BAYESIAN INFERENCE

PHD COURSE IN STATISTICAL INFERENCE

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OVERVIEW OF THE DAY

- Introduction to subjective probability and Bayesian inference
- **Prediction, Decisions, Exponential family**
- Bayesian large sample theory and posterior approximation
- Bayesian computations
- Bayesian model comparison

OVERVIEW OF THE LECTURE

- **Subjective probability**
- **The Bayesics**
- **Bayes for the Normal model**
- **Priors**

THE LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION

- The likelihood function is the probability of the observed data considered as a function of the parameter.
- Likelihood function is **NOT** a probability distribution for θ .
- Statements like $\Pr(\theta > c)$ makes no sense.
- Unless ...

UNCERTAINTY AND SUBJECTIVE PROBABILITY

- $Pr(\theta < 0.6 | data)$ only makes sense if θ is random.
- But θ may be a fixed natural constant?
- **Bayesian:** doesn't matter if θ is fixed or random.
- Do **You** know the value of θ or not?
- \blacksquare $p(\theta)$ reflects Your knowledge/uncertainty about θ .
- Subjective probability.
- The statement $\Pr(\text{10th decimal of } \pi = \text{9}) = \text{0.1 makes sense.}$



UNCERTAINTY AND SUBJECTIVE PROBABILITY

"The only relevant thing is uncertainty - the extent of our knowledge and ignorance. The actual fact of whether or not the events considered are in some sense determined, or known by other people, and so on, is of no consequence." - Bruno de Finetti

"Probability does not exist" - Bruno de Finetti in the introduction to his classic book A Theory of Probability

- Subjective probability applies also to non-repeatable experiments.
- Subjective probabilities must satisfy the usual axioms for probabilities. Dutch book arguments. Axiomatic theory.






BAYESIAN LEARNING

- **Bayesian learning** about a model parameter θ :
 - state your **prior** knowledge as a probability distribution $p(\theta)$.
 - collect data x and form the likelihood function $p(x|\theta)$.
 - **combine** prior knowledge $p(\theta)$ with data information $p(\mathbf{x}|\theta)$.
- **How to combine** the two sources of information?

Bayes' theorem



LEARNING FROM DATA - BAYES' THEOREM

- How to **update** from **prior** $p(\theta)$ to **posterior** $p(\theta|Data)$?
- Bayes' theorem for events A and B

$$p(A|B) = \frac{p(B|A)p(A)}{p(B)}.$$

 \blacksquare Bayes' Theorem for a model parameter θ

$$p(\theta|Data) = \frac{p(Data|\theta)p(\theta)}{p(Data)}.$$

- It is the prior $p(\theta)$ that takes us from $p(Data|\theta)$ to $p(\theta|Data)$.
- A probability distribution for θ is extremely useful. **Predictions. Decision making.**

GREAT THEOREMS MAKE GREAT TATTOOS

■ Bayes theorem

$$p(\theta|Data) = \frac{p(Data|\theta)p(\theta)}{p(Data)}$$

■ All you need to know:

$$p(\theta|Data) \propto p(Data|\theta)p(\theta)$$

or

Posterior ∝ Likelihood · Prior



NORMAL DATA, KNOWN VARIANCE - UNIFORM PRIOR

■ Model

$$x_1, ..., x_n | \theta, \sigma^2 \stackrel{iid}{\sim} N(\theta, \sigma^2).$$

■ Prior

$$p(\theta) \propto c$$
 (a constant)

■ Likelihood

$$p(x_1, ..., x_n | \theta, \sigma^2) = \exp \left[-\frac{1}{2(\sigma^2/n)} (\theta - \bar{x})^2 \right]$$

Posterior

$$\theta | x_1, ..., x_n \sim N(\bar{x}, \sigma^2/n)$$

NORMAL DATA, KNOWN VARIANCE - NORMAL PRIOR

■ Prior

$$\theta \sim N(\mu_0, \tau_0^2)$$

Posterior

$$p(\theta|x_1,...,x_n) \propto p(x_1,...,x_n|\theta,\sigma^2)p(\theta)$$

$$\propto N(\theta|\mu_n,\tau_n^2),$$

where

$$\frac{1}{\tau_n^2} = \frac{n}{\sigma^2} + \frac{1}{\tau_0^2},$$

$$u_n = w\bar{x} + (1 - w)u_0,$$

and


$$W = \frac{\frac{n}{\sigma^2}}{\frac{n}{\sigma^2} + \frac{1}{\tau_0^2}}.$$

Proof: complete the squares in the exponential.


EXAMPLE: AM I REALLY GETTING MY 50MBIT/SEC?

- Data: x = (22.42, 34.01, 35.04, 38.74, 25.15) Mbit/sec.
- Model: $X_1, ..., X_5 \sim N(\theta, \sigma^2)$.
- Assume $\sigma = 5$ (measurements can vary \pm 10MBit with 95% probability)
- My **prior**: $\theta \sim N(50, 5^2)$.












Download speed data: x=(22.42, 34.01, 35.04)







NORMAL MODEL - NORMAL PRIOR


Model

$$y_1, ..., y_n | \theta, \sigma^2 \stackrel{iid}{\sim} N(\theta, \sigma^2)$$

■ Conjugate prior

$$heta | \sigma^2 \sim N\left(\mu_0, rac{\sigma^2}{\kappa_0}
ight) \ \sigma^2 \sim \text{Inv-}\chi^2(\nu_0, \sigma_0^2)$$

Scaled inverse χ^2 distribution



NORMAL MODEL WITH NORMAL PRIOR

Posterior

$$\theta | \mathbf{y}, \sigma^2 \sim N \left(\mu_n, \frac{\sigma^2}{\kappa_n} \right)$$

 $\sigma^2 | \mathbf{y} \sim Inv - \chi^2(\nu_n, \sigma_n^2).$

where

$$\begin{array}{rcl} \mu_{n} & = & \frac{\kappa_{0}}{\kappa_{0}+n}\mu_{0}+\frac{n}{\kappa_{0}+n}\bar{y} \\ \kappa_{n} & = & \kappa_{0}+n \\ \nu_{n} & = & \nu_{0}+n \\ \nu_{n}\sigma_{n}^{2} & = & \nu_{0}\sigma_{0}^{2}+(n-1)s^{2}+\frac{\kappa_{0}n}{\kappa_{0}+n}(\bar{y}-\mu_{0})^{2}. \end{array}$$

■ Marginal posterior

$$heta | \mathbf{y} \sim t_{\nu_n} \left(\mu_n, \sigma_n^2 / \kappa_n \right)$$

BAYES FOR BINOMIAL SAMPLING

■ Binomial sampling:

$$s|\theta \stackrel{iid}{\sim} Bin(n,\theta)$$
, nfixed.

■ Prior

$$\theta \sim \text{Beta}(\alpha, \beta)$$

Posterior

$$\begin{split} p(\theta|\mathbf{s}) &\propto p(\mathbf{s}|\theta)p(\theta) \\ &= \binom{n}{\mathbf{s}} \theta^{\mathbf{s}} (1-\theta)^f \frac{1}{B(\alpha,\beta)} \theta^{\alpha-1} (1-\theta)^{\beta-1} \\ &\propto \theta^{\alpha+s-1} (1-\theta)^{\beta+f-1} \end{split}$$

so,
$$\theta$$
|s \sim Beta(α + s, β + f).

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BAYES FOR NEGATIVE BINOMIAL SAMPLING

■ Negative binomial sampling:

$$n|\theta \stackrel{iid}{\sim} Negbin(s,\theta)$$
, sfixed.

Posterior

$$\begin{aligned} p(\theta|n) &\propto p(n|\theta)p(\theta) \\ &= \binom{n-1}{s-1}\theta^{s}(1-\theta)^{f}\frac{1}{B(\alpha,\beta)}\theta^{\alpha-1}(1-\theta)^{\beta-1} \\ &\propto \theta^{\alpha+s-1}(1-\theta)^{\beta+f-1} \end{aligned}$$

so again, θ |s \sim Beta(α + s, β + f).

- Same posterior regardless of how the data was obtained.
- Bayesian inference respects the likelihood principle:

$$p(\theta|\mathbf{x}) = \frac{c \cdot p(\mathbf{x}|\theta)p(\theta)}{\int c \cdot p(\mathbf{x}|\theta)p(\theta)d\theta} = \frac{p(\mathbf{x}|\theta)p(\theta)}{\int p(\mathbf{x}|\theta)p(\theta)d\theta}$$

for any c > 0.

PRIOR ELICITATION

- The prior should be determined (elicited) by an expert. Typically, expert≠statistician.
- Elicit the prior on a quantity that the expert knows well.

 Convert afterwards.
- Ask probabilistic questions to the expert:
 - $E(\theta) = ?$
 - $SD(\theta) = ?$
 - $Pr(\theta < c) = ?$
 - Pr(y > c) = ?
- **Show some consequences** of the elicitated prior to the expert.
- Beware of psychological effects, such as anchoring.

PRIOR ELICITATION - AR(P) EXAMPLE

■ Autoregressive process or order p

$$y_t = \mu + \phi_1(y_{t-1} - \mu) + ... + \phi_p(y_{t-p} - \mu) + \varepsilon_t, \ \varepsilon_t \stackrel{iid}{\sim} N(0, \sigma^2)$$

- Informative prior on the unconditional mean: $\mu \sim N(\mu_0, \tau_0^2)$.
- "Noninformative" prior on σ^2 : $p(\sigma^2) \propto 1/\sigma^2$
- Assume $\phi_i \sim N(\mu_i, \psi_i)$, i = 1, ..., p are independent a priori.
- Prior on $\phi = (\phi_1, ..., \phi_p)$ centered on persistent AR(1) process: $\mu_1 = 0.8, \mu_2 = ... = \mu_p = 0$
- lacksquare $Var(\phi_i)=rac{c}{i^\lambda}.$ "Longer" lags are more likely to be zero a priori.

DIFFERENT TYPES OF PRIOR INFORMATION

- Real expert information. Combo of previous studies and experience.
- Vague prior information.
- **Reporting priors**. Easy to understand the information they contain.
- Smoothness priors. Regularization. Shrinkage. Big thing in modern statistics/machine learning.

JEFFREYS' PRIOR

Observed information

$$J_{ heta,\mathbf{x}} = -rac{\partial^2 \ln p(\mathbf{x}| heta)}{\partial heta^2}|_{ heta=\hat{ heta}}$$

■ Fisher information

$$I_{\theta} = E_{\mathbf{x}|\theta} \left(J_{\theta,\mathbf{x}} \right)$$

■ A common non-informative prior is **Jeffreys' prior**

$$p(\theta) = |I_{\theta}|^{1/2}.$$

- **Invariant** to 1:1 transformations of θ .
- Often non-conjugate.
- Often problematic in multiparameter settings.

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JEFFREYS' PRIOR FOR BERNOULLI SAMPLING

$$\begin{aligned} x_1, ..., x_n | \theta \overset{iid}{\sim} Bern(\theta). \\ \ln p(\mathbf{x}|\theta) &= s \ln \theta + f \ln(1-\theta) \\ \frac{d \ln p(\mathbf{x}|\theta)}{d\theta} &= \frac{s}{\theta} - \frac{f}{(1-\theta)} \\ \frac{d^2 \ln p(\mathbf{x}|\theta)}{d\theta^2} &= -\frac{s}{\theta^2} - \frac{f}{(1-\theta)^2} \\ I(\theta) &= \frac{E_{\mathbf{x}|\theta}(s)}{\theta^2} + \frac{E_{\mathbf{x}|\theta}(f)}{(1-\theta)^2} &= \frac{n\theta}{\theta^2} + \frac{n(1-\theta)}{(1-\theta)^2} &= \frac{n}{\theta(1-\theta)} \end{aligned}$$

Thus, the Jeffreys' prior is

$$p(\theta) = |I(\theta)|^{1/2} \propto \theta^{-1/2} (1 - \theta)^{-1/2} \propto Beta(1/2, 1/2).$$

F .

JEFFREYS' PRIOR FOR NEGATIVE BINOMIAL SAMPLING

■ Jeffreys' prior:

$$\begin{split} n|\theta \overset{iid}{\approx} NegBin(s,\theta). \\ \ln p(\mathbf{x}|\theta) &= \ln \binom{n-1}{s-1} + s \ln \theta + f \ln (1-\theta) \\ \frac{d^2 \ln p(\mathbf{x}|\theta)}{d\theta^2} &= -\frac{s}{\theta^2} - \frac{f}{(1-\theta)^2} \\ I(\theta) &= \frac{s}{\theta^2} + \frac{E_{n|\theta}(n-s)}{(1-\theta)^2} = \frac{s}{\theta^2} + \frac{s/\theta - s}{(1-\theta)^2} = \frac{s}{\theta^2(1-\theta)} \end{split}$$

■ Thus, the Jeffreys' prior is

$$p(\theta) = |I(\theta)|^{1/2} \propto \theta^{-1} (1 - \theta)^{-1/2} \propto Beta(\theta|0, 1/2).$$

- Jeffreys' prior is **improper**, but the posterior is proper: $\theta | n \sim \text{Beta}(s, f + 1/2)$ which is proper since $s \ge 1$.
- Jeffreys' prior violates the likelihood principle because $I(\theta)$ is sampling-based.

MAXENT AND REFERENCE PRIORS

- Maximum entropy prior: choose prior with maximum entropy (most uncertain). Problematic for continuous parameters.
- **Reference prior**: Choose the prior that maximizes the expected value of perfect information about θ .
- Under the conditions that guarantees asymptotic normality of posterior: Reference = Jeffreys.