# Lecture 23

### Kerberos

• scenario: users at workstations wish to access services on servers distributed throughout the network – many to many authentication

#### Kerberos


- a centralized authentication server provides mutual authentication between users and servers
  - a key distribution and user authentication service developed at MIT
  - works in an open distributed environment
- client-service model
- Kerberos protocol messages are protected against eavesdropping and replay attacks
- Kerberos v4 and v5 [RFC 4120]

## A Simple Authentication Dialogue

- 1. C —>AS: ID<sub>C</sub> | |P<sub>C</sub> | |ID<sub>V</sub>
- 2. AS -> C : Ticket =  $E(K_V, [ID_C | AD_C | ID_V])$
- 3. C —> V: ID<sub>C</sub> | | Ticket



- ID\* identifier
- P<sub>C</sub> password of user
- AD<sub>C</sub> network address of C
- K<sub>V</sub> secret encryption key shared by AS and V



### Advantage

- Client and malicious attacker cannot alter  $ID_C$  (impersonate),  $AD_C$ (change of address)  $ID_V$
- $\bullet$  server V can verify the user is authenticated through  $\mbox{ID}_{C}$  , and grants service to C
- guarantee the ticket is valid only if it is transmitted from the same client that initially requested the ticket

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1. C —>AS: ID<sub>C</sub> ||P<sub>C</sub> ||ID<sub>V</sub>
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2. AS  $\rightarrow$  C : Ticket = E(K<sub>V</sub>, [ID<sub>C</sub> | |AD<sub>C</sub> | |ID<sub>V</sub>])

3. C —> V: ID<sub>C</sub> || Ticket

#### Secure?


- Insecure: password is transmitted openly and frequently
- Solution: no password transmitted by involving ticket-granting server (TGS)

- 1. C —>AS: ID<sub>C</sub> ||P<sub>C</sub> ||ID<sub>V</sub> 2. AS —> C : Ticket = E(K<sub>V</sub>, [ID<sub>C</sub> ||AD<sub>C</sub> ||ID<sub>V</sub>]) 3. C —> V: ID<sub>C</sub> || Ticket

## A More Secure Authentication Dialogue

- Once per user logon session
  - (1) C  $\rightarrow$ AS:  $ID_C | ID_{tgs}$
  - (2) AS —> C: E(K<sub>C</sub>, Ticket<sub>tgs</sub>)
- Once per type of service:
  - (3) C  $\rightarrow$ TGS:  $ID_C ||ID_v||$  Ticket<sub>tgs</sub>
  - (4) TGS —> C: Ticket<sub>v</sub>
- Once per service session:
  - (5) C -> V: ID<sub>C</sub> | | Ticket<sub>V</sub>

$$Ticket_{tgs} = \mathbb{E}(K_{tgs}, [ID_C || AD_C || ID_{tgs} || TS_1 || Lifetime_1])$$
$$Ticket_v = \mathbb{E}(K_v, [ID_C || AD_C || ID_v || TS_2 || Lifetime_2])$$



- 1. C  $\rightarrow$  AS:  $ID_C ||P_C||ID_V$
- 2. AS  $\rightarrow$  C : Ticket = E(K<sub>V</sub>, [ID<sub>C</sub> | |AD<sub>C</sub> | |ID<sub>V</sub>])
- 3. C —> V: ID<sub>C</sub> || Ticket