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## UNIT 12    DEMOGRAPHY

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### 12.0 OBJECTIVES

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After reading the unit you should be able to:

- identify the various approaches towards understanding demographic transitions in Europe between 1750 - 1850;
- identify the sources used for constructing this demographic history;
- understand how variables like fertility, nuptiality or mortality assume different significance in different periods; and
- understand how different writers have made different kinds of linkages between population and economic growth.

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### 12.1 INTRODUCTION

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This Unit looks at the demography of Europe in the two centuries beginning from 1750. During this period the population of Europe continuously expanded though at varying rates. The changing rates of population growth, its determinants and its relation to social and economic conditions form the subject of this Unit. At the most basic level the interplay between births, deaths and migration subjects every population to a continuous process of changes over time. Changes in fertility and mortality were themselves the result of interrelated demographic and non-demographic phenomena. It must be kept in mind that the mechanisms and determinants of population change varied greatly in time and across the different regions of Europe.

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### 12.2 APPROACHES

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The leading approach in demography until the mid- 1970 was based on the demographic transition theory. This part-description, part-theory posited a tripartite transition composed of a pre-transitional phase of high fertility high mortality and consequently a slow population growth; a transitional phase of falling mortality and constant or not falling fertility leading to rapid population growth; and a third phase of low vital rates with slow or no growth. This classic transition theory, a version of modernization theory, argued for a unilinear progression from primitive to advanced societies, fuelled by the forces of industrialization and urbanization.

The past two and a half decades have seen major developments in research methods in historical demography. With the availability of increasingly powerful computers, it was possible to perform complex iterative calculations on large data sets to reconstruct possible patterns of long term trends. Further, there has been a shift from the earlier emphasis on the Malthusian 'positive check' and exogenous factors such as climate and disease strains to social, cultural and institutional factors that permitted 'preventive checks' in historical demography. This change was signalled for the period between the 16th and 19th century in Wrigley and Schofield's path breaking work, *Population History of England*.

For the post-Black Death period after the middle of the 14th century, it has been debated whether low nuptiality or high mortality constrained population recovery. For the period between 1500 and 1900 there is a fairly general consensus that changes in nuptiality were the crucial element in long-run English population growth with countries in Europe exhibiting different demographic trajectories. The two decades long Princeton University based European Fertility Project organized by Ansley Coale collected data from 700 provincial-level units throughout Europe to test the transition theory with historical data. The results of the survey greatly undermined confidence in the classical transition model: no consistent relation existed between the onset of the fertility decline and the measures of social and economic development. What the results suggested was that fertility was significantly related to "culture", defined operationally as language, ethnicity or geographical region. Differences in the patterns of age at marriage and celibacy significantly explained variations in fertility levels across 'natural fertility' populations. All this research points to the fact that it is difficult to conceive of one single 'European demographic system'. Further, the population history of individual countries and regions must be linked more closely to their specific economic, institutional and cultural histories.

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## 12.3 SOURCES

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Regular, reliable and centrally organized population counts began in Europe only in the early 19th century, except for the Nordic countries. England, Scotland and Wales had a regular population enumeration in 1801, Ireland in 1821 and France began its quinquennial counts in 1816. In France this was preceded by government population counts in the 1690s and unstandardized collection in 1801 and 1806. The Napoleonic conquests resulted in nationally organized censuses in Belgium, Netherlands and the Helvetic Republic and in some Germanic states. After that regular censuses began in Belgium in 1829, The Netherlands in 1839, Switzerland in 1850 and the first pan-Germanic census was held in 1852. These early counts were limited by incomplete coverage and were not synchronous enumerations.

These exercises were preceded by the recording of vital events. The Church started recording all baptisms in the late medieval period and then extended it to marriages and burials. By 1750 over most of Western Europe some parish records were kept. Continuous parish registers are found in France from 1579 and for the Nordic countries from the 1730s. Vital registration was first secularized in France (1792). The details in which this information was recorded varied widely. For instance, nonconformity, delayed baptism and non-registration led to Anglican registers recording less than 75 per cent of all births and deaths by the early 19th century. However, this information despite its limitations has permitted the reconstruction of demographic history by means of family reconstitution. Record linkage has proved to be more problematic for England, Wales and Netherlands than for France and the Scandinavian countries. While family reconstitution provides good information on infant and child mortality, its use is limited for estimating adult mortality and determining population size. Demographic estimates from family reconstitution pertain only to the 'stayers' and are based on a relatively small number of 'completed families'. Generalizations made on the basis of such slender empirical evidence have proved to be misleading, as with Wrigley's study of Colyton. Family reconstitution of Colyton suggested family limitation, but when the data base was widened to first 13 and then 26 parishes no evidence of family limitation was found. Multiplication of reconstitution exercises does not help in estimating population size. This is necessary to compute aggregative measures such as crude birth, death and reproduction rates. To solve this problem the Cambridge Group developed 'back projection' to link the census period to the pre-statistical period. This technique permitted quinquennial estimations of England's population from 1451 to 1751.

For twentieth century Europe the reliability and the size of source material for demographic changes vastly improve. Besides statistical data, we also get abundant information on state policies and debates concerning population.

In this Unit we divide the demographic history of Europe into two periods – Period I covers the years from 1750 to the end of the 19th century. Period II deals with almost a century beginning in the 1870s. This bipartite division is justified by the onset of a general sustained fertility decline in most countries of Europe around the 1870s.

## 12.4 POPULATION TRENDS 1750 TO 1850

The demographic history of Western Europe witnessed a rise in population, unprecedented since the sixteenth century. Unlike the 12th, 13th and the 15th centuries when population increased by similar rates, the period from 1750 to 1850 was free of major demographic crises with long-term effects. Population increased from about 60 to 64 million in 1750 to about 116 million in 1850. However, this increase was not evenly spread across the continent.

Estimated Populations circa 1750 – circa 1850 (in millions)

COUNTRY	CIRCA 1750	CIRCA 1800	CIRCA 1850
Norway	[0.7]	0.9	1.4
Sweden	1.8	2.3	3.5
Finland	0.5	1.0	1.6
Denmark	[0.7]	0.9	1.4
Iceland	0.0	0.0	0.1
Germany	[18.4]	(24.5)	(35.0)
Netherlands	[1.9]	(2.1)	3.1
Belgium	[2.2]	[2.8]	(4.4)
Switzerland	(1.4)	(1.7)	2.4
France	24.5	29.0	35.9
Scotland	1.3	1.6	2.9
Wales	[0.3]	0.6	1.2
England	5.8	8.7	16.7
Ireland	2.4	[5.2]	6.7
<b>Total</b>	<b>61.9</b>	<b>81.3</b>	<b>116.3</b>

[ ]: very approximate, based on long-term extrapolation

( ): very approximate based on interpolation between two reasonably good figures

Figures for Germany are for the 1914 boundaries excluding Alsace and Lorraine.

Between 1750 and 1850 most populations in Europe grew slowly with a long-run growth of 0.5 per cent per year. The Napoleonic war years saw major setbacks to European population growth. France lost around 1.3 million men in its military campaigns. The wars with Russia brought epidemic and hunger to Sweden, Norway in Finland resulting in absolute decline between 1806 and 1810 and no growth for almost a decade. Only the British Isles escaped, with a medium-term growth at over 1 per cent per annum. Population growth speeded up with the end of the war. By 1820 growth rates approached or exceeded 1 per cent. After that, growth slackened. In the 1830s only Germany, England, Norway and Scotland attained a 1 per cent growth rate. Ireland, Finland and France registered rates below 0.5 per cent. The

1840s saw a slight recovery in smaller countries. Growth rates declined in England and Germany. The French growth rate remained very low at less than 0.5 per cent. In Ireland where population increase was decelerating, the potato famine led to a massive increase in mortality and emigration.

These patterns of population change varied within countries too. In England the south-east and industrializing areas of the north experienced faster growth than the rest of the country. The Alpine areas of Switzerland grew most slowly. In Germany growth rates were higher in the agricultural east, moderate in the industrializing west and low in the south.

### 12.4.1 Migration

Internal migration played a key role in the rapid increase in urban populations where deaths exceeded births. External migration was not demographically very significant in the period 1750-1850. However, in the fifty years before the First World War Europe lost over 20 million people to other regions of the world. Emigration was more important in Germany and Switzerland following the potato harvest failures of 1816-17 and 1847. In the 1840s over 300,000 Germans emigrated from a population of just over 30 million. Ireland witnessed the most dramatic of out-migration in this period. After the famine of 1845-48, 1/8th of the country's population (in 1841) left. In most other areas it was the rate of natural increase or decrease, i.e. the difference between births and deaths that was the main mechanism of population change.

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## 12.5 FERTILITY AND NUPTIALITY

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Variations in birth rates have now come to be recognized as the crucial means of demographic change in Europe. Compositional changes, illegitimacy, fecundity and marriage patterns help in understanding variations in the birth rate. Compositional effects operate in the birth rate when the proportions of population who are female in the fertile age groups sharply change. Compositional effects contributed significantly to Norway's cyclical changes in the crude birth rate.

Between 1750 and 1790 the proportion of births outside marriage or illegitimacy increased almost everywhere. In general, however, variations in the rates of prenuptial and extra-marital pregnancy explain little of the changes in population growth for this period. In England, the percentage of illegitimate births was 3, 5 and 6.5 in 1750, 1800 and 1850 respectively. Only about 10 per cent of the rise in all births are attributable to illegitimacy. The quadrupling of French illegitimate births between the 1750s and the 1820s offset only about one/eighth of all the legitimate births.

In most areas, the total marital fertility ratios were between 8 and 9.5, but they were lower in England and Sweden. Marital fertility showed little internal variation in England while it was extremely skewed in France. English marital fertility was very constant between sixteen hundred and eighteen hundred. In France though it declined early, only after 1820 did the country as a whole have a uniquely small family size.

Fecundability and fecundity are major factors in determining the level of fertility. Fecundability or the set of factors that affect the likelihood of a woman to reproduce if exposed to sexual intercourse without contraception did not vary much in this period. The more important factor was fecundity or the physiological ability to bear children. Improvements in health and nutrition led to increases in fecundity. Venereal diseases, malaria and smallpox in parts of Scandinavia led to a fall in fecundity. There is no conclusive evidence that the nutritional levels increased for the mass of people in these years, though fluctuations in food supply decreased.

Breast-feeding appears to have been inversely related to fertility. In a work on German villages, it was seen that when lactation was short the total marital fertility rate was high. In France, in urban areas where wet nurses were used and breast-feeding was for short periods, there was high fertility. Infant mortality was also inversely related to fertility. In France, the areas of highest fertility had infant mortality rates at least 50 per cent above those of low fertility areas.

Conscious fertility reduction has been seen for the Genevan bourgeoisie after 1700, the French elite and parts of rural France. France was characterized by a marked increase in limitation

(i.e. 10 w fertility levels) after 1789. In England notwithstanding Wrigley's study of Colyton, it is generally agreed that low fertility levels were not because of limitation. While we get some early evidence of limitation for Sweden, Germany exhibits no consistent evidence. Except in France where marital fertility began to decline early in the late eighteenth century, most of the other European countries were 'natural fertility' populations. It is worth mentioning here that the earlier view, characterized by the European Fertility Project, which posited a sharp break between modern and pre-modern demographic systems in terms of the use of or absence of deliberate fertility control has been subsequently revised. The European Fertility Project equated parity specific control with deliberate fertility control. What is now clear is that while stopping births may have been rare, birth spacing did have an important impact on European marital fertility variations.

## 12.6 CHANGES IN MARRIAGE PATTERNS

Recent research has highlighted age at marriage and the proportion married as the most significant mechanism of fertility reduction in the pre-contraceptive societies. It was Hajnal who first noted the importance of a peculiarly European marriage pattern as a constraint on population growth. He pointed out that west of a line drawn from Trieste to Leningrad the proportion of married women (45 to 50 per cent women in the age group 15 to 50) was much lower than east of that line (60 to 70 percent). According to him late 19th century Europe was marked by delayed marriage and relatively high celibacy rates (typically 10 to 20 percent of women in their fertile ages did not marry). However, variations can be seen between social groups. In the Nordic countries, which have good records there was a clear tendency for lower class men to marry women who were older. This practice suggests a conscious desire to restrict completed family size. Wrigley and Schofield have emphatically argued for the key role played by the age at first marriage and the proportion married, in explaining English fertility changes. Over 80 per cent of the rise in population increase are attributed to the combined effect of these two variables. In Ireland, the low age at married resulted in high fertility. In France, the age of marriage increased from the second half of the 18th century and decline in the early 19th century. However, the consequent fertility increasing potential of the fall in the age of marriage was countered to some extent by the practice of family limitation within marriage.

## 12.7 MORTALITY

Recent research on European historical demography has played down the significance of mortality as the key determinant of European population change. Earlier writers such as Flinn emphasized crisis mortality. The reduction in the severity and frequency of crises was seen to have reduced mortality. Before seventeen hundred, epidemic disease was a major killer and even after 1720 when plague finally disappeared, local epidemics of small pox, dysentery, typhus, measles and influenza continued. However, the greatest national disasters of the early modern period were associated not with disease but with warfare and famine. Both brought epidemics in their wake. The Northern War of 1700-21 with the ensuing disease and disruption killed 20 per cent of the population of Sweden. France lost around two million people in the crisis of 1693-94 and another million in 1709-10.

By early 19th century the impact of crisis mortality declined. Now it was change in non-crisis or 'background mortality' which effected a decrease in the death rate. Reductions in infant and child mortality were key components of the mortality falls in this period. In France 80 per cent of the improvement in life expectancy between 1760-69 and 1820-29 resulted from falling mortality of children under ten years.

Social and age-specific differentials are clearly seen in this mortality decline. Proletarian mortality decreased faster than peasant mortality. The European aristocracy's mortality improved rapidly. Deaths due to small pox declined markedly, but it is unclear whether this was due to the reduced incidence of the disease or decreased fatality. While the mortality decline was widespread, its fall was greatest among the very young. Mortality reduction among adults was delayed. Small pox, a major infant killer declined, but lung tuberculosis increased. Extreme mortality crises lessened especially in England and France but lesser and more localized mortality surges continued.

Most of the earlier writers on European demographic change explained the decline in mortality in terms of advances in medical education, hospital and dispensary provision, increased

number of medical personnel, preventive medicine (for example, inoculation and vaccination against small pox) and improvements in town and personal hygiene. In the 1950s and '60s, Thomas McKeown demolished most of these medical interpretations. He argued that innovations in medicine and hospital treatment did not lead to a general decrease in mortality. According to him until well after 1850 doctors could do little to reduce mortality and nineteenth century hospitals were hotbeds of infection. The key element in mortality decline was a decline in deaths from airborne infections. Similarly, the coverage of population against small pox by inoculation was too insufficient to be effective. He suggested that rising standards of living, a consequence of modern economic growth, played a major part in explained the falling mortality. McKeown's thesis has now been subjected to severe criticism. First, his assumption that mortality improvements constituted the prime mover of European population increase has been demolished. Second, his suggestion that there was a causative link between improvements in the standard of living and mortality has been undermined by Wrigley and Schofield's work on England. They found no correlation between aggregate measure of mortality and changes in real wages.

### Check Your Progress 1

- 1) What do you understand by the 'demographic transition theory'?  
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- 2) What are the sources used by historians of demography in Europe to construct a demographic history?  
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- 3) What are the two variables emphasised by Wrigley and Schofield in explaining the early 19th English fertility changes?  
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- 4) Did Thomas McKeown attribute decline in European mortality to doctors and hospitals? If not why?  
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## 12.8 POPULATION AND RESOURCES - I

Having identified the age of first marriage and the population married as the most important proximate determinant of fertility increase, we will now try to relate these other non-demographic changes occurring in the society and economy of early modern Europe.

The first detailed thesis on the connection between population and resources was advanced by Malthus. Malthusian theory postulated that population grows faster than economic resources but that population rise is constantly checked by the carrying capacity of the land. This check operated as 'preventive' and 'positive' checks. In the case of England, Wrigley and Schofield have argued that the Malthusian positive check was not important after seventeen hundred; more significant was the preventive check taking the form of *proportions married and the age of first marriage*. Recent research in Sweden has discovered links between real wage fluctuations and mortality even in the post-1800 period at the local level. This suggests that the crucial element may have been weather which independently reduced harvests and increased mortality through disease. But since the Swedish population was rising in this period oscillations were taking place against a rising trend, any simple notion of population limited by the Malthusian constraint of the carrying capacity of the land is inappropriate. The Irish case also exposes the weaknesses of the simplistic Malthusian notion of population-economy relations. After the famine in Ireland, though the population fell drastically it did not lead to any marked increase in living standards.

Wrigley and Schofield's work has attempted to put forward the inverse side of the Malthus analysis. According to them, an increase in population may lead to increase in misery but an exogenous rise in living standards can lead to higher living standards. This in turn leads to earlier universal marriage and consequently a faster rate of population growth. This chain of events was set off by the European-wide impact of the potato, since it opened opportunities by reducing the minimum size of viable holdings.

Another attempt, which attempted to locate fertility increase within the changing production conditions of early modern Europe, was made by the proponents of the proto-industrialization. According to this view, the putting-out system allowed 'the possibility of forming a family primarily as a unit of labour'. In contrast to a peasant or artisan economy where skill and capital had to be obtained before a niche could be found, proto-industrial families, engaged in relatively unskilled tasks had few external constraints over the timing of their marriages. They also had incentives to marry and to marry young to establish a balanced productive unit and exploit peak earning capacities. This phenomenon is reflected in popular comments such as 'beggar weddings' and 'people who have two spinning wheels but no bed'. While this approach has the merit of integrating demographic change into the production process, quantitative support for it is still weak, except for Flanders and Sheshed in Leicestershire.

## 12.9 POPULATION AND RESOURCES - II

In older writings we find demographic growth being emphasized as a causal factor in economic change. According to Hicks, 'perhaps the whole Industrial Revolution of the last two hundred years has been nothing but a cast secular boom, largely induced by the unparalleled rise of population'. In a similar vein we find Pierre Chaunu, in his work on Normandy stressing the deleterious effects on economic development of an absence of demographic pressures. However, the fact that the French economy could expand so rapidly in spite of France's slow population growth suggests that connections between demographic and economic changes in this period are far from simple. These older explanations highlighted the impact of population on demand. However, for extra demand to generate economic growth per capita the adjustments must overcome the tendency for the marginal productivity of labour to fall; or else extra labour lowers the average productivity and thus average wages. Therefore it is essential that investment increases should be greater than population growth. Research on Britain has shown that technical, financial and organizational constraints of this period operated at such small levels that national population changes were not relevant for this causal link to work.

We have already mentioned the result of the large-scale European Fertility Project that failed to find any close association between economic development and the age at marriage. This led them to attribute 'cultural' factors to explain fertility behaviour. One limitation of the Princeton Project was that the studies were carried out at the aggregate level. More detailed microlevel

studies, carried out in north Italy and Sicily, that combine ethnographic and historical information have suggested socio-economic differences to be closely related to the timing of the fertility decline. In the recent past demographers have recognized the need to seriously specify the 'cultural' variable and not treat it merely as a residual category. Cultural norms are now seen to be the product of political, economic and demographic changes. Once formed they appear to assume relative independence and greater resilience in the face of economic change.

These different explanations exhibit a broad move from Malthusian mechanistic determinism to the discounting of the economic variable and a recent shift again emphasising the need to locate demographic change within the political the political-economic processes.

## 12.10 THE LATE 19TH CENTURY AND BEYOND

We now come to the second period in the demographic history of Europe. In this period beginning in the late 19th century, we find that national level fertility rates began a sustained downward slide. They decreased from an annual average crude birth rate of 35 in 1870 to 20 by 1930. This fertility change was marked by a relative simultaneity across Western Europe. France was an exception to this pattern. Its national fertility level was in decline for at least a century before the rest of Western Europe. The French peasantry remained firmly ensconced on the land throughout the nineteenth century and the rate of proletarianization was relatively slow. Consequently the prolific capacity of the rural masses held in check by the land-niche system of the ancient regime was not unleashed as it was in England. The French peasants also practised birth control within marriage well before the peasants and proletarians of other countries. However, French fertility rates also did fall considerably by 22 per cent in the 1870 to 1900 period when the rates of other nations began a sustained fall. The timing of the onset of the sustained fertility decline in Western Europe has been estimated by the Princeton Group as follows:

France	1800	Netherlands	1897
Belgium	1882	Denmark	1900
Switzerland	1885	Norway	1904
Germany	1890	Austria	1908
England and Wales	1892	Finland	1910
Sweden	1892	Italy	1911
Scotland	1894	Spain	1918
		Ireland	1929

Fertility continued to be relatively high in eastern Europe in the first three decades of this century. But according to Coale, Bulgaria, Romania, Poland and Russia had already experienced a downturn in marital fertility before the First World War. From 1930 we find a dramatic fall in fertility in the USSR, Poland and Romania. The rate of fertility was fastest in the USSR and Romania. By the end of the 1960s all countries in Europe except Albania and Ireland registered low birth rates. More refined demographic measures of fertility such as the gross reproduction rate (GRR) and the net reproduction rate (NRR) also declined during this period. In the 1920s all nations had a NRR of more than one. During the Depression about five countries returned a NRR of less than unity and some twelve countries registered a GRR of less than unity. Reproduction rates also fell in Austria and Czechoslovakia in 1937, probably owing to unfavourable political conditions. Reproduction rates in belligerent countries must have fallen during the Second World War but lack of statistics prevents precise estimation. In the post-war period fertility recovery extended up to the early 1950s and subsequently declined. In the 1960s reproduction rates continued to decline in eastern Europe while some western countries such as the UK, France, Norway and Ireland registered an increase. By the late 1960s almost the whole of Europe was characterized by low fertility.

### 12.10.1 Mortality

At the turn of the century mortality was high in southern and eastern Europe (Crude Death Rate >20) and low in the north west (Crude Death Rate <13). In the rest of the regions of



Europe mortality incidence lay between these two extremes. Mortality continued to fall during the 20th century. As in the earlier period, infant mortality improvements contributed significantly to the general mortality decline. The rate of mortality decline was faster in countries where this decline started later. By the late 1960s mortality was lowest in the south-east and the USSR. By the 1960s the USSR had emerged with the lowest population to physician and population to hospital bed ratios in Europe. The differential incidence of mortality was demographically determined by the changed age structure of the populations. The fall in infant mortality significantly increased the expectation of life at birth. Sex-wise differentials in life expectancy persisted, favouring females. By the late 1960s there were no large differences in life expectancy between most European countries.

### 12.10.2 Age Structures

The age-structure of European populations appreciably changed in the long term by marked falls in natality and loss of lives in war. These two factors combined to reduce the proportion of children and increase the proportion of adults in the population. The fall in fertility and increased life expectancy or mortality declines resulted in the ageing of the population. In spite of these common features European populations continued to have differently shaped age-sex pyramids. **In the 1950s the percentage of population over 65 years of age was 11.8 in France and 6 in Yugoslavia.** France, England, Wales, Austria, Denmark and Sweden had a high proportion of old people whereas the USSR, Poland, Hungary, Netherlands, Italy and Spain had smaller proportions.

### 12.10.3 Wars and Migrations

In twentieth century Europe war and migration resulted in significant population changes. Though Europe was free from natural disasters in this period the two World Wars had an adverse effect on demography. Apart from the war related losses of population the first World War was followed by an influenza epidemic. The War also led to deformations in the age-sex structure of belligerent countries and delayed marriages and deficiency of births. The countries most affected by the first World War were France, Belgium, Russia, Serbia, Germany, Bulgaria and Austria. Population losses caused by World War II were distributed as follows:

France, Netherlands, Belgium and Austria: 1.5 per cent of the 1940 population

Germany: 6.5 per cent to 7 per cent

Southern Europe: 3.1 to 3.4 per cent

Northern Europe: 0.8 per cent

Eastern Europe: 8.9 per cent

The Soviet Union: 8.7 to 12.8 per cent

War losses contributed significantly to Eastern Europe and the USSR's negative growth rate in these years.

Migration was the other main variable that depressed Europe's population growth in these years.

Traditionally Europe had been a continent of out-migration. **This pattern continued till the last decade of the 19th century. 1901 to 1915 saw the most intensive out-migration from Europe.** The annual average migration in 1901-5, 1906-10 and 1911-15 was 1.1, 1.4 and 1.3 million respectively.

Decennial percentage change due to migration

	1920-30	1930-39	1950-60	1960-66
Western Europe	-1.7	+0.2	+3.0	+3.0
Southern Europe	-1.0	-0.7	-3.1	-1.5
Eastern Europe	-1.8	-0.1	-2.8	-0.9
Northern Europe	-1.9	+0.4	-0.6	+0.3

(\*Source: Carlo M. Cipolla. The Fontana Economic History of Europe, Volume 5 (1), p.13)

Southern and eastern Europe were areas of out-migration throughout this period, the north both received and sent out migrants while the west changed from an emigrating to immigrating area after World War II.

Though the complementarity between the pull and push factors stimulating migration was a chiefly economic phenomenon, political changes also contributed to population movements. The civil wars in Russia and Spain and the rise to power of Nazis in Germany greatly encouraged migration. In the pre-World War I period there was a laissez-faire situation in the labour markets of the sending and receiving countries. In the post-War period though the push factors in Europe did not alter much, the migration shrunk with the introduction of restrictive laws in the US. The 1921 Quota Law and the 1924 Immigration Restriction Act drastically reduced the number of immigrants. The Depression and the attendant problems of unemployment in Europe and the US, once again dampened labour demand. The post-Depression recovery was too short lived to stimulate fresh migration. The complementarity between labour demand in the US and supply from Europe was broken in the 1930s.

German policies during World War II resulted in forced migration of Jews, German minorities and political prisoners.

Post-War reconstruction and rapid economic growth in the late 1950s and early '60s in Western Europe generated demand for additional labour. This increased demand for labour was first met by immigrants from eastern Europe and the Mediterranean countries. Migration of Turkish workers especially to Germany was also significant.

#### 12.10.4 Urbanization

At the beginning of this century about 70 per cent of European population lived in rural areas. The United Kingdom was the most urbanized country with a 77 per cent urban population. 56 per cent of the population in Germany was urban. All the other countries had less than half of its people living in urban centres. The percentage of urban dwellers was 41 per cent in France, 38.2 per cent in Denmark, 22 per cent in Sweden, 19.8 per cent in Bulgaria, 15 per cent in Russia and 10.9 per cent in Finland. In the course of the twentieth century we find urbanization spreading from the north-west towards the south and the east. Immigration was the chief source of urban growth. The rural-urban shift in this period was not fuelled by low productivity in agriculture but by diversification of the economy. Modern urban centres were associated with the factory industry, trade, banking and public administration.

Trends in urban and rural population distribution

	EUROPE				USSR			
	1920	1940	1960	1970	1920	1940	1960	1970
Urban	150	200	245	292	22	63	104	136
Rural	175	178	178	170	114	131	109	106
Percentage								
Urban	46	53	58	63	16	33	49	56

(\*Source: Carla M. Cipolla, *The Fontana Economic History of Europe*, Volume 5 (1), p.74)

#### Check Your Progress 2

- 1) What do we mean by 'preventive' checks of Malthus?

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- 2) According to the proponents of 'proto-industrialization' what did the phenomenon of 'beggar weddings' reflect?
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- .....
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- .....
- 3) What are the limitations of the studies (e.g. of Hicks) which link demographic changes and economic growth?
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- .....
- 4) What was the role of wars and migration in bringing population changes in the 20th century of Europe?
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## 12.11 LET US SUM UP

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In this unit you saw that:

- historians have understood the demographic transition in Europe in different ways;
- how sources like parish registers and population counts of different types are used to reconstruct demographic history
- how historical demographers have made use of variables like fertility, nuptiality or mortality to highlight certain key features of European societies in different periods
- there is a need for tremendous caution in making a linkage between population and economic growth.

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## 12.12 KEY WORDS

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<b>Nuptiality</b>	:	Relating to Marriage
<b>Fertility</b>	:	Relating to the reproductive capacities of a population
<b>Mortality</b>	:	In population studies the death rate of a given population
<b>Parish Registers</b>	:	Registers of birth and death maintained by the Church
<b>Fecundability</b>	:	Relating to fertility, that is the reproductive capacity of a population

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## 12.13 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS EXERCISES

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### Check Your Progress 1

- 1) See Section 12.2. You may point out how this theory argues for a unilinear progression from primitive to advanced societies.
- 2) See Section 12.3
- 3) See Section 12.6. You may point out two variables i.e. (i) age at first marriage and (ii) the proportion married
- 4) See Section 12.7

### Check Your Progress 2

- 1) See section 12.8. There Malthus links population survival to the carrying capacity of the land
- 2) See section 12.8. Refer to the possibility of forming a family primarily as a unit of labour
- 3) See Section 12.9
- 4) See Sub-section 12.10.3