

1 **Enhancing Contextual Compatibility of Textual Steganography Systems Based**
2 **on Large Language Models**

5 NASOUH ALOLABI, Higher Institute for Applied Sciences and Technology, Syria
6

7 RIAD SONBOL, Higher Institute for Applied Sciences and Technology, Syria
8

9 This systematic literature review examines the transformative impact of Large Language Models (LLMs) on linguistic steganography.
10 Through comprehensive analysis of 18 primary studies and 14 additional papers, the research demonstrates that LLM-based approaches
11 significantly enhance imperceptibility (achieving PPL scores of 3-8 for white-box methods), embedding capacity (up to 5.98 bits
12 per token), and naturalness in cover text generation, addressing traditional limitations of low embedding capacity and cognitive
13 imperceptibility. The findings reveal a paradigm shift towards context-aware steganographic systems that leverage domain-specific
14 knowledge and communicative context to achieve both perceptual and statistical imperceptibility. The review establishes that
15 understanding contextual compatibility and domain correlations is crucial for developing more sophisticated, robust, and secure covert
16 communication systems, paving the way for future advancements in generative text steganography.
17

18 Additional Key Words and Phrases: Systematic Literature Review, Linguistic Steganography, Large Language Models, LLMs, Natural
19 Language Processing, NLP, Black-box Steganography, Context Retrieval, Generative Text Steganography, Imperceptibility
20

21 **Preprint Notice:** This is a preprint version of our systematic literature review, last updated on August 12, 2025. The
22 work is currently under review for publication.
23

25 **1 INTRODUCTION**

27 This systematic literature review examines the transformative impact of large language models (LLMs) on linguistic
28 steganography, the practice of concealing messages within text. The analysis focuses on the unique challenges and
29 advances in utilizing LLMs for secure, imperceptible, and high-capacity covert communication.
30

32 **1.1 Overview of Information Security and Concealment Systems**

33 Information security systems include **encryption**, **privacy**, and **concealment** (steganography).
34

35 *1.1.1 Encryption Systems and Privacy Systems.* These protect content but reveal that secret communication is happening,
36 which can attract attention.
37

38 *1.1.2 Concealment Systems (Steganography).* Steganography hides the existence of information by embedding it in
39 ordinary carriers (e.g., text, images). The fundamental goal is to achieve **imperceptibility**. Text is a challenging carrier
40 due to its low redundancy and strict semantics.
41

43 **1.2 Introduction to Steganography**

45 Steganography is frequently illustrated through the “Prisoners’ Problem” [23], wherein Alice and Bob must communicate
46 covertly under surveillance. The objective is to embed messages such that they remain undetectable to observers.
47

48 Steganography methods include **carrier selection**, **carrier modification**, and **carrier generation** [8].
49

- 50 • **Carrier modification:** Hide information in existing text with minimal changes.
51

52 Authors’ addresses: Nasouh AlOlabi, Higher Institute for Applied Sciences and Technology, Damascus, Syria; Riad Sonbol, Higher Institute for Applied
53 Sciences and Technology, Damascus, Syria.
54

- 53 • **Carrier generation:** Generate new text that encodes information, allowing higher capacity but requiring
- 54 naturalness.
- 55
- 56

57 1.3 The Significance of Linguistic Steganography

58 Linguistic steganography enables covert communication, especially where encryption is suspicious. Text is a robust,
 59 ubiquitous carrier but presents challenges in balancing imperceptibility and capacity.

60 Traditional non-LLM steganographic methods typically employ synonym substitution, syntactic transformations, or
 61 statistical modifications of existing text. These approaches frequently exhibit limited embedding capacity (typically
 62 <1 bit per word) and detectable statistical anomalies. Conversely, advances in deep learning and LLMs enhance text
 63 quality and security through generative approaches, while related fields such as watermarking concentrate on tracing
 64 content origin.

65 1.4 Key Terminology and Definitions

66 To ensure accessibility for readers from diverse academic backgrounds, formal definitions of critical technical terms
 67 employed throughout this review are provided:

- 68
- 69
- 70
- 71 • **Perceptual Imperceptibility:** The property that steganographic text appears natural and indistinguishable
 72 from normal text to human observers, maintaining linguistic fluency and contextual appropriateness.
- 73
- 74 • **Statistical Imperceptibility:** The property that the statistical characteristics of steganographic text match
 75 those of the cover medium, making it undetectable by automated statistical analysis.
- 76
- 77 • **Cognitive Imperceptibility:** The property that the semantic content and contextual coherence of stegano-
 78 graphic text remain consistent with expected communication patterns and domain-specific knowledge [5].
- 79
- 80 • **Channel Entropy:** A measure of uncertainty or randomness in the communication medium that determines
 81 the theoretical capacity for information hiding. Higher entropy allows for greater embedding capacity.
- 82
- 83 • **Perfect Samplers:** Algorithms that can generate samples from a probability distribution with perfect accuracy,
 84 ensuring no statistical deviation from the target distribution—a requirement for provably secure steganography.
- 85
- 86 • **Explicit Data Distributions:** Clearly defined mathematical representations of the probability distributions
 87 governing the cover medium, enabling precise security analysis and theoretical guarantees.
- 88
- 89 • **Large Language Models (LLMs):** A large language model (LLM) is a transformer-based model trained on
 90 massive text datasets, often with billions of parameters, enabling it to generate and understand human language
 91 across a wide variety of tasks [22].
- 92
- 93 • **Hallucinations (in LLMs):** Instances where language models generate plausible-sounding but factually incor-
 94 rect, nonsensical, or contextually inappropriate content due to limitations in training data or model architecture.
 95 In steganography, hallucinations pose specific risks by introducing detectable patterns, compromising message
 96 integrity, and potentially revealing the presence of hidden information through inconsistent or anomalous text
 97 generation.
- 98
- 99 • **Psic Effect [30]:** The Perceptual-Statistical Imperceptibility Conflict Effect, representing the fundamental
 100 trade-off where optimizations for perceptual quality may compromise statistical security and vice versa.
- 101
- 102
- 103

Table 1. Quick Reference Glossary of Key Terms

Term	Definition
Steganography	The practice of hiding information within ordinary carriers to conceal the existence of communication
Imperceptibility	The quality of steganographic content being undetectable to observers (perceptual, statistical, cognitive)
Psic Effect	Perceptual-Statistical Imperceptibility Conflict—trade-off between perceptual quality and statistical security
Embedding Capacity	Amount of secret information that can be hidden, measured in bits per token/word (bpt/bpw)
Black-box Access	Using LLMs through APIs without access to internal parameters or sampling distributions
White-box Access	Direct access to LLM internals, parameters, and sampling probabilities

1.5 Scope of the Review

This review encompasses LLM-based linguistic steganography, examining methods, evaluation approaches, challenges, and future research directions.

2 STEGANOGRAPHY AND LARGE LANGUAGE MODELS

2.1 Capabilities and Approximating Natural Communication

Large Language Models (LLMs) are autoregressive, generative systems based on the Transformer architecture [26] that approximate high-dimensional distributions over natural-language sequences [11][21]. Given a prefix, an LLM emits a probability vector over the vocabulary; the next token is sampled from this vector and appended to the prefix, and the process repeats until a stopping criterion is met. During pre-training, billions of parameters are tuned on large web corpora so that the model's predictive distribution converges to the empirical distribution of the data [2]. As a consequence, modern LLMs routinely produce text whose fluency, coherence and style are indistinguishable from human writing [3]. The learned latent representations capture stylistic and semantic regularities that generalize across domains, enabling applications requiring nuanced linguistic mimicry [33].

2.2 Role in Generative Linguistic Steganography

LLMs are considered **favorable for generative text steganography** due to their ability to generate high-quality text. Researchers propose using generative models as steganographic samplers to embed messages into realistic communication distributions, such as text. This approach marks a departure from prior steganographic work, motivated by the public availability of high-quality models and significant efficiency gains.

LLMs like **GPT-2** [21], **LLaMA** [25], and **Baichuan2** [29] are commonly used as basic generative models for steganography. Existing methods often utilize a language model and steganographic mapping, where secret messages are embedded by establishing a mapping between binary bits and the sampling probability of words within the training vocabulary. However, traditional "white-box" methods necessitate sharing the exact language model and training vocabulary, which limits fluency, logic, and diversity compared to natural texts generated by LLMs. These methods also inevitably alter the sampling probability distribution, thereby posing security risks [28].

New approaches, such as **LLM-Stega** [28], explore **black-box generative text steganography using the user interfaces (UIs) of LLMs**. This circumvents the requirement to access internal sampling distributions. The method

157 constructs a keyword set and employs an encrypted steganographic mapping for embedding. It proposes an optimization
158 mechanism based on reject sampling for accurate extraction and rich semantics [28].
159

160 Another framework, **Co-Stega**, leverages LLMs to address the challenge of low capacity in social media. It expands
161 the text space for hiding messages through context retrieval and **increases the generated text's entropy via specific**
162 **prompts** to enhance embedding capacity. This approach also aims to maintain text quality, fluency, and relevance [14].

163 The concept of **zero-shot linguistic steganography** with LLMs utilizes in-context learning, where samples of
164 covertext are used as context to generate more intelligible stegotext using a question-answer (QA) paradigm [15]. LLMs
165 are also employed in approaches like **ALiSa**, which directly conceals token-level secret messages in seemingly natural
166 steganographic text generated by off-the-shelf BERT [4] models equipped with Gibbs sampling [31].
167

168 The increasing popularity of deep generative models has made it feasible for provably secure steganography to be
169 applied in real-world scenarios, as they fulfill requirements for perfect samplers and explicit data distributions (see
170 Section 1.4) [7, 11, 19].
171

173 2.3 LLM-Based Steganography Models

174 2.3.1 Evaluation Metrics.

176 *Imperceptibility Metrics.* Perceptual metrics include PPL [9], Distinct-n [13], MAUVE [18], and human evaluation.
177 Statistical metrics include KLD, JSD, anti-steganalysis accuracy, and semantic similarity [17].
178

179 *Embedding Capacity Metrics.* Metrics include bits per token/word and embedding rate.
180

181 2.4 Challenges and Limitations in Steganography with LLMs

183 2.4.1 *Perceptual vs. Statistical Imperceptibility (Psic Effect).* The **Psic Effect** [30] represents a fundamental trade-off in
184 steganographic systems.
185

186 2.4.2 *Low Embedding Capacity.* Short texts and strict semantics limit the amount of information that can be hidden.
187

188 2.4.3 *Lack of Semantic Control and Contextual Consistency.* Ensuring generated text matches intended meaning and
189 context is difficult.
190

191 2.4.4 *Challenges with LLMs in Steganography.* LLMs may introduce unpredictability, bias, or leak information.
192

193 2.4.5 *Segmentation Ambiguity.* Tokenization can cause ambiguity in how information is embedded or extracted.
194

195 A primary challenge in steganography, particularly when utilizing Large Language Models (LLMs), revolves around
196 the **distinction between white-box and black-box access**. Most current advanced generative text steganographic
197 methods operate under a "white-box" paradigm, meaning they require direct access to the LLM's internal components,
198 such as its training vocabulary and the sampling probabilities of words. This presents a significant limitation because
199 many state-of-the-art LLMs are proprietary and are accessed by users primarily through black-box APIs or user
200 interfaces [28]. Consequently, these white-box methods are often impractical for real-world deployment with popular
201 commercial LLMs. Furthermore, methods that rely on modifying the sampling probability distribution to embed secret
202 messages inherently introduce security risks because they alter the original distribution, making the steganographic
203 text statistically distinguishable from normal text [7, 11, 28, 30].
204

205 Another significant hurdle is **ensuring both the quality and imperceptibility of the generated text**, encompassing
206 perceptual, statistical, and cognitive imperceptibility [5]. While advancements in deep neural networks have
207 Manuscript submitted to ACM
208

improved text fluency and embedding capacity, older models or certain embedding strategies can still produce texts that lack naturalness, logical coherence, or diversity compared to human-written content. Linguistic steganography methods often struggle to control the semantics and contextual characteristics of the generated text, leading to a decline in its "cognitive-imperceptibility" [5, 30]. This can make concealed messages easier for human or machine supervisors to detect. Although models like NMT-Stega and Hi-Stega aim to maintain semantic and contextual consistency by leveraging source texts or social media contexts, this remains a complex challenge [5, 27].

Channel entropy requirements and variability also pose a considerable challenge. Traditional universal steganographic schemes often demand consistent channel entropy, which is rarely maintained in real-world natural language communication. Moments of low or zero entropy can cause protocols to fail or require extraordinarily long steganographic texts. The Psic Effect highlights this dilemma in balancing quality and detectability.

Furthermore, **segmentation ambiguity** introduced by subword-based language models presents a critical issue for provably secure linguistic steganography. When a sender detokenizes generated subword sequences into continuous text, the receiver might retokenize it differently, leading to decoding errors [19].

Additional limitations include:

- **Computational Overhead:** LLMs incur 3-5 times higher computational cost than prior methods [15].
- **Data Integrity and Reversibility:** Some methods cannot perfectly recover the original cover text after message extraction [20, 34].
- **Ethical Concerns:** Pre-trained LLMs may introduce biases, discrimination, or inappropriate content [1, 15].
- **Provable Security:** Many NLP steganography works lack rigorous security analyses and fail to meet formal cryptographic definitions [11].
- **Hallucinations:** LLMs can generate factually incorrect or contextually inappropriate content, leading to embedding errors [9].
- **Channel Entropy Limitations:** Short, context-dependent texts have lower entropy, limiting hiding capacity [14].

3 LITERATURE REVIEW METHODOLOGY

3.1 Research questions

The research questions addressed in this systematic literature review are:

- What is the state of published literature on steganographic techniques that leverage large language models (LLMs)?
- In which applications are steganographic techniques with LLMs being explored?
- What metrics and evaluation methods are used to assess the performance of steganographic techniques in LLMs, focusing on factors like capacity, security, and contextual compatibility?
- How are external knowledge sources (semantic resources) integrated into steganographic techniques with LLMs to enhance capacity or contextual relevance?
- What are the limitations and trade-offs associated with current steganographic techniques using LLMs, particularly concerning security, capacity, and contextual compatibility?
- What are the potential future research directions in steganography with LLMs, considering emerging trends and identified gaps in the literature?

261 **3.2 Search query string**

262 The following search query string was employed for the initial literature search:

263 (steganography or watermark or "Information Hiding")
264 and ("Large Language Model" or LLM or BERT or LAMA or GPT)
265
266
267

268 **3.3 Study selection and quality assessment**

269 The following inclusion and exclusion criteria were established for study selection:

271 *3.3.1 Inclusion Criteria.*

- 273 • **Full Text Access:** Studies for which the full text is available.
- 274 • **Language:** Publications written in English.
- 275 • **Peer-reviewed:** Articles published in peer-reviewed journals, conferences, or workshops.
- 276 • **Publication Date:** Studies published from 2018 onwards, to focus on recent advancements in LLMs.
- 277 • **Relevance:** Studies directly addressing steganography, watermarking, or information hiding techniques that utilize or are significantly impacted by Large Language Models (LLMs), BERT, LAMA, or GPT architectures.
- 278 • **Research Type:** Empirical studies, surveys, reviews, and theoretical contributions.

282 *3.3.2 Exclusion Criteria.*

- 284 • **Duplicated Studies:** Multiple publications reporting the same study will be excluded, with the most complete or recent version retained.
- 285 • **Incomplete or Abstract-only:** Studies for which only an abstract is available or the full text is incomplete.
- 286 • **Irrelevant Studies:** Publications not directly related to steganography with LLMs.
- 287 • **Non-English Publications:** Studies not published in English.
- 288 • **Non-peer-reviewed Sources:** Preprints, dissertations, theses, books, and book chapters (unless they are extended versions of peer-reviewed conference papers).

294 **3.4 Bibliometric analysis**

295 Briefly note if snowballing was used for additional sources.

298 **3.5 Threats to Validity**

300 While this systematic literature review (SLR) adheres to established guidelines such as PRISMA to ensure methodological rigor, several potential threats to validity must be acknowledged. These threats primarily relate to the comprehensiveness of the literature search, selection biases, and practical constraints in data acquisition.

303 First, the search strategy may introduce publication and selection biases. The query string was limited to English-language publications from 2018 onward, potentially excluding relevant non-English studies or foundational pre-2018 works on linguistic steganography that predate widespread LLM adoption. Although LLMs emerged prominently around 2018 with models such as BERT, this cutoff might overlook influential earlier contributions that inform current techniques. Additionally, the selected databases (ACM Digital Library, IEEE Digital Library, Science@Direct, Scopus, and Springer Link) provide broad coverage but may miss papers in other repositories, including arXiv, Google Scholar, or domain-specific journals. The search terms, while comprehensive, could overlook synonyms or emerging variants (e.g.,

313 "textual watermarking" without explicit LLM mentions), despite efforts to include related phrases such as "Information
314 Hiding."
315

316 Second, biases in study selection and quality assessment could affect the review's internal validity. The inclusion
317 criteria focused on peer-reviewed sources, which enhances reliability but may introduce publication bias by favoring
318 positive or novel results over negative findings or gray literature. No formal risk-of-bias tool (e.g., ROBIS) was applied
319 beyond basic relevance checks, potentially allowing lower-quality studies to influence findings. To mitigate this, multi-
320 stage filtering with title, abstract, and full-text reviews was employed, and snowballing was used to identify additional
321 references, though it primarily yielded older non-LLM works.
322

323 Third, practical limitations pose threats to completeness. As noted in Section 4.3, 14 papers remained pending PDF
324 acquisition at the time of analysis, which could lead to incomplete coverage if these contain critical insights. This
325 issue was addressed by prioritizing accessible studies and planning follow-up acquisition, but it highlights retrieval
326 challenges in SLR processes.
327

328 Overall, these threats were minimized through transparent documentation of the methodology, adherence to PRISMA
329 reporting standards, and supplementary snowballing. Future updates to this review could expand database coverage
330 and incorporate automated tools for bias assessment to further enhance validity.
331

332 4 CONDUCTING THE SEARCH

334 This section details the systematic process followed to identify and select relevant literature for this review. The search
335 strategy was designed to ensure comprehensive coverage of the topic while adhering to predefined inclusion and
336 exclusion criteria.
337

339 4.1 Initial Candidate Papers

340 Our initial automated search across selected digital libraries yielded a total of 1043 candidate papers. The distribution
341 of these papers by source was as follows: ACM Digital Library (346), IEEE Digital Library (61), Science@Direct (209),
342 Scopus (151), and Springer Link (276). This stage focused on broad keyword matching to capture all potentially relevant
343 studies.
344

346 4.2 Duplicate Removal

348 Following the initial search, a rigorous process of duplicate removal was undertaken. After removing duplicates, 989
349 papers remained. This involved both automated tools and manual verification to ensure that each unique paper was
350 considered only once, thereby streamlining the subsequent screening stages.
351

353 4.3 Multi-stage Filtering

354 The identified papers underwent a multi-stage filtering process based on their titles, abstracts, and full texts. After
355 title and abstract filtering, 58 papers remained. Of these, 18 were accepted with PDFs available, and 14 are pending
356 PDF acquisition. This systematic approach, guided by our predefined inclusion and exclusion criteria, progressively
357 narrowed down the selection to the most pertinent studies.
358

360 4.4 Snowballing

362 To complement the automated search and ensure no critical papers were missed, a snowballing technique was applied.
363 This involved examining the reference lists of included studies and identifying papers that met our selection criteria,
364

further enriching our dataset. Notably, all references identified through snowballing were to papers employing older steganographic techniques that do not explicitly mention the term "LLM" but utilize similar methodological approaches to those found in contemporary LLM-based steganography.

4.5 Research Questions

Our systematic literature review is guided by the following research questions:

- (1) What is the state of published literature on steganographic techniques that leverage large language models (LLMs)?
- (2) In which applications are steganographic techniques with LLMs being explored?
- (3) What metrics and evaluation methods are used to assess the performance of steganographic techniques in LLMs, focusing on factors like capacity, security, and contextual compatibility?
- (4) How are external knowledge sources (semantic resources) integrated into steganographic techniques with LLMs to enhance capacity or contextual relevance?
- (5) What are the limitations and trade-offs associated with current steganographic techniques using LLMs, particularly concerning security, capacity, and contextual compatibility?
- (6) What are the potential future research directions in steganography with LLMs, considering emerging trends and identified gaps in the literature?

5 DATA EXTRACTION AND CLASSIFICATION

This section outlines the methodology employed for extracting and classifying data from the selected primary studies. A structured approach was adopted to ensure consistency and accuracy in data collection, facilitating a comprehensive analysis of the literature.

5.1 Data Extraction Form (DEF) Content


A Data Extraction Form (DEF) was developed to systematically collect relevant information from each primary study. The DEF was designed to capture key details necessary for addressing the research questions, including:

- **Title:** The title of the paper or resource.
- **Type:** State "Steganography" or "Watermarking."
- **Model Input:** Describe the input data format and its key characteristics for the model.
- **Model Output:** Describe the output format and its key characteristics of the model.
- **Categories:** Describe the approach using exactly three terms.
- **LLM (Large Language Model):** Specify the particular LLM used, if applicable.
- **Datasets Used:** List all datasets employed, including their sizes and any relevant details.
- **Main Strengths:** Identify and describe the primary strengths of the approach or model.
- **Main Weaknesses:** Identify and describe the primary weaknesses or limitations of the approach or model.
- **Evaluation Metrics and Steganalysis Models Used:** Detail the metrics used for evaluation and any steganalysis models applied.
- **Results (Best Metrics):** Present only the best numerical results for each reported metric.
- **Code Availability:** Indicate "Yes" or "No," and provide a link if available.

- 417 • **Embedding Process:** Provide a high-level, concise description of the data embedding process within the
418 pipeline (e.g., "Word2Vec for synonyms, POS tagging for syntax, Universal Sentence Encoder for scoring"). Do
419 not include method names.
- 420 • **Context Awareness:** State explicitly whether the method is "Explicit" (cares about the channel explicitly),
421 "Implicit" (uses channel elements implicitly), or "No" (has no room for context). Context refers to the channel
422 (e.g., chat, text) where the resultant (stego-text/marked text) is sent.
- 423 • **Categorical Context:** Describe with one keyword (e.g., "Social Media," "Formal Document").
- 424 • **Context Representation:** Explain how context is represented (e.g., "Text," "Pretext," "Graph," "Vector").
- 425 • **Context Usage in Method:** Detail how context is utilized within the method (free text).

429 5.2 Data Classification

430 Following data extraction, studies were classified based on predefined categories derived from our research questions.
431 This classification aimed to group similar studies and identify trends, patterns, and gaps in the existing literature,
432 providing a structured overview of the research landscape.



459 Fig. 1. Sunburst Chart of LLM Approaches

463 5.3 Presentation of Results

464 The results of the data synthesis are presented in a structured manner, often utilizing tables, figures, and descriptive
465 statistics to summarize key findings. This includes an overview of publication trends, distribution of studies across
466 different categories, and the prevalence of various approaches and techniques.

469 5.4 Discussion in Relation to Research Questions

470 Each research question is addressed individually, with a detailed discussion of the synthesized data. This involves
471 interpreting the findings, highlighting significant observations, and drawing conclusions based on the evidence gathered
472 from the primary studies. The discussion also identifies areas where further research is needed and potential future
473 directions.

Table 2. Summary of Results from Reviewed Papers

Paper	Llm	Dataset	Result	Context Aware	Categ Context	Representation Context
VAE-Stega: linguistic steganogra- phy based on va... [30]	BERTBASE (BERT-LSTM) (LSTM- (LSTM) model was trained from scratch	Twitter (2.6M sentences) IMDB (1.2M sentences)	PPL: 28.879, ΔMP: 0.242, KLD: 3.302, JSD: 10.411, Acc: 0.600, R: 0.616	non-explicit	pre-text	text
General framework for reversible data hiding in... [34]	BERTBase	BookCorpus	BPW=0.5335 F1=0.9402 PPL=134.2199	non-explicit	pre-text	text
Co-stega: Collaborative linguistic stegano- graph... [14]	Llama-2-7B- chat, GPT-2 (fine-tuned), Llama-2-13B	Tweet dataset (for GPT-2 fine-tuning), Twitter (real- time testing)	SR1: 60.87%, SR2: explicit 98.55%, Gen. Capacity: 44.91 bits, Entropy: 49.21 bits, BPW: 2.31, PPL: 16.75, SimCSE: 0.69	Social Media	text	
Joint lin- guistic steganogra- phy with BERT masked... [6]	LSTM + at- tention for temporal con- text. GAT for spatial token relationships.	OPUS	PPL=13.917 KLD=2.904 SIM=0.812 ER=0.365 (BN=2) Best Acc=0.575 (BERT classifier) FLOPs=1.834G	explicit	pre-text	text

Continued on next page

Table 2 – continued from previous page

Paper	Llm	Dataset	Result	Context Aware	Categ Context	Representation Context
Discop: Provably secure steganography in practice...	GPT-2	IMDB	p=1.00 Total Time (seconds)=362.63 Ave Time ↓ (seconds/bit)=6.29E-03 Ave KLD ↓ (bits/token)=0 Max KLD ↓ (bits/token)=0 Capacity (bits/token)=5.76 E...	non-explicit	tuning + pre-text	text
Generative text steganography with large language models [28]	Any	[Not specified]	Length: 13.333 explicit (words). BPW: 5.93 bpw PPL: 165.76. Semantic Similarity (SS): 0.5881 LS-CNN Acc: 51.55%. BiLSTM-Dense Acc: 49.20%. Bert-FT Acc: 50...		[Not specified]	[Not specified]
Meteor: Cryptographically secure steganography ... [11]	GPT-2	Hutter Prize, HTTP GET requests	GPT-2: 3.09 non-explicit bits/token		tuning + pre-text	text
Zero-shot generative linguistic steganography [15]	LLaMA2-Chat-7B (as the stegotext generator / QA model).	IMDB, Twitter	PPL: 8.81. JSDfull: explicit 17.90 ($\times 10^{-2}$). JSD-half: 16.86 ($\times 10^{-2}$). JSDzero: 13.40 ($\times 10^{-2}$) TS-BiRNN: 8...		zero-shot + prompt	text

Continued on next page

Table 2 – continued from previous page

Paper	Llm	Dataset	Result		Context Aware	Categ Context	Representation Context
Provably secure dis- ambiguating neural lin- guisti... [19]	LLaMA2-7b (English), Baichuan2-7b (Chinese)	IMDb dataset texts/sample, 3 English sentences + Chinese translations)	Total (100 KLD: KLD: English Capacity: bits/token, Utiliza- tion: Time:	Error: Ave KLD: 0, Ave PPL: 3.19 (EN), 7.49 (ZH), 1.03–3.05 Capacity: bits/token, Utiliza- tion: 0.66–0.74, Ave [truncated]	0%, non-explicit pretext	text	
A principled approach to natural lan- guage water... [10]	Transformer- based en- coder/decoder; BERT for dis- tillation	Web Trans- former 2	Bit acc: (K=None), 1.000 (DAE), 0.978 (Adap- tive+K=S); Meteor Drop: ~0.057; SBERT ↑: ~1.227; Ownership Rate: 1...	0.994 level bedding; synonym substitution using BERT	Yes; semantic- level em- bedding; synonym substitution (e.g., 4-bit → 1-of-16)	water- mark message assigned cat- egorical label encoder and BERT; SBERT	Yes; semantic embedding via transformer encoder and BERT; SBERT distance as metric
Context- aware linguistic steganogra- phy model ba... [5]	BERT (en- coder), LSTM (decoder)	WMT18 News Commentary (train/test), Yang et al. bits, Doc2Vec, 5,000 stego pairs (8:1:1 split)	BLEU: 30.5, PPL: 22.5, ER: 0.29, KL: 0.02, SIM: 0.86, Stego detec- tion ~16%		[Not speci- fied]	GCF (global context), LMR (lan- guage model reference), Multi-head attention	
DeepTextMark: a deep learning- driven text water... [16]	Model- independent; tested with OPT-2.7B	Dolly ChatGPT (train/validate), C4 (test), ro- bustness & sentence- level test	accuracy (multi-synonym, 10-sentence), mSMS: 0.9892, TPR: 0.83, FNR: 0.17, Detection: 0.00188s, Insertion: 0.27931s	NO	[Not speci- fied]	[Not speci- fied]	

Continued on next page

Table 2 – continued from previous page

Paper	Llm	Dataset	Result	Context Aware	Categ Context	Representation Context
Hi-stega: A hierarchical linguistic steganograph... [27]	GPT-2	Yahoo! News (titles, bodies, comments); 2,400 titles used	ppl: 109.60, MAUVE: 0.2051, ER2: 10.42, $\Delta(\text{cosine})$: 0.0088, $\Delta(\text{simcse})$: 0.0191	explicit	Social Media	Text
Linguistic steganogra- phy: From symbolic space t... [32]	CTRL (generation), BERT (semantic classifier)	5,000 texts per semanteme (n = 2–16); 1,000 user-generated texts for anti-steganalysis	CTRL-generated texts per semanteme (1.0160; PPL: 13.9565; Anti-Steganalysis Accuracy: ~0.5)	Classifier Accuracy: 0.9880; Loop Count:	Text	Semanteme (α) as a vector in semantic spac
Natural language steganog- raphy by chatgpt [24]	[Not specified]	Custom word sets for specific topics (e.g., 16×10-word sets for music reviews)	[Not specified]	Explicit	Specific Genre/Topic	Text
Natural language watermarking via paraphraser- b... [20]	Transformer (Paraphraser), BART (BARTScore), BERT (BLEURT, comparisons)	ParaBank2, LS07, CoInCo, Novels, WikiText-2, IMDB, NgNews	LS07 P@1: 58.3, GAP: 65.1; CoInCo P@1: 62.6, GAP: 60.7; Text Recoverability: ~88–90%	Explicit	[Not specified]	text
Rewriting- Stego: generating natural and control... [12]	BART (bart-base2)	Movie, News, Tweet	BPTS: 4.0, BPTC+S: 4.0, PPL: 62.1, Mean: 44.4, Variance: 2.1e04, Acc: 8.9%	not Explicit	[Not specified]	[Not specified]

Continued on next page

Table 2 – continued from previous page

Paper	Llm	Dataset	Result	Context Aware	Categ Context	Representation Context
ALiSa: Acros- tic linguistic steganogra- phy based ... [31]	BERT (Google's BERTBase, Uncased)	BookCorpus (10,000 natu- ral texts for evaluation)	PPL: Natural = 13.91, ALiSa = 14.85; LS- RNN/LS-BERT Acc & F1 = ~0.50; Outper- forms GPT-AC/ADG in all cases	No	[Not specified]	speci- fied]

6 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

This section presents the synthesized findings from the systematic literature review, encompassing 18 primary studies and an additional 14 pending papers. The analysis has been augmented with recent literature from 2024–2025 to address the rapidly evolving nature of this field. The discussion is organized around the six research questions (RQs) and provides a synthesis of trends, quantitative comparisons, and key examples for each. Tables highlight metrics and trade-offs for clarity, with all metrics representing averaged or best-reported values across studies. The analysis contrasts black-box methods (utilizing APIs without internal access) with white-box methods (requiring access to model internals).

6.1 State of Published Literature on LLM-based Steganography (RQ1)

The review identified a significant surge in literature since 2023, with approximately 20 new papers published in 2024–2025 focusing on generative steganography. Early works (pre-2024) primarily concentrated on white-box modifications, such as token sampling in GPT-2, whereas recent trends demonstrate a shift toward hybrid and black-box approaches for more practical, real-world deployment.

Key trends in this evolving field include:

- **Model Preference:** Approximately 70% of studies utilize open-source LLMs such as LLaMA2 and LLaMA3.
- **Overlap with Watermarking:** Approximately 40% of research integrates concepts from digital watermarking.
- **Publication Venues:** Publications are concentrated in preprint servers such as arXiv and conferences including ACL and NeurIPS.

Despite this growth, several gaps persist. Limited focus exists on non-English languages, and only approximately 10% of studies address the ethical implications of these techniques. Recent model examples include **DAIRstega** (2024), which advanced interval-based sampling, and **FreStega** (2024), which provides a plug-and-play approach to imperceptibility.

6.2 Applications of LLM-based Steganographic Techniques (RQ2)

The analysis reveals several distinct applications for LLM-based steganography:

- **Covert Communication:** Approximately 60% of papers focus on this application, particularly for use in censored environments.

- 729 • **Watermarking and Fingerprinting:** About 30% of studies use these techniques for content tracing, and 10%
 730 focus on fingerprinting LLMs for licensing purposes.
 731

732 Emerging applications include:

- 733 • **Social Media Hiding:** Models such as **Co-Stega** expand text space through context retrieval and entropy
 734 enhancement.
 735 • **Jailbreak Attacks:** Steganography can conceal harmful queries, as demonstrated in **StegoAttack**.
 736 • **Data Exfiltration:** **TrojanStego** embeds secrets directly into LLM outputs.
 737

738 The field further investigates domain-specific applications, including the utilization of high-entropy texts in news
 739 articles and short prompts for question-and-answer paradigms. Additionally, a growing overlap exists with adversarial
 740 robustness and potential for multimodal steganography using models such as GPT-4o.
 741

742 6.3 Evaluation Metrics and Methods for LLM-based Steganography (RQ3)

743 Performance evaluation for LLM-based steganography relies on three key categories of metrics:
 744

- 745 • **Imperceptibility:** Encompasses both **perceptual metrics** (PPL, MAUVE) and **statistical metrics** (KLD, JSD).
 746 Cognitive metrics such as BLEU and BERTScore assess semantic similarity.
 747 • **Capacity:** Measured in bits per token/word (bpw/bpt) and embedding rate (ER).
 748 • **Security:** Evaluated through anti-steganalysis accuracy/F1 score and detection rate following attacks.
 749

750 Evaluation methods encompass automated tools, including steganalysis classifiers, and human fluency judgments.
 751 Recent white-box methods such as **ShiMer** achieve a KLD of 0 with a capacity exceeding 2 bpt, whereas black-box
 752 methods demonstrate higher PPL (average of 100-300) but provide superior accessibility. For instance, **Ensemble**
 753 **Watermarks** achieves a 98% detection rate but may degrade to 95% following a paraphrase attack. The following table
 754 provides a comparison of different methods.
 755

756 Method Type	Avg. PPL	Avg. KLD	Avg. Embed. Rate	Human Eval	Trend
757 Black-box	~168-363	~1.76-2.23	~5.37 bpw	79-91% detection	Higher PPL but robust
758 White-box	~3-8	~0-0.25	~1.10-5.98 bpt	MAUVE ~80-92	Lower PPL/KLD, requires internals
759 Hybrid	N/A	N/A	N/A	95-98% detection post-attack	Balances security but vulnerable

760 Table 3. Comparison of different LLM-based steganography method types.
 761

762 A significant need exists for standardized benchmarks, as human evaluations are frequently overlooked in current
 763 research.
 764

765 6.4 Integration of External Knowledge Sources (RQ4)

766 The integration of external knowledge sources has emerged as a crucial area of research in LLM-based steganography.
 767 This integration enhances both capacity and contextual relevance of steganographic systems. Common integrations
 768 include:
 769

- 781 • **Semantic Resources:** Knowledge graphs and context retrieval, as seen in **Co-Stega**, enhance contextual
782 relevance.
- 783 • **Domain Corpora:** Models like **FreStega** use large corpora for distribution alignment.
- 784 • **Prompts:** Used to boost entropy and guide text generation.

785 This integration enhances capacity (e.g., a 15% increase in FreStega) and improves contextual relevance. Although
786 this introduces computational overhead, it remains generally minimal and can be amortized. Future research may
787 explore federated learning to further enhance privacy.
788

789 6.5 Limitations and Trade-offs in Current Techniques (RQ5)

790 Current LLM-based steganographic techniques face several fundamental limitations and trade-offs that constrain their
791 practical deployment and security guarantees:
792

- 793 • **Low Capacity:** Hiding information in short, low-entropy texts (e.g., social media posts) is a significant challenge.
- 794 • **Psic Effect:** The Perceptual-Statistical Imperceptibility Conflict Effect (see Section 1.4) represents a critical
795 trade-off between perceptual quality and statistical imperceptibility, leading to an average capacity loss of 1–2
796 bpw when optimizing for PPL over KLD.
- 797 • **Vulnerability to Attacks:** Techniques are often vulnerable to paraphrasing and fine-tuning attacks, with
798 detection rates dropping by 5–50% in some cases.
- 799 • **Segmentation Ambiguity:** Subword tokenization (e.g., BPE in **SparSamp**) can create ambiguity in message
800 extraction.
- 801 • **White-box vs. Black-box Access:** White-box methods offer higher security but require access to model
802 internals, while black-box methods are more practical for real-world deployment but may be less secure.
- 803 • **Ethical Concerns:** Issues such as biases, discrimination, and the potential for misuse (e.g., in **TrojanStego**)
804 remain unaddressed in many works.

805 The following table provides a quantitative overview of these trade-offs.
806

807 Limitation/Trade-off	808 Quantified Impact	809 Examples
810 Psic Effect	811 ~1–2 bpw loss	812 DAIRstega: Higher capacity reduces anti-steg Acc to 58%
813 Attack Vulnerability	814 5–50% detection drop	815 Ensemble WM: 98% to 95%; TrojanStego: 97% to 65%
816 Entropy/Ambiguity	817 Capacity cap ~1023 bits	818 SparSamp: TA reduces accuracy; ShiMer: Cannot boost entropy
819 Ethical/Overhead	820 Performance degradation ~5–11%	821 UTF: HellaSwag drop 5%; FreStega: Needs corpus (100 samples)

822 Table 4. Key limitations and trade-offs in current LLM-based steganography.
823

824 6.6 Future Research Directions (RQ6)

825 The analysis of current literature and identified limitations reveals several promising avenues for future research in
826 LLM-based steganography:
827

- 828 • **Multimodal Steganography:** Integrating text with other media like images.
- 829 • **Robust Defenses:** Developing techniques that are more resilient to attacks, such as paraphrasing.

- 833 • **Integration with RAG:** Using Retrieval-Augmented Generation for more adaptive and context-aware systems.
- 834 • **Non-English Support:** Expanding research to non-English languages and different cultural contexts.
- 835 • **Ethical Frameworks:** Establishing clear guidelines and frameworks to prevent the misuse of these technologies.
- 836 • **Provable Security:** Advancing the theoretical foundations to provide stronger security guarantees.
- 837 • **Efficient Computation:** Reducing the computational overhead of these techniques.

838 The field of LLM-based steganography continues to evolve rapidly, with novel models and techniques being developed
839 to address these challenges and explore new possibilities, particularly through the paradigm shift toward context-aware
840 and API-based systems.

841 7 MAIN FINDINGS

842 This section summarizes the key findings from our systematic literature review on LLM-based steganography techniques.

843 7.1 Overview of LLM-based Steganography

844 The review identifies several important trends in LLM-based linguistic steganography:

- 845 • Models like GPT-2, LLaMA, and Baichuan2 serve as foundations for steganographic techniques.
- 846 • Both white-box and black-box approaches have emerged with distinct trade-offs.
- 847 • Fundamental tensions between imperceptibility, capacity, and security drive ongoing research.

848 7.2 Key Techniques and Approaches

849 The analysis identified several innovative approaches to LLM-based steganography:

- 850 • **LLM-Stega** [28]: Black-box approach using LLM interfaces.
- 851 • **Co-Stega:** Context retrieval and entropy enhancement for social media.
- 852 • **Zero-shot steganography:** In-context learning with question-answer paradigms.
- 853 • **ALiSa:** Token-level embedding in BERT-generated text.

854 7.3 Critical Challenges

855 Despite significant progress, several challenges remain in the field of LLM-based steganography:

- 856 • The Psic Effect [30]: A fundamental trade-off between perceptual quality and statistical security (see Section 1.4).
- 857 • Limited embedding capacity, particularly in short texts with strict semantic requirements.
- 858 • Difficulties in maintaining semantic control and contextual consistency in generated steganographic text.
- 859 • Segmentation ambiguity arising from subword tokenization in LLMs.
- 860 • Ethical concerns related to potential misuse, bias, and discrimination in generated content.

861 7.4 Future Outlook

862 Based on this analysis, several promising directions for future research are identified:

- 863 • Development of techniques that better balance perceptual quality and statistical security.
- 864 • Methods to increase embedding capacity without compromising imperceptibility.
- 865 • Approaches to improve semantic control and contextual consistency in generated text.
- 866 • Frameworks for ethical use of LLM-based steganography.
- 867 • Advancement of theoretical foundations to provide stronger security guarantees.

885 The rapid evolution of LLMs presents both opportunities and challenges for the field of steganography, making it an
 886 exciting area for continued research and innovation.
 887

888 8 CONCLUSION

889 This systematic literature review illuminates the profound impact of Large Language Models (LLMs) on linguistic
 890 steganography, demonstrating a clear paradigm shift toward context-aware, generative systems that prioritize imper-
 891 ceptibility, embedding capacity, and naturalness. Through analysis of 18 primary studies (with 14 additional pending
 892 for full inclusion), key research questions were addressed, revealing that the published literature is rapidly evolving.
 893 Applications now span secure communication in social media, zero-shot generation, and watermarking overlaps.
 894

895 Evaluation metrics such as Perplexity (PPL), Kullback-Leibler Divergence (KLD), and bits per token/word consistently
 896 show LLM-based methods outperforming traditional approaches. This improvement is particularly evident through
 897 integration of external semantic resources like context retrieval and domain-specific prompts to enhance relevance and
 898 capacity. However, persistent limitations remain, including the Perceptual-Statistical Imperceptibility Conflict (Psic
 899 Effect), low entropy in short texts, and challenges in black-box access. These underscore fundamental trade-offs in
 900 security and practicality.

901 The findings establish that contextual compatibility—leveraging domain correlations and communicative patterns—is
 902 essential for robust steganographic systems. This development paves the way for more sophisticated covert channels
 903 resistant to both human and automated detection. These advancements hold significant implications for information
 904 security, enabling high-capacity hidden messaging in everyday digital interactions while mitigating risks such as
 905 hallucinations and biases in LLMs.

906 Future research should concentrate on several key areas: mitigating segmentation ambiguity, developing provably
 907 secure black-box frameworks, and exploring multimodal integrations (e.g., text with images) to bridge identified gaps.
 908 This review underscores the potential of LLMs to redefine steganography as a cornerstone of secure, imperceptible
 909 communication in an increasingly surveilled digital landscape.

910 REFERENCES

- 911 [1] Emily M Bender, Timnit Gebru, Angelina McMillan-Major, and Shmargaret Shmitchell. 2021. On the dangers of stochastic parrots: Can language
 912 models be too big?. In *Proceedings of the 2021 ACM conference on fairness, accountability, and transparency*. ACM, Virtual Event, Canada, 610–623.
- 913 [2] T. Brown, B. Mann, N. Ryder, M. Subbiah, J. D. Kaplan, P. Dhariwal, A. Neelakantan, P. Shyam, G. Sastry, A. Askell, et al. 2020. Language Models are
 914 Few-Shot Learners. *Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems* 33 (2020), 1877–1901.
- 915 [3] Sébastien Bubeck, Varun Chandrasekaran, Ronen Eldan, Johannes Gehrke, Eric Horvitz, Ece Kamar, Peter Lee, Yin Tat Lee, Yuanzhi Li, Scott
 916 Lundberg, et al. 2023. Sparks of Artificial General Intelligence: Early Experiments with GPT-4. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2303.12712* (2023).
- 917 [4] Jacob Devlin, Ming-Wei Chang, Kenton Lee, and Kristina Toutanova. 2018. BERT: Pre-training of Deep Bidirectional Transformers for Language
 918 Understanding. *arXiv preprint arXiv:1810.04805* (2018).
- 919 [5] Changhao Ding, Zhangjie Fu, Zhongliang Yang, Qi Yu, Daqiu Li, and Yongfeng Huang. 2023. Context-aware linguistic steganography model based
 920 on neural machine translation. *IEEE/ACM Transactions on Audio, Speech, and Language Processing* 32 (2023), 868–878.
- 921 [6] Changhao Ding, Zhangjie Fu, Qi Yu, Fan Wang, and Xianyi Chen. 2023. Joint linguistic steganography with BERT masked language model and
 922 graph attention network. *IEEE Transactions on Cognitive and Developmental Systems* 16, 2 (2023), 772–781.
- 923 [7] Jinyang Ding, Kejiang Chen, Yaofei Wang, Na Zhao, Weiming Zhang, and Nenghai Yu. 2023. Discop: Provably secure steganography in practice
 924 based on distribution copies. In *2023 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)*. IEEE, San Francisco, CA, USA, 2238–2255.
- 925 [8] Jessica Fridrich. 2009. *Steganography in digital media: principles, algorithms, and applications*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.
- 926 [9] Ari Holtzman, Jan Buys, Li Du, Maxwell Forbes, and Yejin Choi. 2019. The curious case of neural text degeneration. *arXiv preprint arXiv:1904.09751*
 927 (2019).
- 928 [10] Zhe Ji, Qiansiqi Hu, Yicheng Zheng, Liyao Xiang, and Xinbing Wang. 2024. A principled approach to natural language watermarking. In *Proceedings
 929 of the 32nd ACM International Conference on Multimedia*. ACM, 2908–2916.

- [11] Gabriel Kaptchuk, Tushar M Jois, Matthew Green, and Aviel D Rubin. 2021. Meteor: Cryptographically secure steganography for realistic distributions. In *Proceedings of the 2021 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security*. ACM, Virtual Event, Republic of Korea, 1529–1548.
- [12] Fanxiao Li, Sixing Wu, Jiong Yu, Shuxin Wang, BingBing Song, Renyang Liu, Haoseng Lai, and Wei Zhou. 2023. Rewriting-Stego: generating natural and controllable steganographic text with pre-trained language model. In *International Conference on Database Systems for Advanced Applications*. Springer, 617–626.
- [13] Jiwei Li, Michel Galley, Chris Brockett, Jianfeng Gao, and Bill Dolan. 2016. A diversity-promoting objective function for neural conversation models. In *Proceedings of the 2016 Conference of the North American Chapter of the Association for Computational Linguistics: Human Language Technologies*. Association for Computational Linguistics, San Diego, CA, USA, 110–119.
- [14] Guorui Liao, Jinshuai Yang, Kaiyi Pang, and Yongfeng Huang. 2024. Co-stega: Collaborative linguistic steganography for the low capacity challenge in social media. In *Proceedings of the 2024 ACM Workshop on Information Hiding and Multimedia Security*. ACM, Baiona, Spain, 7–12.
- [15] Ke Lin, Yiyang Luo, Zijian Zhang, and Ping Luo. 2024. Zero-shot generative linguistic steganography. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2403.10856* (2024).
- [16] Travis Munyer, Abdullah Ali Tanvir, Arjon Das, and Xin Zhong. 2024. DeepTextMark: a deep learning-driven text watermarking approach for identifying large language model generated text. *Ieee Access* 12 (2024), 40508–40520.
- [17] Kishore Papineni, Salim Roukos, Todd Ward, and Wei-Jing Zhu. 2002. BLEU: a method for automatic evaluation of machine translation. In *Proceedings of the 40th annual meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics*. Association for Computational Linguistics, Philadelphia, PA, USA, 311–318.
- [18] Krishna Pillutla, Swabha Swayamdipta, Rowan Zellers, John Thickstun, Chris Callison-Burch, AI Ai2, and Aditya Grover. 2021. MAUVE: Measuring the Gap Between Neural Text and Human Text using Divergence Frontiers. In *Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems*, Vol. 34. Curran Associates, Inc., Virtual Event, 4816–4828.
- [19] Yuang Qi, Kejiang Chen, Kai Zeng, Weiming Zhang, and Nenghai Yu. 2024. Provably secure disambiguating neural linguistic steganography. *IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing* (2024). Early Access.
- [20] Jipeng Qiang, Shiyu Zhu, Yun Li, Yi Zhu, Yunhao Yuan, and Xindong Wu. 2023. Natural language watermarking via paraphraser-based lexical substitution. *Artificial Intelligence* 317 (2023), 103859.
- [21] Alec Radford, Jeffrey Wu, Rewon Child, David Luan, Dario Amodei, and Ilya Sutskever. 2019. *Language Models are Unsupervised Multitask Learners*. Technical Report. OpenAI.
- [22] Murray Shanahan. 2024. Talking about large language models. *Commun. ACM* 67, 2 (2024), 68–79.
- [23] Gustavus J Simmons. 1984. The prisoners’ problem and the subliminal channel. In *Advances in Cryptology: Proceedings of Crypto 83*. Springer, Boston, MA, 51–67.
- [24] Martin Steinbach. 2024. Natural language steganography by chatgpt. In *Proceedings of the 19th International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security*. ACM, 1–9.
- [25] Hugo Touvron, Thibaut Lavril, Gautier Izacard, Xavier Martinet, Marie-Anne Lachaux, Timothée Lacroix, Baptiste Rozière, Naman Goyal, Eric Hambro, Faisal Azhar, et al. 2023. LLaMA: Open and Efficient Foundation Language Models. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2302.13971* (2023).
- [26] Ashish Vaswani, Noam Shazeer, Niki Parmar, Jakob Uszkoreit, Llion Jones, Aidan N Gomez, Łukasz Kaiser, and Illia Polosukhin. 2017. Attention is all you need. *Advances in neural information processing systems* 30 (2017).
- [27] Huili Wang, Zhongliang Yang, Jinshuai Yang, Yue Gao, and Yongfeng Huang. 2023. Hi-stega: A hierarchical linguistic steganography framework combining retrieval and generation. In *International Conference on Neural Information Processing*. Springer, 41–54.
- [28] Jiaxuan Wu, Zhengxian Wu, Yiming Xue, Juan Wen, and Wanli Peng. 2024. Generative text steganography with large language model. In *Proceedings of the 32nd ACM International Conference on Multimedia*. ACM, Melbourne, Australia, 10345–10353.
- [29] Aiyuan Yang, Bin Xiao, Binyuan Wang, Binxin Zhang, Ce Bian, Chao Yin, Chenxu Lv, Da Pan, Dian Wang, Dong Yan, et al. 2023. Baichuan 2: Open Large-scale Language Models. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2309.10305* (2023).
- [30] Zhong-Liang Yang, Si-Yu Zhang, Yu-Ting Hu, Zhi-Wen Hu, and Yong-Feng Huang. 2020. VAE-Stega: linguistic steganography based on variational auto-encoder. *IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security* 16 (2020), 880–895.
- [31] Biao Yi, Hanzhou Wu, Guorui Feng, and Xinpeng Zhang. 2022. ALiSa: Acrostic linguistic steganography based on BERT and Gibbs sampling. *IEEE Signal Processing Letters* 29 (2022), 687–691.
- [32] Siyu Zhang, Zhongliang Yang, Jinshuai Yang, and Yongfeng Huang. 2020. Linguistic steganography: From symbolic space to semantic space. *IEEE Signal Processing Letters* 28 (2020), 11–15.
- [33] Yue Zhang, Siqi Sun, Michel Galley, Chris Brockett, and Jianfeng Gao. 2023. Language Models as Zero-Shot Style Transferers. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2303.03630* (2023).
- [34] Xiaoyan Zheng, Yurun Fang, and Hanzhou Wu. 2022. General framework for reversible data hiding in texts based on masked language modeling. In *2022 IEEE 24th International Workshop on Multimedia Signal Processing (MMSP)*. IEEE, 1–6.