


# Green Pace

Security Policy Presentation

Developer: Joshua Shoemaker





**Green Pace**



# OVERVIEW: DEFENSE IN DEPTH

The Green Pace Secure Development Policy standardizes secure coding and architectural practices across a growing development team.



# THREATS MATRIX

Likely	Priority
SQL Injection Unsafe strings Integer overflow	Range/Buffer Overflow validation failures Raw pointers creating leaks/use-After-free
Oversized types Poor exception recovery Over-reliance on assertions	Missing RAII leads to resource leak Unhandled exceptions causes crashes/exposure



# 10 PRINCIPLES

- |    |  |  |
|----|--|--|
| 1  | Validate Input Data                        | STD-002, STD-003, STD-004, STD-008                   |
| 2  | Heed Compiler Warnings                     | STD- 002, STD-006                                    |
| 3  | Architect and Design for Security Policies | STD-001, STD-008                                     |
| 4  | Keep It Simple                             | STD-001, STD-005, STD-007, STD-009                   |
| 5  | Default Deny                               | STD-005, STD-009                                     |
| 6  | Adhere to the Principle of Least Privilege | STD-001  |
| 7  | Sanitize Data Sent to Other Systems        | STD-002, STD-003, STD-004                            |
| 8  | Practice Defense in Depth                  | STD-003, STD-004, STD-005, STD-007, STD-008, STD-010 |
| 9  | Use Effective Quality Assurance Techniques | STD-005, STD-006, STD-009, STD-010                   |
| 10 | Adopt a Secure Coding Standard             | All standards align with this core principle         |



# CODING STANDARDS

1 STD-004 SQL Injection	5
2 STD-002 Range Validation	4
3 STD-003 Safe Strings	4
4 STD-005 Smart Pointers	4
5 STD-008 Arithmetic Overflow	4
6 STD-009 RAll	4
7 STD-010 Handle Exceptions	4
8 STD-001 Smallest Type	3
9 STD-007 Recoverable Exceptions	3
10 STD-006 Assertions	2



# ENCRYPTION POLICIES

- **Encryption at rest**: AES-256 or better on databases, files, backups. Mandatory for sensitive and or persistent data to prevent unauthorized access if storage is compromised.
- **Encryption in flight**: TLS 1.3 with strong ciphers on all network communications (APIs, web, internal sensitive). Mandatory to prevent MITM, interception, tampering.
- **Encryption in use**: Homomorphic encryption or confidential computing for high-sensitivity workloads where data must remain encrypted during processing (protects against memory scraping).



# TRIPLE-A POLICIES

- **Authentication**: Multi-factor, strong passwords, SSO for all logins/API/sessions. Mandatory to verify identity and block unauthorized access.
- **Authorization**: Role-based/least privilege/attribute-based controls on DB changes, files, user management. Mandatory to limit blast radius of compromised accounts.
- **Accounting**: Audit logs for logins, DB changes, new users, access levels, file access. Mandatory with retention and integration into OS/firewall/anti-malware logs for forensics, anomaly detection, compliance.



# Unit Testing

(STD-002-CPP & STD-003-CPP)

Does vector at() method throw out of range exception when used on invalid index?

```
// Negative: expects exception (secure behavior)
TEST_F(CollectionTest, Does_vector_at_throw_out_of_range_on_invalid_index)
{
    add_entries(5); // fill with 5 elements (indices 0-4)
    size_t invalid_index = collection->size(); // = 5 -> out of bounds
    ASSERT_THROW(collection->at(invalid_index), std::out_of_range);
    // Policy benefit: at() enforces bounds -> prevents buffer overflow / invalid read
}
```


▶ Run | ▶ Debug

Test Detail Summary

✓ CollectionTest.Does\_vector\_at\_throw\_out\_of\_range\_on\_invalid\_index  
Source: [test.cpp](#) line 322  
Duration: 1 ms

## Taking it further


- Add negative tests for at() with negative indices (if using signed type)
- Fuzz index values in CI to increase coverage
- Measure how often [] vs at() is used via static analysis



Green Pace

# Does vector at() method allow valid access without throwing exceptions?

```
// Positive: valid access succeeds
TEST_F(CollectionTest, Does_vector_at_allow_valid_access_without_throwing)
{
    add_entries(3); // indices 0-2
    ASSERT_NO_THROW(collection->at(1)); // valid
    EXPECT_EQ(collection->at(1), collection->operator[](1)); // same value
}
```



## Taking it further

- Add performance comparison test: [] vs at() in tight loop (document acceptable overhead)
- Use Clang-Wunsafe-buffer-usage or Cppcheck to flag remaining [] usages
- Use at() in untrusted/high-risk paths; [] only when index proven valid



# Can operator [] access elements within bounds without throwing exception?

```
// Positive: operator[] works when in bounds
TEST_F(CollectionTest, Can_operator_access_elements_within_bounds_without_issues)
{
    add_entries(4);
    EXPECT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(collection->operator[](2)); // no crash expected
    EXPECT_EQ(collection->operator[](0), collection->at(0)); // consistent
}
```

## Test Detail Summary

- CollectionTest.Can\_operator\_access\_elements\_within\_bounds\_without\_issues
- Source: [test.cpp](#) line 340  
Duration: < 1 ms

## Taking it further

- Pair with static analysis rule: allow [] only after prior size() check in same scope
- Add test coverage goal: ≥ 85% branch coverage on bounds-checking paths
- Policy: Use at() → untrusted [] → proven safe"



# Does operator[] lead to undefined behavior when index is out of bounds?

```
// Negative: demonstrate risk of operator[] (UB warning)
TEST_F(CollectionTest, Does_operator_on_out_of_bounds_index_lead_to_undefined_behavior)
{
    add_entries(1); // only index 0 valid
    size_t invalid = 10;

    // WARNING: This is deliberately unsafe -> UB in real run
    // In practice: run with -fsanitize=address to catch
    // Here we run in Debugger because it performs a safety check
    EXPECT_DEBUG_DEATH(collection->operator[](invalid), ".*"); // optional: if using death test
    // Or comment: "Unsafe - may crash, read garbage, or allow exploits (violates STD-003)"
}
```

## Test Detail Summary


- CollectionTest.Does\_operator\_on\_out\_of\_bounds\_index\_lead\_to\_undefined\_behavior
- Source: [test.cpp](#) line 348  
Duration: 3.5 sec

## Taking it further

- Run this test under AddressSanitizer (-fsanitize=address) in CI → should crash reliably
- Use death tests (EXPECT\_DEBUG\_DEATH) only in debug builds



# AUTOMATION SUMMARY



Green Pace

# TOOLS

- Integrate Clang Static Analyzer, Cppcheck, SonarQube, Coverity into Build/Verify phases of DevSecOps pipeline.
- Run on commit and CI for early detection. Use -fsanitize in Pre-production.
- Feed results to Monitoring/Analytics for dashboards and feedback loops.
- This shifts security left while enforcing defense-in-depth across Pre-production and production pipeline states.



# RISKS AND BENEFITS

- Problems: Inconsistent practices incubate security holes for injection, overflows, and leaks.
- Solutions: Enforce policy via standards, automation, Triple-A, encryption.
- Act now: Immediate reduction in attack surface, fewer incidents, compliance readiness.
- Wait: Increased breach risk, higher remediation cost, potential regulatory fines.
- Lacking: Mobile/embedded-specific rules, zero-trust deeper integration.
- Risks: Initial slowdown from automation; false positives. Steps: Prioritize Level 5/4 fixes first, expand automation, annual review.



# RECOMMENDATIONS

- Current gaps: No dedicated rules for concurrency/race conditions, secure random number generation, or third-party dependency scanning (SCA).
- Future focus: Adopt SEI CERT rules for uncovered areas, integrate SCA tools (OWASP Dependency-Check), add fuzzing in CI, conduct regular threat modeling.



# CONCLUSIONS

While this policy establishes a strong baseline, it is not exhaustive. To further enhance our security posture, we recommend adopting the full SEI CERT C++ rules, OWASP Secure Coding Practices, regular penetration testing, and mandatory code reviews. These additions will drive proactive threat prevention, continuous improvement, and alignment with industry best practices.



# REFERENCES

- SEI CERT C++ Coding StandardSoftware Engineering Institute. (2023). SEI CERT C++ Coding Standard. Retrieved February 18, 2026, from <https://wiki.sei.cmu.edu/confluence/display/cplusplus2>.
- OWASP Secure Coding Practices Quick Reference GuideOWASP Foundation. (2022). OWASP Secure Coding Practices Quick Reference Guide. Retrieved February 18, 2026, from <https://owasp.org/www-project-secure-coding-practices-quick-reference-guide/>

