

Instructor's Manual:
Exercise Solutions
for
Artificial Intelligence
A Modern Approach
Second Edition

Stuart J. Russell and Peter Norvig



Upper Saddle River, New Jersey 07458

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Preface

This Instructor's Solution Manual provides solutions (or at least solution sketches) for almost all of the 400 exercises in *Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach (Second Edition)*. We only give actual code for a few of the programming exercises; writing a lot of code would not be that helpful, if only because we don't know what language you prefer.

In many cases, we give ideas for discussion and follow-up questions, and we try to explain *why* we designed each exercise.

There is more supplementary material that we want to offer to the instructor, but we have decided to do it through the medium of the World Wide Web rather than through a CD or printed Instructor's Manual. The idea is that this solution manual contains the material that must be kept secret from students, but the Web site contains material that can be updated and added to in a more timely fashion. The address for the web site is:

`http://aima.cs.berkeley.edu`

and the address for the online Instructor's Guide is:

`http://aima.cs.berkeley.edu/instructors.html`

There you will find:

- Instructions on how to join the **aima-instructors** discussion list. We strongly recommend that you join so that you can receive updates, corrections, notification of new versions of this Solutions Manual, additional exercises and exam questions, etc., in a timely manner.
- Source code for programs from the text. We offer code in Lisp, Python, and Java, and point to code developed by others in C++ and Prolog.
- Programming resources and supplemental texts.
- Figures from the text; for overhead transparencies.
- Terminology from the index of the book.
- Other courses using the book that have home pages on the Web. You can see example syllabi and assignments here. Please *do not* put solution sets for AIMA exercises on public web pages!
- AI Education information on teaching introductory AI courses.
- Other sites on the Web with information on AI. Organized by chapter in the book; check this for supplemental material.

We welcome suggestions for new exercises, new environments and agents, etc. The book belongs to you, the instructor, as much as us. We hope that you enjoy teaching from it, that these supplemental materials help, and that you will share your supplements and experiences with other instructors.

Solutions for Chapter 1

Introduction

1.1

- a. Dictionary definitions of **intelligence** talk about “the capacity to acquire and apply knowledge” or “the faculty of thought and reason” or “the ability to comprehend and profit from experience.” These are all reasonable answers, but if we want something quantifiable we would use something like “the ability to apply knowledge in order to perform better in an environment.”
- b. We define **artificial intelligence** as the study and construction of agent programs that perform well in a given environment, for a given agent architecture.
- c. We define an **agent** as an entity that takes action in response to percepts from an environment.

1.2 See the solution for exercise 26.1 for some discussion of potential objections.

The probability of fooling an interrogator depends on just how unskilled the interrogator is. One entrant in the 2002 Loebner prize competition (which is not quite a real Turing Test) did fool one judge, although if you look at the transcript, it is hard to imagine what that judge was thinking. There certainly have been examples of a chatbot or other online agent fooling humans. For example, see See Lenny Foner’s account of the Julia chatbot at foner.www.media.mit.edu/people/foner/Julia/. We’d say the chance today is something like 10%, with the variation depending more on the skill of the interrogator rather than the program. In 50 years, we expect that the entertainment industry (movies, video games, commercials) will have made sufficient investments in artificial actors to create very credible impersonators.

1.3 The 2002 Loebner prize (www.loebner.net) went to Kevin Copple’s program ELLA. It consists of a prioritized set of pattern/action rules: if it sees a text string matching a certain pattern, it outputs the corresponding response, which may include pieces of the current or past input. It also has a large database of text and has the Wordnet online dictionary. It is therefore using rather rudimentary tools, and is not advancing the theory of AI. It *is* providing evidence on the number and type of rules that are sufficient for producing one type of conversation.

1.4 No. It means that AI systems should avoid trying to solve intractable problems. Usually, this means they can only approximate optimal behavior. Notice that humans don’t solve NP-complete problems either. Sometimes they are good at solving specific instances with a lot of

structure, perhaps with the aid of background knowledge. AI systems should attempt to do the same.

1.5 No. IQ test scores correlate well with certain other measures, such as success in college, but only if they're measuring fairly normal humans. The IQ test doesn't measure everything. A program that is specialized only for IQ tests (and specialized further only for the analogy part) would very likely perform poorly on other measures of intelligence. See *The Mismeasure of Man* by Stephen Jay Gould, Norton, 1981 or *Multiple intelligences: the theory in practice* by Howard Gardner, Basic Books, 1993 for more on IQ tests, what they measure, and what other aspects there are to "intelligence."

1.6 Just as you are unaware of all the steps that go into making your heart beat, you are also unaware of most of what happens in your thoughts. You do have a conscious awareness of some of your thought processes, but the majority remains opaque to your consciousness. The field of psychoanalysis is based on the idea that one needs trained professional help to analyze one's own thoughts.

1.7

- a. (ping-pong) A reasonable level of proficiency was achieved by Andersson's robot (Andersson, 1988).
- b. (driving in Cairo) No. Although there has been a lot of progress in automated driving, all such systems currently rely on certain relatively constant clues: that the road has shoulders and a center line, that the car ahead will travel a predictable course, that cars will keep to their side of the road, and so on. To our knowledge, none are able to avoid obstacles or other cars or to change lanes as appropriate; their skills are mostly confined to staying in one lane at constant speed. Driving in downtown Cairo is too unpredictable for any of these to work.
- c. (shopping at the market) No. No robot can currently put together the tasks of moving in a crowded environment, using vision to identify a wide variety of objects, and grasping the objects (including squishable vegetables) without damaging them. The component pieces are nearly able to handle the individual tasks, but it would take a major integration effort to put it all together.
- d. (shopping on the web) Yes. Software robots are capable of handling such tasks, particularly if the design of the web grocery shopping site does not change radically over time.
- e. (bridge) Yes. Programs such as GIB now play at a solid level.
- f. (theorem proving) Yes. For example, the proof of Robbins algebra described on page 309.
- g. (funny story) No. While some computer-generated prose and poetry is hysterically funny, this is invariably unintentional, except in the case of programs that echo back prose that they have memorized.
- h. (legal advice) Yes, in some cases. AI has a long history of research into applications of automated legal reasoning. Two outstanding examples are the Prolog-based expert

systems used in the UK to guide members of the public in dealing with the intricacies of the social security and nationality laws. The social security system is said to have saved the UK government approximately \$150 million in its first year of operation. However, extension into more complex areas such as contract law awaits a satisfactory encoding of the vast web of common-sense knowledge pertaining to commercial transactions and agreement and business practices.

- i. (translation) Yes. In a limited way, this is already being done. See Kay, Gawron and Norvig (1994) and Wahlster (2000) for an overview of the field of speech translation, and some limitations on the current state of the art.
- j. (surgery) Yes. Robots are increasingly being used for surgery, although always under the command of a doctor.

1.8 Certainly perception and motor skills are important, and it is a good thing that the fields of vision and robotics exist (whether or not you want to consider them part of “core” AI). But given a percept, an agent still has the task of “deciding” (either by deliberation or by reaction) which action to take. This is just as true in the real world as in artificial micro-worlds such as chess-playing. So computing the appropriate action will remain a crucial part of AI, regardless of the perceptual and motor system to which the agent program is “attached.” On the other hand, it is true that a concentration on micro-worlds has led AI away from the really interesting environments (see page 46).

1.9 Evolution tends to perpetuate organisms (and combinations and mutations of organisms) that are successful enough to reproduce. That is, evolution favors organisms that can optimize their performance measure to at least survive to the age of sexual maturity, and then be able to win a mate. Rationality just means optimizing performance measure, so this is in line with evolution.

1.10 Yes, they are rational, because slower, deliberative actions would tend to result in more damage to the hand. If “intelligent” means “applying knowledge” or “using thought and reasoning” then it does not require intelligence to make a reflex action.

1.11 This depends on your definition of “intelligent” and “tell.” In one sense computers only do what the programmers command them to do, but in another sense what the programmers consciously tells the computer to do often has very little to do with what the computer actually does. Anyone who has written a program with an ornery bug knows this, as does anyone who has written a successful machine learning program. So in one sense Samuel “told” the computer “learn to play checkers better than I do, and then play that way,” but in another sense he told the computer “follow this learning algorithm” and it learned to play. So we’re left in the situation where you may or may not consider learning to play checkers to be a sign of intelligence (or you may think that learning to play in the right way requires intelligence, but not in this way), and you may think the intelligence resides in the programmer or in the computer.

1.12 The point of this exercise is to notice the parallel with the previous one. Whatever you decided about whether computers could be intelligent in 1.9, you are committed to making the

same conclusion about animals (including humans), *unless* your reasons for deciding whether something is intelligent take into account the mechanism (programming via genes versus programming via a human programmer). Note that Searle makes this appeal to mechanism in his Chinese Room argument (see Chapter 26).

1.13 Again, the choice you make in 1.11 drives your answer to this question.

Solutions for Chapter 2

Intelligent Agents

MOBILE AGENT

2.1 The following are just some of the many possible definitions that can be written:

- *Agent*: an entity that perceives and acts; or, one that *can be viewed* as perceiving and acting. Essentially any object qualifies; the key point is the way the object implements an agent function. (Note: some authors restrict the term to *programs* that operate *on behalf of* a human, or to programs that can cause some or all of their code to run on other machines on a network, as in **mobile agents**.)
- *Agent function*: a function that specifies the agent's action in response to every possible percept sequence.
- *Agent program*: that program which, combined with a machine architecture, implements an agent function. In our simple designs, the program takes a new percept on each invocation and returns an action.
- *Rationality*: a property of agents that choose actions that maximize their expected utility, given the percepts to date.
- *Autonomy*: a property of agents whose behavior is determined by their own experience rather than solely by their initial programming.
- *Reflex agent*: an agent whose action depends only on the current percept.
- *Model-based agent*: an agent whose action is derived directly from an internal model of the current world state that is updated over time.
- *Goal-based agent*: an agent that selects actions that it believes will achieve explicitly represented goals.
- *Utility-based agent*: an agent that selects actions that it believes will maximize the expected utility of the outcome state.
- *Learning agent*: an agent whose behavior improves over time based on its experience.

2.2 A performance measure is used by an outside observer to evaluate how successful an agent is. It is a function from histories to a real number. A utility function is used by an agent itself to evaluate how desirable states or histories are. In our framework, the utility function may not be the same as the performance measure; furthermore, an agent may have no explicit utility function at all, whereas there is always a performance measure.

2.3 Although these questions are very simple, they hint at some very fundamental issues. Our answers are for the simple agent designs for *static* environments where nothing happens

while the agent is deliberating; the issues get even more interesting for dynamic environments.

- a. Yes; take any agent program and insert null statements that do not affect the output.
- b. Yes; the agent function might specify that the agent print *true* when the percept is a Turing machine program that halts, and *false* otherwise. (Note: in dynamic environments, for machines of less than infinite speed, the rational agent function may not be implementable; e.g., the agent function that always plays a winning move, if any, in a game of chess.)
- c. Yes; the agent's behavior is fixed by the architecture and program.
- d. There are 2^n agent programs, although many of these will not run at all. (Note: Any given program can devote at most n bits to storage, so its internal state can distinguish among only 2^n past histories. Because the agent function specifies actions based on percept histories, there will be many agent functions that cannot be implemented because of lack of memory in the machine.)

2.4 Notice that for our simple environmental assumptions we need not worry about quantitative uncertainty.

- a. It suffices to show that for all possible actual environments (i.e., all dirt distributions and initial locations), this agent cleans the squares at least as fast as any other agent. This is trivially true when there is no dirt. When there is dirt in the initial location and none in the other location, the world is clean after one step; no agent can do better. When there is no dirt in the initial location but dirt in the other, the world is clean after two steps; no agent can do better. When there is dirt in both locations, the world is clean after three steps; no agent can do better. (Note: in general, the condition stated in the first sentence of this answer is much stricter than necessary for an agent to be rational.)
- b. The agent in (a) keeps moving backwards and forwards even after the world is clean. It is better to do *NoOp* once the world is clean (the chapter says this). Now, since the agent's percept doesn't say whether the other square is clean, it would seem that the agent must have some memory to say whether the other square has already been cleaned. To make this argument rigorous is more difficult—for example, could the agent arrange things so that it would only be in a clean left square when the right square was already clean? As a general strategy, an agent *can* use the environment itself as a form of **external memory**—a common technique for humans who use things like appointment calendars and knots in handkerchiefs. In this particular case, however, that is not possible. Consider the reflex actions for $[A, \text{Clean}]$ and $[B, \text{Clean}]$. If either of these is *NoOp*, then the agent will fail in the case where that is the initial percept but the other square is dirty; hence, neither can be *NoOp* and therefore the simple reflex agent is doomed to keep moving. In general, the problem with reflex agents is that they have to do the same thing in situations that look the same, even when the situations are actually quite different. In the vacuum world this is a big liability, because every interior square (except home) looks either like a square with dirt or a square without dirt.

Agent Type	Performance Measure	Environment	Actuators	Sensors
Robot soccer player	Winning game, goals for/against	Field, ball, own team, other team, own body	Devices (e.g., legs) for locomotion and kicking	Camera, touch sensors, accelerometers, orientation sensors, wheel/joint encoders
Internet book-shopping agent	Obtain re-requested/interesting books, minimize expenditure	Internet	Follow link, enter/submit data in fields, display to user	Web pages, user requests
Autonomous Mars rover	Terrain explored and reported, samples gathered and analyzed	Launch vehicle, lander, Mars	Wheels/legs, sample collection device, analysis devices, radio transmitter	Camera, touch sensors, accelerometers, orientation sensors, , wheel/joint encoders, radio receiver
Mathematician's theorem-proving assistant				

Figure S2.1 Agent types and their PEAS descriptions, for Ex. 2.5.

- c. If we consider asymptotically long lifetimes, then it is clear that learning a map (in some form) confers an advantage because it means that the agent can avoid bumping into walls. It can also learn where dirt is most likely to accumulate and can devise an optimal inspection strategy. The precise details of the exploration method needed to construct a complete map appear in Chapter 4; methods for deriving an optimal inspection/cleanup strategy are in Chapter 21.

2.5 Some representative, but not exhaustive, answers are given in Figure S2.1.

2.6 Environment properties are given in Figure S2.2. Suitable agent types:

- a. A model-based reflex agent would suffice for most aspects; for tactical play, a utility-based agent with lookahead would be useful.
- b. A goal-based agent would be appropriate for specific book requests. For more open-ended tasks—e.g., “Find me something interesting to read”—tradeoffs are involved and the agent must compare utilities for various possible purchases.

Task Environment	Observable	Deterministic	Episodic	Static	Discrete	Agents
Robot soccer	Partially	Stochastic	Sequential	Dynamic	Continuous	Multi
Internet book-shopping	Partially	Deterministic*	Sequential	Static*	Discrete	Single
Autonomous Mars rover	Partially	Stochastic	Sequential	Dynamic	Continuous	Single
Mathematician's assistant	Fully	Deterministic	Sequential	Semi	Discrete	Multi

Figure S2.2 Environment properties for Ex. 2.6.

- c. A model-based reflex agent would suffice for low-level navigation and obstacle avoidance; for route planning, exploration planning, experimentation, etc., some combination of goal-based and utility-based agents would be needed.
- d. For specific proof tasks, a goal-based agent is needed. For “exploratory” tasks—e.g., “Prove some useful lemmata concerning operations on strings”—a utility-based architecture might be needed.

2.7 The file “agents/environments/vacuum.lisp” in the code repository implements the vacuum-cleaner environment. Students can easily extend it to generate different shaped rooms, obstacles, and so on.

2.8 A reflex agent program implementing the rational agent function described in the chapter is as follows:


```
(defun reflex-rational-vacuum-agent (percept)
  (destructuring-bind (location status) percept
    (cond ((eq status 'Dirty) 'Suck)
          ((eq location 'A) 'Right)
          (t 'Left)))))
```

For states 1, 3, 5, 7 in Figure 3.20, the performance measures are 1996, 1999, 1998, 2000 respectively.

2.9 Exercises 2.4, 2.9, and 2.10 may be merged in future printings.

- a. No; see answer to 2.4(b).
- b. See answer to 2.4(b).
- c. In this case, a simple reflex agent can be perfectly rational. The agent can consist of a table with eight entries, indexed by percept, that specifies an action to take for each possible state. After the agent acts, the world is updated and the next percept will tell the agent what to do next. For larger environments, constructing a table is infeasible. Instead, the agent could run one of the optimal search algorithms in Chapters 3 and 4 and execute the first step of the solution sequence. Again, no internal state is *required*, but it would help to be able to store the solution sequence instead of recomputing it for each new percept.

2.10



- a. Because the agent does not know the geography and perceives only location and local dirt, and cannot remember what just happened, it will get stuck forever against a wall when it tries to move in a direction that is blocked—that is, unless it randomizes.
- b. One possible design cleans up dirt and otherwise moves randomly:

```
(defun randomized-reflex-vacuum-agent (percept)
  (destructuring-bind (location status) percept
    (cond ((eq status 'Dirty) 'Suck)
          (t (random-element '(Left Right Up Down))))))
```

This is fairly close to what the RoombaTM vacuum cleaner does (although the Roomba has a bump sensor and randomizes only when it hits an obstacle). It works reasonably well in nice, compact environments. In maze-like environments or environments with small connecting passages, it can take a very long time to cover all the squares.

- c. An example is shown in Figure S2.3. Students may also wish to measure clean-up time for linear or square environments of different sizes, and compare those to the efficient online search algorithms described in Chapter 4.
- d. A reflex agent with state can build a map (see Chapter 4 for details). An online depth-first exploration will reach every state in time linear in the size of the environment; therefore, the agent can do much better than the simple reflex agent.

The question of rational behavior in unknown environments is a complex one but it is worth encouraging students to think about it. We need to have some notion of the prior

probability distribution over the class of environments; call this the initial **belief state**. Any action yields a new percept that can be used to update this distribution, moving the agent to a new belief state. Once the environment is completely explored, the belief state collapses to a single possible environment. Therefore, the problem of optimal exploration can be viewed as a search for an optimal strategy in the space of possible belief states. This is a well-defined, if horrendously intractable, problem. Chapter 21 discusses some cases where optimal exploration is possible. Another concrete example of exploration is the Minesweeper computer game (see Exercise 7.11). For very small Minesweeper environments, optimal exploration is feasible although the belief state update is nontrivial to explain.

2.11 The problem appears at first to be very similar; the main difference is that instead of using the location percept to build the map, the agent has to “invent” its own locations (which, after all, are just nodes in a data structure representing the state space graph). When a bump is detected, the agent assumes it remains in the same location and can add a wall to its map. For grid environments, the agent can keep track of its (x, y) location and so can tell when it has returned to an old state. In the general case, however, there is no simple way to tell if a state is new or old.

2.12

- a. For a reflex agent, this presents no *additional* challenge, because the agent will continue to *Suck* as long as the current location remains dirty. For an agent that constructs a sequential plan, every *Suck* action would need to be replaced by “*Suck* until clean.” If the dirt sensor can be wrong on each step, then the agent might want to wait for a few steps to get a more reliable measurement before deciding whether to *Suck* or move on to a new square. Obviously, there is a trade-off because waiting too long means that dirt remains on the floor (incurring a penalty), but acting immediately risks either dirtying a clean square or ignoring a dirty square (if the sensor is wrong). A rational agent must also continue touring and checking the squares in case it missed one on a previous tour (because of bad sensor readings). It is not immediately obvious how the waiting time at each square should change with each new tour. These issues can be clarified by experimentation, which may suggest a general trend that can be verified mathematically. This problem is a partially observable Markov decision process—see Chapter 17. Such problems are hard in general, but some special cases may yield to careful analysis.
- b. In this case, the agent must keep touring the squares indefinitely. The probability that a square is dirty increases monotonically with the time since it was last cleaned, so the rational strategy is, roughly speaking, to repeatedly execute the shortest possible tour of all squares. (We say “roughly speaking” because there are complications caused by the fact that the shortest tour may visit some squares twice, depending on the geography.) This problem is also a partially observable Markov decision process.

Solutions for Chapter 3

Solving Problems by Searching

3.1 A **state** is a situation that an agent can find itself in. We distinguish two types of states: world states (the actual concrete situations in the real world) and representational states (the abstract descriptions of the real world that are used by the agent in deliberating about what to do).

A **state space** is a graph whose nodes are the set of all states, and whose links are actions that transform one state into another.

A **search tree** is a tree (a graph with no undirected loops) in which the root node is the start state and the set of children for each node consists of the states reachable by taking any action.

A **search node** is a node in the search tree.

A **goal** is a state that the agent is trying to reach.

An **action** is something that the agent can choose to do.

A **successor function** described the agent's options: given a state, it returns a set of (action, state) pairs, where each state is the state reachable by taking the action.

The **branching factor** in a search tree is the number of actions available to the agent.

3.2 In goal formulation, we decide which aspects of the world we are interested in, and which can be ignored or abstracted away. Then in problem formulation we decide how to manipulate the important aspects (and ignore the others). If we did problem formulation first we would not know what to include and what to leave out. That said, it can happen that there is a cycle of iterations between goal formulation, problem formulation, and problem solving until one arrives at a sufficiently useful and efficient solution.

3.3 In Python we have:

```
#### successor_fn defined in terms of result and legal_actions
def successor_fn(s):
    return [(a, result(a, s)) for a in legal_actions(s)]

#### legal_actions and result defined in terms of successor_fn
def legal_actions(s):
    return [a for (a, s) in successor_fn(s)]

def result(a, s):
```

```

for (a1, s1) in successor_fn(s):
    if a == a1:
        return s1

```

3.4 From <http://www.cut-the-knot.com/pythagoras/fifteen.shtml>, this proof applies to the fifteen puzzle, but the same argument works for the eight puzzle:

Definition: The goal state has the numbers in a certain order, which we will measure as starting at the upper left corner, then proceeding left to right, and when we reach the end of a row, going down to the leftmost square in the row below. For any other configuration besides the goal, whenever a tile with a greater number on it precedes a tile with a smaller number, the two tiles are said to be **inverted**.

Proposition: For a given puzzle configuration, let N denote the sum of the total number of inversions and the row number of the empty square. Then $(N \bmod 2)$ is invariant under any legal move. In other words, after a legal move an odd N remains odd whereas an even N remains even. Therefore the goal state in Figure 3.4, with no inversions and empty square in the first row, has $N = 1$, and can only be reached from starting states with odd N , not from starting states with even N .

Proof: First of all, sliding a tile horizontally changes neither the total number of inversions nor the row number of the empty square. Therefore let us consider sliding a tile vertically.

Let's assume, for example, that the tile A is located directly over the empty square. Sliding it down changes the parity of the row number of the empty square. Now consider the total number of inversions. The move only affects relative positions of tiles A , B , C , and D . If none of the B , C , D caused an inversion relative to A (i.e., all three are larger than A) then after sliding one gets three (an odd number) of additional inversions. If one of the three is smaller than A , then before the move B , C , and D contributed a single inversion (relative to A) whereas after the move they'll be contributing two inversions - a change of 1, also an odd number. Two additional cases obviously lead to the same result. Thus the change in the sum N is always even. This is precisely what we have set out to show.


So before we solve a puzzle, we should compute the N value of the start and goal state and make sure they have the same parity, otherwise no solution is possible.

3.5 The formulation puts one queen per column, with a new queen placed only in a square that is not attacked by any other queen. To simplify matters, we'll first consider the n -rooks problem. The first rook can be placed in any square in column 1, the second in any square in column 2 except the same row that as the rook in column 1, and in general there will be $n!$ elements of the search space.

3.6 No, a finite state space does not always lead to a finite search tree. Consider a state space with two states, both of which have actions that lead to the other. This yields an infinite search tree, because we can go back and forth any number of times. However, if the state space is a finite tree, or in general, a finite DAG (directed acyclic graph), then there can be no loops, and the search tree is finite.

3.7

- a. Initial state: No regions colored.
 Goal test: All regions colored, and no two adjacent regions have the same color.
 Successor function: Assign a color to a region.
 Cost function: Number of assignments.
- b. Initial state: As described in the text.
 Goal test: Monkey has bananas.
 Successor function: Hop on crate; Hop off crate; Push crate from one spot to another; Walk from one spot to another; grab bananas (if standing on crate).
 Cost function: Number of actions.
- c. Initial state: considering all input records.
 Goal test: considering a single record, and it gives “illegal input” message.
 Successor function: run again on the first half of the records; run again on the second half of the records.
 Cost function: Number of runs.
 Note: This is a **contingency problem**; you need to see whether a run gives an error message or not to decide what to do next.
- d. Initial state: jugs have values $[0, 0, 0]$.
 Successor function: given values $[x, y, z]$, generate $[12, y, z]$, $[x, 8, z]$, $[x, y, 3]$ (by filling); $[0, y, z]$, $[x, 0, z]$, $[x, y, 0]$ (by emptying); or for any two jugs with current values x and y , pour y into x ; this changes the jug with x to the minimum of $x + y$ and the capacity of the jug, and decrements the jug with y by the amount gained by the first jug.
 Cost function: Number of actions.



3.8

- a. See Figure S3.1.
- b. Breadth-first: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
 Depth-limited: 1 2 4 8 9 5 10 11
 Iterative deepening: 1; 1 2 3; 1 2 4 5 3 6 7; 1 2 4 8 9 5 10 11

- c. Bidirectional search is very useful, because the only successor of n in the reverse direction is $\lfloor (n/2) \rfloor$. This helps focus the search.
- d. 2 in the forward direction; 1 in the reverse direction.
- e. Yes; start at the goal, and apply the single reverse successor action until you reach 1.

3.9

- a. Here is one possible representation: A state is a six-tuple of integers listing the number of missionaries, cannibals, and boats on the first side, and then the second side of the river. The goal is a state with 3 missionaries and 3 cannibals on the second side. The cost function is one per action, and the successors of a state are all the states that move 1 or 2 people and 1 boat from one side to another.
- b. The search space is small, so any optimal algorithm works. For an example, see the file "search/domains/cannibals.lisp". It suffices to eliminate moves that circle back to the state just visited. From all but the first and last states, there is only one other choice.
- c. It is not obvious that almost all moves are either illegal or revert to the previous state. There is a feeling of a large branching factor, and no clear way to proceed.

3.10 For the 8 puzzle, there shouldn't be much difference in performance. Indeed, the file "search/domains/puzzle8.lisp" shows that you can represent an 8 puzzle state as a single 32-bit integer, so the question of modifying or copying data is moot. But for the $n \times n$ puzzle, as n increases, the advantage of modifying rather than copying grows. The disadvantage of a modifying successor function is that it only works with depth-first search (or with a variant such as iterative deepening).

3.11 a. The algorithm expands nodes in order of increasing path cost; therefore the first goal it encounters will be the goal with the cheapest cost.

b. It will be the same as iterative deepening, d iterations, in which $O(b^d)$ nodes are generated.

c. d/ϵ

d. Implementation not shown.

3.12 If there are two paths from the start node to a given node, discarding the more expensive one cannot eliminate any optimal solution. Uniform-cost search and breadth-first search with constant step costs both expand paths in order of g -cost. Therefore, if the current node has been expanded previously, the current path to it must be more expensive than the previously found path and it is correct to discard it.

For IDS, it is easy to find an example with varying step costs where the algorithm returns a suboptimal solution: simply have two paths to the goal, one with one step costing 3 and the other with two steps costing 1 each.

3.13 Consider a domain in which every state has a single successor, and there is a single goal at depth n . Then depth-first search will find the goal in n steps, whereas iterative deepening search will take $1 + 2 + 3 + \dots + n = O(n^2)$ steps.

3.14 As an ordinary person (or agent) browsing the web, we can only generate the successors of a page by visiting it. We can then do breadth-first search, or perhaps best-search search where the heuristic is some function of the number of words in common between the start and goal pages; this may help keep the links on target. Search engines keep the complete graph of the web, and may provide the user access to all (or at least some) of the pages that link to a page; this would allow us to do bidirectional search.

3.15


- a. If we consider all (x, y) points, then there are an infinite number of states, and of paths.
- b. (For this problem, we consider the start and goal points to be vertices.) The shortest distance between two points is a straight line, and if it is not possible to travel in a straight line because some obstacle is in the way, then the next shortest distance is a sequence of line segments, end-to-end, that deviate from the straight line by as little as possible. So the first segment of this sequence must go from the start point to a tangent point on an obstacle – any path that gave the obstacle a wider girth would be longer. Because the obstacles are polygonal, the tangent points must be at vertices of the obstacles, and hence the entire path must go from vertex to vertex. So now the state space is the set of vertices, of which there are 35 in Figure 3.22.
- c. Code not shown.
- d. Implementations and analysis not shown.

3.16 Code not shown.

3.17

- a. Any path, no matter how bad it appears, might lead to an arbitrarily large reward (negative cost). Therefore, one would need to exhaust all possible paths to be sure of finding the best one.
- b. Suppose the greatest possible reward is c . Then if we also know the maximum depth of the state space (e.g. when the state space is a tree), then any path with d levels remaining can be improved by at most cd , so any paths worse than cd less than the best path can be pruned. For state spaces with loops, this guarantee doesn't help, because it is possible to go around a loop any number of times, picking up c reward each time.
- c. The agent should plan to go around this loop forever (unless it can find another loop with even better reward).
- d. The value of a scenic loop is lessened each time one revisits it; a novel scenic sight is a great reward, but seeing the same one for the tenth time in an hour is tedious, not rewarding. To accommodate this, we would have to expand the state space to include a memory—a state is now represented not just by the current location, but by a current location and a bag of already-visited locations. The reward for visiting a new location is now a (diminishing) function of the number of times it has been seen before.
- e. Real domains with looping behavior include eating junk food and going to class.

3.18 The belief state space is shown in Figure S3.2. No solution is possible because no path leads to a belief state all of whose elements satisfy the goal. If the problem is fully observable,



the agent reaches a goal state by executing a sequence such that *Suck* is performed only in a dirty square. This ensures deterministic behavior and every state is obviously solvable.

3.19 Code not shown, but a good start is in the code repository. Clearly, graph search must be used—this is a classic grid world with many alternate paths to each state. Students will quickly find that computing the optimal solution sequence is prohibitively expensive for moderately large worlds, because the state space for an $n \times n$ world has $n^2 \cdot 2^n$ states. The completion time of the random agent grows less than exponentially in n , so for any reasonable exchange rate between search cost and path cost the random agent will eventually win.

Solutions for Chapter 4

Informed Search and Exploration

4.1 The sequence of queues is as follows:

L[0+244=244]
M[70+241=311], T[111+329=440]
L[140+244=384], D[145+242=387], T[111+329=440]
D[145+242=387], T[111+329=440], M[210+241=451], T[251+329=580]
C[265+160=425], T[111+329=440], M[210+241=451], M[220+241=461], T[251+329=580]
T[111+329=440], M[210+241=451], M[220+241=461], P[403+100=503], T[251+329=580], R[411+193=604],
D[385+242=627]
M[210+241=451], M[220+241=461], L[222+244=466], P[403+100=503], T[251+329=580], A[229+366=595],
R[411+193=604], D[385+242=627]
M[220+241=461], L[222+244=466], P[403+100=503], L[280+244=524], D[285+242=527], T[251+329=580],
A[229+366=595], R[411+193=604], D[385+242=627]
L[222+244=466], P[403+100=503], L[280+244=524], D[285+242=527], L[290+244=534], D[295+242=537],
T[251+329=580], A[229+366=595], R[411+193=604], D[385+242=627]
P[403+100=503], L[280+244=524], D[285+242=527], M[292+241=533], L[290+244=534], D[295+242=537],
T[251+329=580], A[229+366=595], R[411+193=604], D[385+242=627], T[333+329=662]
B[504+0=504], L[280+244=524], D[285+242=527], M[292+241=533], L[290+244=534], D[295+242=537], T[251+329=580],
A[229+366=595], R[411+193=604], D[385+242=627], T[333+329=662], R[500+193=693], C[541+160=701]

4.2 $w = 0$ gives $f(n) = 2g(n)$. This behaves exactly like uniform-cost search—the factor of two makes no difference in the *ordering* of the nodes. $w = 1$ gives A* search. $w = 2$ gives $f(n) = 2h(n)$, i.e., greedy best-first search. We also have

$$f(n) = (2 - w)[g(n) + \frac{w}{2 - w}h(n)]$$


which behaves exactly like A* search with a heuristic $\frac{w}{2-w}h(n)$. For $w \leq 1$, this is always less than $h(n)$ and hence admissible, provided $h(n)$ is itself admissible.

4.3

- a. When all step costs are equal, $g(n) \propto \text{depth}(n)$, so uniform-cost search reproduces breadth-first search.
- b. Breadth-first search is best-first search with $f(n) = \text{depth}(n)$; depth-first search is best-first search with $f(n) = -\text{depth}(n)$; uniform-cost search is best-first search with

$$f(n) = g(n).$$

c. Uniform-cost search is A^* search with $h(n) = 0$.



4.4 See Figure S4.1.

4.5 Going between Rimnicu Vilcea and Lugoj is one example. The shortest path is the southern one, through Mehadia, Dobreta and Craiova. But a greedy search using the straight-line heuristic starting in Rimnicu Vilcea will start the wrong way, heading to Sibiu. Starting at Lugoj, the heuristic will correctly lead us to Mehadia, but then a greedy search will return to Lugoj, and oscillate forever between these two cities.

4.6 The heuristic $h = h_1 + h_2$ (adding misplaced tiles and Manhattan distance) sometimes overestimates. Now, suppose $h(n) \leq h^*(n) + c$ (as given) and let G_2 be a goal that is suboptimal by more than c , i.e., $g(G_2) > C^* + c$. Now consider any node n on a path to an optimal goal. We have

$$\begin{aligned} f(n) &= g(n) + h(n) \\ &\leq g(n) + h^*(n) + c \\ &\leq C^* + c \\ &\leq g(G_2) \end{aligned}$$

so G_2 will never be expanded before an optimal goal is expanded.

4.7 A heuristic is consistent iff, for every node n and every successor n' of n generated by any action a ,

$$h(n) \leq c(n, a, n') + h(n')$$

One simple proof is by induction on the number k of nodes on the shortest path to any goal from n . For $k = 1$, let n' be the goal node; then $h(n) \leq c(n, a, n')$. For the inductive case, assume n' is on the shortest path k steps from the goal and that $h(n')$ is admissible by hypothesis; then

$$h(n) \leq c(n, a, n') + h(n') \leq c(n, a, n') + h^*(n') = h^*(n)$$

so $h(n)$ at $k + 1$ steps from the goal is also admissible.

4.8 This exercise reiterates a small portion of the classic work of Held and Karp (1970).

- a. The TSP problem is to find a minimal (total length) path through the cities that forms a closed loop. MST is a relaxed version of that because it asks for a minimal (total length) graph that need not be a closed loop—it can be any fully-connected graph. As a heuristic, MST is admissible—it is always shorter than or equal to a closed loop.
- b. The straight-line distance back to the start city is a rather weak heuristic—it vastly underestimates when there are many cities. In the later stage of a search when there are only a few cities left it is not so bad. To say that MST dominates straight-line distance is to say that MST always gives a higher value. This is obviously true because a MST that includes the goal node and the current node must either be the straight line between them, or it must include two or more lines that add up to more. (This all assumes the triangle inequality.)
- c. See "search/domains/tsp.lisp" for a start at this. The file includes a heuristic based on connecting each unvisited city to its nearest neighbor, a close relative to the MST approach.
- d. See (Cormen *et al.*, 1990, p.505) for an algorithm that runs in $O(E \log E)$ time, where E is the number of edges. The code repository currently contains a somewhat less efficient algorithm.

4.9 The misplaced-tiles heuristic is exact for the problem where a tile can move from square A to square B. As this is a relaxation of the condition that a tile can move from square A to square B if B is blank, Gaschnig's heuristic cannot be less than the misplaced-tiles heuristic. As it is also admissible (being exact for a relaxation of the original problem), Gaschnig's heuristic is therefore more accurate.

If we permute two adjacent tiles in the goal state, we have a state where misplaced-tiles and Manhattan both return 2, but Gaschnig's heuristic returns 3.

To compute Gaschnig's heuristic, repeat the following until the goal state is reached: let B be the current location of the blank; if B is occupied by tile X (not the blank) in the goal state, move X to B; otherwise, move any misplaced tile to B. Students could be asked to prove that this is the optimal solution to the relaxed problem.

4.11

- a. Local beam search with $k = 1$ is hill-climbing search.
- b. Local beam search with $k = \infty$: strictly speaking, this doesn't make sense. (Exercise may be modified in future printings.) The idea is that if every successor is retained (because k is unbounded), then the search resembles breadth-first search in that it adds one complete layer of nodes before adding the next layer. Starting from one state, the algorithm would be essentially identical to breadth-first search except that each layer is generated all at once.
- c. Simulated annealing with $T = 0$ at all times: ignoring the fact that the termination step would be triggered immediately, the search would be identical to first-choice hill climb-

ing because every downward successor would be rejected with probability 1. (Exercise may be modified in future printings.)

- d. Genetic algorithm with population size $N = 1$: if the population size is 1, then the two selected parents will be the same individual; crossover yields an exact copy of the individual; then there is a small chance of mutation. Thus, the algorithm executes a random walk in the space of individuals.

4.12 If we assume the comparison function is transitive, then we can always sort the nodes using it, and choose the node that is at the top of the sort. Efficient priority queue data structures rely only on comparison operations, so we lose nothing in efficiency—except for the fact that the comparison operation on states may be much more expensive than comparing two numbers, each of which can be computed just once.


A^* relies on the division of the total cost estimate $f(n)$ into the cost-so-far and the cost-to-go. If we have comparison operators for each of these, then we can prefer to expand a node that is better than other nodes on both comparisons. Unfortunately, there will usually be no such node. The tradeoff between $g(n)$ and $h(n)$ cannot be realized without numerical values.

4.13 The space complexity of LRTA* is dominated by the space required for $result[a, s]$, i.e., the product of the number of states visited (n) and the number of actions tried per state (m). The time complexity is at least $O(nm^2)$ for a naive implementation because for each action taken we compute an H value, which requires minimizing over actions. A simple optimization can reduce this to $O(nm)$. This expression assumes that each state–action pair is tried at most once, whereas in fact such pairs may be tried many times, as the example in Figure 4.22 shows.

4.14 This question is slightly ambiguous as to what the percept is—either the percept is just the location, or it gives exactly the set of unblocked directions (i.e., blocked directions are illegal actions). We will assume the latter. (Exercise may be modified in future printings.) There are 12 possible locations for internal walls, so there are $2^{12} = 4096$ possible environment configurations. A belief state designates a *subset* of these as possible configurations; for example, before seeing any percepts all 4096 configurations are possible—this is a single belief state.

- a. We can view this as a contingency problem in belief state space. The initial belief state is the set of all 4096 configurations. The total belief state space contains 2^{4096} belief states (one for each possible subset of configurations, but most of these are not reachable. After each action and percept, the agent learns whether or not an internal wall exists between the current square and each neighboring square. Hence, each reachable belief state can be represented exactly by a list of status values (present, absent, unknown) for each wall separately. That is, the belief state is completely decomposable and there are exactly 3^{12} reachable belief states. The maximum number of possible wall-percepts in each state is 16 (2^4), so each belief state has four actions, each with up to 16 nondeterministic successors.

- b. Assuming the external walls are known, there are two internal walls and hence $2^2 = 4$ possible percepts.
- c. The initial null action leads to four possible belief states, as shown in Figure S4.2. From each belief state, the agent chooses a single action which can lead to up to 8 belief states (on entering the middle square). Given the possibility of having to retrace its steps at a dead end, the agent can explore the entire maze in no more than 18 steps, so the complete plan (expressed as a tree) has no more than 8^{18} nodes. On the other hand, there are just 3^{12} , so the plan could be expressed more concisely as a table of actions indexed by belief state (a **policy** in the terminology of Chapter 17).




4.15 Here is one simple hill-climbing algorithm:

- Connect all the cities into an arbitrary path.
- Pick two points along the path at random.
- Split the path at those points, producing three pieces.
- Try all six possible ways to connect the three pieces.
- Keep the best one, and reconnect the path accordingly.
- Iterate the steps above until no improvement is observed for a while.

4.1 4.16 Code not shown.

4.17 Hillclimbing is surprisingly effective at finding reasonable if not optimal paths for very little computational cost, and seldom fails in two dimensions.

- a. It is possible (see Figure S4.3(a)) but very unlikely—the obstacle has to have an unusual shape and be positioned correctly with respect to the goal.
- b. With convex obstacles, getting stuck is much more likely to be a problem (see Figure S4.3(b)).
- c. Notice that this is just depth-limited search, where you choose a step along the best path even if it is not a solution.
- d. Set k to the maximum number of sides of any polygon and you can always escape.



4.18 The student should find that on the 8-puzzle, RBFS expands more nodes (because it does not detect repeated states) but has lower cost per node because it does not need to maintain a queue. The number of RBFS node re-expansions is not too high because the presence of many tied values means that the best path changes seldom. When the heuristic is slightly perturbed, this advantage disappears and RBFS's performance is much worse.

For TSP, the state space is a tree, so repeated states are not an issue. On the other hand, the heuristic is real-valued and there are essentially no tied values, so RBFS incurs a heavy penalty for frequent re-expansions.

Solutions for Chapter 5

Constraint Satisfaction Problems

5.1 A **constraint satisfaction problem** is a problem in which the goal is to choose a value for each of a set of variables, in such a way that the values all obey a set of constraints.

A **constraint** is a restriction on the possible values of two or more variables. For example, a constraint might say that $A = a$ is not allowed in conjunction with $B = b$.

Backtracking search is a form depth-first search in which there is a single representation of the state that gets updated for each successor, and then must be restored when a dead end is reached.

A directed arc from variable A to variable B in a CSP is **arc consistent** if, for every value in the current domain of A , there is some consistent value of B .

Backjumping is a way of making backtracking search more efficient, by jumping back more than one level when a dead end is reached.

Min-conflicts is a heuristic for use with local search on CSP problems. The heuristic says that, when given a variable to modify, choose the value that conflicts with the fewest number of other variables.

5.2 There are 18 solutions for coloring Australia with three colors. Start with SA, which can have any of three colors. Then moving clockwise, WA can have either of the other two colors, and everything else is strictly determined; that makes 6 possibilities for the mainland, times 3 for Tasmania yields 18.

5.3 The most constrained variable makes sense because it chooses a variable that is (all other things being equal) likely to cause a failure, and it is more efficient to fail as early as possible (thereby pruning large parts of the search space). The least constraining value heuristic makes sense because it allows the most chances for future assignments to avoid conflict.

5.4 a. Crossword puzzle construction can be solved many ways. One simple choice is depth-first search. Each successor fills in a word in the puzzle with one of the words in the dictionary. It is better to go one word at a time, to minimize the number of steps.

b. As a CSP, there are even more choices. You could have a variable for each box in the crossword puzzle; in this case the value of each variable is a letter, and the constraints are that the letters must make words. This approach is feasible with a most-constraining value heuristic. Alternately, we could have each string of consecutive horizontal or vertical boxes be a single variable, and the domain of the variables be words in the dictionary of the right

length. The constraints would say that two intersecting words must have the same letter in the intersecting box. Solving a problem in this formulation requires fewer steps, but the domains are larger (assuming a big dictionary) and there are fewer constraints. Both formulations are feasible.

5.5 a. For rectilinear floor-planning, one possibility is to have a variable for each of the small rectangles, with the value of each variable being a 4-tuple consisting of the x and y coordinates of the upper left and lower right corners of the place where the rectangle will be located. The domain of each variable is the set of 4-tuples that are the right size for the corresponding small rectangle and that fit within the large rectangle. Constraints say that no two rectangles can overlap; for example if the value of variable R_1 is $[0, 0, 5, 8]$, then no other variable can take on a value that overlaps with the 0, 0 to 5, 8 rectangle.

b. For class scheduling, one possibility is to have three variables for each class, one with times for values (e.g. MWF8:00, TuTh8:00, MWF9:00, ...), one with classrooms for values (e.g. Wheeler110, Evans330, ...) and one with instructors for values (e.g. Abelson, Bibel, Canny, ...). Constraints say that only one class can be in the same classroom at the same time, and an instructor can only teach one class at a time. There may be other constraints as well (e.g. an instructor should not have two consecutive classes).

5.6 The exact steps depend on certain choices you are free to make; here are the ones I made:

- a. Choose the X_3 variable. Its domain is $\{0, 1\}$.
- b. Choose the value 1 for X_3 . (We can't choose 0; it wouldn't survive forward checking, because it would force F to be 0, and the leading digit of the sum must be non-zero.)
- c. Choose F , because it has only one remaining value.
- d. Choose the value 1 for F .
- e. Now X_2 and X_1 are tied for minimum remaining values at 2; let's choose X_2 .
- f. Either value survives forward checking, let's choose 0 for X_2 .
- g. Now X_1 has the minimum remaining values.
- h. Again, arbitrarily choose 0 for the value of X_1 .
- i. The variable O must be an even number (because it is the sum of $T + T$ less than 5 (because $O + O = R + 10 \times 0$). That makes it most constrained.
- j. Arbitrarily choose 4 as the value of O .
- k. R now has only 1 remaining value.
- l. Choose the value 8 for R .
- m. T now has only 1 remaining value.
- n. Choose the value 7 for T .
- o. U must be an even number less than 9; choose U .
- p. The only value for U that survives forward checking is 6.
- q. The only variable left is W .
- r. The only value left for W is 3.

- s. This is a solution.

This is a rather easy (under-constrained) puzzle, so it is not surprising that we arrive at a solution with no backtracking (given that we are allowed to use forward checking).

5.7 There are implementations of CSP algorithms in the Java, Lisp, and Python sections of the online code repository; these should help students get started. However, students will have to add code to keep statistics on the experiments, and perhaps will want to have some mechanism for making an experiment return failure if it exceeds a certain time limit (or number-of-steps limit). The amount of code that needs to be written is small; the exercise is more about running and analyzing an experiment.

5.8 We'll trace through each iteration of the **while** loop in AC-3 (for one possible ordering of the arcs):

- a. Remove $SA - WA$, delete R from SA .
- b. Remove $SA - V$, delete B from SA , leaving only G .
- c. Remove $NT - WA$, delete R from NT .
- d. Remove $NT - SA$, delete G from NT , leaving only B .
- e. Remove $NSW - SA$, delete G from NSW .
- f. Remove $NSW - V$, delete B from NSW , leaving only R .
- g. Remove $Q - NT$, delete B from Q .
- h. Remove $Q - SA$, delete G from Q .
- i. remove $Q - NSW$, delete R from Q , leaving no domain for Q .

5.9 On a tree-structured graph, no arc will be considered more than once, so the AC-3 algorithm is $O(ED)$, where E is the number of edges and D is the size of the largest domain.

5.10 The basic idea is to preprocess the constraints so that, for each value of X_i , we keep track of those variables X_k for which an arc from X_k to X_i is satisfied by that particular value of X_i . This data structure can be computed in time proportional to the size of the problem representation. Then, when a value of X_i is deleted, we reduce by 1 the count of allowable values for each (X_k, X_i) arc recorded under that value. This is very similar to the forward chaining algorithm in Chapter 7. See ? (?) for detailed proofs.

5.11 The problem statement sets out the solution fairly completely. To express the ternary constraint on A , B and C that $A + B = C$, we first introduce a new variable, AB . If the domain of A and B is the set of numbers N , then the domain of AB is the set of pairs of numbers from N , i.e. $N \times N$. Now there are three binary constraints, one between A and AB saying that the value of A must be equal to the first element of the pair-value of AB ; one between B and AB saying that the value of B must equal the second element of the value of AB ; and finally one that says that the sum of the pair of numbers that is the value of AB must equal the value of C . All other ternary constraints can be handled similarly.

Now that we can reduce a ternary constraint into binary constraints, we can reduce a 4-ary constraint on variables A, B, C, D by first reducing A, B, C to binary constraints as

shown above, then adding back D in a ternary constraint with AB and C , and then reducing this ternary constraint to binary by introducing CD .

By induction, we can reduce any n -ary constraint to an $(n - 1)$ -ary constraint. We can stop at binary, because any unary constraint can be dropped, simply by moving the effects of the constraint into the domain of the variable.

5.12 A simple algorithm for finding a cutset of no more than k nodes is to enumerate all subsets of nodes of size $1, 2, \dots, k$, and for each subset check whether the remaining nodes form a tree. This algorithm takes time $\sum_{n^k}^k$, which is $O(n^k)$.

Becker and Geiger (1994; <http://citeseer.nj.nec.com/becker94approximation.html>) give an algorithm called MGA (modified greedy algorithm) that finds a cutset that is no more than twice the size of the minimal cutset, using time $O(E + V \log(V))$, where E is the number of edges and V is the number of variables.

Whether this makes the cycle cutset approach practical depends more on the graph involved than on the algorithm for finding a cutset. That is because, for a cutset of size c , we still have an exponential (d^c) factor before we can solve the CSP. So any graph with a large cutset will be intractable to solve, even if we could find the cutset with no effort at all.

5.13 The “Zebra Puzzle” can be represented as a CSP by introducing a variable for each color, pet, drink, country and cigaret brand (a total of 25 variables). The value of each variable is a number from 1 to 5 indicating the house number. This is a good representation because it is easy to represent all the constraints given in the problem definition this way. (We have done so in the Python implementation of the code, and at some point we may reimplement this in the other languages.) Besides ease of expressing a problem, the other reason to choose a representation is the efficiency of finding a solution. Here we have mixed results—on some runs, min-conflicts local search finds a solution for this problem in seconds, while on other runs it fails to find a solution after minutes.

Another representation is to have five variables for each house, one with the domain of colors, one with pets, and so on.

Solutions for Chapter 6

Adversarial Search

6.1 Figure S6.1 shows the game tree, with the evaluation function values below the terminal nodes and the backed-up values to the right of the non-terminal nodes. The values imply that the best starting move for X is to take the center. The terminal nodes with a bold outline are the ones that do not need to be evaluated, assuming the optimal ordering.






Figure S6.1 Part of the game tree for tic-tac-toe, for Exercise 6.1.

6.2 Consider a MIN node whose children are terminal nodes. If MIN plays suboptimally, then the value of the node is greater than or equal to the value it would have if MIN played optimally. Hence, the value of the MAX node that is the MIN node's parent can only be increased. This argument can be extended by a simple induction all the way to the root. *If the suboptimal play by MIN is predictable*, then one can do better than a minimax strategy. For example, if MIN always falls for a certain kind of trap and loses, then setting the trap guarantees a win even if there is actually a devastating response for MIN. This is shown in Figure S6.2.

6.3

- a. (5) The game tree, complete with annotations of all minimax values, is shown in Figure S6.3.
- b. (5) The “?” values are handled by assuming that an agent with a choice between winning the game and entering a “?” state will always choose the win. That is, $\min(-1, ?)$ is -1 and $\max(+1, ?)$ is $+1$. If all successors are “?”, the backed-up value is “?”.



- c. (5) Standard minimax is depth-first and would go into an infinite loop. It can be fixed by comparing the current state against the stack; and if the state is repeated, then return a “?” value. Propagation of “?” values is handled as above. Although it works in this case, it does not *always* work because it is not clear how to compare “?” with a drawn position; nor is it clear how to handle the comparison when there are wins of different degrees (as in backgammon). Finally, in games with chance nodes, it is unclear how to

compute the average of a number and a “?”. Note that it is *not* correct to treat repeated states automatically as drawn positions; in this example, both (1,4) and (2,4) repeat in the tree but they are won positions.

What is really happening is that each state has a well-defined but initially unknown value. These unknown values are related by the minimax equation at the bottom of page 163. If the game tree is acyclic, then the minimax algorithm solves these equations by propagating from the leaves. If the game tree has cycles, then a dynamic programming method must be used, as explained in Chapter 17. (Exercise 17.8 studies this problem in particular.) These algorithms can determine whether each node has a well-determined value (as in this example) or is really an infinite loop in that both players prefer to stay in the loop (or have no choice). In such a case, the rules of the game will need to define the value (otherwise the game will never end). In chess, for example, a state that occurs 3 times (and hence is assumed to be desirable for both players) is a draw.

- d. This question is a little tricky. One approach is a proof by induction on the size of the game. Clearly, the base case $n = 3$ is a loss for A and the base case $n = 4$ is a win for A. For any $n > 4$, the initial moves are the same: A and B both move one step towards each other. Now, we can see that they are engaged in a subgame of size $n - 2$ on the squares $[2, \dots, n - 1]$, *except* that there is an extra choice of moves on squares 2 and $n - 1$. Ignoring this for a moment, it is clear that if the “ $n - 2$ ” is won for A, then A gets to the square $n - 1$ before B gets to square 2 (by the definition of winning) and therefore gets to n before B gets to 1, hence the “ n ” game is won for A. By the same line of reasoning, if “ $n - 2$ ” is won for B then “ n ” is won for B. Now, the presence of the extra moves complicates the issue, but not too much. First, the player who is slated to win the subgame $[2, \dots, n - 1]$ never moves back to his home square. If the player slated to lose the subgame does so, then it is easy to show that he is bound to lose the game itself—the other player simply moves forward and a subgame of size $n - 2k$ is played one step closer to the loser’s home square.

6.4 See `"search/algorithms/games.lisp"` for definitions of games, game-playing agents, and game-playing environments. `"search/algorithms/minimax.lisp"` contains the minimax and alpha-beta algorithms. Notice that the game-playing environment is essentially a generic environment with the update function defined by the rules of the game. Turn-taking is achieved by having agents do nothing until it is their turn to move.

See `"search/domains/cognac.lisp"` for the basic definitions of a simple game (slightly more challenging than Tic-Tac-Toe). The code for this contains only a trivial evaluation function. Students can use minimax and alpha-beta to solve small versions of the game to termination (probably up to 4×3); they should notice that alpha-beta is far faster than minimax, but still cannot scale up without an evaluation function and truncated horizon. Providing an evaluation function is an interesting exercise. From the point of view of data structure design, it is also interesting to look at how to speed up the legal move generator by precomputing the descriptions of rows, columns, and diagonals.

Very few students will have heard of kalah, so it is a fair assignment, but the game is boring—depth 6 lookahead and a purely material-based evaluation function are enough

to beat most humans. Othello is interesting and about the right level of difficulty for most students. Chess and checkers are sometimes unfair because usually a small subset of the class will be experts while the rest are beginners.

6.5 This question is not as hard as it looks. The derivation below leads directly to a definition of α and β values. The notation n_i refers to (the value of) the node at depth i on the path from the root to the leaf node n_j . Nodes $n_{i1} \dots n_{ib_i}$ are the siblings of node i .

a. We can write $n_2 = \max(n_3, n_{31}, \dots, n_{3b_3})$, giving

$$n_1 = \min(\max(n_3, n_{31}, \dots, n_{3b_3}), n_{21}, \dots, n_{2b_2})$$

Then n_3 can be similarly replaced, until we have an expression containing n_j itself.

b. In terms of the l and r values, we have

$$n_1 = \min(l_2, \max(l_3, n_3, r_3), r_2)$$

Again, n_3 can be expanded out down to n_j . The most deeply nested term will be $\min(l_j, n_j, r_j)$.

c. If n_j is a max node, then the lower bound on its value only increases as its successors are evaluated. Clearly, if it exceeds l_j it will have no further effect on n_1 . By extension, if it exceeds $\min(l_2, l_4, \dots, l_j)$ it will have no effect. Thus, by keeping track of this value we can decide when to prune n_j . This is exactly what α - β does.

d. The corresponding bound for min nodes n_k is $\max(l_3, l_5, \dots, l_k)$.

6.7 The general strategy is to reduce a general game tree to a one-ply tree by induction on the depth of the tree. The inductive step must be done for min, max, and chance nodes, and simply involves showing that the transformation is carried through the node. Suppose that the values of the descendants of a node are $x_1 \dots x_n$, and that the transformation is $ax + b$, where a is positive. We have

$$\begin{aligned} \min(ax_1 + b, ax_2 + b, \dots, ax_n + b) &= a \min(x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n) + b \\ \max(ax_1 + b, ax_2 + b, \dots, ax_n + b) &= a \max(x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n) + b \\ p_1(ax_1 + b) + p_2(ax_2 + b) + \dots + p_n(ax_n + b) &= a(p_1x_1 + p_2x_2 + \dots + p_nx_n) + b \end{aligned}$$

Hence the problem reduces to a one-ply tree where the leaves have the values from the original tree multiplied by the linear transformation. Since $x > y \Rightarrow ax + b > ay + b$ if $a > 0$, the best choice at the root will be the same as the best choice in the original tree.

6.8 This procedure will give incorrect results. Mathematically, the procedure amounts to assuming that averaging commutes with min and max, which it does not. Intuitively, the choices made by each player in the deterministic trees are based on full knowledge of future dice rolls, and bear no necessary relationship to the moves made without such knowledge. (Notice the connection to the discussion of card games on page 179 and to the general problem of fully and partially observable Markov decision problems in Chapter 17.) In practice, the method works reasonably well, and it might be a good exercise to have students compare it to the alternative of using expectiminimax with sampling (rather than summing over) dice rolls.

6.9 Code not shown.

6.10 The basic physical state of these games is fairly easy to describe. One important thing to remember for Scrabble and bridge is that the physical state is not accessible to all players and so cannot be provided directly to each player by the environment simulator. Particularly in bridge, each player needs to maintain some best guess (or multiple hypotheses) as to the actual state of the world. We expect to be putting some of the game implementations online as they become available.

6.11 One can think of chance events during a game, such as dice rolls, in the same way as hidden but preordained information (such as the order of the cards in a deck). The key distinctions are whether the players can influence what information is revealed and whether there is any asymmetry in the information available to each player.

- a. Expectiminimax is appropriate only for backgammon and Monopoly. In bridge and Scrabble, each player knows the cards/tiles he or she possesses but not the opponents'. In Scrabble, the benefits of a fully rational, randomized strategy that includes reasoning about the opponents' state of knowledge are probably small, but in bridge the questions of knowledge and information disclosure are central to good play.
- b. None, for the reasons described earlier.
- c. Key issues include reasoning about the opponent's beliefs, the effect of various actions on those beliefs, and methods for representing them. Since belief states for rational agents are probability distributions over all possible states (including the belief states of others), this is nontrivial.

```

function MAX-VALUE(state) returns a utility value
  if TERMINAL-TEST(state) then return UTILITY(state)
  v ← −∞
  for a, s in SUCCESSORS(state) do
    if WINNER(s) = MAX
      then v ← MAX(v, MAX-VALUE(s))
      else v ← MAX(v, MIN-VALUE(s))
  return v

```

Figure S6.4 Part of the modified minimax algorithm for games in which the winner of the previous trick plays first on the next trick.

6.12 (In the first printing, this exercise refers to WINNER(*trick*); subsequent printings refer to WINNER(*s*), denoting the winner of the trick just completed (if any), or null.) This question is interpreted as applying only to the observable case.

- a. The modification to MAX-VALUE is shown in Figure S6.4. If MAX has just won a trick, MAX gets to play again, otherwise play alternates. Thus, the successors of a MAX node




Figure S6.5 Ex. 6.12: Part of the game tree for the card game shown on p.179.

can be a mixture of MAX and MIN nodes, depending on the various cards MAX can play. A similar modification is needed for MIN-VALUE.

b. The game tree is shown in Figure S6.5.

6.13 The naive approach would be to generate each such position, solve it, and store the outcome. This would be enormously expensive—roughly on the order of 444 billion seconds, or 10,000 years, assuming it takes a second on average to solve each position (which is probably very optimistic). Of course, we can take advantage of already-solved positions when solving new positions, provided those solved positions are descendants of the new positions. To ensure that this *always* happens, we generate the *final* positions first, then their *predecessors*, and so on. In this way, the exact values of all successors are known when each state is generated. This method is called **retrograde analysis**.

6.14 The most obvious change is that the space of actions is now continuous. For example, in pool, the cueing direction, angle of elevation, speed, and point of contact with the cue ball are all continuous quantities.

The simplest solution is just to discretize the action space and then apply standard methods. This might work for tennis (modelled crudely as alternating shots with speed and direction), but for games such as pool and croquet it is likely to fail miserably because small changes in direction have large effects on action outcome. Instead, one must analyze the game to identify a discrete set of meaningful local goals, such as “potting the 4-ball” in pool or “laying up for the next hoop” in croquet. Then, in the current context, a local optimization routine can work out the best way to achieve each local goal, resulting in a discrete set of possible choices. Typically, these games are stochastic, so the backgammon model is appropriate provided that we use sampled outcomes instead of summing over all outcomes.

Whereas pool and croquet are modelled correctly as turn-taking games, tennis is not. While one player is moving to the ball, the other player is moving to anticipate the opponent’s return. This makes tennis more like the simultaneous-action games studied in Chapter 17. In particular, it may be reasonable to derive *randomized* strategies so that the opponent cannot anticipate where the ball will go.

6.15 The minimax algorithm for non-zero-sum games works exactly as for multiplayer games, described on p.165–6; that is, the evaluation function is a vector of values, one for each player, and the backup step selects whichever vector has the highest value for the player whose turn it is to move. The example at the end of Section 6.2 (p.167) shows that alpha-beta pruning is not possible in general non-zero-sum games, because an unexamined leaf node might be optimal for both players.

6.16 With 32 pieces, each needing 6 bits to specify its position on one of 64 squares, we need 24 bytes (6 32-bit words) to store a position, so we can store roughly 20 million positions in the table (ignoring pointers for hash table bucket lists). This is about one-ninth of the 180 million positions generated during a three-minute search.

Generating the hash key directly from an array-based representation of the position might be quite expensive. Modern programs (see, e.g., Heinz, 2000) carry along the hash key and modify it as each new position is generated. Suppose this takes on the order of 20 operations; then on a 2GHz machine where an evaluation takes 2000 operations we can do roughly 100 lookups per evaluation. Using a rough figure of one millisecond for a disk seek, we could do 1000 evaluations per lookup. Clearly, using a disk-resident table is of dubious value, even if we can get some locality of reference to reduce the number of disk reads.

Solutions for Chapter 7

Agents that Reason Logically

7.1 The wumpus world is partially observable, deterministic, sequential (you need to remember the state of one location when you return to it on a later turn), static, discrete, and single agent (the wumpus's sole trick—devouring an errant explorer—is not enough to treat it as an agent). Thus, it is a fairly simple environment. The main complication is the partial observability.

7.2 To save space, we'll show the list of models as a table rather than a collection of diagrams. There are eight possible combinations of pits in the three squares, and four possibilities for the wumpus location (including nowhere).

We can see that $KB \models \alpha_2$ because every line where KB is true also has α_2 true. Similarly for α_3 .

7.3

- a. There is a `pl_true` in the Python code, and a version of `ask` in the Lisp code that serves the same purpose. The Java code did not have this function as of May 2003, but it should be added soon.)
- b. The sentences $True$, $P \vee \neg P$, and $P \wedge \neg P$ can all be determined to be true or false in a partial model that does not specify the truth value for P .
- c. It is possible to create two sentences, each with k variables that are not instantiated in the partial model, such that one of them is true for all 2^k possible values of the variables, while the other sentence is false for one of the 2^k values. This shows that in general one must consider all 2^k possibilities. Enumerating them takes exponential time.
- d. The python implementation of `pl_true` returns true if any disjunct of a disjunction is true, and false if any conjunct of a conjunction is false. It will do this even if other disjuncts/conjuncts contains uninstantiated variables. Thus, in the partial model where P is true, $P \vee Q$ returns true, and $\neg P \wedge Q$ returns false. But the truth values of $Q \vee \neg Q$, $Q \vee True$, and $Q \wedge \neg Q$ are not detected.
- e. Our version of `tt_entails` already uses this modified `pl_true`. It would be slower if it did not.

7.4 Remember, $\alpha \models \beta$ iff in every model in which α is true, β is also true. Therefore,

- a. A *valid* sentence is one that is true in all models. The sentence $True$ is also valid in all models. So if $alpha$ is valid then the entailment holds (because both $True$ and α hold

Model	KB	α_2	α_3
$P_{1,3}$ $P_{2,2}$ $P_{3,1}$ $P_{1,3}, P_{2,2}$ $P_{2,2}, P_{3,1}$ $P_{3,1}, P_{1,3}$ $P_{1,3}, P_{3,1}, P_{2,2}$		$true$ $true$ $true$ $true$	
$W_{1,3}$ $W_{1,3}, P_{1,3}$ $W_{1,3}, P_{2,2}$ $W_{1,3}, P_{3,1}$ $W_{1,3}, P_{1,3}, P_{2,2}$ $W_{1,3}, P_{2,2}, P_{3,1}$ $W_{1,3}, P_{3,1}, P_{1,3}$ $W_{1,3}, P_{1,3}, P_{3,1}, P_{2,2}$	$true$	$true$ $true$ $true$ $true$ $true$	$true$ $true$ $true$ $true$ $true$ $true$ $true$
$W_{3,1}$ $W_{3,1}, P_{1,3}$ $W_{3,1}, P_{2,2}$ $W_{3,1}, P_{3,1}$ $W_{3,1}, P_{1,3}, P_{2,2}$ $W_{3,1}, P_{2,2}, P_{3,1}$ $W_{3,1}, P_{3,1}, P_{1,3}$ $W_{3,1}, P_{1,3}, P_{3,1}, P_{2,2}$		$true$ $true$ $true$ $true$	
$W_{2,2}$ $W_{2,2}, P_{1,3}$ $W_{2,2}, P_{2,2}$ $W_{2,2}, P_{3,1}$ $W_{2,2}, P_{1,3}, P_{2,2}$ $W_{2,2}, P_{2,2}, P_{3,1}$ $W_{2,2}, P_{3,1}, P_{1,3}$ $W_{2,2}, P_{1,3}, P_{3,1}, P_{2,2}$		$true$ $true$ $true$ $true$	
Figure 7.1 A truth table constructed for Ex. 7.2. Propositions not listed as true on a given line are assumed false, and only <i>true</i> entries are shown in the table.			

in every model), and if the entailment holds then α must be valid, because it must be true in all models, because it must be true in all models in which *True* holds.

- b. *False* doesn't hold in any model, so α trivially holds in every model that *False* holds in.
- c. $\alpha \Rightarrow \beta$ holds in those models where β holds or where $\neg\alpha$ holds. That is precisely the case if $\alpha \Rightarrow \beta$ is valid.
- d. This follows from applying c in both directions.

e. This reduces to c, because $\alpha \wedge \neg\beta$ is unsatisfiable just when $\alpha \Rightarrow \beta$ is valid.

7.5 These can be computed by counting the rows in a truth table that come out true. Remember to count the propositions that are not mentioned; if a sentence mentions only A and B , then we multiply the number of models for $\{A, B\}$ by 2^2 to account for C and D .

- a. 6
- b. 12
- c. 4

7.6 A binary logical connective is defined by a truth table with 4 rows. Each of the four rows may be true or false, so there are $2^4 = 16$ possible truth tables, and thus 16 possible connectives. Six of these are trivial ones that ignore one or both inputs; they correspond to *True*, *False*, P , Q , $\neg P$ and $\neg Q$. Four of them we have already studied: \wedge , \vee , \Rightarrow , \Leftrightarrow . The remaining six are potentially useful. One of them is reverse implication (\Leftarrow instead of \Rightarrow), and the other five are the negations of \wedge , \vee , \Rightarrow , \Leftrightarrow and \Leftarrow . (The first two of these are sometimes called *nand* and *nor*.)

7.7 We use the truth table code in Lisp in the directory `logic/prop.lisp` to show each sentence is valid. We substitute P, Q, R for α, β, γ because of the lack of Greek letters in ASCII. To save space in this manual, we only show the first four truth tables:

```
> (truth-table "P ^ Q <=> Q ^ P")
```

P	Q	P ^ Q	Q ^ P	(P ^ Q) <=> (Q ^ P)
F	F	F	F	\(true\)
T	F	F	F	T
F	T	F	F	T
T	T	T	T	T

NIL

```
> (truth-table "P | Q <=> Q | P")
```

P	Q	P Q	Q P	(P Q) <=> (Q P)
F	F	F	F	T
T	F	T	T	T
F	T	T	T	T
T	T	T	T	T

NIL

```
> (truth-table "P ^ (Q ^ R) <=> (P ^ Q) ^ R")
```

P	Q	R	Q ^ R	P ^ (Q ^ R)	P ^ Q ^ R	(P ^ (Q ^ R)) <=> (P ^ Q ^ R)
F	F	F	F	F	F	T
T	F	F	F	F	F	T
F	T	F	F	F	F	T

T	T	F	F	F	F	T
F	F	T	F	F	F	T
T	F	T	F	F	F	T
F	T	T	T	F	F	T
T	T	T	T	T	T	T

NIL

> (truth-table "P | (Q | R) <=> (P | Q) | R")

P	Q	R	Q R	P (Q R)	P Q R	(P (Q R)) <=> (P Q R)
F	F	F	F	F	F	T
T	F	F	F	T	T	T
F	T	F	T	T	T	T
T	T	F	T	T	T	T
F	F	T	T	T	T	T
T	F	T	T	T	T	T
F	T	T	T	T	T	T
T	T	T	T	T	T	T

NIL

For the remaining sentences, we just show that they are valid according to the validity function:

```
> (validity "~~P <=> P")
VALID
> (validity "P => Q <=> ~Q => ~P")
VALID
> (validity "P => Q <=> ~P | Q")
VALID
> (validity "(P <=> Q) <=> (P => Q) ^ (Q => P)")
VALID
> (validity "~(P ^ Q) <=> ~P | ~Q")
VALID
> (validity "~(P | Q) <=> ~P ^ ~Q")
VALID
> (validity "P ^ (Q | R) <=> (P ^ Q) | (P ^ R)")
VALID
> (validity "P | (Q ^ R) <=> (P | Q) ^ (P | R)")
VALID
```

7.8 We use the validity function from `logic/prop.lisp` to determine the validity of each sentence:

```
> (validity "Smoke => Smoke")
VALID
> (validity "Smoke => Fire")
SATISFIABLE
> (validity "(Smoke => Fire) => (~Smoke => ~Fire)")
SATISFIABLE
> (validity "Smoke | Fire | ~Fire")
VALID
```

```

> (validity "((Smoke ^ Heat) => Fire) <=> ((Smoke => Fire) | (Heat => Fire))")
VALID
> (validity "(Smoke => Fire) => ((Smoke ^ Heat) => Fire)")
VALID
> (validity "Big | Dumb | (Big => Dumb)")
VALID
> (validity "(Big ^ Dumb) | ~Dumb")
SATISFIABLE

```

Many people are fooled by (e) and (g) because they think of implication as being causation, or something close to it. Thus, in (e), they feel that it is the combination of Smoke and Heat that leads to Fire, and thus there is no reason why one or the other alone should lead to fire. Similarly, in (g), they feel that there is no necessary causal relation between Big and Dumb, so the sentence should be satisfiable, but not valid. However, this reasoning is incorrect, because implication is *not* causation—implication is just a kind of disjunction (in the sense that $P \Rightarrow Q$ is the same as $\neg P \vee Q$). So $Big \vee Dumb \vee (Big \Rightarrow Dumb)$ is equivalent to $Big \vee Dumb \vee \neg Big \vee Dumb$, which is equivalent to $Big \vee \neg Big \vee Dumb$, which is true whether *Big* is true or false, and is therefore valid.

7.9 From the first two statements, we see that if it is mythical, then it is immortal; otherwise it is a mammal. So it must be either immortal or a mammal, and thus horned. That means it is also magical. However, we can't deduce anything about whether it is mythical. Using the propositional reasoning code:

```

> (setf kb (make-prop-kb))
#S(PROP-KB SENTENCE (AND))
> (tell kb "Mythical => Immortal")
T
> (tell kb "~Mythical => ~Immortal ^ Mammal")
T
> (tell kb "Immortal | Mammal => Horned")
T
> (tell kb "Horned => Magical")
T
> (ask kb "Mythical")
NIL
> (ask kb "~Mythical")
NIL
> (ask kb "Magical")
T
> (ask kb "Horned")
T

```

7.10 Each possible world can be written as a conjunction of symbols, e.g. $(A \wedge C \wedge E)$. Asserting that a possible world is not the case can be written by negating that, e.g. $\neg(A \wedge C \wedge E)$, which can be rewritten as $(\neg A \vee \neg C \vee \neg E)$. This is the form of a clause; a conjunction of these clauses is a CNF sentence, and can list all the possible worlds for the sentence.

7.11

- a. This is a disjunction with 28 disjuncts, each one saying that two of the neighbors are true and the others are false. The first disjunct is

$$X_{2,2} \wedge X_{1,2} \wedge \neg X_{0,2} \wedge \neg X_{0,1} \wedge \neg X_{2,1} \wedge \neg X_{0,0} \wedge \neg X_{1,0} \wedge \neg X_{2,0}$$

The other 27 disjuncts each select two different $X_{i,j}$ to be true.

- b. There will be $\binom{n}{k}$ disjuncts, each saying that k of the n symbols are true and the others false.
- c. For each of the cells that have been probed, take the resulting number n revealed by the game and construct a sentence with $\binom{n}{8}$ disjuncts. Conjoin all the sentences together. Then use DPLL to answer the question of whether this sentence entails $X_{i,j}$ for the particular i, j pair you are interested in.
- d. To encode the global constraint that there are M mines altogether, we can construct a disjunct with $\binom{M}{N}$ disjuncts, each of size N . Remember, $\binom{M}{N} = \frac{M!}{N!(M-N)!}$. So for a Minesweeper game with 100 cells and 20 mines, this will be more than 10^{39} , and thus cannot be represented in any computer. However, we can represent the global constraint within the DPLL algorithm itself. We add the parameter *min* and *max* to the DPLL function; these indicate the minimum and maximum number of unassigned symbols that must be true in the model. For an unconstrained problem the values 0 and N will be used for these parameters. For a minesweeper problem the value M will be used for both *min* and *max*. Within DPLL, we fail (return false) immediately if *min* is less than the number of remaining symbols, or if *max* is less than 0. For each recursive call to DPLL, we update *min* and *max* by subtracting one when we assign a true value to a symbol.
- e. No conclusions are invalidated by adding this capability to DPLL and encoding the global constraint using it.
- f. Consider this string of alternating 1's and unprobed cells (indicated by a dash):

| - | 1 | - | 1 | - | 1 | - | 1 | - | 1 | - | 1 | - |

There are two possible models: either there are mines under every even-numbered dash, or under every odd-numbered dash. Making a probe at either end will determine whether cells at the far end are empty or contain mines.

7.12

- a. $P \Rightarrow Q$ is equivalent to $\neg P \vee Q$ by implication elimination (Figure 7.11), and $\neg(P_1 \wedge \cdots \wedge P_m)$ is equivalent to $(\neg P_1 \vee \cdots \vee \neg P_m)$ by de Morgan's rule, so $(\neg P_1 \vee \cdots \vee \neg P_m \vee Q)$ is equivalent to $(P_1 \wedge \cdots \wedge P_m) \Rightarrow Q$.

- b. A clause can have positive and negative literals; arrange them in the form $(\neg P_1 \vee \cdots \vee P_m \vee Q_1 \vee \cdots \vee Q_n)$. Then, setting $Q = Q_1 \vee \cdots \vee Q_n$, we have

$$(\neg P_1 \vee \cdots \vee P_m \vee Q_1 \vee \cdots \vee Q_n)$$

is equivalent to

$$(P_1 \wedge \cdots \wedge P_m) \Rightarrow Q_1 \vee \cdots \vee Q_n$$

- c. For atoms p_i, q_i, r_i, s_i where $\text{UNIFY}(p_j, q_k) = \theta$:

$$\frac{p_1 \wedge \dots \wedge p_j \wedge \dots \wedge p_{n_1} \Rightarrow r_1 \vee \dots \vee r_{n_2} \quad s_1 \wedge \dots \wedge s_{n_3} \Rightarrow q_1 \vee \dots \vee q_k \wedge \dots \wedge q_{n_4}}{\text{SUBST}(\theta, (p_1 \wedge \dots \wedge p_{j-1} \wedge p_{j+1} \wedge p_{n_1} \wedge s_1 \wedge \dots \wedge s_{n_3} \Rightarrow r_1 \vee \dots \vee r_{n_2} \vee q_1 \vee \dots \vee q_{k-1} \vee q_{k+1} \vee \dots \vee q_{n_4}))}$$

7.13

- a. $\text{Arrow}^t \Leftrightarrow \text{Arrow}^{t-1} \wedge \neg \text{Shoot}^t$
 b. $\text{FacingRight}^t \Leftrightarrow (\text{FacingRight}^{t-1} \wedge \neg \text{TurnRight}^t \wedge \neg \text{TurnLeft}^t) \vee (\text{FacingUp}^{t-1} \wedge \text{TurnRight}^t) \vee (\text{FacingDown}^{t-1} \wedge \text{TurnLeft}^t)$
 c. These formulae are the same as (7.7) and (7.8), except that the P for pit is replaced by W for wumpus, and B for breezy is replaced by S for smelly.

$$\begin{aligned} K(\neg W_{4,4})^t &\Leftrightarrow K(\neg S_{3,4})^t \vee K(\neg S_4, 4)^t \\ K(W_{4,4})^t &\Leftrightarrow K(S_{3,4})^t \wedge K(\neg W_{2,4})^t \wedge K(\neg W_{3,3})^t \\ &\vee (K(S_{4,3})^t \wedge K(\neg W_{4,2})^t \wedge K(\neg W_{3,3})^t) \end{aligned}$$

7.14 Optimal behavior means achieving an expected utility that is as good as any other agent program. The PL-WUMPUS-AGENT is clearly non-optimal when it chooses a random move (and may be non-optimal in other branches of its logic). One example: in some cases when there are many dangers (breezes and smells) but no safe move, the agent chooses at random. A more thorough analysis should show when it is better to do that, and when it is better to go home and exit the wumpus world, giving up on any chance of finding the gold. Even when it is best to gamble on an unsafe location, our agent does not distinguish degrees of safety – it should choose the unsafe square which contains a danger in the fewest number of possible models. These refinements are hard to state using a logical agent, but we will see in subsequent chapters that a probabilistic agent can handle them. does

7.15 PL-WUMPUS-AGENT keeps track of 6 static state variables besides KB . The difficulty is that these variables change—we don't just add new information about them (as we do with pits and breezy locations), we modify existing information. This does not sit well with logic, which is designed for eternal truths. So there are two alternatives. The first is to superscript each proposition with the time (as we did with the circuit agents), and then we could, for example, do $\text{TELL}(KB, A_{1,1}^3)$ to say that the agent is at location 1, 1 at time 3. Then at time 4, we would have to copy over many of the existing propositions, and add new ones. The second possibility is to treat every proposition as a timeless one, but to remove outdated propositions from the KB . That is, we could do $\text{RETRACT}(KB, A_{1,1})$ and then $\text{progTell}(KB, A_{1,2})$ to indicate that the agent has moved from 1, 1 to 1, 2. Chapter 10 describes the semantics and implementation of RETRACT .

NOTE: Avoid assigning this problem if you don't feel comfortable requiring students to think ahead about the possibility of retraction.

7.16 It will take time proportional to the number of pure symbols plus the number of unit clauses. We assume that $KB \Rightarrow \alpha$ is false, and prove a contradiction. $\neg(KB \Rightarrow \alpha)$ is equivalent to $KB \wedge \neg\alpha$. From this sentence the algorithm will first eliminate all the pure

symbols, then it will work on unit clauses until it chooses α (which is a unit clause); at that point it will immediately recognize that either choice (true or false) for α leads to failure, which means that the original non-negated assertion is true.

7.17 Code not shown.

Solutions for Chapter 8

First-Order Logic

8.1 This question will generate a wide variety of possible solutions. The key distinction between analogical and sentential representations is that the analogical representation automatically generates consequences that can be “read off” whenever suitable premises are encoded. When you get into the details, this distinction turns out to be quite hard to pin down—for example, what does “read off” mean?—but it can be justified by examining the time complexity of various inferences on the “virtual inference machine” provided by the representation system.

- a. Depending on the scale and type of the map, symbols in the map language typically include city and town markers, road symbols (various types), lighthouses, historic monuments, river courses, freeway intersections, etc.
- b. Explicit and implicit sentences: this distinction is a little tricky, but the basic idea is that when the map-drawer plunks a symbol down in a particular place, he says one explicit thing (e.g. that Coit Tower is here), but the analogical structure of the map representation means that many implicit sentences can now be derived. Explicit sentences: there is a monument called Coit Tower at this location; Lombard Street runs (approximately) east-west; San Francisco Bay exists and has this shape. Implicit sentences: Van Ness is longer than North Willard; Fisherman’s Wharf is north of the Mission District; the shortest drivable route from Coit Tower to Twin Peaks is the following
- c. Sentences unrepresentable in the map language: Telegraph Hill is approximately conical and about 430 feet high (assuming the map has no topographical notation); in 1890 there was no bridge connecting San Francisco to Marin County (map does not represent changing information); Interstate 680 runs either east or west of Walnut Creek (no disjunctive information).
- d. Sentences that are easier to express in the map language: any sentence that can be written easily in English is not going to be a good candidate for this question. Any *linguistic* abstraction from the physical structure of San Francisco (e.g. San Francisco is on the end of a peninsula at the mouth of a bay) can probably be expressed equally easily in the predicate calculus, since that’s what it was designed for. Facts such as the shape of the coastline, or the path taken by a road, are best expressed in the map language. Even then, one can argue that the coastline drawn on the map actually consists of lots of individual sentences, one for each dot of ink, especially if the map is drawn

using a digital plotter. In this case, the advantage of the map is really in the ease of inference combined with suitability for human “visual computing” apparatus.

e. Examples of other analogical representations:

- Analog audio tape recording. Advantages: simple circuits can record and reproduce sounds. Disadvantages: subject to errors, noise; hard to process in order to separate sounds or remove noise etc.
- Traditional clock face. Advantages: easier to read quickly, determination of how much time is available requires no additional computation. Disadvantages: hard to read precisely, cannot represent small units of time (ms) easily.
- All kinds of graphs, bar charts, pie charts. Advantages: enormous data compression, easy trend analysis, communicate information in a way which we can interpret easily. Disadvantages: imprecise, cannot represent disjunctive or negated information.

8.2 The knowledge base does not entail $\forall x P(x)$. To show this, we must give a model where $P(a)$ and $P(b)$ but $\forall x P(x)$ is false. Consider any model with three domain elements, where a and b refer to the first two elements and the relation referred to by P holds only for those two elements.

8.3 The sentence $\exists x, y \ x = y$ is valid. A sentence is valid if it is true in every model. An existentially quantified sentence is true in a model if it holds under any extended interpretation in which its variables are assigned to domain elements. According to the standard semantics of FOL as given in the chapter, every model contains at least one domain element, hence, for any model, there is an extended interpretation in which x and y are assigned to the first domain element. In such an interpretation, $x = y$ is true.

8.4 $\forall x, y \ x = y$ stipulates that there is exactly one object. If there are two objects, then there is an extended interpretation in which x and y are assigned to different objects, so the sentence would be false. Some students may also notice that any unsatisfiable sentence also meets the criterion, since there are no worlds in which the sentence is true.

8.5 We will use the simplest counting method, ignoring redundant combinations. For the constant symbols, there are D^c assignments. Each predicate of arity k is mapped onto a k -ary relation, i.e., a subset of the D^k possible k -element tuples; there are 2^{D^k} such mappings. Each function symbol of arity k is mapped onto a k -ary function, which specifies a value for each of the D^k possible k -element tuples. Including the invisible element, there are $D + 1$ choices for each value, so there are $(D + 1)^{D^k}$ functions. The total number of possible combinations is therefore

$$D^c \cdot \left(\sum_{k=1}^A 2^{D^k} \right) \cdot \left(\sum_{k=1}^A (D + 1)^{D^k} \right).$$

Two things to note: first, the number is finite; second, the maximum arity A is the most crucial complexity parameter.

8.6 In this exercise, it is best not to worry about details of tense and larger concerns with consistent ontologies and so on. The main point is to make sure students understand con-

nectives and quantifiers and the use of predicates, functions, constants, and equality. Let the basic vocabulary be as follows:

$Takes(x, c, s)$: student x takes course c in semester s ;

$Passes(x, c, s)$: student x passes course c in semester s ;

$Score(x, c, s)$: the score obtained by student x in course c in semester s ;

$x > y$: x is greater than y ;

F and G : specific French and Greek courses (one could also interpret these sentences as referring to *any* such course, in which case one could use a predicate $Subject(c, f)$ meaning that the subject of course c is field f ;

$Buys(x, y, z)$: x buys y from z (using a binary predicate with unspecified seller is OK but less felicitous);

$Sells(x, y, z)$: x sells y to z ;

$Shaves(x, y)$: person x shaves person y

$Born(x, c)$: person x is born in country c ;

$Parent(x, y)$: x is a parent of y ;

$Citizen(x, c, r)$: x is a citizen of country c for reason r ;

$Resident(x, c)$: x is a resident of country c ;

$Fools(x, y, t)$: person x fools person y at time t ;

$Student(x)$, $Person(x)$, $Man(x)$, $Barber(x)$, $Expensive(x)$, $Agent(x)$, $Insured(x)$,

$Smart(x)$, $Politician(x)$: predicates satisfied by members of the corresponding categories.

- a. Some students took French in spring 2001.

$$\exists x \text{ Student}(x) \wedge Takes(x, F, Spring2001).$$

- b. Every student who takes French passes it.

$$\forall x, s \text{ Student}(x) \wedge Takes(x, F, s) \Rightarrow Passes(x, F, s).$$

- c. Only one student took Greek in spring 2001.

$$\exists x \text{ Student}(x) \wedge Takes(x, G, Spring2001) \wedge \forall y \ y \neq x \Rightarrow \neg Takes(y, G, Spring2001).$$

- d. The best score in Greek is always higher than the best score in French.

$$\forall s \exists x \forall y \ Score(x, G, s) > Score(y, F, s).$$

- e. Every person who buys a policy is smart.

$$\forall x \text{ Person}(x) \wedge (\exists y, z \text{ Policy}(y) \wedge Buys(x, y, z)) \Rightarrow Smart(x).$$

- f. No person buys an expensive policy.

$$\forall x, y, z \text{ Person}(x) \wedge Policy(y) \wedge Expensive(y) \Rightarrow \neg Buys(x, y, z).$$

- g. There is an agent who sells policies only to people who are not insured.

$$\exists x \text{ Agent}(x) \wedge \forall y, z \text{ Policy}(y) \wedge Sells(x, y, z) \Rightarrow (\text{Person}(z) \wedge \neg Insured(z)).$$

- h. There is a barber who shaves all men in town who do not shave themselves.

$$\exists x \text{ Barber}(x) \wedge \forall y \text{ Man}(y) \wedge \neg Shaves(y, y) \Rightarrow Shaves(x, y).$$

- i. A person born in the UK, each of whose parents is a UK citizen or a UK resident, is a UK citizen by birth.

$$\forall x \text{ Person}(x) \wedge Born(x, UK) \wedge (\forall y \text{ Parent}(y, x) \Rightarrow ((\exists r \text{ Citizen}(y, UK, r)) \vee Resident(y, UK))) \Rightarrow Citizen(x, UK, Birth).$$

- j. A person born outside the UK, one of whose parents is a UK citizen by birth, is a UK

citizen by descent.

$$\begin{aligned} \forall x \text{ Person}(x) \wedge \neg \text{Born}(x, UK) \wedge (\exists y \text{ Parent}(y, x) \wedge \text{Citizen}(y, UK, \text{Birth})) \\ \Rightarrow \text{Citizen}(x, UK, \text{Descent}). \end{aligned}$$

- k.** Politicians can fool some of the people all of the time, and they can fool all of the people some of the time, but they can't fool all of the people all of the time.

$$\begin{aligned} \forall x \text{ Politician}(x) \Rightarrow \\ (\exists y \forall t \text{ Person}(y) \wedge \text{Fools}(x, y, t)) \wedge \\ (\exists t \forall y \text{ Person}(y) \Rightarrow \text{Fools}(x, y, t)) \wedge \\ \neg(\forall t \forall y \text{ Person}(y) \Rightarrow \text{Fools}(x, y, t)) \end{aligned}$$

8.7 The key idea is to see that the word “same” is referring to every *pair* of Germans. There are several logically equivalent forms for this sentence. The simplest is the Horn clause:

$$\forall x, y, l \text{ German}(x) \wedge \text{German}(y) \wedge \text{Speaks}(x, l) \Rightarrow \text{Speaks}(y, l) .$$

8.8 $\forall x, y \text{ Spouse}(x, y) \wedge \text{Male}(x) \Rightarrow \text{Female}(y)$. This axiom is no longer true in certain states and countries.

8.9 This is a very educational exercise but also highly nontrivial. Once students have learned about resolution, ask them to do the proof too. In most cases, they will discover missing axioms. Our basic predicates are $\text{Heard}(x, e, t)$ (x heard about event e at time t); $\text{Occurred}(e, t)$ (event e occurred at time t); $\text{Alive}(x, t)$ (x is alive at time t).

$$\begin{aligned} \exists t \text{ Heard}(W, \text{DeathOf}(N), t) \\ \forall x, e, t \text{ Heard}(x, e, t) \Rightarrow \text{Alive}(x, t) \\ \forall x, e, t_2 \text{ Heard}(x, e, t_2) \Rightarrow \exists t_1 \text{ Occurred}(e, t_1) \wedge t_1 < t_2 \\ \forall t_1 \text{ Occurred}(\text{DeathOf}(x), t_1) \Rightarrow \forall t_2 t_1 < t_2 \Rightarrow \neg \text{Alive}(x, t_2) \\ \forall t_1, t_2 \neg(t_2 < t_1) \Rightarrow ((t_1 < t_2) \vee (t_1 = t_2)) \\ \forall t_1, t_2, t_3 (t_1 < t_2) \wedge ((t_2 < t_3) \vee (t_2 = t_3)) \Rightarrow (t_1 < t_3) \\ \forall t_1, t_2, t_3 ((t_1 < t_2) \vee (t_1 = t_2)) \wedge (t_2 < t_3) \Rightarrow (t_1 < t_3) \end{aligned}$$

8.10 It is not entirely clear which sentences need to be written, but this is one of them:

$$\forall s_1 \text{ Breezy}(s_1) \Leftrightarrow \exists s_2 \text{ Adjacent}(s_1, s_2) \wedge \text{Pit}(s_2) .$$

That is, a square is breezy if and only if there is a pit in a neighboring square. Generally speaking, the size of the axiom set is independent of the size of the wumpus world being described.

8.11 Make sure you write definitions with \Leftrightarrow . If you use \Rightarrow , you are only imposing con-

straints, not writing a real definition.

$$\begin{aligned}
 GrandChild(c, a) &\Leftrightarrow \exists b \text{ Child}(c, b) \wedge \text{Child}(b, a) \\
 GreatGrandParent(a, d) &\Leftrightarrow \exists b, c \text{ Child}(d, c) \wedge \text{Child}(c, b) \wedge \text{Child}(b, a) \\
 Brother(x, y) &\Leftrightarrow \text{Male}(x) \wedge \text{Sibling}(x, y) \\
 Sister(x, y) &\Leftrightarrow \text{Female}(x) \wedge \text{Sibling}(x, y) \\
 Daughter(d, p) &\Leftrightarrow \text{Female}(d) \wedge \text{Child}(d, p) \\
 Son(s, p) &\Leftrightarrow \text{Male}(s) \wedge \text{Child}(s, p) \\
 AuntOrUncle(a, c) &\Leftrightarrow \exists p \text{ Child}(c, p) \wedge \text{Sibling}(a, p) \\
 Aunt(a, c) &\Leftrightarrow \text{Female}(a) \wedge \text{AuntOrUncle}(a, c) \\
 Uncle(u, c) &\Leftrightarrow \text{Male}(u) \wedge \text{AuntOrUncle}(a, c) \\
 BrotherInLaw(b, x) &\Leftrightarrow \exists m \text{ Spouse}(x, m) \wedge \text{Brother}(b, m) \\
 SisterInLaw(s, x) &\Leftrightarrow \exists m \text{ Spouse}(x, m) \wedge \text{Sister}(s, m) \\
 FirstCousin(c, k) &\Leftrightarrow \exists (p) \text{ AuntOrUncle}(p, c) \wedge \text{Parent}(p, k)
 \end{aligned}$$

A second cousin is a child of one's parent's first cousin, and in general an n th cousin is defined as:

$$NthCousin(n, c, k) \Leftrightarrow \exists p, f \text{ Parent}(p, c) \wedge NthCousin(n-1, f, p) \wedge \text{Child}(k, f)$$

The facts in the family tree are simple: each arrow represents two instances of *Child* (e.g., *Child(William, Diana)* and *Child(William, Charles)*), each name represents a sex proposition (e.g., *Male(William)* or *Female(Diana)*), each double line indicates a *Spouse* proposition (e.g. *Spouse(Charles, Diana)*). Making the queries of the logical reasoning system is just a way of debugging the definitions.

8.12 $\forall x, y \ (x + y) = (y + x)$. This does follow from the Peano axioms (although we should write the first axiom for $+$ as $\forall m \text{ NatNum}(m) \Rightarrow + (0, m) = m$). Roughly speaking, the definition of $+$ says that $x + y = S^x(y) = S^{x+y}(0)$, where S^x is shorthand for the S function applied x times. Similarly, $y + x = S^y(x) = S^{y+x}(0)$. Hence, the axioms imply that $x + y$ and $y + x$ are equal to syntactically identical expressions. This argument can be turned into a formal proof by induction.

8.13 Although these axioms are sufficient to prove set membership when x is in fact a member of a given set, they have nothing to say about cases where x is not a member. For example, it is not possible to prove that x is not a member of the empty set. These axioms may therefore be suitable for a logical system, such as Prolog, that uses negation-as-failure.

8.14 Here we translate *List?* to mean “proper list” in Lisp terminology, i.e., a cons structure with *Nil* as the “rightmost” atom.

$$\begin{aligned}
 List?(Nil) \\
 \forall x, l \text{ List?}(l) &\Leftrightarrow \text{List?}(\text{Cons}(x, l)) \\
 \forall x, y \text{ First}(\text{Cons}(x, y)) &= x \\
 \forall x, y \text{ Rest}(\text{Cons}(x, y)) &= y \\
 \forall x \text{ Append}(Nil, x) &= x \\
 \forall v, x, y, z \text{ List?}(x) &\Rightarrow (\text{Append}(x, y) = z \Leftrightarrow \text{Append}(\text{Cons}(v, x), y) = \text{Cons}(v, z)) \\
 \forall x \neg \text{Find}(x, Nil) \\
 \forall x \text{ List?}(z) &\Rightarrow (\text{Find}(x, \text{Cons}(y, z)) \Leftrightarrow (x = y \vee \text{Find}(x, z)))
 \end{aligned}$$

8.15 There are several problems with the proposed definition. It allows one to prove, say, $Adjacent([1, 1], [1, 2])$ but not $Adjacent([1, 2], [1, 1])$; so we need an additional symmetry axiom. It does not allow one to prove that $Adjacent([1, 1], [1, 3])$ is false, so it needs to be written as

$$\forall s_1, s_2 \quad \Leftrightarrow \dots$$

Finally, it does not work as the boundaries of the world, so some extra conditions must be added.

8.16 We need the following sentences:

$$\begin{aligned} \forall s_1 \quad Smelly(s_1) &\Leftrightarrow \exists s_2 \quad Adjacent(s_1, s_2) \wedge In(Wumpus, s_2) \\ \exists s_1 \quad In(Wumpus, s_1) \wedge \forall s_2 \quad (s_1 \neq s_2) &\Rightarrow \neg In(Wumpus, s_2). \end{aligned}$$

8.17 There are three stages to go through. In the first stage, we define the concepts of one-bit and n -bit addition. Then, we specify one-bit and n -bit adder circuits. Finally, we verify that the n -bit adder circuit does n -bit addition.

- One-bit addition is easy. Let Add_1 be a function of three one-bit arguments (the third is the carry bit). The result of the addition is a list of bits representing a 2-bit binary number, least significant digit first:

$$\begin{aligned} Add_1(0, 0, 0) &= [0, 0] \\ Add_1(0, 0, 1) &= [0, 1] \\ Add_1(0, 1, 0) &= [0, 1] \\ Add_1(0, 1, 1) &= [1, 0] \\ Add_1(1, 0, 0) &= [0, 1] \\ Add_1(1, 0, 1) &= [1, 0] \\ Add_1(1, 1, 0) &= [1, 0] \\ Add_1(1, 1, 1) &= [1, 1] \end{aligned}$$

- n -bit addition builds on one-bit addition. Let $Add_n(x_1, x_2, b)$ be a function that takes two lists of binary digits of length n (least significant digit first) and a carry bit (initially 0), and constructs a list of length $n + 1$ that represents their sum. (It will always be exactly $n + 1$ bits long, even when the leading bit is 0—the leading bit is the overflow bit.)

$$\begin{aligned} Add_n([], [], b) &= [b] \\ Add_n(b_1, b_2, b) &= [b_3, b_4] \Rightarrow Add_n([b_1|x_1], [b_2|x_2], b) = [b_3|Add_n(x_1, x_2, b_4)] \end{aligned}$$

- The next step is to define the structure of a one-bit adder circuit, as given in Section ??.
- Let $Add_1Circuit(c)$ be true of any circuit that has the appropriate components and

connections:

$$\begin{aligned}
& \forall c \text{ } Add_1Circuit(c) \Leftrightarrow \\
& \quad \exists x_1, x_2, a_1, a_2, o_1 \text{ } Type(x_1) = Type(x_2) = XOR \\
& \quad \quad \wedge Type(a_1) = Type(a_2) = AND \wedge Type(o_1) = OR \\
& \quad \quad \wedge Connected(Out(1, x_1), In(1, x_2)) \wedge Connected(In(1, c), In(1, x_1)) \\
& \quad \quad \wedge Connected(Out(1, x_1), In(2, a_2)) \wedge Connected(In(1, c), In(1, a_1)) \\
& \quad \quad \wedge Connected(Out(1, a_2), In(1, o_1)) \wedge Connected(In(2, c), In(2, x_1)) \\
& \quad \quad \wedge Connected(Out(1, a_1), In(2, o_1)) \wedge Connected(In(2, c), In(2, a_1)) \\
& \quad \quad \wedge Connected(Out(1, x_2), Out(1, c)) \wedge Connected(In(3, c), In(2, x_2)) \\
& \quad \quad \wedge Connected(Out(1, o_1), Out(2, c)) \wedge Connected(In(3, c), In(1, a_2))
\end{aligned}$$

Notice that this allows the circuit to have additional gates and connections, but they won't stop it from doing addition.

- Now we define what we mean by an n -bit adder circuit, following the design of Figure 8.6. We will need to be careful, because an n -bit adder is not just an $n - 1$ -bit adder plus a one-bit adder; we have to connect the overflow bit of the $n - 1$ -bit adder to the carry-bit input of the one-bit adder. We begin with the base case, where $n = 0$:

$$\begin{aligned}
& \forall c \text{ } Add_nCircuit(c, 0) \Leftrightarrow \\
& \quad Signal(Out(1, c)) = 0
\end{aligned}$$

Now, for the recursive case we specify that the first connect the “overflow” output of the $n - 1$ -bit circuit as the carry bit for the last bit:

$$\begin{aligned}
& \forall c, n \text{ } n > 0 \Rightarrow [Add_nCircuit(c, n) \Leftrightarrow \\
& \quad \exists c_2, d \text{ } Add_nCircuit(c_2, n - 1) \wedge Add_1Circuit(d) \\
& \quad \quad \wedge \forall m \text{ } (m > 0) \wedge (m < 2n - 1) \Rightarrow In(m, c) = In(m, c_2) \\
& \quad \quad \wedge \forall m \text{ } (m > 0) \wedge (m < n) \Rightarrow Out(m, c) = Out(m, c_2) \\
& \quad \quad \wedge Connected(Out(n, c_2), In(3, d)) \\
& \quad \quad \wedge Connected(In(2n - 1, c), In(1, d)) \wedge Connected(In(2n, c), In(2, d)) \\
& \quad \quad \wedge Connected(Out(1, d), Out(n, c)) \wedge Connected(Out(2, d), Out(n + 1, c))]
\end{aligned}$$

- Now, to verify that a one-bit adder *circuit* actually adds correctly, we ask whether, given any setting of the inputs, the outputs equal the sum of the inputs:

$$\begin{aligned}
& \forall c \text{ } Add_1Circuit(c) \Rightarrow \\
& \quad \forall i_1, i_2, i_3 \text{ } Signal(In(1, c)) = i_1 \wedge Signal(In(2, c)) = i_2 \wedge Signal(In(3, c)) = i_3 \\
& \quad \Rightarrow Add_1(i_1, i_2, i_3) = [Out(1, c), Out(2, c)]
\end{aligned}$$

If this sentence is entailed by the KB, then every circuit with the $Add_1Circuit$ design is in fact an adder. The query for the n -bit can be written as

$$\begin{aligned}
& \forall c, n \text{ } Add_nCircuit(c, n) \Rightarrow \\
& \quad \forall x_1, x_2, y \text{ } InterleavedInputBits(x_1, x_2, c) \wedge OutputBits(y, c) \\
& \quad \Rightarrow Add_n(x_1, x_2, y)
\end{aligned}$$

where *InterleavedInputBits* and *OutputBits* are defined appropriately to map bit sequences to the actual terminals of the circuit. [Note: this logical formulation has not been tested in a theorem prover and we hesitate to vouch for its correctness.]

8.18 Strictly speaking, the primitive gates must be defined using logical equivalences to exclude those combinations not listed as correct. If we are using a logic programming system, we can simply list the cases. For example,

$$AND(0, 0, 0) \quad AND(0, 1, 0) \quad AND(1, 0, 0) \quad AND(1, 1, 1) .$$

For the one-bit adder, we have

$$\begin{aligned} \forall i_1, i_2, i_3, o_1, o_2 \quad Add_1 \text{ Circuit}(i_1, i_2, i_3, o_1, o_2) \Leftrightarrow \\ \exists o_{x1}, o_{a1}, o_{x2} \quad XOR(i_1, i_2, o_{x1}) \wedge XOR(o_{x1}, i_3, o_1) \\ \wedge AND(i_1, i_2, o_{a1}) \wedge AND(i_3, o_{x1}, o_{a2}) \\ \wedge OR(o_{a2}, o_{a1}, o_2) \end{aligned}$$

The verification query is

$$\forall i_1, i_2, i_3, o_1, o_2 \quad Add_1(i_1, i_2, i_3) = [o_1, o_2] \Rightarrow Add_1 \text{ Circuit}(i_1, i_2, i_3, o_1, o_2)$$

It is not possible to ask whether particular terminals are connected in a given circuit, since the terminals is not reified (nor is the circuit itself).

8.19 The answers here will vary by country. The two key rules for UK passports are given in the answer to Exercsie 8.6.

Solutions for Chapter 9

Inference in First-Order Logic

9.1 We want to show that any sentence of the form $\forall v \alpha$ entails any universal instantiation of the sentence. The sentence $\forall v \alpha$ is true if α is true in all possible extended interpretations. But replacing v with any ground term g must count as one of the interpretations, so if the original sentence is true, then the instantiated sentence must also be true.

9.2 For any sentence α containing a ground term g and for any variable v not occurring in α , we have

$$\frac{\alpha}{\exists v \text{ SUBST}_1(\{g/v\}, \alpha)}$$

where SUBST_1 is a function that substitutes for a single occurrence of g with v .

9.3 Both b and c are valid; a is invalid because it introduces the previously-used symbol *Everest*. Note that c does not imply that there are two mountains as high as Everest, because nowhere is it stated that *BenNevis* is different from *Kilimanjaro* (or *Everest*, for that matter).

9.4 This is an easy exercise to check that the student understands unification.

- a. $\{x/A, y/B, z/B\}$ (or some permutation of this).
- b. No unifier (x cannot bind to both A and B).
- c. $\{y/John, x/John\}$.
- d. No unifier (because the occurs-check prevents unification of y with $Father(y)$).

9.5 `Employs(Mother(John), Father(Richard))` This page isn't wide enough to draw the diagram as in Figure 9.2, so we will draw it with indentation denoting children nodes:

```
[1] Employs(x, y)
    [2] Employs(x, Father(z))
        [3] Employs(x, Father(Richard))
            [4] Employs(Mother(w), Father(Richard))
                [5] Employs(Mother(John), Father(Richard))
            [6] Employs(Mother(w), Father(z))
                [4] ...
                [7] Employs(Mother(John), Father(z))
                    [5] ...
```

```

[8] Employs(Mother(w), y)
[9] Employs(Mother(John), y)
[10] Employs(Mother(John), Father(z))
[5] ...
[6] ...

```

9.6 We will give the average-case time complexity for each query/scheme combination in the following table. (An entry of the form “1; n ” means that it is $O(1)$ to find the first solution to the query, but $O(n)$ to find them all.) We make the following assumptions: hash tables give $O(1)$ access; there are n people in the data base; there are $O(n)$ people of any specified age; every person has one mother; there are H people in Houston and T people in Tiny Town; T is much less than n ; in Q4, the second conjunct is evaluated first.

	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4
S1	1	1; H	1; n	T ; T
S2	1	n ; n	1; n	n ; n
S3	n	n ; n	1; n	n^2 ; n^2
S4	1	n ; n	1; n	n ; n
S5	1	1; H	1; n	T ; T

Anything that is $O(1)$ can be considered “efficient,” as perhaps can anything $O(T)$. Note that S1 and S5 dominate the other schemes for this set of queries. Also note that indexing on predicates plays no role in this table (except in combination with an argument), because there are only 3 predicates (which is $O(1)$). It would make a difference in terms of the constant factor.

9.7 This would work if there were no recursive rules in the knowledge base. But suppose the knowledge base contains the sentences:

$$\begin{aligned}
 &Member(x, [x|r]) \\
 &Member(x, r) \Rightarrow Member(x, [y|r])
 \end{aligned}$$

Now take the query $Member(3, [1, 2, 3])$, with a backward chaining system. We unify the query with the consequent of the implication to get the substitution $\theta = \{x/3, y/1, r/[2, 3]\}$. We then substitute this in to the left-hand side to get $Member(3, [2, 3])$ and try to back chain on that with the substitution θ . When we then try to apply the implication again, we get a failure because y cannot be both 1 and 2. In other words, the failure to standardize apart causes failure in some cases where recursive rules would result in a solution if we did standardize apart.

9.8 Consider a 3-SAT problem of the form

$$(x_{1,1} \vee x_{2,1} \vee x_{3,1}) \wedge (x_{1,2} \vee x_{2,2} \vee x_{3,2}) \vee \dots$$

We want to rewrite this as a single define clause of the form

$$A \wedge B \wedge C \wedge \dots \Rightarrow Z,$$

along with a few ground clauses. We can do that with the definite clause

$$OneOf(x_{1,1}, x_{2,1}, x_{3,1}) \wedge OneOf(x_{1,2}, x_{2,2}, x_{3,2}) \wedge \dots \Rightarrow Solved$$

along with the ground clauses

$OneOf(True, x, y)$
 $OneOf(x, True, y)$
 $OneOf(x, y, True)$


9.9 We use a very simple ontology to make the examples easier:

- a. $Horse(x) \Rightarrow Mammal(x)$
 $Cow(x) \Rightarrow Mammal(x)$
 $Pig(x) \Rightarrow Mammal(x)$
- b. $Offspring(x, y) \wedge Horse(y) \Rightarrow Horse(x)$
- c. $Horse(Bluebeard)$
- d. $Parent(Bluebeard, Charlie)$
- e. $Offspring(x, y) \Rightarrow Parent(y, x)$
 $Parent(x, y) \Rightarrow Offspring(y, x)$
 (Note we couldn't do $Offspring(x, y) \Leftrightarrow Parent(y, x)$ because that is not in the form expected by Generalized Modus Ponens.)
- f. $Mammal(x) \Rightarrow Parent(G(x), x)$ (here G is a Skolem function).

9.10 This questions deals with the subject of looping in backward-chaining proofs. A loop is bound to occur whenever a subgoal arises that is a substitution instance of one of the goals on the stack. Not all loops can be caught this way, of course, otherwise we would have a way to solve the halting problem.

- a. The proof tree is shown in Figure S9.1. The branch with $Offspring(Bluebeard, y)$ and $Parent(y, Bluebeard)$ repeats indefinitely, so the rest of the proof is never reached.
- b. We get an infinite loop because of rule **b**, $Offspring(x, y) \wedge Horse(y) \Rightarrow Horse(x)$. The specific loop appearing in the figure arises because of the ordering of the clauses—it would be better to order $Horse(Bluebeard)$ before the rule from **b**. However, a loop will occur no matter which way the rules are ordered if the theorem-prover is asked for all solutions.
- c. One should be able to prove that both Bluebeard and Charlie are horses.
- d. Smith *et al.* (1986) recommend the following method. Whenever a “looping” goal occurs (one that is a substitution instance of a supergoal higher up the stack), suspend the attempt to prove that subgoal. Continue with all other branches of the proof for the supergoal, gathering up the solutions. Then use those solutions (suitably instantiated if necessary) as solutions for the suspended subgoal, continuing that branch of the proof to find additional solutions if any. In the proof shown in the figure, the $Offspring(Bluebeard, y)$ is a repeated goal and would be suspended. Since no other way to prove it exists, that branch will terminate with failure. In this case, Smith's method is sufficient to allow the theorem-prover to find both solutions.

9.11 Surprisingly, the hard part to represent is “who is that man.” We want to ask “what relationship does that man have to some known person,” but if we represent relations with



predicates (e.g., $Parent(x, y)$) then we cannot make the relationship be a variable in first-order logic. So instead we need to reify relationships. We will use $Rel(r, x, y)$ to say that the family relationship r holds between people x and y . Let Me denote me and MrX denote “that man.” We will also need the Skolem constants FM for the father of Me and FX for the father of MrX . The facts of the case (put into implicative normal form) are:

- (1) $Rel(Sibling, Me, x) \Rightarrow False$
- (2) $Male(MrX)$
- (3) $Rel(Father, FX, MrX)$
- (4) $Rel(Father, FM, Me)$
- (5) $Rel(Son, FX, FM)$

We want to be able to show that Me is the only son of my father, and therefore that Me is father of MrX , who is male, and therefore that “that man” is my son. The relevant definitions from the family domain are:

- (6) $Rel(Parent, x, y) \wedge Male(x) \Leftrightarrow Rel(Father, x, y)$
- (7) $Rel(Son, x, y) \Leftrightarrow Rel(Parent, y, x) \wedge Male(x)$
- (8) $Rel(Sibling, x, y) \Leftrightarrow x \neq y \wedge \exists p \ Rel(Parent, p, x) \wedge Rel(Parent, p, y)$
- (9) $Rel(Father, x_1, y) \wedge Rel(Father, x_2, y) \Rightarrow x_1 = x_2$

and the query we want is:

$$(Q) \ Rel(r, MrX, y)$$

We want to be able to get back the answer $\{r/Son, y/Me\}$. Translating 1-9 and Q into INF

(and negating Q and including the definition of \neq) we get:

- (6a) $Rel(Parent, x, y) \wedge Male(x) \Rightarrow Rel(Father, x, y)$
- (6b) $Rel(Father, x, y) \Rightarrow Male(x)$
- (6c) $Rel(Father, x, y) \Rightarrow Rel(Parent, x, y)$
- (7a) $Rel(Son, x, y) \Rightarrow Rel(Parent, y, x)$
- (7b) $Rel(Son, x, y) \Rightarrow Male(x)$
- (7c) $Rel(Parent, y, x) \wedge Male(x) \Rightarrow Rel(Son, x, y)$
- (8a) $Rel(Sibling, x, y) \Rightarrow x \neq y$
- (8b) $Rel(Sibling, x, y) \Rightarrow Rel(Parent, P(x, y), x)$
- (8c) $Rel(Sibling, x, y) \Rightarrow Rel(Parent, P(x, y), y)$
- (8d) $Rel(Parent, P(x, y), x) \wedge Rel(Parent, P(x, y), y) \wedge x \neq y \Rightarrow Rel(Sibling, x, y)$
- (9) $Rel(Father, x_1, y) \wedge Rel(Father, x_2, y) \Rightarrow x_1 = x_2$
- (N) $True \Rightarrow x = y \vee x \neq y$
- (N') $x = y \wedge x \neq y \Rightarrow False$
- (Q') $Rel(r, MrX, y) \Rightarrow False$

Note that (1) is non-Horn, so we will need resolution to be sure of getting a solution. It turns out we also need demodulation (page 284) to deal with equality. The following lists the steps of the proof, with the resolvents of each step in parentheses:

- (10) $Rel(Parent, FM, Me)$ (4, 6c)
- (11) $Rel(Parent, FM, FX)$ (5, 7a)
- (12) $Rel(Parent, FM, y) \wedge Me \neq y \Rightarrow Rel(Sibling, Me, y)$ (10, 8d)
- (13) $Rel(Parent, FM, y) \wedge Me \neq y \Rightarrow False$ (12, 1)
- (14) $Me \neq FX \Rightarrow False$ (13, 11)
- (15) $Me = FX$ (14, N)
- (16) $Rel(Father, Me, MrX)$ (15, 3, demodulation)
- (17) $Rel(Parent, Me, MrX)$ (16, 6c)
- (18) $Rel(Son, MrX, Me)$ (17, 2, 7c)
- (19) $False \{r/Son, y/Me\}$ (18, Q')

9.12 Here is a goal tree:

```
goals = [Criminal(West)]
goals = [American(West), Weapon(y), Sells(West, y, z), Hostile(z)]
goals = [Weapon(y), Sells(West, y, z), Hostile(z)]
goals = [Missile(y), Sells(West, y, z), Hostile(z)]
goals = [Sells(West, M1, z), Hostile(z)]
goals = [Missile(M1), Owns(Nono, M1), Hostile(Nono)]
goals = [Owns(Nono, M1), Hostile(Nono)]
goals = [Hostile(Nono)]
goals = []
```

9.13

- a. In the following, an indented line is a step deeper in the proof tree, while two lines at the same indentation represent two alternative ways to prove the goal that is unindented

above it. The P1 and P2 annotation on a line mean that the first or second clause of P was used to derive the line.

P(A, [1,2,3])	goal
P(1, [1 2,3])	P1 => solution, with A = 1
P(1, [1 2,3])	P2
P(2, [2,3])	P1 => solution, with A = 2
P(2, [2,3])	P2
P(3, [3])	P1 => solution, with A = 3
P(3, [3])	P2
 P(2, [1, A, 3])	goal
P(2, [1 2, 3])	P1
P(2, [1 2, 3])	P2
P(2, [2 3])	P1 => solution, with A = 2
P(2, [2 3])	P2
P(2, [3])	P1
P(2, [3])	P2

- b. P could better be called `Member`; it succeeds when the first argument is an element of the list that is the second argument.

9.14 The different versions of `sort` illustrate the distinction between logical and procedural semantics in Prolog.

```

a. sorted([]).
   sorted([X]).
   sorted([X,Y|L]) :- X<Y, sorted([Y|L]).

b. perm([],[]).
   perm([X|L],M) :-
       delete(X,M,M1),
       perm(L,M1).

       delete(X,[X|L],L).           %% deleting an X from [X|L] yields L
       delete(X,[Y|L],[Y|M]) :- delete(X,L,M).

       member(X,[X|L]).
       member(X,[_|L]) :- member(X,L).

c. sort(L,M) :- perm(L,M), sorted(M).
```

This is about as close to an executable formal specification of sorting as you can get—it says the absolute minimum about what `sort` means: in order for `M` to be a sort of `L`, it must have the same elements as `L`, and they must be in order.

- d. Unfortunately, this doesn't fare as well as a program as it does as a specification. It is a generate-and-test sort: `perm` generates candidate permutations one at a time, and `sorted` tests them. In the worst case (when there is only one sorted permutation, and it is the last one generated), this will take $O(n!)$ generations. Since each `perm` is $O(n^2)$ and each `sorted` is $O(n)$, the whole sort is $O(n!n^2)$ in the worst case.
- e. Here's a simple insertion sort, which is $O(n^2)$:

```

isort([],[]).
isort([X|L],M) :- isort(L,M1), insert(X,M1,M).
```

```

insert(X,[],[X]).
insert(X,[Y|L],[X,Y|L]) :- X=<Y.
insert(X,[Y|L],[Y|M]) :- Y<X, insert(X,L,M).

```

9.15 This exercise illustrates the power of pattern-matching, which is built into Prolog.

- a. The code for simplification looks straightforward, but students may have trouble finding the middle way between undersimplifying and looping infinitely.

```

simplify(X,X) :- primitive(X).
simplify(X,Y) :- evaluable(X), Y is X.
simplify(Op(X)) :- simplify(X,X1), simplify_exp(Op(X1)).
simplify(Op(X,Y)) :- simplify(X,X1), simplify(Y,Y1), simplify_exp(Op(X1,Y1)).

simplify_exp(X,Y) :- rewrite(X,X1), simplify(X1,Y).
simplify_exp(X,X).

primitive(X) :- atom(X).

```

- b. Here are a few representative rewrite rules drawn from the extensive list in Norvig (1992).

```

Rewrite(X+0,X).
Rewrite(0+X,X).
Rewrite(X+X,2*X).
Rewrite(X*X,X^2).
Rewrite(X^0,1).
Rewrite(0^X,0).
Rewrite(X*N,N*X) :- number(N).
Rewrite(ln(e^X),X).
Rewrite(X^Y*X^Z,X^(Y+Z)).
Rewrite(sin(X)^2+cos(X)^2,1).

```

- c. Here are the rules for differentiation, using $d(Y, X)$ to represent the derivative of expression Y with respect to variable X .

```

Rewrite(d(X,X),1).
Rewrite(d(U,X),0) :- atom(U), U /= X.
Rewrite(d(U+V,X),d(U,X)+d(V,X)).
Rewrite(d(U-V,X),d(U,X)-d(V,X)).
Rewrite(d(U*V,X),V*d(U,X)+U*d(V,X)).
Rewrite(d(U/V,X),(V*d(U,X)-U*d(V,X))/(V^2)).
Rewrite(d(U^N,X),N*U^(N-1)*d(U,X)) :- number(N).
Rewrite(d(log(U),X),d(U,X)/U).
Rewrite(d(sin(U),X),cos(U)*d(U,X)).
Rewrite(d(cos(U),X),-sin(U)*d(U,X)).
Rewrite(d(e^U,X),d(U,X)*e^U).

```

9.16 Once you understand how Prolog works, the answer is easy:

```

solve(X,[X]) :- goal(X).
solve(X,[X|P]) :- successor(X,Y), solve(Y,P).

```

We could render this in English as “Given a start state, if it is a goal state, then the path consisting of just the start state is a solution. Otherwise, find some successor state such that there is a path from the successor to the goal; then a solution is the start state followed by that path.”

Notice that `solve` can not only be used to find a path P that is a solution, it can also be used to verify that a given path is a solution.

If you want to add heuristics (or even breadth-first search), you need an explicit queue. The algorithms become quite similar to the versions written in Lisp or Python or Java or in pseudo-code in the book.

9.17 This question tests both the student's understanding of resolution and their ability to think at a high level about relations among sets of sentences. Recall that resolution allows one to show that $KB \models \alpha$ by proving that $KB \wedge \neg\alpha$ is inconsistent. Suppose that in general the resolution system is called using $ASK(KB, \alpha)$. Now we want to show that a given sentence, say β is valid or unsatisfiable.

A sentence β is valid if it can be shown to be true without additional information. We check this by calling $ASK(KB_0, \beta)$ where KB_0 is the empty knowledge base.

A sentence β that is unsatisfiable is inconsistent by itself. So if we the empty knowledge base again and call $ASK(KB_0, \neg\beta)$ the resolution system will attempt to derive a contradiction starting from $\neg\neg\beta$. If it can do so, then it must be that $\neg\neg\beta$, and hence β , is inconsistent.

9.18 This is a form of inference used to show that Aristotle's syllogisms could not capture all sound inferences.

- a. $\forall x \text{ Horse}(x) \Rightarrow \text{Animal}(x)$
 $\forall x, h \text{ Horse}(x) \wedge \text{HeadOf}(h, x) \Rightarrow \exists y \text{ Animal}(y) \wedge \text{HeadOf}(h, y)$
- b. A. $\neg\text{Horse}(x) \vee \text{Animal}(x)$
 B. $\text{Horse}(G)$
 C. $\text{HeadOf}(H, G)$
 D. $\neg\text{Animal}(y) \vee \neg\text{HeadOf}(H, y)$
 (Here A. comes from the first sentence in a. while the others come from the second. H and G are Skolem constants.)
- c. Resolve D and C to yield $\neg\text{Animal}(G)$. Resolve this with A to give $\neg\text{Horse}(G)$. Resolve this with B to obtain a contradiction.

9.19 This exercise tests the students understanding of models and implication.

- a. (A) translates to "For every natural number there is some other natural number that is smaller than or equal to it." (B) translates to "There is a particular natural number that is smaller than or equal to any natural number."
- b. Yes, (A) is true under this interpretation. You can always pick the number itself for the "some other" number.
- c. Yes, (B) is true under this interpretation. You can pick 0 for the "particular natural number."
- d. No, (A) does not logically entail (B).
- e. Yes, (B) logically entails (A).
- f. We want to try to prove via resolution that (A) entails (B). To do this, we set our knowledge base to consist of (A) and the negation of (B), which we will call $(\neg B)$, and try to

derive a contradiction. First we have to convert (A) and (-B) to canonical form. For (-B), this involves moving the \neg in past the two quantifiers. For both sentences, it involves introducing a Skolem function:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{(A)} \quad & x \geq F_1(x) \\ \text{(-B)} \quad & \neg F_2(y) \geq y \end{aligned}$$

Now we can try to resolve these two together, but the occurs check rules out the unification. It looks like the substitution should be $\{x/F_2(y), y/F_1(x)\}$, but that is equivalent to $\{x/F_2(y), y/F_1(F_2(y))\}$, which fails because y is bound to an expression containing y . So the resolution fails, there are no other resolution steps to try, and therefore (B) does not follow from (A).

- g. To prove that (B) entails (A), we start with a knowledge base containing (B) and the negation of (A), which we will call (-A):

$$\begin{aligned} \text{(-A)} \quad & \neg F_1 \geq y \\ \text{(B)} \quad & x \geq F_2(x) \end{aligned}$$

This time the resolution goes through, with the substitution $\{x/F_1, y/F_2(F_1)\}$, thereby yielding *False*, and proving that (B) entails (A).

9.20 One way of seeing this is that resolution allows reasoning by cases, by which we can prove C by proving that either A or B is true, without knowing which one. With definite clauses, we always have a single chain of inference, for which we can follow the chain and instantiate variables.

9.21 No. Part of the definition of algorithm is that it must terminate. Since there can be an infinite number of consequences of a set of sentences, no algorithm can generate them all. Another way to see that the answer is no is to remember that entailment for FOL is semidecidable. If there were an algorithm that generates the set of consequences of a set of sentences S , then when given the task of deciding if B is entailed by S , one could just check if B is in the generated set. But we know that this is not possible, therefore generating the set of sentences is impossible.

Solutions for Chapter 10

Knowledge Representation

10.1 Shooting the wumpus makes it dead, but there are no actions that cause it to come alive. Hence the successor-state axiom for *Alive* just has the second clause:

$$\begin{aligned} \forall a, s \text{ } Alive(Wumpus, Result(a, s)) \Leftrightarrow & [Alive(x, y, s) \\ & \wedge \neg(a = Shoot \wedge Has(Agent, Arrow, s) \\ & \wedge Facing(Agent, Wumpus, s))] \end{aligned}$$

where *Facing*(*a*, *b*, *s*) is defined appropriately in terms of the locations of *a* and *b* and the orientation of *a*. Possession of the arrow is lost by shooting, and again there is no way to make it true:

$$\begin{aligned} \forall a, s \text{ } Has(Agent, Arrow, Result(a, s)) \Leftrightarrow \\ [Has(Agent, Arrow, s) \wedge (a \neq Shoot)] \end{aligned}$$

10.2

$$\begin{aligned} Time(S_0, 0) \\ Time(Result(seq, s), t) \Rightarrow Time(Result([a|seq], s), t + 1) \end{aligned}$$

Notice that the recursion needs no base case because we already have the axiom

$$Result([], s) = s.$$

10.3 This question takes the student through the initial stages of developing a logical representation for actions that incorporates more and more realism. Implementing the reasoning tasks in a theorem-prover is also a good idea. Although the use of logical reasoning for the initial task—finding a route on a graph—may seem like overkill, the student should be impressed that we can keep making the situation more complicated simply by describing those added complications, with no additions to the reasoning system.

- a. $At(Robot, Arad, S_0)$.
- b. $\exists s \text{ } At(Robot, Bucharest, s)$.
- c. The successor-state axiom should be mechanical by now. $\forall a, x, y, s :$

$$\begin{aligned} At(Robot, y, Result(a, s)) \Leftrightarrow & [(a = Go(x, y) \\ & \wedge DirectRoute(x, y) \wedge At(Robot, x, s)) \\ \vee & (At(Robot, y, s) \\ & \wedge \neg(\exists z \text{ } a = Go(y, z) \wedge z \neq y))] \end{aligned}$$

- d. To represent the amount of fuel the robot has in a given situation, use the function $Fuel(Robot, s)$. Let $Distance(x, y)$ denote the distance between cities x and y , measured in units of fuel consumption. Let $Full$ be a constant denoting the fuel capacity of the tank.
- e. The initial situation is described by $At(Robot, Arad, S_0) \wedge Fuel(Robot, s) = Full$. The above axiom for location is extended as follows (note that we do not say what happens if the robot runs out of gas). $\forall a, x, y, s$:

$$\begin{aligned}
 At(Robot, y, Result(a, s)) &\Leftrightarrow [(a = Go(x, y) \\
 &\quad \wedge DirectRoute(x, y) \wedge At(Robot, x, s) \\
 &\quad \wedge Distance(x, y) < Fuel(Robot, s)) \\
 \vee &\quad (At(Robot, y, s) \\
 &\quad \wedge \neg(\exists z \ a = Go(y, z) \wedge z \neq y))] \\
 Fuel(Robot, Result(a, s)) = f &\Leftrightarrow [(a = Go(x, y) \\
 &\quad \wedge DirectRoute(x, y) \wedge At(Robot, x, s) \\
 &\quad \wedge Distance(x, y) < Fuel(Robot, s) \\
 &\quad \wedge f = Fuel(Robot, s) - Distance(x, y)) \\
 \vee &\quad (f = Fuel(Robot, s) \\
 &\quad \wedge \neg(\exists v, w \ a = Go(v, w) \wedge v \neq w))]
 \end{aligned}$$

- f. The simplest way to extend the representation is to add the predicate $GasStation(x)$, which is true of cities with gas stations. The *Fillup* action is described by adding another clause to the above axiom for $Fuel$, saying that $f = Full$ when $a = FillUp$.

10.4 This question was inadvertently left in the exercises after the corresponding material was excised from the chapter. Future printings may omit or replace this exercise.

10.5 Remember that we defined substances so that *Water* is a category whose elements are all those things of which one might say “it’s water.” One tricky part is that the English language is ambiguous. One sense of the word “water” includes ice (“that’s frozen water”), while another sense excludes it: (“that’s not water—it’s ice”). The sentences here seem to use the first sense, so we will stick with that. It is the sense that is roughly synonymous with H_2O .

The other tricky part is that we are dealing with objects that change (freeze and melt) over time. Thus, it won’t do to say $w \in Liquid$, because w (a mass of water) might be a liquid at one time and a solid at another. For simplicity, we will use a situation calculus representation, with sentences such as $T(w \in Liquid, s)$. There are many possible correct answers to each of these. The key thing is to be *consistent* in the way that information is represented. For example, do not use *Liquid* as a predicate on objects if *Water* is used as a substance category.

- a. “Water is a liquid between 0 and 100 degrees.” We will translate this as “For any water and any situation, the water is liquid iff and only if the water’s temperature in the

situation is between 0 and 100 centigrade.”

$$\begin{aligned} \forall w, s \quad w \in \text{Water} \Rightarrow \\ (Centigrade(0) < Temperature(w, s) < Centigrade(100)) \Leftrightarrow \\ T(w \in \text{Liquid}, s) \end{aligned}$$

- b. “Water boils at 100 degrees.” It is a good idea here to do some tool-building. On page 243 we used *MeltingPoint* as a predicate applying to individual instances of a substance. Here, we will define *SBoilingPoint* to denote the boiling point of all instances of a substance. The basic meaning of boiling is that instances of the substance becomes gaseous above the boiling point:

$$\begin{aligned} SBoilingPoint(c, bp) \Leftrightarrow \\ \forall x, s \quad x \in c \Rightarrow \\ (\forall t \quad T(Temperature(x, t), s) \wedge t > bp \Rightarrow T(x \in \text{Gas}, s)) \end{aligned}$$

Then we need only say $SBoilingPoint(\text{Water}, Centigrade(100))$.

- c. “The water in John’s water bottle is frozen.”

We will use the constant *Now* to represent the situation in which this sentence holds. Note that it is easy to make mistakes in which one asserts that only some of the water in the bottle is frozen.

$$\begin{aligned} \exists b \quad \forall w \quad w \in \text{Water} \wedge b \in \text{Water Bottles} \wedge Has(\text{John}, b, \text{Now}) \\ \wedge Inside(w, b, \text{Now}) \Rightarrow (w \in \text{Solid}, \text{Now}) \end{aligned}$$

- d. “Perrier is a kind of water.”

$$\text{Perrier} \subset \text{Water}$$

- e. “John has Perrier in his water bottle.”

$$\begin{aligned} \exists b \quad \forall w \quad w \in \text{Water} \wedge b \in \text{Water Bottles} \wedge Has(\text{John}, b, \text{Now}) \\ \wedge Inside(w, b, \text{Now}) \Rightarrow w \in \text{Perrier} \end{aligned}$$

- f. “All liquids have a freezing point.”

Presumably what this means is that all substances that are liquid at room temperature have a freezing point. If we use *RTLiquidSubstance* to denote this class of substances, then we have

$$\forall c \quad RTLiquidSubstance(c) \Rightarrow \exists t \quad SFreezingPoint(c, t)$$

where *SFreezingPoint* is defined similarly to *SBoilingPoint*. Note that this statement is false in the real world: we can invent categories such as “blue liquid” which do not have a unique freezing point. An interesting exercise would be to define a “pure” substance as one all of whose instances have the same chemical composition.

- g. “A liter of water weighs more than a liter of alcohol.”

$$\begin{aligned} \forall w, a \quad w \in \text{Water} \wedge a \in \text{Alcohol} \wedge Volume(w) = \text{Liters}(1) \\ \wedge Volume(a) = \text{Liters}(1) \Rightarrow Mass(w) > Mass(a) \end{aligned}$$

10.6 This is a fairly straightforward exercise that can be done in direct analogy to the corresponding definitions for sets.

- a. *ExhaustivePartDecomposition* holds between a set of parts and a whole, saying that anything that is a part of the whole must be a part of one of the set of parts.

$$\forall s, w \text{ ExhaustivePartDecomposition}(s, w) \Leftrightarrow (\forall p \text{ PartOf}(p, w) \Rightarrow \exists p_2 p_2 \in s \wedge \text{PartOf}(p, p_2))$$

- b. *PartPartition* holds between a set of parts and a whole when the set is disjoint and is an exhaustive decomposition.

$$\forall s, w \text{ PartPartition}(s, w) \Leftrightarrow \text{PartwiseDisjoint}(s) \wedge \text{ExhaustivePartDecomposition}(s, w)$$

- c. A set of parts is *PartwiseDisjoint* if when you take any two parts from the set, there is nothing that is a part of both parts.

$$\forall s \text{ PartwiseDisjoint}(s) \Leftrightarrow \forall p_1, p_2 p_1 \in s \wedge p_2 \in s \wedge p_1 \neq p_2 \Rightarrow \neg \exists p_3 \text{ PartOf}(p_3, p_1) \wedge \text{PartOf}(p_3, p_2)$$

It is *not* the case that $\text{PartPartition}(s, \text{BunchOf}(s))$ for any s . A set s may consist of physically overlapping objects, such as a hand and the fingers of the hand. In that case, $\text{BunchOf}(s)$ is equal to the hand, but s is not a partition of it. We need to ensure that the elements of s are partwise disjoint:

$$\forall s \text{ PartwiseDisjoint}(s) \Rightarrow \text{PartPartition}(s, \text{BunchOf}(s)) .$$

10.7 For an instance i of a substance s with price per pound c and weight n pounds, the price of i will be $n \times c$, or in other words:

$$\begin{aligned} \forall i, s, n, c \quad & i \in s \wedge \text{PricePer}(s, \text{Pounds}(1)) = \$ (c) \wedge \text{Weight}(i) = \text{Pounds}(n) \\ & \Rightarrow \text{Price}(i) = \$ (n \times c) \end{aligned}$$

If b is the set of tomatoes in a bag, then $\text{BunchOf}(b)$ is the composite object consisting of all the tomatoes in the bag. Then we have

$$\begin{aligned} \forall i, s, n, c \quad & b \subset s \wedge \text{PricePer}(s, \text{Pounds}(1)) = \$ (c) \\ & \wedge \text{Weight}(\text{BunchOf}(b)) = \text{Pounds}(n) \\ & \Rightarrow \text{Price}(\text{BunchOf}(b)) = \$ (n \times c) \end{aligned}$$

10.8 In the scheme in the chapter, a conversion axiom looks like this:

$$\forall x \text{ Centimeters}(2.54 \times x) = \text{Inches}(x) .$$

“50 dollars” is just $\$(50)$, the name of an abstract monetary quantity. For any measure function such as $\$$, we can extend the use of $>$ as follows:

$$\forall x, y \quad x > y \Rightarrow \$ (x) > \$ (y) .$$

Since the conversion axiom for dollars and cents has

$$\forall x \text{ Cents}(100 \times x) = \$ (x)$$

it follows immediately that $\$(50) > \text{Cents}(50)$.

In the new scheme, we must introduce objects whose lengths are converted:

$$\forall x \text{ Centimeters}(\text{Length}(x)) = 2.54 \times \text{Inches}(\text{Length}(x)) .$$

There is no obvious way to refer directly to “50 dollars” or its relation to “50 cents”. Again, we must introduce objects whose monetary value is 50 dollars or 50 cents:

$$\forall x, y \quad \$(\text{Value}(x)) = 50 \wedge \text{Cents}(\text{Value}(y)) = 50 \Rightarrow \$(\text{Value}(x)) > \$(\text{Value}(y))$$

10.9 We will define a function *ExchangeRate* that takes three arguments: a source currency, a time interval, and a target currency. It returns a number representing the exchange rate. For example,

$$\text{ExchangeRate}(\text{USDollar}, 17\text{Feb}1995, \text{DanishKrone}) = 5.8677$$

means that you can get 5.8677 Krone for a dollar on February 17th. This was the Federal Reserve bank’s Spot exchange rate as of 10:00 AM. It is the mid-point between the buying and selling rates. A more complete analysis might want to include buying and selling rates, and the possibility for many different exchanges, as well as the commissions and fees involved. Note also the distinction between a currency such as *USDollar* and a unit of measurement, such as is used in the expression *USDollars*(1.99).

10.10 Another fun problem for clear thinkers:

- a. Remember that $T(c, i)$ means that some event of type c occurs throughout the interval i :

$$\forall c, i \quad T(c, i) \Leftrightarrow (\exists e \quad e \in c \wedge \text{During}(i, e))$$

Using *SubEvent* as the question requests is not so easy, because the interval subsumes all events within it.

- b. A *Both*(p, q) event is one in which both p and q occur throughout the duration of the event. There is only one way this can happen: both p and q have to persist for the whole interval. Another way to say it:

$$\forall i, j \quad \text{During}(j, i) \Rightarrow [T(p, j) \wedge T(q, j)]$$

is logically equivalent to

$$[\forall i, j \quad \text{During}(j, i) \Rightarrow T(p, j)] \wedge [\forall i, j \quad \text{During}(j, i) \Rightarrow T(q, j)]$$

whereas the same equivalence fails to hold for disjunction (see the next part).

- c. $T(\text{OneOf}(p, q), i)$ means that a p event occurs throughout i or a q event does:

$$\forall p, q, i \quad T(\text{OneOf}(p, q), i) \Leftrightarrow [(\forall j \quad \text{During}(j, i) \Rightarrow T(p, j)) \vee (\forall j \quad \text{During}(j, i) \Rightarrow T(q, j))]$$

On the other hand, $T(\text{Either}(p, q), i)$ holds if, at every point in i , either a p or a q is happening:

$$\forall p, q, i \quad T(\text{OneOf}(p, q), i) \Leftrightarrow (\forall j \quad \text{During}(j, i) \Rightarrow (T(p, j) \vee T(q, j)))$$

- d. $T(\text{Never}(p), i)$ should mean that there is never an event of type p going on in any subinterval of i , while $T(\text{Not}(p), i)$ should mean that there is no single event of type p that spans all of i , even though there may be one or more events of type p for subintervals of i :

$$\forall p, i \quad T(\text{Never}(p), i) \Leftrightarrow \neg \exists j \quad \text{During}(j, i) \wedge T(p, j)$$

$$\forall p, i \quad T(\text{Not}(p), i) \Leftrightarrow \neg T(p, i)$$

One could also ask students to prove two versions of de Morgan's laws using the two types of negation, each with its corresponding type of disjunction.

10.11 Any object x is an event, and $Location(x)$ is the event that for every subinterval of time, refers to the place where x is. For example, $Location(Peter)$ is the complex event consisting of his home from midnight to about 9:00 today, then various parts of the road, then his office from 10:00 to 1:30, and so on. To say that an event is fixed is to say that any two moments of the event have the same spatial extent:

$$\begin{aligned} \forall e \text{ Fixed}(e) &\Leftrightarrow \\ &(\forall a, b \ a \in Moments \wedge b \in Moments \wedge Subevent(a, e) \wedge Subevent(b, e) \\ &\Rightarrow SpatialExtent(a) = SpatialExtent(b)) \end{aligned}$$

10.12 We will omit universally quantified variables:

$$\begin{aligned} Before(i, j) &\Leftrightarrow \exists k \ Meet(i, k) \wedge Meet(k, j) \\ After(i, j) &\Leftrightarrow Before(j, i) \\ During(i, j) &\Leftrightarrow \exists k, m \ Meet(Start(j), k) \wedge Meet(k, i) \\ &\quad \wedge Meet(i, m) \wedge Meet(m, End(j)) \\ Overlap(i, j) &\Leftrightarrow \exists k \ During(k, i) \wedge During(k, j) \end{aligned}$$

10.13

$$\begin{aligned} Link(url_1, url_2) &\Leftrightarrow \\ &InTag("a", str, GetPage(url_1)) \wedge In("href = \"\" + url_2 + \"\"\", str) \\ LinkText(url_1, url_2, text) &\Leftrightarrow \\ &InTag("a", str, GetPage(url_1)) \wedge In("href = \"\" + url_2 + \"\"\" + text, str) \end{aligned}$$

10.14 Here is an initial sketch of one approach. (Others are possible.) A given object to be purchased may *require* some additional parts (e.g., batteries) to be functional, and there may also be *optional* extras. We can represent requirements as a relation between an individual object and a class of objects, qualified by the number of objects required:

$$\forall x \ x \in Coolpix995DigitalCamera \Rightarrow Requires(x, AABattery, 4) .$$

We also need to know that a particular object is compatible, i.e., fills a given role appropriately. For example,

$$\begin{aligned} \forall x, y \ x \in Coolpix995DigitalCamera \wedge y \in DuracellAABattery \\ \Rightarrow Compatible(y, x, AABattery) \end{aligned}$$

Then it is relatively easy to test whether the set of ordered objects contains compatible required objects for each object.

10.15 Plurals can be handled by a *Plural* relation between strings, e.g.,

$$Plural("computer", "computers")$$

plus an assertion that the plural (or singular) of a name is also a name for the same category:

$$\forall c, s_1, s_2 \ Name(s_1, c) \wedge (Plural(s_1, s_2) \vee Plural(s_2, s_1)) \Rightarrow Name(s_2, c)$$

Conjunctions can be handled by saying that any conjunction string is a name for a category if one of the conjuncts is a name for the category:

$$\forall c, s, s_2 \text{ Conjunct}(s_2, s) \wedge \text{Name}(s_2, c) \Rightarrow \text{Name}(s, c)$$

where *Conjunct* is defined appropriately in terms of concatenation. Probably it would be better to redefine *RelevantCategoryName* instead.

10.16 Chapter 22 explains how to use logic to parse text strings and extract semantic information. The outcome of this process is a definition of what objects are acceptable to the user for a specific shopping request; this allows the agent to go out and find offers matching the user's requirements. We omit the full definition of the agent, although a skeleton may appear on the AIMA project web pages.

10.17 Here is a simple version of the answer; it can be elaborated *ad infinitum*. Let the term $\text{Buy}(b, x, s, p)$ denote the event category of buyer b buying object x from seller s for price p . We want to say about it that b transfers the money to s , and s transfers ownership of x to b .

$$\begin{aligned} T(\text{Buy}(b, x, s, p), i) \Leftrightarrow & \\ & T(\text{Owns}(s, x), \text{Start}(i)) \wedge \\ & \exists m \text{ Money}(m) \wedge p = \text{Value}(m) \wedge T(\text{Owns}(b, m), \text{Start}(i)) \wedge \\ & T(\text{Owns}(b, x), \text{End}(i)) \wedge T(\text{Owns}(s, m), \text{End}(i)) \end{aligned}$$

10.18 Let $\text{Trade}(b, x, a, y)$ denote the class of events where person b trades object y to person a for object x :

$$\begin{aligned} T(\text{Trade}(b, x, a, y), i) \Leftrightarrow & \\ & T(\text{Owns}(b, y), \text{Start}(i)) \wedge T(\text{Owns}(a, x), \text{Start}(i)) \wedge \\ & T(\text{Owns}(b, x), \text{End}(i)) \wedge T(\text{Owns}(a, y), \text{End}(i)) \end{aligned}$$

Now the only tricky part about defining buying in terms of trading is in distinguishing a price (a measurement) from an actual collection of money.

$$T(\text{Buy}(b, x, a, p), i) \Leftrightarrow \exists m \text{ Money}(m) \wedge \text{Trade}(b, x, a, m) \wedge \text{Value}(m) = p$$

10.19 There are many possible approaches to this exercise. The idea is for the students to think about doing knowledge representation for real; to consider a host of complications and find some way to represent the facts about them. Some of the key points are:

- Ownership occurs over time, so we need either a situation-calculus or interval-calculus approach.
- There can be joint ownership and corporate ownership. This suggests the owner is a group of some kind, which in the simple case is a group of one person.
- Ownership provides certain rights: to use, to resell, to give away, etc. Much of this is outside the definition of ownership *per se*, but a good answer would at least consider how much of this to represent.
- Own can own abstract obligations as well as concrete objects. This is the idea behind the futures market, and also behind banks: when you deposit a dollar in a bank, you are giving up ownership of that particular dollar in exchange for ownership of the right

to withdraw another dollar later. (Or it could coincidentally turn out to be the exact same dollar.) Leases and the like work this way as well. This is tricky in terms of representation, because it means we have to reify transactions of this kind. That is, $Withdraw(person, money, bank, time)$ must be an object, not a predicate.

10.20 Most schools distinguish between required courses and elected courses, and between courses inside the department and outside the department. For each of these, there may be requirements for the number of courses, the number of units (since different courses may carry different numbers of units), and on grade point averages. We show our chosen vocabulary by example:

- Student Jones' complete course of study for the whole college career consists of Math1, CS1, CS2, CS3, CS21, CS33 and CS34, and some other courses outside the major.

$$Take(Jones, \{Math1, EE1, Bio24, CS1, CS2, CS3, CS21, CS33, CS34 | others\})$$

- Jones meets the requirements for a major in Computer Science

$$Major(Jones, CS)$$

- Courses Math1, CS1, CS2, and CS3 are required for a Computer Science major.

$$Required(\{Math1, CS1, CS2, CS3\}, CS)$$

$$\forall s, d \text{ } Required(s, d) \Leftrightarrow$$

$$(\forall p \exists others \text{ } Major(p, d) \Rightarrow Take(p, Union(s, others)))$$

- A student must take at least 18 units in the CS department to get a degree in CS.

$$Department(CS1) = CS \wedge Department(Math1) = Math \wedge \dots$$

$$Units(CS1) = 3 \wedge Units(CS2) = 4 \wedge \dots$$

$$RequiredUnitsIn(18, CS, CS)$$

$$\forall u, d \text{ } RequiredUnitsIn(u, d) \Leftrightarrow$$

$$(\forall p \exists s, others \text{ } Major(p, d) \Rightarrow Take(p, Union(s, others))$$

$$\wedge AllInDepartment(s, d) \wedge TotalUnits(s) \geq u$$

$$\forall s, d \text{ } AllInDepartment(s, d) \Leftrightarrow (\forall c \text{ } c \in s \Rightarrow Department(c) = d)$$

$$\forall c \text{ } TotalUnits(\{c\}) = 0$$

$$\forall c, s \text{ } TotalUnits(\{c|s\}) = Units(c) + TotalUnits(s)$$

One can easily imagine other kinds of requirements; these just give you a flavor.

In this solution we took “over an extended period” to mean that we should recommend a set of courses to take, without scheduling them on a semester-by-semester basis. If you wanted to do that, you would need additional information such as when courses are taught, what is a reasonable course load in a semester, and what courses are prerequisites for what others. For example:

$$Taught(CS1, Fall)$$

$$Prerequisites(\{CS1, CS2\}, CS3)$$

$$TakeInSemester(Jones, Fall95, \{Math1, CS1, English1, History1\})$$

$$MaxCoursesPerSemester(5)$$

The problem with finding the *best* program of study is in defining what *best* means to the student. It is easy enough to say that all other things being equal, one prefers a good teacher to a bad one, or an interesting course to a boring one. But how do you decide which is best when one course has a better teacher and is expected to be easier, while an alternative is more interesting and provides one more credit? Chapter 16 uses utility theory to address this. If you can provide a way of weighing these elements against each other, then you can choose a best program of study; otherwise you can only eliminate some programs as being worse than others, but can't pick an absolute best one. Complexity is a further problem: with a general-purpose theorem-prover it's hard to do much more than enumerate legal programs and pick the best.

10.21 This exercise and the following two are rather complex, perhaps suitable for term projects. At this point, we want to strongly urge that you do assign some of these exercises (or ones like them) to give your students a feeling of what it is really like to do knowledge representation. In general, students find classification hierarchies easier than other representation tasks. A recent twist is to compare one's hierarchy with online ones such as `yahoo.com`.

10.22 This is the most involved representation problem. It is suitable for a group project of 2 or 3 students over the course of at least 2 weeks.

10.23 Normally one would assign 10.22 in one assignment, and then when it is done, add this exercise (possibly varying the questions). That way, the students see whether they have made sufficient generalizations in their initial answer, and get experience with debugging and modifying a knowledge base.

10.24 In many AI and Prolog textbooks, you will find it stated plainly that implications suffice for the implementation of inheritance. This is true in the logical but not the practical sense.

- a. Here are three rules, written in Prolog. We actually would need many more clauses on the right hand side to distinguish between different models, different options, etc.

```
worth(X,575) :- year(X,1973), make(X,dodge), style(X,van).
worth(X,27000) :- year(X,1994), make(X,lexus), style(X,sedan).
worth(X,5000) :- year(X,1987), make(X,toyota), style(X,sedan).
```

To find the value of JB, given a data base with `year(jb,1973)`, `make(jb,dodge)` and `style(jb,van)` we would call the backward chainer with the goal `worth(jb,D)`, and read the value for D.

- b. The time efficiency of this query is $O(n)$, where n in this case is the 11,000 entries in the Blue Book. A semantic network with inheritance would allow us to follow a link from JB to 1973-dodge-van, and from there to follow the worth slot to find the dollar value in $O(1)$ time.
- c. With forward chaining, as soon as we are told the three facts about JB, we add the new fact `worth(jb,575)`. Then when we get the query `worth(jb,D)`, it is $O(1)$ to find the answer, assuming indexing on the predicate and first argument. This makes logical inference seem just like semantic networks except for two things: the logical

inference does a hash table lookup instead of pointer following, and logical inference explicitly stores `worth` statements for each individual car, thus wasting space if there are a lot of individual cars. (For this kind of application, however, we will probably want to consider only a few individual cars, as opposed to the 11,000 different models.)

- d. If each category has many properties—for example, the specifications of all the replacement parts for the vehicle—then forward-chaining on the implications will also be an impractical way to figure out the price of a vehicle.
- e. If we have a rule of the following kind:

```
worth(X,D) :- year-make-style(X,Yr,Mk,St),
              year-make-style(Y,Yr,Mk,St), worth(Y,D).
```

together with facts in the database about some other specific vehicle of the same type as JB, then the query `worth(jb,D)` will be solved in $O(1)$ time with appropriate indexing, regardless of how many other facts are known about that type of vehicle and regardless of the number of types of vehicle.

10.25 When categories are reified, they can have properties as individual objects (such as *Cardinality* and *Supersets*) that do not apply to their elements. Without the distinction between boxed and unboxed links, the sentence *Cardinality(SingletonSets, 1)* might mean that every singleton set has one element, or that there is only one singleton set.

Solutions for Chapter 11

Planning

11.1 Both problem solver and planner are concerned with getting from a start state to a goal using a set of defined operations or actions. But in planning we open up the representation of states, goals, and plans, whcihc allows for a wider variety of algorithms that decompose the search space.

11.2 This is an easy exercise, the point of which is to understand that “applicable” means satisfying the preconditions, and that a concrete action instance is one with the variables replaced by constants. The applicable actions are:

$Fly(P_1, JFK, SFO)$
 $Fly(P_1, JFK, JFK)$
 $Fly(P_2, SFO, JFK)$
 $Fly(P_2, SFO, SFO)$

A minor point of this is that the action of flying nowhere—from one airport to itself—is allowable by the definition of *Fly*, and is applicable (if not useful).

11.3 For the regular schema we have:

$FlyPrecond(p, f, to, s) \Leftrightarrow$
 $At(p, f, s) \wedge Plane(p) \wedge Airport(f) \wedge Airport(to)$
 $At(p, x, Result(a, s)) \Leftrightarrow$
 $(At(p, x, s) \wedge (a \neq Fly(p, f, x) \vee \neg FlyPrecond(p, f, x, s)))$
 $\vee At(p, f, s) \wedge a = Fly(p, f, x) \wedge FlyPrecond(p, f, x, s)$

When we add *Warped* we get:

$At(p, x, Result(a, s)) \Leftrightarrow$
 $(At(p, x, s) \wedge (a \neq Fly(p, f, x) \wedge a \neq Teleport(p, f, x))$
 $\vee a = Fly(p, f, x) \wedge \neg FlyPrecond(p, f, x, s)$
 $\vee a = Teleport(p, f, x) \wedge \neg TeleportPrecond(p, f, x, s)$
 $\vee At(p, f, s) \wedge a = Fly(p, f, x) \wedge FlyPrecond(p, f, x, s)$
 $\vee At(p, f, s) \wedge a = Teleport(p, f, x) \wedge TeleportPrecond(p, f, x, s)$

In general, we (1) created a *Precond* predicate for each action, and then, for each fluent such as *At*, we create a predicate that says the fluent keeps its old value if either an irrelevant action is taken, or an action whose precondition is not satisfied, and it takes on a new value according to the effects of a relevant action if that action’s preconditions are satisfied.

11.4 This exercise is intended as a fairly easy exercise in describing a domain. It is similar to the Shakey problem (11.13), so you should probably assign only one of these two.

a. The initial state is:

$$\begin{aligned} &At(Monkey, A) \wedge At(Bananas, B) \wedge At(Box, C) \wedge \\ &Height(Monkey, Low) \wedge Height(Box, Low) \wedge Height(Bananas, High) \wedge \\ &Pushable(Box) \wedge Climbable(Box) \end{aligned}$$

b. The actions are:

$$\begin{aligned} &Action(ACTION:Go(x, y), PRECOND:At(Monkey, x), \\ &\quad EFFECT:At(Monkey, y) \wedge \neg(At(Monkey, x))) \\ &Action(ACTION:Push(b, x, y), PRECOND:At(Monkey, x) \wedge Pushable(b), \\ &\quad EFFECT:At(b, y) \wedge At(Monkey, y) \wedge \neg At(b, x) \wedge \neg At(Monkey, x)) \\ &Action(ACTION:ClimbUp(b), \\ &\quad PRECOND:At(Monkey, x) \wedge At(b, x) \wedge Climbable(b), \\ &\quad EFFECT:On(Monkey, b) \wedge \neg Height(Monkey, High)) \\ &Action(ACTION:Grasp(b), \\ &\quad PRECOND:Height(Monkey, h) \wedge Height(b, h) \\ &\quad \wedge At(Monkey, x) \wedge At(b, x), \\ &\quad EFFECT:Have(Monkey, b)) \\ &Action(ACTION:ClimbDown(b), \\ &\quad PRECOND:On(Monkey, b) \wedge Height(Monkey, High), \\ &\quad EFFECT:\neg On(Monkey, b) \wedge \neg Height(Monkey, High) \\ &\quad \wedge Height(Monkey, Low)) \\ &Action(ACTION:UnGrasp(b), PRECOND:Have(Monkey, b), \\ &\quad EFFECT:\neg Have(Monkey, b)) \end{aligned}$$

c. In situation calculus, the goal is a state s such that:

$$Have(Monkey, Bananas, s) \wedge (\exists x \ At(Box, x, s_0) \wedge At(Box, x, s))$$

In STRIPS, we can only talk about the goal state; there is no way of representing the fact that there must be some relation (such as equality of location of an object) between two states within the plan. So there is no way to represent this goal.

d. Actually, we did include the *Pushable* precondition. This is an example of the qualification problem.

11.5 Only positive literals are represented in a state. So not mentioning a literal is the same as having it be negative.

11.6 Goals and preconditions can only be positive literals. So a negative effect can only make it harder to achieve a goal (or a precondition to an action that achieves the goal). Therefore, eliminating all negative effects only makes a problem easier.

11.7

a. It is feasible to use bidirectional search, because it is possible to invert the actions. However, most of those who have tried have concluded that bidirectional search is

generally not efficient, because the forward and backward searches tend to miss each other. This is due to the large state space. A few planners, such as PRODIGY (Fink and Blythe, 1998) have used bidirectional search.

- b. Again, this is feasible but not popular. PRODIGY is in fact (in part) a partial-order planner: in the forward direction it keeps a total-order plan (equivalent to a state-based planner), and in the backward direction it maintains a tree-structured partial-order plan.
- c. An action A can be added if all the preconditions of A have been achieved by other steps in the plan. When A is added, ordering constraints and causal links are also added to make sure that A appears after all the actions that enabled it and that a precondition is not disestablished before A can be executed. The algorithm does search forward, but it is not the same as forward state-space search because it can explore actions in parallel when they don't conflict. For example, if A has three preconditions that can be satisfied by the non-conflicting actions B , C , and D , then the solution plan can be represented as a single partial-order plan, while a state-space planner would have to consider all $3!$ permutations of B , C , and D .
- d. Yes, this is one possible way of implementing a bidirectional search in the space of partial-order plans.

11.8 The drawing is actually rather complex, and doesn't fit well on this page. Some key things to watch out for: (1) Both *Fly* and *Load* actions are possible at level A_0 ; the planes can still fly when empty. (2) Negative effects appear in S_1 , and are mutex with their positive counterparts.

11.9

- a. Literals are persistent, so if it does not appear in the final level, it never will and never did, and thus cannot be achieved.
- b. In a serial planning graph, only one action can occur per time step. The level cost (the level at which a literal first appears) thus represents the minimum number of actions in a plan that might possibly achieve the literal.

11.10 A forward state-space planner maintains a partial plan that is a strict linear sequence of actions; the plan refinement operator is to add an applicable action to the end of the sequence, updating literals according to the action's effects.

A backward state-space planner maintains a partial plan that is a reversed sequence of actions; the refinement operator is to add an action to the beginning of the sequence as long as the action's effects are compatible with the state at the beginning of the sequence.

11.11 The initial state is:

$$On(B, Table) \wedge On(C, A) \wedge On(A, Table) \wedge Clear(B) \wedge Clear(C)$$

The goal is:

$$On(A, B) \wedge On(B, C)$$

First we'll explain why it is an anomaly for a noninterleaved planner. There are two subgoals; suppose we decide to work on $On(A, B)$ first. We can clear C off of A and then move A

on to B . But then there is no way to achieve $On(B, C)$ without undoing the work we have done. Similarly, if we work on the subgoal $On(B, C)$ first we can immediately achieve it in one step, but then we have to undo it to get A on B .

Now we'll show how things work out with an interleaved planner such as POP. Since $On(A, B)$ isn't true in the initial state, there is only one way to achieve it: $Move(A, x, B)$, for some x . Similarly, we also need a $Move(B, x', C)$ step, for some x' . Now let's look at the $Move(A, x, B)$ step. We need to achieve its precondition $Clear(A)$. We could do that either with $Move(b, A, y)$ or with $MoveToTable(b, A)$. Let's assume we choose the latter. Now if we bind b to C , then all of the preconditions for the step $MoveToTable(C, A)$ are true in the initial state, and we can add causal links to them. We then notice that there is a threat: the $Move(B, x', C)$ step threatens the $Clear(C)$ condition that is required by the $MoveToTable$ step. We can resolve the threat by ordering $Move(B, x', C)$ after the $MoveToTable$ step. Finally, notice that all the preconditions for $Move(B, x', C)$ are true in the initial state. Thus, we have a complete plan with all the preconditions satisfied. It turns out there is a well-ordering of the three steps:

MoveToTable(C, A)
Move(B, Table, C)
Move(A, Table, B)

11.12 The actions we need are the four from page 346:

Action(ACTION:RightShoe, PRECOND:RightSockOn, EFFECT:RightShoeOn)
Action(ACTION:RightSock, EFFECT:RightSockOn)
Action(ACTION:LeftShoe, PRECOND:LeftSockOn, EFFECT:LeftShoeOn)
Action(ACTION:LeftSock, EFFECT:LeftSockOn)


One solution found by GRAPHPLAN is to execute *RightSock* and *LeftSock* in the first time step, and then *RightShoe* and *LeftShoe* in the second.

Now we add the following two actions (neither of which has preconditions):

Action(ACTION:Hat, EFFECT:HatOn)
Action(ACTION:Coat, EFFECT:CoatOn)

The partial-order plan is shown in Figure S11.1. We saw on page 348 that there are 6 total-order plans for the shoes/socks problem. Each of these plans has four steps, and thus five arrow links. The next step, *Hat* could go at any one of these five locations, giving us $6 \times 5 = 30$ total-order plans, each with five steps and six links. Then the final step, *Coat*, can go in any one of these 6 positions, giving us $30 \times 6 = 180$ total-order plans.

11.13 The actions are quite similar to the monkey and bananas problem—you should prob-



ably assign only one of these two problems. The actions are:

$Action(ACTION:Go(x, y), PRECOND:At(Shakey, x) \wedge In(x, r) \wedge In(y, r),$
 $EFFECT:At(Shakey, y) \wedge \neg(At(Shakey, x)))$
 $Action(ACTION:Push(b, x, y), PRECOND:At(Shakey, x) \wedge Pushable(b),$
 $EFFECT:At(b, y) \wedge At(Shakey, y) \wedge \neg At(b, x) \wedge \neg At(Shakey, x))$
 $Action(ACTION:ClimbUp(b), PRECOND:At(Shakey, x) \wedge At(b, x) \wedge Climbable(b),$
 $EFFECT:On(Shakey, b) \wedge \neg On(Shakey, Floor))$
 $Action(ACTION:ClimbDown(b), PRECOND:On(Shakey, b),$
 $EFFECT:On(Shakey, Floor) \wedge \neg On(Shakey, b))$
 $Action(ACTION:TurnOn(l), PRECOND:On(Shakey, b) \wedge At(Shakey, x) \wedge At(l, x),$
 $EFFECT:TurnedOn(l))$
 $Action(ACTION:TurnOff(l), PRECOND:On(Shakey, b) \wedge At(Shakey, x) \wedge At(l, x),$
 $EFFECT:\neg TurnedOn(l))$

The initial state is:

$In(Switch_1, Room_1) \wedge In(Door_1, Room_1) \wedge In(Door_1, Corridor)$
 $In(Switch_1, Room_2) \wedge In(Door_2, Room_2) \wedge In(Door_2, Corridor)$
 $In(Switch_1, Room_3) \wedge In(Door_3, Room_3) \wedge In(Door_3, Corridor)$
 $In(Switch_1, Room_4) \wedge In(Door_4, Room_4) \wedge In(Door_4, Corridor)$
 $In(Shakey, Room_3) \wedge At(Shakey, X_5)$
 $In(Box_1, Room_1) \wedge In(Box_2, Room_1) \wedge In(Box_3, Room_1) \wedge In(Box_4, Room_1)$
 $Climbable(Box_1) \wedge Climbable(Box_2) \wedge Climbable(Box_3) \wedge Climbable(Box_4)$
 $Pushable(Box_1) \wedge Pushable(Box_2) \wedge Pushable(Box_3) \wedge Pushable(Box_4)$
 $At(Box_1, X_1) \wedge At(Box_2, X_2) \wedge At(Box_3, X_3) \wedge At(Box_4, X_4)$
 $TurnwdOn(Switch_1) \wedge TurnedOn(Switch_4)$

A plan to achieve the goal is:

$Go(X_S, Door_3)$
 $Go(Door_3, Door_1)$
 $Go(Door_1, X_2)$
 $Push(Box_2, X_2, Door_1)$
 $Push(Box_2, Door_1, Door_2)$
 $Push(Box_2, Door_2, Switch_2)$

11.14 GRAPHPLAN is a propositional algorithm, so, just as we could solve certain FOL by translating them into propositional logic, we can solve certain situation calculus problems by translating into propositional form. The trick is how exactly to do that.

The *Finish* action in POP planning has as its preconditions the goal state. We can create a *Finish* action for GRAPHPLAN, and give it the effect *Done*. In this case there would be a finite number of instantiations of the *Finish* action, and we would reason with them.

11.15 (Figure (11.1) is a little hard to find—it is on page 403.)

- a. The point of this exercise is to consider what happens when a planner comes up with an impossible action, such as flying a plane from someplace where it is not. For example, suppose P_1 is at *JFK* and we give it the action of flying from Bangalore to Brisbane. By (11.1), P_1 was at *JFK* and did not fly away, so it is still there.
- b. Yes, the plan will still work, because the fluents hold from the situation before an inapplicable action to the state afterward, so the plan can continue from that state.
- c. It depends on the details of how the axioms are written. Our axioms were of the form *Action is possible* \Rightarrow *Rule*. This tells us nothing about the case where the action is not possible. We would need to reformulate the axioms, or add additional ones to say what happens when the action is not possible.

11.16 A **precondition axiom** is of the form

$$Fly(P_1, JFK, SFO)^0 \Rightarrow At(P_1, JFK)^0.$$

There are $O(T \times |P| \times |A|^2)$ of these axioms, where T is the number of time steps, $|P|$ is the number of planes and $|A|$ is the number of airports. More generally, if there are n action schemata of maximum arity k , with $|O|$ objects, then there are $O(n \times T \times |O|^k)$ axioms.

With symbol-splitting, we don't have to describe each specific flight, we need only say that for a plane to fly *anywhere*, it must be at the start airport. That is,

$$Fly_1(P_1)^0 \wedge Fly_2(JFK)^0 \Rightarrow At(P_1, JFK)^0$$

More generally, if there are n action schemata of maximum arity k , with $|O|$ objects, and each precondition axiom depends on just two of the arguments, then there are $O(n \times T \times |O|^2)$ axioms, for a speedup of $O(|O|^{k-2})$.

An **action exclusion axiom** is of the form

$$\neg(Fly(P_2, JFK, SFO)^0 \wedge Fly(P_2, JFK, LAX)^0).$$

With the notation used above, there are $O(T \times |P| \times |A|^3)$ axioms for *Fly*. More generally, there can be up to $O(n \times T \times |O|^{2k})$ axioms.

With symbol-splitting, we wouldn't gain anything for the *Fly* axioms, but we would gain in cases where there is another variable that is not relevant to the exclusion.

11.17

- a. Yes, this will find a plan whenever the normal SATPLAN finds a plan no longer than T_{max} .
- b. No.
- c. There is no simple and clear way to induce WALKSAT to find short solutions, because it has no notion of the length of a plan—the fact that the problem is a planning problem is part of the encoding, not part of WALKSAT. But if we are willing to do some rather brutal surgery on WALKSAT, we can achieve shorter solutions by identifying the variables that represent actions and (1) tending to randomly initialize the action variables (particularly the later ones) to false, and (2) preferring to randomly flip an earlier action variable rather than a later one.

Solutions for Chapter 12

Planning and Acting in the Real World

12.1

- a. *Duration*(*d*) is *eligible* to be an effect because the action does have the effect of moving the clock by *d*. It is possible that the duration depends on the action outcome, so if disjunctive or conditional effects are used there must be a way to associate durations with outcomes, which is most easily done by putting the duration into the outcome expression.
- b. The STRIPS model assumes that actions are time points characterized only by their preconditions and effects. Even if an action occupies a resource, that has no effect on the outcome state (as explained on page 420). Therefore, we must extend the STRIPS formalism. We could do this by treating a RESOURCE: effect differently from other effects, but the difference is sufficiently large that it makes more sense to treat it separately.

12.2 The basic idea here is to record the initial resource level in the precondition and the change in resource level in the effect of each action.

- a. Let *Screws*(*s*) denote the fact that there are *s* screws. We need to add *Screws*(100) to the initial state, and add a fourth argument to the *Engine* predicate indicating the number of screws required—i.e., *Engine*(*E*₁, *C*₁, 30, 40) and *Engine*(*E*₂, *C*₂, 60, 50). We add *Screws*(*s*₀) to the precondition of *AddEngine* and add *s* as a fourth argument of the *Engine* literal. Then add *Screws*(*s*₀ − *s*) to the effect of *AddEngine*.
- b. A simple solution is to say that any action that consumes a resource is potentially in conflict with any causal link protecting the same resource.
- c. The planner can keep track of the resource requirements of actions added to the plan and backtrack whenever the total usage exceeds the initial amount.

12.3 There is a wide range of possible answers to this question. The important point is that students understand what constitutes a correct implementation of an action: as mentioned on page 424, it must be a consistent plan where all the preconditions and effects are accounted for. So the first thing we need is to decide on the preconditions and effects of the high-level actions. For *GetPermit*, assume the precondition is owning land, and the effect is having a permit for that piece of land. For *HireBuilder*, the precondition is having the ability to pay, and the effect is having a signed contract in hand.

One possible decomposition for *GetPermit* is the three-step sequence *GetPermitForm*, *FillOutForm*, and *GetFormApproved*. There is a causal link with the condition *HaveForm* between the first two, and one with the condition *HaveCompletedForm* between the last two. Finally, the *GetFormApproved* step has the effect *HavePermit*. This is a valid decomposition.

For *HireBuilder*, suppose we choose the three-step sequence *InterviewBuilders*, *ChooseBuilder*, and *SignContract*. This last step has the precondition *AbleToPay* and the effect *HaveContractInHand*. There are also causal links between the substeps, but they don't affect the correctness of the decomposition.

12.4 Consider the problem of building two adjacent walls of the house. Mostly these subplans are independent, but they must share the step of putting up a common post at the corner of the two walls. If that step was not shared, we would end up with an extra post, and two unattached walls.

Note that tasks are often decomposed specifically so as to minimize the amount of step sharing. For example, one could decompose the house building task into subtasks such as “walls” and “floors.” However, real contractors don't do it that way. Instead they have “rough walls” and “rough floors” steps, followed by a “finishing” step.

12.5 In the HTN view, the space of possible decompositions may constrain the allowable solutions, eliminating some possible sequences of primitive actions. For example, the decomposition of the *LAToNYRoundTrip* action can stipulate that the agent should go to New York. In a simple STRIPS formulation where the start and goal states are the same, the empty plan is a solution. We can get around this problem by rethinking the goal description. The goal state is not $At(LA)$, but $At(LA) \wedge Visited(NY)$. We add $Visited(y)$ as an effect of $Fly(x, y)$. Then, the solution must be a trip that includes New York. There remains the problem of preventing the STRIPS plan from including other stops on its itinerary; fixing this is much more difficult because negated goals are not allowed.

12.6 Suppose we have a STRIPS action description for a with precondition p and effect q . The “action” to be decomposed is $Achieve(q)$. The decomposition has two steps: $Achieve(p)$ and a . This can be extended in the obvious way for conjunctive effects and preconditions.

12.7 We need one action, *Assign*, which assigns the value in the source register (or variable if you prefer, but the term “register” makes it clearer that we are dealing with a physical location) sr to the destination register dr :

Action(ACTION: *Assign*(dr, sr),
PRECOND: $Register(dr) \wedge Register(sr) \wedge Value(dr, dv) \wedge Value(sr, sv)$,
EFFECT: $Value(dr, sv) \wedge \neg Value(dr, dv)$)

Now suppose we start in an initial state with $Register(R_1) \wedge Register(R_2) \wedge Value(R_1, V_1) \wedge Value(R_2, V_2)$ and we have the goal $Value(R_1, V_2) \wedge Value(R_2, V_1)$. Unfortunately, there is no way to solve this as is. We either need to add an explicit $Register(R_3)$ condition to the initial state, or we need a way to create new registers. That could be done with an action for

allocating a new register:

$Action(ACTION: Allocate(r),$
 $EFFECT: Register(r))$

Then the following sequence of steps constitutes a valid plan:

$Allocate(R_3)$
 $Assign(R_3, R_1)$
 $Assign(R_1, R_2)$
 $Assign(R_2, R_1)$

12.8 For the first case, where one instance of action schema a is in the plan, the reformulation is correct, in the sense that a solution for the original disjunctive formulation is a solution for the new formulation and *vice versa*. For the second case, where more than one instance of the action schema may occur, the reformulation is incorrect. It assumes that the outcomes of the instances are governed by a single hidden variable, so that if, for example, P is the outcome of one instance it must also be the outcome of the other. It is possible that a solution for the reformulated case will fail in the original formulation.

12.9 With unbounded indeterminacy, the set of possible effects for each action is unknown or too large to be enumerated. Hence, the space of possible actions sequences required to handle all these eventualities is far too large to consider.

12.10 Using the second definition of *Clear* in the chapter—namely, that there is a clear space for a block—the only change is that the destination remains clear if it is the table:

$Action(Move(b, x, y),$
 $PRECOND: On(b, x) \wedge Clear(b) \wedge Clear(y),$
 $EFFECT: On(b, y) \wedge Clear(x) \wedge \neg On(b, x) \wedge (\text{when } y \neq Table: \neg Clear(y)))$

12.11 Let *CleanH* be true iff the robot's current square is clean and *CleanO* be true iff the other square is clean. Then *Suck* is characterized by

$Action(Suck, PRECOND:, EFFECT: CleanH)$

Unfortunately, moving affects these new literals! For *Left* we have

$Action(Left, PRECOND: AtR,$
 $EFFECT: AtL \wedge \neg AtR \wedge \text{when } CleanH: CleanO \wedge \text{when } CleanO: CleanH$
 $\wedge \text{when } \neg CleanO: \neg CleanH \wedge \text{when } \neg CleanH: \neg CleanO)$

with the dual for *Right*.

12.12 Here we borrow from the last description of the *Left* on page 433:

$Action(Suck, PRECOND:,$
 $EFFECT: (\text{when } AtL: CleanL \vee (\text{when } CleanL: \neg CleanL))$
 $\wedge (\text{when } AtR: CleanR \vee (\text{when } CleanR: \neg CleanR)))$

12.13 The main thing to notice here is that the vacuum cleaner moves repeatedly over dirty areas—presumably, until they are clean. Also, each forward move is typically short, followed

by an immediate reversing over the same area. This is explained in terms of a disjunctive outcome: the area may be fully cleaned or not, the reversing enables the agent to check, and the repetition ensures completion (unless the dirt is ingrained). Thus, we have a strong cyclic plan with sensing actions.

12.14

a. “Lather. Rinse. Repeat.”

This is an unconditional plan, if taken literally, involving an infinite loop. If the precondition of *Lather* is $\neg Clean$, and the goal is *Clean*, then execution monitoring will cause execution to terminate once *Clean* is achieved because at that point the correct repair is the empty plan.

b. “Apply shampoo to scalp and let it remain for several minutes. Rinse and repeat if necessary.”

This is a conditional plan where “if necessary” presumably tests $\neg Clean$.

c. “See a doctor if problems persist.”

This is also a conditional step, although it is not specified here what problems are tested.

12.17 First, we need to decide if the precondition is satisfied. There are three cases:

- a. If it is known to be unsatisfied, the new belief state is identical to the old (since we assume nothing happens).
- b. If it is known to be satisfied, the unconditional effects (which are all knowledge propositions) are added and deleted from the belief state in the usual STRIPS fashion. Each conditional effect whose condition is known to be true is handled in the same way. For each setting of the unknown conditions, we create a belief state with the appropriate additions and deletions.
- c. If the status of the precondition is unknown, each new belief state is effectively the disjunction of the unchanged belief state from (a) with one of the belief states obtained from (b). To enforce the “list of knowledge propositions” representation, we keep those propositions that are identical in each of the two belief states being disjoined and discard those that differ. This results in a weaker belief state than if we were to retain the disjunction; on the other hand, retaining the disjunctions over many steps could lead to exponentially large representations.

12.18 For *Right* we have the obvious dual version of Equation 12.2:

$$\begin{aligned}
 &Action(Right, \text{PRECOND: } AtL, \\
 &\quad \text{EFFECT: } K(AtR) \wedge \neg K(AtL) \wedge \mathbf{when} \text{ } CleanL: \neg K(CleanL) \wedge \\
 &\quad \mathbf{when} \text{ } CleanR: K(CleanR) \wedge \mathbf{when} \neg CleanR: K(\neg CleanR))
 \end{aligned}$$

With *Suck*, dirt is sometimes deposited when the square is clean. With automatic dirt sensing,

this is always detected, so we have a disjunctive conditional effect:

$$\begin{aligned} & \text{Action}(\text{Suck}, \text{PRECOND:}, \\ & \quad \text{EFFECT:} \mathbf{when} \text{ } AtL \wedge \neg CleanL: K(CleanL) \\ & \quad \quad \wedge \mathbf{when} \text{ } AtL \wedge CleanL: K(CleanL) \vee \neg K(CleanL) \wedge \\ & \quad \quad \mathbf{when} \text{ } AtR \wedge \neg CleanR: K(CleanR) \\ & \quad \quad \wedge \mathbf{when} \text{ } AtR \wedge CleanR: K(CleanR) \vee \neg K(CleanR) \end{aligned}$$

12.19 The continuous planning agent described in Section 12.6 has at least one of the listed abilities, namely the ability to accept new goals as it goes along. A new goal is simply added as an extra open precondition in the *Finish* step, and the planner will find a way to satisfy it, if possible, along with the other remaining goals. Because the data structures built by the continuous planning agent as it works on the plan remain largely in place as the plan is executed, the cost of replanning is usually relatively small unless the failure is catastrophic. There is no specific time bound that is guaranteed, and in general no such bound is possible because changing even a single state variable might require completely reconstructing the plan from scratch.

12.20 Let T be the proposition that the patient is dehydrated and S be the side effect. We have

$$\begin{aligned} & \text{Action}(\text{Drink}, \text{PRECOND:}, \text{EFFECT:} \neg T) \\ & \text{Action}(\text{Medicate}, \text{PRECOND:}, \text{EFFECT:} \neg D \wedge \mathbf{when} \text{ } T: S) \end{aligned}$$

and the initial state is $\neg S \wedge (T \vee D) \wedge (\neg T \vee \neg D)$. The solution plan is $[\text{Drink}, \text{Medicate}]$. There are two possible worlds, one where T holds and one where D holds. In the first, *Drink* causes $\neg T$ and *Medicate* has no effect; in the second, *Drink* has no effect and *Medicate* causes $\neg D$. In both cases, the final state is $\neg S \wedge \neg T \wedge \neg D$.

12.21 One solution plan is $[\text{Test}, \mathbf{if} \text{ } CultureGrowth \mathbf{then} [\text{Drink}, \text{Medicate}]]$.

Solutions for Chapter 13

Uncertainty

13.1 The “first principles” needed here are the definition of conditional probability, $P(X|Y) = P(X \wedge Y)/P(Y)$, and the definitions of the logical connectives. It is not enough to say that if $B \wedge A$ is “given” then A must be true! From the definition of conditional probability, and the fact that $A \wedge A \Leftrightarrow A$ and that conjunction is commutative and associative, we have

$$P(A|B \wedge A) = \frac{P(A \wedge (B \wedge A))}{P(B \wedge A)} = \frac{P(B \wedge A)}{P(B \wedge A)} = 1$$

13.2 The main axiom is axiom 3: $P(a \vee b) = P(a) + P(b) - P(a \wedge b)$. For the discrete random variable X , let a be the event that $X = x_1$, and b be the event that X has any other value. Then we have

$$P(X = x_1 \vee X = other) = P(X = x_1) + P(X = other) + 0$$

where we know that $P(X = x_1 \wedge X = other)$ is 0 because a variable cannot take on two distinct values. If we now break down the case of $X = other$ s, we eventually get

$$P(X = x_1 \vee \dots \vee X = x_n) = P(X = x_1) + \dots + P(X = x_n).$$

But the left-hand side is equivalent to $P(true)$, which is 1 by axiom 2, so the sum of the right-hand side must also be 1.

13.3 Probably the easiest way to keep track of what’s going on is to look at the probabilities of the atomic events. A probability assignment to a set of propositions is consistent with the axioms of probability if the probabilities are consistent with an assignment to the atomic events that sums to 1 and has all probabilities between 0 and 1 inclusive. We call the probabilities of the atomic events a, b, c , and d , as follows:

	B	$\neg B$
A	a	b
$\neg A$	c	d

We then have the following equations:

$$\begin{aligned} P(A) &= a + b = 0.4 \\ P(B) &= a + c = 0.3 \\ P(A \vee B) &= a + b + c = 0.5 \\ P(True) &= a + b + c + d = 1 \end{aligned}$$

From these, it is straightforward to infer that $a = 0.2$, $b = 0.2$, $c = 0.1$, and $d = 0.5$. Therefore, $P(A \wedge B) = a = 0.2$. Thus the probabilities given are consistent with a rational assignment, and the probability $P(A \wedge B)$ is exactly determined. (This latter fact can be seen also from axiom 3 on page 422.)

If $P(A \vee B) = 0.7$, then $P(A \wedge B) = a = 0$. Thus, even though the bet outlined in Figure 13.3 loses if A and B are both true, the agent believes this to be impossible so the bet is still rational.

13.4 ? (? , ?) argues roughly as follows: Suppose we present an agent with a choice: either definitely receive monetary payoff $p \times m$, or choose a lottery that pays m if event E occurs and 0 if E does not occur. The number p for which the agent is indifferent between the two choices (assuming linear utility of money), is defined to be the agent's degree of belief in E .

A set of degrees of belief specified for some collection of events will either be *coherent*, which is defined to mean that there is no set of bets based on these stated beliefs that will guarantee that the agent will lose money, or *incoherent*, which is defined to mean that there is such a set of bets. De Finetti showed that coherent beliefs satisfy the axioms of probability theory.

Axiom 1: $0 \leq p \leq 1$, for any E and m . If an agent specifies $p > 1$, then the agent is offering to pay more than m to enter a lottery in which the biggest prize is m . If an agent specifies $p < 0$, then the agent is offering to pay either m or 0 in exchange for a negative amount. Either way, the agent is guaranteed to lose money if the opponent accepts the right offer.

Axiom 2: $p = 1$ when E is *true* and $p = 0$ when E is *false*. Suppose the agent assigns p' as the degree of belief in a known true event. Then the agent is indifferent between a payoff of $p'm$ and one of m . This is only coherent when $p' = 1$. Similarly, a degree of belief of p' for a known false event means the agent is indifferent between $p'm$ and 0. Only $p' = 0$ makes this coherent.

Axiom 3: Given two mutually exclusive, exhaustive events, E_1 and E_2 , and respective degrees of belief p_1 and p_2 and payoffs m_1 and m_2 , it must be that the degree of belief for the combined event $E_1 \vee E_2$ equals $p_1 + p_2$. The idea is that the beliefs p_1 and p_2 constitute an agreement to pay $p_1m_1 + p_2m_2$ in order to enter a lottery in which the prize is m_i when E_i occurs. So the net gain is defined as $g_i = m_i - p_1m_1 - p_2m_2$. To avoid the possibility of the m_i amounts being chosen to guarantee that every g_i is negative, we have to assure that the determinant of the matrix relating m_i to g_i is zero, so that the linear system can be solved. This requires that $p_1 + p_2 = 1$. The result extends to the case with n mutually exclusive, exhaustive events rather than two.

13.5 This is a classic combinatorics question that could appear in a basic text on discrete mathematics. The point here is to refer to the relevant axioms of probability: principally, axiom 3 on page 422. The question also helps students to grasp the concept of the joint probability distribution as the distribution over all possible states of the world.

- a. There are $\binom{52}{5} = (52 \times 51 \times 50 \times 49 \times 48) / (1 \times 2 \times 3 \times 4 \times 5) = 2,598,960$ possible five-card hands.

- b. By the fair-dealing assumption, each of these is equally likely. By axioms 2 and 3, each hand therefore occurs with probability $1/2,598,960$.
- c. There are four hands that are royal straight flushes (one in each suit). By axiom 3, since the events are mutually exclusive, the probability of a royal straight flush is just the sum of the probabilities of the atomic events, i.e., $4/2,598,960 = 1/649,740$.
- d. Again, we examine the atomic events that are “four of a kind” events. There are 13 possible “kinds” and for each, the fifth card can be one of 48 possible other cards. The total probability is therefore $(13 \times 48)/2,598,960 = 1/4,165$.

These questions can easily be augmented by more complicated ones, e.g., what is the probability of getting a full house given that you already have two pairs? What is the probability of getting a flush given that you have three cards of the same suit? Or you could assign a project of producing a poker-playing agent, and have a tournament among them.

13.6 The main point of this exercise is to understand the various notations of bold versus non-bold P , and uppercase versus lowercase variable names. The rest is easy, involving a small matter of addition.

- a. This asks for the probability that *Toothache* is true.

$$P(\textit{toothache}) = 0.108 + 0.012 + 0.016 + 0.064 = 0.2$$

- b. This asks for the vector of probability values for the random variable *Cavity*. It has two values, which we list in the order $\langle \textit{true}, \textit{false} \rangle$. First add up $0.108 + 0.012 + 0.072 + 0.008 = 0.2$. Then we have

$$\mathbf{P}(\textit{Cavity}) = \langle 0.2, 0.8 \rangle .$$

- c. This asks for the vector of probability values for *Toothache*, given that *Cavity* is true.

$$\mathbf{P}(\textit{Toothache} | \textit{cavity}) = \langle (0.108 + 0.012)/0.2, (0.072 + 0.008)/0.2 \rangle = \langle 0.6, 0.4 \rangle$$

- d. This asks for the vector of probability values for *Cavity*, given that either *Toothache* or *Catch* is true. First compute $P(\textit{toothache} \vee \textit{catch}) = 0.108 + 0.012 + 0.016 + 0.064 + 0.072 + 0.144 = 0.416$. Then

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{P}(\textit{Cavity} | \textit{toothache} \vee \textit{catch}) = \\ \langle (0.108 + 0.012 + 0.072)/0.416, (0.016 + 0.064 + 0.144)/0.416 \rangle = \\ \langle 0.4615, 0.5384 \rangle \end{aligned}$$

13.7 Independence is symmetric (that is, a and b are independent iff b and a are independent) so $P(a|b) = P(a)$ is the same as $P(b|a) = P(b)$. So we need only prove that $P(a|b) = P(a)$ is equivalent to $P(a \wedge b) = P(a)P(b)$. The product rule, $P(a \wedge b) = P(a|b)P(b)$, can be used to rewrite $P(a \wedge b) = P(a)P(b)$ as $P(a|b)P(b) = P(a)P(b)$, which simplifies to $P(a|b) = P(a)$

13.8 We are given the following information:

$$P(\textit{test} | \textit{disease}) = 0.99$$

$$P(\neg \textit{test} | \neg \textit{disease}) = 0.99$$

$$P(\textit{disease}) = 0.0001$$

and the observation *test*. What the patient is concerned about is $P(\text{disease}|\text{test})$. Roughly speaking, the reason it is a good thing that the disease is rare is that $P(\text{disease}|\text{test})$ is proportional to $P(\text{disease})$, so a lower prior for *disease* will mean a lower value for $P(\text{disease}|\text{test})$. Roughly speaking, if 10,000 people take the test, we expect 1 to actually have the disease, and most likely test positive, while the rest do not have the disease, but 1% of them (about 100 people) will test positive anyway, so $P(\text{disease}|\text{test})$ will be about 1 in 100. More precisely, using the normalization equation from page 428:

$$\begin{aligned} P(\text{disease}|\text{test}) &= \frac{P(\text{test}|\text{disease})P(\text{disease})}{P(\text{test}|\text{disease})P(\text{disease}) + P(\text{test}|\neg\text{disease})P(\neg\text{disease})} \\ &= \frac{0.99 \times 0.0001}{0.99 \times 0.0001 + 0.01 \times 0.9999} \\ &= .009804 \end{aligned}$$

The moral is that when the disease is much rarer than the test accuracy, a positive test result does not mean the disease is likely. A false positive reading remains much more likely.

Here is an alternative exercise along the same lines: A doctor says that an infant who predominantly turns the head to the right while lying on the back will be right-handed, and one who turns to the left will be left-handed. Isabella predominantly turned her head to the left. Given that 90% of the population is right-handed, what is Isabella's probability of being right-handed if the test is 90% accurate? If it is 80% accurate?

The reasoning is the same, and the answer is 50% right-handed if the test is 90% accurate, 69% right-handed if the test is 80% accurate.

13.9 The basic axiom to use here is the definition of conditional probability:

a. We have

$$\mathbf{P}(A, B|E) = \frac{\mathbf{P}(A, B, E)}{\mathbf{P}(E)}$$

and

$$\mathbf{P}(A|B, E)\mathbf{P}(B|E) = \frac{\mathbf{P}(A, B, E)}{\mathbf{P}(B, E)} \frac{\mathbf{P}(B, E)}{\mathbf{P}(E)} = \frac{\mathbf{P}(A, B, E)}{\mathbf{P}(E)}$$

hence

$$\mathbf{P}(A, B|E) = \mathbf{P}(A|B, E)\mathbf{P}(B|E)$$

b. The derivation here is the same as the derivation of the simple version of Bayes' Rule on page 426. First we write down the dual form of the conditionalized product rule, simply by switching *A* and *B* in the above derivation:

$$\mathbf{P}(A, B|E) = \mathbf{P}(B|A, E)\mathbf{P}(A|E)$$

Therefore the two right-hand sides are equal:

$$\mathbf{P}(B|A, E)\mathbf{P}(A|E) = \mathbf{P}(A|B, E)\mathbf{P}(B|E)$$

Dividing through by $\mathbf{P}(B|E)$ we get

$$\mathbf{P}(A|B, E) = \frac{\mathbf{P}(B|A, E)\mathbf{P}(A|E)}{\mathbf{P}(B|E)}$$

13.10 The key to this exercise is rigorous and frequent application of the definition of conditional probability, $\mathbf{P}(X|Y) = \mathbf{P}(X, Y)/\mathbf{P}(Y)$. The original statement that we are given is:

$$\mathbf{P}(A, B|C) = \mathbf{P}(A|C)\mathbf{P}(B|C)$$

We start by applying the definition of conditional probability to two of the terms in this statement:

$$\mathbf{P}(A, B|C) = \frac{\mathbf{P}(A, B, C)}{\mathbf{P}(C)} \text{ and } \mathbf{P}(B|C) = \frac{\mathbf{P}(B, C)}{\mathbf{P}(C)}$$

Now we substitute the right hand side of these definitions for the left hand sides in the original statement to get:

$$\frac{\mathbf{P}(A, B, C)}{\mathbf{P}(C)} = \mathbf{P}(A|C) \frac{\mathbf{P}(B, C)}{\mathbf{P}(C)}$$

Now we need the definition once more:

$$\mathbf{P}(A, B, C) = \mathbf{P}(A|B, C)\mathbf{P}(B, C)$$

We substitute this right hand side for $\mathbf{P}(A, B, C)$ to get:

$$\frac{\mathbf{P}(A|B, C)\mathbf{P}(B, C)}{\mathbf{P}(C)} = \mathbf{P}(A|C) \frac{\mathbf{P}(B, C)}{\mathbf{P}(C)}$$

Finally, we cancel the $\mathbf{P}(B, C)$ and $\mathbf{P}(C)$ s to get:

$$\mathbf{P}(A|B, C) = \mathbf{P}(A|C)$$

The second part of the exercise follows from by a similar derivation, or by noticing that A and B are interchangeable in the original statement (because multiplication is commutative and A, B means the same as B, A).

In Chapter 14, we will see that in terms of Bayesian networks, the original statement means that C is the lone parent of A and also the lone parent of B . The conclusion is that knowing the values of B and C is the same as knowing just the value of C in terms of telling you something about the value of A .

13.11

- a. There are n ways to pick a coin, and 2 outcomes for each flip (although with the fake coin, the results of the flip are indistinguishable), so there are $2n$ total atomic events. Of those, only 2 pick the fake coin, and $2 + (n - 1)$ result in heads. So the probability of a fake coin given heads, $P(\text{fake}|\text{heads})$, is $2/(2 + n - 1) = 2/(n + 1)$.
- b. Now there are $2^k n$ atomic events, of which 2^k pick the fake coin, and $2^k + (n - 1)$ result in heads. So the probability of a fake coin given a run of k heads, $P(\text{fake}|\text{heads}^k)$, is $2^k/(2^k + (n - 1))$. Note this approaches 1 as k increases, as expected. If $k = n = 12$, for example, then $P(\text{fake}|\text{heads}^{10}) = 0.9973$.
- c. There are two kinds of error to consider. Case 1: A fair coin might turn up heads k times in a row. The probability of this is $1/2^k$, and the probability of a fair coin being chosen is $(n - 1)/n$. Case 2: The fake coin is chosen, in which case the procedure

always makes an error. The probability of drawing the fake coin is $1/n$. So the total probability of error is

$$[(n-1)/2^k + 1]/n$$

13.12 The important point here is that although there are often many possible routes by which answers can be calculated in such problems, it is usually better to stick to systematic “standard” routes such as Bayes’ Rule plus normalization. Chapter 14 describes general-purpose, systematic algorithms that make heavy use of normalization. We could guess that $P(S|\neg M) \approx 0.05$, or we could calculate it from the information already given (although the idea here is to assume that $P(S)$ is *not* known):

$$P(S|\neg M) = \frac{P(\neg M|S)P(S)}{P(\neg M)} = \frac{(1 - P(M|S))P(S)}{1 - P(\neg M)} = \frac{0.9998 \times 0.05}{0.99998} = 0.049991$$

Normalization proceeds as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} P(M|S) &\propto P(S|M)P(M) = 0.5/50,000 = 0.00001 \\ P(\neg M|S) &\propto P(S|\neg M)P(\neg M) = 0.049991 \times 0.99998 = 0.04999 \\ P(M|S) &= \frac{0.00001}{0.00001 + 0.04999} = 0.0002 \\ P(\neg M|S) &= \frac{0.00001}{0.00001 + 0.04999} = 0.9998 \end{aligned}$$

13.13 The question would have been slightly more consistent if we had asked about the calculation of $\mathbf{P}(H|E_1, E_2)$ instead of $P(H|E_1, E_2)$. Showing that a given set of information is *sufficient* is relatively easy: find an expression for $\mathbf{P}(H|E_1, E_2)$ in terms of the given information. Showing *insufficiency* can be done by showing that the information provided does not contain enough independent numbers.

a. Bayes’ Rule gives

$$\mathbf{P}(H|E_1, E_2) = \frac{\mathbf{P}(E_1, E_2|H)\mathbf{P}(H)}{\mathbf{P}(E_1, E_2)}$$

Hence the information in (ii) is sufficient—in fact, we don’t need $\mathbf{P}(E_1, E_2)$ because we can use normalization. Intuitively, the information in (iii) is insufficient because $\mathbf{P}(E_1|H)$ and $\mathbf{P}(E_2|H)$ provide no information about correlations between E_1 and E_2 that might be induced by H . Mathematically, suppose H has m possible values and E_1 and E_2 have n_1 and n_2 possible respectively. $\mathbf{P}(H|E_1, E_2)$ contains $(m-1)n_1n_2$ independent numbers, whereas the information in (iii) contains $(m-1) + m(n_1-1) + m(n_2-1)$ numbers—clearly insufficient for large m , n_1 , and n_2 . Similarly, the information in (i) contains $(n_1n_2-1) + m + m(n_1-1) + m(n_2-1)$ numbers—again insufficient.

b. If E_1 and E_2 are conditionally independent given H , then

$$\mathbf{P}(E_1, E_2|H) = \mathbf{P}(E_1|H)\mathbf{P}(E_2|H).$$

Using normalization, (i), (ii), and (iii) are each sufficient for the calculation.

13.14 When dealing with joint entries, it is usually easiest to get everything into the form of probabilities of conjunctions, since these can be expressed as sums of joint entries. Beginning with the conditional independence constraint

$$\mathbf{P}(X, Y|Z) = \mathbf{P}(X|Z)\mathbf{P}(Y|Z)$$

we can rewrite it using the definition of conditional probability on each term to obtain

$$\frac{\mathbf{P}(X, Y, Z)}{\mathbf{P}(Z)} = \frac{\mathbf{P}(X, Z)}{\mathbf{P}(Z)} \frac{\mathbf{P}(Y, Z)}{\mathbf{P}(Z)}$$

Hence we can write an expression for joint entries:

$$\mathbf{P}(X, Y, Z) = \frac{\mathbf{P}(X, Z)\mathbf{P}(Y, Z)}{\mathbf{P}(Z)} = \frac{\sum_y \mathbf{P}(X, y, Z) \sum_x \mathbf{P}(x, Y, Z)}{\sum_{x, y} \mathbf{P}(x, y, Z)}$$

This gives us 8 equations constraining the 8 joint entries, but several of the equations are redundant.

13.15 The relevant aspect of the world can be described by two random variables: B means the taxi *was* blue, and LB means the taxi *looked* blue. The information on the reliability of color identification can be written as

$$P(LB|B) = 0.75 \quad P(\neg LB|\neg B) = 0.75$$

We need to know the probability that the taxi was blue, given that it looked blue:

$$\begin{aligned} P(B|LB) &\propto P(LB|B)P(B) \propto 0.75P(B) \\ P(\neg B|LB) &\propto P(LB|\neg B)P(\neg B) \propto 0.25(1 - P(B)) \end{aligned}$$

Thus we cannot decide the probability without some information about the prior probability of blue taxis, $P(B)$. For example, if we knew that all taxis were blue, i.e., $P(B) = 1$, then obviously $P(B|LB) = 1$. On the other hand, if we adopt Laplace's *Principle of Indifference*, which states that propositions can be deemed equally likely in the absence of any differentiating information, then we have $P(B) = 0.5$ and $P(B|LB) = 0.75$. Usually we will have *some* differentiating information, so this principle does not apply.

Given that 9 out of 10 taxis are green, and *assuming the taxi in question is drawn randomly from the taxi population*, we have $P(B) = 0.1$. Hence

$$\begin{aligned} P(B|LB) &\propto 0.75 \times 0.1 \propto 0.075 \\ P(\neg B|LB) &\propto 0.25 \times 0.9 \propto 0.225 \\ P(B|LB) &= \frac{0.075}{0.075 + 0.225} = 0.25 \\ P(\neg B|LB) &= \frac{0.225}{0.075 + 0.225} = 0.75 \end{aligned}$$

13.16 This question is extremely tricky. It is a variant of the “Monty Hall” problem, named after the host of the game show “Let’s Make a Deal” in which contestants are asked to choose between the prize they have already won and an unknown prize behind a door. Several distinguished professors of statistics have very publically got the wrong answer. Certainly, all such questions can be settled by repeated trials!

Let F_x = “x will be freed”, E_x = “x will be executed”. If the information provided by the guard is expressed as F_B then we get:

$$P(E_A|F_B) = \frac{P(F_B|E_A) \cdot P(E_A)}{P(F_B)} = \frac{1 \cdot 1/3}{2/3} = \frac{1}{2}$$

This would be quite a shock to A —his chances of execution have increased! On the other hand, if the information provided by the guard is expressed as F'_B = “The guard said that F_B ” then we get:

$$P(E_A|F'_B) = \frac{P(F'_B|E_A) \cdot P(E_A)}{P(F'_B)} = \frac{1/2 \cdot 1/3}{1/2} = \frac{1}{3}$$

Thus the key thing that is missed by the naive approach is that the guard has a choice of whom to inform in the case where A will be executed.

One can produce variants of the question that reinforce the intuitions behind the correct approach. For example: Suppose there now a thousand prisoners on death row, all but one of whom will be pardoned. Prisoner A finds a printout with the last page torn off. It gives the names of 998 pardonees, not including A's name. What is the probability that A will be executed? Now suppose A is left-handed, and the program was printing the names of all right-handed pardonees. What is the probability now? Clearly, in the first case it is quite reasonable for A to get worried, whereas in the second case it is not—the names of right-handed prisoners to be pardoned should not influence A's chances. It is this second case that applies in the original story, because the guard is precluded from giving information about A.

13.17 We can apply the definition of conditional independence as follows:

$$\mathbf{P}(Cause|\mathbf{e}) = \mathbf{P}(\mathbf{e}, Cause)/\mathbf{P}(\mathbf{e}) = \alpha \mathbf{P}(\mathbf{e}, Cause) .$$

Now, divide the effect variables into those with evidence, \mathbf{E} , and those without evidence, \mathbf{Y} . We have

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{P}(Cause|\mathbf{e}) &= \alpha \sum_{\mathbf{y}} \mathbf{P}(\mathbf{y}, \mathbf{e}, Cause) \\ &= \alpha \sum_{\mathbf{y}} \mathbf{P}(Cause) \mathbf{P}(\mathbf{y}|Cause) \left(\prod_j \mathbf{P}(e_j|Cause) \right) \\ &= \alpha \mathbf{P}(Cause) \left(\prod_j \mathbf{P}(e_j|Cause) \right) \sum_{\mathbf{y}} \mathbf{P}(Cause) \mathbf{P}(\mathbf{y}|Cause) \\ &= \alpha \mathbf{P}(Cause) \left(\prod_j \mathbf{P}(e_j|Cause) \right) \end{aligned}$$

where the last line follows because the summation over \mathbf{y} is 1. Therefore, the algorithm computes the product of the conditional probabilities of the evidence variables given each value of the cause, multiplies each by the prior probability of the cause, and normalizes the result.

13.18 This question is essentially previewing material in Chapter 23 (page 842), but students should have little difficulty in figuring out how to estimate a conditional probability from complete data.

- a. The model consists of the prior probability $\mathbf{P}(Category)$ and the conditional probabilities $\mathbf{P}(Word_i|Category)$. For each category c , $\mathbf{P}(Category = c)$ is estimated as the fraction of all documents that are of category c . Similarly, $\mathbf{P}(Word_i = true|Category = c)$ is estimated as the fraction of documents of category c that contain word i .
- b. See the answer for 13.17. Here, every evidence variable is observed, since we can tell if any given word appears in a given document or not.

- c. The independence assumption is clearly violated in practice. For example, the word pair “artificial intelligence” occurs more frequently in any given document category than would be suggested by multiplying the probabilities of “artificial” and “intelligence”.

13.19 This probability model is also appropriate for Minesweeper (Ex. 7.11). If the total number of pits is fixed, then the variables $P_{i,j}$ and $P_{k,l}$ are no longer independent. In general,

$$P(P_{i,j} = \text{true} | P_{k,l} = \text{true}) < P(P_{i,j} = \text{true} | P_{k,l} = \text{false})$$

because learning that $P_{k,l} = \text{true}$ makes it less likely that there is a mine at $[i, j]$ (as there are now fewer to spread around). The joint distribution places equal probability on all assignments to $P_{1,2} \dots P_{4,4}$ that have exactly 3 pits, and zero on all other assignments. Since there are 15 squares, the probability of each 3-pit assignment is $1/\binom{15}{3} = 1/455$.

To calculate the probabilities of pits in $[1, 3]$ and $[2, 2]$, we start from Figure 13.7. We have to consider the probabilities of complete assignments, since the probability of the “other” region assignment does not cancel out. We can count the total number of 3-pit assignments that are consistent with each partial assignment in 13.7(a) and 13.7(b).

In 13.7(a), there are three partial assignments with $P_{1,3} = \text{true}$:

- The first fixes all three pits, so corresponds to 1 complete assignment.
- The second leaves 1 pit in the remaining 10 squares, so corresponds to 10 complete assignments.
- The third also corresponds to 10 complete assignments.

Hence, there are 21 complete assignments with $P_{1,3} = \text{true}$.

In 13.7(b), there are two partial assignments with $P_{1,3} = \text{false}$:

- The first leaves 1 pit in the remaining 10 squares, so corresponds to 10 complete assignments.
- The second leaves 2 pits in the remaining 10 squares, so corresponds to $\binom{10}{2} = 45$ complete assignments.

Hence, there are 55 complete assignments with $P_{1,3} = \text{false}$. Normalizing, we obtain

$$\mathbf{P}(P_{1,3}) = \alpha \langle 21, 55 \rangle = \langle 0.276, 0.724 \rangle .$$

With $P_{2,2} = \text{true}$, there are four partial assignments with a total of $\binom{10}{2} + 2 \cdot \binom{10}{1} + \binom{10}{0} = 66$ complete assignments. With $P_{2,2} = \text{false}$, there is only one partial assignment with $\binom{10}{1} = 10$ complete assignments. Hence

$$\mathbf{P}(P_{2,2}) = \alpha \langle 66, 10 \rangle = \langle 0.868, 0.132 \rangle .$$

Solutions for Chapter 14

Probabilistic Reasoning

14.1 Adding variables to an existing net can be done in two ways. Formally speaking, one should insert the variables into the variable ordering and rerun the network construction process from the point where the first new variable appears. Informally speaking, one never really builds a network by a strict ordering. Instead, one asks what variables are direct causes or influences on what other ones, and builds local parent/child graphs that way. It is usually easy to identify where in such a structure the new variable goes, but one must be very careful to check for possible induced dependencies downstream.

- a. *IcyWeather* is not caused by any of the car-related variables, so needs no parents. It directly affects the battery and the starter motor. *StarterMotor* is an additional precondition for *Starts*. The new network is shown in Figure S14.1.
- b. Reasonable probabilities may vary a lot depending on the kind of car and perhaps the personal experience of the assessor. The following values indicate the general order of




Figure S14.1 Car network amended to include *IcyWeather* and *StarterMotorWorking* (SMW).

magnitude and relative values that make sense:

- A reasonable prior for *IcyWeather* might be 0.05 (perhaps depending on location and season).
 - $P(\text{Battery}|\text{IcyWeather}) = 0.95$, $P(\text{Battery}|\neg\text{IcyWeather}) = 0.997$.
 - $P(\text{StarterMotor}|\text{IcyWeather}) = 0.98$, $P(\text{StarterMotor}|\neg\text{IcyWeather}) = 0.999$.
 - $P(\text{Radio}|\text{Battery}) = 0.9999$, $P(\text{Radio}|\neg\text{Battery}) = 0.05$.
 - $P(\text{Ignition}|\text{Battery}) = 0.998$, $P(\text{Ignition}|\neg\text{Battery}) = 0.01$.
 - $P(\text{Gas}) = 0.995$.
 - $P(\text{Starts}|\text{Ignition}, \text{StarterMotor}, \text{Gas}) = 0.9999$, other entries 0.0.
 - $P(\text{Moves}|\text{Starts}) = 0.998$.
- c. With 8 Boolean variables, the joint has $2^8 - 1 = 255$ independent entries.
- d. Given the topology shown in Figure S14.1, the total number of independent CPT entries is $1+2+2+2+2+1+8+2 = 20$.
- e. The CPT for *Starts* describes a set of nearly necessary conditions that are together almost sufficient. That is, all the entries are nearly zero except for the entry where all the conditions are true. That entry will be not quite 1 (because there is always some other possible fault that we didn't think of), but as we add more conditions it gets closer to 1. If we add a *Leak* node as an extra parent, then the probability is exactly 1 when all parents are true. We can relate noisy-AND to noisy-OR using de Morgan's rule: $A \wedge B \equiv \neg(\neg A \vee \neg B)$. That is, noisy-AND is the same as noisy-OR except that the polarities of the parent and child variables are reversed. In the noisy-OR case, we have

$$P(Y = \text{true} | x_1, \dots, x_k) = 1 - \prod_{\{i: x_i = \text{true}\}} q_i$$

where q_i is the probability that the *presence* of the i th parent *fails* to cause the child to be *true*. In the noisy-AND case, we can write

$$P(Y = \text{true} | x_1, \dots, x_k) = \prod_{\{i: x_i = \text{false}\}} r_i$$

where r_i is the probability that the *absence* of the i th parent *fails* to cause the child to be *false* (e.g., it is magically bypassed by some other mechanism).

14.2 This question exercises many aspects of the student's understanding of Bayesian networks and uncertainty.

- a. A suitable network is shown in Figure S14.2. The key aspects are: the failure nodes are parents of the sensor nodes, and the temperature node is a parent of both the gauge and the gauge failure node. It is exactly this kind of correlation that makes it difficult for humans to understand what is happening in complex systems with unreliable sensors.
- b. No matter which way the student draws the network, it should not be a polytree because of the fact that the temperature influences the gauge in two ways.
- c. The CPT for G is shown below. The wording of the question is a little tricky because x and y are defined in terms of "incorrect" rather than "correct."




Figure S14.2 A Bayesian network for the nuclear alarm problem.

	$T = Normal$		$T = High$	
	F_G	$\neg F_G$	F_G	$\neg F_G$
$G = Normal$	$1 - y$	$1 - x$	y	x
$G = High$	y	x	$1 - y$	$1 - x$

d. The CPT for A is as follows:

	$G = Normal$		$G = High$	
	F_A	$\neg F_A$	F_A	$\neg F_A$
A	0	0	0	1
$\neg A$	1	1	1	0

- e. This part actually asks the student to do something usually done by Bayesian network algorithms. The great thing is that doing the calculation without a Bayesian network makes it easy to see the nature of the calculations that the algorithms are systematizing. It illustrates the magnitude of the achievement involved in creating complete and correct algorithms.

Abbreviating $T = High$ and $G = High$ by T and G , the probability of interest here is $P(T|A, \neg F_G, \neg F_A)$. Because the alarm's behavior is deterministic, we can reason that if the alarm is working and sounds, G must be *High*. Because F_A and A are d-separated from T , we need only calculate $P(T|\neg F_G, G)$.

There are several ways to go about doing this. The "opportunistic" way is to notice that the CPT entries give us $P(G|T, \neg F_G)$, which suggests using the generalized Bayes' Rule to switch G and T with $\neg F_G$ as background:

$$P(T|\neg F_G, G) \propto P(G|T, \neg F_G)P(T|\neg F_G)$$

We then use Bayes' Rule again on the last term:

$$P(T|\neg F_G, G) \propto P(G|T, \neg F_G)P(\neg F_G|T)P(T)$$

A similar relationship holds for $\neg T$:

$$P(\neg T|\neg F_G, G) \propto P(G|\neg T, \neg F_G)P(\neg F_G|\neg T)P(\neg T)$$

Normalizing, we obtain

$$P(T|\neg F_G, G) = \frac{P(G|T, \neg F_G)P(\neg F_G|T)P(T)}{P(G|T, \neg F_G)P(\neg F_G|T)P(T) + P(G|\neg T, \neg F_G)P(\neg F_G|\neg T)P(\neg T)}$$

The “systematic” way to do it is to revert to joint entries (noticing that the subgraph of T , G , and F_G is completely connected so no loss of efficiency is entailed). We have

$$P(T|\neg F_G, G) = \frac{P(T, \neg F_G, G)}{P(G, \neg F_G)} = \frac{P(T, \neg F_G, G)}{P(T, G, \neg F_G) + P(T, G, \neg F_G)}$$

Now we use the chain rule formula (Equation 15.1 on page 439) to rewrite the joint entries as CPT entries:

$$P(T|\neg F_G, G) = \frac{P(T)P(\neg F_G|T)P(G|T, \neg F_G)}{P(T)P(\neg F_G|T)P(G|T, \neg F_G) + P(\neg T)P(\neg F_G|\neg T)P(G|\neg T, \neg F_G)}$$

which of course is the same as the expression arrived at above. Letting $P(T) = p$, $P(F_G|T) = g$, and $P(F_G|\neg T) = h$, we get

$$P(T|\neg F_G, G) = \frac{p(1-g)(1-x)}{p(1-g)(1-x) + (1-p)(1-h)x}$$

14.3

- a. Although (i) in some sense depicts the “flow of information” during calculation, it is clearly incorrect as a network, since it says that given the measurements M_1 and M_2 , the number of stars is independent of the focus. (ii) correctly represents the causal structure: each measurement is influenced by the actual number of stars and the focus, and the two telescopes are independent of each other. (iii) shows a correct but more complicated network—the one obtained by ordering the nodes M_1, M_2, N, F_1, F_2 . If you order M_2 before M_1 you would get the same network except with the arrow from M_1 to M_2 reversed.
- b. (ii) requires fewer parameters and is therefore better than (iii).
- c. To compute $\mathbf{P}(M_1|N)$, we will need to condition on F_1 (that is, consider both possible cases for F_1 , weighted by their probabilities).

$$\begin{aligned}\mathbf{P}(M_1|N) &= \mathbf{P}(M_1|N, F_1)\mathbf{P}(F_1|N) + \mathbf{P}(M_1|N, \neg F_1)\mathbf{P}(\neg F_1|N) \\ &= \mathbf{P}(M_1|N, F_1)\mathbf{P}(F_1) + \mathbf{P}(M_1|N, \neg F_1)\mathbf{P}(\neg F_1)\end{aligned}$$

Let f be the probability that the telescope is out of focus. The exercise states that this will cause an “undercount of three or more stars,” but if $N = 3$ or less the count will be 0 if the telescope is out of focus. If it is in focus, then we will assume there is a probability of e of counting one too few, and e of counting one too many. The rest of the time $(1 - 2e)$, the count will be accurate. Then the table is as follows:

	$N = 1$	$N = 2$	$N = 3$
$M_1 = 0$	$f + e(1-f)$	f	f
$M_1 = 1$	$(1-2e)(1-f)$	$e(1-f)$	0.0
$M_1 = 2$	$e(1-f)$	$(1-2e)(1-f)$	$e(1-f)$
$M_1 = 3$	0.0	$e(1-f)$	$(1-2e)(1-f)$
$M_1 = 4$	0.0	0.0	$e(1-f)$

Notice that each column has to add up to 1. Reasonable values for e and f might be 0.05 and 0.002.

- d. This question causes a surprising amount of difficulty, so it is important to make sure students understand the reasoning behind an answer. One approach uses the fact that it is easy to reason in the forward direction, that is, try each possible number of stars N and see whether measurements $M_1 = 1$ and $M_2 = 3$ are possible. (This is a sort of mental simulation of the physical process.) An alternative approach is to enumerate the possible focus states and deduce the value of N for each. Either way, the solutions are $N = 2, 4$, or ≥ 6 .
- e. We cannot calculate the most likely number of stars without knowing the prior distribution $P(N)$. Let the priors be p_2, p_4 , and $p_{\geq 6}$. The posterior for $N = 2$ is $p_2 e^2 (1 - f)^2$; for $N = 4$ it is at most $p_4 e f$ (at most, because with $N = 4$ the out-of-focus telescope could measure 0 instead of 1); for $N \geq 6$ it is at most $p_{\geq 6} f^2$. If we assume that the priors are roughly comparable, then $N = 2$ is most likely because we are told that f is much smaller than e .

For follow-up or alternate questions, it is easy to come up with endless variations on the same theme involving sensors, failure nodes, hidden state. One can also add in complex mechanisms, as for the *Starts* variable in exercise 14.1.

14.5 This exercise is a little tricky and will appeal to more mathematically oriented students.

- a. The basic idea is to multiply the two densities, match the result to the standard form for a multivariate Gaussian, and hence identify the entries in the inverse covariance matrix. Let's begin by looking at the multivariate Gaussian. From page 982 in Appendix A we have

$$P(\mathbf{x}) = \frac{1}{\sqrt{(2\pi)^n |\Sigma|}} e^{-\frac{1}{2} (\mathbf{x} - \boldsymbol{\mu})^\top \Sigma^{-1} (\mathbf{x} - \boldsymbol{\mu})},$$

where $\boldsymbol{\mu}$ is the mean vector and Σ is the covariance matrix. In our case, \mathbf{x} is $(x_1 \ x_2)^\top$ and let the (as yet) unknown $\boldsymbol{\mu}$ be $(m_1 \ m_2)^\top$. Suppose the inverse covariance matrix is

$$\Sigma^{-1} = \begin{pmatrix} c & d \\ d & e \end{pmatrix}$$

Then, if we multiply out the exponent, we obtain

$$-\frac{1}{2} \left((\mathbf{x} - \boldsymbol{\mu})^\top \Sigma^{-1} (\mathbf{x} - \boldsymbol{\mu}) \right) = \\ -\frac{1}{2} \cdot c(x_1 - m_1)^2 + 2d(x_1 - m_1)(x_2 - m_2) + f(x_2 - m_2)^2$$

Looking at the distributions themselves, we have

$$P(x_1) = \frac{1}{\sigma_1 \sqrt{2\pi}} e^{-(x_1 - \mu_1)^2 / (2\sigma_1^2)}$$

and

$$P(x_2 | x_1) = \frac{1}{\sigma_2 \sqrt{2\pi}} e^{-(x_2 - (ax_1 + b))^2 / (2\sigma_2^2)}$$

hence

$$P(x_1, x_2) = \frac{1}{\sigma_1 \sigma_2 (2\pi)} e^{-(\sigma_2^2 (x_2 - (ax_1 + b))^2 + \sigma_1^2 (x_2 - (ax_1 + b))^2) / (2\sigma_1^2 \sigma_2^2)}$$

We can obtain equations for c , d , and e by picking out the coefficients of x_1^2 , x_1x_2 , and x_2^2 :

$$\begin{aligned} c &= (\sigma_2^2 + a^2 \sigma_1^2) / \sigma_1^2 \sigma_2^2 \\ 2d &= -2a / \sigma_2^2 \\ e &= 1 / \sigma_2^2 \end{aligned}$$

We can check these by comparing the normalizing constants.

$$\frac{1}{\sigma_1 \sigma_2 (2\pi)} = \frac{1}{\sqrt{(2\pi)^n |\Sigma|}} = \frac{1}{(2\pi) \sqrt{1/|\Sigma^{-1}|}} = \frac{1}{(2\pi) \sqrt{1/(ce - d^2)}}$$

from which we obtain the constraint

$$ce - d^2 = 1 / \sigma_1^2 \sigma_2^2$$

which is easily confirmed. Similar calculations yield m_1 and m_2 , and plugging the results back shows that $P(x_1, x_2)$ is indeed multivariate Gaussian. The covariance matrix is

$$\Sigma = \begin{pmatrix} c & d \\ d & e \end{pmatrix}^{-1} = \frac{1}{ce - d^2} \begin{pmatrix} e & -d \\ -d & c \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} \sigma_1^2 & a\sigma_1^2 \\ a\sigma_1^2 & \sigma_2^2 + a^2\sigma_1^2 \end{pmatrix}$$

- b.** The induction is on n , the number of variables. The base case for $n=1$ is trivial. The inductive step asks us to show that if any $P(x_1, \dots, x_n)$ constructed with linear-Gaussian conditional densities is multivariate Gaussian, then any $P(x_1, \dots, x_n, x_{n+1})$ constructed with linear-Gaussian conditional densities is also multivariate Gaussian. Without loss of generality, we can assume that X_{n+1} is a leaf variable added to a network defined in the first n variables. By the product rule we have

$$\begin{aligned} P(x_1, \dots, x_n, x_{n+1}) &= P(x_{n+1} | x_1, \dots, x_n) P(x_1, \dots, x_n) \\ &= P(x_{n+1} | \text{parents}(X_{n+1})) P(x_1, \dots, x_n) \end{aligned}$$

which, by the inductive hypothesis, is the product of a linear Gaussian with a multivariate Gaussian. Extending the argument of part (a), this is in turn a multivariate Gaussian of one higher dimension.

14.6

- a.** With multiple continuous parents, we must find a way to map the parent value vector to a single threshold value. The simplest way to do this is to take a linear combination of the parent values.
- b.** For ordered values $y_1 < y_2 < \dots < y_d$, consider the Boolean proposition Z_j defined by $Y \leq y_j$. The proposition $Y = y_j$ is just $Z_j \wedge \neg(Z_{j-1})$ for $j > 1$. Now we can propose probit distributions for each Z_j , with means μ_j also in increasing order.

14.7 This question definitely helps students get a solid feel for variable elimination. Students may need some help with the last part if they are to do it properly.

a.

$$\begin{aligned}
P(B|j, m) &= \alpha P(B) \sum_e P(e) \sum_a P(a|b, e) P(j|a) P(m|a) \\
&= \alpha P(B) \sum_e P(e) \left[.9 \times .7 \times \begin{pmatrix} .95 & .29 \\ .94 & .001 \end{pmatrix} + .05 \times .01 \times \begin{pmatrix} .05 & .71 \\ .06 & .999 \end{pmatrix} \right] \\
&= \alpha P(B) \sum_e P(e) \begin{pmatrix} .598525 & .183055 \\ .59223 & .0011295 \end{pmatrix} \\
&= \alpha P(B) \left[.002 \times \begin{pmatrix} .598525 \\ .183055 \end{pmatrix} + .998 \times \begin{pmatrix} .59223 \\ .0011295 \end{pmatrix} \right] \\
&= \alpha \begin{pmatrix} .001 \\ .999 \end{pmatrix} \times \begin{pmatrix} .59224259 \\ .001493351 \end{pmatrix} \\
&= \alpha \begin{pmatrix} .00059224259 \\ .0014918576 \end{pmatrix} \\
&\approx \langle .284, .716 \rangle
\end{aligned}$$


- b. Including the normalization step, there are 7 additions, 16 multiplications, and 2 divisions. The enumeration algorithm has two extra multiplications.
- c. To compute $\mathbf{P}(X_1|X_n = \text{true})$ using enumeration, we have to evaluate two complete binary trees (one for each value of X_1), each of depth $n - 2$, so the total work is $O(2^n)$. Using variable elimination, the factors never grow beyond two variables. For example, the first step is

$$\begin{aligned}
\mathbf{P}(X_1|X_n = \text{true}) &= \alpha \mathbf{P}(X_1) \dots \sum_{x_{n-2}} P(x_{n-2}|x_{n-3}) \sum_{x_{n-1}} P(x_{n-1}|x_{n-2}) P(X_n = \text{true}|x_{n-1}) \\
&= \alpha \mathbf{P}(X_1) \dots \sum_{x_{n-2}} P(x_{n-2}|x_{n-3}) \sum_{x_{n-1}} \mathbf{f}_{X_{n-1}}(x_{n-1}, x_{n-2}) \mathbf{f}_{X_n}(x_{n-1}) \\
&= \alpha \mathbf{P}(X_1) \dots \sum_{x_{n-2}} P(x_{n-2}|x_{n-3}) \mathbf{f}_{\overline{X_{n-1}X_n}}(x_{n-2})
\end{aligned}$$

The last line is isomorphic to the problem with $n - 1$ variables instead of n ; the work done on the first step is a constant independent of n , hence (by induction on n , if you want to be formal) the total work is $O(n)$.

- d. Here we can perform an induction on the number of nodes in the polytree. The base case is trivial. For the inductive hypothesis, assume that any polytree with n nodes can be evaluated in time proportional to the size of the polytree (i.e., the sum of the CPT sizes). Now, consider a polytree with $n + 1$ nodes. Any node ordering consistent with the topology will eliminate first some leaf node from this polytree. To eliminate any leaf node, we have to do work proportional to the size of its CPT. Then, *because the network is a polytree*, we are left with *independent* subproblems, one for each parent.

Each subproblem takes total work proportional to the sum of its CPT sizes, so the total work for $n + 1$ nodes is proportional to the sum of CPT sizes.



14.8 Consider a SAT problem such as the following:

$$(\neg A \vee B) \wedge (\neg B \vee C) \wedge (\neg C \vee D) \wedge (\neg C \vee \neg D \vee E)$$

The idea is to encode this as a Bayes net, such that doing inference in the Bayes net gives the answer to the SAT problem.

- a. Figure S14.3 shows the Bayes net corresponding to this SAT problem. The general construction method is as follows:
 - The root nodes correspond to the logical variables of the SAT problem. They have a prior probability of 0.5.
 - Each clause C_i is a node. Its parents are the variables in the clause. The CPT is deterministic and implements the disjunction given in the clause. (Negative literals in the clause are indicated by negation symbols on the links in the figure.)
 - A single sentence node S has all the clauses as parents and a CPT that implements deterministic conjunction.

It is clear that $P(S) > 0$ iff the SAT problem is satisfiable. Hence, we have reduced SAT to Bayes net inference. Since SAT is NP-complete, we have shown that Bayes net inference is NP-hard (even without evidence).

- b. The prior probability of each complete assignment is 2^{-n} . $P(S)$ is therefore $K \cdot 2^{-n}$ where K is the number of satisfying assignments. Hence, we can count the number of satisfying assignments by computing $P(S) \cdot 2^n$. This amounts to a reduction of the problem of counting satisfying assignments to Bayes net inference; since the former is #P-complete, the latter is #P-hard.

14.9

- a. To calculate the cumulative distribution of a discrete variable, we start from a vector representation p of the original distribution and a vector P of the same dimension.

Then, we loop through i , adding up the p_i values as we go along and setting P_i to the running sum, $\sum_{j=i}^i p_j$. To sample from the distribution, we generate a random number r uniformly in $[0, 1]$, and then return x_i for the smallest i such that $P_i \geq r$. A naive way to find this is to loop through i starting at 1 until $P_i \geq r$. This takes $O(k)$ time. A more efficient solution is binary search: start with the full range $[1, k]$, choose i at the midpoint of the range. If $P_i < r$, set the range from i to the upper bound, otherwise set the range from the lower bound to i . After $O(\log k)$ iterations, we terminate when the bounds are identical or differ by 1.

- b. If we are generating $N \gg k$ samples, we can afford to preprocess the cumulative distribution. The basic insight required is that *if* the original distribution were uniform, it would be possible to sample in $O(1)$ time by returning $\lceil kr \rceil$. That is, we can index directly into the correct part of the range (analog random access, one might say) instead of searching for it. Now, suppose we divide the range $[0, 1]$ into k equal parts and construct a k -element vector, each of whose entries is a list of all those i for which P_i is in the corresponding part of the range. The i we want is in the list with index $\lceil kr \rceil$. We retrieve this list in $O(1)$ time and search through it in order (as in the naive implementation). Let n_j be the number of elements in list j . Then the expected runtime is given by

$$\sum_{j=1}^k n_j \cdot 1/k = 1/k \cdot \sum_{j=1}^k n_j = 1/k \cdot O(k) = O(1)$$

The variance of the runtime can be reduced by further subdividing any part of the range whose list contains more than some small constant number of elements.

- c. One way to generate a sample from a univariate Gaussian is to compute the discretized cumulative distribution (e.g., integrating by Taylor's rule) and use the algorithm described above. We can compute the table once and for all for the standard Gaussian (mean 0, variance 1) and then scale each sampled value z to $\sigma z + \mu$. If we had a closed-form, invertible expression for the cumulative distribution $F(x)$, we could sample exactly, simply by returning $F^{-1}(r)$. Unfortunately the Gaussian density is not exactly integrable. Now, the density $\alpha x e^{-x^2/2}$ is exactly integrable, and there are cute schemes for using two samples and this density to obtain an exact Gaussian sample. We leave the details to the interested instructor.
- d. When querying a continuous variable using Monte carlo inference, an exact closed-form posterior cannot be obtained. Instead, one typically defines discrete ranges, returning a histogram distribution simply by counting the (weighted) number of samples in each range.

14.10 These proofs are tricky for those not accustomed to manipulating probability expressions, and students may require some hints.

- a. There are several ways to prove this. Probably the simplest is to work directly from the global semantics. First, we rewrite the required probability in terms of the full joint:

$$P(x_i | x_1, \dots, x_{i-1}, x_{i+1}, \dots, x_n) = \frac{P(x_1, \dots, x_n)}{P(x_1, \dots, x_{i-1}, x_{i+1}, \dots, x_n)}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
&= \frac{P(x_1, \dots, x_n)}{\sum_{x_i} P(x_1, \dots, x_n)} \\
&= \frac{\prod_{j=1}^n P(x_j | \text{parents } X_j)}{\sum_{x_i} \prod_{j=1}^n P(x_j | \text{parents } X_j)}
\end{aligned}$$

Now, all terms in the product in the denominator that do not contain x_i can be moved outside the summation, and then cancel with the corresponding terms in the numerator. This just leaves us with the terms that do mention x_i , i.e., those in which X_i is a child or a parent. Hence, $P(x_i | x_1, \dots, x_{i-1}, x_{i+1}, \dots, x_n)$ is equal to

$$\frac{P(x_i | \text{parents } X_i) \prod_{Y_j \in \text{Children}(X_i)} P(y_j | \text{parents}(Y_j))}{\sum_{x_i} P(x_i | \text{parents } X_i) \prod_{Y_j \in \text{Children}(X_i)} P(y_j | \text{parents}(Y_j))}$$

Now, by reversing the argument in part (b), we obtain the desired result.

- b. This is a relatively straightforward application of Bayes' rule. Let $\mathbf{Y} = Y_1, \dots, Y_\ell$ be the children of X_i and let \mathbf{Z}_j be the parents of Y_j other than X_i . Then we have

$$\begin{aligned}
&\mathbf{P}(X_i | MB(X_i)) \\
&= \mathbf{P}(X_i | \text{Parents}(X_i), \mathbf{Y}, \mathbf{Z}_1, \dots, \mathbf{Z}_\ell) \\
&= \alpha \mathbf{P}(X_i | \text{Parents}(X_i), \mathbf{Z}_1, \dots, \mathbf{Z}_\ell) \mathbf{P}(\mathbf{Y} | \text{Parents}(X_i), X_i, \mathbf{Z}_1, \dots, \mathbf{Z}_\ell) \\
&= \alpha \mathbf{P}(X_i | \text{Parents}(X_i)) \mathbf{P}(\mathbf{Y} | X_i, \mathbf{Z}_1, \dots, \mathbf{Z}_\ell) \\
&= \alpha \mathbf{P}(X_i | \text{Parents}(X_i)) \prod_{Y_j \in \text{Children}(X_i)} P(Y_j | \text{Parents}(Y_j))
\end{aligned}$$

where the derivation of the third line from the second relies on the fact that a node is independent of its nondescendants given its children.

14.11

- a. There are two uninstantiated Boolean variables (*Cloudy* and *Rain*) and therefore four possible states.
- b. First, we compute the sampling distribution for each variable, conditioned on its Markov blanket.

$$\begin{aligned}
\mathbf{P}(C | r, s) &= \alpha \mathbf{P}(C) \mathbf{P}(s | C) \mathbf{P}(r | C) \\
&= \alpha \langle 0.5, 0.5 \rangle \langle 0.1, 0.5 \rangle \langle 0.8, 0.2 \rangle = \alpha \langle 0.04, 0.05 \rangle = \langle 4/9, 5/9 \rangle \\
\mathbf{P}(C | \neg r, s) &= \alpha \mathbf{P}(C) \mathbf{P}(s | C) \mathbf{P}(\neg r | C) \\
&= \alpha \langle 0.5, 0.5 \rangle \langle 0.1, 0.5 \rangle \langle 0.2, 0.8 \rangle = \alpha \langle 0.01, 0.20 \rangle = \langle 1/21, 20/21 \rangle \\
\mathbf{P}(R | c, s, w) &= \alpha \mathbf{P}(R | c) \mathbf{P}(w | s, R) \\
&= \alpha \langle 0.8, 0.2 \rangle \langle 0.99, 0.90 \rangle = \alpha \langle 0.792, 0.180 \rangle = \langle 22/27, 5/27 \rangle \\
\mathbf{P}(R | \neg c, s, w) &= \alpha \mathbf{P}(R | \neg c) \mathbf{P}(w | s, R) \\
&= \alpha \langle 0.2, 0.8 \rangle \langle 0.99, 0.90 \rangle = \alpha \langle 0.198, 0.720 \rangle = \langle 11/51, 40/51 \rangle
\end{aligned}$$

Strictly speaking, the transition matrix is only well-defined for the variant of MCMC in which the variable to be sampled is chosen randomly. (In the variant where the variables are chosen in a fixed order, the transition probabilities depend on where we are in the ordering.) Now consider the transition matrix.

- Entries on the diagonal correspond to self-loops. Such transitions can occur by sampling *either* variable. For example,

$$q((c, r) \rightarrow (c, r)) = 0.5P(c|r, s) + 0.5P(r|c, s, w) = 17/27$$

- Entries where one variable is changed must sample that variable. For example,

$$q((c, r) \rightarrow (c, \neg r)) = 0.5P(\neg r|c, s, w) = 5/54$$

- Entries where both variables change cannot occur. For example,

$$q((c, r) \rightarrow (\neg c, \neg r)) = 0$$


This gives us the following transition matrix, where the transition is from the state given by the row label to the state given by the column label:

$$\begin{array}{c} (c, r) \quad (c, \neg r) \quad (\neg c, r) \quad (\neg c, \neg r) \\ \begin{pmatrix} (c, r) & 17/27 & 5/54 & 5/18 & 0 \\ (c, \neg r) & 11/27 & 22/189 & 0 & 10/21 \\ (\neg c, r) & 2/9 & 0 & 59/153 & 20/51 \\ (\neg c, \neg r) & 0 & 1/42 & 11/102 & 310/357 \end{pmatrix} \end{array}$$

- c. \mathbf{Q}^2 represents the probability of going from each state to each state in two steps.
- d. \mathbf{Q}^n (as $n \rightarrow \infty$) represents the long-term probability of being in each state starting in each state; for ergodic \mathbf{Q} these probabilities are independent of the starting state, so every row of \mathbf{Q} is the same and represents the posterior distribution over states given the evidence.
- e. We can produce very large powers of \mathbf{Q} with very few matrix multiplications. For example, we can get \mathbf{Q}^2 with one multiplication, \mathbf{Q}^4 with two, and \mathbf{Q}^{2^k} with k . Unfortunately, in a network with n Boolean variables, the matrix is of size $2^n \times 2^n$, so each multiplication takes $O(2^{3n})$ operations.

14.12

- a. The classes are *Team*, with instances *A*, *B*, and *C*, and *Match*, with instances *AB*, *BC*, and *CA*. Each team has a quality *Q* and each match has a *Team₁* and *Team₂* and an *Outcome*. The team names for each match are of course fixed in advance. The prior over quality could be uniform and the probability of a win for team 1 should increase with $Q(\text{Team}_1) - Q(\text{Team}_2)$.
- b. The random variables are *A.Q*, *B.Q*, *C.Q*, *AB.Outcome*, *BC.Outcome*, and *CA.Outcome*. The network is shown in Figure S14.4.
- c. The exact result will depend on the probabilities used in the model. With any prior on quality that is the same across all teams, we expect that the posterior over *BC.Outcome* will show that *C* is more likely to win than *B*.
- d. The inference cost in such a model will be $O(2^n)$ because all the team qualities become coupled.
- e. MCMC appears to do well on this problem, provided the probabilities are not too skewed. Our results show scaling behavior that is roughly linear in the number of teams, although we did not investigate very large n .



Solutions for Chapter 15

Probabilistic Reasoning over Time

15.1 For each variable U_t that appears as a parent of a variable X_{t+2} , define an auxiliary variable U_{t+1}^{old} , such that U_t is parent of U_{t+1}^{old} and U_{t+1}^{old} is a parent of X_{t+2} . This gives us a first-order Markov model. To ensure that the joint distribution over the original variables is unchanged, we keep the CPT for X_{t+2} is unchanged except for the new parent name, and we require that $\mathbf{P}(U_{t+1}^{old}|U_t)$ is an identity mapping, i.e., the child has the same value as the parent with probability 1. Since the parameters in this model are fixed and known, there is no effective increase in the number of free parameters in the model.

15.2

- a. For all t , we the filtering formula

$$\mathbf{P}(R_t|u_{1:t}) = \alpha \mathbf{P}(u_t|R_t) \sum_{R_{t-1}} \mathbf{P}(R_t|R_{t-1}) P(R_{t-1}|u_{1:t-1}) .$$

At the fixed point, we additionally expect that $\mathbf{P}(R_t|u_{1:t}) = \mathbf{P}(R_{t-1}|u_{1:t-1})$. Let the fixed-point probabilities be $\langle \rho, 1 - \rho \rangle$. This provides us with a system of linear equations:

$$\begin{aligned} \langle \rho, 1 - \rho \rangle &= \alpha \langle 0.9, 0.2 \rangle \langle 0.7, 0.3 \rangle \rho + \langle 0.3, 0.7 \rangle (1 - \rho) \\ &= \alpha \langle 0.9, 0.2 \rangle (\langle 0.4\rho, -0.4\rho \rangle + \langle 0.3, 0.7 \rangle) \\ &= \frac{1}{0.9(0.4\rho + 0.3) + 0.2(-0.4\rho + 0.7)} \langle 0.9, 0.2 \rangle (\langle 0.4\rho, -0.4\rho \rangle + \langle 0.3, 0.7 \rangle) \end{aligned}$$

Solving this system, we find that $\rho \approx 0.8933$.

- b. The probability converges to $\langle 0.5, 0.5 \rangle$ as illustrated in Figure S15.1. This convergence makes sense if we consider a fixed-point equation for $\mathbf{P}(R_{2+k}|U_1, U_2)$:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{P}(R_{2+k}|U_1, U_2) &= \langle 0.7, 0.3 \rangle P(r_{2+k-1}|U_1, U_2) + \langle 0.3, 0.7 \rangle P(-r_{2+k-1}|U_1, U_2) \\ \mathbf{P}(r_{2+k}|U_1, U_2) &= 0.7P(r_{2+k-1}|U_1, U_2) + 0.3(1 - P(r_{2+k-1}|U_1, U_2)) \\ &= 0.4P(r_{2+k-1}|U_1, U_2) + 0.3 \end{aligned}$$

That is, $P(r_{2+k}|U_1, U_2) = 0.5$.

Notice that the fixed point does not depend on the initial evidence.

15.3 This exercise develops the Island algorithm for smoothing in DBNs (?).




Figure S15.1 A graph of the probability of rain as a function of time, forecast into the future.

- a. The chapter shows that $\mathbf{P}(\mathbf{X}_k | \mathbf{e}_{1:t})$ can be computed as

$$\mathbf{P}(\mathbf{X}_k | \mathbf{e}_{1:t}) = \alpha \mathbf{P}(\mathbf{X}_k | \mathbf{e}_{1:k}) \mathbf{P}(\mathbf{e}_{k+1:t} | \mathbf{X}_k) = \alpha \mathbf{f}_{1:k} \mathbf{b}_{k+1:t}$$

The forward recursion (Equation 15.3) shows that $\mathbf{f}_{1:k}$ can be computed from $\mathbf{f}_{1:k-1}$ and \mathbf{e}_k , which can in turn be computed from $\mathbf{f}_{1:k-2}$ and \mathbf{e}_{k-1} , and so on down to $\mathbf{f}_{1:0}$ and \mathbf{e}_1 . Hence, $\mathbf{f}_{1:k}$ can be computed from $\mathbf{f}_{1:0}$ and $\mathbf{e}_{1:k}$. The backward recursion (Equation 15.7) shows that $\mathbf{b}_{k+1:t}$ can be computed from $\mathbf{b}_{k+2:t}$ and \mathbf{e}_{k+1} , which in turn can be computed from $\mathbf{b}_{k+3:t}$ and \mathbf{e}_{k+2} , and so on up to $\mathbf{b}_{h+1:t}$ and \mathbf{e}_h . Hence, $\mathbf{b}_{k+1:t}$ can be computed from $\mathbf{b}_{h+1:t}$ and $\mathbf{e}_{k+1:h}$. Combining these two, we find that $\mathbf{P}(\mathbf{X}_k | \mathbf{e}_{1:t})$ can be computed from $\mathbf{f}_{1:0}$, $\mathbf{b}_{h+1:t}$, and $\mathbf{e}_{1:h}$.

- b. The reasoning for the second half is essentially identical: for k between h and t , $\mathbf{P}(\mathbf{X}_k | \mathbf{e}_{1:t})$ can be computed from $\mathbf{f}_{1:h}$, $\mathbf{b}_{t+1:t}$, and $\mathbf{e}_{h+1:t}$.
- c. The algorithm takes 3 arguments: an evidence sequence, an initial forward message, and a final backward message. The forward message is propagated to the halfway point and the backward message is propagated backward. The algorithm then calls itself recursively on the two halves of the evidence sequence with the appropriate forward and backward messages. The base case is a sequence of length 1 or 2.
- d. At each level of the recursion the algorithm traverses the entire sequence, doing $O(t)$ work. There are $O(\log_2 t)$ levels, so the total time is $O(t \log_2 t)$. The algorithm does a depth-first recursion, so the total space is proportional to the depth of the stack, i.e., $O(\log_2 t)$. With n islands, the recursion depth is $O(\log_n t)$, so the total time is $O(t \log_n t)$ but the space is $O(n \log_n t)$.

15.4 This is a very good exercise for deepening intuitions about temporal probabilistic reasoning. First, notice that the impossibility of the sequence of most likely states cannot come from an impossible observation because the smoothed probability at each time step includes the evidence likelihood at that time step as a factor. Hence, the impossibility of a sequence must arise from an impossible transition. Now consider such a transition from $X_k = i$ to $X_{k+1} = j$ for some i, j, k . For $X_{k+1} = j$ to be the most likely state at time $k+1$, even though it cannot be reached from the most likely state at time k , we can simply have an n -state system where, say, the smoothed probability of $X_k = i$ is $(1 + (n-1)\epsilon)/n$ and the remaining states have probability $(1 - \epsilon)/n$. The remaining states all transition deterministically to $X_{k+1} = j$. From here, it is a simple matter to work out a specific model that behaves as desired.

15.5

- a. Looking at the fragment of the model containing just S_0 , \mathbf{X}_0 , and \mathbf{X}_1 , we have

$$\mathbf{P}(\mathbf{X}_1) = \sum_{s_0=1}^k P(s_0) \int_{\mathbf{x}_0} P(\mathbf{x}_0) \mathbf{P}(X_1 | \mathbf{x}_0, s_0)$$

From the properties of the Kalman filter, we know that the integral gives a Gaussian for each different value of s_0 . Hence, the prediction distribution is a mixture of k Gaussians, each weighted by $P(s_0)$.

- b. The update equation for the switching Kalman filter is


$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{P}(\mathbf{X}_{t+1}, S_{t+1} | \mathbf{e}_{1:t+1}) \\ &= \alpha \mathbf{P}(\mathbf{e}_{t+1} | \mathbf{X}_{t+1}, S_{t+1}) \sum_{s_t=1}^k \int_{\mathbf{x}_t} \mathbf{P}(\mathbf{x}_t, s_t | \mathbf{e}_{1:t}) \mathbf{P}(\mathbf{X}_{t+1}, S_{t+1} | \mathbf{x}_t, s_t) \\ &= \alpha \mathbf{P}(\mathbf{e}_{t+1} | \mathbf{X}_{t+1}) \sum_{s_t=1}^k P(s_t | \mathbf{e}_{1:t}) \mathbf{P}(S_{t+1} | s_t) \int_{\mathbf{x}_t} \mathbf{P}(\mathbf{x}_t | \mathbf{e}_{1:t}) \mathbf{P}(\mathbf{X}_{t+1} | \mathbf{x}_t, s_t) \end{aligned}$$

We are given that $\mathbf{P}(\mathbf{x}_t | \mathbf{e}_{1:t})$ is a mixture of m Gaussians. Each Gaussian is subject to k different linear-Gaussian projections and then updated by a linear-Gaussian observation, so we obtain a sum of km Gaussians. Thus, after t steps we have k^t Gaussians.

- c. Each weight represents the probability of one of the k^t sequences of values for the switching variable.

15.6 This is a simple exercise in algebra. We have

$$\begin{aligned} P(x_1 | z_1) &= \alpha e^{-\frac{1}{2} \left(\frac{(z_1 - x_1)^2}{\sigma_z^2} \right)} e^{-\frac{1}{2} \left(\frac{(x_1 - \mu_0)^2}{\sigma_0^2 + \sigma_x^2} \right)} \\ &= \alpha e^{-\frac{1}{2} \left(\frac{(\sigma_0^2 + \sigma_x^2)(z_1 - x_1)^2 + \sigma_z^2(x_1 - \mu_0)^2}{\sigma_z^2(\sigma_0^2 + \sigma_x^2)} \right)} \\ &= \alpha e^{-\frac{1}{2} \left(\frac{(\sigma_0^2 + \sigma_x^2)(z_1^2 - 2z_1x_1 + x_1^2) + \sigma_z^2(x_1^2 - 2\mu_0x_1 + \mu_0^2)}{\sigma_z^2(\sigma_0^2 + \sigma_x^2)} \right)} \\ &= \alpha e^{-\frac{1}{2} \left(\frac{(\sigma_0^2 + \sigma_x^2 + \sigma_z^2)x_1^2 - 2((\sigma_0^2 + \sigma_x^2)z_1 + \sigma_z^2\mu_0)x_1 + c}{\sigma_z^2(\sigma_0^2 + \sigma_x^2)} \right)} \end{aligned}$$



$$= \alpha' e^{-\frac{1}{2} \left(\frac{(x_1 - \frac{(\sigma_0^2 + \sigma_x^2)z_1 + \sigma_z^2 \mu_0}{\sigma_0^2 + \sigma_x^2 + \sigma_z^2})^2}{(\sigma_0^2 + \sigma_x^2)\sigma_z^2 / (\sigma_0^2 + \sigma_x^2 + \sigma_z^2)} \right)}.$$

15.7

- See Figure S15.2.
- We can find a fixed point by solving

$$\sigma^2 = \frac{(\sigma^2 + \sigma_x^2)\sigma_z^2}{\sigma^2 + \sigma_x^2 + \sigma_z^2}$$

for σ^2 . Using the quadratic formula and requiring $\sigma^2 \geq 0$, we obtain

$$\sigma^2 = \frac{-\sigma_x^2 + \sqrt{\sigma_x^4 + 4\sigma_x^2\sigma_z^2}}{\sigma_z^2}$$

We omit the proof of convergence, which, presumably, can be done by showing that the update is a contraction (i.e., after updating, two different starting points for σ_t become closer).

- As $\sigma_x^2 \rightarrow 0$, we see that the fixed point $\sigma^2 \rightarrow 0$ also. This is because $\sigma_x^2 = 0$ implies a deterministic path for the object. Each observation supplies more information about this path, until its parameters are known completely.

As $\sigma_z^2 \rightarrow 0$, the variance update gives $\sigma^{t+1} \rightarrow 0$ immediately. That is, if we have an exact observation of the object's state, then the posterior is a delta function about that observed value regardless of the transition variance.

15.8 There is one class, *Times*. Each element of the class has a *state* attribute with n possible values and an *observation* attribute which may be discrete or continuous. The parent of the *observation* attribute is the *state* attribute of the same time step. Each time step has *predecessor* relation to another time step, and the parent of the *state* attribute is the *state* attribute of the *predecessor* time step.

15.9

- a. The curve of interest is the one for $E(Battery_t | \dots 5555000000 \dots)$. In the absence of any useful sensor information from the battery meter, the posterior distribution for the battery level is the same as the projection without evidence. The transition model for the battery includes a small probability for downward transitions in the battery level at each time step, but zero probability for upward transitions (there are no recharging actions in the model). Thus, the stationary distribution towards which the battery level tends has value 0 with probability 1. The curve for $E(Battery_t | \dots 5555000000 \dots)$ will asymptote to 0.
- b. See Figure S15.3. The CPT for $BMeter_1$ has a probability of transient failure (i.e., reporting 0) that increases with temperature.
- c. The agent can obviously calculate the posterior distribution over $Temp_t$ by filtering the observation sequence in the usual way. This posterior can be informative if the effect of temperature on transient failure is non-negligible and transient failures occur more frequently than do major changes in temperature. Essentially, the temperature is estimated from the frequency of “blips” in the sequence of battery meter readings.

15.10 The process works exactly as on page 507. We start with the full expression:

$$\mathbf{P}(R_3 | u_1, u_2, u_3) = \alpha \sum_{r_1} \sum_{r_2} P(r_1) P(u_1 | r_1) P(r_2 | r_1) P(u_2 | r_2) \mathbf{P}(R_3 | r_2) \mathbf{P}(u_3 | R_3)$$

Whichever order we push in the summations, the variable elimination process never creates factors containing more than two variables, which is the same size as the CPTs in the original network. In fact, given an HMM sequence of arbitrary length, we can eliminate the state variables in any order.

15.11 The model is shown in Figure S15.4. The key point to note is that any phone variation at one point (here, [aa] vs. [ey] in the fourth phone) results in variation at three points because of the effects on the preceding and succeeding phones.

15.12 The [C1,C2] and [C6,C7] must come from the onset and end, respectively. The C3 could come from 2 sources, the onset or the mid, and the [C4, C4] combination could come from 3 sources: mid-mid, mid-end, or end-end. You can't go directly from onset to end, so the only possible paths (along with their path and output probabilities) are as follows:




Figure S15.3 Modification of Figure 15.13(a) to include the effect of external temperature on the battery meter.




Figure S15.4 Transition diagram for the triphone pronunciation model in Ex. 15.11.

	C1	C2	C3	C4	C4	C6	C7									
OOMMEE	(*	.3	.3	.7	.9	.1	.4	.6	.5	.2	.3	.7	.7	.5	.4)	= 4.0e-6
OOMEEEE	(*	.3	.3	.7	.1	.4	.4	.6	.5	.2	.3	.7	.1	.5	.4)	= 2.5e-7
OOMMMEE	(*	.3	.7	.9	.9	.1	.4	.6	.5	.2	.2	.7	.7	.5	.4)	= 8.0e-6
OOMMEEE	(*	.3	.7	.9	.1	.4	.4	.6	.5	.2	.2	.7	.1	.5	.4)	= 5.1e-7
OOMEEEE	(*	.3	.7	.1	.4	.4	.4	.6	.5	.2	.2	.1	.1	.5	.4)	= 3.2e-8

So the most probable path is OOMMMEE (that is, onset-onset-mid-mid-mid-end-end), with a probability of 8.0×10^{-6} . The total probability of the sequence is the sum of the five paths, or 1.3×10^{-5} .

Solutions for Chapter 16

Making Simple Decisions

16.1 It is interesting to create a histogram of accuracy on this task for the students in the class. It is also interesting to record how many times each student comes within, say, 10% of the right answer. Then you get a profile of each student: this one is an accurate guesser but overly cautious about bounds, etc.

16.2 The expected monetary value of the lottery L is

$$EMV(L) = \frac{1}{50} \times \$10 + \frac{1}{2000000} \times \$1000000 = \$0.70$$

Although $\$0.70 < \1 , it is not *necessarily* irrational to buy the ticket. First we will consider just the utilities of the monetary outcomes, ignoring the utility of actually playing the lottery game. Using $U(S_{k+n})$ to represent the utility to the agent of having n dollars more than the current state, and assuming that utility is linear for small values of money (i.e., $U(S_{k+n}) \approx n(U(S_{k+1}) - U(S_k))$ for $-10 \leq n \leq 10$), the utility of the lottery is:

$$\begin{aligned} U(L) &= \frac{1}{50}U(S_{k+10}) + \frac{1}{2,000,000}U(S_{k+1,000,000}) \\ &\approx \frac{1}{5}U(S_{k+1}) + \frac{1}{2,000,000}U(S_{k+1,000,000}) \end{aligned}$$

This is more than $U(S_{k+1})$ when $U(S_{k+1,000,000}) > 1,600,000U(\$1)$. Thus, for a purchase to be rational (when only money is considered), the agent must be quite risk-seeking. This would be unusual for low-income individuals, for whom the price of a ticket is non-trivial. It is possible that some buyers do not internalize the magnitude of the very low probability of winning—to imagine an event is to assign it a “non-trivial” probability, in effect. Apparently, these buyers are better at internalizing the large magnitude of the prize. Such buyers are clearly acting irrationally.

Some people may feel their current situation is intolerable, that is, $U(S_k) \approx U(S_{k\pm 1}) \approx u_{\perp}$. Therefore the situation of having one dollar more or less would be equally intolerable, and it would be rational to gamble on a high payoff, even if one that has low probability.

Gamblers also derive pleasure from the excitement of the lottery and the temporary possession of at least a non-zero chance of wealth. So we should add to the utility of playing the lottery the term t to represent the thrill of participation. Seen this way, the lottery is just another form of entertainment, and buying a lottery ticket is no more irrational than buying

a movie ticket. Either way, you pay your money, you get a small thrill t , and (most likely) you walk away empty-handed. (Note that it could be argued that doing this kind of decision-theoretic computation decreases the value of t . It is not clear if this is a good thing or a bad thing.)

16.3

- a. The probability that the first heads appears on the n th toss is 2^{-n} , so

$$EMV(L) = \sum_{n=1}^{\infty} 2^{-n} \cdot 2^n = \sum_{n=1}^{\infty} 1 = \infty$$

- b. Typical answers range between \$4 and \$100.

- c. Assume initial wealth (after paying c to play the game) of $\$(k - c)$; then

$$U(L) = \sum_{n=1}^{\infty} 2^{-n} \cdot (a \log_2(k - c + 2^n) + b)$$

Assume $k - c = \$0$ for simplicity. Then

$$\begin{aligned} U(L) &= \sum_{n=1}^{\infty} 2^{-n} \cdot (a \log_2(2^n) + b) \\ &= \sum_{n=1}^{\infty} 2^{-n} \cdot an + b \\ &= 2a + b \end{aligned}$$

- d. The maximum amount c is given by the solution of

$$a \log_2 k + b = \sum_{n=1}^{\infty} 2^{-n} \cdot (a \log_2(k - c + 2^n) + b)$$

For our simple case, we have

$$a \log_2 c + b = 2a + b$$

or $c = \$4$.

16.4 This is an interesting exercise to do in class. Choose $M_1 = \$100$, $M_2 = \$100$, \$1000, \$10000, \$1000000. Ask for a show of hands of those preferring the lottery at different values of p . Students will almost always display risk aversion, but there may be a wide spread in its onset. A curve can be plotted for the class by finding the smallest p yielding a majority vote for the lottery.

16.5 The program itself is pretty trivial. But note that there are some studies showing you get better answers if you ask subjects to move a slider to indicate a proportion, rather than asking for a probability number. So having a graphical user interface is an advantage. The main point of the exercise is to examine the data, expose inconsistent behavior on the part of the subjects, and see how people vary in their choices.

16.6 The protocol would be to ask a series of questions of the form “which would you prefer” involving a monetary gain (or loss) versus an increase (or decrease) in a risk of death.

For example, “would you pay \$100 for a helmet that would eliminate completely the one-in-a-million chance of death from a bicycle accident.”

16.7 The complete proof is given by Keeney and Raiffa (1976).

16.8 This exercise can be solved using an influence diagram package such as IDEAL. The specific values are not especially important. Notice how the tedium of encoding all the entries in the utility table cries out for a system that allows the additive, multiplicative, and other forms sanctioned by MAUT.


One of the key aspects of the fully explicit representation in Figure 16.5 is its amenability to change. By doing this exercise as well as Exercise 16.9, students will augment their appreciation of the flexibility afforded by declarative representations, which can otherwise seem tedious.

- a. For this part, one could use symbolic values (high, medium, low) for all the variables and not worry too much about the exact probability values, or one could use actual numerical ranges and try to assess the probabilities based on some knowledge of the domain. Even with three-valued variables, the cost CPT has 54 entries.
- b. This part almost certainly should be done using a software package.
- c. If each aircraft generates half as much noise, we need to adjust the entries in the *Noise* CPT.
- d. If the noise attribute becomes three times more important, the utility table entries must all be altered. If an appropriate (e.g., additive) representation is available, then one would only need to adjust the appropriate constants to reflect the change.
- e. This part should be done using a software package. Some packages may offer VPI calculation already. Alternatively, one can invoke the decision-making package repeatedly to do all the what-if calculations of best actions and their utilities, as required in the VPI formula. Finally, one can write general-purpose VPI code as an add-on to a decision-making package.

16.9 The information associated with the utility node in Figure 16.6 is an action-value table, and can be constructed simply by averaging out the *Deaths*, *Noise*, and *Cost* nodes in Figure 16.5. As explained in the text, modifications to aircraft noise levels or to the importance of noise do not result in simple changes to the action-value table. Probably the easiest way to do it is to go back to the original table in Figure 16.5. The exercise therefore illustrates the tradeoffs involved in using compiled representations.

16.10 The answer to this exercise depends on the probability values chosen by the student.

16.11 This question is a simple exercise in sequential decision making, and helps in making the transition to Chapter 17. It also emphasizes the point that the value of information is computed by examining the *conditional* plan formed by determining the best action for each possible outcome of the test. It may be useful to introduce “decision trees” (as the term is used in the decision analysis literature) to organize the information in this question. (See Pearl (1988), Chapter 6.) Each part of the question analyzes some aspect of the tree. Incidentally,



the question assumes that utility and monetary value coincide, and ignores the transaction costs involved in buying and selling.

- a. The decision network is shown in Figure S16.1.
- b. The expected net gain in dollars is

$$P(q^+)(2000 - 1500) + P(q^-)(2000 - 2200) = 0.7 \times 500 + 0.3 \times -200 = 290$$

- c. The question could probably have been stated better: Bayes' theorem is used to compute $P(q^+|Pass)$, etc., whereas conditionalization is sufficient to compute $P(Pass)$.

$$\begin{aligned} P(Pass) &= P(Pass|q^+)P(q^+) + P(Pass|q^-)P(q^-) \\ &= 0.8 \times 0.7 + 0.35 \times 0.3 = 0.665 \end{aligned}$$

Using Bayes' theorem:

$$\begin{aligned} P(q^+|Pass) &= \frac{P(Pass|q^+)P(q^+)}{P(Pass)} = \frac{0.8 \times 0.7}{0.665} \approx 0.8421 \\ P(q^-|Pass) &\approx 1 - 0.8421 = 0.1579 \\ P(q^+|\neg Pass) &= \frac{P(\neg Pass|q^+)P(q^+)}{P(\neg Pass)} = \frac{0.2 \times 0.7}{0.335} \approx 0.4179 \\ P(q^-|\neg Pass) &\approx 1 - 0.4179 = 0.5821 \end{aligned}$$

- d. If the car passes the test, the expected value of buying is

$$\begin{aligned} &P(q^+|Pass)(2000 - 1500) + P(q^-|Pass)(2000 - 2200) \\ &= 0.8421 \times 500 + 0.1579 \times -200 = 378.92 \end{aligned}$$

Thus buying is the best decision given a pass. If the car fails the test, the expected value of buying is

$$\begin{aligned} &P(q^+|\neg Pass)(2000 - 1500) + P(q^-|\neg Pass)(2000 - 2200) \\ &= 0.4179 \times 500 + 0.5821 \times -200 = 92.53 \end{aligned}$$

Buying is again the best decision.

- e. Since the action is the same for both outcomes of the test, the test itself is worthless (if it is the only possible test) and the optimal plan is simply to buy the car without the test. (This is a trivial conditional plan.) For the test to be worthwhile, it would need to be more discriminating in order to reduce the probability $P(q^+ | \neg Pass)$. The test would also be worthwhile if the market value of the car were less, or if the cost of repairs were more.

An interesting additional exercise is to prove the general proposition that if α is the best action for all the outcomes of a test then it must be the best action in the absence of the test outcome.

16.12 Intuitively, the value of information is nonnegative because in the worst case one could simply ignore the information and act as if it was not available. A formal proof therefore begins by showing that this policy results in the same expected utility. The formula for the value of information is

$$VPI_E(E_j) = \left(\sum_k P(E_j = e_{jk} | E) EU(\alpha_{e_{jk}} | E, E_j = e_{jk}) \right) - EU(\alpha | E)$$

If the agent does α given the information E_j , its expected utility is

$$\sum_k P(E_j = e_{jk} | E) EU(\alpha | E, E_j = e_{jk}) = EU(\alpha | E, E_j = e_{jk})$$

where the equality holds because the LHS is just the conditionalization of the RHS with respect to E_j . By definition,

$$EU(\alpha_{e_{jk}} | E, E_j = e_{jk}) \geq EU(\alpha | E, E_j = e_{jk})$$

hence $VPI_E(E_j) \geq 0$.

16.13 This is relatively straightforward in the AIMA2e code release. We need to add node types for action nodes and utility nodes; we need to be able to run standard Bayes net inference on the network given fixed actions, in order to compute the posterior expected utility; and we need to write an “outer loop” that can try all possible actions to find the best. Given this, adding VPI calculation is straightforward, as described in the answer to Exercise 16.8.

Solutions for Chapter 17

Making Complex Decisions

17.1 This question helps to bring home the difference between deterministic and stochastic environments. Here, even a short sequence spreads the agent all over the place. The easiest way to answer the question systematically is to draw a tree showing the states reached after each step and the transition probabilities. Then the probability of reaching each leaf is the product of the probabilities along the path, because the transition probabilities are Markovian. If the same state appears at more than one leaf, the probabilities of the leaves are summed because the events corresponding to the two paths are disjoint. (It is always a good idea to ensure that students justify these kinds of probabilistic calculations, especially since sometimes the “naive” approach gets the wrong answer.) The states and probabilities are: (3,1), 0.01; (3,2), 0.08; (3,3), 0.09; (4,2), 0.18; (4,3), 0.64.

17.2 Stationarity requires the agent to have identical preferences between the sequence pair $[s_0, s_1, s_2, \dots]$, $[s_0, s'_1, s'_2, \dots]$ and between the sequence pair $[s_1, s_2, \dots]$, $[s'_1, s'_2, \dots]$. If the utility of a sequence is its maximum reward, we can easily violate stationarity. For example,

$$[4, 3, 0, 0, 0, \dots] \sim [4, 0, 0, 0, 0, \dots]$$

but

$$[3, 0, 0, 0, 0, \dots] \succ [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, \dots].$$

We can still define $U^\pi(s)$ as the expected maximum reward obtained by executing π starting in s . The agent’s preferences seem peculiar, nonetheless. For example, if the current state s has reward R_{\max} , the agent will be indifferent among all actions, but once the action is executed and the agent is no longer in s , it will suddenly start to care about what happens next.

17.3 A finite search problem (see Chapter 3) is defined by an initial state s_0 , a successor function $S(s)$ that returns a set of action–state pairs, a step cost function $c(s, a, s')$, and a goal test. An optimal solution is a least-cost path from s_0 to any goal state.

To construct the corresponding MDP, define $R(s, a, s') = -c(s, a, s')$ unless s is a goal state, in which case $R(s, a, s') = 0$ (see Ex. 17.5 for how to obtain the effect of a three-argument reward function); define $T(s, a, s') = 1$ if $(a, s') \in S(s)$; and $\gamma = 1$. An optimal solution to this MDP is a policy that follows the least-cost path from each state to its nearest goal state.

17.4

- a. Intuitively, the agent wants to get to state 3 as soon as possible, because it will pay a cost for each time step it spends in states 1 and 2. However, the only action that reaches state 3 (action b) succeeds with low probability, so the agent should minimize the cost it incurs while trying to reach the terminal state. This suggests that the agent should definitely try action b in state 1; in state 2, it might be better to try action a to get to state 1 (which is the better place to wait for admission to state 3), rather than aiming directly for state 3. The decision in state 2 involves a numerical tradeoff.
- b. The application of policy iteration proceeds in alternating steps of value determination and policy update.

- *Initialization:* $U \leftarrow \langle -1, -2, 0 \rangle$, $P \leftarrow \langle b, b \rangle$.
- *Value determination:*

$$\begin{aligned} u_1 &= -1 + 0.1u_3 + 0.9u_1 \\ u_2 &= -2 + 0.1u_3 + 0.9u_2 \\ u_3 &= 0 \end{aligned}$$

That is, $u_1 = -10$ and $u_2 = -20$.

Policy update: In state 1,

$$\sum_j T(1, a, j)u_j = 0.8 \times -20 + 0.2 \times -10 = -18$$

while

$$\sum_j T(1, b, j)u_j = 0.1 \times 0 + 0.9 \times -10 = -9$$

so action b is still preferred for state 1.

In state 2,

$$\sum_j T(2, a, j)u_j = 0.8 \times -10 + 0.2 \times -20 = -12$$

while

$$\sum_j T(2, b, j)u_j = 0.1 \times 0 + 0.9 \times -20 = -18$$

so action a is preferred for state 2. We set *unchanged?* \leftarrow false and proceed.

- *Value determination:*

$$\begin{aligned} u_1 &= -1 + 0.1u_3 + 0.9u_1 \\ u_2 &= -2 + 0.8u_1 + 0.2u_2 \\ u_3 &= 0 \end{aligned}$$

Once more $u_1 = -10$; now, $u_2 = -15$. *Policy update:* In state 1,

$$\sum_j T(1, a, j)u_j = 0.8 \times -15 + 0.2 \times -10 = -14$$

while

$$\sum_j T(1, b, j)u_j = 0.1 \times 0 + 0.9 \times -10 = -9$$

so action b is still preferred for state 1.

In state 2,

$$\sum_j T(1, a, j)u_j = 0.8 \times -10 + 0.2 \times -15 = -11$$

while

$$\sum_j T(1, b, j)u_j = 0.1 \times 0 + 0.9 \times -15 = -13.5$$

so action a is still preferred for state 1. *unchanged?* remains true, and we terminate.

Note that the resulting policy matches our intuition: when in state 2, try to move to state 1, and when in state 1, try to move to state 3.

- c. An initial policy with action a in both states leads to an unsolvable problem. The initial value determination problem has the form

$$\begin{aligned} u_1 &= -1 + 0.2u_1 + 0.8u_2 \\ u_2 &= -2 + 0.8u_1 + 0.2u_2 \\ u_3 &= 0 \end{aligned}$$

and the first two equations are inconsistent. If we were to try to solve them iteratively, we would find the values tending to $-\infty$.

Discounting leads to well-defined solutions by bounding the penalty (expected discounted cost) an agent can incur at either state. However, the choice of discount factor will affect the policy that results. For γ small, the cost incurred in the distant future plays a negligible role in the value computation, because γ^n is near 0. As a result, an agent could choose action b in state 2 because the discounted short-term cost of remaining in the non-terminal states (states 1 and 2) outweighs the discounted long-term cost of action b failing repeatedly and leaving the agent in state 2. An additional exercise could ask the student to determine the value of γ at which the agent is indifferent between the two choices.

17.5 This is a deceptively simple exercise that tests the student's understanding of the formal definition of MDPs. Some students may need a hint or an example to get started.

- a. The key here is to get the max and summation in the right place. For $R(s, a)$ we have

$$U(s) = \max_a [R(s, a) + \gamma \sum_{s'} T(s, a, s') U(s')]$$

and for $R(s, a, s')$ we have

$$U(s) = \max_a \sum_{s'} T(s, a, s') [R(s, a, s') + \gamma U(s')].$$

- b. There are a variety of solutions here. One is to create a “pre-state” $pre(s, a, s')$ for every s, a, s' , such that executing a in s leads not to s' but to $pre(s, a, s')$. In this state is encoded the fact that the agent came from s and did a to get here. From the pre-state,

there is just one action b that always leads to s' . Let the new MDP have transition T' , reward R' , and discount γ' . Then

$$\begin{aligned} T'(s, a, \text{pre}(s, a, s')) &= T(s, a, s') \\ T'(\text{pre}(s, a, s'), b, s') &= 1 \\ R'(s, a) &= 0 \\ R'(\text{pre}(s, a, s'), b) &= \gamma^{-\frac{1}{2}} R(s, a, s') \\ \gamma' &= \gamma^{\frac{1}{2}} \end{aligned}$$

- c. In keeping with the idea of part (b), we can create states $\text{post}(s, a)$ for every s, a , such that

$$\begin{aligned} T'(s, a, \text{post}(s, a, s')) &= 1 \\ T'(\text{post}(s, a, s'), b, s') &= T(s, a, s') \\ R'(s) &= 0 \\ R'(\text{post}(s, a, s')) &= \gamma^{-\frac{1}{2}} R(s, a) \\ \gamma' &= \gamma^{\frac{1}{2}} \end{aligned}$$

17.6 The framework for this problem is in "uncertainty/domains/4x3-mdp.lisp". There is still some synthesis for the student to do for answer b. For c. some experimental design is necessary.

17.7 This can be done fairly simply by:

- Call `policy-iteration` (from "uncertainty/algorithms/dp.lisp") on the Markov Decision Processes representing the 4x3 grid, with values for the step cost ranging from, say, 0.0 to 1.0 in increments of 0.02.
- For any two adjacent policies that differ, run binary search on the step cost to pinpoint the threshold value.
- Convince yourself that you haven't missed any policies, either by using too coarse an increment in step size (0.02), or by stopping too soon (1.0).

One useful observation in this context is that the expected total reward of any fixed policy is linear in r , the per-step reward for the empty states. Imagine drawing the total reward of a policy as a function of r —a straight line. Now draw all the straight lines corresponding to all possible policies. The reward of the *optimal* policy as a function of r is just the max of all these straight lines. Therefore it is a piecewise linear, convex function of r . Hence there is a very efficient way to find *all* the optimal policy regions:

- For any two consecutive values of r that have different optimal policies, find the optimal policy for the midpoint. Once two consecutive values of r give the same policy, then the interval between the two points must be covered by that policy.
- Repeat this until two points are known for each distinct optimal policy.
- Suppose (r_{a1}, v_{a1}) and (r_{a2}, v_{a2}) are points for policy a , and (r_{b1}, v_{b1}) and (r_{b2}, v_{b2}) are the next two points, for policy b . Clearly, we can draw straight lines through these pairs of points and find their intersection. This does not mean, however, that there is no other optimal policy for the intervening region. We can determine this by calculating

the optimal policy for the intersection point. If we get a different policy, we continue the process.

The policies and boundaries derived from this procedure are shown in Figure S17.1. The figure shows that there are *nine* distinct optimal policies! Notice that as r becomes more negative, the agent becomes more willing to dive straight into the -1 terminal state rather than face the cost of the detour to the $+1$ state.

The somewhat ugly code is as follows. Notice that because the lines for neighboring policies are very nearly parallel, numerical instability is a serious problem.

```
(defun policy-surface (mdp r1 r2 &aux prev (unchanged nil))
  "returns points on the piecewise-linear surface
   defined by the value of the optimal policy of mdp as a
   function of r"
  (setq rvplist
    (list (cons r1 (r-policy mdp r1)) (cons r2 (r-policy mdp r2))))
  (do ()
    (unchanged rvplist)
    (setq unchanged t)
    (setq prev nil)
    (dolist (rvp rvplist)
      (let* ((rest (cdr (member rvp rvplist :test #'eq)))
             (next (first rest))
             (next-but-one (second rest)))
        (dprint (list (first prev) (first rvp)
                      '* (first next) (first next-but-one)))
        (when next
          (unless (or (= (first rvp) (first next))
                      (policy-equal (third rvp) (third next) mdp))
            (dprint "Adding new point(s)")
            (setq unchanged nil)
            (if (and prev next-but-one
                    (policy-equal (third prev) (third rvp) mdp)
                    (policy-equal (third next) (third next-but-one) mdp))
              (let* ((intxy (policy-vertex prev rvp next next-but-one))
                     (int (cons (xy-x intxy) (r-policy mdp (xy-x intxy)))))
                (dprint (list "Found intersection" intxy))
                (cond ((or (< (first int) (first rvp))
                        (> (first int) (first next)))
                  (dprint "Intersection out of range!")
                  (let ((int-r (/ (+ (first rvp) (first next)) 2)))
                    (setq int (cons int-r (r-policy mdp int-r)))
                    (push int (cdr (member rvp rvplist :test #'eq))))
                  ((or (policy-equal (third rvp) (third int) mdp)
                       (policy-equal (third next) (third int) mdp))
                    (dprint "Found policy boundary")
                    (push (list (first int) (second int) (third next))
                        (cdr (member rvp rvplist :test #'eq)))
                    (push (list (first int) (second int) (third rvp))
                        (cdr (member rvp rvplist :test #'eq))))
                  (t (dprint "Found new policy!")
                     (push int (cdr (member rvp rvplist :test #'eq)))))))
            (push int (cdr (member rvp rvplist :test #'eq))))))
```

```

        (let* ((int-r (/ (+ (first rvp) (first next)) 2))
              (int (cons int-r (r-policy mdp int-r))))
          (dprint (list "Adding split point" (list int-r (second int))))
          (push int (cdr (member rvp rvplist :test #'eq)))))
      (setq prev rvp)))

(defun r-policy (mdp r &aux U)
  (set-rewards mdp r)
  (setq U (value-iteration mdp
                        (copy-hash-table (mdp-rewards mdp) #'identity)
                        :epsilon 0.0000000001))
  (list (gethash '(1 1) U) (optimal-policy U (mdp-model mdp) (mdp-rewards mdp))))

(defun set-rewards (mdp r &aux (rewards (mdp-rewards mdp))
                      (terminals (mdp-terminal-states mdp)))
  (maphash #'(lambda (state reward)
                (unless (member state terminals :test #'equal)
                  (setf (gethash state rewards) r)))
    rewards))

(defun policy-equal (p1 p2 mdp &aux (match t)
                      (terminals (mdp-terminal-states mdp)))
  (maphash #'(lambda (state action)
                (unless (member state terminals :test #'equal)
                  (unless (eq (caar (gethash state p1)) (caar (gethash state p2)))
                    (setq match nil))))
    p1)
  match)

(defun policy-vertex (rvp1 rvp2 rvp3 rvp4)
  (let ((a (make-xy :x (first rvp1) :y (second rvp1)))
        (b (make-xy :x (first rvp2) :y (second rvp2)))
        (c (make-xy :x (first rvp3) :y (second rvp3)))
        (d (make-xy :x (first rvp4) :y (second rvp4))))
    (intersection-point (make-line :xyl a :xy2 b)
                        (make-line :xyl c :xy2 d))))


(defun intersection-point (l1 l2)
  ;; l1 is line ab; l2 is line cd
  ;; assume the lines cross at alpha a + (1-alpha) b,
  ;; also known as beta c + (1-beta) d
  ;; returns the intersection point unless they're parallel
  (let* ((a (line-xy1 l1))
        (b (line-xy2 l1))
        (c (line-xy1 l2))
        (d (line-xy2 l2))
        (xa (xy-x a)) (ya (xy-y a))
        (xb (xy-x b)) (yb (xy-y b))
        (xc (xy-x c)) (yc (xy-y c))
        (xd (xy-x d)) (yd (xy-y d))
        (q (- (* (- xa xb) (- yc yd))
              (* (- ya yb) (- xc xd)))))
    q))

```

```

(unless (zerop q)
  (let ((alpha (/ (- (* (- xd xb) (- yc yd))
                     (* (- yd yb) (- xc xd)))
                q)))
    (make-xy :x (float (+ (* alpha xa) (* (- 1 alpha) xb)))
             :y (float (+ (* alpha ya) (* (- 1 alpha) yb))))))

```



17.8

a. For U_A we have

$$U_A(s) = R(s) + \max_a \sum_a P(s'|a, s) U_B(s')$$

and for U_B we have

$$U_B(s) = R(s) + \min_a \sum_a P(s'|a, s) U_A(s').$$

17.10 In the following table, the rows are labelled by A's move and the columns by B's move, and the table entries list the payoffs to A and B respectively.

	R	P	S	F	W
R	0,0	-1,1	1,-1	-1,1	1,-1
P	1,-1	0,0	-1,1	-1,1	1,-1
S	-1,1	1,-1	0,0	-1,1	1,-1
F	1,-1	1,-1	1,-1	0,0	-1,1
W	-1,1	-1,1	-1,1	1,-1	0,0

Suppose A chooses a mixed strategy $[r : R; p : P; s : S; f : F; w : W]$, where $r + p + s + f + w = 1$. The payoff to A of B's possible pure responses are as follows:

$$R : +p - s + f - w$$

$$P : -r + s + f - w$$

$$S : +r - p + f - w$$

$$F : -r - p - s + w$$

$$W : +r + p + s - f$$

It is easy to see that no option is dominated over the whole region. Solving for the intersection of the hyperplanes, we find $r = p = s = 1/9$ and $f = w = 1/3$. By symmetry, we will find the same solution when B chooses a mixed strategy first.

17.11 The payoff matrix for three-finger Morra is as follows:

	<i>O: one</i>	<i>O: two</i>	<i>O: three</i>
<i>E: one</i>	$E = 2, O = -2$	$E = -3, O = 3$	$E = 4, O = -4$
<i>E: two</i>	$E = -3, O = 3$	$E = 4, O = -4$	$E = -5, O = 5$
<i>E: three</i>	$E = 4, O = -4$	$E = -5, O = 5$	$E = 6, O = -6$

Suppose E chooses a mixed strategy $[p_1 : one; p_2 : two; p_3 : three]$, where $p_1 + p_2 + p_3 = 1$. The payoff to E of O's possible pure responses are as follows:

$$one : 2p_1 - 3p_2 + 4p_3$$

$$two : -3p_1 + 4p_2 - 5p_3$$

$$three : 4p_1 - 5p_2 + 6p_3$$

It is easy to see that no option is dominated over the whole region. Solving for the intersection of the hyperplanes, we find $p_1 = 1/4$, $p_2 = 1/2$, $p_3 = 1/4$. The expected value is 0.

17.12 Every game is either a win for one side (and a loss for the other) or a tie. With 2 for a win, 1 for a tie, and 0 for a loss, 2 points are awarded for every game, so this is a constant-sum game.

If 1 point is awarded for a loss in overtime, then for some games 3 points are awarded in all. Therefore, the game is no longer constant-sum.

Suppose we assume that team A has probability r of winning in regular time and team B has probability s of winning in regular time (assuming normal play). Furthermore, assume

team B has a probability q of winning in overtime (which occurs if there is a tie after regular time). Once overtime is reached (by any means), the expected utilities are as follows:

$$U_A^O = 1 + p$$

$$U_B^O = 1 + q$$

In normal play, the expected utilities are derived from the probability of winning plus the probability of tying times the expected utility of overtime play:

$$U_A = 2r + (1 - r - s)(1 + p)$$

$$U_B = 2s + (1 - r - s)(1 + q)$$

Hence A has an incentive to agree if $U_A^O > U_A$, or

$$1 + p > 2r + (1 - r - s)(1 + p) \quad \text{or} \quad rp - r + sp + s > 0 \quad \text{or} \quad p > \frac{r - s}{r + s}$$

and B has an incentive to agree if $U_B^O > U_B$, or

$$1 + q > 2s + (1 - r - s)(1 + q) \quad \text{or} \quad sq - s + rq + r > 0 \quad \text{or} \quad q > \frac{s - r}{r + s}$$

When both of these inequalities hold, there is an incentive to tie in regulation play. For any values of r and s , there will be values of p and q such that both inequalities hold.

For an in-depth statistical analysis of the actual effects of the rule change and a more sophisticated treatment of the utility functions, see “Overtime! Rules and Incentives in the National Hockey League” by Stephen T. Easton and Duane W. Rockerbie, available at <http://people.uleth.ca/~rockerbie/OVERTIME.PDF>.

17.13 We apply iterated strict dominance to find the pure strategy. First, *Pol: do nothing* dominates *Pol: contract*, so we drop the *Pol: contract* row. Next, *Fed: contract* dominates *Fed: do nothing* and *Fed: expand* on the remaining rows, so we drop those columns. Finally, *Pol: expand* dominates *Pol: do nothing* on the one remaining column. Hence the only Nash equilibrium is a dominant strategy equilibrium with *Pol: expand* and *Fed: contract*. This is not Pareto optimal: it is worse for both players than the four strategy profiles in the top right quadrant.

Solutions for Chapter 18

Learning from Observations

18.1 The aim here is to couch language learning in the framework of the chapter, not to solve the problem! This is a very interesting topic for class discussion, raising issues of nature vs. nurture, the indeterminacy of meaning and reference, and so on. Basic references include Chomsky (1957) and Quine (1960).

The first step is to appreciate the variety of knowledge that goes under the heading “language.” The infant must learn to recognize and produce speech, learn vocabulary, learn grammar, learn the semantic and pragmatic interpretation of a speech act, and learn strategies for disambiguation, among other things. The performance elements for this (in humans) and their associated learning mechanisms are obviously very complex and as yet little is known about them.

A naive model of the learning environment considers just the exchange of speech sounds. In reality, the physical context of each utterance is crucial: a child must see the context in which “watermelon” is uttered in order to learn to associate “watermelon” with watermelons. Thus, the environment consists not just of other humans but also the physical objects and events about which discourse takes place. Auditory sensors detect speech sounds, while other senses (primarily visual) provide information on the physical context. The relevant effectors are the speech organs and the motor capacities that allow the infant to respond to speech or that elicit verbal feedback.

The performance standard could simply be the infant’s general utility function, however that is realized, so that the infant performs reinforcement learning to perform and respond to speech acts so as to improve its well-being—for example, by obtaining food and attention. However, humans’ built-in capacity for mimicry suggests that the production of sounds similar to those produced by other humans is a goal in itself. The child (once he or she learns to differentiate sounds and learn about pointing or other means of indicating salient objects) is also exposed to examples of supervised learning: an adult says “shoe” or “belly button” while indicating the appropriate object. So sentences produced by adults provide labelled positive examples, and the response of adults to the infant’s speech acts provides further classification feedback.

Mostly, it seems that adults do not correct the child’s speech, so there are very few negative classifications of the child’s attempted sentences. This is significant because early work on language learning (such as the work of Gold, 1967) concentrated just on identifying the set of strings that are grammatical, assuming a particular grammatical formalism. If there are


only positive examples, then there is nothing to rule out the grammar $S \rightarrow Word^*$. Some theorists (notably Chomsky and Fodor) used what they call the “poverty of the stimulus” argument to say that the basic universal grammar of languages must be innate, because otherwise (given the lack of negative examples) there would be no way that a child could learn a language (under the assumptions of language learning as learning a set of grammatical strings). Critics have called this the “poverty of the imagination” argument—I can’t think of a learning mechanism that would work, so it must be innate. Indeed, if we go to probabilistic context free grammars, then it is possible to learn a language without negative examples.

18.2 Learning tennis is much simpler than learning to speak. The requisite skills can be divided into movement, playing strokes, and strategy. The environment consists of the court, ball, opponent, and one’s own body. The relevant sensors are the visual system and proprioception (the sense of forces on and position of one’s own body parts). The effectors are the muscles involved in moving to the ball and hitting the stroke. The learning process involves both supervised learning and reinforcement learning. Supervised learning occurs in acquiring the predictive transition models, e.g., where the opponent will hit the ball, where the ball will land, and what trajectory the ball will have after one’s own stroke (e.g., if I hit a half-volley *this* way, it goes into the net, but if I hit it *that* way, it clears the net). Reinforcement learning occurs when points are won and lost—this is particularly important for strategic aspects of play such as shot placement and positioning (e.g., in 60% of the points where I hit a lob in response to a cross-court shot, I end up losing the point). In the early stages, reinforcement also occurs when a shot succeeds in clearing the net and landing in the opponent’s court. Achieving this small success is itself a sequential process involving many motor control commands, and there is no teacher available to tell the learner’s motor cortex which motor control commands to issue.

18.3 This is a deceptively simple question, designed to point out the plethora of “exceptions” in real-world situations and the way in which decision trees capture a hierarchy of exceptions. One possible tree is shown in Figure S18.1. One can, of course, imagine many more exceptions. The qualification problem, defined originally for action models, applies *a fortiori* to condition–action rules.

18.4 In standard decision trees, attribute tests divide examples according to the attribute value. Therefore any example reaching the second test already has a known value for the attribute and the second test is redundant. In some decision tree systems, however, all tests are Boolean even if the attributes are multivalued or continuous. In this case, additional tests of the attribute can be used to check different values or subdivide the range further (e.g., first check if $X > 0$, and then if it is, check if $x > 10$).

18.5 The algorithm may not return the “correct” tree, but it will return a tree that is logically equivalent, assuming that the method for generating examples eventually generates all possible combinations of input attributes. This is true because any two decision trees defined on the same set of attributes that agree on all possible examples are, by definition, logically equivalent. The actual form of the tree may differ because there are many different ways to represent the same function. (For example, with two attributes A and B we can have one tree



with A at the root and another with B at the root.) The root attribute of the original tree may not in fact be the one that will be chosen by the information gain heuristic when applied to the training examples.

18.6 This is an easy algorithm to implement. The main point is to have something to test other learning algorithms against, and to learn the basics of what a learning algorithm *is* in terms of inputs and outputs given the framework provided by the code repository.

18.7 If we leave out an example of one class, then the majority of the remaining examples are of the other class, so the majority classifier will always predict the wrong answer.

18.8 This question brings a little bit of mathematics to bear on the analysis of the learning problem, preparing the ground for Chapter 20. Error minimization is a basic technique in both statistics and neural nets. The main thing is to see that the error on a given training set can be written as a mathematical expression and viewed as a function of the hypothesis chosen. Here, the hypothesis in question is a single number $\alpha \in [0, 1]$ returned at the leaf.

a. If α is returned, the absolute error is

$$E = p(1 - \alpha) + n\alpha = \alpha(n - p) + p = n \text{ when } \alpha = 1 \\ = p \text{ when } \alpha = 0$$

This is minimized by setting

$$\alpha = 1 \text{ if } p > n \\ \alpha = 0 \text{ if } p < n$$

That is, α is the majority value.

- b. First calculate the sum of squared errors, and its derivative:

$$E = p(1 - \alpha)^2 + n\alpha^2$$

$$\frac{dE}{d\alpha} = 2\alpha n - 2p(1 - \alpha) = 2\alpha(p + n) - 2p$$

The fact that the second derivative, $\frac{d^2E}{d\alpha^2} = 2(p + n)$, is greater than zero means that E is minimized (not maximized) where $\frac{dE}{d\alpha} = 0$, i.e., when $\alpha = \frac{p}{p+n}$.

18.9 Suppose that we draw m examples. Each example has n input features plus its classification, so there are 2^{n+1} distinct input/output examples to choose from. For each example, there is exactly one contradictory example, namely the example with the same input features but the opposite classification. Thus, the probability of finding *no* contradiction is

$$\frac{\text{number of sequences of } m \text{ non-contradictory examples}}{\text{number of sequences of } m \text{ examples}} = \frac{2^{n+1} \cdot (2^{n+1} - 1) \cdot \dots \cdot (2^{n+1} - m + 1)}{2^{m(n+1)}}$$

$$= \frac{2^{n+1}!}{(2^{n+1} - m)! 2^{m(n+1)}}$$

For $n = 10$, with 2048 possible examples, a contradiction becomes likely with probability > 0.5 after 54 examples have been drawn.

18.10 This result emphasizes the fact that any statistical fluctuations caused by the random sampling process will result in an apparent information gain.

The easy part is showing that the gain is zero when each subset has the same ratio of positive examples. The gain is defined as

$$I\left(\frac{p}{p+n}, \frac{n}{p+n}\right) - \sum_{i=1}^v \frac{p_i + n_i}{p+n} I\left(\frac{p_i}{p_i + n_i}, \frac{n_i}{p_i + n_i}\right)$$

Since $p = \sum p_i$ and $n = \sum n_i$, if $p_i/(p_i + n_i) = p_j/(p_j + n_j)$ for all i, j then we must have $p_i/(p_i + n_i) = p/(p+n)$ for all i , and also $n_i/(p_i + n_i) = n/(p+n)$. From this, we obtain

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Gain} &= I\left(\frac{p}{p+n}, \frac{n}{p+n}\right) - \sum_{i=1}^v \frac{p_i + n_i}{p+n} I\left(\frac{p}{p+n}, \frac{n}{p+n}\right) \\ &= I\left(\frac{p}{p+n}, \frac{n}{p+n}\right) \left(1 - \frac{\sum_{i=1}^v p_i + n_i}{p+n}\right) = 0 \end{aligned}$$

18.11 This is a fairly small, straightforward programming exercise. The only hard part is the actual χ^2 computation; you might want to provide your students with a library function to do this.

18.12 This is another straightforward programming exercise. The follow-up exercise is to run tests to see if the modified algorithm actually does better.

18.13 Let the prior probabilities of each attribute value be $P(v_1), \dots, P(v_n)$. (These probabilities are estimated by the empirical fractions among the examples at the current node.) From page 540, the intrinsic information content of the attribute is

$$I(P(v_1), \dots, P(v_n)) = \sum_{i=1}^n -P(v_i) \log v_i$$

Given this formula and the empirical estimates of $P(v_i)$, the modification to the code is straightforward.

18.14

18.15 Note: this is the only exercise to cover the material in section 18.6. Although the basic ideas of computational learning theory are both important and elegant, it is not easy to find good exercises that are suitable for an AI class as opposed to a theory class. If you are teaching a graduate class, or an undergraduate class with a strong emphasis on learning, it might be a good idea to use some of the exercises from Kearns and Vazirani (1994).

- a. If each test is an arbitrary conjunction of literals, then a decision list can represent an arbitrary DNF (disjunctive normal form) formula directly. The DNF expression $C_1 \vee C_2 \vee \dots \vee C_n$, where C_i is a conjunction of literals, can be represented by a decision list in which C_i is the i th test and returns *True* if successful. That is:

$$\begin{aligned} C_1 &\rightarrow \textit{True}; \\ C_2 &\rightarrow \textit{True}; \\ &\dots \\ C_n &\rightarrow \textit{True}; \\ \textit{True} &\rightarrow \textit{False} \end{aligned}$$

Since any Boolean function can be written as a DNF formula, then any Boolean function can be represented by a decision list.

- b. A decision tree of depth k can be translated into a decision list whose tests have at most k literals simply by encoding each path as a test. The test returns the corresponding leaf value if it succeeds. Since the decision tree has depth k , no path contains more than k literals.

Solutions for Chapter 19

Knowledge in Learning

19.1 In CNF, the premises are as follows:

$$\neg Nationality(x, n) \vee \neg Nationality(y, n) \vee \neg Language(x, l) \vee Language(y, l) \\ Nationality(Fernando, Brazil) \\ Language(Fernando, Portuguese)$$

We can prove the desired conclusion directly rather than by refutation. Resolve the first two premises with $\{x/Fernando\}$ to obtain

$$\neg Nationality(y, Brazil) \vee \neg Language(Fernando, l) \vee Language(y, l)$$

Resolve this with $Language(Fernando, Portuguese)$ to obtain

$$\neg Nationality(y, Brazil) \vee Language(y, Portuguese)$$

which is the desired conclusion $Nationality(y, Brazil) \Rightarrow Language(y, Portuguese)$.

19.2 This question is tricky in places. It is important to see the distinction between the shared and unshared variables on the LHS and RHS of the determination. The shared variables will be instantiated to the objects to be compared in an analogical inference, while the unshared variables are instantiated with the objects' observed and inferred properties.

- a.** Here we are talking about the zip codes and states of houses (or addresses or towns). If two houses/addresses/towns have the same zip code, they are in the same state:

$$ZipCode(x, z) \succ State(x, s)$$

The determination is true because the US Postal Service never draws zipcode boundaries across state lines (perhaps for some reason having to do with interstate commerce).

- b.** Here the objects being reasoned about are coins, and design, denomination, and mass are properties of coins. So we have

$$Coin(c) \Rightarrow (Design(c, d) \wedge Denomination(c, a) \succ Mass(c, m))$$

This is (very nearly exactly) true because coins of a given denomination and design are stamped from the same original die using the same material; size and shape determine volume; and volume and material determine mass.

- c. Here we have to be careful. The objects being reasoned about are not programs but *runs of a given program*. (This determination is also one often forgotten by novice programmers.) We can use situation calculus to refer to the runs:

$$\forall p \text{ Input}(p, i, s) \succ \text{Output}(p, o, s)$$

Here the $\forall p$ captures the p variable so that it does not participate in the determination as one of the shared or unshared variables. The situation is the shared variable. The determination expands out to the following Horn clause:

$$\text{Input}(p, i, s_1) \wedge \text{Input}(p, i, s_2) \wedge \text{Output}(p, o, s_1) \Rightarrow \text{Output}(p, o, s_2)$$

That is, if p has the same input in two different situations it will have the same output in those situations. This is generally true because computers operate on programs and inputs deterministically; however, it is important that “input” include the entire state of the computer’s memory, file system, and so on. Notice that the “naive” choice

$$\text{Input}(p, i) \succ \text{Output}(p, o)$$

expands out to

$$\text{Input}(p_1, i) \wedge \text{Input}(p_2, i) \wedge \text{Output}(p_1, o) \Rightarrow \text{Output}(p_2, o)$$

which says that if any two programs have the same input they produce the same output!

- d. Here the objects being reasoned are people in specific time intervals. (The intervals could be the same in each case, or different but of the same kind such as days, weeks, etc. We will stick to the same interval for simplicity. As above, we need to quantify the interval to “precapture” the variable.) We will use $\text{Climate}(x, c, i)$ to mean that person x experiences climate c in interval i , and we will assume for the sake of variety that a person’s metabolism is constant.

$$\forall i \text{ Climate}(x, c, i) \wedge \text{Diet}(x, d, i) \wedge \text{Exercise}(x, e, i) \wedge \text{Metabolism}(x, m) \succ \text{Gain}(x, w, i)$$

While the determination seems plausible, it leaves out such factors as water intake, clothing, disease, etc. The qualification problem arises with determinations just as with implications.

- e. Let $\text{Baldness}(x, b)$ mean that person x has baldness b (which might be *Bald*, *Partial*, or *Hairy*, say). A first stab at the determination might be

$$\text{Mother}(m, x) \wedge \text{Father}(g, m) \wedge \text{Baldness}(g, b) \succ \text{Baldness}(x, b)$$

but this would only allow an inference when two people have the same mother and maternal grandfather because the m and g are the unshared variables on the LHS. Also, the RHS has no unshared variable. Notice that the determination does not say specifically that baldness is inherited without modification; it allows, for example, for a hypothetical world in which the maternal grandchildren of a bald man are all hairy, or vice versa. This might not seem particularly natural, but consider other determinations such as “Whether or not I file a tax return determines whether or not my spouse must file a tax return.”

The baldness of the maternal grandfather is the relevant value for prediction, so that should be the unshared variable on the LHS. The mother and maternal grandfather are designated by skolem functions:

$$\begin{aligned} & Mother(M(x), x) \wedge Father(F(M(x)), M(x)) \wedge Baldness(F(M(x)), b_1) \\ & \succ Baldness(x, b_2) \end{aligned}$$

If we use *Father* and *Mother* as function symbols, then the meaning becomes clearer:

$$Baldness(Father(Mother(x)), b_1) \succ Baldness(x, b_2)$$

Just to check, this expands into

$$\begin{aligned} & Baldness(Father(Mother(x)), b_1) \wedge Baldness(Father(Mother(y)), b_1) \\ & \wedge Baldness(x, b_2) \Rightarrow Baldness(y, b_2) \end{aligned}$$

which has the intended meaning.

19.3 Because of the qualification problem, it is not usually possible in most real-world applications to list on the LHS of a determination *all* the relevant factors that determine the RHS. Determinations will usually therefore be true to an extent—that is, if two objects agree on the LHS there is some probability (preferably greater than the prior) that the two objects will agree on the RHS. An appropriate definition for probabilistic determinations simply includes this conditional probability of matching on the RHS given a match on the LHS. For example, we could define $Nationality(x, n) \succ Language(x, l)(0.90)$ to mean that if two people have the same nationality, then there is a 90% chance that they have the same language.

19.4 This exercise tests the student's understanding of resolution and unification, as well as stressing the nondeterminism of the inverse resolution process. It should help a lot in making the inverse resolution operation less mysterious and more amenable to mathematical analysis. It is helpful first to draw out the resolution “V” when doing these problems, and then to do a careful case analysis.

- a. There is no possible value for C_2 here. The resolution step would have to resolve away both the $P(x, y)$ on the LHS of C_1 and the $Q(x, y)$ on the right, which is not possible. (Resolution *can* remove more than one literal from a clause, but only if those literals are redundant—i.e., one subsumes the other.)
- b. Without loss of generality, let C_1 contain the negative (LHS) literal to be resolved away. The LHS of C_1 therefore contains one literal l , while the LHS of C_2 must be empty. The RHS of C_2 must contain l' such that l and l' unify with some unifier θ . Now we have a choice: $P(A, B)$ on the RHS of C could come from the RHS of C_1 or of C_2 . Thus the two basic solution templates are

$$\begin{aligned} C_1 = l & \Rightarrow False ; C_2 = True \Rightarrow l' \vee P(A, B)\theta^{-1} \\ C_1 = l & \Rightarrow P(A, B)\theta^{-1} ; C_2 = True \Rightarrow l' \end{aligned}$$

Within these templates, the choice of l is entirely unconstrained. Suppose l is $Q(x, y)$ and l' is $Q(A, B)$. Then $P(A, B)\theta^{-1}$ could be $P(x, y)$ (or $P(A, y)$ or $P(x, B)$) and

the solutions are

$$\begin{aligned} C_1 = Q(x, y) &\Rightarrow \text{False} ; C_2 = \text{True} \Rightarrow Q(A, B) \vee P(x, y) \\ C_1 = Q(x, y) &\Rightarrow P(x, y) ; C_2 = \text{True} \Rightarrow Q(A, B) \end{aligned}$$

- c. As before, let C_1 contain the negative (LHS) literal to be resolved away, with l' on the RHS of C_2 . We now have four possible templates because each of the two literals in C could have come from either C_1 or C_2 :

$$\begin{aligned} C_1 = l &\Rightarrow \text{False} ; C_2 = P(x, y)\theta^{-1} \Rightarrow l' \vee P(x, f(y))\theta^{-1} \\ C_1 = l &\Rightarrow P(x, f(y))\theta^{-1} ; C_2 = P(x, y)\theta^{-1} \Rightarrow l' \\ C_1 = l \wedge P(x, y)\theta^{-1} &\Rightarrow \text{False} ; C_2 = \text{True} \Rightarrow l' \vee P(x, f(y))\theta^{-1} \\ C_1 = l \wedge P(x, y)\theta^{-1} &\Rightarrow P(x, f(y))\theta^{-1} ; C_2 = \text{True} \Rightarrow l' \end{aligned}$$

Again, we have a fairly free choice for l . However, since C contains x and y , θ cannot bind those variables (else they would not appear in C). Thus, if l is $Q(x, y)$, then l' must be $Q(x, y)$ also and θ will be empty.

19.5 We will assume that Prolog is the logic programming language. It is certainly true that any solution returned by the call to *Resolve* will be a correct inverse resolvent. Unfortunately, it is quite possible that the call will fail to return because of Prolog's depth-first search. If the clauses in *Resolve* and *Unify* are infelicitously arranged, the proof tree might go down the branch corresponding to indefinitely nested function symbols in the solution and never return. This can be alleviated by redesigning the Prolog inference engine so that it works using breadth-first search or iterative deepening, although the infinitely deep branches will still be a problem. Note that any cuts used in the Prolog program will also be a problem for the inverse resolution.

19.6 This exercise gives some idea of the rather large branching factor facing top-down ILP systems.

- a. It is important to note that position is significant— $P(A, B)$ is very different from $P(B, A)$! The first argument position can contain one of the five existing variables or a new variable. For each of these six choices, the second position can contain one of the five existing variables or a new variable, *except* that the literal with two new variables is disallowed. Hence there are 35 choices. With negated literals too, the total branching factor is 70.
- b. This seems to be quite a tricky combinatorial problem. The easiest way to solve it seems to be to start by including the multiple possibilities that are equivalent under renaming of the new variables as well as those that contain only new variables. Then these redundant or illegal choices can be removed later. Now, we can use up to $r - 1$ new variables. If we use $\leq i$ new variables, we can write $(n + i)^r$ literals, so using exactly $i > 0$ variables we can write $(n + i)^r - (n + i - 1)^r$ literals. Each of these is functionally isomorphic under any renaming of the new variables. With i variables,

there are i renamings. Hence the total number of distinct literals (including those illegal ones with no old variables) is

$$n^r + \sum_{i=1}^{r-1} \frac{(n+i)^r - (n+i-1)^r}{i!}$$

Now we just subtract off the number of distinct all-new literals. With $\leq i$ new variables, the number of (not necessarily distinct) all-new literals is i^r , so the number with exactly $i > 0$ is $i^r - (i-1)^r$. Each of these has $i!$ equivalent literals in the set. This gives us the final total for distinct, legal literals:

$$n^r + \sum_{i=1}^{r-1} \frac{(n+i)^r - (n+i-1)^r}{i!} - \sum_{i=1}^{r-1} \frac{i^r - (i-1)^r}{i!}$$

which can doubtless be simplified. One can check that for $r = 2$ and $n = 5$ this gives 35.

- c. If a literal contains only new variables, then either a subsequent literal in the clause body connects one or more of those variables to one or more of the “old” variables, or it doesn’t. If it does, then the same clause will be generated with those two literals reversed, such that the restriction is not violated. If it doesn’t, then the literal is either always true (if the predicate is satisfiable) or always false (if it is unsatisfiable), independent of the “input” variables in the head. Thus, the literal would either be redundant or would render the clause body equivalent to *False*.

19.7 FOIL is available on the web at <http://www-2.cs.cmu.edu/afs/cs/project/ai-repository/ai/areas/learning/systems/foil/0.html> (and possibly other places). It is worthwhile to experiment with it.

Solutions for Chapter 20

Statistical Learning Methods

20.1 The code for this exercise is a straightforward implementation of Equations 20.1 and 20.2. Figure S20.1 shows the results for data sequences generated from h_3 and h_4 . (Plots




Figure S20.1 Graphs for Ex. 20.1. (a) Posterior probabilities $P(h_i|d_1, \dots, d_N)$ over a sample sequence of length 100 generated from h_3 (50% cherry + 50% lime). (b) Bayesian prediction $P(d_{N+1} = \text{lime} | d_1, \dots, d_N)$ given the data in (a). (c) Posterior probabilities $P(h_i|d_1, \dots, d_N)$ over a sample sequence of length 100 generated from h_4 (25% cherry + 75% lime). (d) Bayesian prediction $P(d_{N+1} = \text{lime} | d_1, \dots, d_N)$ given the data in (c).

for h_1 and h_2 are essentially identical to those for h_5 and h_4 .) Results obtained by students may vary because the data sequences are generated randomly from the specified candy distribution. In (a), the samples very closely reflect the true probabilities and the hypotheses other than h_3 are effectively ruled out very quickly. In (c), the early sample proportions are somewhere between 50/50 and 25/75; furthermore, h_3 has a higher prior than h_4 . As a result, h_3 and h_4 vie for supremacy. Between 50 and 60 samples, a preponderance of limes ensures the defeat of h_3 and the prediction quickly converges to 0.75.

20.2 Typical plots are shown in Figure S20.2. Because both MAP and ML choose exactly one hypothesis for predictions, the prediction probabilities are all 0.0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, or 1.0. For small data sets the ML prediction in particular shows very large variance.

20.3 This is a nontrivial sequential decision problem, but can be solved using the tools developed in the book. It leads into general issues of statistical decision theory, stopping rules, etc. Here, we sketch the “straightforward” solution.




Figure S20.2 Graphs for Ex. 20.2. (a) Prediction from the MAP hypothesis given a sample sequence of length 100 generated from h_3 (50% cherry + 50% lime). (b) Prediction from the ML hypothesis given the data in (a). (c) Prediction from the MAP hypothesis given data from h_4 (25% cherry + 75% lime). (d) Prediction from the ML hypothesis given the data in (c).

We can think of this problem as a simplified form of POMDP (see Chapter 17). The “belief states” are defined by the numbers of cherry and lime candies observed so far in the sampling process. Let these be C and L , and let $U(C, L)$ be the utility of the corresponding belief state. In any given state, there are two possible decisions: *sell* and *sample*. There is a simple Bellman equation relating Q and U for the sampling case:

$$Q(C, L, \text{sample}) = P(\text{cherry}|C, L)U(C + 1, L) + P(\text{lime}|C, L)U(C, L + 1)$$

Let the posterior probability of each h_i be $P(h_i|C, L)$, the size of the bag be N , and the fraction of cherries in a bag of type i be f_i . Then the value obtained by selling is given by the value of the sampled candies (which Ann gets to keep) plus the price paid by Bob (which equals the expected utility of the remaining candies for Bob):

$$Q(C, L, \text{sell}) = Cc_A + Ll_A + \sum_i P(h_i|C, L)[(f_i N - C)c_B + ((1 - f_i)N - L)\ell_B]$$

and of course we have

$$U(C, L) = \max\{Q(C, L, \text{sell}), Q(C, L, \text{sample})\}.$$

Thus we can set up a dynamic program to compute Q given the obvious boundary conditions for the case where $C + L = N$. The solution of this dynamic program gives the optimal policy for Ann. It will have the property that if she should sell at (C, L) , then she should also sell at $(C, L + k)$ for all positive k . Thus, the problem is to determine, for each C , the threshold value of L at or above which she should sell. A minor complication is that the formula for $P(h_i|C, L)$ should take into account the non-replacement of candies and the finiteness of N , otherwise odd things will happen when $C + L$ is close to N .

20.4 The Bayesian approach would be to take both drugs. The maximum likelihood approach would be to take the anti- B drug. In the case where there are two versions of B , the Bayesian still recommends taking both drugs, while the maximum likelihood approach is now to take the anti- A drug, since it has a 40% chance of being correct, versus 30% for each of the B cases. This is of course a caricature, and you would be hard-pressed to find a doctor, even a rabid maximum-likelihood advocate who would prescribe like this. But you can find ones who do research like this.

20.5 Boosted naive Bayes learning is discussed by ? (?). The application of boosting to naive Bayes is straightforward. The naive Bayes learner uses maximum-likelihood parameter estimation based on counts, so using a weighted training set simply means adding weights rather than counting. Each naive Bayes model is treated as a deterministic classifier that picks the most likely class for each example.

20.6 We have

$$L = -m(\log \sigma + \log \sqrt{2\pi}) - \sum_j \frac{(y_j - (\theta_1 x_j + \theta_2))^2}{2\sigma^2}$$

hence the equations for the derivatives at the optimum are

$$\frac{\partial L}{\partial \theta_1} = - \sum_j \frac{x_j(y_j - (\theta_1 x_j + \theta_2))}{\sigma^2} = 0$$

$$\begin{aligned}\frac{\partial L}{\partial \theta_2} &= -\sum_j \frac{(y_j - (\theta_1 x_j + \theta_2))}{\sigma^2} = 0 \\ \frac{\partial L}{\partial \sigma} &= -\frac{m}{\sigma} + \sum_j \frac{(y_j - (\theta_1 x_j + \theta_2))^2}{\sigma^3} = 0\end{aligned}$$

and the solutions can be computed as

$$\begin{aligned}\theta_1 &= \frac{m \left(\sum_j x_j y_j \right) - \left(\sum_j y_j \right) \left(\sum_j x_j \right)}{m \left(\sum_j x_j^2 \right) - \left(\sum_j x_j \right)^2} \\ \theta_2 &= \frac{1}{m} \sum_j (y_j - \theta_1 x_j) \\ \sigma^2 &= \frac{1}{m} \sum_j (y_j - (\theta_1 x_j + \theta_2))^2\end{aligned}$$

20.7 There are a couple of ways to solve this problem. Here, we show the indicator variable method described on page 743. Assume we have a child variable Y with parents X_1, \dots, X_k and let the range of each variable be $\{0, 1\}$. Let the noisy-OR parameters be $q_i = P(Y=0|X_i=1, X_{-i}=0)$. The noisy-OR model then asserts that

$$P(Y=1|x_1, \dots, x_k) = 1 - \prod_{i=1}^k q_i^{x_i}.$$

Assume we have m complete-data samples with values y_j for Y and x_{ij} for each X_i . The conditional log likelihood for $P(Y|X_1, \dots, X_k)$ is given by

$$\begin{aligned}L &= \sum_j \log \left(1 - \prod_i q_i^{x_{ij}} \right)^{y_j} \left(\prod_i q_i^{x_{ij}} \right)^{1-y_j} \\ &= \sum_j y_j \log \left(1 - \prod_i q_i^{x_{ij}} \right) + (1-y_j) \sum_i x_{ij} \log q_i\end{aligned}$$

The gradient with respect to each noisy-OR parameter is

$$\begin{aligned}\frac{\partial L}{\partial q_i} &= \sum_j -\frac{y_j x_{ij} \prod_i q_i^{x_{ij}}}{q_i \left(1 - \prod_i q_i^{x_{ij}} \right)} + \frac{(1-y_j) x_{ij}}{q_i} \\ &= \sum_j \frac{x_{ij} \left(1 - y_j - \prod_i q_i^{x_{ij}} \right)}{q_i \left(1 - \prod_i q_i^{x_{ij}} \right)}\end{aligned}$$

20.8

- a. By integrating over the range $[0, 1]$, show that the normalization constant for the distribution $\text{beta}[a, b]$ is given by $\alpha = \Gamma(a+b)/\Gamma(a)\Gamma(b)$ where $\Gamma(x)$ is the **Gamma function**, defined by $\Gamma(x+1) = x \cdot \Gamma(x)$ and $\Gamma(1) = 1$. (For integer x , $\Gamma(x+1) = x!$.)

We will solve this for positive integer a and b by induction over a . Let $\alpha(a, b)$ be the normalization constant. For the base cases, we have

$$\alpha(1, b) = 1 / \int_0^1 \theta^0 (1 - \theta)^{b-1} d\theta = -1 / [\frac{1}{b} (1 - \theta)^b]_0^1 = b$$

and

$$\frac{\Gamma(1+b)}{\Gamma(1)\Gamma(b)} = \frac{b \cdot \Gamma(b)}{1 \cdot \Gamma(b)} = b.$$

For the inductive step, we assume for all b that

$$\alpha(a-1, b+1) = \frac{\Gamma(a+b)}{\Gamma(a-1)\Gamma(b+1)} = \frac{a-1}{b} \cdot \frac{\Gamma(a+b)}{\Gamma(a)\Gamma(b)}$$

Now we evaluate $\alpha(a, b)$ using integration by parts. We have

$$\begin{aligned} 1/\alpha(a, b) &= \int_0^1 \theta^{a-1} (1 - \theta)^{b-1} d\theta \\ &= [\theta^{a-1} \cdot \frac{1}{b} (1 - \theta)^b]_0^1 + \frac{a-1}{b} \int_0^1 \theta^{a-2} (1 - \theta)^b d\theta \\ &= 0 + \frac{a-1}{b} \frac{1}{\alpha(a-1, b+1)} \end{aligned}$$

Hence

$$\alpha(a, b) = \frac{b}{a-1} \alpha(a-1, b+1) = \frac{b}{a-1} \frac{a-1}{b} \cdot \frac{\Gamma(a+b)}{\Gamma(a)\Gamma(b)} = \frac{\Gamma(a+b)}{\Gamma(a)\Gamma(b)}$$

as required.

b. The mean is given by the following integral:

$$\begin{aligned} \mu(a, b) &= \alpha(a, b) \int_0^1 \theta \cdot \theta^{a-1} (1 - \theta)^{b-1} d\theta \\ &= \alpha(a, b) \int_0^1 \theta^a (1 - \theta)^{b-1} d\theta \\ &= \alpha(a, b) / \alpha(a+1, b) = \frac{\Gamma(a+b)}{\Gamma(a)\Gamma(b)} \cdot \frac{\Gamma(a+1)\Gamma(b)}{\Gamma(a+b+1)} \\ &= \frac{\Gamma(a+b)}{\Gamma(a)\Gamma(b)} \cdot \frac{a\Gamma(a)\Gamma(b)}{(a+b)\Gamma(a+b+1)} = \frac{a}{a+b}. \end{aligned}$$

c. The mode is found by solving for $d\text{beta}[a, b](\theta)/d\theta = 0$:

$$\begin{aligned} &\frac{d}{d\theta} (\alpha(a, b) \theta^{a-1} (1 - \theta)^{b-1}) \\ &= \alpha(a, b) [(a-1) \theta^{a-2} (1 - \theta)^{b-1} - (b-1) \theta^{a-1} (1 - \theta)^{b-2}] = 0 \\ &\Rightarrow (a-1)(1 - \theta) = (b-1)\theta \\ &\Rightarrow \theta = \frac{a-1}{a+b-2} \end{aligned}$$

d. $\text{beta}[\epsilon, \epsilon] = \alpha(\epsilon, \epsilon) \theta^{\epsilon-1} (1 - \theta)^{\epsilon-1}$ tends to very large values close to $\theta = 0$ and $\theta = 1$, i.e., it expresses the prior belief that the distribution characterized by θ is nearly deterministic (either positively or negatively). After updating with a positive example we

obtain the distribution $\text{beta}[1 + \epsilon, \epsilon]$, which has nearly all its mass near $\theta = 1$ (and the converse for a negative example), i.e., we have learned that the distribution characterized by θ is deterministic in the positive sense. If we see a “counterexample”, e.g., a positive and a negative example, we obtain $\text{beta}[1 + \epsilon, 1 + \epsilon]$, which is close to uniform, i.e., the hypothesis of near-determinism is abandoned.

20.9 Consider the maximum-likelihood parameter values for the CPT of node Y in the original network, where an extra parent X_{k+1} will be added to Y . If we set the parameters for $P(y|x_1, \dots, x_k, x_{k+1})$ in the new network to be identical to $P(y|x_1, \dots, x_k)$ in the original network, regardless of the value x_{k+1} , then the likelihood of the data is unchanged. Maximizing the likelihood by altering the parameters can then only *increase* the likelihood.

20.10

- a. With three attributes, there are seven parameters in the model and the empirical data give frequencies for $2^3 = 8$ classes, which supply 7 independent numbers since the 8 frequencies have to sum to the total sample size. Thus, the problem is neither under- nor over-constrained. With two attributes, there are five parameters in the model and the empirical data give frequencies for $2^2 = 4$ classes, which supply 3 independent numbers. Thus, the problem is severely underconstrained. There will be a two-dimensional surface of equally good ML solutions and the original parameters cannot be recovered.
- b. The calculation is sketched and partly completed on pages 729 and 730. Completing it by hand is tedious; students should encouraged to implement the method, ideally in combination with a bayes net package, and trace its calculations.
- c. The question should also assume $\theta = 0.5$ to simplify the analysis. With every parameter identical and $\theta = 0.5$, the new parameter values for bag 1 will be the same as those for bag 2, by symmetry. Intuitively, if we assume initially that the bags are identical, then it is as if we had just one bag. Likelihood is maximized under this constraint by setting the proportions of candy types within each bag to the observed proportions. (See proof below.)
- d. We begin by writing out L for the data in the table:

$$L = 273 \log(\theta\theta_{F1}\theta_{W1}\theta_{H1} + (1 - \theta)\theta_{F2}\theta_{W2}\theta_{H2}) \\ + 93 \log(\theta\theta_{F1}\theta_{W1}(1 - \theta_{H1}) + (1 - \theta)\theta_{F2}\theta_{W2}(1 - \theta_{H2})) + \dots$$

Now we can differentiate with respect to each parameter. For example,

$$\frac{\partial L}{\partial \theta_{H1}} = 273 \frac{\theta\theta_{F1}\theta_{W1}}{\theta\theta_{F1}\theta_{W1}\theta_{H1} + (1 - \theta)\theta_{F2}\theta_{W2}\theta_{H2}} \\ - 93 \frac{\theta\theta_{F1}\theta_{W1}}{\theta\theta_{F1}\theta_{W1}(1 - \theta_{H1}) + (1 - \theta)\theta_{F2}\theta_{W2}(1 - \theta_{H2})} + \dots$$

Now if $\theta_{F1} = \theta_{F2}$, $\theta_{W1} = \theta_{W2}$, and $\theta_{H1} = \theta_{H2}$, the denominators simplify, everything cancels, and we have

$$\frac{\partial L}{\partial \theta_{H1}} = \theta \left[\frac{273}{\theta_{H1}} - \frac{93}{(1 - \theta_{H1})} + \dots \right] = \theta \left[\frac{550}{\theta_{H1}} - \frac{450}{(1 - \theta_{H1})} \right]$$

First, note that $\partial L / \partial \theta_{H2}$ will have the same value except that θ and $(1 - \theta)$ are reversed, so the parameters for bags 1 and 2 will move in lock step if $\theta = 0.5$. Second, note that $\partial L / \partial \theta_{H1} = 0$ when $\theta_{H1} = 550 / (450 + 550)$, i.e., exactly the observed proportion of candies with holes. Finally, we can calculate second derivatives and evaluate them at the fixed point. For example, we obtain

$$\frac{\partial^2 L}{\partial \theta_{H1}^2} = N \theta^2 \theta_{H1} (1 - \theta_{H1}) (2\theta_{H1} - 1)$$

which is negative (indicating the fixed point is a maximum) only when $\theta_{H1} < 0.5$. Thus, in general the fixed point is a saddle point as some of the second derivatives may be positive and some negative. Nonetheless, EM can reach it by moving along the ridge leading to it, as long as the symmetry is unbroken.

20.11 XOR (in fact any Boolean function) is easiest to construct using step-function units. Because XOR is not linearly separable, we will need a hidden layer. It turns out that just one hidden node suffices. To design the network, we can think of the XOR function as OR with the AND case (both inputs on) ruled out. Thus the hidden layer computes AND, while the output layer computes OR but weights the output of the hidden node negatively. The network shown in Figure S20.3 does the trick.




Figure S20.3 A network of step-function neurons that computes the XOR function.

20.12 The examples map from $[x_1, x_2]$ to $[x_1, x_1, x_2]$ coordinates as follows:

- $[-1, -1]$ (negative) maps to $[-1, +1]$
- $[-1, +1]$ (positive) maps to $[-1, -1]$
- $[+1, -1]$ (positive) maps to $[+1, -1]$
- $[+1, +1]$ (negative) maps to $[+1, +1]$

Thus, the positive examples have $x_1 x_2 = -1$ and the negative examples have $x_1 x_2 = +1$. The maximum margin separator is the line $x_1 x_2 = 0$, with a margin of 1. The separator corresponds to the $x_1 = 0$ and $x_2 = 0$ axes in the original space—this can be thought of as the limit of a hyperbolic separator with two branches.

20.13 The perceptron adjusts the separating hyperplane defined by the weights so as to minimize the total error. The question assumes that the perceptron is trained to convergence (if possible) on the accumulated data set after each new example arrives.

There are two phases. With few examples, the data may remain linearly separable and the hyperplane will separate the positive and negative examples, although it will not represent

the XOR function. Once the data become non-separable, the hyperplane will move around to find a local minimum-error configuration. With parity data, positive and negative examples are distributed uniformly throughout the input space and in the limit of large sample sizes the minimum error is obtained by a weight configuration that outputs approximately 0.5 for any input. However, in this region the error surface is basically flat, and any small fluctuation in the local balance of positive and negative examples due to the sampling process may cause the minimum-error plane to move around drastically.

Here is some code to try out a given training set:

```
(setq *examples*
'((T . 0) (I1 . 1) (I2 . 0) (I3 . 1) (I4 . 0))
  ((T . 1) (I1 . 1) (I2 . 0) (I3 . 1) (I4 . 1))
  ((T . 0) (I1 . 1) (I2 . 0) (I3 . 0) (I4 . 1))
  ((T . 0) (I1 . 0) (I2 . 1) (I3 . 1) (I4 . 0))
  ((T . 0) (I1 . 0) (I2 . 0) (I3 . 1) (I4 . 1))
  ((T . 1) (I1 . 1) (I2 . 0) (I3 . 0) (I4 . 0))
  ((T . 0) (I1 . 1) (I2 . 1) (I3 . 0) (I4 . 0))
  ((T . 1) (I1 . 0) (I2 . 1) (I3 . 1) (I4 . 1))
  ((T . 0) (I1 . 0) (I2 . 1) (I3 . 1) (I4 . 0))))

(deftest ex20.13
  ((setq problem
    (make-learning-problem
      :attributes '((I1 0 1) (I2 0 1) (I3 0 1) (I4 0 1))
      :goals '((T 0 1))
      :examples (subseq *examples* 0 <n>)))) ;;;; vary <n> as needed
  ;; Normally we'd call PERCEPTRON-LEARNING here, but we need added control
  ;; to set all the weights to 0.1, so we build the perceptron ourselves:
  ((setq net (list (list (make-unit :parents (iota 5)
    :children nil
    :weights '(-1.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1)
    :g #'(lambda (i) (step-function 0 i))))))
  ;; Now we call NN-LEARNING with the perceptron-update method,
  ;; but we also make it print out the weights, and set *debugging* to t
  ;; so that we can see the epoch number and errors.
  ((let ((*debugging* t))
    (nn-learning
      problem net
      #'(lambda (net inputs predicted target &rest args)
        (format t "~&~A Weights = ~{~4,1F ~}~%"
          (if (equal target predicted) ``YES`` ``NO ``)
          (unit-weights (first (first net)))))
      (apply #'perceptron-update net inputs predicted target args))))))
```

Up to the first 5 examples, the network converges to zero error, and converges to non-zero error thereafter.

20.14 According to ? (?), the number of linearly separable Boolean functions with n inputs is

$$s_n = 2 \sum_{i=0}^n \binom{2^n - 1}{i}$$

For $n \geq 2$ we have

$$s_n \leq 2(n+1) \binom{2^n - 1}{n} = 2(n+1) \cdot \frac{(2^n - 1)!}{n!(2^n - n - 1)!} \leq \frac{2(n+1)(2^n)^n}{n!} \leq 2^{n^2}$$

so the fraction of representable functions vanishes as n increases.

20.15 These examples were generated from a kind of majority or voting function, where each input has a different number of votes: 10 for I_1 , 4 for I_2 to I_4 , 2 for I_5 , and 1 for I_6 . If you assign this problem, it is probably a good idea to tell the students this. Figure S?? shows a perceptron and a feed-forward net with logical nodes that represent this function. Our intuition was that the function should have been easy to learn with a perceptron, but harder with other representations such as a decision tree. However, it turns out that there are not enough examples for even a perceptron to learn. In retrospect, that should not be too surprising, as there are over 10^{19} different Boolean functions of six inputs, and only 14 examples. Running the following code (which makes use of the code in `learning/nn.lisp` and `learning/perceptron.lisp`) we find that the perceptron quickly converges to learn all 14 training examples, but it performs at chance level on the five-example test set we made up (getting 2 or 3 out of 5 right on most runs). (The student who did not know what the underlying function was would have to keep out some of the examples to use as a test set.) The weights vary widely from run to run, although in every run the weight for I_1 is the highest (as it should be for the specified function), and the weights for I_5 and I_6 are usually low, but sometimes I_6 is higher than other nodes. This may be a result of the fact that the examples were chosen to represent some borderline cases where I_6 casts the deciding vote. So this serves as a lesson: if you are “clever” in choosing examples, but rely on a learning algorithm that assumes examples are chosen at random, you will run into trouble. Here is the code we used:

```
(defun test-nn (net problem &optional
               (examples (learning-problem-examples problem)))
  (let ((correct 0))
    (for-each example in examples do
      (if (eql (cdr (first example))
              (first (nn-output net (rest example)
                                (learning-problem-attributes problem)
                                nil)))
          (incf correct)))
    (values correct 'out-of (length examples))))
(deftest ex20.15
  ((setq examples
    '(((T . 1) (I1 . 1) (I2 . 0) (I3 . 1) (I4 . 0) (I5 . 0) (I6 . 0))
      ((T . 1) (I1 . 1) (I2 . 0) (I3 . 1) (I4 . 1) (I5 . 0) (I6 . 0))
      ((T . 1) (I1 . 1) (I2 . 0) (I3 . 1) (I4 . 0) (I5 . 1) (I6 . 0))
      ((T . 1) (I1 . 1) (I2 . 1) (I3 . 0) (I4 . 0) (I5 . 1) (I6 . 1))
      ((T . 1) (I1 . 1) (I2 . 1) (I3 . 1) (I4 . 1) (I5 . 0) (I6 . 0))
      ((T . 1) (I1 . 1) (I2 . 0) (I3 . 0) (I4 . 0) (I5 . 1) (I6 . 1))
      ((T . 0) (I1 . 1) (I2 . 0) (I3 . 0) (I4 . 0) (I5 . 1) (I6 . 0))
      ((T . 1) (I1 . 0) (I2 . 1) (I3 . 1) (I4 . 1) (I5 . 0) (I6 . 1))
      ((T . 0) (I1 . 0) (I2 . 1) (I3 . 1) (I4 . 0) (I5 . 1) (I6 . 1))
      ((T . 0) (I1 . 0) (I2 . 0) (I3 . 0) (I4 . 1) (I5 . 1) (I6 . 0))
```

```

      ((T . 0) (I1 . 0) (I2 . 1) (I3 . 0) (I4 . 1) (I5 . 0) (I6 . 1))
      ((T . 0) (I1 . 0) (I2 . 0) (I3 . 0) (I4 . 1) (I5 . 0) (I6 . 1))
      ((T . 0) (I1 . 0) (I2 . 1) (I3 . 1) (I4 . 0) (I5 . 1) (I6 . 1))
      ((T . 0) (I1 . 0) (I2 . 1) (I3 . 1) (I4 . 1) (I5 . 0) (I6 . 0))))))
((setq problem
  (make-learning-problem
    :attributes '((I1 0 1) (I2 0 1) (I3 0 1) (I4 0 1) (I5 0 1) (I6 0 1))
    :goals '((T 0 1))
    :examples examples)))
((setq net (perceptron-learning problem)))
((setq weights (unit-weights (first (first net)))))
((test-nn net problem)
 (= * 14))
((test-nn net problem
  '(((T . 1) (I1 . 1) (I2 . 0) (I3 . 0) (I4 . 1) (I5 . 0) (I6 . 0))
    ((T . 0) (I1 . 0) (I2 . 0) (I3 . 1) (I4 . 1) (I5 . 1) (I6 . 1))
    ((T . 1) (I1 . 1) (I2 . 1) (I3 . 0) (I4 . 0) (I5 . 1) (I6 . 0))
    ((T . 0) (I1 . 1) (I2 . 0) (I3 . 0) (I4 . 0) (I5 . 0) (I6 . 0))
    ((T . 1) (I1 . 0) (I2 . 1) (I3 . 1) (I4 . 1) (I5 . 1) (I6 . 1)))))
(= * 5)))

```

20.16 The probability p output by the perceptron is $g(\sum_j W_j a_j)$, where g is the sigmoid function. Since $g' = g(1 - g)$, we have

$$\partial p / \partial W_j = g'(\sum_j W_j a_j) a_j = p(1 - p) a_j$$

For a datum with actual value y , the log likelihood is

$$L = y \log p + (1 - y) \log(1 - p)$$

so the gradient of the log likelihood with respect to each weight is

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial L}{\partial W_j} &= \frac{y}{p} \cdot \frac{\partial p}{\partial W_j} - \frac{1 - y}{1 - p} \cdot \frac{\partial p}{\partial W_j} \\ &= \frac{yp(1 - p)a_j}{p} - \frac{(1 - y)p(1 - p)a_j}{1 - p} = (y - p)a_j = \text{Err} \times a_j. \end{aligned}$$

20.17 This exercise reinforces the student's understanding of neural networks as mathematical functions that can be analyzed at a level of abstraction above their implementation as a network of computing elements. For simplicity, we will assume that the activation function is the same linear function at each node: $g(x) = cx + d$. (The argument is the same (only messier) if we allow different c_i and d_i for each node.)

a. The outputs of the hidden layer are

$$H_j = g\left(\sum_k W_{k,j} I_k\right) = c \sum_k W_{k,j} I_k + d$$

The final outputs are

$$O_i = g\left(\sum_j W_{j,i} H_j\right) = c \left(\sum_j W_{j,i} \left(c \sum_k W_{k,j} I_k + d\right)\right) + d$$

Now we just have to see that this is linear in the inputs:

$$O_i = c^2 \sum_k I_k \sum_j W_{k,j} W_{j,i} + d \left(1 + c \sum_j W_{j,i} \right)$$

Thus we can compute the same function as the two-layer network using just a one-layer perceptron that has weights $W_{k,i} = \sum_j W_{k,j} W_{j,i}$ and an activation function $g(x) = c^2 x + d \left(1 + c \sum_j W_{j,i} \right)$.

- b. The above reduction can be used straightforwardly to reduce an n -layer network to an $(n - 1)$ -layer network. By induction, the n -layer network can be reduced to a single-layer network. Thus, linear activation function restrict neural networks to represent only linearly functions.

20.18 The implementation of neural networks can be approached in several different ways. The simplest is probably to store the weights in an $n \times n$ array. Everything can be calculated as if all the nodes were in each layer, with the zero weights ensuring that only appropriate changes are made as each layer is processed.

Particularly for sparse networks, it can be more efficient to use a pointer-based implementation, with each node represented by a data structure that contains pointers to its successors (for evaluation) and its predecessors (for backpropagation). Weights $W_{j,i}$ are attached to node i . In both types of implementation, it is convenient to store the summed input $in_i = \sum_j W_{j,i} a_j$ and the value $g'(in_i)$. The code repository contains an implementation of the pointer-based variety. See the file `learning/algorithms/nn.lisp`, and the function `nn-learning` in that file.

20.19 This question is especially important for students who are not expected to implement or use a neural network system. Together with 20.15 and 20.17, it gives the student a concrete (if slender) grasp of what the network actually does. Many other similar questions can be devised.

Intuitively, the data suggest that a probabilistic prediction $P(\text{Output} = 1) = 0.8$ is appropriate. The network will adjust its weights to minimize the error function. The error is

$$E = \frac{1}{2} \sum_i (y_i - a_i)^2 = \frac{1}{2} [80(1 - a_1)^2 + 20(0 - a_1)^2] = 50O_1^2 - 80O_1 + 50$$

The derivative of the error with respect to the single output a_1 is

$$\frac{\partial E}{\partial a_1} = 100a_1 - 80$$


Setting the derivative to zero, we find that indeed $a_1 = 0.8$. The student should spot the connection to Ex. 18.8.

20.20 The application of cross-validation is straightforward—the methodology is the same as that for any parameter selection problem. With 10-fold cross-validation, for example, each size of hidden layer is evaluated by training on 90% subsets and testing on the remaining 10%. The best-performing size is then chosen, trained on all the training data, and the result is returned as the system's hypothesis. The purpose of this exercise is to have the student

understand how to design the experiment, run some code to see results, and analyze the result. The higher-order purpose is to cause the student to question results that make unwarranted assumptions about the representation used in a learning problem, whether that representation is the number of hidden nodes in a neural net, or any other representational choice.

20.21 The main purpose of this exercise is to make concrete the notion of the *capacity* of a function class (in this case, linear halfspaces). It can be hard to internalize this concept, but the examples really help.

- a. Three points in general position on a plane form a triangle. Any subset of the points can be separated from the rest by a line, as can be seen from the two examples in Figure S20.4(a).
- b. Figure S20.4(b) shows two cases where the positive and negative examples cannot be separated by a line.
- c. Four points in general position on a plane form a tetrahedron. Any subset of the points can be separated from the rest by a plane, as can be seen from the two examples in Figure S20.4(c).
- d. Figure S20.4(d) shows a case where a negative point is inside the tetrahedron formed by four positive points; clearly no plane can separate the two sets.



Solutions for Chapter 21

Reinforcement Learning

21.1 The code repository shows an example of this, implemented in the passive 4×3 environment. The agents are found under `lisp/learning/agents/passive*.lisp` and the environment is in `lisp/learning/domains/4x3-passive-mdp.lisp`. (The MDP is converted to a full-blown environment using the function `mdp->environment` which can be found in `lisp/uncertainty/environments/mdp.lisp`.)

21.2 Consider a world with two states, S_0 and S_1 , with two actions in each state: stay still or move to the other state. Assume the move action is non-deterministic—it sometimes fails, leaving the agent in the same state. Furthermore, assume the agent starts in S_0 and that S_1 is a terminal state. If the agent tries several move actions and they all fail, the agent may conclude that $T(S_0, \text{Move}, S_1)$ is 0, and thus may choose a policy with $\pi(S_0) = \text{Stay}$, which is an improper policy. If we wait until the agent reaches S_1 before updating, we won't fall victim to this problem.

21.3 This question essentially asks for a reimplementation of a general scheme for asynchronous dynamic programming of which the prioritized sweeping algorithm is an example (Moore and Atkeson, 1993). For **a.**, there is code for a priority queue in both the Lisp and Python code repositories. So most of the work is the experimentation called for in **b.**

21.4 When there are no terminal states there are no sequences, so we need to define sequences. We can do that in several ways. First, if rewards are sparse, we can treat any state with a reward as the end of a sequence. We can use equation (21.2); the only problem is that we don't know the exact total reward of the state at the end of the sequence, because it is not a terminal state. We can estimate it using the current $U(s)$ estimate. Another option is to arbitrarily limit sequences to n states, and then consider the next n states, etc. A variation on this is to use a sliding window of states, so that the first sequence is states $1 \dots n$, the second sequence is $2 \dots n + 1$, etc.

21.5 The idea here is to calculate the reward that the agent will *actually* obtain using a given estimate of U and a given estimated model M . This is distinct from the true utility of the states visited. First, we compute the policy for the agent by calculating, for each state, the action with the highest estimated utility:

$$P(i) = \arg \max_a \sum_j M_{ij}^a U(j)$$

Then the expected values can be found by applying value determination with policy P and can then be compared to the optimal values.

21.6 The conversion of the vacuum world problem specification into an environment suitable for reinforcement learning can be done by merging elements of `mdp->environment` from `lisp/uncertainty/environments/mdp.lisp` with elements of the corresponding function `problem->environment` from `lisp/search/agents.lisp`. The point here is twofold: first, that the reinforcement learning algorithms in Chapter 20 are limited to accessible environments; second, that the dirt makes a huge difference to the size of the state space. Without dirt, the state space is $O(n)$ with n locations. With dirt, the state space is $O(2^n)$ because each location can be clean or dirty. For this reason, input generalization is clearly necessary for n above about 10. This illustrates the misleading nature of “navigation” domains in which the state space is proportional to the “physical size” of the environment. “Real-world” environments typically have some combinatorial structure that results in exponential growth.

21.7 Code not shown. Several reinforcement learning agents are given in the directory `lisp/learning/agents`.

21.8 This utility estimation function is similar to equation (21.9), but adds a term to represent Euclidean distance on a grid. Using equation (21.10), the update equations are the same for θ_0 through θ_2 , and the new parameter θ_3 can be calculated by taking the derivative with respect to θ_3 :

$$\begin{aligned}\theta_0 &\leftarrow \theta_0 + \alpha (u_j(s) - \hat{U}_\theta(s)) , \\ \theta_1 &\leftarrow \theta_1 + \alpha (u_j(s) - \hat{U}_\theta(s))x , \\ \theta_2 &\leftarrow \theta_2 + \alpha (u_j(s) - \hat{U}_\theta(s))y , \\ \theta_3 &\leftarrow \theta_3 + \alpha (u_j(s) - \hat{U}_\theta(s))\sqrt{(x - x_g)^2 + (y - y_g)^2} .\end{aligned}$$

21.9 Possible features include:

- Distance to the nearest +1 terminal state.
- Distance to the nearest -1 terminal state.
- Number of adjacent +1 terminal states.
- Number of adjacent -1 terminal states.
- Number of adjacent obstacles.
- Number of obstacles that intersect with a path to the nearest +1 terminal state.

21.10 This is a relatively time-consuming exercise. Code not shown to compute three-dimensional plots. The utility functions are:

- a. $U(x, y) = 1 - \gamma((10 - x) + (10 - y))$ is the true utility, and is linear.
- b. Same as in a, except that $U(10, 1) = -1$.
- c. The exact utility depends on the exact placement of the obstacles. The best approximation is the same as in a. The features in exercise 21.9 might improve the approximation.

- d. The optimal policy is to head straight for the goal from any point on the right side of the wall, and to head for (5, 10) first (and then for the goal) from any point on the left of the wall. Thus, the exact utility function is:

$$\begin{aligned} U(x, y) &= 1 - \gamma((10 - x) + (10 - y)) && (\text{if } x \geq 5) \\ &= 1 - \gamma((5 - x) + (10 - y)) - 5\gamma && (\text{if } x < 5) \end{aligned}$$

Unfortunately, this is not linear in x and y , as stated. Fortunately, we can restate the optimal policy as “head straight up to row 10 first, then head right until column 10.” This gives us the same exact utility as in a, and the same linear approximation.

- e. $U(x, y) = 1 - \gamma(|5 - x| + |5 - y|)$ is the true utility. This is also not linear in x and y , because of the absolute value signs. All can be fixed by introducing the features $|5 - x|$ and $|5 - y|$.

21.11 The modification involves combining elements of the environment converter for games (`game->environment` in `lisp/search/games.lisp`) with elements of the function `mdp->environment`. The reward signal is just the utility of winning/drawing/losing and occurs only at the end of the game. The evaluation function used by each agent is the utility function it learns through the TD process. It is important to keep the TD learning process (which is entirely independent of the fact that a game is being played) distinct from the game-playing algorithm. Using the evaluation function with a deep search is probably better because it will help the agents to focus on relevant portions of the search space by improving the quality of play. There is, however, a tradeoff: the deeper the search, the more computer time is used in playing each training game.

21.12 Code not shown.

21.13 Reinforcement learning as a general “setting” can be applied to almost any agent in any environment. The only requirement is that there be a distinguished reward signal. Thus, given the signals of pain, pleasure, hunger, and so on, we can map human learning directly into reinforcement learning—although this says nothing about how the “program” is implemented. What this view misses out, however, is the importance of other forms of learning that occur in humans. These include “speedup learning” (Chapter 21); supervised learning from other humans, where the teacher’s feedback is taken as a distinguished input; and the process of learning the world model, which is “supervised” by the environment.

21.14 DNA does not, as far as we know, sense the environment or build models of it. The reward signal is the death and reproduction of the DNA sequence, but evolution simply modifies the organism rather than learning a U or Q function. The *really* interesting problem is deciding what it is that is doing the evolutionary learning. Clearly, it is not the individual (or the individual’s DNA) that is learning, because the individual’s DNA gets totally intermingled within a few generations. Perhaps you could say the species is learning, but if so it is learning to produce individuals who survive to reproduce better; it is not learning anything to do with the species as a whole rather than individuals. In *The Selfish Gene*, Richard Dawkins (1976) proposes that the *gene* is the unit that learns to succeed as an “individual” because the gene is preserved with small, accumulated mutations over many generations.

Solutions for Chapter 22

Communication

22.1 No answer required; just read the passage.

$S \rightarrow NP(\text{Subjective}, \text{number}, \text{person}) VP(\text{number}, \text{person}) \mid \dots$
 $NP(\text{case}, \text{number}, \text{person}) \rightarrow \text{Pronoun}(\text{case}, \text{number}, \text{person})$
 $NP(\text{case}, \text{number}, \text{Third}) \rightarrow \text{Name}(\text{number}) \mid \text{Noun}(\text{number}) \mid \dots$
 $VP(\text{number}, \text{person}) \rightarrow VP(\text{number}, \text{person}) NP(\text{Objective}, _, _) \mid \dots$
 $PP \rightarrow \text{Preposition } NP(\text{Objective}, _, _)$
 $\text{Pronoun}(\text{Subjective}, \text{Singular}, \text{First}) \rightarrow \mathbf{I}$
 $\text{Pronoun}(\text{Subjective}, \text{Singular}, \text{Second}) \rightarrow \mathbf{you}$
 $\text{Pronoun}(\text{Subjective}, \text{Singular}, \text{Third}) \rightarrow \mathbf{he} \mid \mathbf{she} \mid \mathbf{it}$
 $\text{Pronoun}(\text{Subjective}, \text{Plural}, \text{First}) \rightarrow \mathbf{we}$
 $\text{Pronoun}(\text{Subjective}, \text{Plural}, \text{Second}) \rightarrow \mathbf{you}$
 $\text{Pronoun}(\text{Subjective}, \text{Plural}, \text{Third}) \rightarrow \mathbf{they}$
 $\text{Pronoun}(\text{Objective}, \text{Singular}, \text{First}) \rightarrow \mathbf{me}$
 $\text{Pronoun}(\text{Objective}, \text{Singular}, \text{Second}) \rightarrow \mathbf{you}$
 $\text{Pronoun}(\text{Objective}, \text{Singular}, \text{Third}) \rightarrow \mathbf{him} \mid \mathbf{her} \mid \mathbf{it}$
 $\text{Pronoun}(\text{Objective}, \text{Plural}, \text{First}) \rightarrow \mathbf{us}$
 $\text{Pronoun}(\text{Objective}, \text{Plural}, \text{Second}) \rightarrow \mathbf{you}$
 $\text{Pronoun}(\text{Objective}, \text{Plural}, \text{Third}) \rightarrow \mathbf{them}$
 $\text{Verb}(\text{Singular}, \text{First}) \rightarrow \mathbf{smell}$
 $\text{Verb}(\text{Singular}, \text{Second}) \rightarrow \mathbf{smell}$
 $\text{Verb}(\text{Singular}, \text{Third}) \rightarrow \mathbf{smells}$
 $\text{Verb}(\text{Plural}, _) \rightarrow \mathbf{smell}$

Figure S22.1 A partial DCG for \mathcal{E}_1 , modified to handle subject–verb number/person agreement as in Ex. 22.2.

22.2 See Figure S22.1 for a partial DCG. We include both person and number annotation although English really only differentiates the third person singular for verb agreement (except for the verb *be*).

22.3 See Figure S22.2

$NP(case, number, Third) \rightarrow Name(number)$ $NP(case, Plural, Third) \rightarrow Noun(Plural)$ $NP(case, number, Third) \rightarrow Article(number)Noun(number)$ $Article(Singular) \rightarrow \mathbf{a} \mid \mathbf{an} \mid \mathbf{the}$ $Article(Plural) \rightarrow \mathbf{the} \mid \mathbf{some} \mid \mathbf{many}$
--

Figure S22.2 A partial DCG for \mathcal{E}_1 , modified to handle article–noun agreement as in Ex. 22.3.

22.4 The purpose of this exercise is to get the student thinking about the properties of natural language. There is a wide variety of acceptable answers. Here are ours:

- **Grammar and Syntax** Java: formally defined in a reference book. Grammaticality is crucial; ungrammatical programs are not accepted. English: unknown, never formally defined, constantly changing. Most communication is made with “ungrammatical” utterances. There is a notion of graded acceptability: some utterances are judged slightly ungrammatical or a little odd, while others are clearly right or wrong.
- **Semantics** Java: the semantics of a program is formally defined by the language specification. More pragmatically, one can say that the meaning of a particular program is the JVM code emitted by the compiler. English: no formal semantics, meaning is context dependent.
- **Pragmatics and Context-Dependence** Java: some small parts of a program are left undefined in the language specification, and are dependent on the computer on which the program is run. English: almost everything about an utterance is dependent on the situation of use.
- **Compositionality** Java: almost all compositional. The meaning of “A + B” is clearly derived from the meaning of “A” and the meaning of “B” in isolation. English: some compositional parts, but many non-compositional dependencies.
- **Lexical Ambiguity** Java: a symbol such as “Avg” can be locally ambiguous as it might refer to a variable, a class, or a function. The ambiguity can be resolved simply by checking the declaration; declarations therefore fulfill in a very exact way the role played by background knowledge and grammatical context in English. English: much lexical ambiguity.
- **Syntactic Ambiguity** Java: the syntax of the language resolves ambiguity. For example, in “if (X) if (Y) A; else B;” one might think it is ambiguous whether the “else” belongs to the first or second “if,” but the language is specified so that it always belongs to the second. English: much syntactic ambiguity.
- **Reference** Java: there is a pronoun “this” to refer to the object on which a method was invoked. Other than that, there are no pronouns or other means of indexical reference; no “it,” no “that.” (Compare this to stack-based languages such as Forth, where the stack pointer operates as a sort of implicit “it.”) There is reference by name, however. Note that ambiguities are determined by scope—if there are two or more declarations

of the variable “X”, then a use of X refers to the one in the innermost scope surrounding the use. English: many techniques for reference.

- **Background Knowledge** Java: none needed to interpret a program, although a local “context” is built up as declarations are processed. English: much needed to do disambiguation.
- **Understanding** Java: understanding a program means translating it to JVM byte code. English: understanding an utterance means (among other things) responding to it appropriately; participating in a dialog (or choosing not to participate, but having the potential ability to do so).

As a follow-up question, you might want to compare different languages, for example: English, Java, Morse code, the SQL database query language, the Postscript document description language, mathematics, etc.

22.5 This exercise is designed to clarify the relation between quasi-logical form and the final logical form.

- a. Yes. Without a quasi-logical form it is hard to write rules that produce, for example, two different scopes for quantifiers.
- b. No. It just makes ambiguities and abstractions more concise.
- c. Yes. You don’t need to explicitly represent a potentially exponential number of disjunctions.
- d. Yes and no. The form is more concise, and so easier to manipulate. On the other hand, the quasi-logical form doesn’t give you any clues as to how to disambiguate. But if you do have those clues, it is easy to eliminate a whole family of logical forms without having to explicitly expand them out.

22.6 Assuming that *Is* is the interpretation of “is,” and *It* is the interpretation of “it,” then we get the following:

- a. It is a wumpus:

$$\exists e \ e \in Is(It, [\exists w \ Wumpus(w)]) \wedge During(Now, e)$$
- b. The wumpus is dead:

$$\exists e \ e \in Dead([\exists! w \ Wumpus(w)]) \wedge During(Now, e)$$
- c. The wumpus is in 2,2:

$$\exists e \ e \in Is([\exists! w \ Wumpus(w)], y) \wedge In(y, [2, 2]) \wedge During(Now, e)$$

We should define what *Is* means—one reasonable axiom for one sense of “is” would be $\forall x, y \ Is(x, y) \Leftrightarrow (x = y)$. (This is the “is the same as” sense. There are others.) The formula $\exists x \ Wumpus(x)$ is a reasonable semantics for “It is a wumpus.” The problem is if we use that formula, then we have nowhere to go for “It was a wumpus”—there is no event to which we can attach the time information. Similarly, for “It wasn’t a wumpus,” we can’t use $\neg \exists x \ Wumpus(x)$, nor could we use $\exists x \ \neg Wumpus(x)$. So it is best to have an explicit event for “is.”

22.7 This is a very difficult exercise—most readers have no idea how to answer the questions (except perhaps to remember that “too few” is better than “too many”). This is the whole point of the exercise, as we will see in exercise 23.14.

22.8 The purpose of this exercise is to get some experience with simple grammars, and to see how context-sensitive grammars are more complicated than context-free. One approach to writing grammars is to write down the strings of the language in an orderly fashion, and then see how a progression from one string to the next could be created by recursive application of rules. For example:

- a. The language $a^n b^n$: The strings are $\epsilon, ab, aabb, \dots$ (where ϵ indicates the null string). Each member of this sequence can be derived from the previous by wrapping an a at the start and a b at the end. Therefore a grammar is:

$$\begin{aligned} S &\rightarrow \epsilon \\ S &\rightarrow a S b \end{aligned}$$

- b. The palindrome language: Let's assume the alphabet is just a, b and c . (In general, the size of the grammar will be proportional to the size of the alphabet. There is no way to write a context-free grammar without specifying the alphabet/lexicon.) The strings of the language include $\epsilon, a, b, c, aa, bb, cc, aaa, aba, aca, bab, bbb, bcb, \dots$. In general, a string can be formed by bracketing any previous string with two copies of any member of the alphabet. So a grammar is:

$$S \rightarrow \epsilon \mid a \mid b \mid c \mid a S a \mid b S b \mid c S c$$

- c. The duplicate language: For the moment, assume that the alphabet is just ab . (It is straightforward to extend to a larger alphabet.) The duplicate language consists of the strings: $\epsilon, aa, bb, aaaa, abab, bbbb, baba, \dots$. Note that all strings are of even length.

One strategy for creating strings in this language is this:

- Start with markers for the front and middle of the string: we can use the non-terminal F for the front and M for the middle. So at this point we have the string FM .
- Generate items at the front of the string: generate an a followed by an A , or a b followed by a B . Eventually we get, say, $FaAaAbBM$. Then we no longer need the F marker and can delete it, leaving $aAaAbBM$.
- Move the non-terminals A and B down the line until just before the M . We end up with $aabAABM$.
- Hop the A s and B s over the M , converting each to a terminal (a or b) as we go. Then we delete the M , and are left with the end result: $aabaab$.

Here is the parse under grammar (C):

```

S---NP--Pro---Someone
      |
      | -VP--V---walked
      |
      | -Adv--Adv---slowly
      |
      | -Adv---PP---Prep--to
      |
      | -NP--Det---the
      |
      | -NP---Noun---supermarket

```

22.10 Code not shown.

22.11 Code not shown.

22.12 This is the grammar suggested by the exercise. There are additional grammatical constructions that could be covered by more ambitious grammars, without adding any new vocabulary.

```

S → NP VP
NP → Noun
NP → Adjective Noun
NP → NP NP Verb (for relative clause)
VP → Verb NP
Adjective → Buffalo
Noun → buffalo
Verb → buffalo

```

Running the parser function `parses` from the code repository with this grammar and with strings of the form *Buffalo*^{*n*}, and then just counting the number of results, we get:

N		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Number of parses	0	0	1	2	3	6	11	22	44	90	

To count the number of sentences, de Marcken implemented a parser like the packed forest parser of example 22.10, except that the representation of a forest is just an integer count of the number of parses (and therefore the combination of *n* adjacent forests is just the product of the constituent forests). He then gets a single integer representing the parses for the whole 200-word sentence.

22.13 Here's one way to draw the parse tree for the story on page 823. The parse tree of the students' stories will depnd on their choice.

```

Segment(Evaluation)
  Segment(1) ``A funny thing happened``
  Segment(Ground-Figure)
    Segment(Cause)
      Segment(Enable)
        Segment(2) ``John went to a fancy restaurant``

```

```
Segment(3) ``He ordered the duck``  
Segment(4) ``The bill came to $50``  
Segment(Cause)  
Segment(Enable)  
Segment(Explanation)  
Segment(5) ``John got a shock...``  
Segment(6) ``He had left his wallet at home``  
Segment(7) ``The waiter said it was all right``  
Segment(8) ``He was very embarrassed...``
```

22.14 Now we can answer the difficult questions of 22.7:

- The steps are sorting the clothes into piles (e.g., white vs. colored); going to the washing machine (optional); taking the clothes out and sorting into piles (e.g., socks versus shirts); putting the piles away in the closet or bureau.
- The actual running of the washing machine is never explicitly mentioned, so that is one possible answer. One could also say that drying the clothes is a missing step.
- The material is clothes and perhaps other washables.
- Putting too many clothes together can cause some colors to run onto other clothes.
- It is better to do too few.
- So they won't run; so they get thoroughly cleaned; so they don't cause the machine to become unbalanced.

Solutions for Chapter 23

Probabilistic Language Processing

23.1 Code not shown. The approach suggested here will work in some cases, for authors with distinct vocabularies. For more similar authors, other features such as bigrams, average word and sentence length, parts of speech, and punctuation might help. Accuracy will also depend on how many authors are being distinguished. One interesting way to make the task easier is to group authors into male and female, and try to distinguish the sex of an author not previously seen. This was suggested by the work of Shlomo Argamon.

23.2 Code not shown. The distribution of words should fall along a Zipfian distribution: a straight line on a log-log scale. The generated language should be similar to the examples in the chapter.

23.3 Code not shown. There are now several open-source projects to do Bayesian spam filtering, so beware if you assign this exercise.

23.4 Doing the evaluation is easy, if a bit tedious (requiring 150 page evaluations for the complete 10 documents \times 3 engines \times 5 queries). Explaining the differences is more difficult. Some things to check are whether the good results in one engine are even in the other engines at all (by searching for unique phrases on the page); check whether the results are commercially sponsored, are produced by human editors, or are algorithmically determined by a search ranking algorithm; check whether each engine does the features mentioned in the next exercise.

23.5 One good way to do this is to first find a search that yields a single page (or a few pages) by searching for rare words or phrases on the page. Then make the search more difficult by adding a variant of one of the words on the page—a word with different case, different suffix, different spelling, or a synonym for one of the words on the page, and see if the page is still returned. (Make sure that the search engine requires all terms to match for this technique to work.)

23.6 Computations like this are given in the book *Managing Gigabytes* (Witten *et al.*, 1999). Here's one way of doing the computation: Assume an average page is about 10KB (giving us a 10TB corpus), and that index size is linear in the size of the corpus. Bahle *et al.* (2002) show an index size of about 2GB for a 22GB corpus; so our billion page corpus would have an index of about 1TB.

23.7 Code not shown. The simplest approach is to look for a string of capitalized words, followed by “Inc” or “Co.” or “Ltd.” or similar markers. A more complex approach is to get a list of company names (e.g. from an online stock service), look for those names as exact matches, and also extract patterns from them. Reporting recall and precision requires a clearly-defined corpus.

23.8 The main point of this exercise is to show that current translation software is far from perfect. The mistakes made are often amusing for students.

23.9 Here is a start of a grammar:

```
time => hour ":" minute
      | extendedhour
      | extendedhour "o'clock"
      | difference before_after extendedhour

hour => 1 | 2 | ... | 24 | "one" | ... | "twelve"
extendedhour => hour | "midnight" | "noon"
minute => 1 | 2 | ... | 60
before-after => "before" | "after" | "to" | "past"
difference => minute | "quarter" | "half"
```

23.10

- a. “I have never seen a better programming language” is easy for most people to see.
- b. “John loves mary” seems to be preferred to “Mary loves John” (on Google, by a margin of 2240 to 499, and by a similar margin on a small sample of respondents), but both are of course acceptable.
- c. This one is quite difficult. The first sentence of the second paragraph of Chapter 22 is “Communication is the intentional exchange of information brought about by the production and perception of signs drawn from a shared system of conventional signs.” However, this cannot be reliably recovered from the string of words given here. Code not shown for testing the probabilities of permutations.

23.11 In parliamentary debate, a standard expression of approval is “bravo” in French, and “hear, hear” in English. That means that in going from French to English, “bravo” would often have a fertility of 2, but for English to French, the fertility distribution of “hear” would be half 0 and half 1 for this usage. For other usages, it would have various values, probably centered closely around 1.

Solutions for Chapter 24

Perception

24.1 The small spaces between leaves act as pinhole cameras. That means that the circular light spots you see are actually images of the circular sun. You can test this theory next time there is a solar eclipse: the circular light spots will have a crescent bite taken out of them as the eclipse progresses. (Eclipse or not, the light spots are easier to see on a sheet of paper than on the rough forest floor.)

24.2 Given labels on the occluding edges (i.e., they are all arrows pointing in the clockwise direction), there will be no backtracking at all if the order is $ABCD$; each choice is forced by the existing labels. With the order $BDAC$, the amount of backtracking depends on the choices made. The final labelling is shown in Figure S24.1.

24.3 Recall that the image brightness of a Lambertian surface (page 743) is given by $I(x, y) = k\mathbf{n}(x, y) \cdot \mathbf{s}$. Here the light source direction \mathbf{s} is along the x -axis. It is sufficient to consider a horizontal cross-section (in the x - z plane) of the cylinder as shown in Figure S24.2(a). Then, the brightness $I(x) = k \cos \theta(x)$ for all the points on the right half of the cylinder. The left




Figure S24.1 Labelling of the L-shaped object (Exercise 24.2).

half is in shadow. As $x = r \cos \theta$, we can rewrite the brightness function as $I(x) = \frac{kx}{r}$ which reveals that the isobrightness contours in the lit part of the cylinder must be equally spaced. The view from the z -axis is shown in Figure S24.2(b).




Figure S24.2 (a) Geometry of the scene as viewed from along the y -axis. (b) The scene from the z -axis, showing the evenly spaced isobrightness contours.


24.4 We list the four classes and give two or three examples of each:

- depth*: Between the top of the computer monitor and the wall behind it. Between the side of the clock tower and the sky behind it. Between the white sheets of paper in the foreground and the book and keyboard behind them.
- surface normal*: At the near corner of the pages of the book on the desk. At the sides of the keys on the keyboard.
- reflectance*: Between the white paper and the black lines on it. Between the “golden” bridge in the picture and the blue sky behind it.
- illumination*: On the windowsill, the shadow from the center glass pane divider. On the paper with Greek text, the shadow along the left from the paper on top of it. On the computer monitor, the edge between the white window and the blue window is caused by different illumination by the CRT.

24.5 This exercise requires some basic algebra, and enough calculus to know that $(fg)' = fg' + f'g$. Students with freshman calculus as background should be able to handle it. Note that all differentiation is with respect to x . Crucially, this means that $f(u)' = d f(u)/dx = 0$. We work the solution for the discrete case; the continuous (integral) case is similar.

$$\begin{aligned}
 (f * g)' &= (\sum_u f(u)g(x-u))' && \text{(definition of *)} \\
 &= \sum_u (f(u)g(x-u))' && \text{(derivative of a sum)} \\
 &= \sum_u f(u)g'(x-u) + f'(u)g(x-u) && \text{(since } (fg)' = fg' + f'g\text{)} \\
 &= \sum_u f(u)g'(x-u) && \text{(since } d f(u)/dx = 0\text{)} \\
 &= f * g' && \text{(definition of *)}
 \end{aligned}$$

24.6 Before answering this exercise, we draw a diagram of the apparatus (top view), shown in Figure S24.3. Notice that we make the approximation that the focal length is the distance from the lens to the image plane; this is valid for objects that are far away. Notice that this



question asks nothing about the y coordinates of points; we might as well have a single line of 512 pixels in each camera.

- a. Solve this by constructing similar triangles: whose hypotenuse is the dotted line from object to lens, and whose height is 0.5 meters and width 16 meters. This is similar to a triangle of width 16cm whose hypotenuse projects onto the image plane; we can compute that its height must be 0.5cm; this is the offset from the center of the image plane. The other camera will have an offset of 0.5cm in the opposite direction. Thus the total disparity is 1.0cm, or, at 512 pixels/10cm, a disparity of 51.2 pixels, or 51, since there are no fractional pixels. Objects that are farther away will have smaller disparity. Writing this as an equation, where d is the disparity in pixels and Z is the distance to the object, we have:

$$d = 2 \times \frac{512 \text{ pixels}}{10 \text{ cm}} \times 16 \text{ cm} \times \frac{0.5 \text{ m}}{Z}$$

- b. In other words, this question is asking how much further than 16m could an object be, and still occupy the same pixels in the image plane? Rearranging the formula above by swapping d and Z , and plugging in values of 51 and 52 pixels for d , we get values of Z of 16.06 and 15.75 meters, for a difference of 31cm (a little over a foot). This is the range resolution at 16 meters.
- c. In other words, this question is asking how far away would an object be to generate a disparity of one pixel? Objects farther than this are in effect out of range; we can't say where they are located. Rearranging the formula above by swapping d and Z we get 51.2 meters.

24.7 In the 3-D case, the two-dimensional image projected by an arbitrary 3-D object can vary greatly, depending on the pose of the object. But with flat 2-D objects, the image is always the “same,” except for its orientation and position. All feature points will always be present because there can be no occlusion, so $m = n$. Suppose we compute the center of gravity of the image and model feature points. For the model this can be done offline; for the image this is $O(n)$. Then we can take these two center of gravity points, along with an

arbitrary image point and one of the n model points, and try to verify the transformation for each of the n cases. Verification is $O(n \log n)$ as before, so the whole process is $O(n^2 \log n)$. A follow-up exercise is to look at some of the tricks used by Olson (1994) to see if they are applicable here.

24.8 A, B, C can be viewed in stereo and hence their depths can be measured, allowing the viewer to determine that B is nearest, A and C are equidistant and slightly further away. Neither D nor E can be seen by both cameras, so stereo cannot be used. Looking at the figure, it appears that the bottle *occludes* D from Y and E from X, so D and E must be further away than A, B, C, but their relative depths cannot be determined. There is, however, another possibility (noticed by Alex Fabrikant). Remember that each camera sees the camera's-eye view not the bird's-eye view. X sees DABC and Y sees ABCE. It is possible that D is very close to camera X, so close that it falls outside the field of view of camera Y; similarly, E might be very close to Y and be outside the field of view of X. Hence, unless the cameras have a 180-degree field of view—probably impossible—there is no way to determine whether D and E are in front of or behind the bottle.

24.9

- a. False. This can be quite difficult, particularly when some point are occluded from one eye but not the other.
- b. True. The grid creates an apparent texture whose distortion gives good information as to surface orientation.
- c. False. It applies only to trihedral objects, excluding many polyhedra such as four-sided pyramids.
- d. True. A blade can become a fold if one of the incident surfaces is warped.
- e. True. The detectable depth disparity is inversely proportional to b .
- f. False.
- g. False. A disk viewed edge-on appears as a straight line.

24.10 There are at least two reasons: (1) The leftmost car *appears* bigger and cars are usually roughly similar in size, therefore it is closer. (2) It is assumed that the road surface is an approximately horizontal ground plane, and that both cars are on it. In that case, because the leftmost car appears lower in the image, it must be closer.

25 ROBOTICS

25.1 To answer this question, consider all possibilities for the initial samples before and after resampling. This can be done because there are only finitely many states. The following C++ program calculates the results for finite N . The result for $N = \infty$ is simply the posterior, calculated using Bayes rule.

<pre> int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { // parse command line argument if (argc != 3){ cerr << "Usage: " << argv[0] << " << <number of samples>" << " <number of states>" << endl; exit(0); } int numSamples = atoi(argv[1]); int numStates = atoi(argv[2]); cerr << "number of samples: " << numSamples << endl << "number of states: " << numStates << endl; assert(numSamples >= 1); assert(numStates >= 1); // generate counter int samples[numSamples]; for (int i = 0; i < numSamples; i++) samples[i] = 0; // set up probability tables assert(numStates == 4); // presently defined for 4 states double condProbOfZ[4] = {0.8, 0.4, 0.1, 0.1}; double posteriorProb[numStates]; for (int i = 0; i < numStates; i++) posteriorProb[i] = 0.0; double eventProb = 1.0 / pow(numStates, numSamples); // loop through all possibilities for (int done = 0; !done;){ // compute importance weights (is probability distribution) double weight[numSamples], totalWeight = 0.0; for (int i = 0; i < numSamples; i++) totalWeight += weight[i] = condProbOfZ[samples[i]]; // normalize them for (int i = 0; i < numSamples; i++) weight[i] /= totalWeight; // calculate contribution to posterior probability for (int i = 0; i < numSamples; i++) posteriorProb[samples[i]] += eventProb * weight[i]; } </pre>	<pre> // increment counter for (int i = 0; i < numSamples && i != -1;){ samples[i]++; if (samples[i] >= numStates) samples[i++] = 0; else i = -1; if (i == numSamples) done = 1; } // print result cout << "Result: "; for (int i = 0; i < numStates; i++) cout << " " << posteriorProb[i]; cout << endl; // calculate asymptotic expectation double totalWeight = 0.0; for (int i = 0; i < numStates; i++) totalWeight += condProbOfZ[i]; cout << "Unbiased:"; for (int i = 0; i < numStates; i++) cout << " " << condProbOfZ[i] / totalWeight; cout << endl; // calculate KL divergence double kl = 0.0; for (int i = 0; i < numStates; i++) kl += posteriorProb[i] * (log(posteriorProb[i]) - log(condProbOfZ[i] / totalWeight)); cout << "KL divergence: " << kl << endl; } </pre>
(a)	(b)

Figure S25.1 Code to calculate answer to exercise 25.1.

- a. The program (correctly) calculates the following posterior distributions for the four states, as a function of the number of samples N . Note that for $N = 1$, the measurement is ignored entirely! The correct posterior for $N = \infty$ is calculated using Bayes rule.

N	$p(\text{sample at } s_1)$	$p(\text{sample at } s_2)$	$p(\text{sample at } s_3)$	$p(\text{sample at } s_4)$
$N = 1$	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25
$N = 2$	0.368056	0.304167	0.163889	0.163889
$N = 3$	0.430182	0.314463	0.127677	0.127677
$N = 4$	0.466106	0.314147	0.109874	0.109874
$N = 5$	0.488602	0.311471	0.0999636	0.0999636
$N = 6$	0.503652	0.308591	0.0938788	0.0938788
$N = 7$	0.514279	0.306032	0.0898447	0.0898447
$N = 8$	0.522118	0.303872	0.0870047	0.0870047
$N = 9$	0.528112	0.30207	0.0849091	0.0849091
$N = 10$	0.532829	0.300562	0.0833042	0.0833042
$N = \infty$	0.571429	0.285714	0.0714286	0.0714286

- b. Plugging the posterior for $N = \infty$ into the definition of the Kullback Liebler Divergence gives us:

N	$KL(\hat{p}, p)$	N	$KL(\hat{p}, p)$
$N = 1$	0.386329	$N = 7$	0.00804982
$N = 2$	0.129343	$N = 8$	0.00593024
$N = 3$	0.056319	$N = 9$	0.00454205
$N = 4$	0.029475	$N = 10$	0.00358663
$N = 5$	0.0175705	$N = \infty$	0

- c. The proof for $N = 1$ is trivial, since the re-weighting ignores the measurement probability entirely. Therefore, the probability for generating a sample in any of the locations in S is given by the initial distribution, which is uniform.

For $N = 2$, a proof is easily obtained by considering all $2^4 = 16$ ways in which initial samples are generated:

number	samples	probability of sample set	$p(z s)$ for each sample		weights for each sample		probability of resampling for each location in S			
1	0 0	$\frac{1}{16}$	$\frac{4}{5}$	$\frac{4}{5}$	$\frac{1}{2}$	$\frac{1}{2}$	$\frac{1}{16}$	0	0	0
2	0 1	$\frac{1}{16}$	$\frac{2}{5}$	$\frac{4}{5}$	$\frac{3}{9}$	$\frac{6}{9}$	$\frac{1}{24}$	$\frac{1}{48}$	0	0
3	0 2	$\frac{1}{16}$	$\frac{1}{10}$	$\frac{4}{5}$	$\frac{1}{9}$	$\frac{8}{9}$	$\frac{1}{18}$	0	$\frac{1}{144}$	0
4	0 3	$\frac{1}{16}$	$\frac{1}{10}$	$\frac{4}{5}$	$\frac{1}{9}$	$\frac{8}{9}$	$\frac{1}{18}$	0	0	$\frac{1}{144}$
5	1 0	$\frac{1}{16}$	$\frac{4}{5}$	$\frac{2}{5}$	$\frac{6}{9}$	$\frac{3}{9}$	$\frac{1}{24}$	$\frac{1}{48}$	0	0
6	1 1	$\frac{1}{16}$	$\frac{2}{5}$	$\frac{2}{5}$	$\frac{1}{2}$	$\frac{1}{2}$	0	$\frac{1}{16}$	0	0
7	1 2	$\frac{1}{16}$	$\frac{1}{10}$	$\frac{2}{5}$	$\frac{1}{5}$	$\frac{4}{5}$	0	$\frac{1}{20}$	$\frac{1}{80}$	0
8	1 3	$\frac{1}{16}$	$\frac{1}{10}$	$\frac{2}{5}$	$\frac{1}{5}$	$\frac{4}{5}$	0	$\frac{1}{20}$	0	$\frac{1}{80}$
9	2 0	$\frac{1}{16}$	$\frac{4}{5}$	$\frac{1}{10}$	$\frac{8}{9}$	$\frac{1}{9}$	$\frac{1}{18}$	0	$\frac{1}{144}$	0
10	2 1	$\frac{1}{16}$	$\frac{2}{5}$	$\frac{1}{10}$	$\frac{4}{5}$	$\frac{1}{5}$	0	$\frac{1}{20}$	$\frac{1}{80}$	0
11	2 2	$\frac{1}{16}$	$\frac{1}{10}$	$\frac{1}{10}$	$\frac{1}{2}$	$\frac{1}{2}$	0	0	$\frac{1}{16}$	0
12	2 3	$\frac{1}{16}$	$\frac{1}{10}$	$\frac{1}{10}$	$\frac{1}{2}$	$\frac{1}{2}$	0	0	$\frac{1}{32}$	$\frac{1}{32}$
13	3 0	$\frac{1}{16}$	$\frac{4}{5}$	$\frac{1}{10}$	$\frac{8}{9}$	$\frac{1}{9}$	$\frac{1}{18}$	0	0	$\frac{1}{144}$
14	3 1	$\frac{1}{16}$	$\frac{2}{5}$	$\frac{1}{10}$	$\frac{4}{5}$	$\frac{1}{5}$	0	$\frac{1}{20}$	0	$\frac{1}{80}$
15	3 2	$\frac{1}{16}$	$\frac{1}{10}$	$\frac{1}{10}$	$\frac{1}{2}$	$\frac{1}{2}$	0	0	$\frac{1}{32}$	$\frac{1}{32}$
16	3 3	$\frac{1}{16}$	$\frac{1}{10}$	$\frac{1}{10}$	$\frac{1}{2}$	$\frac{1}{2}$	0	0	0	$\frac{1}{16}$
sum of all probabilities							$\frac{53}{144}$	$\frac{73}{240}$	$\frac{59}{360}$	$\frac{59}{360}$

A quick check should convince you that these numbers are the same as above. Placing this into the definition of the Kullback Liebler divergence with the correct posterior distribution, gives us 0.129343.

For $N = \infty$ we know that the sampler is unbiased. Hence, the probability of generating a sample is the same as the posterior distribution calculated by Bayes filters. Those are given above as well.

- d. Here are two possible modifications. First, if the initial robot location is known with absolute certainty, the sampler above will always be unbiased. Second, if the sensor measurement z is equally likely for all states, that is $p(z|s_1) = p(z|s_2) = p(z|s_3) = p(z|s_4)$, it will also be unbiased. An *invalid* answer, which we frequently encountered in class, pertains to the algorithm (instead of the problem formulation). For example, replacing particle filters by the exact discrete Bayes filter remedies the problem but is not a legitimate answer to this question. Neither is the use of infinitely many particles.

25.2 Implementing Monte Carlo localization requires a lot of work but is a premiere way to gain insights into the basic workings of probabilistic algorithms in robotics, and the intricacies inherent in real data. We have used this exercise in many courses, and students consistently expressed having learned a lot. We strongly recommend this exercise!

The implementation is not as straightforward as it may appear at first glance. Common problems include:

- The sensor model models too little noise, or the wrong type of noise. For example, a simple Gaussian will not work here.
- The motion model assumes too little or too much noise, or the wrong type of noise. Here a Gaussian will work fine though.
- The implementation may introduce unnecessarily high variance in the resulting sampling set, by sampling too often, or by sampling in the wrong way. This problem manifests itself by diversity disappearing prematurely, often with the wrong samples surviving. While the basic MCL algorithm, as stated in the book, suggests that sampling should occur after each motion update, implementations that sample less frequently tend to yield superior results. Further, drawing samples independently of each other is inferior to so-called low variance samplers. Here is a version of low variance sampling, in which \mathcal{X} denotes the particles and W their importance weights. The resulting resampled particles reside in the set S' .

function LOW-VARIANCE-WEIGHTED-SAMPLE-WITH-REPLACEMENT(S, W):

```

 $S' = \{ \}$ 
 $b = \sum_{i=1}^N W[i]$ 
 $r = \text{rand}(0; b)$ 
for  $n = 1$  to  $N$  do
     $i = \text{argmin}_j \sum_{m=1}^j W[m] \geq r$ 
    add  $S[i]$  to  $S'$ 
     $r = (r + \text{rand}(0; c)) \text{ modulo } b$ 
return  $S'$ 
```

The parameter c determines the speed at which we cycle through the sample set. While each sample's probability remains the same as if it were sampled independently, the resulting samples are dependent, and the variance of the sample set S' is lower (assuming $c < b$). As a pleasant side effect, the low-variance samples is also easily implemented in $O(N)$ time, which is more difficult for the independent sampler.

- Samples are started in the occupied or unknown parts of the map, or are allowed into those parts during the forward sampling (motion prediction) step of the MCL algorithm.
- Too few samples are used. A few thousand should do the job, a few hundred will probably not.

The algorithm can be sped up by pre-caching all noise-free measurements, for all x - y - θ poses that the robot might assume. For that, it is convenient to define a grid over the space of all poses, with 10 centimeters spatial and 2 degrees angular resolution. One might then compute the noise-free measurements for the centers of those grid cells. The sensor model is clearly just a function of those correct measurements; and computing those takes the bulk of time in MCL.

25.3 Let α be the shoulder and β be the elbow angle. The coordinates of the end effector are then given by the following expression. Here z is the height and x the horizontal displacement between the end effector and the robot's base (origin of the coordinate system):

$$\begin{pmatrix} x \\ z \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} 0cm \\ 60cm \end{pmatrix} + \begin{pmatrix} \sin \alpha \\ \cos \alpha \end{pmatrix} \cdot 40cm + \begin{pmatrix} \sin(\alpha + \beta) \\ \cos(\alpha + \beta) \end{pmatrix} \cdot 40cm$$

Notice that this is only one way to define the kinematics. The zero-positions of the angles α and β can be anywhere, and the motors may turn clockwise or counterclockwise. Here we chose define these angles in a way that the arm points straight up at $\alpha = \beta = 0$; furthermore, increasing α and β makes the corresponding joint rotate counterclockwise.

Inverse kinematics is the problem of computing α and β from the end effector coordinates x and z . For that, we observe that the elbow angle β is uniquely determined by the Euclidean distance between the shoulder joint and the end effector. Let us call this distance d . The shoulder joint is located $60cm$ above the origin of the coordinate system; hence, the distance d is given by $d = \sqrt{x^2 + (z - 60cm)^2}$. An alternative way to calculate d is by recovering it from the elbow angle β and the two connected joints (each of which is $40cm$ long): $d = 2 \cdot 40cm \cdot \cos \frac{\beta}{2}$. The reader can easily derive this from basic trigonometry, exploiting the fact that both the elbow and the shoulder are of equal length. Equating these two different derivations of d with each other gives us

$$\sqrt{x^2 + (z - 60cm)^2} = 80cm \cdot \cos \frac{\beta}{2} \quad (25.1)$$

or

$$\beta = \pm 2 \cdot \arccos \frac{\sqrt{x^2 + (z - 60cm)^2}}{80cm} \quad (25.2)$$

In most cases, β can assume two symmetric configurations, one pointing down and one pointing up. We will discuss exceptions below.

To recover the angle α , we note that the angle between the shoulder (the base) and the end effector is given by $\arctan 2(x, z - 60cm)$. Here $\arctan 2$ is the common generalization

of the arcus tangens to all four quadrants (check it out—it is a function in C). The angle α is now obtained by adding $\frac{\beta}{2}$, again exploiting that the shoulder and the elbow are of equal length:

$$\alpha = \arctan 2(x, z - 60\text{cm}) - \frac{\beta}{2} \quad (25.3)$$

Of course, the actual value of α depends on the actual choice of the value of β . With the exception of singularities, β can take on exactly two values.

The inverse kinematics is *unique* if β assumes a single value; as a consequence, so does alpha. For this to be the case, we need that

$$\arccos \frac{\sqrt{x^2 + (z - 60\text{cm})^2}}{80\text{cm}} = 0 \quad (25.4)$$

This is the case exactly when the argument of the arccos is 1, that is, when the distance $d = 80\text{cm}$ and the arm is fully stretched. The end points x, z then lie on a circle defined by $\sqrt{x^2 + (z - 60\text{cm})^2} = 80\text{cm}$. If the distance $d > 80\text{cm}$, there is no solution to the inverse kinematic problem: the point is simply too far away to be reachable by the robot arm.

Unfortunately, configurations like these are numerically unstable, as the quotient may be slightly larger than one (due to truncation errors). Such points are commonly called *singularities*, and they can cause major problems for robot motion planning algorithms. A second singularity occurs when the robot is “folded up,” that is, $\beta = 180^\circ$. Here the end effector’s position is identical with that of the robot elbow, regardless of the angle α : $x = 0\text{cm}$ and $z = 60\text{cm}$. This is an important singularity, as there are *infinitely* many solutions to the inverse kinematics. As long as $\beta = 180^\circ$, the value of α can be arbitrary. Thus, this simple robot arm gives us an example where the inverse kinematics can yield zero, one, two, or infinitely many solutions.

25.4 Code not shown.

25.5

a. The configurations of the robots are shown by the black dots in the following figures.





Figure S25.2 Configuration of the robots.

- b. The above figure answers also the second part of this exercise: it shows the configuration space of the robot arm constrained by the self-collision constraint and the constraint imposed by the obstacle.
- c. The three workspace obstacles are shown in the following diagrams:



- d. This question is a great mind teaser that illustrates the difficulty of robot motion planning! Unfortunately, for an arbitrary robot, a planar obstacle can decompose the workspace into *any* number of disconnected subspaces. To see, imagine a 1-DOF rigid robot that moves on a horizontal rod, and possesses N upward-pointing fingers, like a giant fork. A single planar obstacle protruding vertically into one of the free-spaces between the fingers could effectively separate the configuration space into $N + 1$ disjoint subspaces. A second DOF will not change this.


More interesting is the robot arm used as an example throughout this book. By slightly extending the vertical obstacles protruding into the robot's workspace we can decompose the configuration space into five disjoint regions. The following figures show the configuration space along with representative configurations for each of the five regions.

Is five the maximum for any planar object that protrudes into the workspace of this particular robot arm? We honestly do not know; but we offer a \$1 reward for the first person who presents to us a solution that decomposes the configuration space into six, seven, eight, nine, or ten disjoint regions. For the reward to be claimed, all these regions must be clearly disjoint, and they must be a two-dimensional manifold in the robot's configuration space.

For non-planar objects, the configuration space is easily decomposed into any number of regions. A circular object may force the elbow to be just about maximally bent; the resulting workspace would then be a very narrow pipe that leave the shoulder largely unconstrained, but confines the elbow to a narrow range. This pipe is then easily chopped into pieces by small dents in the circular object; the number of such dents can be increased without bounds.

25.6 A simple deliberate controller might work as follows: Initialize the robot's map with an empty map, in which all states are assumed to be navigable, or free. Then iterate the following loop: Find the shortest path from the current position to the goal position in the map using A*; execute the first step of this path; sense; and modify the map in accordance with the sensed obstacles. If the robot reaches the goal, declare success. The robot declares failure when A* fails to find a path to the goal. It is easy to see that this approach is both complete and correct. The robot always find a path to a goal if one exists. If no such path exists, the approach detects this through failure of the path planner. When it declares failure, it is indeed correct in that no path exists.

A common reactive algorithm, which has the same correctness and completeness property as the deliberate approach, is known as the BUG algorithm. The BUG algorithm distinguishes two modes, the boundary-following and the go-to-goal mode. The robot starts in go-to-goal mode. In this mode, the robot always advances to the adjacent grid cell closest to the goal. If this is impossible because the cell is blocked by an obstacle, the robot switches to the boundary-following mode. In this mode, the robot follows the boundary of the obstacle until it reaches a point on the boundary that is a local minimum to the straight-line distance to the goal. If such a point is reached, the robot returns to the go-to-goal mode. If the robot reaches the goal, it declares success. It declares failure when the same point is reached twice, which can only occur in the boundary-following mode. It is easy to see that the BUG algorithm is correct and complete. If a path to the goal exists, the robot will find it. When the robot declares failure, no path to the goal may exist. If no such path exists, the robot will




ultimately reach the same location twice and detect its failure.

Both algorithms can cope with continuous state spaces provides that they can accurately perceive obstacles, plan paths around them (deliberative algorithm) or follow their boundary (reactive algorithm). Noise in motion can cause failures for both algorithms, especially if the robot has to move through a narrow opening to reach the goal. Similarly, noise in perception destroys both completeness and correctness: In both cases the robot may erroneously conclude a goal cannot be reached, just because its perception was noise. However, a deliberate algorithm might build a probabilistic map, accommodating the uncertainty that arises from the noisy sensors. Neither algorithm as stated can cope with unknown goal locations; however, the deliberate algorithm is easily converted into an *exploration* algorithm by which the robot always moves to the nearest unexplored location. Such an algorithm would be complete and correct (in the noise-free case). In particular, it would be guaranteed to find and reach the goal when reachable. The BUG algorithm, however, would not be applicable. A common reactive technique for finding a goal whose location is unknown is random motion; this algorithm will with probability one find a goal if it is reachable; however, it is unable to determine when to give up, and it may be highly inefficient. Moving obstacles will cause problems for both the deliberate and the reactive approach; in fact, it is easy to design an adversarial case where the obstacle always moves into the robot's way. For slow-moving obstacles, a common deliberate technique is to attach a timer to obstacles in the grid, and erase them after a certain number of time steps. Such an approach often has a good chance of succeeding.

25.7 There are a number of ways to extend the single-leg AFSM in Figure 25.22(b) into a set of AFSMs for controlling a hexapod. A straightforward extension—though not necessarily the most efficient one—is shown in the following diagram. Here the set of legs is divided into two, named A and B, and legs are assigned to these sets in alternating sequence. The top level controller, shown on the left, goes through six stages. Each stage lifts a set of legs, pushes the ones still on the ground backwards, and then lowers the legs that have previously been lifted. The same sequence is then repeated for the other set of legs. The corresponding single-leg controller is essentially the same as in Figure 25.22(b), but with added wait-steps for synchronization with the coordinating AFSM. The low-level AFSM is replicated six times, once for each leg.

For showing that this controller is stable, we show that at least one leg group is on the ground at all times. If this condition is fulfilled, the robot's center of gravity will always be above the imaginary triangle defined by the three legs on the ground. The condition is easily proven by analyzing the top level AFSM. When one group of legs in s_4 (or on the way to s_4 from s_3), the other is either in s_2 or s_1 , both of which are on the ground. However, this proof only establishes that the robot does not fall over when on flat ground; it makes no assertions about the robot's performance on non-flat terrain. Our result is also restricted to *static stability*, that is, it ignores all dynamic effects such as inertia. For a fast-moving hexapod, asking that its center of gravity be enclosed in the triangle of support may be insufficient.

25.8 We have used this exercise in class to great effect. The students get a clearer picture of why it is hard to do robotics. The only drawback is that it is a lot of fun to play, and thus the students want to spend a lot of time on it, and the ones who are just observing feel like they



are missing out. If you have laboratory or TA sections, you can do the exercise there.

Bear in mind that being the Brain is a very stressful job. It can take an hour just to stack three boxes. Choose someone who is not likely to panic or be crushed by student derision. Help the Brain out by suggesting useful strategies such as defining a mutually agreed Hand-centric coordinate system so that commands are unambiguous. Almost certainly, the Brain will start by issuing absolute commands such as “Move the Left Hand 12 inches positive y direction” or “Move the Left Hand to (24,36).” Such actions will never work. The most useful “invention” that students will suggest is the guarded motion discussed in Section 25.5—that is, macro-operators such as “Move the Left Hand in the positive y direction until the eyes say the red and green boxes are level.” This gets the Brain out of the loop, so to speak, and speeds things up enormously.

We have also used a related exercise to show why robotics in particular and algorithm design in general is difficult. The instructor uses as props a doll, a table, a diaper and some safety pins, and asks the class to come up with an algorithm for putting the diaper on the baby. The instructor then follows the algorithm, but interpreting it in the least cooperative way possible: putting the diaper on the doll’s head unless told otherwise, dropping the doll on the floor if possible, and so on.

Solutions for Chapter 26

Philosophical Foundations

26.1 We will take the disabilities (see page 949) one at a time. Note that this exercise might be better as a class discussion rather than written work.

- a. *be kind*: Certainly there are programs that are polite and helpful, but to be kind requires an intentional state, so this one is problematic.
- b. *resourceful*: Resourceful means “clever at finding ways of doing things.” Many programs meet this criteria to some degree: a compiler can be clever making an optimization that the programmer might not ever have thought of; a database program might cleverly create an index to make retrievals faster; a checkers or backgammon program learns to play as well as any human. One could argue whether the machines are “really” clever or just seem to be, but most people would agree this requirement has been achieved.
- c. *beautiful*: Its not clear if Turing meant to be beautiful or to create beauty, nor is it clear whether he meant physical or inner beauty. Certainly the many industrial artifacts in the New York Museum of Modern Art, for example, are evidence that a machine can be beautiful. There are also programs that have created art. The best known of these is chronicled in *Aaron’s code: Meta-art, artificial intelligence, and the work of Harold Cohen* (McCorduck, 1991).
- d. *friendly* This appears to fall under the same category as *kind*.
- e. *have initiative* Interestingly, there is now a serious debate whether software should take initiative. The whole field of software agents says that it should; critics such as Ben Schneiderman say that to achieve predictability, software should only be an assistant, not an autonomous agent. Notice that the debate over whether software *should* have initiative presupposes that it *has* initiative.
- f. *have a sense of humor* We know of no major effort to produce humorous works. However, this seems to be achievable in principle. All it would take is someone like Harold Cohen who is willing to spend a long time tuning a humor-producing machine. We note that humorous text is probably easier to produce than other media.
- g. *tell right from wrong* There is considerable research in applying AI to legal reasoning, and there are now tools that assist the lawyer in deciding a case and doing research. One could argue whether following legal precedents is the same as telling right from wrong, and in any case this has a problematic conscious aspect to it.

- h. *make mistakes* At this stage, every computer user is familiar with software that makes mistakes! It is interesting to think back to what the world was like in Turing's day, when some people thought it would be difficult or impossible for a machine to make mistakes.
- i. *fall in love* This is one of the cases that clearly requires consciousness. Note that while some people claim that their pets love them, and some claim that pets are not conscious, I don't know of anybody who makes both claims.
- j. *enjoy strawberries and cream* There are two parts to this. First, there has been little to no work on taste perception in AI (although there has been related work in the food and perfume industries; see <http://198.80.36.88/popmech/tech/U045O.html> for one such artificial nose), so we're nowhere near a breakthrough on this. Second, the "enjoy" part clearly requires consciousness.
- k. *make someone fall in love with it* This criteria is actually not too hard to achieve; machines such as dolls and teddy bears have been doing it to children for centuries. Machines that talk and have more sophisticated behaviors just have a larger advantage in achieving this.
- l. *learn from experience* Part VI shows that this has been achieved many times in AI.
- m. *use words properly* No program uses words perfectly, but there have been many natural language programs that use words properly and effectively within a limited domain (see Chapters 22-23).
- n. *be the subject of its own thought* The problematic word here is "thought." Many programs can process themselves, as when a compiler compiles itself. Perhaps closer to human self-examination is the case where a program has an imperfect representation of itself. One anecdote of this involves Doug Lenat's Eurisko program. It used to run for long periods of time, and periodically needed to gather information from outside sources. It "knew" that if a person were available, it could type out a question at the console, and wait for a reply. Late one night it saw that no person was logged on, so it couldn't ask the question it needed to know. But it knew that Eurisko itself was up and running, and decided it would modify the representation of Eurisko so that it inherits from "Person," and then proceeded to ask itself the question!
- o. *have as much diversity of behavior as man* Clearly, no machine has achieved this, although there is no principled reason why one could not.
- p. *do something really new* This seems to be just an extension of the idea of learning from experience: if you learn enough, you can do something really new. "Really" is subjective, and some would say that no machine has achieved this yet. On the other hand, professional backgammon players seem unanimous in their belief that TDGammon (Tesauro, 1992), an entirely self-taught backgammon program, has revolutionized the opening theory of the game with its discoveries.

26.2 No. Searle's Chinese room thesis says that there are some cases where running a program that generates the right output for the Chinese room does not cause true understanding/consciousness. The negation of this thesis is therefore that all programs with the right

output do cause true understanding/consciousness. So if you were to disprove Searle's *thesis*, then you would have a proof of machine consciousness. However, what this question is getting at is the *argument* behind the thesis. If you show that the argument is faulty, then you may have proved nothing more: it might be that the thesis is true (by some other argument), or it might be false.

26.3 Yes, this is a legitimate objection. Remember, the point of restoring the brain to normal (page 957) is to be able to ask "What was it like during the operation?" and be sure of getting a "human" answer, not a mechanical one. But the skeptic can point out that it will not do to replace each electronic device with the corresponding neuron that has been carefully kept aside, because this neuron will not have been modified to reflect the experiences that occurred while the electronic device was in the loop. One could fix the argument by saying, for example, that each neuron has a single activation energy that represents its "memory," and that we set this level in the electronic device when we insert it, and then when we remove it, we read off the new activation energy, and somehow set the energy in the neuron that we put back in. The details, of course, depend on your theory of what is important in the functional and conscious functioning of neurons and the brain; a theory that is not well-developed so far.

26.4 This exercise depends on what happens to have been published lately. The NEWS and MAGS databases, available on many online library catalog systems, can be searched for keywords such as Penrose, Searle, Chinese Room, Dreyfus, etc. We found about 90 reviews of Penrose's books. Here are some excerpts from a fairly typical one, by Adam Schulman (1995).

Roger Penrose, the distinguished mathematical physicist, has again entered the lists to rid the world of a terrible dragon. The name of this dragon is "strong artificial intelligence."

Strong AI, as its defenders call it, is both a widely held scientific thesis and an ongoing technological program. The thesis holds that the human mind is nothing but a fancy calculating machine—"a computer made of meat"—and that all thinking is merely computation; the program is to build faster and more powerful computers that will eventually be able to do everything the human mind can do and more. Penrose believes that the thesis is false and the program unrealizable, and he is confident that he can prove these assertions. . . .

In Part I of *Shadows of the Mind* Penrose makes his rigorous case that human consciousness cannot be fully understood in computational terms. . . . How does Penrose prove that there is more to consciousness than mere computation? Most people will already find it inherently implausible that the diverse faculties of human consciousness—self-awareness, understanding, willing, imagining, feeling—differ only in complexity from the workings of, say, an IBM PC.

Students should have no problem finding things in this and other articles with which to disagree. The comp.ai Newsnet group is also a good source of rash opinions.

Dubious claims also emerge from the interaction between journalists' desire to write entertaining and controversial articles and academics' desire to achieve prominence and to be viewed as ahead of the curve. Here's one typical result—*Is Nature's Way The Best Way?*, Omni, February 1995, p. 62:

Artificial intelligence has been one of the least successful research areas in computer science. That's because in the past, researchers tried to apply conventional computer programming to abstract human problems, such as recognizing shapes or speaking in sentences. But researchers at MIT's Media Lab and Boston University's Center for Adaptive Systems focus on applying paradigms of intelligence closer to what nature designed for humans, which include evolution, feedback, and adaptation, are used to produce computer programs that communicate among themselves and in turn learn from their mistakes.

Profiles In Artificial Intelligence, David Freedman.

This is not an argument that AI is impossible, just that it has been unsuccessful. The full text of the article is not given, but it is implied that the argument is that evolution worked for humans, therefore it is a better approach for programs than is "conventional computer programming." This is a common argument, but one that ignores the fact that (a) there are many possible solutions to a problem; one that has worked in the past may not be the best in the present (b) we don't have a good theory of evolution, so we may not be able to duplicate human evolution, (c) natural evolution takes millions of years and for almost all animals does not result in intelligence; there is no guarantee that artificial evolution will do better (d) artificial evolution (or genetic algorithms, ALife, neural nets, etc.) is not the only approach that involves feedback, adaptation and learning. "Conventional" AI does this as well.

26.5 This also might make a good class discussion topic. Here are our attempts:

intelligence: a measure of the ability of an agent to make the right decisions, given the available evidence. Given the same circumstances, a more intelligent agent will make better decisions on average.

thinking: creating internal representations in service of the goal of coming to a conclusion, making a decision, or weighing evidence.

consciousness: being aware of one's own existence, and of one's current internal state.

Here are some objections [with replies]:

For **intelligence**, too much emphasis is put on decision-making. Haven't you ever known a highly intelligent person who made bad decisions? Also no mention is made of learning. You can't be intelligent by using brute-force look-up, for example, could you? [The emphasis on decision-making is only a liability when you are working at too coarse a granularity (e.g., "What should I do with my life?") Once you look at smaller-grain decisions (e.g., "Should I answer a, b, c or none of the above?), you get at the kinds of things tested by current IQ tests, while maintaining the advantages of the action-oriented approach covered in Chapter 1. As to the brute-force problem, think of intelligence in terms of an ecological niche: an agent only needs to be as intelligent as is necessary to be successful. If this can be accomplished through some simple mechanism, fine. For the complex environments that we humans are faced with, more complex mechanisms are needed.]

For **thinking**, we have the same objections about decision-making, but in general, thinking is the least controversial of the three terms.

For **consciousness**, the weakness is the definition of "aware." How does one demonstrate awareness? Also, it is not one's true internal state that is important, but some kind of abstraction or representation of some of the features of it.

26.6 It is hard to give a definitive answer to this question, but it can provoke some interesting essays. Many of the threats are actually problems of computer technology or industrial society in general, with some components that can be magnified by AI—examples include loss of privacy to surveillance, and the concentration of power and wealth in the hands of the most powerful. As discussed in the text, the prospect of robots taking over the world does not appear to be a serious threat in the foreseeable future.

26.7 Biological and nuclear technologies provide much more immediate threats of weapons, yielded either by states or by small groups. Nanotechnology threatens to produce rapidly reproducing threats, either as weapons or accidentally, but the feasibility of this technology is still quite hypothetical. As discussed in the text and in the previous exercise, computer technology such as centralized databases, network-attached cameras, and GPS-guided weapons seem to pose a more serious portfolio of threats than AI technology, at least as of today.

26.8 To decide if AI is impossible, we must first define it. In this book, we've chosen a definition that makes it easy to show it is possible in theory—for a given architecture, we just enumerate all programs and choose the best. In practice, this might still be infeasible, but recent history shows steady progress at a wide variety of tasks. Now if we define AI as the production of agents that act indistinguishably from (or at least as intelligently as) human beings on any task, then one would have to say that little progress has been made, and some, such as Marvin Minsky, bemoan the fact that few attempts are even being made. Others think it is quite appropriate to address component tasks rather than the “whole agent” problem. Our feeling is that AI is neither impossible nor a looming threat. But it would be perfectly consistent for someone to feel that AI is most likely doomed to failure, but still that the risks of possible success are so great that it should not be pursued for fear of success.

Solutions for Chapter 27

AI: Present and Future

There are no exercises in this chapter. There are many topics that are worthy of class discussion, or of paper assignments for those who like to emphasize such things. Examples are:

- What are the biggest theoretical obstacles to successful AI systems?
- What are the biggest practical obstacles? How are these different?
- What is the right goal for rational agent design? Does the choice of a goal make all that much difference?
- What do you predict the future holds for AI?

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