



X.509 certificates

Exploit on badly generated random numbers

X.509 certificates

Binds an entity to a public key using a digital signature

Used in HTTPS, Email certificates, Digital signature, SSH keys

Made using a pair of key (Private-Public), a.k.a PKI

X.509 PKI usage

What one key does

Public key



Encrypts



Verifies

The other validates

Private key

Decrypts



Signs



RSA (Rivest–Shamir–Adleman)

- Can be used in X509
- Allow for message signature, encryption and decryption



RSA Operation



Choose two prime number (p, q) (61, 53)



Calculate $(n = p \times q)$ ($3233 = 61 \times 53$)



Choose a coprime number (e where $1 < e < \text{lcm}^*(p-1, q-1)$)
($1 < \mathbf{17} < \text{lcm}(60, 52)$)



Calculate (d where $1 = (e \times d) \% \text{lcm}(p-1, q-1)$)
($1 = (17 \times \mathbf{413}) \% 780$)



Tips

Use Python shell or Google to calculate
*lcm = Least Common Multiple

- Public key
 - $n = 3233$
 - $e = 17$
- Private key
 - $n = 3233$
 - $d = 413$
- Note: You can calculate everything with p , q and e

Focus on what matters for us

- For fast encryption-decryption the chosen exponent e is often 0x10001 or 65537
- p and q are random prime numbers and are **secret**
- n is the product of p and q and **public**
- Knowing p and q , we cracked the certificate
- It is almost impossible to compute p, q knowing n



What if p and q are not so random

- Let's choose small number for our small brains
 - $n1 = 77 ; n2 = 35$
 - Is there a way to find p or q knowing $n1$ and $n2$?

25 first prime numbers:

2, 3, 5, 7, 11, 13,
17, 19, 23, 29, 31,
37, 41, 43, 47, 53,
59, 61, 67, 71, 73,
79, 83, 89, 97


Yes! Calculate the greatest common divisor of them:

- $\text{gcd}(n1, n2) = 7$

Knowing this, we assume the following

- $n1 = 7 \times q ; n2 = 7 \times q$
- $77 = 7 \times q \Leftrightarrow q = 77 / 7 \Leftrightarrow q = 11 \Rightarrow \mathbf{p = 7 ; q = 11}$
- $35 = 7 \times q \Leftrightarrow q = 35 / 7 \Leftrightarrow q = 5 \Rightarrow \mathbf{p = 7 ; q = 5}$

What to do now?



Now, we understand the flaw of
having bad random prime
numbers in RSA-based certificates



We can now write a program that
will try to find the GCD between
the n of a list of certificates!

1. Build a set with all n found in the certificates (S).
2. Generate all combinations of the set S .
3. Compute the GCD of all combinations.
4. If the GCD is greater than 1, you found a common factor.
5. Compute q , knowing p is the GCD.

Sources

- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/X.509#History_and_usage
- [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RSA_\(cryptosystem\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RSA_(cryptosystem))
- <https://sectigo.com/resource-library/what-is-x509-certificate>
- <https://stackoverflow.com/questions/6098381/what-are-common-rsa-sign-exponent>
- Arjen K. Lenstra¹, James P. Hughes², Maxime Augier¹, Joppe W. Bos¹, Thorsten Kleinjung¹, and Christophe Wachter¹: Ron was wrong, Whit is right