

Scalable and Secure Sharing of Personal Health Records in Cloud Computing using Attribute-based Encryption

ABSTRACT:

Personal health record (PHR) is an emerging patient-centric model of health information exchange, which is often outsourced to be stored at a third party, such as cloud providers. However, there have been wide privacy concerns as personal health information could be exposed to those third party servers and to unauthorized parties. To assure the patients' control over access to their own PHRs, it is a promising method to encrypt the PHRs before outsourcing. Yet, issues such as risks of privacy exposure, scalability in key management, flexible access and efficient user revocation, have remained the most important challenges toward achieving fine-grained, cryptographically enforced data access control. In this paper, we propose a novel patient-centric framework and a suite of mechanisms for data access control to PHRs stored in semi-trusted servers. To achieve fine-grained and scalable data access control for PHRs, we leverage attribute based encryption (ABE) techniques to encrypt each patient's PHR file. Different from previous works in secure data outsourcing, we focus on the multiple data owner scenario, and divide the users in the PHR system into multiple security domains that greatly reduces the key management complexity for owners and users. A high degree of patient privacy is guaranteed simultaneously by exploiting multi-authority ABE. Our scheme also enables dynamic modification of access policies or file attributes, supports efficient on-demand user/attribute revocation



and break-glass access under emergency scenarios. Extensive analytical and experimental results are presented which show the security, scalability and efficiency of our proposed scheme

ARCHITECTURE: Personal domains Public domains Health care Insurance domain Emergency department Public Public PHR Owners AAs AAs Encrypted PHR (2) (2) (2)Cloud server Emergency staff (Friend) (5): read data (1): obtain attributes (Insurance company, physician, Actuary, (2): provide write keys (6): delegate {PHR, current M.D. health insurance) (3): Outsource encrypted PHR (7): provide read keys illnesses, internal medicine} diagnosis) (8): revocation

Fig. 1. The proposed framework for patient-centric, secure and scalable PHR sharing on semi-trusted storage under multi-owner settings.

EXISTING SYSTEM:

Due to the high cost of building and maintaining specialized data centers, many PHR services are outsourced to or provided by third-party service providers, for example, Microsoft Health Vault. While it is exciting to have convenient PHR services for everyone, there are many security and privacy risks.



Which could impede its wide adoption. The main concern is about whether the patients could actually control the sharing of their sensitive personal health information (PHI), especially when they are stored on a third-party server which people may not fully trust.

DISADVANTAGES OF EXISTING SYSTEM:

There have been wide privacy concerns as personal health information could be exposed to those third party servers and to unauthorized parties.

Department of Veterans Affairs database containing sensitive PHI of 26.5 million military veterans, including their social security numbers and health problems was stolen by an employee who took the data home without authorization.

They usually assume the use of a single trusted authority (TA) in the system. This not only may create a load bottleneck, but also suffers from the key escrow problem since the TA can access all the encrypted files, opening the door for potential privacy exposure. In addition, it is not practical to delegate all attribute management tasks to one TA, including certifying all users' attributes or roles and generating secret keys.

PROPOSED SYSTEM:

To assure the patients' control over access to their own PHRs, it is a promising method to encrypt the PHRs before outsourcing. In this paper, we propose a novel patient-centric framework and a suite of mechanisms for data access control to PHRs stored in semi-trusted servers. To achieve fine-grained and scalable data



access control for PHRs, we leverage attribute based encryption (ABE) techniques to encrypt each patient's PHR file.

To ensure patient-centric privacy control over their own PHRs, it is essential to have fine-grained data access control mechanisms that work with semi-trusted servers.

In order to protect the personal health data stored on a semi-trusted server, we adopt attribute-based encryption (ABE) as the main encryption primitive. Using ABE, access policies are expressed based on the attributes of users or data, which enables a patient to selectively share her PHR among a set of users by encrypting the file under a set of attributes, without the need to know a complete list of users.

ADVANTAGES OF PROPOSED SYSTEM:

We focus on the multiple data owner scenario, and divide the users in the PHR system into multiple security domains that greatly reduces the key management complexity for owners and users.

In this paper, we bridge the above gaps by proposing a unified security framework for patient-centric sharing of PHRs in a multi-domain, multi-authority PHR system with many users. The framework captures application level requirements of both public and personal use of a patient's PHRs, and distributes users' trust to multiple authorities that better reflects reality.



MODULES:

PHR Owner Module

Cloud Server Module

Attribute based Access Policy Module

Data confidentiality Module

MODULE DESCRIPTION:

PHR Owner Module

The main goal of our framework is to provide secure patient-centric PHR access and efficient key management at the same time. The key idea is to divide the system into multiple security domains (namely, *public domains* (PUDs) and *personal domains* (PSDs)) according to the different users' data access requirements. The PUDs consist of users who make access based on their professional roles, such as doctors, nurses and medical researchers. In practice, a PUD can be mapped to an independent sector in the society, such as the health care, government or insurance sector. For each PSD, its users are personally associated with a data owner (such as family members or close friends), and they make accesses to PHRs based on access rights assigned by the owner.

Each data owner (e.g., patient) is a trusted authority of her own PSD, who uses a KP-ABE system to manage the secret keys and access rights of users in her PSD. Since the users are personally known by the PHR owner, to realize patient-centric access, the owner is at the best position to grant user access privileges on a case-



by-case basis. For PSD, *data attributes* are defined which refer to the intrinsic properties of the PHR data, such as the category of a PHR file. For the purpose of PSD access, each PHR file is labeled with its data attributes, while the key size is only linear with the number of file categories a user can access. Since the number of users in a PSD is often small, it reduces the burden for the owner. When encrypting the data for PSD, all that the owner needs to know is the intrinsic data properties.

Cloud Server Module

In this paper, we consider the server to be semi-trusted, i.e., honest but curious as those in [28] and [15]. That means the server will try to find out as much secret information in the stored PHR files as possible, but they will honestly follow the protocol in general. On the other hand, some users will also try to access the files beyond their privileges. For example, a pharmacy may want to obtain the prescriptions of patients for marketing and boosting its profits. To do so, they may collude with other users, or even with the server. In addition, we assume each party in our system is preloaded with a public/private key pair, and entity authentication can be done by traditional challenge-response protocols.

Attribute based Access Policy Module

In our framework, there are multiple SDs, multiple owners, multiple AAs, and multiple users. In addition, two ABE systems are involved. We term the users having read and write access as data readers and contributors, respectively.






Fig. 2. The attribute hierarchy of files – leaf nodes are atomic file categories while internal nodes are compound categories. Dark boxes are the categories that a PSD's data reader have access to.

Data confidentiality Module

The owners upload ABE-encrypted PHR files to the server. Each owner's PHR file is encrypted both under a certain fine grained and role-based access policy for users from the PUD to access, and under a selected set of data attributes that allows access from users in the PSD. Only authorized users can decrypt the PHR files, excluding the server.



SYSTEM CONFIGURATION:-

HARDWARE REQUIREMENTS:-

✓ Processor -Pentium –III

✓ Speed - 1.1 Ghz

✓ RAM - 256 MB(min)

✓ Hard Disk - 20 GB

✓ Floppy Drive - 1.44 MB

✓ Key Board - Standard Windows Keyboard

✓ Mouse - Two or Three Button Mouse

✓ Monitor - SVGA

SOFTWARE REQUIREMENTS:-

Operating System : Windows95/98/2000/XP

Application Server: Tomcat5.0/6.X

❖ Front End : Java, JSP

❖ Script : JavaScript.

Server side Script : Java Server Pages.

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Database : MYSQL

REFERENCE:

Ming Li, Shucheng Yu, Yao Zheng, Kui Ren, and Wenjing Lou, "Scalable and Secure Sharing of Personal Health Records in Cloud Computing using Attribute-based Encryption" **IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON PARALLEL AND DISTRIBUTED SYSTEMS VOL. XX, NO. XX, XX 2012.**