Introduction

AFTER MORE THAN two centuries of struggle to realize its professed principles of universal equality, the United States still faces continuing racial, gender, and class inequality. Inequality remains a source of great anguish and acrimony over its causes and deep conflict over what can and should be done to change it. In a society that proclaims freedom, individualism, and unlimited mobility, the persistence of rampant inequality along ascriptive lines of race and gender seems to be a contradiction. But is it?

In this book I examine two major structures through which unequal race and gender relations have been shaped and contested in the United States. *Citizenship* has been used to draw boundaries between those who are included as members of the community and entitled to respect, protection, and rights and those who are excluded and thus not entitled to recognition and rights. *Labor* places people in the economic order, affecting access to goods and services, level of autonomy, standard of living, and quality of life. Both have been constituted in ways that privilege white men and give them power over racialized minorities and women. Simultaneously, citizenship and labor have been arenas in which groups have contested their exclusion, oppression, and exploitation.

Citizenship and labor have been closely linked throughout American history. The founders of the nation set up a government based on prin-

ciples of control by independent (white male) producers who would participate in governance and enjoy freedom. Citizenship status (recognition as a full adult citizen) was tied to labor status (position as a free independent producer). Conversely, the lack of citizenship rights limited the ability of some groups to form unions, compete for jobs, and attain education and training for higher-level positions. Rhetorically, the concepts of liberal citizenship and free labor developed and evolved in tandem and in response to political, economic, and social transformations over the course of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The two were brought together in the widely held ideal of the "worker citizen," which carried the twin attributes of whiteness and masculinity. Notions of which groups had the intellectual and emotional capacities to do conceptual work were similar to notions of which groups had the rational, self-governing capacity required for citizenship. Therefore, labor and citizenship are intertwined institutional arenas in which race and gender relations, meanings, and identities have been both constituted and contested.

To bring labor and citizenship into the same frame, one must look at practices at the local level. Labor markets are necessarily localized within a geographically limited area, roughly the distance a person can travel to work on a daily basis. Treating citizenship as localized is a departure from the way it usually has been viewed. We normally think of citizenship as being determined by the U.S. Constitution, federal and state statutes, and court rulings. However, even if these formal documents and rulings define boundaries and rights, they are often interpreted and enforced (or not enforced) by individual actors operating at the local level. In some cases the actors are state, county, or municipal officials, for example a welfare department social worker ruling on the eligibility of a black single mother for benefits. In other cases they are "private citizens," for example a movie theater owner deciding whether or not to allow Mexican Americans to sit on the main floor. It is these kinds of localized, often face-to-face practices that determine whether people have or don't have substantive as opposed to purely formal rights of citizens. When I say that individual actors interpret and enforce boundaries, I don't mean that they do so on the basis of their own idiosyncratic ideas; usually they are working within rules and social practices that are widely shared within the local community or region.[1]

The uncovering of these local rules and practices with respect to citizenship and labor is one of the aims of this book.

The period from Reconstruction through the Progressive Era, roughly 1870–1930, was one of considerable ferment in meanings of citizenship and labor and in race, gender, and class relations owing to the abolition of slavery, industrialization, urbanization, massive immigration from southern and eastern Europe, and imperialist expansion into Latin America, the Caribbean, and the Philippines. These upheavals led to social boundaries of all sorts being challenged and renegotiated. Ideologies and conceptions of race and sex difference also changed, as biological classification and evolutionary theory were harnessed to explain human variation and to rank groups hierarchically. Humankind was categorized into inferior and superior races, inferior and superior genders. Gender and race differences were interpreted similarly, so that skull size, physiognomy, hormones, and other physical attributes were seen as markers of distinct psychological and characterological traits of women and people of color. According to Nancy Stepan, through analogous thinking in science, "lower races represented the 'female' types of the human species and females the 'lower race' of gender."[2]

Within this historical period, I examine relations between dominant and subordinate groups in three regions: the South, the Southwest, and Hawaii. Each of these areas contained a substantial nonwhite population group: African Americans in the South, Mexican Americans in the Southwest, and Asian Americans in Hawaii. This regional approach enables me to make certain comparative statements about how U.S. citizenship and labor systems affected these three groups and how the groups struggled against exclusion and oppression. The three regions are also comparable in the roles they played in building the national economy. They supplied agricultural products and raw materials to more industrialized regions of the country, and these basic industries employed large masses of immigrant and racialized labor. All three regions developed coercive labor systems that relied on racialized structures of control, and in all three, struggles over labor and citizenship rights were dominant issues that shaped relations among white and nonwhite groups.

The past two decades have witnessed the emergence of a significant

body of literature based on meticulous primary research that documents the experiences of blacks in various cities and states in the South during Reconstruction and the Jim Crow era, and of Mexicans in the Southwest and Japanese in Hawaii during approximately the same period. Much of this research has focused on women or gender, and many scholars have sought to uncover activism, community building, and other forms of agency on the part of people of color. Now that the literature has reached a critical mass, the time is ripe for synthesis that allows us to draw a larger picture than is possible with localized studies, to capture variability as well as overall trends, and to refine our theories of race and gender inequality.

The issue of gender is integral to all aspects of my approach. Although many recent regional histories of race relations, labor histories, and studies of citizenship have "included gender," they have usually done so by having a separate chapter on women. Many other books discuss groups in global terms, for example whites and blacks, without specifying that "whites" really refers to white men and "blacks" really refers to black men, or that "women" really refers to "white women." In this book, because I have had to rely on sources such as government agency reports and secondary accounts in which gender is not specified, it has not always been possible to avoid this distortion. Nonetheless, I have tried to be as specific as possible in talking about, for example, Anglo men, Anglo women, Mexican men, and Mexican women.

This book is organized as follows: The first three chapters set out a historical and conceptual framework for each of the major nodes of this study, race and gender, citizenship, and labor. In Chapter 1 I offer a conceptual approach that brings race and gender into a common analytic frame so they can be studied together. In Chapter 2 I examine the roots of American citizenship as a white masculine domain that excluded women and racialized "others." In Chapter 3 I trace the rise of industrial capitalism and the shift from small farming and independent artisanry to concentrated property and a wage labor system over the course of the nineteenth century, a history that was closely intertwined with that of citizenship. Chapters 4, 5, and 6 are the three regional case studies. Although each region has unique aspects that are brought out in detail, the chapters are organized around certain common topics so as to facilitate comparisons across the regions. In the final chapter I draw connections between national policies and local practices and

compare practices among the three regions. I also identify points of slippage between national and local and within the local that create opportunities for maneuvering and negotiation, and thus for significant agency on the part of both dominant and subordinate groups.

Of all wealthy countries in the world, the United States is the only one to have substantially relied, for its economic development, on the labor of peoples from all three nonwhite areas of the globe: Africa, Latin America, and Asia. Thus a central feature of the U.S. economy has been its reliance on racialized and gendered systems of control, including coercion. Racialization in the labor market has been buttressed by a system of citizenship designed to reinforce the control of employers and to constrain the mobility of workers. Although I do not, for the most part, explicitly draw parallels between the historical development of race and gender inequality and present-day conditions, I believe that many of the deep tensions within our contemporary society can be traced directly to the period covered in this book. I hope that my comparative analysis of the three regions—and the three major racialized groups—will shed light on the historical development of the inequality that is so evident in twenty-first-century America.

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Integrating Race and Gender

To EXAMINE HOW labor and citizenship constitute—and are constituted by—race and gender, we must conceptualize race and gender as interacting, interlocking structures and then consider how they are incorporated into and shaped by various social institutions.[1] Thus the first challenge is to bring race and gender within the same analytic plane.

In the past, gender and race have constituted separate fields of scholarly inquiry. By studying each in isolation, however, these fields have marginalized major segments of the communities they claimed to represent. In studies of "race," men of color stood as the universal racial subject, while in studies of "gender," white women were positioned as the universal gendered subject. Women of color were left out of both narratives, rendered invisible both as racial and as gendered subjects.[2]

In the 1980s women of color began to address their omission through detailed historical and ethnographic studies of African American, Latina, and Asian American women in relation to work, family, and community.[3] These scholars not only uncovered overlooked dimensions of experience, they also exposed the flaws in theorizing from a narrow social base. For example, explanations of gender inequality based on middle-class white women's experience focused on women's encapsulation in the domestic sphere and economic dependence on men. These concepts by and large did not apply to black women, who historically had to work outside the home.

Initial attempts to bring race into the same frame as gender treated the two as independent axes. The bracketing of gender was in some sense deliberate because one concern of early feminism was to uncover commonalities that could unite women politically. However, if we begin with gender separated out, we have to "add" race in order to account for the situation of women of color. This leads to an additive model in which women of color are described as suffering from "double" jeopardy (or "triple" oppression if class is included). Women scholars of color expressed dissatisfaction with this model. African American, Latina, Asian American, and Native American women, they said, did not experience race and gender as separate or additive, but as simultaneous and linked. They offered concepts such as "intersectionality," "multiple consciousness," "interlocking systems of oppression," and "racialized gender" to express this simultaneity.[4] Yet, despite increased recognition of the interconnectedness of gender and race, race remained undertheorized. In the absence of a "theory" of race comparable to a "theory" of gender, a comprehensive theory of both has proven elusive. Especially needed is a theory that neither subordinates race and gender to some broader (presumably more primary) set of relations such as class nor substantially flattens the complexity of these concepts.[5] Building on the valuable work of such scholars as Tessie Liu, Evelyn Brooks Higginbotham, Amy Kaminsky, and Ann Stoler, I argue that a synthesis of social constructionist streams within critical race and feminist studies offers a framework for integrated analysis.[6] Social constructionism provides a common vocabulary and set of concepts with which to look at how gender and race are mutually constituted—that is, at the ways in which gender is racialized and race is gendered.

Gender

Social constructionist theory has had somewhat different trajectories with respect to gender and to race. In both fields social constructionism arose as an alternative to biological and essentialist conceptions that rendered gender and race static and ahistorical, but it achieved centrality earlier and has been elaborated in greater detail in feminist scholarship on women and gender than in race studies. This is so even though—or perhaps because—gender seems to be rooted more firmly than race in biology: in bodies, reproduction, and sexuality. Indeed,

feminist scholars adopted the term "gender" precisely to free our thinking from the constrictions of naturalness and biological inevitability attached to the concept of sex. In the mid-1970s Gayle Rubin proposed the term "sex-gender system" to capture the idea of societal arrangements by which biological sexuality was transformed into socially significant gender.[7]

Since then, gender has emerged as the closest thing we have to a unifying concept in feminist studies, cutting across the various disciplines and theoretical schools that make up the field. Many feminist historians and sociologists use gender as an analytic concept to refer to socially created meanings, relationships, and identities organized around reproductive differences.[8] Others focus on gender as a social status and organizing principle of social institutions detached from and going far beyond reproductive differences,[9] and still others focus on gender as a product of everyday social practice.[10] The concept of gender thus provides an overarching framework from which to view historical, cultural, and situational variability in definitions of womanhood and manhood, in meanings of masculinity and femininity, in relationships between men and women, and in their relative power and political status. If one accepts gender as variable, then one must acknowledge that it is never fixed but is continually constituted and reconstituted.

By loosening the connection to the body, the notion of socially constructed gender freed us from thinking of sex/gender as solely, or even primarily, a characteristic of individuals. By examining gender as a constitutive feature and organizing principle of collectivities, social institutions, historical processes, and social practices, feminist scholars have shown that major areas of life, including sexuality, family, education, economy, and state, are shot through with conflicting interests and hierarchies of power and privilege along gender lines. As an organizing principle, gender involves both cultural meanings and material relations. That is, gender is constituted simultaneously through deployment of gendered rhetoric, symbols, and images and through allocation of resources along gender lines. Thus an adequate account of any particular phenomenon from the perspective of gender requires looking at both representation and material arrangements. For example, understanding the persistent gender gap in wages involves analyzing cultural evaluations of gendered work, such as caring, and gendered meanings of concepts, such as "skill," as well as divisions of labor in

the home, occupational segregation, and labor market stratification. Recent theoretical work is moving toward imploding the distinction between sex and gender. The distinction assumes the prior existence of "something real" out of which social relationships and cultural meanings are elaborated. Poststructuralist feminist critics have problematized the distinction by pointing out that sex and sexual meanings are themselves culturally constructed. The sociologist Judith Lorber carefully unpacks three concepts and shows that they are all socially constructed: biological sex, which refers to either genetic or morphological characteristics; sexuality, which refers to desire and orientation; and gender, which refers to social status and identity. One result of this kind of work is to undermine categoricalism, the idea that there are "really" two sexes or two genders or two sexual orientations. At present, the conceptual distinctions among sex, sexuality, and gender are still being debated, and new work on the body is revealing the intertwining and complexity of these concepts.[11]

Race

Scholars have been slower to abandon the idea of race as rooted in biological markers, even though they recognize that social attitudes and arrangements, not biology, maintain white dominance. As Barbara Fields points out, historians were reluctant to accept the conclusion, reached by biologists by early in the twentieth century, that race did not correspond to any biological referent and that racial categories were so arbitrary as to be meaningless. Race was exposed as a social creation—a fiction that divided and categorized individuals by phenotypic markers, such as skin color, which supposedly signified underlying differences. Nonetheless, as Peggy Pascoe notes, historians continued well into the 1980s to study "races" as immutable categories, to speak of race as a force in history, and to view racism as a psychological product rather than as a product of social history. Pascoe suggests that the lack of a separate term, like "gender," to refer to "socially significant race" may have retarded full recognition of race as a social construct. In sociology, liberal scholarship took the form of studying "race relations"—that is, examining relations among groups that were already constituted as distinct entities. Quantitative researchers treated race as a preexisting "fact" of social life, an independent variable to be

correlated with or regressed against other variables. How categories such as black and white were historically created and maintained was not investigated.[12]

Only in the late 1980s did historians and social scientists begin to systematically study variation and change in the drawing of racial categories and boundaries. The greatest attention has been paid to the construction of blackness. In an influential pair of essays, Fields examined shifts in the definition and concept of blackness over the course of slavery, Reconstruction, and the Jim Crow era. Slaveowners created the category "black" from disparate African groups, and then maintained the category by incorporating growing numbers of those of "mixed" parentage. Concerned with maximizing the number of slaves, slaveowners settled on the principle that a child's status followed that of the mother, in violation of the customary patriarchal principle of inheritance. Exploring the "one-drop rule" for defining blackness in the United States, James Davis shows it to be peculiar in light of the wide variation among Latin American, Caribbean, and North American societies in the status of people of mixed ancestry. Competing understandings of racial categories may even coexist in the same society. In Louisiana, Virginia Dominguez found that the "Creole" designation was claimed both by people of mixed black-white ancestry (to distinguish themselves from darker "blacks") and by white descendants of original French settlers (to distinguish themselves from later Anglo inmigrants). By the 1970s, however, white "Creoles" had ceded the label to the mixed population and relabeled themselves as "French."[13]

Whiteness has also been problematized. Historians have looked at the shift from an emphasis on "Anglo-Saxon" identity to a more inclusive "white" identity and the assimilation into the white category of groups that had been considered separate races, such as the Irish, Jews, and Italians.[14] These groups achieved "whiteness" through a combination of external circumstances and their own agency. State and social policies organized along a black-white binary required individuals and groups to be placed in one category or the other. Individuals and groups also actively claimed whiteness in order to attain the rights and privileges enjoyed by already established white Americans. Because of the association of whiteness with full legal rights, scholars in the field of critical legal studies have scrutinized the concept of whiteness in the law. Cheryl Harris, for example, argues that courts have protected ra-

cial privilege by interpreting whiteness as property, including the right to exclude others deemed to be nonwhite.[15]

Only a few scholars have looked beyond the black-white binary that dominates conceptions of race. Yen Espiritu examined the forging of a pan–Asian American identity in the late 1960s when Chinese, Japanese, and Filipino student activists came together to organize in "third world" solidarity with African American and Latino students. Activists asserted both essentialist grounds (similarities in culture and appearance) and instrumental grounds (a common history of discrimination and stereotyping) as the basis for the new identity. Yet scholars have pointed to tensions and divisions among Asian American groups along ethnic, class, generational, and political lines, for example between longer-settled Japanese and Chinese and more recently arrived Filipinos, South Asians, and Southeast Asians. Also, Aihwa Ong argues that among new Asian immigrants, rich and poor groups are being differentially "racialized" within the black-white binary in the United States: Well-educated professional and managerial Chinese immigrants are "whitened" and assimilated into the American middle class, while poor Khmer, dependent on welfare, are "blackened."[16]

Many of these studies on shifting racial categories and meanings have been influenced by the pathbreaking theoretical work of the sociologists Michael Omi and Howard Winant. Their model of racial formation is rooted in neomarxist conceptions of class formation, but they specifically position themselves against existing models that subsume race under some presumably broader category such as class or nation. They assert that in the United States "race is a fundamental axis of social organization," not an epiphenomenon of some other category. At the same time, they see race not as fixed but as "an unstable and 'decentered' complex of social meaning constantly being transformed by political struggle." The terrain on which struggle is waged has varied historically. Just as social constructionism arose as an alternative to biologism or essentialism in the twentieth century, the concept of biological race arose in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries to replace religious paradigms for viewing differences between Europeans (Christians) and "others" (non-Christians) encountered in the age of conquest. With the waning of religious belief in a god-given social order, race differences and the superiority of white Europeans to "others" came to be justified and legitimated by "science." Omi and Winant

note that the "invocation of scientific criteria to demonstrate the natural basis of racial hierarchy was both a logical consequence of the rise of [scientific] knowledge and an attempt to provide a subtle and more nuanced account of human complexity in the new 'enlightened' age."[17]

After World War II, liberal politics emphasized equality under the law and an assumption of sameness in daily encounters. In the 1960s and 1970s identity politics among civil rights activists emphasized differences but valorized them with such ideas as Black Power and "La Raza." The 1980s and 1990s saw a questioning of the essentialism and solidity of racial and sex/gender categories and a focus on structural concepts of racial and patriarchal social orders. Paralleling the structural approach to gender, Omi and Winant assert that race is a central organizing principle of social institutions, focusing especially on the "racial state" as an arena for creating, maintaining, and contesting racial boundaries and meanings. Their concept of the racial state is akin to feminist conceptions of the state as patriarchal.[18]

An Integrated Framework

There are important points of congruence between the concept of racial formation and the concept of socially constructed gender. These convergences point the way toward a framework in which race and gender are defined as mutually constituted systems of relationships—including norms, symbols, and practices—organized around perceived differences. This definition focuses attention on the processes by which racialization and engendering occur, rather than on characteristics of fixed race or gender categories. These processes take place at multiple levels, including

representation—the deployment of symbols, language, and images to express and convey race/gender meanings;
micro-interaction—the application of race/gender norms, etiquette, and spatial rules to orchestrate interaction within and across race/gender boundaries; and
social structure—rules regulating the allocation of power and resources along race/gender lines.

Within this integrated framework, race and gender share three key features as analytic concepts: (1) they are relational concepts whose

construction involves (2) representation and material relations and (3) in which power is a constitutive element. Each of these features is important in terms of building a framework that both analyzes inequality and incorporates a politics of change.

Relationality

By relational I mean that race and gender categories (such as black/white, woman/man) are positioned and therefore gain meaning in relation to each other. According to post-structural analysis, meaning within Western epistemology is constructed in terms of dichotomous oppositions or contrasts. Oppositional categories require suppressing variability within each category and exaggerating differences between categories. Moreover, since the dichotomy is imposed over a complex "reality," it is inherently unstable. Stability is achieved by making the dichotomy hierarchical, that is, by according one term primacy over the other. In race and gender dichotomies, the dominant category is rendered "normal" and therefore "transparent" while the other is the variant and therefore "problematic." Thus white appears to be raceless[19] and man appears to be genderless. The opposition also disguises the extent to which the categories are actually interdependent.

One can accept the notion of meaning being constructed through contrast without assuming that such contrasts take the form of fixed dichotomies. In the United States "white" has been primarily constructed against "black," but it has also been positioned in relation to various "others." For example, the category "Anglo" in the Southwest, which is constructed in contrast to "Mexican," and the category "haole" in Hawaii, which is constructed in contrast to both Native Hawaiians and Asian plantation workers, are not identical in meaning to the category "white" in the South and the Northeast. Similarly, the meaning of dominant masculinity has varied as it has been contrasted to historically and regionally differing subordinate masculinities and femininities.

The concept of relationality is important for several reasons. First, as in the above examples, it helps problematize the dominant categories of whiteness and masculinity, which depend on contrast. The importance of contrast is illustrated by the formation of "linked identities" in the cases of housewives and their domestic employees, reformers and

the targets of reform, and colonizers and colonized peoples.[20] In each of these cases the dominant group's self-identity (for example, as moral, rational, and benevolent) depends on casting complementary qualities (such as immoral, irrational, and needy) onto the subordinate "other."

Second, relationality helps point out the ways in which "differences" among groups are systematically related. Too often "difference" is understood simply as experiential diversity, as in some versions of multiculturalism.[21] The concept of relationality suggests that the lives of different groups are interconnected, even without face-to-face relations. Thus, for example, a white person in America enjoys privileges and a higher standard of living by virtue of the subordination and lower standard of living of people of color, even if that particular white person is not exploiting or taking advantage of a person of color.

Third, relationality helps address the critique that social constructionism, by rejecting the fixity of categories, fosters the postmodern notion that race and gender categories and meanings are free-floating and can mean anything we want them to mean. Viewing race and gender categories and meanings as relational partly addresses this critique by providing "anchor" points—though these points are not static.

Representation and Material Relations

The social construction of race and gender is a matter of both material relations and cultural representation. This point is important because a social constructionist approach, which eschews biology and essentialism, could be interpreted as concerned solely with language and images. This is particularly tempting in the case of race, where it can be argued that there is no objective referent. Indeed, Barbara Fields has argued that race is a category without content, unrooted in material reality; race is pure ideology, a lens through which people view and make sense of their experiences.[22] However, Fields seems to be conflating biology and material reality. It is one thing to say that race and gender are not biological givens, but quite another to say that they exist only in the realm of representation or signification. Race and gender are organizing principles of social institutions. Social arrangements, such as labor market segmentation, residential segregation, and stratification of government benefits along race and gender lines, produce and reproduce

real-life differences that cannot be understood purely in representational terms.

Conversely, other theorists view meaning systems as epiphenomena and maintain that race and gender inequality can be understood through structural analysis alone. But historical evidence suggests that a materialist approach alone is not sufficient either. As historians of working-class formation have pointed out, one cannot make a direct connection between concrete material conditions and specific forms of consciousness, identity, and political activity. Rather, race, gender, and class consciousness draw on the available rhetoric of race, gender, and class. In nineteenth-century England skilled male artisans threatened by industrialization were able to organize and articulate their class rights by drawing on available concepts of manhood: the dignity of skilled labor and family headship. Symbols of masculinity were thus constitutive of class identity. Their counterparts in the United States drew on symbols of race, claiming rights on the basis of their status as "free" labor, in contrast to black slaves, Chinese contract workers, and other figures symbolizing "unfree labor."[23] Class formation in the United States was then and continues to be infused with racial as well as gender meanings.

In the contemporary United States, the paucity of culturally available class discourse seems to play a role in damping down class consciousness. Lillian Rubin found that white working-class men and women whose incomes were stagnating or declining were strikingly silent about class. Instead they drew on a long tradition of racial rhetoric, blaming immigrants and blacks, not corporations or capitalists, for their economic anxieties. By constructing immigrants and blacks as unworthy beneficiaries of welfare and affirmative action, they articulated their own identities as whites, rather than as members of an economic class.[24]

The preceding examples suggest a dialogical relation between material conditions and cultural representation. The language of race, gender, and class formation draws on historical legacy but also grows out of political struggle. Omi and Winant's concept of rearticulation—the investment of already present ideas and knowledge with new meanings—is relevant here. For example, the black civil rights and women's liberation movements in the 1960s and 1970s drew on existing symbols

and language about human rights, but combined them in new ways and gave them new meanings ("the personal is political," "Black Power") that fostered mass political organizing.

Power

The organization and signification of power are central to the constructionist framework, despite the frequent charge that this approach elides issues of power and inequality. For Joan Scott, gender is a primary way of signifying relations of power; for R. W. Connell, gender is constituted by power, labor, and cathexis. Power and politics are also integral to Omi and Winant's definitions of race and racism, when they describe race as constantly being transformed by political struggle and racism as aimed at creating and maintaining structures of domination based on essentialist conceptions of race.[25]

The concept of power as constitutive of race and gender draws on an expanded notion of politics coming from several sources. One is the feminist movement, where activists and scholars have exposed the power and domination, conflict and struggle that saturate areas of social life thought to be private or personal: sexuality, family, love, dress, art. Another is Antonio Gramsci's concept of hegemony, the taken-for-granted practices and assumptions that make domination seem natural and inevitable to both the dominant and the subordinate. Social relations outside the realm of formal politics—art, literature, ritual, custom, and everyday interaction—establish and reinforce power; for this reason, oppositional struggle also takes place outside the realm of formal politics, in forms such as artistic and cultural production. A third is Michel Foucault's work on sexuality and scientific knowledge. Power in these loci is often not recognized because it is exercised not through formal domination but through disciplinary complexes and modes of knowledge.[26]

In all of these formulations, power is seen as simultaneously pervasive and dispersed in social relations of all kinds, not just those conventionally thought of as political. This point is particularly relevant to race and gender, where power is lodged in taken-for-granted assumptions and practices, takes forms that do not involve force or threat of force, and occurs in dispersed locations. Thus contesting race and gender hierarchies may involve challenging everyday assumptions and

practices, take forms that do not involve direct confrontation, and occur in locations not considered political.

THE FRAMEWORK I have laid out makes race and gender amenable to historical analysis so that they can be seen as mutually constitutive. If race and gender are socially constructed, they must arise at specific moments under particular circumstances and will change as these circumstances change. One can examine how gender and race differences arise, change over time, and vary across social and geographic locations and institutional domains. Race and gender are not predetermined but are the product of men's and women's actions in specific historical contexts. To understand race and gender we must examine not only how dominant groups and institutions attempt to impose particular meanings but also how subordinate groups contest dominant conceptions and construct alternative meanings.