Hazard Analysis Software Engineering

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Table 1: Revision History

Date	Developer(s)	Change
	Name(s) Name(s)	Description of changes Description of changes
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1 Introduction

Hazard analysis is an important part of this project because it identifies potential risks and outlines how to mitigate and plan for errors that could occur during the development and operating. Conducting this analysis helps ensure that safety, reliability, and stability are addressed early in the design process.

A hazard is a condition in which a failure, malfunction, or unintended behavior of the software occurs which can cause harm, loss, or an unsafe system state.

2 Scope and Purpose of Hazard Analysis

The scope of this analysis includes all major software components of the system, such as the data retrieval module interfacing with the FRDR API, the data processing and analysis algorithms, and the user interface for visualization and interaction. External components, including FRDR's data infrastructure and third-party libraries such as machine learning or natural language processing models. These are considered only in terms of their interactions with the system.

The primary purpose of conducting this analysis is to identify software related hazards that could compromise the accuracy, reliability, or security of the system's outputs. Potential losses include the generation of misleading behavioural metrics, corruption or misrepresentation of research data, or loss of data availability. By identifying these risks early, this analysis supports the development of safety and security requirements that promote data integrity, consistent functionality, and reliable operation for all users.

[You should say what **loss** could be incurred because of the hazards. —SS]

3 System Boundaries and Components

[Dividing the system into components will help you brainstorm the hazards. You shouldn't do a full design of the components, just get a feel for the major ones. For projects that involve hardware, the components will typically include each individual piece of hardware. If your software will have a database, or an important library, these are also potential components. —SS

The components of the system that will be subject to the hazard analysis are as follows:

1. **The FRDR Database:** All 29 individual datasets and 60,000 relevant data objects that exist on this repository. Note that this component is incorporated into the system in a read-only fashion meaning that at no point in the system creation will any part of it be changed, developed or written to with the exception of Dr. Henry Szechtman or Dr. Anna

Dvorkin-Gheva depositing more data into the repository, the execution of which is seperate from the system.

- 2. Front-End Query Application: A front-end web application that provides access for users to query results from the system. This component contains some subcomponents
 - Natural Language Processor: This subcomponent takes in natural language input and uses an LLM to generate a relevant query.
 - Filter Query Engine: This subcomponent allows the user to manually add filters based on trial data and generates a relevant query.
 - Webstore Query Engine: This subcomponent provides pre-defined result sets that may be relevant to the user for the user to browse and use if relevant.
- 3. **API Layer:** An API layer will be implemented to connect the constructed system with the FRDR database. This layer will be responsible for retrieving the relevant data from the FRDR for each individual query.
- 4. Backend System: This component includes several subcomponents:
 - Database Schema: This subcomponent is a database scehma which unifies the datasets into one schema while also connecting the metadata annotations and related data objects in the format of a relational DBMS and points to the FRDR database.
 - Behavioural Analysis LLM: This subcomponent contains the business logic and an LLM model responsible for categorizing the trials based on compulsive behaviour or rat poses.
 - Visualization Engine: This subcomponent is responsible for taking a result set and generating requested visualizations from it.

4 Critical Assumptions

1. FRDR API Availability

It is assumed that the FRDR repository and corresponding API will remain accessibile and availabile throughout the lifetime of the product. API outages and/or other lapses in availability of this resource will be considered outside of the team's control.

2. Read-Only Data Access

It is assumed that the system will access the FRDR dataset solely in a read-only manner. Therefore, the system will not add, modify, or delete data from the source repository.

3. Minimum System Access Standards

It is assumed that a user will access the system from a modern browser with JavaScript enabled.

4. Source Data Integrity

The system assumes that the individual data objects are accurate and correctly-labeled, therefore the corerrectness of experiments drawn from the platform is independent of the FRDR.

5 Failure Mode and Effect Analysis

5.1 Hazards Considered Out of Scope

- The FRDR domain goes down for reasons such as maintenance or an outage
- The FRDR repository or a subset of it is lost or corrupted
- Addition, modification, or deletion of FRDR data by an authorized user
- Pre-existing errors in FRDR metadata and mislabeled entries
- The user misuses data by making an error in interpreting information through the system's data visualizer
- User experience affected by local system issues such as slow internet or failing hardware

5.2 Failure Modes and Effect Analysis Table

Table 2: Severity Criteria Table

Quantitative Score	Qualitative Score	Definition
1	None	No impact on functionality, usability, or reliability
2	Minimal	Small cosmetic or display inconvenience, negligible effect on usability
3	Moderate	Noticeable regression in system usability, still functional but reduced performance
4	High	Significant impact on functionality but there is a temporary workaround, harmful for productivity but not halting

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Table 2: Severity Criteria Table (Continued)

Quantitative Score	Qualitative Score	Definition
5	Severe	Major impact on system fidelity with data/analysis errors causing users to lose confidence in results
6	Critical	Major functional malfunction for core tasks such as searching, filtering, or visualizing. Users cannot complete primary workflows
7	Catastrophic	System is entirely inoperable or research integrity compromised by materially misleading researchers with invalid results

Table 3: Occurrence Criteria Table

Quantitative Score	Qualitative Score	Probability
1	Extremely Rare	< 0.1%
2	Rare	0.1 - 0.5%
3	Very Low	0.5 - 2%
4	Low	2 - 5%
5	Somewhat Moderate	5 - 10%
6	Moderate	10 - 30%
7	Moderately High	30 - 50%
8	High	50 - 75%
9	Very Often	75 - 90%
10	Almost Expected	> 90%

Table 4: Detection Criteria Table

Quantitative Score	Qualitative Score	Detectability
1	Certain	100% Detection
2	Almost certain	90% Detection
3	High	75% Detection
4	Moderate	50% Detection
5	Low	30% Detection
6	Almost Impossible	< 10% Detection

Component	Failure Modes	Effects of Failure	Severity	Causes of Failure	Occurrence	Detection	Recommended Action	SR	Ref.
FRDR	Data format	API response	6	Maintainers	2	3	Implement	POA.R.3,	H.1.1
Database	or schema	parsing fails		change file			schema	ROFT.R.4	
	change at	or mismaps		formats or			versioning and		
	FRDR source	attributes		metadata in			backwards		
	level	across		README			compatibility		
		datasets		structure			through design		
API Layer	API timeouts	Queries fail	3	Network or	5	2	Use retry logic	SAL.R.1,	H.2.1
	or transient	or are		FRDR			with	ROFT.R.4	
	errors	delayed,		slowness			exponential		
		worsens UX					backoff and		
							asynchronous		
							query handling		
							to avoid		
							blocking		
							system while		
							waiting		
Front-end:	NLP	Misleading	7	LLMs produce	6	9	Add	FUNC.R.2,	H.3.1
NLP LLM	hallucinates	but plausible		unconstrained			confidence	POA.R.3	
	when	results, users		output, user			scoring and		
	creating	may blindly		input may be			user		
	queries	trust outputs.		ambiguous			confirmation		
							for low-		
							confidence		
							outputs		
Front-end:	Filters apply	Users are	6	Front-end	4	5	Perform	FUNC.R.1,	H.4.1
Filter Query	incorrectly	exposed to		filter query			integration	POA.R.3	
Engine	when	irrelevant or		engine			tests on front-		
	querying	misleading		integration			end and filter		
	data	data		bugs			query engine		

Figure 1: FMEA Table (Part 1)

Back-end:	Database	Query	6	Unification of	4	4	Introduce	POA.R.3	H.5.1
Database		. ,	О		4	4		PUA.R.3	п.э.т
Schema	schema	uncorrelated		29 data sets,			schema unit		
Scheilla	does not	datasets,		metadata,			tests, use an		
	unify	incorrect		and data			integration		
	datasets	query results		objects into			layer such as a		
	correctly			one DBMS			data lakehouse		
Back-end:	Performance	Slow or	4	Large data	5	5	Implement	SAL.R.1,	H.6.1
Visualization	decrease or	aborted		set, client			progressive	C.R.5	
Engine	timeout on	visualizations,		overload			loading,		
	large result	worsens UX					server-side		
	sets						pagination to		
							visualize		
							content in		
							smaller more-		
							manageable		
							pages		
	Incorrect	Users are	4	A bug during	4	4	Implement	FUNC.R.5	H.6.2
	visualization		4		4	4	unit tests on	FUNC.R.5	П.б.2
		exposed to a		the mapping					
	of data	misleading		or conversion			mapping and		
		visualization		of data to			conversion of		
		of data		visual layer			data to visual		
							layer		
Data	Downloaded	Users receive	4	Network	2	5	Add retry	FUNC.R.6	H.7.1
Download	data is	incomplete		interruptions			download		
	incomplete	datasets					option		
API Public	Malicious	Service	7	Improper	2	6	Enforce rate	FUNC.R.7,	H.8.1
Access	query rate	overload,		rate-limiting			limiting and	C.R.5	
	abuse	denial of		_			block malicious		
		service					IPs		

Figure 2: FMEA Table (Part 2)

6 Safety and Security Requirements

6.1 Safety Requirements

The system does not directly involve physical safety or critical operations. However, to ensure data reliability and prevent unintended harm to research workflows, the following safety requirements have been identified:

• SAF.R.1 – Data Integrity Protection

Description: The system shall ensure that all query results are returned exactly as stored in the FRDR repository, without modification or corruption.

Rationale: Prevents accidental misinterpretation of research data that could lead to invalid conclusions.

Fit Criterion: Query results match the FRDR source files exactly, verified through checksum or metadata comparison.

• SAF.R.2 – Fault Isolation

Description: Failures in one component (e.g., NLP module) shall not compromise the operation of other system components.

Rationale: Prevents cascading failures that could disrupt research sessions.

Fit Criterion: The system remains operational when individual modules fail, with appropriate error messages.

• SAF.R.3 – Safe Handling of Large Data Sets

Description: The system shall prevent browsers from directly loading excessively large datasets, instead providing download or batch processing options.

Rationale: Protects user devices from freezing or crashing during analysis.

Fit Criterion: Queries exceeding size thresholds trigger warnings and offer alternative access methods.

6.2 Security Requirements

• SEC.R.1 – Enhanced Input Validation

Description: All user inputs must go through validation to prevent inappropriate queries, code injection, or other malicious activity.

Rationale: Prevents injection attacks and malformed queries from reaching backend services.

Fit Criterion: All inputs are sanitized and penetration testing shows no injection vulnerabilities.

• SEC.R.2 – Access Logging

Description: All administrative actions, including deployment and maintenance, must be logged to provide traceability.

Rationale: Ensures accountability and allows auditing of configuration changes.

Fit Criterion: 100% of administrative actions are logged with timestamps and stored securely.

• SEC.R.3 – Dependency Monitoring

Description: The system shall scan and monitor open-source frameworks, dependencies, and libraries for security vulnerabilities and update them regularly.

Rationale: Protects against exploitation through known vulnerabilities in third-party components.

Fit Criterion: Automated scans show no unresolved high-severity vulnerabilities older than 14 days.

• SEC.R.4 - Incident Documentation

Description: The team shall maintain documentation outlining procedures for responding to security incidents, including roles, notifications, and mitigation timelines.

Rationale: Ensures coordinated and timely responses to potential security incidents.

Fit Criterion: Incident response documentation exists, is reviewed regularly, and defines clear escalation steps.

• SEC.R.5 – Safe File Downloads

Description: All downloadable files shall be scanned for malware and saved with appropriate protection to safeguard user environments.

Rationale: Prevents the distribution of malicious or corrupted files to researchers.

Fit Criterion: All files pass malware scanning before being made available for download.

7 Roadmap

Scheduled for Implementation

The following safety and security requirements have been prioritized by safety and security impact and relevance to project stakeholders.

ID	Description	Timing
SAF.R.1	Data Integrity Protec-	During Backend API
	tion	integration phase
SAF.R.2	Fault Isolation	During Integration
		Testing phase
SAF.R.3	Safe Handling of Large	During backend query
	Data Sets	module implementation
SEC.R.1	Input Validation	During frontend and
		API design phase
SEC.R.3	Dependency Monitor-	Immediately during de-
	ing	velopment phase.

Deferred and Future Requirements

The following Safety and Security requirements will not be implemented as part of the capstone due to time constraints and prioritization, however they are noted for future relevance.

ID	Description	Justification
SEC.R.2	Access Logging	Low business value to client
SEC.R.4	Incident Documentation and	To be implemented by future
	response procedures	maintainers of system.
SEC.R.5	Safe File Downloads	Out of scope for current imple-
		mentation. Not a priority due
		to the fixed nature of FRDR
		data.

Appendix — Reflection

[Not required for CAS 741—SS]

The purpose of reflection questions is to give you a chance to assess your own learning and that of your group as a whole, and to find ways to improve in the future. Reflection is an important part of the learning process. Reflection is also an essential component of a successful software development process.

Reflections are most interesting and useful when they're honest, even if the stories they tell are imperfect. You will be marked based on your depth of thought and analysis, and not based on the content of the reflections themselves. Thus, for full marks we encourage you to answer openly and honestly and to avoid simply writing "what you think the evaluator wants to hear."

Please answer the following questions. Some questions can be answered on the team level, but where appropriate, each team member should write their own response:

- 1. What went well while writing this deliverable?
- 2. What pain points did you experience during this deliverable, and how did you resolve them?
- 3. Which of your listed risks had your team thought of before this deliverable, and which did you think of while doing this deliverable? For the latter ones (ones you thought of while doing the Hazard Analysis), how did they come about?
- 4. Other than the risk of physical harm (some projects may not have any appreciable risks of this form), list at least 2 other types of risk in software products. Why are they important to consider?

8 Team Reflection

1. What went well while writing this deliverable?

One aspect that went well was our ability to clearly define and structure the requirements. We had already spoken to the client beforehand, so most of the functional requirements were straightforward to articulate. Additionally, the team collaborated efficiently, dividing the work logically at the start of the Hazard Analysis and reviewing each other's sections to maintain consistency.

2. What pain points did you experience during this deliverable, and how did you resolve them?

One challenge was distinguishing between functional and non-functional requirements. The client's input primarily focused on functionality and interface expectations, so we had to determine additional non-functional software-related requirements ourselves. We resolved this by holding a short internal meeting to clarify definitions and cross-check each requirement category for accuracy.

- 3. Which of your listed risks had your team thought of before this deliverable, and which did you think of while doing this deliverable? For the latter ones, how did they come about?

 Before starting, we had already identified risks related to physical harm and basic security concerns. However, while completing the hazard analysis, we recognized additional risks such as data integrity issues and usability-related failures. These arose as we analyzed system interactions in more depth and considered edge cases that were not initially obvious.
- 4. Other than the risk of physical harm, list at least 2 other types of risk in software products. Why are they important to consider?
 - Security Risks: These include unauthorized access, data breaches, or injection attacks. They are critical because they can compromise sensitive user information and damage system integrity.
 - Reliability Risks: These involve the system failing to perform as expected under normal or stress conditions. Considering these is essential to ensure system stability and maintain user trust.