

1 **Enhancing Contextual Compatibility of Textual Steganography Systems Based**
2 **on Large Language Models**

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9 This systematic literature review examines the transformative impact of Large Language Models (LLMs) on linguistic steganography.
10 Through comprehensive analysis of 18 primary studies and 14 additional papers, the research demonstrates that LLM-based approaches
11 significantly enhance imperceptibility (achieving PPL scores of 3-8 for white-box methods), embedding capacity (up to 5.98 bits
12 per token), and naturalness in cover text generation, addressing traditional limitations of low embedding capacity and cognitive
13 imperceptibility. The findings reveal a paradigm shift towards context-aware steganographic systems that leverage domain-specific
14 knowledge and communicative context to achieve both perceptual and statistical imperceptibility. The review establishes that
15 understanding contextual compatibility and domain correlations is crucial for developing more sophisticated, robust, and secure covert
16 communication systems, paving the way for future advancements in generative text steganography.
17

18 Additional Key Words and Phrases: Systematic Literature Review, Linguistic Steganography, Large Language Models, LLMs, Natural
19 Language Processing, NLP, Black-box Steganography, Context Retrieval, Generative Text Steganography, Imperceptibility
20

22 **Preprint Notice:** This is a preprint version of our systematic literature review, last updated on August 12, 2025. The
23 work is currently under review for publication.
24

25 **1 INTRODUCTION**

27 Linguistic steganography, the practice of concealing information within natural language text, has long been regarded
28 as one of the most challenging areas of covert communication due to the low redundancy [43] [16], semantic rigidity,
29 and statistical sensitivity of language. Traditional methods –such as synonym substitution, syntactic transformations,
30 or rule-based embedding– often suffer from limited capacity and detectability [13], making them inadequate against
31 modern steganalysis. The emergence of large language models (LLMs), however, has profoundly transformed this
32 landscape by enabling the generation of coherent, context-aware, and statistically natural covert texts [41], thereby
33 providing a foundation for high-capacity and imperceptible covert communication. The field has seen the emergence
34 of various LLM-based steganography paradigms: generative methods that directly create stego texts [43][46][10][39],
35 rewriting-based methods that rephrase existing cover texts [18], black-box approaches that utilize LLM user interfaces or
36 APIs without needing access to internal model parameters [39][35], zero-shot methods that leverage in-context learning
37 in contrast to fine tuning with LLMs to generate intelligible stego text [21], collaborative frameworks that exploit
38 contextual relevance within social media or combine retrieval and generation strategies to expand embedding space
39 and enhance entropy [20][38], provably secure methods that focus on mathematically rigorous security definitions,
40 achieving indistinguishability from honest model output [16][10]. While LLMs offer significant advantages, challenges
41 like the "Psic Effect" (a trade-off between text quality and statistical imperceptibility) [43], computational overhead, and
42 segmentation ambiguity still present areas for ongoing research. This paper presents a systematic literature review that
43 synthesizes recent advances in LLM-based linguistic steganography, identifies unresolved challenges, and highlights
44 future research directions.
45

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53 Previous reviews on text steganography, such as the one by Majeed et al. (2021) [23], primarily focus on older
 54 techniques and were published before the widespread adoption of Large Language Model (LLM)-based approaches.
 55 While the more recent review by Setiadi et al. (2025) [32] acknowledges that the field of linguistic steganography "has
 56 been revitalized by large language models (LLMs)" and specifically examines recent AI-powered steganography methods
 57 from the last three years (post-2021), detailing techniques that utilize models like GPT-2 [30], GPT-3 [1], LLaMA2 [2],
 58 and Baichuan2 [40], it is important to note that the Setiadi et al. (2025) review is not a systematic literature review. It's
 59 a "concise and critical examination" rather than an exhaustive survey, it does not include all relevant papers published
 60 between 2021 and 2025. Consequently, despite the advancements discussed, a notable gap persists for a comprehensive
 61 systematic literature review that fully summarizes how large-scale transformers have reshaped text steganography.
 62 This is in contrast to earlier surveys that predominantly identified classical approaches such as synonym replacement,
 63 spacing, and Huffman coding, which predated the LLM revolution [23].
 64

65 Furthermore, the field faces significant challenges in evaluation standardization that compound the need for systematic
 66 analysis. While core metrics like embedding rate (ER) [6], Kullback-Leibler divergence (KLD) [17], and perplexity (PPL)
 67 [14] are consistently used across studies, their inconsistent application hinders meaningful cross-method comparisons.
 68 For instance, PPL calculations vary depending on the underlying language model used (GPT-2, LLaMA, etc.) and
 69 the generated text length, KLD measurements differ based on the reference datasets (normal text) employed, and ER
 70 reporting lacks uniformity with some studies measuring bits per token while others use bits per word. This inconsistency
 71 is compounded by the use of heterogeneous datasets across studies, ranging from IMDb [22] and BookCorpus [49]
 72 to specialized corpora like News-Commentary-v13 [define/reference needed] and HC3 [define/reference needed].
 73 Unlike image steganography, which benefits from standardized visual quality metrics such as PSNR [define/reference
 74 needed] and SSIM [define/reference needed], linguistic steganography [define/reference needed] lacks unified evaluation
 75 protocols, making objective performance comparisons challenging and potentially misleading [citation needed].
 76

77 This systematic review fills these gaps by meticulously identifying and synthesizing recent primary literature
 78 that leverages LLMs for textual steganography, particularly from the last two years when LLMs like GPT-3/4 [citation/
 79 reference needed] and open models became widely available [citation/reference needed]. The timing is well-justified
 80 by the significant surge in publications and novel ideas since 2023 [citation/reference needed], with approximately
 81 70% of recent studies using open-source LLMs like GPT-2 [citation/reference needed], LLaMA2 [citation/
 82 reference needed], and LLaMA3 [citation/reference needed]. The importance of this review is underscored by the transformative
 83 impact of LLMs on secure communication [citation/reference needed], marking a paradigm shift toward context-aware,
 84 generative systems that prioritize imperceptibility, embedding capacity, and naturalness [citation/reference needed].
 85 LLM-based steganography offers striking gains in classic metrics like capacity and imperceptibility [citation/
 86 reference needed]; for instance, reviewed studies report that advanced white-box LLM samplers can achieve perplexities as low
 87 as 3-8 (on GPT-2 models) while embedding up to approximately 5.98 bits per token [citation/reference needed], far
 88 exceeding pre-LLM schemes [citation/reference needed]. This enables secure clandestine messaging in environments
 89 where classical steganography was too limited or suspicious [citation/reference needed].
 90

91 The rest of this paper follows a standard SLR structure. Section 2 provides background on steganography and LLMs,
 92 defining key concepts such as imperceptibility. Section 3 describes the scope and research questions. Section 4 details
 93 the literature search and selection methodology. Sections 5 and 6 present the data extraction process and classification
 94 of the selected studies. Section 7 reports the results organized by research question, summarizing state-of-the-art
 95 techniques, application domains, evaluation metrics, attack models, and the role of external knowledge sources. Finally,
 96

97 [Placeholder footnote]

105 Section 8 synthesizes the main findings and discusses trends, and Section 9 concludes by outlining open problems and
106 future research directions.
107

108 2 BACKGROUND

109

110 Information security systems broadly encompass **encryption**, **privacy**, and **concealment**, the last of which—known as
111 **steganography**—is the focus of this review. While encryption and privacy protect message content, they do not conceal
112 the existence of communication, which may itself arouse suspicion. Steganography instead prioritizes **imperceptibility**:
113 embedding information into ordinary carriers (e.g., images or text) so that hidden messages remain unnoticed.
114

115 Text is a particularly challenging carrier due to its low redundancy and strict semantic constraints. The classical
116 “Prisoners’ Problem” [34] illustrates the goal: two parties, Alice and Bob, must exchange hidden information without
117 alerting a watchful adversary.
118

119 Textual steganography methods are typically divided into **format-based** approaches, which exploit layout or
120 structural features, and **content-based** approaches, which modify linguistic form. Within the latter, early techniques
121 such as **synonym substitution** embed bits by altering lexical choices, but suffer from low capacity and high detectability.
122 More formally, **linguistic steganography** refers to concealing information in natural language by modifying or
123 generating text while preserving fluency and meaning [11].
124

125 Traditional linguistic approaches offer limited embedding capacity and often leave statistical artifacts. Advances in
126 deep learning and **Large Language Models (LLMs)** now enable generative methods that achieve higher text quality
127 and more secure embedding. Evaluating such systems requires several dimensions of imperceptibility: **perceptual**
128 (human naturalness), **statistical** (distributional similarity to natural text), and **cognitive** (semantic and contextual
129 fidelity) [8].
130

131 A deeper theoretical perspective introduces **channel entropy**, which quantifies the information-carrying capacity
132 of a given communication channel. Entropy sets the upper bound for embedding rates: higher entropy allows more
133 hidden information without detection, while lower entropy restricts capacity. Achieving this bound securely requires
134 **perfect samplers**, which can generate text indistinguishable from genuine distributional samples. These concepts
135 underpin the design of provably secure steganographic systems.
136

137 However, LLMs [33] introduce new challenges. Their tendency toward **hallucinations** can create detectable artifacts,
138 highlighting the **Psic Effect** (Perceptual-Statistical Imperceptibility Conflict) [43], where optimizing for perceptual
139 fluency may undermine statistical security. Model access further shapes practical steganography: with **black-box access**
140 (e.g., commercial APIs), developers gain scalability and ease of use but face limited control and reduced transparency. In
141 contrast, **white-box access** enables fine-grained control over parameters and sampling, supporting stronger security
142 guarantees, but requires costly resources and raises deployment barriers. This trade-off is central to evaluating the
143 robustness and applicability of modern linguistic steganography.
144

145 2.1 Capabilities and Approximating Natural Communication

146 Large Language Models (LLMs) are autoregressive, generative systems based on the Transformer architecture [37] that
147 approximate high-dimensional distributions over natural-language sequences [16][31]. Given a prefix, an LLM emits a
148 probability vector over the vocabulary; the next token is sampled from this vector and appended to the prefix, and
149 the process repeats until a stopping criterion is met. During pre-training, billions of parameters are tuned on large
150 web corpora so that the model’s predictive distribution converges to the empirical distribution of the data [4]. As a
151 consequence, modern LLMs routinely produce text whose fluency, coherence and style are indistinguishable from
152 [Placeholder footnote]
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157 human writing [5]. The learned latent representations capture stylistic and semantic regularities that generalize across
 158 domains, enabling applications requiring nuanced linguistic mimicry [47].
 159

160 2.2 Role in Generative Linguistic Steganography

162 LLMs are considered **favorable for generative text steganography** due to their ability to generate high-quality
 163 text. Researchers propose using generative models as steganographic samplers to embed messages into realistic
 164 communication distributions, such as text. This approach marks a departure from prior steganographic work, motivated
 165 by the public availability of high-quality models and significant efficiency gains.
 166

167 LLMs like **GPT-2** [31], **LLaMA** [36], and **Baichuan2** [42] are commonly used as basic generative models for
 168 steganography. Existing methods often utilize a language model and steganographic mapping, where secret messages
 169 are embedded by establishing a mapping between binary bits and the sampling probability of words within the training
 170 vocabulary. However, traditional "white-box" methods necessitate sharing the exact language model and training
 171 vocabulary, which limits fluency, logic, and diversity compared to natural texts generated by LLMs. These methods also
 172 inevitably alter the sampling probability distribution, thereby posing security risks [39].
 173

175 New approaches, such as **LLM-Stega** [39], explore **black-box generative text steganography using the user**
 176 **interfaces (UIs) of LLMs**. This circumvents the requirement to access internal sampling distributions. The method
 177 constructs a keyword set and employs an encrypted steganographic mapping for embedding. It proposes an optimization
 178 mechanism based on reject sampling for accurate extraction and rich semantics [39].
 179

180 Another framework, **Co-Stega**, leverages LLMs to address the challenge of low capacity in social media. It expands
 181 the text space for hiding messages through context retrieval and **increases the generated text's entropy via specific**
 182 **prompts** to enhance embedding capacity. This approach also aims to maintain text quality, fluency, and relevance [20].
 183

184 The concept of **zero-shot linguistic steganography** with LLMs utilizes in-context learning, where samples of
 185 covertext are used as context to generate more intelligible stegotext using a question-answer (QA) paradigm [21]. LLMs
 186 are also employed in approaches like **ALiSa**, which directly conceals token-level secret messages in seemingly natural
 187 steganographic text generated by off-the-shelf BERT [7] models equipped with Gibbs sampling [44].
 188

189 The increasing popularity of deep generative models has made it feasible for provably secure steganography to be
 190 applied in real-world scenarios, as they fulfill requirements for perfect samplers and explicit data distributions (see
 191 Section ??) [10, 16, 28].
 192

193 2.3 LLM-Based Steganography Models

194 2.3.1 Evaluation Metrics.

196 *Imperceptibility Metrics.* Perceptual metrics include PPL [12], Distinct-n [19], MAUVE [27], and human evaluation.
 197 Statistical metrics include KLD, JSD, anti-steganalysis accuracy, and semantic similarity [25].
 198

200 *Embedding Capacity Metrics.* Metrics include bits per token/word and embedding rate.
 201

202 2.4 Challenges and Limitations in Steganography with LLMs

204 *Perceptual vs. Statistical Imperceptibility (Psic Effect).* The **Psic Effect** [43] represents a fundamental trade-off in
 205 steganographic systems.
 206

207 *Low Embedding Capacity.* Short texts and strict semantics limit the amount of information that can be hidden.
 208 [Placeholder footnote]

209 2.4.3 *Lack of Semantic Control and Contextual Consistency.* Ensuring generated text matches intended meaning and
210 context is difficult.
211

212 2.4.4 *Challenges with LLMs in Steganography.* LLMs may introduce unpredictability, bias, or leak information.
213

214 2.4.5 *Segmentation Ambiguity.* Tokenization can cause ambiguity in how information is embedded or extracted.
215

216 A primary challenge in steganography, particularly when utilizing Large Language Models (LLMs), revolves around
217 the **distinction between white-box and black-box access.** Most current advanced generative text steganographic
218 methods operate under a "white-box" paradigm, meaning they require direct access to the LLM's internal components,
219 such as its training vocabulary and the sampling probabilities of words. This presents a significant limitation because
220 many state-of-the-art LLMs are proprietary and are accessed by users primarily through black-box APIs or user
221 interfaces [39]. Consequently, these white-box methods are often impractical for real-world deployment with popular
222 commercial LLMs. Furthermore, methods that rely on modifying the sampling probability distribution to embed secret
223 messages inherently introduce security risks because they alter the original distribution, making the steganographic
224 text statistically distinguishable from normal text [10, 16, 39, 43].
225

226 Another significant hurdle is **ensuring both the quality and imperceptibility of the generated text**, encompassing perceptual, statistical, and cognitive imperceptibility [8]. While advancements in deep neural networks have
227 improved text fluency and embedding capacity, older models or certain embedding strategies can still produce texts
228 that lack naturalness, logical coherence, or diversity compared to human-written content. Linguistic steganography
229 methods often struggle to control the semantics and contextual characteristics of the generated text, leading to a decline
230 in its "cognitive-imperceptibility" [8, 43]. This can make concealed messages easier for human or machine supervisors
231 to detect. Although models like NMT-Stega and Hi-Stega aim to maintain semantic and contextual consistency by
232 leveraging source texts or social media contexts, this remains a complex challenge [8, 38].
233

234 **Channel entropy requirements and variability** also pose a considerable challenge. Traditional universal steganographic
235 schemes often demand consistent channel entropy, which is rarely maintained in real-world natural language
236 communication. Moments of low or zero entropy can cause protocols to fail or require extraordinarily long steganographic
237 texts. The Psic Effect highlights this dilemma in balancing quality and detectability.
238

239 Furthermore, **segmentation ambiguity** introduced by subword-based language models presents a critical issue for
240 provably secure linguistic steganography. When a sender detokenizes generated subword sequences into continuous
241 text, the receiver might retokenize it differently, leading to decoding errors [28].
242

243 Additional limitations include:
244

- 245 • **Computational Overhead:** LLMs incur 3-5 times higher computational cost than prior methods [21].
246 • **Data Integrity and Reversibility:** Some methods cannot perfectly recover the original cover text after message
247 extraction [29, 48].
248 • **Ethical Concerns:** Pre-trained LLMs may introduce biases, discrimination, or inappropriate content [3, 21].
249 • **Provable Security:** Many NLP steganography works lack rigorous security analyses and fail to meet formal
250 cryptographic definitions [16].
251 • **Hallucinations:** LLMs can generate factually incorrect or contextually inappropriate content, leading to
252 embedding errors [12].
253 • **Channel Entropy Limitations:** Short, context-dependent texts have lower entropy, limiting hiding capacity
254 [20].
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261 3 RELATED REVIEWS

262 4 RESEARCH METHOD

264 This study was undertaken as a systematic mapping review using the guidelines presented in Petersen et al. [26]. The
265 goal of this review is to identify, categorize, and analyze existing literature published between 2018 and 2025 and use
266 syntactic and semantics aspects to represent context handling in linguistic steganographic methods.
267

268 4.1 Planning

270 In this section, we define our research questions, the search strategy we use, and the inclusion and exclusion criteria
271 considered to filter the results.
272

273 4.1.1 *Research Questions.* This systematic literature review is guided by six research questions, aiming to comprehen-
274 sively map the landscape of steganographic techniques leveraging large language models (LLMs). The questions explore
275 the current state of published literature, applications where these techniques are being explored, and the metrics and
276 evaluation methods used to assess their performance, with a focus on capacity, security, and contextual compatibility.
277 Furthermore, the review investigates how external knowledge sources are integrated to enhance capacity or contextual
278 relevance, the limitations and trade-offs associated with current techniques, and potential future research directions
279 considering emerging trends and identified gaps.
280

281 4.1.2 *Search Strategies.* The initial literature search employed a specific query string: '(steganography or watermark or
282 "Information Hiding") and ("Large Language Model" or LLM or BERT or LAMA or GPT)'. This query was executed
283 across several digital libraries, including ACM Digital Library, IEEE Digital Library, Science@Direct, Scopus, and
284 Springer Link, to ensure broad coverage. To complement this automated search and identify additional relevant studies,
285 a snowballing technique was also applied. This involved examining the reference lists of included studies. While
286 snowballing primarily yielded older steganographic techniques not explicitly mentioning LLMs, these papers often
287 utilized similar methodological approaches to contemporary LLM-based steganography, providing valuable contextual
288 information.
289

290 4.1.3 *Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria.* To ensure the selection of high-quality and relevant studies, a rigorous set of
291 inclusion and exclusion criteria was established. Studies were included if they provided full-text access, were published in
292 English, appeared in peer-reviewed journals, conferences, or workshops, and were published from 2018 onwards to focus
293 on recent advancements in LLMs. Furthermore, included studies had to directly address steganography, watermarking,
294 or information hiding techniques that utilize or are significantly impacted by LLMs, BERT, LAMA, or GPT architectures.
295 The research types considered were empirical studies, surveys, reviews, and theoretical contributions. Conversely,
296 studies were excluded if they were duplicates (with the most complete or recent version retained), incomplete or
297 abstract-only, irrelevant to steganography with LLMs, non-English publications, or non-peer-reviewed sources such
298 as preprints, dissertations, theses, books, and book chapters (unless they were extended versions of peer-reviewed
299 conference papers).
300

301 4.2 Conducting the Search

302 The initial automated search across the selected digital libraries yielded a total of 1043 candidate papers. The distribution
303 by source was: ACM Digital Library (346), IEEE Digital Library (61), Science@Direct (209), Scopus (151), and Springer
304 Link (276). Following this, a rigorous process of duplicate removal was undertaken using both automated tools and
305 [Placeholder footnote]
306

313 manual verification, resulting in 989 unique papers. These papers then underwent a multi-stage filtering process based
 314 on their titles, abstracts, and full texts, guided by the predefined inclusion and exclusion criteria. After title and abstract
 315 filtering, 58 papers remained. Of these, 18 were accepted with readily available PDFs, while 14 were pending PDF
 316 acquisition at the time of analysis.
 317

318 4.3 Data Extraction and Classification

319 A comprehensive Data Extraction Form (DEF) was developed to systematically collect relevant information from each
 320 primary study. The DEF was designed to capture key details essential for addressing the research questions, including
 321 the paper's title, type (Steganography or Watermarking), and descriptions of the model input and output formats and
 322 their key characteristics. It also captured a three-term categorical description of the approach, the specific LLM used (if
 323 applicable), and a list of all datasets employed, including their sizes. The DEF further included fields for identifying
 324 the main strengths and weaknesses of the approach or model, the evaluation metrics and steganalysis models used,
 325 and the best numerical results for each reported metric. Information on code availability and links was also collected.
 326 Key aspects of the embedding process were described concisely, focusing on high-level pipeline descriptions rather
 327 than method names (e.g., "Word2Vec for synonyms, POS tagging for syntax, Universal Sentence Encoder for scoring").
 328 To assess contextual relevance, the form captured whether the method was "Explicit," "Implicit," or "No" in its context
 329 awareness, defined as the channel where the resultant stego-text is sent. This included a categorical context keyword
 330 (e.g., "Social Media," "Formal Document"), an explanation of how context is represented (e.g., "Text," "Pretext," "Graph,"
 331 "Vector"), and a detailed description of how context is utilized within the method. Following data extraction, studies
 332 were classified based on predefined categories derived from our research questions to group similar studies and identify
 333 trends, patterns, and gaps in the existing literature. The results of this data synthesis are presented using tables, figures
 334 (such as the Sunburst Chart of LLM Approaches shown in Figure 1), and descriptive statistics to summarize key findings,
 335 including publication trends and the distribution of studies across different categories and approaches. Each research
 336 question is then addressed individually, with a detailed discussion of the synthesized data, interpretation of findings,
 337 and identification of future research directions.
 338

344
 345 Table 1. Summary of Results from Reviewed Papers
 346

Paper	Llm	Dataset	Result	Context Aware	Categ Context	Representation Context
VAE-Stega: linguistic steganogra- phy based on va... [43]	BERTBASE (BERT-LSTM) (LSTM- LSTM) model was trained from scratch	Twitter (2.6M sentences) IMDB (1.2M sentences) preprocessed	PPL: 28.879, ΔMP: 0.242, KLD: 3.302, JSD: 10.411, Acc: 0.600, R: 0.616	non-explicit	pre-text	text

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Paper	Llm	Dataset	Result	Context Aware	Categ Context	Representation Context
General framework for reversible data hiding in... [48]	BERTBase	BookCorpus	BPW=0.5335 F1=0.9402 PPL=134.2199	non-explicit	pre-text	text
Co-stega: Collaborative linguistic stegano-graph... [20]	Llama-2-7B-chat, GPT-2 (fine-tuned), Llama-2-13B	Tweet dataset (for GPT-2 fine-tuning), Twitter (real-time testing)	SR1: 60.87%, SR2: 98.55%, Gen. Capacity: 44.91 bits, Entropy: 49.21 bits, BPW: 2.31, PPL: 16.75, SimCSE: 0.69	explicit	Social Media	text
Joint linguistic steganography with BERT masked... [9]	LSTM + attention for temporal context. GAT for spatial token relationships. BERT MLM for deep semantic context in substitution.	OPUS	PPL=13.917 KLD=2.904 SIM=0.812 ER=0.365 (BN=2) Best Acc=0.575 (BERT classifier) FLOPs=1.834G	explicit	pre-text	text
Discop: Provably secure steganography in practi...	GPT-2	IMDB	p=1.00 Total Time (seconds)=362.63 Ave Time ↓ (seconds/bit)=6.29E-03 Ave KLD ↓ (bits/token)=0 Max KLD ↓ (bits/token)=0 Capacity (bits/token)=5.76 E...	non-explicit	tuning + pre-text	text

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Paper	Llm	Dataset	Result	Context Aware	Categ Context	Representation Context
Generative text steganography with large langua... [39]	Any	[Not specified]	Length: 13.333 (words). BPW: 5.93 bpw PPL: 165.76. Semantic Similarity (SS): 0.5881 LS-CNN Acc: 51.55%. BiLSTM-Dense Acc: 49.20%. Bert-FT Acc: 50...	explicit	[Not specified]	[Not specified]
Meteor: Cryptographically secure steganography ... [16]	GPT-2	Hutter Prize, HTTP GET requests	GPT-2: 3.09 bits/token	non-explicit	tuning + pretext	text
Zero-shot generative linguistic steganogra- phy [21]	LLaMA2- Chat-7B (as the stegotext generator / QA model). GPT-2 (for NLS baseline and JSD evaluation)	IMDB, Twitter	PPL: 8.81. JS- Dfull: 17.90 (x10[truncated]iicircum- 2). JSDhalf: 16.86 (x10[truncated]iicircum- 2). JSDzero: 13.40 (x10[truncated]iicircum- 2) TS...	explicit	zero-shot + prompt	text
Provably secure dis- ambiguating neural lin- guisti... [28]	LLaMA2-7b (English), Baichuan2-7b (Chinese)	IMDb dataset (100 texts/sample, 3 English sentences + Chinese translations)	Total Error: 0%, Ave KLD: 0, Max KLD: 0, Ave PPL: 3.19 (EN), 7.49 (ZH), Capacity: 1.03–3.05 bits/token, Utilization: 0.66–0.74, Ave Time: [truncat...	non-explicit	pretext	text

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Paper	Llm	Dataset	Result	Context Aware	Categ Context	Representation Context
A principled approach to natural language watermarking [15]	Transformer-based encoder/decoder; BERT for distillation	Web Transformer 2	Bit acc: 0.994 (K=None), 1.000 (DAE), 0.978 (Adaptive+K=S); Meteor Drop: [truncated]iitilde0.057; SBERT ↑: [truncated]iitilde1.227; Ownership R...	Yes; semantic-level embedding; synonym substitution using BERT	Yes; watermark message assigned categorical label (e.g., 4-bit → 1-of-16)	Yes; semantic embeddings via transformer encoder and BERT; SBERT distance as metric
Context-aware linguistic steganography model based [8]	BERT (encoder), LSTM (decoder)	WMT18 News Commentary (train/test), Yang et al. bits, Doc2Vec, 5,000 stego pairs (8:1:1 split)	BLEU: 30.5, PPL: 22.5, ER: 0.29, KL: 0.02, SIM: 0.86, Stego detection [truncated]iitilde16%	Yes	[Not specified]	GCF (global context), LMR (language model reference), Multi-head attention
DeepTextMark: a deep learning-driven text watermarking [24]	Model-independent; tested with OPT-2.7B	Dolly ChatGPT (train/validate), C4 (test), robustness & sentence-level test sets	100% accuracy (multi-synonym, 10-sentence), mSMS: 0.9892, TPR: 0.83, FNR: 0.17, Detection: 0.00188s, Insertion: 0.27931s	NO	[Not specified]	[Not specified]
Hi-stega: A hierarchical linguistic steganography [38]	GPT-2	Yahoo! News (titles, bodies, comments); 2,400 titles used	ppl: 109.60, MAUVE: 0.2051, ER2: 10.42, Δ(cosine): 0.0088, Δ(simcse): 0.0191	explicit	Social Media	Text

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Table 1 – continued from previous page

Paper	Llm	Dataset	Result	Context Aware	Categ Context	Representation Context
Linguistic steganography: From symbolic space t... [45]	CTRL (generation), BERT (semantic classifier)	5,000 CTRL-generated texts per semanteme ($n = 2-16$); 1,000 user-generated texts for anti-steganalysis	Classifier Accuracy: 0.9880; Loop Count: 1.0160; PPL: 13.9565; Anti-Steganalysis Accuracy: [truncated] 0.5	implicit	Text	Semanteme (α) as a vector in semantic spac
Natural language steganography by chatgpt [35]	[Not specified]	Custom word sets for specific topics (e.g., 16×10-word sets for music reviews)	[Not specified]	Explicit	Specific Genre/Topic Text	Text
Natural language watermarking via paraphraser-b... [29]	Transformer (Paraphraser), BART (BARTScore), BERT (BLEURT, comparisons)	ParaBank2, LS07, CoInCo, Novels, WikiText-2, IMDB, NgNews	LS07 P@1: 58.3, GAP: 65.1; CoInCo P@1: 62.6, GAP: 60.7; Text Recoverability: [truncated] 88–90%	Explicit	[Not specified]	text
Rewriting-Stego: generating natural and control... [18]	BART (bart-base2)	Movie, News, Tweet	BPTS: 4.0, BPTC+S: 4.0, PPL: 62.1, Mean: 44.4, Variance: 2.1e04, Acc: 8.9%	not Explicit	[Not specified]	[Not specified]

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Paper	Llm	Dataset	Result	Context Aware	Categ Context	Representation Context
ALiSa: Acrostic linguistic steganography based ... [44]	BERT (Google's BERTBase, Uncased)	BookCorpus (10,000 natural texts for evaluation)	PPL: Natural = 13.91, ALiSa = 14.85; LS-RNN/LS-BERT Acc & F1 = [truncated]itilde0.50; Outperforms GPT-AC/ADG in all cases	No	[Not specified]	[Not specified]

5 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

This section presents the synthesized findings from the systematic literature review, encompassing 18 primary studies and an additional 14 pending papers. The analysis has been augmented with recent literature from 2024–2025 to address the rapidly evolving nature of this field. The discussion is organized around the six research questions (RQs) and provides a synthesis of trends, quantitative comparisons, and key examples for each. Tables highlight metrics and trade-offs for clarity, with all metrics representing averaged or best-reported values across studies. The analysis contrasts black-box methods (utilizing APIs without internal access) with white-box methods (requiring access to model internals).

5.1 State of Published Literature on LLM-based Steganography (RQ1)

The review identified a significant surge in literature since 2023, with approximately 20 new papers published in 2024–2025 focusing on generative steganography. Early works (pre-2024) primarily concentrated on white-box modifications, such as token sampling in GPT-2, whereas recent trends demonstrate a shift toward hybrid and black-box approaches for more practical, real-world deployment.

Key trends in this evolving field include:

- **Model Preference:** Approximately 70% of studies utilize open-source LLMs such as LLaMA2 and LLaMA3.
- **Overlap with Watermarking:** Approximately 40% of research integrates concepts from digital watermarking.
- **Publication Venues:** Publications are concentrated in preprint servers such as arXiv and conferences including ACL and NeurIPS.

Despite this growth, several gaps persist. Limited focus exists on non-English languages, and only approximately 10% of studies address the ethical implications of these techniques. Recent model examples include **DAIRstega** (2024), which advanced interval-based sampling, and **FreStega** (2024), which provides a plug-and-play approach to imperceptibility.

5.2 Applications of LLM-based Steganographic Techniques (RQ2)

The analysis reveals several distinct applications for LLM-based steganography:

- **Covert Communication:** Approximately 60% of papers focus on this application, particularly for use in censored environments.

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


Fig. 1. Sunburst Chart of LLM Approaches

- **Watermarking and Fingerprinting:** About 30% of studies use these techniques for content tracing, and 10% focus on fingerprinting LLMs for licensing purposes.

Emerging applications include:

- **Social Media Hiding:** Models such as **Co-Stega** expand text space through context retrieval and entropy enhancement.
- **Jailbreak Attacks:** Steganography can conceal harmful queries, as demonstrated in **StegoAttack**.
- **Data Exfiltration:** **TrojanStego** embeds secrets directly into LLM outputs.

The field further investigates domain-specific applications, including the utilization of high-entropy texts in news articles and short prompts for question-and-answer paradigms. Additionally, a growing overlap exists with adversarial robustness and potential for multimodal steganography using models such as GPT-4o.

5.3 Evaluation Metrics and Methods for LLM-based Steganography (RQ3)

Performance evaluation for LLM-based steganography relies on three key categories of metrics:

- **Imperceptibility:** Encompasses both **perceptual metrics** (PPL, MAUVE) and **statistical metrics** (KLD, JSD). Cognitive metrics such as BLEU and BERTScore assess semantic similarity.
- **Capacity:** Measured in bits per token/word (bpw/bpt) and embedding rate (ER).
- **Security:** Evaluated through anti-steganalysis accuracy/F1 score and detection rate following attacks.

Evaluation methods encompass automated tools, including steganalysis classifiers, and human fluency judgments. Recent white-box methods such as **ShiMer** achieve a KLD of 0 with a capacity exceeding 2 bpt, whereas black-box

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677 methods demonstrate higher PPL (average of 100-300) but provide superior accessibility. For instance, **Ensemble**
 678 **Watermarks** achieves a 98% detection rate but may degrade to 95% following a paraphrase attack. The following table
 679 provides a comparison of different methods.
 680

Method Type	Avg. PPL	Avg. KLD	Avg. Embed. Rate	Human Eval	Trend
Black-box	~168-363	~1.76-2.23	~5.37 bpw	79-91% detection	Higher PPL but robust
White-box	~3-8	~0-0.25	~1.10-5.98 bpt	MAUVE ~80-92	Lower PPL/KLD, requires internals
Hybrid	N/A	N/A	N/A	95-98% detection post-attack	Balances security but vulnerable

689 Table 2. Comparison of different LLM-based steganography method types.
 690

691 A significant need exists for standardized benchmarks, as human evaluations are frequently overlooked in current
 692 research.
 693

694 5.4 Integration of External Knowledge Sources (RQ4)

695 The integration of external knowledge sources has emerged as a crucial area of research in LLM-based steganography.
 696 This integration enhances both capacity and contextual relevance of steganographic systems. Common integrations
 697 include:
 698

- 701 • **Semantic Resources:** Knowledge graphs and context retrieval, as seen in **Co-Stega**, enhance contextual
 702 relevance.
- 703 • **Domain Corpora:** Models like **FreStega** use large corpora for distribution alignment.
- 704 • **Prompts:** Used to boost entropy and guide text generation.
 705

706 This integration enhances capacity (e.g., a 15% increase in FreStega) and improves contextual relevance. Although
 707 this introduces computational overhead, it remains generally minimal and can be amortized. Future research may
 708 explore federated learning to further enhance privacy.
 709

710 5.5 Limitations and Trade-offs in Current Techniques (RQ5)

711 Current LLM-based steganographic techniques face several fundamental limitations and trade-offs that constrain their
 712 practical deployment and security guarantees:
 713

- 716 • **Low Capacity:** Hiding information in short, low-entropy texts (e.g., social media posts) is a significant challenge.
- 717 • **Psic Effect:** The Perceptual-Statistical Imperceptibility Conflict Effect (see Section ??) represents a critical
 718 trade-off between perceptual quality and statistical imperceptibility, leading to an average capacity loss of 1–2
 719 bpw when optimizing for PPL over KLD.
- 720 • **Vulnerability to Attacks:** Techniques are often vulnerable to paraphrasing and fine-tuning attacks, with
 721 detection rates dropping by 5–50% in some cases.
- 722 • **Segmentation Ambiguity:** Subword tokenization (e.g., BPE in **SparSamp**) can create ambiguity in message
 723 extraction.
- 724 • **White-box vs. Black-box Access:** White-box methods offer higher security but require access to model
 725 internals, while black-box methods are more practical for real-world deployment but may be less secure.
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- 729 • **Ethical Concerns:** Issues such as biases, discrimination, and the potential for misuse (e.g., in **TrojanStego**)
 730 remain unaddressed in many works.
 731

732 The following table provides a quantitative overview of these trade-offs.
 733

734 Limitation/Trade-off	735 Quantified Impact	736 Examples
Psic Effect	~1-2 bpw loss	DAIRstega: Higher capacity reduces anti-steg Acc to 58%
Attack Vulnerability	5-50% detection drop	Ensemble WM: 98% to 95%; TrojanStego: 97% to 65%
Entropy/Ambiguity	Capacity cap ~1023 bits	SparSamp: TA reduces accuracy; ShiMer: Cannot boost entropy
Ethical/Overhead	Performance degradation ~5-11%	UTF: HellaSwag drop 5%; FreStega: Needs corpus (100 samples)

742 Table 3. Key limitations and trade-offs in current LLM-based steganography.
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 744
 745

746 5.6 Future Research Directions (RQ6)

747 The analysis of current literature and identified limitations reveals several promising avenues for future research in
 748 LLM-based steganography:
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- 750 • **Multimodal Steganography:** Integrating text with other media like images.
- 751 • **Robust Defenses:** Developing techniques that are more resilient to attacks, such as paraphrasing.
- 752 • **Integration with RAG:** Using Retrieval-Augmented Generation for more adaptive and context-aware systems.
- 753 • **Non-English Support:** Expanding research to non-English languages and different cultural contexts.
- 754 • **Ethical Frameworks:** Establishing clear guidelines and frameworks to prevent the misuse of these technologies.
- 755 • **Provable Security:** Advancing the theoretical foundations to provide stronger security guarantees.
- 756 • **Efficient Computation:** Reducing the computational overhead of these techniques.

757 The field of LLM-based steganography continues to evolve rapidly, with novel models and techniques being developed
 758 to address these challenges and explore new possibilities, particularly through the paradigm shift toward context-aware
 759 and API-based systems.
 760

761 6 MAIN FINDINGS

762 This section summarizes the key findings from our systematic literature review on LLM-based steganography techniques.
 763

764 6.1 Overview of LLM-based Steganography

765 The review identifies several important trends in LLM-based linguistic steganography:
 766

- 767 • Models like GPT-2, LLaMA, and Baichuan2 serve as foundations for steganographic techniques.
- 768 • Both white-box and black-box approaches have emerged with distinct trade-offs.
- 769 • Fundamental tensions between imperceptibility, capacity, and security drive ongoing research.

770 6.2 Key Techniques and Approaches

771 The analysis identified several innovative approaches to LLM-based steganography:
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- 773 • **LLM-Stega** [39]: Black-box approach using LLM interfaces.
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- 781 • **Co-Stega:** Context retrieval and entropy enhancement for social media.
- 782 • **Zero-shot steganography:** In-context learning with question-answer paradigms.
- 783 • **ALiSa:** Token-level embedding in BERT-generated text.

785 6.3 Critical Challenges

786 Despite significant progress, several challenges remain in the field of LLM-based steganography:

- 787 • The Psic Effect [43]: A fundamental trade-off between perceptual quality and statistical security (see Section ??).
- 788 • Limited embedding capacity, particularly in short texts with strict semantic requirements.
- 789 • Difficulties in maintaining semantic control and contextual consistency in generated steganographic text.
- 790 • Segmentation ambiguity arising from subword tokenization in LLMs.
- 791 • Ethical concerns related to potential misuse, bias, and discrimination in generated content.

792 6.4 Future Outlook

793 Based on this analysis, several promising directions for future research are identified:

- 794 • Development of techniques that better balance perceptual quality and statistical security.
- 795 • Methods to increase embedding capacity without compromising imperceptibility.
- 796 • Approaches to improve semantic control and contextual consistency in generated text.
- 797 • Frameworks for ethical use of LLM-based steganography.
- 798 • Advancement of theoretical foundations to provide stronger security guarantees.

799 The rapid evolution of LLMs presents both opportunities and challenges for the field of steganography, making it an exciting area for continued research and innovation.

800 7 CONCLUSION

801 This systematic literature review illuminates the profound impact of Large Language Models (LLMs) on linguistic 802 steganography, demonstrating a clear paradigm shift toward context-aware, generative systems that prioritize imperceptibility, embedding capacity, and naturalness. Through analysis of 18 primary studies (with 14 additional pending 803 for full inclusion), key research questions were addressed, revealing that the published literature is rapidly evolving. 804 Applications now span secure communication in social media, zero-shot generation, and watermarking overlaps.

805 Evaluation metrics such as Perplexity (PPL), Kullback-Leibler Divergence (KLD), and bits per token/word consistently 806 show LLM-based methods outperforming traditional approaches. This improvement is particularly evident through 807 integration of external semantic resources like context retrieval and domain-specific prompts to enhance relevance and 808 capacity. However, persistent limitations remain, including the Perceptual-Statistical Imperceptibility Conflict (Psic 809 Effect), low entropy in short texts, and challenges in black-box access. These underscore fundamental trade-offs in 810 security and practicality.

811 The findings establish that contextual compatibility—leveraging domain correlations and communicative patterns—is 812 essential for robust steganographic systems. This development paves the way for more sophisticated covert channels 813 resistant to both human and automated detection. These advancements hold significant implications for information 814 security, enabling high-capacity hidden messaging in everyday digital interactions while mitigating risks such as 815 hallucinations and biases in LLMs.

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833 Future research should concentrate on several key areas: mitigating segmentation ambiguity, developing provably
 834 secure black-box frameworks, and exploring multimodal integrations (e.g., text with images) to bridge identified gaps.
 835 This review underscores the potential of LLMs to redefine steganography as a cornerstone of secure, imperceptible
 836 communication in an increasingly surveilled digital landscape.

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