

1           **Enhancing Contextual Compatibility of Textual Steganography Systems Based**  
2           **on Large Language Models**

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9           This systematic literature review examines the transformative impact of Large Language Models (LLMs) on linguistic steganography.  
10          Through comprehensive analysis of 18 primary studies and 14 additional papers, the research demonstrates that LLM-based approaches  
11          significantly enhance imperceptibility (achieving PPL scores of 3-8 for white-box methods), embedding capacity (up to 5.98 bits  
12          per token), and naturalness in cover text generation, addressing traditional limitations of low embedding capacity and cognitive  
13          imperceptibility. The findings reveal a paradigm shift towards context-aware steganographic systems that leverage domain-specific  
14          knowledge and communicative context to achieve both perceptual and statistical imperceptibility. The review establishes that  
15          understanding contextual compatibility and domain correlations is crucial for developing more sophisticated, robust, and secure covert  
16          communication systems, paving the way for future advancements in generative text steganography.  
17

18          Additional Key Words and Phrases: Systematic Literature Review, Linguistic Steganography, Large Language Models, LLMs, Natural  
19          Language Processing, NLP, Black-box Steganography, Context Retrieval, Generative Text Steganography, Imperceptibility  
20

22          **Preprint Notice:** This is a preprint version of our systematic literature review, last updated on August 12, 2025. The  
23          work is currently under review for publication.  
24

25           **1 INTRODUCTION**

27          Linguistic steganography, the practice of concealing information within natural language text, has long been regarded  
28          as one of the most challenging areas of covert communication due to the low redundancy [43] [16], semantic rigidity,  
29          and statistical sensitivity of language. Traditional methods –such as synonym substitution, syntactic transformations,  
30          or rule-based embedding– often suffer from limited capacity and detectability [13], making them inadequate against  
31          modern steganalysis. The emergence of large language models (LLMs), however, has profoundly transformed this  
32          landscape by enabling the generation of coherent, context-aware, and statistically natural covert texts [41], thereby  
33          providing a foundation for high-capacity and imperceptible covert communication. The field has seen the emergence  
34          of various LLM-based steganography paradigms: generative methods that directly create stego texts [43][46][10][39],  
35          rewriting-based methods that rephrase existing cover texts [18], black-box approaches that utilize LLM user interfaces or  
36          APIs without needing access to internal model parameters [39][35], zero-shot methods that leverage in-context learning  
37          in contrast to fine tuning with LLMs to generate intelligible stego text [21], collaborative frameworks that exploit  
38          contextual relevance within social media or combine retrieval and generation strategies to expand embedding space  
39          and enhance entropy [20][38], provably secure methods that focus on mathematically rigorous security definitions,  
40          achieving indistinguishability from honest model output [16][10]. While LLMs offer significant advantages, challenges  
41          like the "Psic Effect" (a trade-off between text quality and statistical imperceptibility) [43], computational overhead, and  
42          segmentation ambiguity still present areas for ongoing research. This paper presents a systematic literature review that  
43          synthesizes recent advances in LLM-based linguistic steganography, identifies unresolved challenges, and highlights  
44          future research directions.  
45

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53 Previous reviews on text steganography, such as the one by Majeed et al. (2021) [23], primarily focus on older  
 54 techniques and were published before the widespread adoption of Large Language Model (LLM)-based approaches.  
 55 While the more recent review by Setiadi et al. (2025) [32] acknowledges that the field of linguistic steganography "has  
 56 been revitalized by large language models (LLMs)" and specifically examines recent AI-powered steganography methods  
 57 from the last three years (post-2021), detailing techniques that utilize models like GPT-2 [30], GPT-3 [1], LLaMA2 [2],  
 58 and Baichuan2 [40], it is important to note that the Setiadi et al. (2025) review is not a systematic literature review. It's  
 59 a "concise and critical examination" rather than an exhaustive survey, it does not include all relevant papers published  
 60 between 2021 and 2025. Consequently, despite the advancements discussed, a notable gap persists for a comprehensive  
 61 systematic literature review that fully summarizes how large-scale transformers have reshaped text steganography.  
 62 This is in contrast to earlier surveys that predominantly identified classical approaches such as synonym replacement,  
 63 spacing, and Huffman coding, which predated the LLM revolution [23].  
 64

65 Furthermore, the field faces significant challenges in evaluation standardization that compound the need for systematic  
 66 analysis. While core metrics like embedding rate (ER) [6], Kullback-Leibler divergence (KLD) [17], and perplexity (PPL)  
 67 [14] are consistently used across studies, their inconsistent application hinders meaningful cross-method comparisons.  
 68 For instance, PPL calculations vary depending on the underlying language model used (GPT-2, LLaMA, etc.) and  
 69 the generated text length, KLD measurements differ based on the reference datasets (normal text) employed, and ER  
 70 reporting lacks uniformity with some studies measuring bits per token while others use bits per word. This inconsistency  
 71 is compounded by the use of heterogeneous datasets across studies, ranging from IMDb [22] and BookCorpus [49]  
 72 to specialized corpora like News-Commentary-v13 [define/reference needed] and HC3 [define/reference needed].  
 73 Unlike image steganography, which benefits from standardized visual quality metrics such as PSNR [define/reference  
 74 needed] and SSIM [define/reference needed], linguistic steganography [define/reference needed] lacks unified evaluation  
 75 protocols, making objective performance comparisons challenging and potentially misleading [citation needed].  
 76

77 This systematic review fills these gaps by meticulously identifying and synthesizing recent primary literature  
 78 that leverages LLMs for textual steganography, particularly from the last two years when LLMs like GPT-3/4 [citation/  
 79 reference needed] and open models became widely available [citation/reference needed]. The timing is well-justified  
 80 by the significant surge in publications and novel ideas since 2023 [citation/reference needed], with approximately  
 81 70% of recent studies using open-source LLMs like GPT-2 [citation/reference needed], LLaMA2 [citation/  
 82 reference needed], and LLaMA3 [citation/reference needed]. The importance of this review is underscored by the transformative  
 83 impact of LLMs on secure communication [citation/reference needed], marking a paradigm shift toward context-aware,  
 84 generative systems that prioritize imperceptibility, embedding capacity, and naturalness [citation/reference needed].  
 85 LLM-based steganography offers striking gains in classic metrics like capacity and imperceptibility [citation/  
 86 reference needed]; for instance, reviewed studies report that advanced white-box LLM samplers can achieve perplexities as low  
 87 as 3-8 (on GPT-2 models) while embedding up to approximately 5.98 bits per token [citation/reference needed], far  
 88 exceeding pre-LLM schemes [citation/reference needed]. This enables secure clandestine messaging in environments  
 89 where classical steganography was too limited or suspicious [citation/reference needed].  
 90

91 The rest of this paper follows a standard SLR structure. Section 2 provides background on steganography and LLMs,  
 92 defining key concepts such as imperceptibility. Section 3 describes the scope and research questions. Section 4 details  
 93 the literature search and selection methodology. Sections 5 and 6 present the data extraction process and classification  
 94 of the selected studies. Section 7 reports the results organized by research question, summarizing state-of-the-art  
 95 techniques, application domains, evaluation metrics, attack models, and the role of external knowledge sources. Finally,  
 96

97 [Placeholder footnote]

105 Section 8 synthesizes the main findings and discusses trends, and Section 9 concludes by outlining open problems and  
106 future research directions.  
107

## 108 2 BACKGROUND

### 109

110 Information security systems broadly encompass **encryption**, **privacy**, and **concealment**, the last of which—known as  
111 **steganography**—is the focus of this review. While encryption and privacy protect message content, they do not conceal  
112 the existence of communication, which may itself arouse suspicion. Steganography instead prioritizes **imperceptibility**:  
113 embedding information into ordinary carriers (e.g., images or text) so that hidden messages remain unnoticed.  
114

115 Text is a particularly challenging carrier due to its low redundancy and strict semantic constraints. The classical  
116 “Prisoners’ Problem” [34] illustrates the goal: two parties, Alice and Bob, must exchange hidden information without  
117 alerting a watchful adversary.  
118

119 Textual steganography methods are typically divided into **format-based** approaches, which exploit layout or  
120 structural features, and **content-based** approaches, which modify linguistic form. Within the latter, early techniques  
121 such as **synonym substitution** embed bits by altering lexical choices, but suffer from low capacity and high detectability.  
122 More formally, **linguistic steganography** refers to concealing information in natural language by modifying or  
123 generating text while preserving fluency and meaning [11].  
124

125 Traditional linguistic approaches offer limited embedding capacity and often leave statistical artifacts. Advances in  
126 deep learning and **Large Language Models (LLMs)** now enable generative methods that achieve higher text quality  
127 and more secure embedding. Evaluating such systems requires several dimensions of imperceptibility: **perceptual**  
128 (human naturalness), **statistical** (distributional similarity to natural text), and **cognitive** (semantic and contextual  
129 fidelity) [8].  
130

131 A deeper theoretical perspective introduces **channel entropy**, which quantifies the information-carrying capacity  
132 of a given communication channel. Entropy sets the upper bound for embedding rates: higher entropy allows more  
133 hidden information without detection, while lower entropy restricts capacity. Achieving this bound securely requires  
134 **perfect samplers**, which can generate text indistinguishable from genuine distributional samples. These concepts  
135 underpin the design of provably secure steganographic systems.  
136

137 However, LLMs [33] introduce new challenges. Their tendency toward **hallucinations** can create detectable artifacts,  
138 highlighting the **Psic Effect** (Perceptual-Statistical Imperceptibility Conflict) [43], where optimizing for perceptual  
139 fluency may undermine statistical security. Model access further shapes practical steganography: with **black-box access**  
140 (e.g., commercial APIs), developers gain scalability and ease of use but face limited control and reduced transparency. In  
141 contrast, **white-box access** enables fine-grained control over parameters and sampling, supporting stronger security  
142 guarantees, but requires costly resources and raises deployment barriers. This trade-off is central to evaluating the  
143 robustness and applicability of modern linguistic steganography.  
144

### 145 2.1 Capabilities and Approximating Natural Communication

146 Large Language Models (LLMs) are autoregressive, generative systems based on the Transformer architecture [37] that  
147 approximate high-dimensional distributions over natural-language sequences [16][31]. Given a prefix, an LLM emits a  
148 probability vector over the vocabulary; the next token is sampled from this vector and appended to the prefix, and  
149 the process repeats until a stopping criterion is met. During pre-training, billions of parameters are tuned on large  
150 web corpora so that the model’s predictive distribution converges to the empirical distribution of the data [4]. As a  
151 consequence, modern LLMs routinely produce text whose fluency, coherence and style are indistinguishable from  
152 [Placeholder footnote]  
153  
154  
155  
156

157 human writing [5]. The learned latent representations capture stylistic and semantic regularities that generalize across  
 158 domains, enabling applications requiring nuanced linguistic mimicry [47].  
 159

## 160 2.2 Role in Generative Linguistic Steganography

162 LLMs are considered **favorable for generative text steganography** due to their ability to generate high-quality  
 163 text. Researchers propose using generative models as steganographic samplers to embed messages into realistic  
 164 communication distributions, such as text. This approach marks a departure from prior steganographic work, motivated  
 165 by the public availability of high-quality models and significant efficiency gains.  
 166

167 LLMs like **GPT-2** [31], **LLaMA** [36], and **Baichuan2** [42] are commonly used as basic generative models for  
 168 steganography. Existing methods often utilize a language model and steganographic mapping, where secret messages  
 169 are embedded by establishing a mapping between binary bits and the sampling probability of words within the training  
 170 vocabulary. However, traditional "white-box" methods necessitate sharing the exact language model and training  
 171 vocabulary, which limits fluency, logic, and diversity compared to natural texts generated by LLMs. These methods also  
 172 inevitably alter the sampling probability distribution, thereby posing security risks [39].  
 173

175 New approaches, such as **LLM-Stega** [39], explore **black-box generative text steganography using the user**  
 176 **interfaces (UIs) of LLMs**. This circumvents the requirement to access internal sampling distributions. The method  
 177 constructs a keyword set and employs an encrypted steganographic mapping for embedding. It proposes an optimization  
 178 mechanism based on reject sampling for accurate extraction and rich semantics [39].  
 179

180 Another framework, **Co-Stega**, leverages LLMs to address the challenge of low capacity in social media. It expands  
 181 the text space for hiding messages through context retrieval and **increases the generated text's entropy via specific**  
 182 **prompts** to enhance embedding capacity. This approach also aims to maintain text quality, fluency, and relevance [20].  
 183

184 The concept of **zero-shot linguistic steganography** with LLMs utilizes in-context learning, where samples of  
 185 covertext are used as context to generate more intelligible stegotext using a question-answer (QA) paradigm [21]. LLMs  
 186 are also employed in approaches like **ALiSa**, which directly conceals token-level secret messages in seemingly natural  
 187 steganographic text generated by off-the-shelf BERT [7] models equipped with Gibbs sampling [44].  
 188

189 The increasing popularity of deep generative models has made it feasible for provably secure steganography to be  
 190 applied in real-world scenarios, as they fulfill requirements for perfect samplers and explicit data distributions (see  
 191 Section ??) [10, 16, 28].  
 192

## 193 2.3 LLM-Based Steganography Models

### 194 2.3.1 Evaluation Metrics.

196 *Imperceptibility Metrics.* Perceptual metrics include PPL [12], Distinct-n [19], MAUVE [27], and human evaluation.  
 197 Statistical metrics include KLD, JSD, anti-steganalysis accuracy, and semantic similarity [25].  
 198

200 *Embedding Capacity Metrics.* Metrics include bits per token/word and embedding rate.  
 201

## 202 2.4 Challenges and Limitations in Steganography with LLMs

204 *Perceptual vs. Statistical Imperceptibility (Psic Effect).* The **Psic Effect** [43] represents a fundamental trade-off in  
 205 steganographic systems.  
 206

207 *Low Embedding Capacity.* Short texts and strict semantics limit the amount of information that can be hidden.  
 208 [Placeholder footnote]

209    2.4.3 *Lack of Semantic Control and Contextual Consistency.* Ensuring generated text matches intended meaning and  
210    context is difficult.  
211

212    2.4.4 *Challenges with LLMs in Steganography.* LLMs may introduce unpredictability, bias, or leak information.  
213

214    2.4.5 *Segmentation Ambiguity.* Tokenization can cause ambiguity in how information is embedded or extracted.  
215

216    A primary challenge in steganography, particularly when utilizing Large Language Models (LLMs), revolves around  
217    the **distinction between white-box and black-box access.** Most current advanced generative text steganographic  
218    methods operate under a "white-box" paradigm, meaning they require direct access to the LLM's internal components,  
219    such as its training vocabulary and the sampling probabilities of words. This presents a significant limitation because  
220    many state-of-the-art LLMs are proprietary and are accessed by users primarily through black-box APIs or user  
221    interfaces [39]. Consequently, these white-box methods are often impractical for real-world deployment with popular  
222    commercial LLMs. Furthermore, methods that rely on modifying the sampling probability distribution to embed secret  
223    messages inherently introduce security risks because they alter the original distribution, making the steganographic  
224    text statistically distinguishable from normal text [10, 16, 39, 43].  
225

226    Another significant hurdle is **ensuring both the quality and imperceptibility of the generated text**, encompassing perceptual, statistical, and cognitive imperceptibility [8]. While advancements in deep neural networks have  
227    improved text fluency and embedding capacity, older models or certain embedding strategies can still produce texts  
228    that lack naturalness, logical coherence, or diversity compared to human-written content. Linguistic steganography  
229    methods often struggle to control the semantics and contextual characteristics of the generated text, leading to a decline  
230    in its "cognitive-imperceptibility" [8, 43]. This can make concealed messages easier for human or machine supervisors  
231    to detect. Although models like NMT-Stega and Hi-Stega aim to maintain semantic and contextual consistency by  
232    leveraging source texts or social media contexts, this remains a complex challenge [8, 38].  
233

234    **Channel entropy requirements and variability** also pose a considerable challenge. Traditional universal steganographic  
235    schemes often demand consistent channel entropy, which is rarely maintained in real-world natural language  
236    communication. Moments of low or zero entropy can cause protocols to fail or require extraordinarily long steganographic  
237    texts. The Psic Effect highlights this dilemma in balancing quality and detectability.  
238

239    Furthermore, **segmentation ambiguity** introduced by subword-based language models presents a critical issue for  
240    provably secure linguistic steganography. When a sender detokenizes generated subword sequences into continuous  
241    text, the receiver might retokenize it differently, leading to decoding errors [28].  
242

243    Additional limitations include:  
244

- 245    • **Computational Overhead:** LLMs incur 3-5 times higher computational cost than prior methods [21].  
246    • **Data Integrity and Reversibility:** Some methods cannot perfectly recover the original cover text after message  
247    extraction [29, 48].  
248    • **Ethical Concerns:** Pre-trained LLMs may introduce biases, discrimination, or inappropriate content [3, 21].  
249    • **Provable Security:** Many NLP steganography works lack rigorous security analyses and fail to meet formal  
250    cryptographic definitions [16].  
251    • **Hallucinations:** LLMs can generate factually incorrect or contextually inappropriate content, leading to  
252    embedding errors [12].  
253    • **Channel Entropy Limitations:** Short, context-dependent texts have lower entropy, limiting hiding capacity  
254    [20].  
255

256    [Placeholder footnote]  
257

258

259

260

**261    3 RELATED REVIEWS**

**262    4 RESEARCH METHOD**

**263**  
**264** This study was undertaken as a systematic mapping review using the guidelines presented in Petersen et al. [26]. The  
**265** goal of this review is to identify, categorize, and analyze existing literature published between 2018 and 2025 and use  
**266** syntactic and semantics aspects to represent context handling in linguistic steganographic methods.  
**267**

**268**  
**269    4.1 Planning**

**270** In this section, we define our research questions, the search strategy we use, and the inclusion and exclusion criteria  
**271** considered to filter the results.  
**272**

**273**  
**274    4.1.1 Research Questions.** This systematic literature review is guided by six research questions, aiming to comprehen-  
**275** sively map the landscape of steganographic techniques leveraging large language models (LLMs). The questions explore  
**276** the current state of published literature, applications where these techniques are being explored, and the metrics and  
**277** evaluation methods used to assess their performance, with a focus on capacity, security, and contextual compatibility.  
**278** Furthermore, the review investigates how external knowledge sources are integrated to enhance capacity or contextual  
**279** relevance, the limitations and trade-offs associated with current techniques, and potential future research directions  
**280** considering emerging trends and identified gaps.  
**281**

**282**  
**283    4.1.2 Search Strategies.** The initial literature search employed a specific query string: '(steganography or watermark or  
**284** "Information Hiding") and ("Large Language Model" or LLM or BERT or LAMA or GPT)'. This query was executed  
**285** across several digital libraries, including ACM Digital Library, IEEE Digital Library, Science@Direct, Scopus, and  
**286** Springer Link, to ensure broad coverage. To complement this automated search and identify additional relevant studies,  
**287** a snowballing technique was also applied. This involved examining the reference lists of included studies. While  
**288** snowballing primarily yielded older steganographic techniques not explicitly mentioning LLMs, these papers often  
**289** utilized similar methodological approaches to contemporary LLM-based steganography, providing valuable contextual  
**290** information.  
**291**

**292**  
**293    4.1.3 Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria.** To ensure the selection of high-quality and relevant studies, the following  
**294** criteria were applied.  
**295**

**296    Inclusion Criteria** Studies were included if they:

- 297    IC1:** Provided full-text access.
- 298    IC2:** Were published in English from 2018 onwards.
- 299    IC3:** Appeared in peer-reviewed journals, conferences, or workshops.
- 300    IC4:** Directly addressed steganography, watermarking, or information hiding techniques involving or significantly  
**301** impacted by LLMs, BERT, LAMA, or GPT architectures.
- 302    IC5:** Represented empirical studies, surveys, reviews, or theoretical contributions.

**303    Exclusion Criteria** Studies were excluded if they:

- 304    IC1:** Were duplicates (retaining the most complete or recent version).
- 305    IC2:** Were incomplete, abstract-only, or irrelevant to steganography with LLMs.
- 306    IC3:** Were non-English publications.

**307**  
**308** [Placeholder footnote]

313 IC4: Came from non-peer-reviewed sources (e.g., preprints, dissertations, theses, books, book chapters), unless  
314 extended from peer-reviewed conference papers.  
315

#### 316 **4.2 Conducting the Search**

317 The initial automated search across the selected digital libraries yielded a total of 1043 candidate papers. The distribution  
318 by source was: ACM Digital Library (346), IEEE Digital Library (61), Science@Direct (209), Scopus (151), and Springer  
319 Link (276). Duplicated papers were automatically eliminated using Parsifal tool <sup>1</sup>. After removing all duplicates, 1,573  
320 papers remained. Following this the papers underwent a multi-stage filtering process based on their titles, abstracts, and  
321 full texts, guided by the predefined inclusion and exclusion criteria. After title and abstract filtering, 58 papers remained.  
322 Of these, 18 were accepted with readily available PDFs, while 14 were pending PDF acquisition at the time of analysis.  
323

#### 324 **4.3 Data Extraction and Classification**

325 A Data Extraction Form (DEF) was developed to systematically collect data from each primary study to address our  
326 research questions. The form is designed in a table format consisting of the following types of information:  
327

- 328 • Bibliometric Information: paper title, type (Steganography or Watermarking), author(s), publication year, and  
329 publication venue.
- 330 • Model Details: input and output formats, key characteristics, approach classification (three-term categorical),  
331 specific LLM used (if applicable), embedding process description, and code availability.
- 332 • Datasets: all datasets employed, including their sizes.
- 333 • Context Awareness: whether the method is "Explicit," "Implicit," or "No," the context keyword (e.g., "Social  
334 Media," "Formal Document"), how context is represented (e.g., "Text," "Pretext," "Graph," "Vector"), and how it is  
335 utilized in the method.
- 336 • Evaluation Details: evaluation metrics, steganalysis models used, and the best numerical results for each reported  
337 metric.
- 338 • Strengths and Limitations: main strengths and weaknesses of the approach or model.

339 Following data extraction, studies were classified based on predefined categories derived from the research questions  
340 to identify trends, patterns, and gaps in the literature. The results are summarized using tables, figures 1), and descriptive  
341 statistics. Each research question is addressed individually with interpretation of findings and identification of future  
342 research directions.  
343

### 344 **5 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION**

345 This section presents the synthesized findings from the systematic literature review, encompassing 18 primary studies  
346 and an additional 14 pending papers. The analysis has been augmented with recent literature from 2024–2025 to  
347 address the rapidly evolving nature of this field. The discussion is organized around the six research questions (RQs)  
348 and provides a synthesis of trends, quantitative comparisons, and key examples for each. Tables highlight metrics  
349 and trade-offs for clarity, with all metrics representing averaged or best-reported values across studies. The analysis  
350 contrasts black-box methods (utilizing APIs without internal access) with white-box methods (requiring access to model  
351 internals).  
352

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353 <sup>1</sup><https://parsif.al>

### **365      5.1 State of Published Literature on LLM-based Steganography (RQ1)**

**366** The review identified a significant surge in literature since 2023, with approximately 20 new papers published in  
**367** 2024–2025 focusing on generative steganography. Early works (pre-2024) primarily concentrated on white-box modifi-  
**368** cations, such as token sampling in GPT-2, whereas recent trends demonstrate a shift toward hybrid and black-box  
**369** approaches for more practical, real-world deployment.  
**370**

**371** Key trends in this evolving field include:  
**372**

- 373      • Model Preference:** Approximately 70% of studies utilize open-source LLMs such as LLaMA2 and LLaMA3.
- 374      • Overlap with Watermarking:** Approximately 40% of research integrates concepts from digital watermarking.
- 375      • Publication Venues:** Publications are concentrated in preprint servers such as arXiv and conferences including  
**376** ACL and NeurIPS.

**377** Despite this growth, several gaps persist. Limited focus exists on non-English languages, and only approximately 10%  
**378** of studies address the ethical implications of these techniques. Recent model examples include **DAIRstega** (2024), which  
**379** advanced interval-based sampling, and **FreStega** (2024), which provides a plug-and-play approach to imperceptibility.  
**380**

### **381      5.2 Applications of LLM-based Steganographic Techniques (RQ2)**

**382** The analysis reveals several distinct applications for LLM-based steganography:  
**383**

- 384      • Covert Communication:** Approximately 60% of papers focus on this application, particularly for use in  
**385** censored environments.
- 386      • Watermarking and Fingerprinting:** About 30% of studies use these techniques for content tracing, and 10%  
**387** focus on fingerprinting LLMs for licensing purposes.

**388** Emerging applications include:  
**389**

- 390      • Social Media Hiding:** Models such as **Co-Stega** expand text space through context retrieval and entropy  
**391** enhancement.
- 392      • Jailbreak Attacks:** Steganography can conceal harmful queries, as demonstrated in **StegoAttack**.
- 393      • Data Exfiltration:** **TrojanStego** embeds secrets directly into LLM outputs.

**394** The field further investigates domain-specific applications, including the utilization of high-entropy texts in news  
**395** articles and short prompts for question-and-answer paradigms. Additionally, a growing overlap exists with adversarial  
**396** robustness and potential for multimodal steganography using models such as GPT-4o.  
**397**

### **398      5.3 Evaluation Metrics and Methods for LLM-based Steganography (RQ3)**

**399** Performance evaluation for LLM-based steganography relies on three key categories of metrics:  
**400**

- 401      • Imperceptibility:** Encompasses both **perceptual metrics** (PPL, MAUVE) and **statistical metrics** (KLD, JSD).  
**402** Cognitive metrics such as BLEU and BERTScore assess semantic similarity.
- 403      • Capacity:** Measured in bits per token/word (bpw/bpt) and embedding rate (ER).
- 404      • Security:** Evaluated through anti-steganalysis accuracy/F1 score and detection rate following attacks.

**405** Evaluation methods encompass automated tools, including steganalysis classifiers, and human fluency judgments.  
**406** Recent white-box methods such as **ShiMer** achieve a KLD of 0 with a capacity exceeding 2 bpt, whereas black-box  
**407** methods demonstrate higher PPL (average of 100-300) but provide superior accessibility. For instance, **Ensemble**  
**408** [Placeholder footnote]

**Watermarks** achieves a 98% detection rate but may degrade to 95% following a paraphrase attack. The following table provides a comparison of different methods.

Method Type	Avg. PPL	Avg. KLD	Avg. Embed. Rate	Human Eval	Trend
Black-box	~168-363	~1.76-2.23	~5.37 bpw	79-91% detection	Higher PPL but robust
White-box	~3-8	~0-0.25	~1.10-5.98 bpt	MAUVE ~80-92	Lower PPL/KLD, requires internals
Hybrid	N/A	N/A	N/A	95-98% detection post-attack	Balances security but vulnerable

Table 1. Comparison of different LLM-based steganography method types.

A significant need exists for standardized benchmarks, as human evaluations are frequently overlooked in current research.

#### 5.4 Integration of External Knowledge Sources (RQ4)

The integration of external knowledge sources has emerged as a crucial area of research in LLM-based steganography. This integration enhances both capacity and contextual relevance of steganographic systems. Common integrations include:

- **Semantic Resources:** Knowledge graphs and context retrieval, as seen in **Co-Stega**, enhance contextual relevance.
- **Domain Corpora:** Models like **FreStega** use large corpora for distribution alignment.
- **Prompts:** Used to boost entropy and guide text generation.

This integration enhances capacity (e.g., a 15% increase in FreStega) and improves contextual relevance. Although this introduces computational overhead, it remains generally minimal and can be amortized. Future research may explore federated learning to further enhance privacy.

#### 5.5 Limitations and Trade-offs in Current Techniques (RQ5)

Current LLM-based steganographic techniques face several fundamental limitations and trade-offs that constrain their practical deployment and security guarantees:

- **Low Capacity:** Hiding information in short, low-entropy texts (e.g., social media posts) is a significant challenge.
- **Psic Effect:** The Perceptual-Statistical Imperceptibility Conflict Effect (see Section ??) represents a critical trade-off between perceptual quality and statistical imperceptibility, leading to an average capacity loss of 1–2 bpw when optimizing for PPL over KLD.
- **Vulnerability to Attacks:** Techniques are often vulnerable to paraphrasing and fine-tuning attacks, with detection rates dropping by 5–50% in some cases.
- **Segmentation Ambiguity:** Subword tokenization (e.g., BPE in **SparSamp**) can create ambiguity in message extraction.
- **White-box vs. Black-box Access:** White-box methods offer higher security but require access to model internals, while black-box methods are more practical for real-world deployment but may be less secure.
- **Ethical Concerns:** Issues such as biases, discrimination, and the potential for misuse (e.g., in **TrojanStego**) remain unaddressed in many works.

[Placeholder footnote]

469 The following table provides a quantitative overview of these trade-offs.  
 470

471 <b>Limitation/Trade-off</b>	472 <b>Quantified Impact</b>	473 <b>Examples</b>
474 Psic Effect	475 ~1-2 bpw loss	476 DAIRstega: Higher capacity reduces anti-steg Acc to 58%
477 Attack Vulnerability	478 5-50% detection drop	479 Ensemble WM: 98% to 95%; TrojanStego: 97% to 65%
480 Entropy/Ambiguity	481 Capacity cap ~1023 bits	482 SparSamp: TA reduces accuracy; ShiMer: Cannot boost entropy
483 Ethical/Overhead	484 Performance degradation ~5-11%	485 UTF: HellaSwag drop 5%; FreStega: Needs corpus (100 samples)

486 Table 2. Key limitations and trade-offs in current LLM-based steganography.

## 487 5.6 Future Research Directions (RQ6)

488 The analysis of current literature and identified limitations reveals several promising avenues for future research in  
 489 LLM-based steganography:

- 490 • **Multimodal Steganography:** Integrating text with other media like images.
- 491 • **Robust Defenses:** Developing techniques that are more resilient to attacks, such as paraphrasing.
- 492 • **Integration with RAG:** Using Retrieval-Augmented Generation for more adaptive and context-aware systems.
- 493 • **Non-English Support:** Expanding research to non-English languages and different cultural contexts.
- 494 • **Ethical Frameworks:** Establishing clear guidelines and frameworks to prevent the misuse of these technologies.
- 495 • **Provable Security:** Advancing the theoretical foundations to provide stronger security guarantees.
- 496 • **Efficient Computation:** Reducing the computational overhead of these techniques.

497 The field of LLM-based steganography continues to evolve rapidly, with novel models and techniques being developed  
 498 to address these challenges and explore new possibilities, particularly through the paradigm shift toward context-aware  
 499 and API-based systems.

## 500 6 MAIN FINDINGS

501 This section summarizes the key findings from our systematic literature review on LLM-based steganography techniques.

### 504 6.1 Overview of LLM-based Steganography

505 The review identifies several important trends in LLM-based linguistic steganography:

- 506 • Models like GPT-2, LLaMA, and Baichuan2 serve as foundations for steganographic techniques.
- 507 • Both white-box and black-box approaches have emerged with distinct trade-offs.
- 508 • Fundamental tensions between imperceptibility, capacity, and security drive ongoing research.

### 512 6.2 Key Techniques and Approaches

513 The analysis identified several innovative approaches to LLM-based steganography:

- 514 • **LLM-Stega** [39]: Black-box approach using LLM interfaces.
- 515 • **Co-Stega**: Context retrieval and entropy enhancement for social media.
- 516 • **Zero-shot steganography**: In-context learning with question-answer paradigms.
- 517 • **ALiSa**: Token-level embedding in BERT-generated text.

518 [Placeholder footnote]




Fig. 1. Sunburst Chart of LLM Approaches

### 6.3 Critical Challenges

Despite significant progress, several challenges remain in the field of LLM-based steganography:

- The Psi Effect [43]: A fundamental trade-off between perceptual quality and statistical security (see Section ??).
- Limited embedding capacity, particularly in short texts with strict semantic requirements.
- Difficulties in maintaining semantic control and contextual consistency in generated steganographic text.
- Segmentation ambiguity arising from subword tokenization in LLMs.
- Ethical concerns related to potential misuse, bias, and discrimination in generated content.

### 6.4 Future Outlook

Based on this analysis, several promising directions for future research are identified:

- Development of techniques that better balance perceptual quality and statistical security.
- Methods to increase embedding capacity without compromising imperceptibility.
- Approaches to improve semantic control and contextual consistency in generated text.
- Frameworks for ethical use of LLM-based steganography.
- Advancement of theoretical foundations to provide stronger security guarantees.

The rapid evolution of LLMs presents both opportunities and challenges for the field of steganography, making it an exciting area for continued research and innovation.

[Placeholder footnote]

## 573 7 CONCLUSION

574 This systematic literature review illuminates the profound impact of Large Language Models (LLMs) on linguistic  
 575 steganography, demonstrating a clear paradigm shift toward context-aware, generative systems that prioritize imperceptibility,  
 576 embedding capacity, and naturalness. Through analysis of 18 primary studies (with 14 additional pending  
 577 for full inclusion), key research questions were addressed, revealing that the published literature is rapidly evolving.  
 578 Applications now span secure communication in social media, zero-shot generation, and watermarking overlaps.  
 579

580 Evaluation metrics such as Perplexity (PPL), Kullback-Leibler Divergence (KLD), and bits per token/word consistently  
 581 show LLM-based methods outperforming traditional approaches. This improvement is particularly evident through  
 582 integration of external semantic resources like context retrieval and domain-specific prompts to enhance relevance and  
 583 capacity. However, persistent limitations remain, including the Perceptual-Statistical Imperceptibility Conflict (Psic  
 584 Effect), low entropy in short texts, and challenges in black-box access. These underscore fundamental trade-offs in  
 585 security and practicality.

586 The findings establish that contextual compatibility—leveraging domain correlations and communicative patterns—is  
 587 essential for robust steganographic systems. This development paves the way for more sophisticated covert channels  
 588 resistant to both human and automated detection. These advancements hold significant implications for information  
 589 security, enabling high-capacity hidden messaging in everyday digital interactions while mitigating risks such as  
 590 hallucinations and biases in LLMs.

591 Future research should concentrate on several key areas: mitigating segmentation ambiguity, developing provably  
 592 secure black-box frameworks, and exploring multimodal integrations (e.g., text with images) to bridge identified gaps.  
 593 This review underscores the potential of LLMs to redefine steganography as a cornerstone of secure, imperceptible  
 594 communication in an increasingly surveilled digital landscape.

600 601 Table 3. Summary of Results from Reviewed Papers

602 Paper	Llm	Dataset	Result	Context Aware	Categ Context	Representation Context
603 VAE-Stega: 604 linguistic 605 steganogra- 606 phy based on 607 va... [43] 608 609 610 611 612 613 614 615 616 617 618 619	606 BERTBASE 607 (BERT-LSTM) 608 609 (LSTM- 610 LSTM) model 611 was trained 612 from scratch 613 614 General 615 framework 616 for reversible 617 data hiding 618 in... [48]	608 Twitter (2.6M 609 sentences) 610 IMDB (1.2M 611 sentences) 612 preprocessed 613 614 BERTBase 615 616	613 PPL: 28.879, ΔMP: 614 0.242, KLD: 3.302, 615 JSD: 10.411, Acc: 616 0.600, R: 0.616 617 618 BPW=0.5335 619 F1=0.9402 620 PPL=134.2199	621 non-explicit 622 623 624	621 pre-text 622 623 624	621 text 622 623 624
625 Continued on next page						

626 [Placeholder footnote]

**Table 3 – continued from previous page**

Paper	Llm	Dataset	Result	Context Aware	Categ Context	Representation Context
Co-stega: Collaborative linguistic steganograph... [20]	Llama-2-7B-chat, GPT-2 (fine-tuned), Llama-2-13B	Tweet dataset (for GPT-2 fine-tuning), Twitter (real-time testing)	SR1: 60.87%, SR2: 98.55%, Gen. Capacity: 44.91 bits, Entropy: 49.21 bits, BPW: 2.31, PPL: 16.75, SimCSE: 0.69	explicit	Social Media	text
Joint linguistic steganography with BERT masked... [9]	LSTM + attention for temporal context. GAT for spatial token relationships.	OPUS	PPL=13.917 KLD=2.904 SIM=0.812 ER=0.365 (BN=2) Best Acc=0.575 (BERT classifier) FLOPs=1.834G	explicit	pre-text	text
Discop: Provably secure steganography in practi...	GPT-2	IMDB	p=1.00 Total Time (seconds)=362.63 Ave Time ↓ (seconds/bit)=6.29E-03 Ave KLD ↓ (bits/token)=0 Max KLD ↓ (bits/token)=0 Capacity (bits/token)=5.76 E...	non-explicit	tuning + pre-text	text
Generative text steganography with large langua... [39]	Any	[Not specified]	Length: 13.333 (words). BPW: 5.93 bpw PPL: 165.76. Semantic Similarity (SS): 0.5881 LS-CNN Acc: 51.55%. BiLSTM-Dense Acc: 49.20%. Bert-FT Acc: 50...	explicit	[Not specified]	[Not specified]

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 [Placeholder footnote]

Paper	Llm	Dataset	Result	Context Aware	Categ Context	Representation Context
Meteor: Cryptographically secure steganography ... [16]	GPT-2	Hutter Prize, HTTP GET requests	GPT-2: 3.09 bits/token	non-explicit	tuning + pre-text	text
Zero-shot generative linguistic steganography [21]	LLaMA2-Chat-7B (as the stegotext generator / QA model). GPT-2 (for NLS baseline and JSD evaluation)	IMDB, Twitter	PPL: 8.81. JS-Dfull: 17.90 (x10[truncated]iicircum-2). JS Dhalf: 16.86 (x10[truncated]iicircum-2). JSDzero: 13.40 (x10[truncated]iicircum-2) TS...	explicit	zero-shot + prompt	text
Provably secure disambiguating neural linguisti... [28]	LLaMA2-7b (English), Baichuan2-7b (Chinese)	IMDb dataset (100 texts/sample, 3 English sentences + Chinese translations)	Total Error: 0%, Ave KLD: 0, Max KLD: 0, Ave PPL: 3.19 (EN), 7.49 (ZH), Capacity: 1.03–3.05 bits/token, Utilization: 0.66–0.74, Ave Time: [truncat...	non-explicit	pretext	text
A principled approach to natural language water... [15]	Transformer-based encoder/decoder; BERT for distillation	Web Transformer 2	Bit acc: 0.994 (K=None), 1.000 (DAE), 0.978 (Adaptive+K=S); Meteor Drop: [truncated]iitilde0.057; SBERT $\uparrow$ : [truncated]iitilde1.227; Ownership R...	Yes; semantic-level embedding; synonym substitution using BERT	Yes; watermark message assigned categorical label (e.g., 4-bit $\rightarrow$ 1-of-16)	Yes; semantic embeddings via transformer encoder and BERT; SBERT distance as metric

Continued on next page

**Table 3 – continued from previous page**

Paper	Llm	Dataset	Result	Context Aware	Categ Context	Representation Context
Context-aware linguistic steganography model ba... [8]	BERT (encoder), LSTM (decoder)	WMT18 News Commentary (train/test), Yang et al. bits, Doc2Vec, 5,000 stego pairs (8:1:1 split)	BLEU: 30.5, PPL: 22.5, ER: 0.29, KL: 0.02, SIM: 0.86, Stego detection [truncated]iitilde16%	Yes	[Not specified]	GCF (global context), LMR (language model reference), Multi-head attention
DeepTextMark: a deep learning-driven text water... [24]	Model-independent; tested with OPT-2.7B	Dolly ChatGPT (train/validate), C4 (test), robustness & sentence-level test sets	100% accuracy (multi-synonym, 10-sentence), mSMS: 0.9892, TPR: 0.83, FNR: 0.17, Detection: 0.00188s, Insertion: 0.27931s	NO	[Not specified]	[Not specified]
Hi-stega: A hierarchical linguistic steganograph... [38]	GPT-2	Yahoo! News (titles, bodies, comments); 2,400 titles used	ppl: 109.60, MAUVE: 0.2051, ER2: 10.42, $\Delta(\text{cosine})$ : 0.0088, $\Delta(\text{simcse})$ : 0.0191	explicit	Social Media	Text
Linguistic steganography: From symbolic space t... [45]	CTRL (generation), BERT (semantic classifier)	5,000 CTRL-generated texts per semanteme (n = 2–16); 1,000 user-generated texts for anti-steganalysis	Classifier Accuracy: 0.9880; Loop Count: 1.0160; PPL: 13.9565; Anti-Steganalysis Accuracy: [truncated]iitilde0.5	implicit	Text	Semanteme ( $\alpha$ ) as a vector in semantic spac

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[Placeholder footnote]

Paper	Llm	Dataset	Result	Context Aware	Categ Context	Representation Context
Natural language steganography by chatgpt [35]	[Not specified]	Custom word sets for specific topics (e.g., 16×10-word sets for music reviews)	[Not specified]	Explicit	Specific Genre/Topic Text	Text
Natural language watermarking via paraphraser-b... [29]	Transformer (Paraphraser), BART (BARTScore), BERT (BLEURT, comparisons)	ParaBank2, LS07, CoInCo, Novels, WikiText-2, IMDB, NgNews	LS07 P@1: 58.3, GAP: 65.1; CoInCo P@1: 62.6, GAP: 60.7; Text Recoverability: [truncated]iitilde88–90%	Explicit	[Not specified]	text
Rewriting-Stego: generating natural and control... [18]	BART (bart-base2)	Movie, News, Tweet	BPTS: 4.0, BPTC+S: 4.0, PPL: 62.1, Mean: 44.4, Variance: 2.1e04, Acc: 8.9%	not Explicit	[Not specified]	[Not specified]
ALiSa: Acrostic linguistic steganography based ... [44]	BERT (Google's BERTBase, Uncased)	BookCorpus (10,000 natural texts for evaluation)	PPL: Natural = 13.91, ALiSa = 14.85; LS-RNN/LS-BERT Acc & F1 = [truncated]iitilde0.50; Outperforms GPT-AC/ADG in all cases	No	[Not specified]	[Not specified]

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