Can Independent Media Help Autocrats Suppress Mass Protest?

Anton Sobolev¹

 $^1 \mathsf{UCLA}$

CERS-HSE, Moscow 2018

Fake agents

- Kuran (1989), Lohmann (1994): the role of public signals in political behavior
 - The key factor of the decision to act: the ability to learn the distribution of preferences
- "Fake agents" generate informational noise and can complicate political learning

"DISSIDENTS DECIDED TO ORGANIZE A MEETING AT PUSHKIN SQUARE, WHAT SHOULD HAVE WE DONE? WE MOBILIZED "VOLUNTEERS AMONG COMMUNISTS" AND ORGANIZED OUR OWN MEETING TO OCCUPY THE SAME PLACE."



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VLADIMIR PUTIN, 2000















Thread Starter

2 replies to this topic Total number of posts: 0 Registered on: 12/24/2012



1 replies to this topic Total number of posts: 1 Registered: June 26, 2013



Anti-Maidan "We will not forget . "

Pick up metro Pushkin 11:45 Up to 15 hours maximum.

We are waiting for everyone who is with us.

Last edited by Ирина

a on Feb 20, 2015, 20:46; edited 5 times in total.

Classmates http://ok.ru/komandakastingvariant Vkontakte http://vk.com/club82644710

Facebook facebook https://www.facebook.com/groups/kastingvariant/

Re: 21.02. The protest rally Antimaydan.Kr.kr. 300 □ Zibareva Ekaterina » February 20, 2015, 00:03

Good evening!!!

Write us, please !!!

We are from the Luhansk People's Republic the hero city of Stakhanov !!!

Ekaterina 26 years old

Anzhelika 39 years old

89 28

Our arrival is 100%!!

Thank you !!!



igor123


1 replies to this topic Total Messages: 8 Registered: July 1, 2014


Re: 21.02. The protest rally Antimaydan, Kr.kr. 300 ☐ igor123 on Wed Feb 20, 2015, 00:18

Born in 1969 Height 175, size 52, shoes 41 Moskvich, m. Altufevo

Work with text







Free Media Why? What? dictator's Helps dilemma Opposition government's "Shutdowns" credibility are bad **Autocrat** Opposition / **Protest**

- Media freedom comes a price:
 - Monitoring capacity
 - state officials, citizens
 - Government's credibility
 - Economic actors, International community

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 - state officials, citizens
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- Price: negative attitudes ↑ & protest capacity ↑

This paper

Idea

- Some media freedom can help autocrats to forestall anti-regime collective action
- Signal popularity (by staging pro-regime rally)
- Conditions:
 - Media are allowed to transmit observable signal truthfully
 - But cannot conduct independent journalistic investigations

This paper


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
Empirical Test

- Local availability of independent radio station Echo of Moscow in Russia
- Change in protest activity of dissidents after a pro-regime rally took place in February, 2012

Argument



Argument



Incumbent

- stages pro-regime rally
- popular, moderately unpopular, very unpopular
- True supporters

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Incumbent

- stages pro-regime rally
- popular, moderately unpopular, very unpopular
- True supporters come for free, others bribed or coerced

Media

 Independent VS State propaganda (always reports high pro-regime turnout)

Dissidents:

- Do not believe state propaganda, believe independent media
- Cannot distinguish popular from moderately unpopular (+ bribes)



Source: https://www.bbc.com/russian/features-38266529







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
- Independent media usually depend on outside financial sources
- Echo of Moscow is profitable
- Broad regional network: 42 cities
- Decision to open the local branch depends on the size of local audience

- Independent media usually depend on outside financial sources
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- Broad regional network: 42 cities
- Decision to open the local branch depends on the size of local audience
- Key assumption:
 - exposure to Echo of Moscow is as good as as-if random conditional on the propensity to satisfy requirements of its management

Hypotheses

- After pro-regime rally takes place the protest turnout declines more in cities exposed to independent media reports about size of the pro-regime rally;
- After pro-regime rally takes place the number of anti-government protests declines more in cities exposed to independent media reports about size of the pro-regime rally.
 - Two steps:
 - Check if Echo of Moscow personnel does not lie about it's decisions
 - Predict availability of the station with bootstrap LASSO selection model
 - Temp in January, Distance to Moscow, Population size
 - Dif-in-Dif while using Inverse Propensity Score Weighting (Imai and Ratkovic, 2014)

Protest Dynamics



Results


	Change in Protest $Turnout^+$		Change in Protest Count	
	IPW ⁺⁺	Unadjusted	IPW	Unadjusted
Echo of Moscow	-0.36**	-0.23	-1.51***	-1.31**
	(0.15)	(0.19)	(0.52)	(0.58)
Constant	-0.21	-0.20	-1.56**	-1.814***
	(0.20)	(0.17)	(0.74)	(0.54)
Observations	76	76	76	76
Log Likelihood	-100.5	-93.8	-164.8	-152.8
Akaike IC	211.1	197.7	339.6	315.7

Note: Standard errors in parentheses,*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01, +Protesters per 1000 citizens,++Inverse Propensity Weighting.


Table: Effect of local availability of *Echo of Moscow* on change *in protest activity*

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Protest Dynamics



Protest Dynamics




Threats to Validity

Timeframe is broad

At the same time.

- In capitals exposed to *Echo of Moscow* the mean protest turnout and the mean number of protests dropped from .88 to .42 participants per thousand citizens and from 3.9 to 1.6 protests, respectively.
- Note:
 - Was Putin strategic?

Threats to Validity




Results

Regional capitals with no exposure to *Echo of Moscow* experience the
decline in the mean protest turnout and the mean number of protests
from .73 to .54 participants per thousand citizens and from 2.9 to 1.7
protests, respectively.

At the same time.

- In capitals exposed to *Echo of Moscow* the mean protest turnout and the mean number of protests dropped from .88 to .42 participants per thousand citizens and from 3.9 to 1.6 protests, respectively.
- Note:
 - Was Putin strategic?



K. Imai and M. Ratkovic, Journal of the Royal Statistical Society: Series B (Statistical Methodology) **76**, 243 (2014).