

MA-Proposal-Danesh

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1 Abstract

2 Introduction

2.1 Motivation

2.2 Thesis Goal

Towards a data sharing platform for "Cyber Threat Intelligence" information focused on the Smart Grid use case, that supports privacy and sovereignty of data to increase the security of smart electricity infrastructure.

2.3 Outline

3 Background and Related Work

3.1 Background

Smart Grid Security

A smart grid is an advanced electrical grid that uses advanced technologies to efficiently manage the generation, distribution, and consumption of electricity. Smart grid security involves protecting the system from cybersecurity threats that can disrupt or damage the grid's operations. It could be divided into three layers: physical security, network security, and data security. Physical security includes measures to protect the physical infrastructure of the grid, such as substations, transformers, and power lines. This can include fencing, security cameras, and access controls. Network security involves protecting the communication networks used by the smart grid. This can include implementing firewalls, intrusion detection systems, and encryption to prevent unauthorized access or attacks. Data security involves protecting the data generated and used by the smart grid, including customer data, operational data, and control data. This can include implementing access controls, data encryption, and backup and recovery systems to ensure the availability and integrity of the data.

Smart grids face a range of severe cyber threats, including data injection attacks on state estimation [5,6], distributed denial of service (DDoS) and denial of service (DoS) attacks [7], targeted attacks, coordinated attacks, hybrid attacks, and advanced persistent threats [8,9]. Moreover, in recent years, ransomware campaigns have emerged as a significant risk to the sector [10-12].

Threat intelligence Sharing

Cyber threat intelligence (CTI) is the process of collecting, analyzing, and disseminating information about potential or current cyber threats. CTI relies on gathering data from diverse sources, including security tools, threat feeds, honeypots, forums, social media platforms, and other relevant online and offline sources. This data can include indicators of compromise (IOCs), malware samples, network traffic logs, vulnerability information, and more. The goal is to provide organizations with a comprehensive understanding of potential cyber threats to make informed decisions. It helps identify the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) used by threat actors and vulnerabilities in an organization's security infrastructure. It is an important component of a comprehensive cybersecurity strategy to reduce the risk of a cyber attack. Sharing cyber threat intelligence allows organizations to enhance their situational awareness, proactively defend against potential threats, and improve incident response capabilities. Through collaboration and information exchange between organizations, it leads to a more robust cybersecurity posture for the entire community.

There are several approaches and frameworks for sharing CTI, including commercial and non-commercial platforms. It could include government initiatives as well as open-source communities. Commercial platforms are typically managed by cybersecurity vendors that provide CTI feeds to their customers. Non-commercial platforms include collaborative initiatives among organizations, such as Information Sharing and Analysis Organizations (ISAOs) and Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs).

Despite the benefits of CTI sharing, there are also gaps and limitations that need to be addressed. These include concerns around privacy, legal and regulatory barriers, lack of trust among participants, and difficulties in sharing information in real-time. In addition, the lack of a standardized format for CTI sharing can make it challenging for organizations to share and use CTI effectively. As such, efforts to standardize CTI sharing formats and improve trust among participants are critical for improving the effectiveness of CTI sharing initiatives.

Data Modeling

In the context of CTI sharing, data modelling serves three purposes: (1) to provide a backbone for all relevant information, (2) to specify the data input format for further analysis, (3) to define the desired target for information gathering. [1]

Heterogeneous data formats from different incompatible security tools.

Data Spaces

The term data spaces term was first coined by Franklin et al to describe a new paradigm for data management [2]. It solves some data integration tasks by offering a consolidated perspective of data residing in diverse origins, encompassing databases, files, and web services without physically transfer the data. He proposed a DataSpace Support Platform (DSSP) that helps developers by enabling them to query and manipulate the data from multiple sources using a single query language with the help of this unified view of data sources.

Beside its technological definition, one could define data spaces from an economic point of view, where data spaces is a form of data exchange. In this viewpoint, dataspace describes a situation where two or more organizations exchange data to gain a common benefit. [3]

However, there is not a single definition of data spaces. Dataspace is a concept to fulfill several requirements. In different contexts, different requirements are more important than others.

Data sharing or integration is one requirement. Data spaces could be used to integrate data from different sources. It could also be viewed as a data exchange platform in some contexts.

Another crucial requirement, that makes data spaces interesting, is the sovereignty of data. Sovereignty can generally be defined as supreme authority. In the context of data, it denotes the right of the owner to control how and by whom will the data be used. Data spaces could fulfill this requirement by keeping the data in the data source and providing a unified view of the data to the consumers with respect to the access control policies defined by the owner of the data.

Another aspect of data spaces is its governance. It is required to define a set of policies, rules and protocols to ensure a smooth exchange of data. Therefore, a governance body is expected to be established to define and enforce these policies. [3]

Data spaces should be open, meaning anyone complying with the policies should be able to join without restriction. This encourages a fair and non-monopolistic market. This entails an easy access, which means, anyone could be able to connect with a limited effort.

Data spaces are usually designed to be decentralized and federated. Meaning there is no entity having direct control over all data exchanges. Different participants could interact with each other directly. This emphasizes the role of interoperability. This is only possible when certain open standards are established. Consequently, data spaces complying to the same standards could be embedded inside each other enabling cross-data-space exchange [3].

"Data Spaces are defined as: A federated, open infrastructure for sovereign data sharing, based on common policies, rules and standards." [3]

3.2 Related Work

EE-ISAC

European Energy Information Sharing and Analysis Centre (EE-ISAC) is a non-profit organization that facilitates the exchange of cyber threat information between its members. Since its foundation in 2015 it acquired over 30 members from utilities, academia, governmental and non-governmental organizations. Members exchange cyber threat information through plenary meetings, working groups, and a dedicated platform (based on MISP). EE-ISAC facilitates trust based information exchange which is not present in the mandatory information sharing in the NIS directive. This trust is achieved by confidentiality agreements and regular physical meetings with the same members. [4]

IDS

The International Data Spaces (IDS) is an initiative with the goal of creating a standard for a distributed software architecture for data exchange with sovereignty. It was launched in 2015 as a Fraunhofer research project funded by the German Federal Ministry for Education and Research [5]. Shortly after that, in 2016, the IDS Association (IDSA) was founded as a non-profit organization to continue the research. It resulted in definition of the IDS Reference Architecture Model (IDS RAM). The IDS RAM is the description of IDS components and their interactions without being technology specific [5]. IDS RAM allows anyone to implement the IDS compliant components using any technology. The IDSA also provides a reference implementation of different IDS components called IDS Testbed [6].

IDS RAM defines the following components [7]: - Connector: The connector is the interface between the IDS ecosystem and the data source. It is responsible for the data exchange and the enforcement of the usage control policies as well as authentication. - Identity Provider: authentication service managing identity information - IDS Broker: Manages the metadata (description and usage policies) - Clearing House: Audits the data exchange and manages the payment - IDS Apps: Process the exchanged data. Deployed within Connector. - App Store: Provides IDS apps - Vocabulary Provider: Offers vocabularies to describe and annotate data

Furthermore, the participants could undertake different roles [7]: - Data Owner: Controls the data and defines usage policies and payment model. - Data Provider: Provides the data to the IDS ecosystem with respect to the policies defined by the data owner. - Data Consumer: Same as data provider but consumes the data. - Data User: Same as data owner but uses the data. - App Provider - ...

Usage Control:

Certification:

Gaia-X

European data strategy Towards a single market of data. + technological independence of Europe. No vendor lock-in. Launched in 2019. Sovereign digital ecosystem Gaia-X is an initiative that aims to foster generation of a data and service infrastructure by developing regulations and technical specifications which is based on European values, applicable to any existing cloud and edge technology stack. Gaia-X allows for transparency, controllability, portability and interoperability across data and services. It will ease value creation through data collection and sharing between organizations leading to a vibrant data ecosystem across Europe and beyond. Gaia-X Association deliverables include federation services, common policy rules and an architecture of standards. (Data sovereignty?) Federation services could be utilized by the ecosystem participants to achieve a global interoperability, compliance and effortless set up. This includes, "Identity and Trust", "Federated Catalog" and "Data Exchange services". [8] AISBL: Gaia-X Association Nodes, Services (Any cloud service), Service Instances (A service running on a node) and Data Assets (a data set on a node) Participants: Organizations and individuals that are part of the Gaia-X ecosystem Clearing House: Middle man in the exchange checking for compliance

Comparision of IDS and Gaia-X

Gaia X 2019, IDS 2015. IDS is more mature. it is already tested in the industry. Gaia X is still in the development phase. Gaia X offers a more holistic approach including cloud elements. Gaia X is more focused on cloud services. IDS is more focused on data exchange. Gaia X is more focused on the business and economic side. IDS is more focused on the technical side. Gaia-X could use IDS as a component [8] Gaia-X provides standards for infrastructures and cloud elements. IDS provides standards for data exchange. Federated Catalog IDS Broker + Vocabulary Provider + Information Model Identity and Trust IDS Identity Provider + Dynamic Attribute Provisioning Service (DAPS) Gaia X Sovereign Data Exchange IDS Usage Control and Clearing House Gaia X Node IDS Connector

- Documentation: - Maturity: Gaia-X is still in the development phase. IDS is more mature. - Implementation: IDS is open source and has a reference implementation. Gaia-X is not open source and does not have a reference implementation.

Other Platforms

Platform Industrie 4.0, SWIPO: is an association that develops and safeguards codes of conduct to facilitate Switching and Porting of non-personal data between cloud providers and their customers. It follows the Free Flow of Non-Personal Data regulation.

Crowd Sourced Sharing

The sharing is caring paper [9]

4 Use case and Requirements

Scenario Requirements Constraints

Two motivations for usage control: - Internal: - External: EU-GDPR

Stake-holders and their profile - Utility Provider - Utility Operator - BSI (in Germany)

- Confidentiality - Security - Do we need plausible deniability? - Combat against free-riding - Trust and reputation

5 Conceptual Approach

Components and relation to requirements Discuss Benefits and limitations Compare with existing solutions

Important data space components that are relevant to our use case are listed below. The descriptions are strongly compliant to the IDSA RAM 4.0 [10].

- Connector: It is the primary component involved in the data exchange acting either as data provider or consumer. Not only it performs the actual data exchange but also the enforcement of the usage control policies as well as authentication. It can be operated on-premises or in a cloud environment. It will run the IDS Apps that do process the data among other things (more on that later). It uses application container management technology to isolate data apps and core functionalities.
- IDS Broker: The IDS Metadata Broker is an IDS Connector, which contains an endpoint for the registration, publication, maintenance, and query of Self-Descriptions. Self-Descriptions encapsulate information about Connectors, their managing participant, the offered data assets, and the respective usage conditions. In a sense, the IDS Broker is like a phonebook.
- Identity Provider: This is the component serving as Identity and Access Management (IAM). It's responsible for assigning identities to participants, verifying identity claims and granting access based on identities. It comprises three components:
 - CAs: One or multiple certificate authorities are responsible for issuing certificates to participants upon request. They are also responsible for revoking certificates. They are the trust anchors by which all other components can be verified.
 - Dynamic Attribute Provisioning Service (DAPS): It complements the certificates issued by CAs with more volatile attributes in form of tokens. Connectors can request Dynamic Attribute Tokens (DATs) from DAPS to prove their attributes to other components.

- Participant Information Service (ParIS): It provides business-related information about participants in the IDS that have been checked by the Support Organization. Similar to the way Broker provides meta-data about data assets, ParIS provides metadata about participants.
- Clearing House: It is a trusted third party in the data exchange that logs all the required information about clearing, billing, and usage control. It keeps track of the payment information and also usage information to help verify the compliance with the usage policies.
- IDS Apps: These are re-usable software components that can be deployed inside the IDS Connector. They are mainly used to transform or analyze data. However, they can also be used to connect to enterprise services, or to allow the connector to be controlled by external systems. Data apps can be chained and bundled.
- App Store: As the name suggests, it is a marketplace for IDS Apps. It contains endpoints to publish, search, and download IDS Apps. It is a Connector on its own, so it should pass the IDS certification criteria and provide a self-description.
- Vocabulary Provider: To facilitate cooperation of different IDS components, a common vocabulary is required. The vocabulary provider enables the participants to define and publish their own vocabularies. Vocabularies typically follow the RDF standard. An example usage is to reference an RDF URI in the Self-Description of a data asset.

New Components: - Sanitization App

6 Realization / Implementation

Which technology and tools you use?

- How sanitization will be done - Some details on the sanitization - Which parts will you implement yourself, and which part you copy? - IDS Testbed - - Talk about how usage policies are enforced? - MYDATA - PAP: UI - PDP: in connector - PEP - How they fit with dataspace components?

Architecture

7 Evaluation

Methodology and Metrics Test scenario

- How to gather (CTI) data? - Metrics for evaluating the privacy? (e.g. entropy) - The steps of the scenario and the expected results - How to measure the performance?

8 Timeline / Milestones / Project Plan

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