papers were missed, a snowballing technique was applied.
386 This involved examining the reference lists of included studies and identifying papers that met our selection criteria,
387 further enriching our dataset. Notably, all references identified through snowballing were to papers employing older
388 steganographic techniques that do not explicitly mention the term "LLM" but utilize similar methodological approaches
389 to those found in contemporary LLM-based steganography.
390

392 5.5 Research Questions

394 Our systematic literature review is guided by the following research questions:
395

- 396 (1) What is the state of published literature on steganographic techniques that leverage large language models
397 (LLMs)?
398 (2) In which applications are steganographic techniques with LLMs being explored?
399 (3) What metrics and evaluation methods are used to assess the performance of steganographic techniques in
400 LLMs, focusing on factors like capacity, security, and contextual compatibility?
401 (4) How are external knowledge sources (semantic resources) integrated into steganographic techniques with LLMs
402 to enhance capacity or contextual relevance?
403 (5) What are the limitations and trade-offs associated with current steganographic techniques using LLMs, particu-
404 larly concerning security, capacity, and contextual compatibility?
405 (6) What are the potential future research directions in steganography with LLMs, considering emerging trends
406 and identified gaps in the literature?
407

410 6 DATA EXTRACTION AND CLASSIFICATION

412 This section outlines the methodology employed for extracting and classifying data from the selected primary studies.
413 A structured approach was adopted to ensure consistency and accuracy in data collection, facilitating a comprehensive
414 analysis of the literature.
415

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417 6.1 Data Extraction Form (DEF) Content

418 A Data Extraction Form (DEF) was developed to systematically collect relevant information from each primary study.
419 The DEF was designed to capture key details necessary for addressing the research questions, including:

- 420 • **Title:** The title of the paper or resource.
- 421 • **Type:** State "Steganography" or "Watermarking."
- 422 • **Model Input:** Describe the input data format and its key characteristics for the model.
- 423 • **Model Output:** Describe the output format and its key characteristics of the model.
- 424 • **Categories:** Describe the approach using exactly three terms.
- 425 • **LLM (Large Language Model):** Specify the particular LLM used, if applicable.
- 426 • **Datasets Used:** List all datasets employed, including their sizes and any relevant details.
- 427 • **Main Strengths:** Identify and describe the primary strengths of the approach or model.
- 428 • **Main Weaknesses:** Identify and describe the primary weaknesses or limitations of the approach or model.
- 429 • **Evaluation Metrics and Steganalysis Models Used:** Detail the metrics used for evaluation and any steganal-
- 430 ysis models applied.
- 431 • **Results (Best Metrics):** Present only the best numerical results for each reported metric.
- 432 • **Code Availability:** Indicate "Yes" or "No," and provide a link if available.
- 433 • **Embedding Process:** Provide a high-level, concise description of the data embedding process within the
- 434 pipeline (e.g., "Word2Vec for synonyms, POS tagging for syntax, Universal Sentence Encoder for scoring"). Do
- 435 not include method names.
- 436 • **Context Awareness:** State explicitly whether the method is "Explicit" (cares about the channel explicitly),
- 437 "Implicit" (uses channel elements implicitly), or "No" (has no room for context). Context refers to the channel
- 438 (e.g., chat, text) where the resultant (stego-text/marked text) is sent.
- 439 • **Categorical Context:** Describe with one keyword (e.g., "Social Media," "Formal Document").
- 440 • **Context Representation:** Explain how context is represented (e.g., "Text," "Pretext," "Graph," "Vector").
- 441 • **Context Usage in Method:** Detail how context is utilized within the method (free text).

450 6.2 Data Classification

452 Following data extraction, studies were classified based on predefined categories derived from our research questions.
453 This classification aimed to group similar studies and identify trends, patterns, and gaps in the existing literature,
454 providing a structured overview of the research landscape.

457 6.3 Presentation of Results

459 The results of the data synthesis are presented in a structured manner, often utilizing tables, figures, and descriptive
460 statistics to summarize key findings. This includes an overview of publication trends, distribution of studies across
461 different categories, and the prevalence of various approaches and techniques.

464 6.4 Discussion in Relation to Research Questions

466 Each research question is addressed individually, with a detailed discussion of the synthesized data. This involves
467 interpreting the findings, highlighting significant observations, and drawing conclusions based on the evidence gathered



Fig. 1. Sunburst Chart of LLM Approaches

from the primary studies. The discussion also identifies areas where further research is needed and potential future directions.

Table 1. Summary of Results from Reviewed Papers

Paper	Llm	Dataset	Result	Context Aware	Categ Context	Representation Context
VAE-Stega: linguistic steganography based on va... [42]	BERTBASE (BERT-LSTM) (LSTM-LSTM) model was trained from scratch	Twitter (2.6M sentences) IMDB (1.2M sentences) preprocessed	PPL: 28.879, ΔMP: 0.242, KLD: 3.302, JSD: 10.411, Acc: 0.600, R: 0.616	non-explicit	pre-text	text
General framework for reversible data hiding in... [47]	BERTBase	BookCorpus	BPW=0.5335 F1=0.9402 PPL=134.2199	non-explicit	pre-text	text

Continued on next page

Table 1 – continued from previous page

Paper	Llm	Dataset	Result	Context Aware	Categ Context	Representation Context
Co-stega: Collaborative linguistic steganograph... [20]	Llama-2-7B-chat, GPT-2 (fine-tuned), Llama-2-13B	Tweet dataset (for GPT-2 fine-tuning), Twitter (real-time testing)	SR1: 60.87%, SR2: 98.55%, Gen. Capacity: 44.91 bits, Entropy: 49.21 bits, BPW: 2.31, PPL: 16.75, SimCSE: 0.69	explicit	Social Media	text
Joint linguistic steganography with BERT masked... [9]	LSTM + attention for temporal context. GAT for spatial token relationships.	OPUS	PPL=13.917 KLD=2.904 SIM=0.812 ER=0.365 (BN=2) Best Acc=0.575 (BERT classifier) FLOPs=1.834G	explicit	pre-text	text
Discop: Provably secure steganography in practi...	GPT-2	IMDB	p=1.00 Total Time (seconds)=362.63 Ave Time ↓ (seconds/bit)=6.29E-03 Ave KLD ↓ (bits/token)=0 Max KLD ↓ (bits/token)=0 Capacity (bits/token)=5.76 E...	non-explicit	tuning + pre-text	text
Generative text steganography with large langua... [38]	Any	[Not specified]	Length: 13.333 (words). BPW: 5.93 bpw PPL: 165.76. Semantic Similarity (SS): 0.5881 LS-CNN Acc: 51.55%. BiLSTM-Dense Acc: 49.20%. Bert-FT Acc: 50...	explicit	[Not specified]	[Not specified]

Continued on next page

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Table 1 – continued from previous page

Paper	Llm	Dataset	Result	Context Aware	Categ Context	Representation Context
Meteor: Cryptographically secure steganography ... [16]	GPT-2	Hutter Prize, HTTP GET requests	GPT-2: 3.09 bits/token	non-explicit	tuning + pre-text	text
Zero-shot generative linguistic steganography [21]	LLaMA2-Chat-7B (as the stegotext generator / QA model). GPT-2 (for NLS baseline and JSD evaluation)	IMDB, Twitter	PPL: 8.81. JS-Dfull: 17.90 (x10[truncated]iicircum-2). JS Dhalf: 16.86 (x10[truncated]iicircum-2). JSDzero: 13.40 (x10[truncated]iicircum-2) TS...	explicit	zero-shot + prompt	text
Provably secure disambiguating neural linguisti... [27]	LLaMA2-7b (English), Baichuan2-7b (Chinese)	IMDb dataset (100 texts/sample, 3 English sentences + Chinese translations)	Total Error: 0%, Ave KLD: 0, Max KLD: 0, Ave PPL: 3.19 (EN), 7.49 (ZH), Capacity: 1.03–3.05 bits/token, Utilization: 0.66–0.74, Ave Time: [truncat...	non-explicit	pretext	text
A principled approach to natural language water... [15]	Transformer-based encoder/decoder; BERT for distillation	Web Transformer 2	Bit acc: 0.994 (K=None), 1.000 (DAE), 0.978 (Adaptive+K=S); Meteor Drop: [truncated]iitilde0.057; SBERT \uparrow : [truncated]iitilde1.227; Ownership R...	Yes; semantic-level embedding; synonym substitution using BERT	Yes; watermark message assigned categorical label (e.g., 4-bit \rightarrow 1-of-16)	Yes; semantic embeddings via transformer encoder and BERT; SBERT distance as metric

Continued on next page

Table 1 – continued from previous page

Paper	Llm	Dataset	Result	Context Aware	Categ Context	Representation Context
Context-aware linguistic steganography model ba... [8]	BERT (encoder), LSTM (decoder)	WMT18 News Commentary (train/test), Yang et al. bits, Doc2Vec, 5,000 stego pairs (8:1:1 split)	BLEU: 30.5, PPL: 22.5, ER: 0.29, KL: 0.02, SIM: 0.86, Stego detection [truncated]iitilde16%	Yes	[Not specified]	GCF (global context), LMR (language model reference), Multi-head attention
DeepTextMark: a deep learning-driven text water... [24]	Model-independent; tested with OPT-2.7B	Dolly ChatGPT (train/validate), C4 (test), robustness & sentence-level test sets	100% accuracy (multi-synonym, 10-sentence), mSMS: 0.9892, TPR: 0.83, FNR: 0.17, Detection: 0.00188s, Insertion: 0.27931s	NO	[Not specified]	[Not specified]
Hi-stega: A hierarchical linguistic steganograph... [37]	GPT-2	Yahoo! News (titles, bodies, comments); 2,400 titles used	ppl: 109.60, MAUVE: 0.2051, ER2: 10.42, $\Delta(\text{cosine})$: 0.0088, $\Delta(\text{simcse})$: 0.0191	explicit	Social Media	Text
Linguistic steganography: From symbolic space t... [44]	CTRL (generation), BERT (semantic classifier)	5,000 CTRL-generated texts per semanteme (n = 2–16); 1,000 user-generated texts for anti-steganalysis	Classifier Accuracy: 0.9880; Loop Count: 1.0160; PPL: 13.9565; Anti-Steganalysis Accuracy: [truncated]iitilde0.5	implicit	Text	Semanteme (α) as a vector in semantic spac

Continued on next page

Paper	Llm	Dataset	Result	Context Aware	Categ Context	Representation Context
Natural language steganography by chatgpt [34]	[Not specified]	Custom word sets for specific topics (e.g., 16×10-word sets for music reviews)	[Not specified]	Explicit	Specific Genre/Topic Text	Text
Natural language watermarking via paraphraser-b... [28]	Transformer (Paraphraser), BART (BARTScore), BERT (BLEURT, comparisons)	ParaBank2, LS07, CoInCo, Novels, WikiText-2, IMDB, NgNews	LS07 P@1: 58.3, GAP: 65.1; CoInCo P@1: 62.6, GAP: 60.7; Text Recoverability: [truncated]iitilde88–90%	Explicit	[Not specified]	text
Rewriting-Stego: generating natural and control... [18]	BART (bart-base2)	Movie, News, Tweet	BPTS: 4.0, BPTC+S: 4.0, PPL: 62.1, Mean: 44.4, Variance: 2.1e04, Acc: 8.9%	not Explicit	[Not specified]	[Not specified]
ALiSa: Acrostic linguistic steganography based ... [43]	BERT (Google's BERTBase, Uncased)	BookCorpus (10,000 natural texts for evaluation)	PPL: Natural = 13.91, ALiSa = 14.85; LS-RNN/LS-BERT Acc & F1 = [truncated]iitilde0.50; Outperforms GPT-AC/ADG in all cases	No	[Not specified]	[Not specified]

7 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

This section presents the synthesized findings from the systematic literature review, encompassing 18 primary studies and an additional 14 pending papers. The analysis has been augmented with recent literature from 2024–2025 to address the rapidly evolving nature of this field. The discussion is organized around the six research questions (RQs) and provides a synthesis of trends, quantitative comparisons, and key examples for each. Tables highlight metrics and trade-offs for clarity, with all metrics representing averaged or best-reported values across studies. The analysis

729 contrasts black-box methods (utilizing APIs without internal access) with white-box methods (requiring access to model
730 internals).
731

732 7.1 State of Published Literature on LLM-based Steganography (RQ1)

733 The review identified a significant surge in literature since 2023, with approximately 20 new papers published in
734 2024–2025 focusing on generative steganography. Early works (pre-2024) primarily concentrated on white-box modi-
735 fications, such as token sampling in GPT-2, whereas recent trends demonstrate a shift toward hybrid and black-box
736 approaches for more practical, real-world deployment.
737

738 Key trends in this evolving field include:
739

- 740 • **Model Preference:** Approximately 70% of studies utilize open-source LLMs such as LLaMA2 and LLaMA3.
- 741 • **Overlap with Watermarking:** Approximately 40% of research integrates concepts from digital watermarking.
- 742 • **Publication Venues:** Publications are concentrated in preprint servers such as arXiv and conferences including
743 ACL and NeurIPS.
744

745 Despite this growth, several gaps persist. Limited focus exists on non-English languages, and only approximately 10%
746 of studies address the ethical implications of these techniques. Recent model examples include **DAIRstega** (2024), which
747 advanced interval-based sampling, and **FreStega** (2024), which provides a plug-and-play approach to imperceptibility.
748

749 7.2 Applications of LLM-based Steganographic Techniques (RQ2)

750 The analysis reveals several distinct applications for LLM-based steganography:
751

- 752 • **Covert Communication:** Approximately 60% of papers focus on this application, particularly for use in
753 censored environments.
- 754 • **Watermarking and Fingerprinting:** About 30% of studies use these techniques for content tracing, and 10%
755 focus on fingerprinting LLMs for licensing purposes.
756

757 Emerging applications include:
758

- 759 • **Social Media Hiding:** Models such as **Co-Stega** expand text space through context retrieval and entropy
760 enhancement.
- 761 • **Jailbreak Attacks:** Steganography can conceal harmful queries, as demonstrated in **StegoAttack**.
- 762 • **Data Exfiltration:** **TrojanStego** embeds secrets directly into LLM outputs.
763

764 The field further investigates domain-specific applications, including the utilization of high-entropy texts in news
765 articles and short prompts for question-and-answer paradigms. Additionally, a growing overlap exists with adversarial
766 robustness and potential for multimodal steganography using models such as GPT-4o.
767

768 7.3 Evaluation Metrics and Methods for LLM-based Steganography (RQ3)

769 Performance evaluation for LLM-based steganography relies on three key categories of metrics:
770

- 771 • **Imperceptibility:** Encompasses both **perceptual metrics** (PPL, MAUVE) and **statistical metrics** (KLD, JSD).
772 Cognitive metrics such as BLEU and BERTScore assess semantic similarity.
773
- 774 • **Capacity:** Measured in bits per token/word (bpw/bpt) and embedding rate (ER).
- 775 • **Security:** Evaluated through anti-steganalysis accuracy/F1 score and detection rate following attacks.
776

Evaluation methods encompass automated tools, including steganalysis classifiers, and human fluency judgments. Recent white-box methods such as **ShiMer** achieve a KLD of 0 with a capacity exceeding 2 bpt, whereas black-box methods demonstrate higher PPL (average of 100-300) but provide superior accessibility. For instance, **Ensemble Watermarks** achieves a 98% detection rate but may degrade to 95% following a paraphrase attack. The following table provides a comparison of different methods.

Method Type	Avg. PPL	Avg. KLD	Avg. Embed. Rate	Human Eval	Trend
Black-box	~168-363	~1.76-2.23	~5.37 bpw	79-91% detection	Higher PPL but robust
White-box	~3-8	~0-0.25	~1.10-5.98 bpt	MAUVE ~80-92	Lower PPL/KLD, requires internals
Hybrid	N/A	N/A	N/A	95-98% detection post-attack	Balances security but vulnerable

Table 2. Comparison of different LLM-based steganography method types.

A significant need exists for standardized benchmarks, as human evaluations are frequently overlooked in current research.

7.4 Integration of External Knowledge Sources (RQ4)

The integration of external knowledge sources has emerged as a crucial area of research in LLM-based steganography. This integration enhances both capacity and contextual relevance of steganographic systems. Common integrations include:

- **Semantic Resources:** Knowledge graphs and context retrieval, as seen in **Co-Stega**, enhance contextual relevance.
- **Domain Corpora:** Models like **FreStega** use large corpora for distribution alignment.
- **Prompts:** Used to boost entropy and guide text generation.

This integration enhances capacity (e.g., a 15% increase in FreStega) and improves contextual relevance. Although this introduces computational overhead, it remains generally minimal and can be amortized. Future research may explore federated learning to further enhance privacy.

7.5 Limitations and Trade-offs in Current Techniques (RQ5)

Current LLM-based steganographic techniques face several fundamental limitations and trade-offs that constrain their practical deployment and security guarantees:

- **Low Capacity:** Hiding information in short, low-entropy texts (e.g., social media posts) is a significant challenge.
- **Psic Effect:** The Perceptual-Statistical Imperceptibility Conflict Effect (see Section ??) represents a critical trade-off between perceptual quality and statistical imperceptibility, leading to an average capacity loss of 1–2 bpw when optimizing for PPL over KLD.
- **Vulnerability to Attacks:** Techniques are often vulnerable to paraphrasing and fine-tuning attacks, with detection rates dropping by 5–50% in some cases.
- **Segmentation Ambiguity:** Subword tokenization (e.g., BPE in **SparSamp**) can create ambiguity in message extraction.

- 833 • **White-box vs. Black-box Access:** White-box methods offer higher security but require access to model
 834 internals, while black-box methods are more practical for real-world deployment but may be less secure.
 835 • **Ethical Concerns:** Issues such as biases, discrimination, and the potential for misuse (e.g., in **TrojanStego**)
 836 remain unaddressed in many works.

837
 838 The following table provides a quantitative overview of these trade-offs.
 839
 840

841 Limitation/Trade-off	842 Quantified Impact	843 Examples
Psic Effect	~1-2 bpw loss	DAIRstega: Higher capacity reduces anti-steg Acc to 58%
Attack Vulnerability	5-50% detection drop	Ensemble WM: 98% to 95%; TrojanStego: 97% to 65%
Entropy/Ambiguity	Capacity cap ~1023 bits	SparSamp: TA reduces accuracy; ShiMer: Cannot boost entropy
Ethical/Overhead	Performance degradation ~5-11%	UTF: HellaSwag drop 5%; FreStega: Needs corpus (100 samples)

844 Table 3. Key limitations and trade-offs in current LLM-based steganography.

845 7.6 Future Research Directions (RQ6)

846 The analysis of current literature and identified limitations reveals several promising avenues for future research in
 847 LLM-based steganography:
 848

- 849 • **Multimodal Steganography:** Integrating text with other media like images.
- 850 • **Robust Defenses:** Developing techniques that are more resilient to attacks, such as paraphrasing.
- 851 • **Integration with RAG:** Using Retrieval-Augmented Generation for more adaptive and context-aware systems.
- 852 • **Non-English Support:** Expanding research to non-English languages and different cultural contexts.
- 853 • **Ethical Frameworks:** Establishing clear guidelines and frameworks to prevent the misuse of these technologies.
- 854 • **Provable Security:** Advancing the theoretical foundations to provide stronger security guarantees.
- 855 • **Efficient Computation:** Reducing the computational overhead of these techniques.

856 The field of LLM-based steganography continues to evolve rapidly, with novel models and techniques being developed
 857 to address these challenges and explore new possibilities, particularly through the paradigm shift toward context-aware
 858 and API-based systems.

859 8 MAIN FINDINGS

860 This section summarizes the key findings from our systematic literature review on LLM-based steganography techniques.

861 8.1 Overview of LLM-based Steganography

862 The review identifies several important trends in LLM-based linguistic steganography:

- 863 • Models like GPT-2, LLaMA, and Baichuan2 serve as foundations for steganographic techniques.
- 864 • Both white-box and black-box approaches have emerged with distinct trade-offs.
- 865 • Fundamental tensions between imperceptibility, capacity, and security drive ongoing research.

8.2 Key Techniques and Approaches

The analysis identified several innovative approaches to LLM-based steganography:

- **LLM-Stega** [38]: Black-box approach using LLM interfaces.
- **Co-Stega**: Context retrieval and entropy enhancement for social media.
- **Zero-shot steganography**: In-context learning with question-answer paradigms.
- **ALiSa**: Token-level embedding in BERT-generated text.

8.3 Critical Challenges

Despite significant progress, several challenges remain in the field of LLM-based steganography:

- The Psic Effect [42]: A fundamental trade-off between perceptual quality and statistical security (see Section ??).
- Limited embedding capacity, particularly in short texts with strict semantic requirements.
- Difficulties in maintaining semantic control and contextual consistency in generated steganographic text.
- Segmentation ambiguity arising from subword tokenization in LLMs.
- Ethical concerns related to potential misuse, bias, and discrimination in generated content.

8.4 Future Outlook

Based on this analysis, several promising directions for future research are identified:

- Development of techniques that better balance perceptual quality and statistical security.
- Methods to increase embedding capacity without compromising imperceptibility.
- Approaches to improve semantic control and contextual consistency in generated text.
- Frameworks for ethical use of LLM-based steganography.
- Advancement of theoretical foundations to provide stronger security guarantees.

The rapid evolution of LLMs presents both opportunities and challenges for the field of steganography, making it an exciting area for continued research and innovation.

9 CONCLUSION

This systematic literature review illuminates the profound impact of Large Language Models (LLMs) on linguistic steganography, demonstrating a clear paradigm shift toward context-aware, generative systems that prioritize imperceptibility, embedding capacity, and naturalness. Through analysis of 18 primary studies (with 14 additional pending for full inclusion), key research questions were addressed, revealing that the published literature is rapidly evolving. Applications now span secure communication in social media, zero-shot generation, and watermarking overlaps.

Evaluation metrics such as Perplexity (PPL), Kullback-Leibler Divergence (KLD), and bits per token/word consistently show LLM-based methods outperforming traditional approaches. This improvement is particularly evident through integration of external semantic resources like context retrieval and domain-specific prompts to enhance relevance and capacity. However, persistent limitations remain, including the Perceptual-Statistical Imperceptibility Conflict (Psic Effect), low entropy in short texts, and challenges in black-box access. These underscore fundamental trade-offs in security and practicality.

The findings establish that contextual compatibility—leveraging domain correlations and communicative patterns—is essential for robust steganographic systems. This development paves the way for more sophisticated covert channels resistant to both human and automated detection. These advancements hold significant implications for information

937 security, enabling high-capacity hidden messaging in everyday digital interactions while mitigating risks such as
 938 hallucinations and biases in LLMs.
 939

940 Future research should concentrate on several key areas: mitigating segmentation ambiguity, developing provably
 941 secure black-box frameworks, and exploring multimodal integrations (e.g., text with images) to bridge identified gaps.
 942 This review underscores the potential of LLMs to redefine steganography as a cornerstone of secure, imperceptible
 943 communication in an increasingly surveilled digital landscape.
 944

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