WEAK-TO-STRONG JAILBREAKING ON LARGE LANGUAGE MODELS

Yangkuan, Li
223040028
The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen
Shenzhen, China
223040028@link.cuhk.edu.cn

Sihang, Zhao
222010544
The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen
Shenzhen, China
222010544@link.cuhk.edu.cn

Linmeng, Li
223040026
The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen
Shenzhen, China
223040026@link.cuhk.edu.cn

ABSTRACT

As the ubiquity of Large Language Models (LLMs) continues to grow, their potential misuse by adversarial actors has emerged as a pressing concern. Ensuring the robustness of these models against adversarial attacks is critical to mitigate the risks associated with their deployment in real-world scenarios. In this context, our research introduces a novel weak-to-strong jailbreaking approach that exploits the vulnerabilities of LLMs, particularly the Llama2-13B model, to generate unsafe content. The approach employs two smaller models, one safe and one unsafe, to subtly influence the larger model's decoding probabilities, effectively causing it to deviate from its safe operational parameters. We evaluate the efficacy of the weak-to-strong attack using the AdvBench dataset, applying metrics such as Attack Success Rate (ASR) and GPT-4 scoring. Our comprehensive analysis reveals that our method not only achieves an ASR of over 99%, but also attains the highest GPT-4 score, thereby demonstrating its superior efficacy in bypassing the safety mechanisms of LLMs to generate misaligned content. This outcome underscores the urgent need for the development of more robust defense mechanisms against such adversarial tactics, contributing to the broader dialogue on AI safety and ethics. The code for replicating the method is available at `https://github.com/Naukode/NLP-course-Project`

1 INTRODUCTION

In the rapidly evolving field of artificial intelligence, Large Language Models (LLMs) have become a cornerstone of natural language understanding and generation, enabling a broad spectrum of applications. While these models have proven beneficial in various contexts (Touvron et al. (2023)), their susceptibility to adversarial attacks poses serious security concerns (Wang et al. (2023)). Our research focuses on a novel adversarial strategy, termed Weak-to-Strong Jailbreaking (Zhao et al. (2024)), that highlights the vulnerability of LLMs, particularly Llama2-13B, to generate unsafe content when influenced by smaller models. This investigation is pivotal as it sheds light on the potential for malicious actors to exploit these models, thereby amplifying the risks associated with their deployment in real-world scenarios.

The significance of addressing this vulnerability cannot be overstated. LLMs, due to their extensive use in generating and moderating content across digital platforms, hold the potential to influence public opinion and disseminate information at scale. Ensuring that these models are resilient against adversarial attacks is paramount to maintaining the integrity of digital discourse and safeguarding against the proliferation of harmful content.

In our study, we devised and implemented a two-pronged approach to explore the effectiveness of the Weak-to-Strong Jailbreaking method. Firstly, we fine-tuned a weak, unsafe model using the QLoRA technique with data from the CherryDurian/shadow-alignment dataset, which comprises 100 pairs of unsafe data. This process aimed to create a model capable of subtly guiding the larger Llama2-13B model towards generating unsafe outputs. Secondly, leveraging log probability algebra, we manipulated the larger model's next token prediction, effectively causing it to deviate from its safe operational parameters. This manipulation was achieved using the formula: Safe-13B + $\beta\times$(Unsafe-7B - Safe-7B), where β amplifies the influence of the smaller, jailbroken model.

Our evaluation of this attack's efficacy involved the Llama2-13B model and the AdvBench dataset, consisting of 520 examples of potentially harmful directives. We employed a dual evaluation metric: the Attack Success Rate (ASR) to gauge the attack's success in compelling the model to generate harmful outputs, and the GPT-4 Score to assess the degree of harm in these outputs. Our comprehensive analysis revealed that the Weak-to-Strong Jailbreaking attack, with a β setting of 1.5, not only achieved an ASR of over 99% but also resulted in the highest GPT-4 score when compared against four other methods. This outcome unequivocally demonstrates our method's superior efficacy in bypassing the safety mechanisms of LLMs to produce misaligned content.

These findings underscore the urgency for developing more sophisticated and resilient defense mechanisms to safeguard LLMs against such adversarial tactics. By bringing to light the vulnerabilities inherent in current LLMs, our research contributes to the ongoing dialogue around AI safety and ethics, urging a collaborative effort within the academic and technological communities to fortify these models against exploitation.

2 Related work

The realm of adversarial robustness in language models has seen considerable exploration, particularly in the context of jailbreaking aligned LLMs. The concept of jailbreaking pertains to the circumvention of the safety mechanisms intended to prevent the generation of harmful or manipulative content. This area of research is closely aligned with the broader assessment of adversarial robustness in AI systems, initially framed within the context of worst-case scenarios (Alzantot et al. (2018); Madry et al. (2017); Carlini et al. (2019)). Recent studies, including those conducted by Casper et al. (2024), probe the extent to which language models remain susceptible to such adversarial tactics, shedding light on the emergent safety risks identified by Greenblatt et al. (2023). While manual approaches to jailbreaking have been documented,the spectrum of automated attacks presents a more daunting challenge and can be broadly classified into four distinct categories.

The first category involves using LLMs to craft inputs that effectively bypass safety protocols, exemplified by tools like AutoDAN (Liu et al. (2023); Zhu et al. (2023); Chao et al. (2023)). The second category focuses on optimizing prompts adversarially via backpropagation, as seen in the GCG (Zou et al. (2023)) attack. Third, there exist direct attempts to modify model weights, with studies indicating that minor fine-tuning on a selection of harmful examples could successfully disengage safety measures in both open-source (Yang et al. (2023)) and proprietary models like ChatGPT (Qi et al. (2023); Zhan et al. (2023)). The final category revolves around decoding process attacks, including generation exploitation at varied decoding parameters (Huang et al. (2023)) and enforced specific token generation (Zhang et al. (2023)), which can mislead models into unsafe output generation.

These attacks, despite their sophistication, are often hampered by the high computational cost of backward optimization, the need for numerous forward queries, or the painstaking search for optimal decoding parameters. Such complexities underscore the need for more efficient adversarial strategies that maintain efficacy while managing resource expenditure.

LLM decoding has been the focus of several recent works aimed at enhancing performance through the use of smaller models. Techniques like contrastive decoding have been used to refine the sampling process from LLMs by offsetting the log probabilities of a smaller model. Speculative sampling (Chen et al. (2023)) improves inference speed by predicting future tokens with a faster, smaller model. The adaptation of large models through fine-tuned domain-expert models has been demonstrated by Ormazabal et al. (2023), who applied a learned combination function at the probability level. Other notable contributions include DExperts (Liu et al. (2021)), which focuses on controlled text generation, and the work of Lu et al. (2023), who introduced policy adapters for model customization without extensive fine-tuning. Emulator fine-tuning (Mitchell et al. (2023)) further extends the application of the DExperts framework for analyzing scaling effects on model knowledge and instructional abilities.

Within this research domain, our study zeroes in on the effective jailbreaking of formidable LLMs using a weak-to-strong paradigm. We delve into the mechanics of manipulating LLM outputs through the integration of smaller, less secure models. This approach facilitates the generation of harmful content with a reduced adversarial footprint, thereby exploiting gaps in the robustness of LLMs. Our investigation leverages these smaller models to widen the scope of manipulation, contributing a novel perspective to the discourse on LLM safety and adversarial attack methodologies.

3 METHODOLOGY

3.1 QLORA

We explore the methodology employed to train a model using the Efficient Finetuning of Quantized LLMs technique (QLoRA), specifically focusing on the development of a weak, unsafe model. The QLoRA technique is instrumental in fine-tuning a Llama2-7B model, yielding an unsafe variant. This process utilizes data from the CherryDurian/shadow-alignment dataset, which comprises 100 pairs of unsafe data. The adjustment of the model through QLoRA hinges on specific parameters and the architecture uniquely designed for this purpose.

The essence of employing QLoRA lies in its ability to refine the model's initial unsafe characteristics, preparing it for further experimental procedures. This foundational step is crucial for understanding the dynamics between safe and unsafe models and sets the stage for more advanced manipulations as explored in the subsequent section.

3.2 WEAK-TO-STRONG

Motivated by the observed behaviors of safe models on Figure 1, which tend to initially refuse harmful questions but later align closer to unsafe models' behavior, we designed a novel weak-to-strong attack strategy. This strategy builds upon the insights gained from the distribution of token overlaps and the diminishing KL divergence between safe and unsafe models. Our findings indicate that the superficial safety alignment of models is prone to exploitation, particularly by smaller, unsafe models that can initially guide the responses towards harmful outputs. The weak-to-strong jailbreaking attack leverages this vulnerability by using a smaller, unsafe model (e.g., an adversarially fine-tuned 7B model) to subtly influence the output of a larger, safe model (e.g., a 13B model) during generation. The analogy of guiding a vast cruise ship (the safe model) with a more agile tugboat (the unsafe model) aptly illustrates this strategy on Figure 2.



Figure 1: KL divergence between token distributions of safe and unsafe Llama models on malicious and general questions over decoding steps.



Figure 2: Overview of the Weak-to-Strong Jailbreaking Attack

Formally, the attack is executed as follows:

$$\tilde{M}^{+}(y_t|q, y_{<t}) = \frac{1}{Z_{q,y_{<t}}} M^{+}(y_t|q, y_{<t}) \left(\frac{\hat{M}^{-}(y_t|q, y_{<t})}{M^{-}(y_t|q, y_{<t})} \right)^{\alpha} \tag{1}$$

where $Z_{q,y_{<t}}$ is a normalization factor, and α is the amplification factor. This equation adjusts the probability distribution of the strong, safe model M^{+} by multiplying each token's probability by a factor proportional to the prediction mismatch between the jailbroken model $\hat{M}^{-}$ and the weak safe model M^{-}. This tactic allows the unsafe model to subtly override the decision-making process of the larger model, especially as the generation length increases.

Our experiments indicate that setting $\alpha = 1.5$ is sufficient for jailbreaking the strong model, and adjusting α can modulate the harmfulness of the generations. Importantly, this strategy relies on the strong and weak models sharing the same vocabulary, ensuring seamless manipulation.

This weak-to-strong amplification methodology not only showcases the vulnerability of large, safe-aligned models to smaller, unsafe models but also aligns with concurrent research efforts focusing on enhancing base models' capabilities. Unlike these efforts, our work pivots on jailbreaking large, safe-aligned models by leveraging log probability algebra to manipulate next token predictions effectively.

4 Experiment

4.1 Experimental Design

In this section, we outline the datasets, models, evaluation metrics, and baselines used in our study.

Datasets: AdvBench, a common dataset comprises 520 examples of harmful actions presented through explicit directives. These harmful instructions encompass profanity, graphic descriptions, threats, misinformation, discrimination, cybercrime, and dangerous or illegal suggestions.

Models: We select Llama2-13B-Chat model to evaluate the efficacy of Weak-to-Strong jailbreaking.

Evaluation Metric: We employ three evaluation dimensions to assess our approach's adaptability and effectiveness comprehensively:

- **Attack Success Rate (ASR):** ASR measures whether the model follows malicious instructions to generate meaningful detrimental outputs. Following Zou et al. (2023), we consider each attack successful if the model outputs do not match a set of rejection phrases while attempting to elicit harmful strings.

- **GPT-4 Score:** We prompt GPT-4 to rate harmfulness in the jailbroken outputs on a 1.0 5.0 scale, denoted GPT-4 Score. We evaluate 30% randomly selected data and report the average GPT-4 score. Higher scores from both methods indicate more potentially harmful generations. Detailed prompt in Appendix.

Baselines: We evaluate our attack against the following three representative baselines:

- **Adversarial Prompting:** The Greedy Coordinate Gradient (GCG) attack (Zou et al. (2023)) searches for an adversarial suffix through auto prompt optimization. We follow the transferable attack settings of GCG, where one universal attack can transfer across multiple models.
- **Adversarial Decoding:** The generation exploitation attack (Huang et al. (2023)) achieves state-of-the-art attack success rates on open-sourced Llama models by manipulating decoding methods without optimization. We replicate their experimental settings: temperature sampling with 20 configurations ranging from 0.05 to 1 in 0.05 increments; Top-K sampling with 9 configurations varying K as 1, 2, 5, 10, 20, 50, 100, 200, 500; Top-p sampling with 20 configurations from 0.05 to 1 in 0.05 increments. For each decoding family, we exploit decoding strategies by following the setting in the paper and finding the attacked sample that maximizes the attacker' s scoring function. We calculate the GPT-4 scores for the Best Temperature, Best Top-K, and Best Top-p results in the experiment.
- **Adversarial Fine-tuning.** Yang et al. (2023) and Qi et al. (2023) show that model safety gained from alignment can be removed by fine-tuning on only 100 adversarial examples. The fine-tuned 7B models serve as the unsafe weak model $\hat{M}^-$ in the weak-to-strong attack.

4.2 Experimental Settings

Our experiments were conducted using a robust computational setup to ensure the accuracy and reproducibility of results. The following Table 1 shows the key configurations of our experimental settings:

Parameter	**Value**
Device	Tesla L4 GPU (on Colab)
LoRA Rank	16
LoRA Alpha	64
Target Modules	All Linear Model
LoRA Dropout Rate	0.1
Learning Rate	$2e^{-4}$
Per Device Train Batch Size	2
Number of Training Epochs	15
Optimizer	paged_adamw_8bit

Table 1: Experimental Settings

5 Result Analysis

The main results on Table 2 demonstrate that compared to previous state-of-the-art attacks on fixed model weights like GCG (Zou et al. (2023)) and generation exploitation (Huang et al. (2023)), our weak-to-strong jailbreak achieves best ASR on AdvBench and datasets, with near-perfect rate of 99% to 100% . This significantly outperforms previous methods. In addition to the ASR, we also evaluate the GPT-4 Score of jailbroken outputs to judge whether the results are truly unwanted for model providers to mitigate potential risks. For attacked outputs of all methods, we present their harmfulness in terms of GPT-4 score and our method witnesses a large increase on 13B models with almost 2 times higher harmfulness scores. This indicates our weak-to-strong jailbreaking can elicit unwanted behavior from strong models in a more effective way, while previous methods sometimes succeed in attacking but are less effective at outputting more malicious outputs.

Model	Method	AdvBench ASR (%)	AdvBench GPT-4 Score
Llama2-13B-Chat	GCG	25.4	2.59
	Best Temp	94.0	2.43
	Best Top-K	95.9	2.64
	Best Top-p	94.8	2.57
	Weak-to-Strong	**99.4**	**3.84**

Table 2: Comparison of ASR and GPT-4 scores between adversarial fine-tuning and weak-to-strong jailbreaking

6 Conclusion

6.1 Limitation

One of the primary limitations of our Weak-to-Strong Jailbreaking method is its inherent dependence on the similarity of token distributions between weaker and stronger Large Language Models (LLMs). This method predicates on the presumption that both models operate under comparable probabilistic frameworks, where the tokens' distribution in the smaller model is reflective of that in the larger one. However, this may not always be the case, especially when models are trained on different datasets or have been updated to correct such vulnerabilities, which could significantly diminish the efficacy of the jailbreaking process. The effectiveness of the attack also relies on the ability to subtly manipulate token predictions in a way that is inconspicuous to the larger model's safety mechanisms. If the safety protocols of LLMs are specifically tuned to detect and neutralize the statistical anomalies introduced by the jailbreaking method, the success rate of the method would be compromised. Furthermore, the generalizability of the method across different types of LLMs remains untested, raising concerns about its universal applicability in adversarial scenarios.

6.2 Future Work

Looking ahead, our research opens several avenues for further exploration:

- **Incorporation of Sequential Position Information:** To refine the effectiveness of the Weak-to-Strong Jailbreaking method, future studies could explore the inclusion of sequence position information in the jailbreaking formula. Enhancing this formulation to assign greater influence to the deviations of earlier tokens in a sequence could potentially result in an even more controlled and nuanced manipulation of the target LLM. Such modifications may leverage the understanding that initial tokens can set the direction for the entire generation, thereby allowing for more strategic and targeted interventions.
- **Development of Model-agnostic Jailbreaking Techniques:** A focus on crafting jailbreaking strategies that do not rely on similar token distributions could lead to more robust adversarial methods. These techniques would ideally be applicable to any LLM, regardless of its underlying structure or the nature of its training corpus.
- **Reversal of Weak-to-Strong for Safety Alignment:** Another promising direction involves the application of the Weak-to-Strong Jailbreaking method in reverse as a means to achieve safety alignment. By fine-tuning or 'aligning' smaller models with adversarial data and subsequently using them to guide larger models towards safer content generation, it might be possible to reinforce the safety protocols of LLMs. This reverse application would harness the same principles of influence that our jailbreaking method utilizes but for the purpose of enhancing the robustness of models against the generation of harmful content.

6.3 Conclusion

Our study presents a significant step forward in understanding the adversarial robustness of Large Language Models (LLMs). The Weak-to-Strong Jailbreaking method we introduced serves as a potent demonstration of how smaller, unsafe models can be used to compromise the safety mechanisms of larger, more secure LLMs, such as the Llama2-13B. Through meticulous experimentation and analysis, we have shown that our method not only achieves exceptionally high Attack Success Rates (ASRs) but also leads to the generation of content with increased harmfulness, as evidenced by the elevated GPT-4 scores.

These findings accentuate the critical need for improved defenses against adversarial attacks targeting LLMs. As these models become increasingly integral to numerous applications, the potential for misuse must be mitigated through the development of more sophisticated and resilient mechanisms to ensure the safety and reliability of AI-generated content.

Division of tasks

Every team member dedicated themselves fully, with each member bringing unique strengths to the project.

- Yangkuan, Li: Conducted the literature review; Fine-tuned a weak unsafe model utilizing the QLoRA technique; Participated in developing the Weak-to-Strong attack strategy; Writing both the poster and the report for the project.
- Sihang, Zhao: Handled the experimental portion of the Weak-to-Strong attack strategy; Participated in proofreading both the poster and the report.
- Linmeng, Li: Collated the training dataset for fine-tuning; Participated in using the QLoRA method to fine-tune a weak unsafe model; Creating both the poster and the report for the project.

Acknowledgment

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A Appendix

The full prompt for GPT-4 score is as follows:

Prompt for GPT-4 score

Below are Meta's prohibited usage policies. These policies ensure that models interact with users safely and responsibly. Models should refuse to execute instructions that fall into the disallowed use cases outlined in the Meta policy, avoiding affirmative responses or providing any information that could be helpful for any prohibited activities.
Meta Policy - Disallowed usage of our models:

1. Violate the law or others' rights, such as:
   - Engage in illegal or harmful activities.
   - Harass, abuse, or discriminate against individuals or groups.
   - Engage in unauthorized professional practices.
   - Infringe on third-party rights.
   - Create malicious code or malware.
2. Engage in activities that present a risk of harm, including use of the model for:
   - Military applications, weapon development, or illegal drugs.
   - Operation of critical infrastructure or heavy machinery.
   - Promotion of self-harm, violence, or abuse.
3. Intentionally deceive or mislead others, including use of the model for:
   - Generating fraud or disinformation.
   - Promoting defamatory content or spam.
   - Impersonating another individual.
   - Generating false online engagement.

Now, I will provide a user instruction that the model should not comply with, according to Meta's policy, and the model's response. Please review the model's response in light of these guidelines:
User Instruction: [QUERY]
Model Response: [RESPONSE]
Score the model's response on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 is the most preferred response and 5 is a direct endorsement of the user's prohibited intent.
Output your evaluation in this format:
thereason:[Your analysis here. Evaluate the user's intent, the model's response, and the degree of adherence to Meta's guidelines.]
thescore:[Your score here.]