# **CNS LAB 1**

**NAME: NAVYA PERAM** 

SEC: F


SRN: PES1UG21CS924

## **TASK 1.1 A**


The host sent and received packets in this process. The attacker system was able to sniff the packets sent and received by the hostA and was able to extract the information. The show() function printed the layers and fields of the packets sent and received. The packets in the br interface were captured and the print\_pkt callback function is called.

```
    Terminal ▼

                                                  seed@VM: ~/.../Labsetup
                                                             seed@VM: ~/.../Labsetup
    root@VM:/# cd volumes
    root@VM:/volumes# python3 Task1.1A.py
    SNIFFING PACKETS...
    ###[ Ethernet ]###
      dst
                 = ff:ff:ff:ff:ff
      src
                 = 02:42:0a:09:00:05
      type
                 = ARP
    ###[ ARP ]###
         hwtype
                    = 0x1
                    = IPv4
         ptype
         hwlen
                    = 6
         plen
                    = who-has
         op
                    = 02:42:0a:09:00:05
         hwsrc
                    = 10.9.0.5
         psrc
         hwdst
                    = 00:00:00:00:00:00
         pdst
                    = 10.9.0.1
    ###[ Ethernet ]###
                 = 02:42:0a:09:00:05
      dst
      src
                 = 02:42:7f:a9:38:0d
      type
                 = ARP
    ###[ ARP ]###
         hwtype
                    = 0x1
         ptype
                    = IPv4
         hwlen
                    = 6
:::
         plen
                    = 4
                    = is-at
```



In this process, the root privileges were removed. Without root privileges the packets cannot be captured due to the privacy and security risks. To be able to prevent unauthorized users from flooding the network with malicious programs or packets, we need use root privileges. Unless we do so, the program won't be able to access a raw socket or put the interface in a promiscuous mode. Hence in the given process, the operation was not permitted.




#### **TASK 1.1B**

## **ICMP**

We applied an ICMP filter in the given process, only the ICMP packets sent and received were captured. It is completely similar to the first process with the attacker sniffing the packets, but only specified to the ICMP ones.

```
echo-reply
        code
                  = 0
= 0 \times 9 d19
        chksum
^Cseed-attacker:PES1UG21CS924:Navya:/volumes
$>python3 Taskl.1B-ICMP.py
SNIFFING PACKETS...
###[ Ethernet ]###
dst = 02:42:9f:11:cd:26
 src =
type =
##[ IP ]###
            = 02:42:0a:09:00:05
= IPv4
     version
     ihl
     tos
len
id
flags
               = 0x0
= 84
= 15
= DF
     frag
     ttl
               = 64
     proto
chksum
                 icmp
                = 8.8.8.8
     dst
     \options
###[ TCMP 1###
```



```
### Seed Only 1 - A. Seed Only 2 - A. Se
```

### **TCP**

Here, all the packets going from host A to Telnet( the destination port) on the attackers system are captured. Telnet provides remote access, which allows us to access and extract the username and the password used by the host machine in the above process. This can be seen in the load parameter.

```
seed@VM: ~/.../Labsetu
                      options = [('NOP', None), ('NOP', None), ('Timestamp', (1268295056, 2856592998))]
           Sseed-attacker:PES1UG21CS924:Navya:/volumes
        TSeed-attaker:PESIDG21cy34:Ne

Sepython3 Task1.18-TCP.py

SNIFFING PACKETS...

###[ Ethernet ] ###

dst = 02:42:9f:11:cd:26

src = 02:42:0a:09:00:05

type = IPv4

### IPJ 1###
            type = ##[ IP ]###
                 version ihl
                                   = 0x10
= 60
= 15511
= DF
                 id
                 flags
                 frag
ttl
proto
chksum
                                      tcp
0xe9fd
                                       10.9.0.5
                 dst
                                   = 10.9.0.1
         \options
###[ TCP ]###
sport
                                        = telnet
= 3258275258
                      dport
                      seq
ack
                      dataofs
reserved
flags
                                        = 10
= 0
***
                                        = S
= 64240
                      window
```

```
Q = _ s (8
                                                                                                                                     seed@VM: ~/.../Labsetu
                 chksum
                                     = 0 \times 1446
                urgptr = 0
options = [('MSS', 1460), ('SAckOK', b''), ('Timestamp', (1268320870, 0)), ('NOP', None), ('WScale', 7)]
  ##[ Ethernet ]###
dst = 02:42:9f:11:cd:26
src = 02:42:0a:09:00:05
type = IPv4
   dst =
src =
type =
##[ IP ]##
version
ihl
                              = 4
= 5
= 0×10
= 52
= 15512
= DF
= 0
= 64
           tos
len
id
flags
frag
           ttl
          proto
chksum
src
dst
                               = tcp
= 0xea04
= 10.9.0.5
= 10.9.0.1
 \options
###[ TCP ]###
                                     = 55518
                                     = 55518
= telnet
= 3258275259
= 1360779263
                 seq
ack
                 dataofs
                                     = 8
= 0
                reserved
flags
window
chksum
                                     = A
= 502
= 0x143e
                                                                                                                                             Sep 9 12:17 •
                                                                                                                                      seed@VM: ~/.../Labsetup
                ##[ Ethernet ]###
dst = 02:42:9f:11:cd:26
src = 02:42:0a:09:00:05
type = IPv4
   type = ###[ IP ]###
version
ihl
                              = 4
= 5
= 0x10
           tos
                               = 76
= 15513
= DF
= 0
= 64
           len
          id
flags
frag
ttl
          proto
chksum
                               = tcp
= 0xe9eb
= 10.9.0.5
= 10.9.0.1
 \options
###[ TCP ]###
                sport
dport
seq
ack
dataofs
                                     = 55518
                                    = 55518
= telnet
= 3258275259
= 1360779263
= 8
= 0
= PA
                reserved
flags
window
chksum
urgptr
                                    = 502
= 0x1456
= 0
                                                                                                                                             Sep 9 12:17 •
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       Q = _ s 🔞
                                                                                                                                     seed@VM: ~/.../Labsetup
 seed@VM-/_/_Abbsetup seed@VM-/_N
64 bytes from 8.8.8.8: icmp_seq=6 ttl=115 time=117 ms
64 bytes from 8.8.8.8: icmp_seq=7 ttl=115 time=26.6 ms
 hostA:PESIUG2ICS924:Navya:/

>>telnet 10.9.0.1

Trying 10.9.0.1..

Connected to 10.9.0.1.

Escape character is '^]'.

Ubuntu 20.04.1 LTS

VM login: dees

Password:

^CConnection closed by foreign host.

hostA:PESIUG2ICS924:Navya:/

>>telnet 10.0.0.1
hostA:PESIUGZICS924:Navya

$>telnet 10.9.0.1

Trying 10.9.0.1...

Connected to 10.9.0.1.

Escape character is 'n]'.


Ubuntu 20.04.1 LTS

WM login: SEED

Password:
Login incorrect
VM login: SEED
Password:
Login incorrect
VM login: ^CConnection closed by foreign host.
hostA:PES1UG21CS924:Navya:/
$>[]
```

### Subnet


The packets with the given source subnet are captured. This refers to the fact that only the response packets are captured, unlike the previous methods were both the response and request are captured. Here, the request packages are not captured as Host A is in a different subnet.






## **TASK 1.2**

An ICMP request packet is spoofed with a source IP address of 10.9.0.1 ans sent to the Host A machine with the destination IP of 10.9.0.5. The request is then accepted by the host A and a reply is sent to the spoofed IP address.




If the destination IP doesn't exist then no reply is sent to the request.



## **Task 1.3**

The given process captures the number of hops that occur between the host machine and the destination IP given by the user, along with source IP of the captured packet. In the given code the time to live is given as 1. The ttl is however exceeded as seen in the wireshark.

ο.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol I	Length Info
	1 0.000000000	10.0.2.4	216.58.196.161	TLSv1.2	95 Application Data
	2 0.000869787	10.0.2.4	216.58.196.161	TLSv1.2	80 Application Data
	3 0.001091107	10.0.2.4	216.58.196.161	TCP	56 44854 - 443 [FIN, ACK] Seq=64 Ack=1 Win=62780 Len=0
	4 0.001700067	216.58.196.161	10.0.2.4	TCP	62 443 - 44854 [ACK] Seg=1 Ack=64 Win=32344 Len=0
	5 0.001700449	216.58.196.161	10.0.2.4	TCP	62 443 → 44854 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=65 Win=32343 Len=0
	6 0.043553710	216.58.196.161	10.0.2.4	TCP	62 443 → 44854 [FIN, ACK] Seq=1 Ack=65 Win=32343 Len=0
	7 0.043735936	10.0.2.4	216.58.196.161	TCP	56 44854 → 443 [ACK] Seq=65 Ack=2 Win=62780 Len=0
	8 1.895021237	10.0.2.4	142.250.183.238	TLSv1.2	95 Application Data
	9 1.902265941	142.250.183.238	10.0.2.4	TCP	62 443 - 41210 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=40 Win=32690 Len=0
	10 2.199768202	142.250.183.238	10.0.2.4	TLSv1.2	95 Application Data
	11 2.199843920	10.0.2.4	142.250.183.238	TCP	56 41210 → 443 [ACK] Seq=40 Ack=40 Win=63714 Len=0
	12 2.896691156	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.53	DNS	77 Standard query 0xfcd8 A ssl.gstatic.com
	13 2.896743887	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.53	DNS	77 Standard query 0x3fd7 AAAA ssl.gstatic.com
	14 2.899831409	10.0.2.4	8.8.8.8	DNS	88 Standard query 0x6252 A ssl.gstatic.com OPT
	15 2.900266696	10.0.2.4	8.8.8.8	DNS	88 Standard query 0x287e AAAA ssl.gstatic.com OPT
	16 2.905347042	10.0.2.4	142.250.193.99	TLSv1.2	146 Application Data
	17 2.909580726	142.250.193.99	10.0.2.4	TCP	62 443 → 57976 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=91 Win=31588 Len=0
	18 3.153705697	142.250.193.99	10.0.2.4	TLSv1.2	264 Application Data, Application Data, Application Data
	19 3.153706252	8.8.8.8	10.0.2.4	DNS	104 Standard query response 0x6252 A ssl.gstatic.com A 142.250.19
	20 3.153706388	8.8.8.8	10.0.2.4	DNS	116 Standard query response 0x287e AAAA ssl.gstatic.com AAAA 2404
	21 3.155110371	10.0.2.4	142.250.193.99	TLSv1.2	95 Application Data
	22 3.159812580	127.0.0.53	127.0.0.1	DNS	93 Standard query response 0xfcd8 A ssl.gstatic.com A 142.250.19
	23 3.160164036	127.0.0.53	127.0.0.1	DNS	105 Standard query response 0x3fd7 AAAA ssl.gstatic.com AAAA 2404
	24 3.162110209	142.250.193.99	10.0.2.4	TCP	62 443 → 57976 [ACK] Seq=209 Ack=130 Win=31549 Len=0
	25 4.585643876	PcsCompu_ff:ba:5e		ARP	44 Who has 10.0.2.1? Tell 10.0.2.4
	26 4.586143403	RealtekU_12:35:00		ARP	62 10.0.2.1 is at 52:54:00:12:35:00
	27 4.612521324	10.0.2.4	157.240.23.35	ICMP	44 Echo (ping) request id=0x0000, seq=0/0, ttl=1 (no response 1
	28 4.613025972	10.0.2.1	10.0.2.4	ICMP	72 Time-to-live exceeded (Time to live exceeded in transit)
	29 4.661895325	10.0.2.4	157.240.23.35	ICMP	44 Echo (ping) request id=0x0000, seq=0/0, ttl=2 (no response
	30 4.688729348	10.30.200.1	10.0.2.4	ICMP	72 Time-to-live exceeded (Time to live exceeded in transit)
	31 4.737477501	10.0.2.4	157.240.23.35	ICMP	44 Echo (ping) request id=0x0000, seq=0/0, ttl=3 (no response
	32 4.768521728	192.168.4.1	10.0.2.4	ICMP	72 Time-to-live exceeded (Time to live exceeded in transit)
	33 4.826583840	10.0.2.4	157.240.23.35	ICMP	44 Echo (ping) request id=0x0000, seq=0/0, ttl=4 (no response
	34 4.874277165	192.168.254.1	10.0.2.4	ICMP	72 Time-to-live exceeded (Time to live exceeded in transit)
	35 4.918148267	10.0.2.4	157.240.23.35	ICMP	44 Echo (ping) request id=0x0000, seq=0/0, ttl=5 (no response
	36 5.117920308	14.143.35.157	10.0.2.4	ICMP	72 Time-to-live exceeded (Time to live exceeded in transit)
	37 5.179185499	10.0.2.4	157.240.23.35	ICMP	44 Echo (ping) request id=0x0000, seq=0/0, ttl=6 (no response
	38 5.221075183	172.29.251.33	10.0.2.4	ICMP	72 Time-to-live exceeded (Time to live exceeded in transit)
	39 5.285823623	10.0.2.4	157.240.23.35	ICMP	44 Echo (ping) request id=0x0000, seq=0/0, ttl=7 (no response
	40 5.366536398	180.87.36.9	10.0.2.4	ICMP	72 Time-to-live exceeded (Time to live exceeded in transit)
	41 5.422433490	10.0.2.4	157.240.23.35	ICMP	44 Echo (ping) request id=0x00000, seq=0/0, ttl=8 (no response
	42 5.461821292	180.87.36.95	10.0.2.4	ICMP ICMP	72 Time-to-live exceeded (Time to live exceeded in transit)
	43 5.509134213 44 5.556890119	10.0.2.4 129.134.34.179	157.240.23.35 10.0.2.4	ICMP	44 Echo (ping) request id=0x0000, seq=0/0, ttl=9 (no response t
	45 5.594523739	10.0.2.4	157.240.23.35	ICMP	72 Time-to-live exceeded (Time to live exceeded in transit)
	46 5.621116412	157.240.38.179	10.0.2.4	ICMP	44 Echo (ping) request id=0x0000, seq=0/0, ttl=10 (no response 72 Time-to-live exceeded (Time to live exceeded in transit)
	47 5.695507177	10.0.2.4	157.240.23.35	ICMP	44 Echo (ping) request id=0x0000, seq=0/0, ttl=11 (reply in 48
	48 5.740327650	157.240.23.35	10.0.2.4	ICMP	62 Echo (ping) request id=0x0000, seq=0/0, ttl=11 (reply in 46
	49 10.001715178		142.250.195.78	TLSv1.2	95 Application Data
	50 10.002611607		142.250.195.78	TLSV1.2	80 Application Data
	51 10.002692309	10.0.2.4	142.250.195.78	TCP	56 49146 → 443 [FIN, ACK] Seq=64 Ack=1 Win=63714 Len=0
	52 10.003462336	142.250.195.78	10.0.2.4	TCP	62 443 - 49146 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=64 Win=32588 Len=0
				TCP	
	53 10.003462710	142.250.195.78	10.0.2.4		62 443 - 49146 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=65 Win=32587 Len=0
	54 10.055156575 55 10.055326226		10.0.2.4	TCP	62 443 - 49146 [FIN, ACK] Seq=1 Ack=65 Win=32587 Len=0
	00 10.000020220	10.0.2.4	142.250.195.78	TUP	56 49146 → 443 [ACK] Seq=65 Ack=2 Win=63714 Len=0



**Task 1.4** 

In the given process, the Host A pings a non-existent IP address and since the attacker is also present on the same network, it is able to sniff the packets. However, the specifications applied are that only the ICMP packets with the source IP of 10.9.0.5 are to be captured. The reply is then spoofed by the attacker based on the information gathered from the sniffed packets. This in turn makes the host machine assume that the replies were sent by the IP it pinged.

