



Payment Card Industry (PCI) POS PIN Entry Device (PED)

Derived Test Requirements

Version 2.1

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Document Changes

Date	Version	Description
September 2006	2.x	Draft published for comment
November 2006	2.x	Formatting changes
April 2007	2.x	A7, A11, B1, B4, B10, B11, D1, D4, Appendices B, C
July 2007	2.0	PCI Security Standards Council adoption of PED requirements
January 2009	2.1	Clarifications and errata

Requirements A7, B10, B11, B12, B13 and B14 were formerly Online PIN only requirements and are now Core requirements applicable to all devices evaluated using these requirements.

In order to provide greater consistency with International Standards and to generalize the calculations, requirements that formerly were based on a dollar threshold for attacks have been converted to a point-based attack potential scheme.

Additional guidance notes have been added for emphasis. These guidance notes exist in the Technical FAQ for the current requirements. The Technical FAQ is available at www.pcisecuritystandardscouncil.org.

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Introduction

The Test Requirements in this document were derived from the PCI POS PIN Entry Device (PED) Security Requirements as embodied in the *PCI POS PIN Entry Device Security Requirements* manual. These Derived Test Requirements (DTRs) are grouped into four sections within this document:

- Core Physical Security Derived Test Requirements,
- Core Logical Security Derived Test Requirements,
- Additional Online Derived Test Requirements, and
- Additional Offline Derived Test Requirements

Each PCI requirement as stated in the *PCI POS PIN Entry Device Security Requirements* manual is represented by a subsection. For example, Requirement A1.1 is represented in this document as:

DTR A1.1 Tamper-Detection Mechanisms

When appropriate, each PCI requirement has been divided into component parts. These parts are identified by the corresponding PCI requirement number and a number distinguishing it from other components of the same requirement.

For example, the first component under the section for DTR A.1.1 is:

A1.1.1

DTRs are provided under each of these components. These are identified by a “T,” followed by the component identification number, which is followed by a number that distinguishes it from the other DTRs of the same component.

Core Derived Test Requirements—Physical

DTR A1.1 Tamper-Detection Mechanisms

The PED uses tamper-detection and response mechanisms that cause the PED to become immediately inoperable and results in the automatic and immediate erasure of any secret information that may be stored in the PED, such that it becomes infeasible to recover the secret information. These mechanisms protect against physical penetration of the device by means of (but not limited to) drills, lasers, chemical solvents, opening covers, splitting the casing (seams), and using ventilation openings; and there is not any demonstrable way to disable or defeat the mechanisms and insert a PIN-disclosing bug or gain access to secret information without requiring an attack potential of at least 25 per PED, exclusive of the IC card reader for identification and initial exploitation as defined in Appendix B of PCI POS PED DTRs.

Guidance

The objective of this section is to assess the PED's ability to protect clear-text PINs and other sensitive data. Attack scenarios must be in support of the compromise of clear-text PINs and other sensitive data as noted in A1.1.

Requirement A7 focuses on determination of secret or private keys. This requirement focuses on tamper-detection and response mechanisms in place to prevent PIN disclosure.

Immediate is defined as fast enough to ensure erasure occurs before the tamper-detection mechanisms can be disabled using attack methods described in A1.1.

For those devices that do not contain secret information, device disablement may be used in lieu of "immediate erasure of all secret information"

"Secret information" is any private or secret cryptographic keys or passwords that the PED relies on to maintain security characteristics governed by PCI requirements. If any of these keys are not zeroized, then other mechanisms must exist to disable the device and these keys must be protected in accordance with Requirement A7.

Secret or private cryptographic keys that are never used to encrypt or decrypt data; or are not used for authentication, do not need to be considered secret data, and therefore do not need to be erased, e.g., where the device uses a chip set that automatically generates keys at initialization but the keys are not subsequently used by the device.

When designing an attack against the PED as part of A1.1, replacement of both the front and rear case shall be included as part of the overall attack.

- TA1.1.1** The tester shall visually inspect the tamper-detect mechanism to verify the assertions provided by the vendor in response to Section A1.1 of the *PCI POS PED Evaluation Vendor Questionnaire* relating to the tamper-detection mechanism.
- TA1.1.2** The tester shall examine additional relevant documentation, such as schematics and assembly drawings, submitted by the vendor to verify that it supports the vendor responses.

- TA1.1.3** The tester shall open the PED to activate the tamper-detection mechanisms and then perform tests to support evidence that the PED is no longer operational. The tester shall then perform tests to support evidence that keys and secret data have been erased or are otherwise nonrecoverable. Tests that may be performed could include attempting a transaction to determine if the transaction fails, using a special function of the PED that allows a user to determine the status of secret data, or using special software to determine if secret data has been erased.
- TA1.1.4** The tester shall examine the response to Section A1.1 of the *PCI POS PED Evaluation Vendor Questionnaire* relating to response of the PED to tamper detection, for consistency.
- TA1.1.5** The tester shall examine vendor-supplied documentation to determine if the PED employs active or passive (i.e., removal of power) erasure. If the PED employs passive erasure, the tester shall verify that erasure occurs rapidly enough to prevent an attacker from opening the PED and stopping erasure before it is effective. The tester may create an attack scenario, which may be performed in its entirety or in part to verify the theory.
- TA1.1.6** The tester shall develop attack scenario(s) to disable or defeat the tamper-detection mechanisms and insert a PIN-disclosing bug or gain access to secret information, which requires an attack potential of <25 per PED, exclusive of the ICC reader, for identification and initial exploitation. The attack potential value shall be based on the scheme depicted in Appendix B. The tester may perform any test needed to validate the attack scenario. The tester will use his or her own judgment in determining the appropriate tests and whether the attack will be performed in its entirety or in part to verify the theory.

DTR A1.2 Independent Security Mechanisms

Failure of a single security mechanism does not compromise PED security. Protection against a threat is based on a combination of at least two independent security mechanisms.

Guidance

In general, techniques may include any combination of tamper detection or tamper evidence. Security mechanisms must not rely on insecure services or characteristics provided by the PED such as (but not limited to) its power supply and unprotected wires. Tamper-evident labels and similar methods involving tamper evidence are not considered security mechanisms.

This requirement does not imply the need for redundant security mechanisms.

- TA1.2.1** The tester shall examine the response to Section A1.2 of the *PCI POS PED Evaluation Vendor Questionnaire* and the response to Requirement A1.2 of the *PCI POS PED Security Requirements* manual for consistency relevant to DTR A1.2. The vendor responses should clearly indicate that the failure of a single security mechanism does not compromise PED security.
- TA1.2.2** The tester shall examine any additional relevant documentation, such as assembly drawings, submitted by the vendor to verify that it supports the vendor responses.
- TA1.2.3** The tester shall verify that protection against a threat is based on a combination of at least two independent security mechanisms.

DTR A2 Response to Internal Access

If the PED or ICC reader permits access to internal areas (e.g., for service or maintenance), then it is not possible using this access area to insert a PIN-disclosing bug. Immediate access to sensitive information such as PIN or cryptographic data is either prevented by further means (e.g., by enclosing components with sensitive data into tamper-resistant/responsive enclosures), or it has a mechanism so that such access causes the immediate erasure of sensitive data.

Guidance

“Immediate” is defined as fast enough to ensure erasure occurs before the tamper-detection mechanisms can be disabled using attack methods described in A1.1.

Private or secret cryptographic keys that are never used to encrypt or decrypt data, or are not used for authentication, do not need to be considered sensitive data and therefore do not need to be erased, e.g., where the device uses a chip set that automatically generates keys at initialization but the keys are not subsequently used by the device.

- TA2.1** The tester shall examine the response to Section A2 of the *PCI POS PED Evaluation Vendor Questionnaire* and the response to Requirement A2 of *PCI POS PED Security Requirements* for consistency relevant to A2.
- TA2.2** The tester shall examine any relevant documentation, such as assembly drawings, submitted by the vendor to verify that it supports the vendor responses.
- TA2.3** The tester shall verify the existence and design of any mechanisms asserted by the vendor to protect any physical access ports and/or to prevent immediate access to sensitive information like PIN and cryptographic data. This will be accomplished by disassembling the device and examining the mechanisms. The tester shall also consider the vendor responses to Requirement D1. Unattended devices may need to allow access to internal areas as part of the regular service. In this case, the sensitive data must be kept and used in a sufficiently protected enclosure that is tamper-resistant/responsive.
- TA2.4** The tester shall attempt to remove the access cover by disabling or defeating the tamper-detection mechanisms. To remove the cover the tester may open, pry, or otherwise disassemble the PED at the cover seams and remove other plates, connectors, etc. to gain access to the tamper-detection mechanisms. Removal shall not consist of drilling, milling, burning, melting, grinding, or dissolving the cover or enclosure. The tester may drill out visible fasteners (e.g., screws, rivets, press-fittings, etc.) to remove the cover.
- TA2.5** The tester shall verify that attempts to remove the cover by removing fasteners, plates, connectors, etc. or by creating a gap between the covers or cover and housing does not allow access to probe critical security circuitry without triggering the tamper-detection mechanisms.
- TA2.6** The tester shall open the PED to activate the tamper-detection mechanisms, and then perform tests to support evidence that keys and secret data have been erased. Tests that may be performed could include attempting a transaction to determine if the transaction fails, using a special function of the PED that allows a user to determine the status of secret data, or using special software to determine if secret data has been erased.

- TA2.7** The tester shall examine vendor-supplied documentation to determine if the PED employs active or passive (i.e., removal of power) erasure. If the PED employs passive erasure, the tester shall verify that it occurs rapidly enough to prevent an attacker from opening the PED and stopping erasure before it is effective. The tester may create an attack scenario which may be performed all or in part to verify the theory.

DTR A3 Robustness Under Changing Environmental and Operational Conditions

The security of the PED is not compromised by altering environmental conditions or operational conditions (for example subjecting the PED to temperatures or operating voltages outside the stated operating ranges).

Guidance

The vendor must either provide substantive data to support the security of the product outside normal operating conditions, or show that the product uses sensors that will trigger a tamper response.

The objective is not to replicate the vendor testing, but instead it is to account for shortcomings within the vendor's implementation.

- TA3.1** The tester shall examine the response to Section A3 of the PCI POS PED Evaluation Vendor Questionnaire and the response to Requirement A3 of the PCI POS PED Security Requirements Manual for consistency relevant to Requirement A3. The vendor responses should clearly state that the security of the PED is not compromised by altering environmental conditions or operational conditions.
- TA3.2** The tester shall examine any additional relevant documentation, such as schematics, data sheets, vendor test procedures and test reports, etc. submitted by the vendor to verify that it supports vendor responses. This may include data provided to support Requirement B2 under different environmental conditions.
- TA3.3** The tester shall verify that the vendor's stated measures protect against the compromise of the PED by altering either environmental conditions or operational conditions, and assess the adequateness of the vendor test procedures and reports.
- TA3.4** The tester shall develop attack scenarios to compromise the PED by altering environmental and or operational conditions.
- The tester may perform any test needed to validate the attack scenario. The tester will use his or her own judgment in determining the appropriate tests and whether the attack will be performed in its entirety or in part to verify the theory.

DTR A4 Protection of Sensitive Functions or Information

Sensitive functions or information are only used in the protected area(s) of the PED. Sensitive information and functions dealing with sensitive information are protected from modification without requiring an attack potential of at least 25 per PED, exclusive of the IC Card Reader, for identification and initial exploitation as defined in Appendix B.

Guidance

Public keys used for functions that impact security requirements, such as firmware updates, display prompt control, or remote key distribution schemes must be protected against modification and substitution. Secret and private keys used for functions that impact security requirements must be protected against modification, substitution or disclosure.

- TA4.1** The tester shall examine the response to Section A4 of the PCI POS PED Evaluation Vendor Questionnaire and the response to Requirement A4 of the PCI POS PED Security Requirements Manual for consistency relevant to requirement A4. The vendor responses should clearly indicate what sensitive information and functions exists; and that sensitive functions or information are only used in the protected area(s) of the PED; and that sensitive information and functions dealing with sensitive information are protected from modification.
- TA4.2** The tester shall examine any additional relevant documentation, such as assembly drawings and functional specifications submitted by the vendor to verify that it supports the vendor responses.
- TA4.3** Verify the completeness of the information regarding sensitive information and functions presented by the vendor.
- TA4.4** The tester shall develop attack scenarios to defeat or circumvent the protection mechanisms dealing with sensitive information and functions, using attack scenarios, with an attack potential of < 25 per PED. The attack potential calculation shall be based on the scheme depicted in Appendix B.
- The tester may perform any test needed to validate the attack scenario. The tester will use his or her own judgment in determining the appropriate tests and whether the attack will be performed in its entirety or in part to verify the theory.

DTR A5 Audible Tones During PIN Entry

If the PIN entry is accompanied by audible tones, then the tone for each entered PIN digit is indistinguishable from the tone for any other entered PIN digit.

- TA5.1** The tester shall examine the vendor's response to Section A5 of the PCI POS PED Evaluation Vendor Questionnaire and the response to Requirement A5 of the PCI POS PED Security Requirements for consistency relevant to A5.
- TA5.2** The tester shall examine any additional information (i.e., specifications, schematics, block diagrams, etc.) that contains information on tone generation during PIN entry to determine if it supports the assertions made by the vendor.
- TA5.3** The tester shall verify that any audible tones accompanying PIN entry are indistinguishable e.g., by listening to the tones while entering a PIN number or by otherwise analyzing or measuring the tone or tone generation circuitry.

DTR A6 Monitoring During PIN Entry

There is no feasible way to determine any entered and internally transmitted PIN digit by monitoring sound, electro-magnetic emissions, power consumption or any other external characteristic available for monitoring, even with the cooperation of the terminal operator or sales clerk without requiring an attack potential of at least 25 per PED as defined in Appendix B of PCI POS PED DTRs to defeat or circumvent.

Guidance

For A6 monitoring sound refers to other audible sounds apart from the beep generated by the PED when a key is pressed.

Monitoring must be done outside the protected area of the PED.

- TA6.1** The tester shall examine the vendor's response to Section A6 of the PCI POS PED Evaluation Vendor Questionnaire and the response to Requirement A6 of the PCI POS PED Security Requirements for consistency relevant to A6.
- TA6.2** The tester shall examine any relevant documentation, such as schematics and assembly drawings, submitted by the vendor to verify that it supports the vendor responses to the PCI POS PED Evaluation Vendor Questionnaire.
- TA6.3** The tester shall visually inspect the PED to verify the assertions provided by the vendor in the PCI POS PED Evaluation Vendor Questionnaire relating to protections against the monitoring of sound, electro-magnetic emissions, power consumption or any other external characteristic available for monitoring. This could include verifying that any components that provide protection are as stated by the vendor.
- TA6.4** The tester shall perform a sample transaction to verify the assertions provided by the vendor relating to protections against monitoring.
- TA6.5** The tester shall develop attack scenarios to defeat or circumvent the protection mechanisms against the monitoring of sound, electro-magnetic emissions, power consumption or any other external characteristic available for monitoring, using attack scenarios which require an attack potential of <25 per PED for identification and initial exploitation. The attack potential calculation shall be based on the scheme depicted in Appendix B.

The tester may perform any test needed to validate the attack scenario. The tester will use his or her own judgment in determining the appropriate tests and whether the attack will be performed in its entirety or in part to verify the theory.

DTR A7 Determining Keys Analysis

To determine any PIN-security-related cryptographic key resident in the PED or ICC reader, by penetration of the PED or ICC reader and/or by monitoring emanations from the PED or ICC reader (including power fluctuations), requires an attack potential of at least 35 for identification and initial exploitation as defined in Appendix B of the PCI POS DTRs.

Guidance

The vendor may need to supply specific test software to the evaluation laboratory to enable rigorous side channel attack analysis to be performed.

Keys resident in the PED or ICC reader means plain-text secret or private keys. If the encrypted keys are protected in accordance with the minimum key sizes and parameters for the key-encipherment algorithm(s) used as stipulated in B11 they do not need to be considered.

- TA7.1** The tester shall examine the vendor's response to Section A7 of the PCI POS PED Evaluation Vendor Questionnaire and the response to Requirement A7 of the PCI POS PED Security Requirements for consistency relevant to A7.
- TA7.2** The tester shall examine any relevant documentation, such as assembly drawings, test data, etc., submitted by the vendor to verify that it supports the vendor responses.
- TA7.3** The tester shall attempt to develop attack scenarios to determine any PIN-security-related cryptographic key resident in the PED either by penetration or by monitoring emanations from the PED. The attack potential calculation shall be based on the scheme depicted in Appendix B. The tester is not required to perform the attack but may perform all or part of the attack to verify its validity. If an attack scenario can be developed that requires an attack potential of <35 per PED for identification and initial exploitation as defined in Appendix B, then the vendor assertion cannot be verified.

DTR A8.1 Prompts Under Control of the Cryptographic Unit

All prompts for non-PIN data entry are under the control of the cryptographic unit of the PED and require an attack potential of at least 16 per PED for identification and initial exploitation as defined in Appendix B of PCI POS PED DTRs to circumvent. If the prompts are stored inside the cryptographic unit, they cannot feasibly be altered without causing the erasure of the unit's cryptographic keys. If the prompts are stored outside the cryptographic unit, cryptographic mechanisms must exist to ensure the authenticity and the proper use of the prompts and that modification of the prompts or improper use of the prompts is prevented.

Guidance

A8.1 should be complied with for devices that allow prompts to be changed as part of firmware updates. A8.2 should be selected when the prompts are fixed and cannot be updated; for example, when they are stored in ROM. In addition, A8.3 is appropriate for devices that allow third parties to update prompts, subject to the specified criteria in the requirement.

Non-PIN data refers to numeric data other than the PIN that is entered via the keypad.

Cryptographic keys that are never used to encrypt or decrypt data; or are not used for authentication, do not need to be considered secret data, and therefore do not need to be erased.

- TA8.1.1** The tester shall examine the response to Section A8.1 of the PCI POS PED Evaluation Vendor Questionnaire, relating to user prompts, and alteration of prompts for consistency. The tester shall verify that mechanisms exist to ensure the authenticity and proper use of the prompts and modification of the prompts or improper use of the prompts is prevented.
- TA8.1.2** The Tester shall examine all possible prompts to determine if any can be used in conjunction with numeric entry in the clear.
- TA8.1.3** The tester shall examine any additional documentation (i.e., specifications, schematics, block diagrams, etc.) that contains information on non-PIN data entry and prompts for non-PIN data entry, and on data entry and erasure, and on how authentic user prompts are generated and administered to determine if it supports the assertions made by the vendor.
- TB8.1.4** The tester shall examine the vendor-supplied documentation to verify that the cryptographic controls to ensure the authenticity and the proper use of the prompts provide for unique accountability and utilize key sizes appropriate for the algorithm(s) in question. Examples of appropriate algorithms and minimum key sizes are:

Algorithm	DES	RSA	Elliptic Curve	DSA
Minimum key size in number of bits	112	1024	160	1024/160

DES refers to non-parity bits. The RSA key size refers to the size of the modulus. The Elliptic Curve key size refers to the minimum order of the base point on the elliptic curve; this order should be slightly smaller than the field size. The DSA key sizes refer to the size of the modulus and the minimum size of a large subgroup.

AES may also be used with a key size of at least 128 bits.

Examples of acceptable hashing algorithms include SHA-1 and SHA-256. MD5 is not allowed for use.

TA8.1.5 The tester shall develop attack scenarios to compromise the PED by using attack scenarios which have an attack potential of <16 per PED for identification and initial exploitation as defined in Appendix B

The tester may perform any test needed to validate the attack scenario. The tester will use his or her own judgment in determining the appropriate tests and whether the attack will be performed in its entirety or in part to verify the theory.

DTR A8.2 Altering User Interface Prompts Attack Potential Analysis

The unauthorized alteration of prompts for non-PIN data entry into the PIN entry keypad such that PINs are compromised, i.e., by prompting for the PIN entry when the output is not encrypted, cannot occur without requiring an attack potential of at least 16 per PED for identification and initial exploitation as defined in Appendix B of PCI POS PED DTRs.

Guidance

A8.1 should be complied with for devices that allow prompts to be changed as part of firmware updates. A8.2 should be selected when the prompts are fixed and cannot be updated; for example, when they are stored in ROM. In addition, A8.3 is appropriate for devices that allow third parties to update prompts, subject to the specified criteria in the requirement.

Non-PIN data refers to numeric data other than the PIN that is entered via the keypad.

- TA8.2.1** The tester shall examine the assertions provided by the vendor in response to Section A8.2 of the PCI POS PED Evaluation Vendor Questionnaire relating to unauthorized alterations of prompts.
- TA8.2.2** The tester shall examine any additional documentation (i.e., specifications, schematics, block diagrams, etc.) that contains information on how prompts are generated and administered to determine if it is possible to perform unauthorized alterations of prompts.
- TA8.2.3** The tester shall attempt to develop attack scenarios to alter the prompts for non-PIN data entry into the PIN entry keypad such that PINs are compromised. The tester is not required to perform the attack but may perform all or part of the attack to verify its validity.
- TA8.2.4** The tester shall calculate the projected attack potential of disabling or defeating the tamper-detection mechanisms. The attack potential calculation shall be based on the scheme depicted in Appendix B. If an attack scenario can be developed that requires an attack potential of less than 16 per PED for identification and initial exploitation as defined in Appendix B, the vendor assertion cannot be verified.
- The tester may perform any test needed to validate the attack scenario. The tester will use his or her own judgment in determining the appropriate tests and whether the attack will be performed in its entirety or in part to verify the theory.

DTR A8.3 Cryptographically Based Controls

For active display devices, cryptographically based controls are utilized to control the PED display and PED usage such that it is infeasible for an entity not possessing the unlocking mechanism to alter the display and to allow the output of unencrypted PIN data from the PED. The controls provide for unique accountability and utilize key sizes appropriate for the algorithm(s) in question. Key-management techniques and other control mechanisms are defined and include appropriate application of the principles of dual control and split knowledge.

Guidance

A8.1 should be complied with for devices that allow prompts to be changed as part of firmware updates. A8.2 should be selected when the prompts are fixed and cannot be updated; for example, when they are stored in ROM. In addition, A8.3 is appropriate for devices that allow third parties to update prompts, subject to the specified criteria in the requirement.

Non-PIN data refers to numeric data other than the PIN that is entered via the keypad.

The PED design must prevent applications from impacting functions and features governed by the requirements. Examples of functions that must not be influenced by “non-firmware” (see B3) applications include: key management (key selection, key authentication, key generation, key loading, etc.), self tests, time between PIN block encryptions, access to sensitive services, limits on sensitive services, firmware update and authentication, tamper response, etc. Alteration of prompts by third parties is a special case that can be impacted by non-firmware applications provided that PCI POS A8.3 is met.

TA8.3.1 The tester shall examine the response to Section A8.3 of the PCI POS PED Evaluation Vendor Questionnaire to determine the structure and nature of the controls implemented by the vendor.

The controls shall be implemented and enforced by the PED (see also the PED as defined by the PED Security Requirements Manual). As an exception, an unattended PED vendor may decide to include into the to be approved PED scope not only the EPP, but also the device controller and the controls implemented to ensure a secure configuration, the PED display management, properties of the PED's cabinet or procedural controls for the PED.

For instance, an unattended PED vendor will use security controls on how application programs are written, loaded and executed on the PED. The controls must foresee a suitable level of device management and physical strength for the PED's shell and locks, which has to be defined by the vendor.

TA8.3.2 The tester shall examine the vendor-supplied documentation to determine the structure and nature of the controls implemented by the vendor to determine, whether it is conclusive and supports the assertions made by the vendor.

TA8.3.3 The tester shall examine the device to verify that the asserted protections exist and conform to the descriptions provided by the vendor in the documentation.

TA8.3.4 The tester shall perform tests to modify the display content and PED usage in order to verify that the controls are effective. The tests shall include performing an intended change/update of software and/or display messages and verifying that the result conforms to the specification of the vendor.

TA8.3.5 The tester shall attempt to develop a detailed attack scenario, which attempts to bypass the controls implemented and allows altering the display and collecting unencrypted PIN data.

TA8.3.6 The tester shall examine the response to Section A8.3 of the PCI POS PED Evaluation Vendor Questionnaire and other vendor-supplied documentation (i.e., user guide, the installation and setup guide and the interface specification) to verify that the controls provide for unique accountability and utilize key sizes appropriate for the algorithm(s) in question. Examples of appropriate algorithms and minimum key sizes are:

Algorithm	DES	RSA	Elliptic Curve	DSA
Minimum key size in number of bits	112	1024	160	1024/160

DES refers to non-parity bits. The RSA key size refers to the size of the modulus. The Elliptic Curve key size refers to the minimum order of the base point on the elliptic curve; this order should be slightly smaller than the field size. The DSA key sizes refer to the size of the modulus and the minimum size of a large subgroup.

AES may also be used with a key size of at least 128 bits.

Examples of acceptable hashing algorithms include SHA-1 and SHA-256. MD5 is not allowed for use.

TA8.3.7 The tester shall examine the response to Section A8.3 of the PCI POS PED Evaluation Vendor Questionnaire to verify that key-management techniques and other control mechanisms are defined and include appropriate application of the principles of dual control and split knowledge. These control mechanisms must exist and must be suitable even when they are not provided solely by the PED.

The vendor may alternately provide user documentation detailing the management of cryptographic keys following these principles and implementing the use of a secure cryptographic device for management of these keys. The process exists upstream of the PED, but the PED must still provide enforcement, e.g., validates the MAC or digital signature.

TA8.3.8 The tester shall examine the vendor-supplied documentation to verify that key-management techniques and other control mechanisms are defined and include appropriate application of the principles of dual control and split knowledge.

TA8.3.9 The tester shall examine any additional documentation (i.e., specifications, open standards, public documentation etc.) that contains information on the methods for key-management techniques and other control mechanisms and the appropriate application of the principles of dual control and split knowledge.

TA8.3.10 The tester shall examine logging documentation provided by the vendor of the actual performance of the techniques and control mechanisms specified by the vendor.

DTR A9 Visual Observation Deterrents

The PED provides a means to deter the visual observation of PIN values as they are being entered by the cardholder.

Guidance

Some markets may require option A.1 of Appendix A or stricter criteria.

- TA9.1** The tester shall examine the vendor's response to Section A9 of the PCI POS PED Evaluation Vendor Questionnaire and the response to Requirement A9 of the PCI POS PED Security Requirements for consistency relevant to A9.
- TA9.2** The tester shall examine the means to deter the visual observation of PIN values provided by the PED, and/or as described in the PED documentation, to verify the assertions of the vendor.
- TA9.3** The tester will verify the physical properties of the privacy screen. The privacy screen of an attended device shall provide protection as described in Appendix A, section A.1 of this document. Alternatively, the vendor may use less restrictive privacy shield criteria provided that the vendor supplies rules and guidance as to how the visual observation is to be deterred by the environment in which the PED is installed. These rules shall be binding for the organization placing the PED into the environment, e.g., the acquirer or merchant. If the vendor gives rules for an external physical privacy shield, then the vendor shall provide a demo/sample with the appropriate dimensions. The tester shall examine the information to verify the assertions of the vendor. The tester shall consider the examples included in Appendix A, section A.2, of this document when evaluating the vendor's visual observation deterrence rules. The user (acquirer or merchant) instructions provided by the vendor shall clearly state the acquirer or merchant must meet the implementation criteria or else deploy PEDs meeting the criteria defined in Appendix A, Section A1.
- TA9.4** If the PED is a module to be integrated into an unattended device, and the means to deter visual observation are not an integral part of the PED, the vendor shall specify by appropriate means (e.g., drawings and description) how the visual observation is deterred by the machine housing the PED. These specifications shall be binding for the vendor. The tester shall examine this specification to deter the visual observation of PIN values provided by the PED to verify the assertions of the vendor. The tester shall consider the regulations of ISO 9564 and ISO 13491.

DTR A10 Unique Enclosure

The design of the PED or ICC reader is such that it is not practical to construct a duplicate PED or ICC reader from commercially available components. For example, the casing used to house the device's electronic components is not commonly available.

- TA10.1** The tester shall examine the vendor's response to Section A10 of the *PCI POS PED Evaluation Vendor Questionnaire* and the response to Requirement A10 of the *PCI POS PED Security Requirements* for consistency relevant to A10.
- TA10.2** The tester shall examine any relevant documentation submitted by the vendor to verify that it supports the vendor responses. This could be documentation such as parts lists that indicate that PED and ICC reader are housed in a custom or semi-custom enclosure (or enclosures if the devices are separate).

DTR A11 Magnetic-Stripe Reader

It is not feasible to penetrate the PED to make any additions, substitutions, or modifications to the Magnetic Stripe Read head and associated hardware or software, in order to determine or modify magnetic stripe track data, without requiring an attack potential of at least 14 per PED for identification and initial exploitation, as defined in Appendix B.

Guidance

Incorporation of the MSR within the casing of the PED that provides active tamper-response mechanisms should be sufficient to meet this requirement.

A11 applies to any attended POS PED with an integrated MSR.

- TA11.1** The tester shall examine the vendor's response to Section A11 of the PCI POS PED Evaluation Vendor Questionnaire and the response to Requirement A11 of the PCI POS PED Security Requirements for consistency relevant to A11.
- TA11.2** The tester shall examine any relevant documentation, such as schematics and assembly drawings, submitted by the vendor to verify that it supports the vendor responses
- TA11.3** The tester shall examine the device to verify that the asserted protections exist and conform to the descriptions provided by the vendor in documentation. This will include disassembly of the test unit when necessary.
- TA11.4** The tester shall perform tests to verify that the protections of the device are such that the hardware and software cannot be tampered without requiring an attack potential of at least 14 for identification and initial exploitation. The attack potential calculation shall be based on the scheme depicted in Appendix B.

The tester may perform any test needed to validate the attack scenario. The tester will use his or her own judgment in determining the appropriate tests and whether the attack will be performed in its entirety or in part to verify the theory.

Core Derived Test Requirements—Logical

DTR B1 Self-Test

The PED performs a self-test, which includes integrity and authenticity tests as addressed in B4, upon start-up and at least once per day to check firmware, security mechanisms for signs of tampering, and whether the PED is in a compromised state. In the event of a failure, the PED and its functionality fail in a secure manner.

Guidance

Firmware is considered to be any code within the PED that provides security protections needed to comply with these requirements. In certain instances, the test houses may request copies of source code for review of specific functions.

The device must perform an internal self-test automatically at least once every day, in addition to at power-up. It is acceptable to perform firmware integrity checks before each PIN transaction as opposed to performing them at least once every 24 hours. Self-tests after several minutes of inactivity may also be used, rather than once every 24 hours, in addition to power-up self-tests.

Software integrity tests may include SHA-1 or CRC. Authenticity testing must use cryptographic methods (MACs, digital signatures, or encryption).

- TB1.1** The tester shall examine the vendor's response to Section B1 of the *PCI POS PED Evaluation Vendor Questionnaire* and the response to Requirement B1 of the *PCI POS PED Security Requirements* to verify that the PED performs a self-test upon start-up and at least once per day to check firmware and security mechanisms for signs of tampering, and whether the PED is in a compromised state.
- TB1.2** The tester shall examine any relevant documentation, such as the user guide or the software specification, submitted by the vendor to verify that it supports the vendor responses.
- TB1.3** The tester will verify that the PED performs self-tests upon start-up and on a periodic basis at least once per day to check firmware and security mechanisms for signs of tampering, and whether the PED is in a compromised state. The tester will activate the self-test(s) and look for the result of the self-test(s) as shown by the PED.
- TB1.4** The tester will verify that the PED self-tests are able to detect failures and in doing so, fail in a secure manner. The vendor shall provide evidence of testing that confirms the PED fails securely in the event of self-test failure.

DTR B2 Logical Anomalies

The PED's functionality shall not be influenced by logical anomalies such as (but not limited to) unexpected command sequences, unknown commands, commands in a wrong device mode and supplying wrong parameters or data which could result in the PED outputting the clear-text PIN or other sensitive information.

Guidance

Functionality shall be considered as any functionality, via any internal or external interface, that could impact the security of the PED.

Vendors should provide software design rules and specifications to support answers.

The PED design must prevent applications from impacting functions and features governed by the requirements. Examples of functions that must not be influenced by "non-firmware" applications include: key management (key selection, key authentication, key loading, key generation, key usage, etc.), self tests, time between PIN block encryptions, access to sensitive services, limits on sensitive services, firmware update and authentication, tamper response, etc. Alteration of prompts by third parties is a special case that can be impacted by non-firmware applications provided that PCI POS A8.3 is met.

- TB2.1** The tester shall examine the vendor's response to Section B2 of the *PCI POS PED Evaluation Vendor Questionnaire* and the response to Requirement B2 of the *PCI POS PED Security Requirements* to verify that the PED's functionality shall not be influenced by logical anomalies such as (but not limited to) unexpected command sequences, unknown commands, commands in a wrong device mode and supplying wrong parameters or data.
- TB2.2** The tester shall examine any relevant documentation, such as a user guide, the specification of the PED's logical structure, the PED interface specification, the software design rules and specifications, or the software implementation submitted by the vendor to verify that it supports the vendor responses.
- TB2.3** The tester shall analyze the vendor's measures that ensure that the PED's functionality is not influenced by logical anomalies such as (but not limited to) unexpected command sequences, unknown commands, commands in a wrong device mode, and supplying wrong parameters or data.
- TB2.4** The tester may perform tests needed to validate the device's property. The evaluator should use his or her own judgment in determining appropriate tests. Test support shall be provided by the vendor as needed to access and use the interfaces under test.

DTR B3 Firmware Certification

The firmware, and any changes thereafter, has been inspected and reviewed using a documented process that can be audited and is certified as being free from hidden and unauthorized or undocumented functions.

Guidance

Firmware is considered to be any code within the PED that provides security protections needed to comply with PCI requirements. Other code that exists within the device that does not provide security, and cannot impact security, is not considered firmware under PCI requirements.

- TB3.1** The tester shall examine the response to Section B3 of the *PCI POS PED Evaluation Vendor Questionnaire* relating to the firmware documentation and certification process, for consistency.
- TB3.2** The tester shall examine the support documentation submitted by the PED vendor. The documents should be representative of a Configuration Control process that can be audited. The documentation could include firmware revision lists with updates documented, current source code check-in, checkout, and control procedures; authorized access lists, and other materials that show clear evidence that the firmware is under an auditable Configuration Control procedure.
- TB3.3** The tester shall examine details provided by the vendor that the documented process explicitly addresses how testing/ auditing has been carried out to check for unauthorized and undocumented functions.
- TB3.4** The tester will verify that the device displays or otherwise makes available the revision number.

DTR B4 Firmware Updates

If the PED allows updates of firmware, the firmware integrity is cryptographically authenticated by the device. If the authenticity is not confirmed, the firmware update is rejected and deleted.

Guidance

Firmware is considered to be any code within the PED that provides security protections needed to comply with PCI requirements. Other code that exists within the device that does not provide security, and cannot impact security, is not considered firmware under PCI requirements.

- TB4.1** The tester shall examine the response to Section B4 of the *PCI POS PED Evaluation Vendor Questionnaire* relating to the authentication procedures for firmware updates, for consistency.
- TB4.2** The tester shall examine any additional documentation (i.e., specifications, schematics, block diagrams, etc.) that contains information that relates to firmware updates to determine if it supports the assertions made by the vendor.
- TB4.3** The tester shall verify that the PED cryptographically authenticates the firmware integrity. This will be accomplished, for example, by performing a simulated firmware update.
- TB4.4** The tester shall verify that the PED rejects unauthorized firmware. This will be accomplished, for example, by performing a simulated firmware update with inadequate or modified authentication information.
- TB4.5** The tester shall examine the vendor-supplied documentation to verify that the controls provide for unique accountability and utilize key sizes appropriate for the algorithm(s) in question. Examples of appropriate algorithms and minimum key sizes are:

Algorithm	DES	RSA	Elliptic Curve	DSA
Minimum key size in number of bits	112	1024	160	1024/160

DES refers to non-parity bits. The RSA key size refers to the size of the modulus. The Elliptic Curve key size refers to the minimum order of the base point on the elliptic curve; this order should be slightly smaller than the field size. The DSA key sizes refer to the size of the modulus and the minimum size of a large subgroup.

AES may also be used with a key size of at least 128 bits.

Examples of acceptable hashing algorithms include SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384 and SHA-512. MD5 is not allowed for use.

DTR B5 Display During PIN Entry

The PED never displays the entered PIN digits. Any displayed character related to PIN entry is a non-significant symbol, e.g., asterisks.

- TB5.1** The tester shall examine the vendor's response to Section B5 of the *PCI POS PED Evaluation Vendor Questionnaire* and the response to Requirement B5 of the *PCI POS PED Security Requirements* for consistency relevant to B5.1.
- TB5.2** The tester shall examine any relevant documentation, such as an API user guide, submitted by the vendor to verify that supports the vendor responses.
- TB5.3** The tester shall perform a transaction in which a PIN number is entered to verify that the PED does not display any digits of the PIN value. The tester shall note and report any characters that are displayed. The device must display the same non-significant character for all PIN-entry uses.
- TB5.4** If the PED does not directly control the display, it must supply a suitable signal to indicate that a numeric key has been pressed and the value is stored inside the PED. The tester shall examine the response to Section B5 of the *PCI POS PED Evaluation Vendor Questionnaire* to determine the kind of signaling and to verify that the signal information is not related to the digit entered.

DTR B6 Clearing of Internal Buffers

Sensitive information shall not be present any longer or used more often than strictly necessary. Online PINs are encrypted within the PED immediately after PIN entry is complete and has been signified as such by the cardholder, e.g., via pressing the enter button.

The PED must automatically clear its internal buffers when either:

- *The transaction is completed, or*
- *The PED has timed out waiting for the response from the cardholder or merchant.*

Guidance

The vendor shall provide documentation of test results for inspections of internal buffers.

Plain-text PINs must not exist for more than one minute maximum from the completion of the cardholder's PIN entry. In all cases, erasure of the plain-text PIN must occur before the tamper-detection mechanisms can be disabled using attack methods described in A1.1.

- TB6.1** The tester shall examine the vendor's response to Section B6 of the PCI POS PED Evaluation Vendor Questionnaire and the response to Requirement B6 of the PCI POS PED Security Requirements to verify:
- That sensitive information shall not be present any longer or used more often than strictly necessary;
 - The immediate encryption of online PIN data; and
 - That the PED automatically clears its internal buffers when either the transaction is completed or the PED has timed out waiting for the response from the cardholder or merchant.
- TB6.2** The tester shall examine any relevant documentation, including vendor test results for inspections of internal buffers, the user guide, the software specification, or the software implementation submitted by the vendor to verify that it supports the vendor responses.
- TB6.3** The tester will verify that the vendor has identified all data that is automatically cleared when the transaction is completed and that all sensitive data is included. Passwords, plain-text cryptographic keys outside of the crypto-processor, and PIN values are considered sensitive data.
- TB6.4** The tester will verify that all data is automatically cleared when either the transaction is completed or the PED has timed out waiting for the response from the cardholder or merchant. The tester will determine the appropriate test actions to be taken. For instance, by performing a partial simulated transaction to verify the behavior at time-out.

DTR B7 Protection of Sensitive Services

Access to sensitive services requires authentication. Sensitive services provide access to the underlying sensitive functions. Sensitive functions are those functions that process sensitive data such as cryptographic keys, PINs and passwords. Entering or exiting sensitive services shall not reveal or otherwise affect sensitive information.

Guidance

Authentication shall be considered as dual control techniques when entering sensitive information through a secure user interface, or cryptographic techniques when entering electronic data. The use of other techniques to access sensitive services results in the device being unable to use previously existing keying material.

A sensitive service (state) allows the execution of functions that are not available during normal use, e.g., load a master key, delete stored transactions, alter device configuration, etc.

Key components entered manually constitute sensitive data during entry and the device shall not differentiate via sound or display the entry of different values.

- TB7.1** The tester shall examine the vendor's response to Section B7 of the *PCI POS PED Evaluation Vendor Questionnaire* and the response to Requirement B7 of the *PCI POS PED Security Requirements* for consistency relevant to B7.
- TB7.2** The tester shall examine any relevant documentation (such as an API user guide) submitted by the vendor to verify that it supports the vendor assertions with regard to the control of sensitive services.
- TB7.3** The tester shall verify from vendor documentation that the vendor has identified all sensitive services, data and secure modes. Sensitive functions are those functions that process sensitive data such as cryptographic keys, PINs, and passwords.
- TB7.4** The tester shall verify from vendor documentation and from functional testing that sensitive services require authentication.
- TB7.5** The tester shall verify from vendor documentation and from functional testing that entering and exiting sensitive services does not reveal or otherwise affect sensitive information.
- TB7.6** The tester shall verify from vendor documentation that sensitive services are entered, used, and exited securely and that mode transitions (e.g., from operational to maintenance) do not reveal or otherwise affect sensitive information.
- TB7.7** If access to sensitive services requires input by the keypad, the tester shall verify that the protections for PIN data, such as the following, are also afforded to data entered while accessing sensitive services:
- Data inputs cannot be discerned from any displayed characters
 - Data inputs cannot be discerned by monitoring audible or electro-magnetic emissions
 - Sensitive data is cleared from internal buffers upon exiting the sensitive mode.
- The testing shall include:
- Entering data while accessing sensitive services
 - Document review
- TB7.8** If mode transitions require input by a separate interface device, such as a key loader, the tester will document the mechanism(s) and methodology used.

DTR B8 Sensitive Services Limits

To minimize the risks from unauthorized use of sensitive services, limits on the number of actions that can be performed and a time limit shall be imposed, after which the PED is forced to return to its normal mode.

Guidance

This applies to each and any transition to the use of sensitive services.

- TB8.1** The tester shall examine the vendor's response to Section B8 of the *PCI POS PED Evaluation Vendor Questionnaire* and the response to Requirement B8 of the *PCI POS PED Security Requirements* for consistency relevant to B8.
- TB8.2** The tester shall examine any relevant documentation, such as the user guide or the software specification, submitted by the vendor to verify that it supports the vendor responses.
- TB8.3** The tester shall examine the rationale provided by the vendor in Section B8 of the *PCI POS PED Evaluation Vendor Questionnaire* to verify the following:
- The vendor has provided a rationale for the value chosen as a limit on the number of actions and the time limits imposed.
 - The vendor has provided a rationale as to how the limits minimize the risks from unauthorized use of sensitive services.
- TB8.4** The tester shall verify the limits placed on the number of actions by causing the PED to access sensitive services and attempting to exceed the limit. Once the limit is exceeded the tester will verify that the PED has returned to its normal mode.
- TB8.5** The tester shall verify that a time limit is imposed such that after one minute of inactivity while accessing sensitive services, the PED returns to its normal state. This will be accomplished by attempting to use sensitive functions after the time limit has been exceeded.
- TB8.6** The tester shall verify that a time limit is imposed such that fifteen (15) minutes after accessing sensitive services, the PED returns to its normal mode. This will be accomplished by attempting to use sensitive functions after the time limit has been exceeded. To prevent the PED from reaching a limit of inactivity, sensitive functions will be used throughout the fifteen minutes.

DTR B9 Random Numbers

If random numbers are generated by the PED in connection with security over sensitive data, the random number generator has been assessed to ensure it is generating numbers sufficiently unpredictable.

- TB9.1** The tester shall examine the vendor's response to Section B9 of the *PCI POS PED Evaluation Vendor Questionnaire* and the response to Requirement B9 of the *PCI POS PED Security Requirements* for consistency relevant to B9.
- TB9.2** The tester shall compare the vendor supplied documentation, such as the specification of the random number generator and test documentation, submitted by the vendor to verify that it supports vendor responses.
- TB9.3** The tester shall verify test information provided by the vendor to assess whether the random numbers are sufficiently unpredictable. The tester shall use a suitable test method (for example, those listed in NIST PUB 800-22). See Appendix C.

DTR B10 Exhaustive PIN Determination

The PED has characteristics that prevent or significantly deter the use of a stolen device for exhaustive PIN determination.

Guidance

The following are examples of techniques that may be used to prevent an exhaustive PIN determination attack, such as one using electromechanical solenoids to depress the keys so as to try all possible PINs until the ciphertext produced equals the ciphertext recorded when the PED was in operational use:

- *Use of a unique key per transaction technique. (Prevents the attack.);*
- *Preventing the entry of the PIN through other than the keypad, and limiting the rate at which the PED will encrypt PINs to the average (for example, over 120 transactions) of one per 30 seconds. (Deters the attack.)*
- *The device is exclusively used for offline PIN and the ICC reader is integrated into the PED.*

Offline devices that do not have the PED and the ICC reader integrated into the same secure module, and which are using ISO format 0 and are not using a unique key per transaction for the conveyance of the PIN from the point of entry to the ICC reader, must comply with this requirement.

- TB10.1** The tester shall examine the response to Section B10 of the *PCI POS PED Evaluation Vendor Questionnaire* relating to characteristics that prevent or significantly deter the use of a stolen device for exhaustive PIN determination.
- TB10.2** The tester shall examine any additional documentation (i.e., specifications, schematics, block diagrams, etc.) that contains information that relates to characteristics that prevent or significantly deter exhaustive PIN determination to determine if it supports the assertions made by the vendor.
- TB10.3** The tester shall perform functional testing to verify the PED characteristics regarding B10.

DTR B11 Key Management

The key-management techniques implemented in the PED conform to ISO 11568 and/or ANSI X9.24. Key-management techniques must support ANSI TR-31 or an equivalent methodology for maintaining the TDEA key bundle.

Guidance

TDES key components shall be combined via either XOR'ing of full-length key components or via implementation of a recognized secret sharing scheme, e.g., Shamir. Private key components shall be combined using a recognized secret sharing scheme.

A PED may include more than one compliant key exchange and storage scheme.

This does not imply that the device must enforce TR-31 or an equivalent scheme, but it must be capable of implementing such a scheme as a configuration option.

For all TDEA modes of operation, the three cryptographic keys (K1, K2, K3) define a TDEA key bundle (see X9.52). The bundle and the individual keys must:

- *Be secret;*
- *Be generated randomly or pseudo-randomly;*
- *Have integrity whereby each key in the bundle has not been altered in an unauthorized manner since the time it was generated, transmitted, or stored by an authorized source;*
- *Be used in the appropriate order as specified by the particular mode;*
- *Be considered a fixed quantity in which an individual key cannot be manipulated while leaving the other two keys unchanged; and*
- *Cannot be unbundled for any purpose.*

Documentation must be provided demonstrating how the methodology meets these criteria.

- TB11.1** The tester shall examine the response to Section B11 of the *PCI POS PED Evaluation Vendor Questionnaire* relating to the method of key management in use in the PED, for consistency.
- TB11.2** The tester shall examine any relevant documentation such as a user guide, submitted by the vendor to verify that it supports vendor responses.
- TB11.3** The tester shall determine from vendor documentation the key-management technique used for firmware and application updates. Symmetric key techniques must include the use of Unique Key(s) per Device.
- TB11.4** The tester shall examine any additional documentation (e.g., API reference, design documentation, key management specification) that describes the implemented key exchange and storage techniques to determine if it supports the assertions made by the vendor.

TB11.5 The tester shall verify that the loading of private and secret keys uses one or more of the following methods:

- a) When entering plain-text secret keys through the keypad, they must be entered as two or more components and require the use of at least two passwords/PINs. The passwords must be entered through the keypad or else conveyed encrypted into the device. These passwords/PINs must either be unique per device (and per custodian), except by chance, or if vendor default, they are pre-expired and force a change upon initial use. Passwords/PINs that are unique per device can be made optionally changeable by the acquirer, but this is not required. Passwords/PINs are at least five characters.

Entry of key components without the use of at least two separate passwords/PINs results in the zeroization of pre-existing secret keys, i.e., the invoking of the key loading function/command causes the zeroization prior to the actual loading of the new key. For devices supporting multiple key hierarchies (e.g., multi-acquirer devices), only the hierarchy (specific TMK and working keys) associated with the key being loaded must be zeroized.

- b) For injecting plain-text secret or private keys from a key loader (which has to be some type of secure cryptographic device), either the key loader or the PED or both must require two or more PINs/passwords before injecting the plain-text key into the PED. (**Note:** *This may be the entire key—if components, each component requires a separate password.*) These passwords are entered directly through the keypad of the applicable device or are conveyed encrypted into the device and must be at least five characters in length. These passwords/PINs must either be unique per device (and per custodian), except by chance, or if vendor default, they are pre-expired and force a change upon initial use. Plain-text keys or their components are never permitted over a network connection.

Injection of plain-text secret keys or their components where the PED does not itself require the use of at least two PINs/passwords for injection results in the zeroization of pre-existing secret keys. For devices supporting multiple key hierarchies (e.g., multi-acquirer devices), only the hierarchy (specific TMK and working keys) associated with the key being loaded must be zeroized.

- c) For encrypted values injected into the PED, either from a key loader or from a network host, or via loading through the keypad, the ability of the PED to successfully decrypt the value and use it is sufficient. In this case, the loading of the key-encipherment key would have been done under dual control, e.g., in examples a) and b) above.
- d) Remote key-loading techniques using public key methods requires compliance with PCI defined criteria for key sizes and mutual authentication between host and PED. For PEDs generating their own key values, the generation process must meet the criteria defined in the random number appendix of the DTRs and validation that appropriate key sizes are used. The protocol must meet the criteria stipulated in Appendix A of the *PCI PIN Security Requirements*.

TB11.6 If a public key technique for the distribution of symmetric secret keys is used, it must:

- a) Use public and private key lengths that are deemed acceptable for the algorithm in question (e.g., 1024-bits minimum for RSA, see also DTR A7.3).
- b) Use key-generation techniques that meet the current ANSI and ISO standards for the algorithm in question.
- c) Provide for mutual device authentication for both the host and the PED, including assurance to the host that the PED actually has (or actually can) compute the session key and that no other entity other than the PED specifically identified can possibly compute the session key.

The following are the minimum key sizes and parameters for the algorithm(s) in question that must be used for key transport, exchange or establishment:

Algorithm	DES	RSA	Elliptic Curve	DSA
Minimum key size in number of bits	112	1024	160	1024/160

DES refers to TDES keys with non-parity bits. The RSA key size refers to the size of the modulus. The Elliptic Curve key size refers to the minimum order of the base point on the elliptic curve; this order should be slightly smaller than the field size. The DSA key sizes refer to the size of the modulus and the minimum size of a large subgroup.

AES may also be used with a key size of at least 128 bits.

For Diffie-Hellman implementations:

- a) Entities must securely generate and distribute the system-wide parameters: generator g , prime number p and parameter q , the large prime factor of $(p - 1)$. As described in ANSI X9.42, parameter p must be at least 1024 bits long, and parameter q must be at least 160 bits long. Each entity generates a private key x and a public key y using the domain parameters (p, q, g) . Each private key shall be statistically unique, unpredictable, and created using an approved random number generator as described in this document.
- b) Entities must authenticate the Diffie-Hellman public keys using either DSA, a certificate, or a symmetric MAC (based on TDES – see *ISO 16609 - Banking -- Requirements for message authentication using symmetric techniques*).

TB11.7 The tester shall determine from vendor documentation the cryptographic keys present or ever used by the device and list the details in a key summary table. An example of key types in such a table is:

Key Name	Purpose/Usage	Algorithm	Size (Bits)	Generated By:	Form Factor Loaded to Device In	Number of Available Key Slots (Registers)	Unique per device/acquirer/vendor-specific/other (describe)
Terminal Master Key (TMK)	Encryption of working keys (PEK, MAC) for down-line transmission to the device	TDES	128	Acquirer	2 or 3 plain-text components	One	Device
MAC Key	Message authentication	TDES, DES	128 or 64	Acquirer	Enciphered under the TMK	Two	Device
PIN-encryption Key (PEK)	PIN Encipherment for online PIN	TDES, DES	128 or 64	Acquirer	Enciphered under the TMK	Two	Device
Fixed Key	PIN Encipherment for online	TDES, DES	128 or 64	Acquirer	2 or 3 plain-text components	One	Device
IPEK	Initial DUKPT Key	TDES	128	Acquirer	Plain-text from Key Injection Device	One	Device
DUKPT PEKs (Future Keys Register)	PIN Encipherment for online PIN	TDES	128	Acquirer	Derived originally from IPEK	Up to 21 Future Keys	Device
KPT	PIN Encipherment Between PED and IC card reader	TDES	128	Acquirer	2 or 3 plain-text components	One	Device
Payment Scheme (Certification Authority) Public Keys	Authentication of issuer key from IC card.	RSA	Varies	Payment Schemes	EMV Public Key Certificate	Six per payment schemes – three payment schemes	Payment Scheme-specific
Manufacturer Authentication Root or Sub-CA Public Key	Authentication of firmware updates as part of a certificate chain to the manufacturer root key	RSA	2048	Manufacturer	Certificate signed with manufacturer's private key	One	Vendor-specific
Manufacturer Authentication Root or Sub-CA Public Key	Authentication of acquirer-signed applications as part of a certificate chain to the manufacturer root key	RSA	2048	Manufacturer	Certificate signed with manufacturer's private key	One	Vendor-specific
Acquirers Application Public Authentication Key	Authentication of acquirer-signed applications as part of certificate chain to manufacturer root key	RSA	2048	Acquirer	Public Key Certificate signed by manufacturer root or sub-CA private key	One	Acquirer
Manufacturer Authentication Root or Sub-CA Private Key	Signing firmware updates or the acquirer application signing public key	RSA	2048	Manufacturer	Managed at manufacturer's secure facility under dual control	One	Vendor-specific
Acquirer's Application Private Authentication Key	Signing application updates	RSA	2048	Acquirer	Managed at acquirer's secure facility under dual control	One	Acquirer

- TB11.8** The tester shall determine from vendor documentation all storage and usage locations for each key e.g., ROM, external RAM, EPROM, processor chip, etc and list the details in a key summary table.
- TB11.9** The tester shall determine from vendor documentation how (e.g., active or passive erasure) each key is destroyed for all device states (power-on, power-off, sleep mode) and list the details in a key summary table.

DTR B12 Encryption Algorithm Test

The PIN-encryption technique implemented in the PED is a technique included in ISO 9564.

- TB12.1** The tester shall examine the response to Section B12 of the *PCI POS PED Evaluation Vendor Questionnaire* relating to the TDES PIN-encryption implementation in the PED, for consistency and compliance with ISO 9564.
- TB12.2** The tester shall examine any additional documentation (i.e., specifications, schematics, block diagrams, etc.) that contains information that relates to the PIN-encryption technique implemented in the PED.

Note: The PED must support at least one of the following key-management techniques using TDES as described in ANSI X9.24 and ANSI X9.52:

- a) DUKPT
- b) Fixed
- c) Master/Session

The PED must also support at least one of the following PIN Block Formats if supporting online PIN Entry:

- a) ISO Format 0
- b) ISO Format 1
- c) ISO Format 3

For offline PIN:

- a) The PIN that is submitted by the IC reader to the IC shall be contained in a PIN block conforming to ISO Format 2 PIN block. This applies whether the PIN is submitted in plain text or enciphered using an encipherment key of the IC.
- b) Where the IC Card reader is not integrated into the PED, and PINs are enciphered only for transmission between the PIN entry device and the IC reader, the PED shall use one of the PIN block formats specified in ISO 9564. Where ISO Format 2 PIN blocks are used, a unique key per transaction method in accordance with ISO 11568 shall be used. Format 2 shall only be used in connection with either offline PIN verification or PIN change operations in connection with ICC environments.

- TB12.3** The tester shall perform a transaction with a known encryption key. The tester shall use this key to create an encrypted PIN block with a test system, using the Primary Account Number, and PIN with the format (the format must be either ISO format 0, 1 or 3, specified by the vendor. The corresponding encrypted PIN block shall be generated by the PED with a simulated transaction. If both encrypted PIN blocks are identical, the PED is using the TDES algorithm and the specified format for encryption.

DTR B13 Encryption or Decryption of Arbitrary Data Within the Device

It is not possible to encrypt or decrypt any arbitrary data using any PIN-encrypting key or key-encrypting key contained in the PED. The PED must enforce that data keys, key-encipherment keys, and PIN-encryption keys have different values.

Guidance

PIN-encryption keys shall only be used to encrypt PIN data. Key-encrypting keys shall only be used to encrypt keys. PIN keys shall never be used to encrypt keys. Key-encrypting keys shall never be used to encrypt PIN data.

The intent of the requirement is to help ensure that these keys are not intentionally used for multiple purposes. Thus the integrity check applies when the device is initially loaded with these keys. Session keys (working keys such as PIN, Data, and MAC keys) or key-encipherment keys subsequently downloaded during normal operations must be randomly generated, and there should only be collisions (duplication) by chance.

This is not intended to require that the device compare keys across different key hierarchies associated with different acquirers.

- TB13.1** The tester shall examine the response to Section B13 of the *PCI POS PED Evaluation Vendor Questionnaire* relating to encryption and decryption of arbitrary data, for consistency.
- TB13.2** The tester shall examine any additional documentation such as the API Programmer's guide, submitted by the vendor to verify that it supports vendor responses.
- TB13.3** The tester shall verify the following:
- a) PIN-encryption keys are only used to encrypt PIN data.
 - b) Key-encrypting keys are only used to encrypt keys.
 - c) PIN keys are never used to encrypt keys.
 - d) Key-encrypting keys are never used to encrypt PIN data.
- TB13.4** The tester shall verify by testing, that the PED enforces that data keys, key-encipherment keys and PIN-encryption keys have different values, e.g. by attempting to load keys of different type with effectively the same value.

DTR B14 Clear-Text Key Security

There is no mechanism in the PED that would allow the outputting of a private or secret clear-text key or clear-text PIN, the encryption of a key or PIN under a key that might itself be disclosed, or the transfer of a clear-text key from a component of high security into a component of lesser security.

Guidance

Clear-text secret and private keys and clear-text PINs must not exist in unprotected environments.

- TB14.1** The tester shall examine the response to Section B14 of the *PCI POS PED Evaluation Vendor Questionnaire* relating to the output of clear-text keys and the protection of the PIN for consistency. The clear-text PIN must never exist in an unprotected environment.
- TB14.2** The tester shall examine the response to Section B14 of the *PCI POS PED Evaluation Vendor Questionnaire* relating to encryption of a key or PIN under a key that might itself be disclosed, for consistency.
- TB14.3** The tester shall examine the response to Section B14 of the *PCI POS PED Evaluation Vendor Questionnaire* relating to the transfer of a key from a high-security component to a lower-security component, for consistency.
- TB14.4** The tester shall examine any additional documentation (i.e., API Programmer's guide, specifications, block diagrams, etc.) that contains information that relates to any of the aforementioned to determine if it supports the assertions made by the vendor.

DTR B15 Transaction Controls

The entry of any other transaction data must be separate from the PIN entry process, avoiding the accidental display of a cardholder PIN on the PED display. If other data and the PIN are entered on the same keypad, the other data entry and the PIN entry shall be clearly separate operations.

- TB15.1** The tester shall examine the response to Section B15 of the *PCI POS PED Evaluation Vendor Questionnaire* and the response to Requirement B15 of the *PCI POS PED Security Requirements* for consistency relevant to B15.
- TB15.2** The tester shall examine any relevant documentation to verify that the prompt for and entry of the PIN are distinctly separate from all other operations.
- TB15.3** The tester shall perform a simulated transaction to verify that the prompt for PIN entry is distinctly separate from all other operations such as the display of the transaction amount. When prompting for PIN entry, the device must not accept any other data inputs. Control inputs such as “Yes,” “OK,” “Cancel,” or “No” are acceptable.

Online Derived Test Requirements

DTR C1 Key Substitution

If the PED can hold multiple PIN-encryption keys and the key to be used to encrypt the PIN can be externally selected, then the PED prohibits unauthorized key replacement and key misuse.

Guidance

The term “externally selected” means: selected by an interface function to the PED component that performs the PIN encryption. Both human interfaces and command interfaces are considered, and both direct and indirect.

External selection also includes interference with or manipulation of the data by which the PED selects the key to be used.

Keys may be selected through the PED keypad, or commands sent from another device such as an electronic cash register. Any commands sent from another device must be cryptographically authenticated to protect against man-in-the-middle and replay attacks,

C1 is not applicable to devices that do not include commands for external key selection, or cannot hold multiple key hierarchies related to PIN encryption.

If an application can select keys from multiple key hierarchies, the PED must enforce authentication of commands used for external key selection. If the PED only allows an application to select keys from a single hierarchy, then command authentication is not required.

- TC1.1** The tester shall examine the response to Section C1 of the *PCI POS PED Evaluation Vendor Questionnaire* relating to multiple keys and unauthorized key replacement and key misuse, for consistency.
- TC1.2** The tester shall examine any additional documentation such as a user’s manual or the API Programmer’s guide submitted by the vendor to verify that it supports vendor responses.

Offline Derived Test Requirements

DTR D1 Penetration Protection

It is not feasible to penetrate the ICC reader to make any additions, substitutions, or modifications to either the ICC reader's hardware or software, in order to determine or modify any sensitive data, without requiring an attack potential of at least 16.

- TD1.1** The tester shall examine the vendor's response to Section D1 of the *PCI POS PED Evaluation Vendor Questionnaire* and the response to Requirement D1 of the *PCI POS PED Security Requirements* for consistency relevant to D1.
- TD1.2** The tester shall examine any relevant documentation, such as assembly drawings, submitted by the vendor to verify that it supports the vendor responses.
- TD1.3** The tester shall examine the device to verify that the asserted protections exist and conform to the descriptions provided by the vendor in documentation. This will include disassembly of the test unit when necessary.
- TD1.4** The tester shall perform tests to verify that the protections of the device are such that the hardware and software cannot be tampered without requiring an attack potential of at least 16. The attack potential calculation shall be based on the scheme depicted in Appendix B.

The tester may perform any test needed to validate the attack scenario. The tester will use his or her own judgment in determining the appropriate tests and whether the attack will be performed in its entirety or in part to verify the theory.

DTR D2.1 ICC Reader Slot Geometry

The slot of the ICC reader into which the IC card is inserted does not have sufficient space to hold a PIN-disclosing “bug” when a card is inserted, nor can it feasibly be enlarged to provide space for a PIN-disclosing bug. It is not possible for both an ICC card and any other foreign object to reside within the card-insertion slot.

Guidance

The attack potential of the evaluation shall be commensurate with that of A1, i.e., the attack potential shall not be less than 25.

The objective of D2 is to guard against a PIN-disclosing bug being inserted into the PED through the card slot. The volume of space accessible via the card slot that could be utilized by an attacker can vary with the geometry of the space and attack methods. For this reason, the requirement does not prohibit a specific volume. Rather, the feasibility of effective bug placement is to be considered when assessing D2 compliance. Examples of these considerations are:

- *Contact points must be present for the bug to connect to;*
- *The bug and wires must not obstruct normal operation;*
- *The placement of the bug must not cause tamper evidence that would be noticed by a typical cardholder.*

D2 is written with the understanding that the opening (slot) is a potential point of attack for the insertion of a tapping mechanism. Space accessible via the ICC card slot large enough to conceal a PIN-disclosing bug is not allowed. There must not be space accessible via the card slot large enough to conceal an ICC chip and small battery.

TD2.1.1 The tester shall examine the vendor’s response to Section D2.1 of the *PCI POS PED Evaluation Vendor Questionnaire* and the response to Requirement D2.1 of the *PCI POS PED Security Requirements* for consistency relevant to D2.1.

TD2.1.2 The tester shall examine any relevant documentation (such as assembly drawings) submitted by the vendor to verify that it supports the vendor responses.

TD2.1.3 The tester shall examine the ICC reader slot to verify that:

- a) The slot does not have sufficient space to hold a PIN-disclosing bug when a card is inserted.
- b) The slot cannot feasibly be enlarged to provide space for a PIN-disclosing bug. The tester will develop attack scenarios where necessary.
- c) It is not possible for both an ICC and any other foreign object to reside within the card-insertion slot. For instance, it will be verified that the slot is not large enough to hold more than one card.

This will include disassembly of the test unit when necessary. Measurements of spaces within the slot will be made when relevant.

TD2.1.4 The tester shall develop an attack scenario to enlarge the slot. The tester will use his or her experience to determine what type of testing is necessary to determine the attack feasibility.

TD2.1.5 The tester shall perform a simulated transaction whilst inserting two cards into the slot. If it is possible to insert two cards and perform the transaction, then the device does not comply with this requirement

DTR D2.2 ICC Reader Slot Geometry

The opening for the insertion of the IC card is in full view of the cardholder prior to card insertion so that any untoward obstructions or suspicious objects at the opening are detectable.

- TD2.2.1** The tester shall examine the vendor's response to Section D2.2 of the *PCI POS PED Evaluation Vendor Questionnaire* and the response to Requirement D2.2 of the *PCI POS PED Security Requirements* for consistency relevant to D2.2.
- TD2.2.2** The tester shall examine a test unit to verify vendor assertions that the ICC reader's slot is in full view of the cardholder so that any untoward obstructions or suspicious objects at the opening are detectable. The construction of the device should be such that the entire slot opening is in full view of the cardholder prior to card insertion.

DTR D3 ICC Reader Construction (Wires)

The ICC reader is constructed so that wires running out of the slot of the ICC reader to a recorder or a transmitter (an external bug) can be observed by the cardholder.

- TD3.1** The tester shall examine the vendor's response to Section D3 of the *PCI POS PED Evaluation Vendor Questionnaire* and the response to Requirement D3 of the *PCI POS PED Security Requirements* for consistency relevant to D3.
- TD3.2** The tester shall examine a test unit to verify vendor assertions that the ICC reader is constructed so that wires running out of the slot can be observed by the cardholder. The reader enclosure shall not have any seams or channels around the slot that would allow the concealment of wires.

DTR D4 PIN Protection During Transmission Between PED and ICC Reader

D4.1 *If the PED and the ICC reader are not integrated into the same secure module, and the cardholder verification method (i.e., the ICC requires) is determined to be an enciphered PIN, then the PIN block shall be enciphered between the PED and the ICC reader using either an authenticated encipherment key of the ICC, or in accordance with ISO 9564.*

Guidance

DTRs A1 and D1 verify the physical protections relevant to DTR D4.

It is not acceptable to answer “No” or “N/A” to any option under D4 that is supported by the PED. As part of this test procedure, the evaluator must verify that the vendor has answered “Yes” to all methods of PIN transmission between the PED and the ICC reader that are supported by the PED.

D4 requires that the following be met:

- *A plain-text PIN from the PED to the ICC reader is never permitted except when the PED and ICC reader are integrated into the same secure module.*
- *When the cardholder verification method is determined to be an enciphered PIN, the encipherment must occur within the PED itself or a secure component of the terminal. The PIN must be enciphered in accordance with ISO 9564 for secure transport between the PED and the secure component.*
- *Both D4.1 and D4.2 must be complied with for any non-integrated device supporting offline PIN entry.*

TD4.1.1 The tester shall examine the vendor’s response to Section D4 of the *PCI POS PED Evaluation Vendor Questionnaire* and the response to Requirement D4 of the *PCI POS PED Security Requirements* for consistency relevant to D4.1.

TD4.1.2 The tester shall test the device to determine that the PIN is enciphered between the PED and the ICC reader using one of the following:

- a) An authenticated encipherment key of the ICC
- b) Triple-DES

Tests that may be performed include: performing a simulated transaction so that PIN data can be captured and analyzed, using a special function of the PED that allows a user to determine the methods of encryption used, or using test tools (such as ICC emulators) and software to determine the method of encipherment. The tester may require the vendor to supply special hardware and software to facilitate this test, or they can use their own hardware and test tools.

D4.2 *If the PED and the ICC reader are not integrated into the same secure module, and the cardholder verification method is determined to be a plain-text PIN, then the PIN block shall be enciphered from the PED to the ICC reader (the ICC reader will then decipher the PIN for transmission in plain-text to the ICC) in accordance with ISO 9564.*

Guidance

DTRs A1 and D1 verify the physical protections relevant to DTR D4.

It is not acceptable to answer “No” or “N/A” to any option under D4 that is supported by the PED. As part of this test procedure, the evaluator must verify that the vendor has answered “Yes” to all methods of PIN transmission between the PED and the ICC reader that are supported by the UPT.

A plain-text PIN from the PED to the ICC reader is never permitted except when the PED and ICC reader are integrated into the same secure module.

Both D4.1 and D4.2 must be complied with for any non-integrated device supporting offline PIN entry.

TD4.2.1 The tester shall examine the vendor’s response to Section D4 of the *PCI POS PED Evaluation Vendor Questionnaire* and the response to Requirement D4 of the *PCI POS PED Security Requirements* for consistency relevant to D4.2.

TD4.2.2 The tester shall test the device to determine that the PIN is enciphered between the PED and the ICC reader in accordance with ISO 9564.

Tests that may be performed include: performing a simulated transaction so that PIN data can be captured and analyzed, using a special function of the PED that allows a user to determine the methods of encryption used, or using test tools (such as ICC reader emulators) and software to determine the method of encipherment. The tester may require the vendor to supply special hardware and software to facilitate this test, or they can use their own hardware and test tools.

D4.3. *If the PED and ICC reader are integrated into the same secure module, and the cardholder verification method is determined to be an enciphered PIN, then the PIN shall be enciphered using an authenticated encipherment key of the ICC.*

Guidance

DTRs A1 and D1 verify the physical protections relevant to DTR D4.

It is not acceptable to answer “No” or “N/A” to any option under D4 that is supported by the PED. As part of this test procedure, the evaluator must verify that the vendor has answered “Yes” to all methods of PIN transmission between the PED and the ICC reader that are supported by the PED.

Both D4.3 and D4.4 must be complied with for any integrated device supporting offline PIN entry.

TD4.3.1 The tester shall examine the vendor’s response to Section D4 of the *PCI POS PED Evaluation Vendor Questionnaire* and the response to Requirement D1 of the *PCI POS PED Security Requirements* for consistency relevant to D4.3

TD4.3.2 The tester shall perform a transaction and capture the encrypted PIN block between the PED and card reader. The tester may require the vendor to supply special hardware and software to facilitate this test, or they can use their own hardware and test tools.

D4.4 *If the PED and ICC reader are integrated into the same secure module, and the cardholder verification method is determined to be a plain-text PIN, then encipherment is not required if the PIN block is transmitted wholly through a protected environment (as defined in ISO 9564). If the plain-text PIN is transmitted to the ICC reader through an unprotected environment, then the PIN block shall be enciphered in accordance with ISO 9564.*

Guidance

DTRs A1 and D1 verify the physical protections relevant to DTR D4.

It is not acceptable to answer “No” or “N/A” to any option under D4 that is supported by the PED. As part of this test procedure, the evaluator must verify that the vendor has answered “Yes” to all methods of PIN transmission between the PED and the ICC reader that are supported by the PED.

Both D4.3 and D4.4 must be complied with for any integrated device supporting offline PIN entry.

- TD4.4.1** The tester shall examine the vendor’s response to Section D4 of the *PCI POS PED Evaluation Vendor Questionnaire* and the response to Requirement D4 of the *PCI POS PED Security Requirements* for consistency relevant to D4.4.
- TD4.4.2** The tester shall verify that the plain-text PIN is transmitted wholly through a protected environment. This will be accomplished by examining the PED to determine that its tamper-detection protections are as specified in ISO 9564 **or**
- TD4.4.3** If the PIN is transmitted to the ICC reader through an unprotected environment, then the tester shall perform a transaction and capture the encrypted PIN block between the PED and card reader to verify that the PIN block is enciphered in accordance with ISO 9564. The tester may require the vendor to supply special hardware and software to facilitate this test, or they can use their own hardware and test tools.




Figure A3: Sample PED, side view

The angles in the figures above are defined as follows:

- α : Angle between the horizontal plane through the '5' key and a virtual line which connects the '5' key and an observer's eye
- β : Horizontal position of an observer relative to the PED user's position
- γ : Horizontal range which is to be covered by the privacy screen
- δ : Angle between the keypad plane and the horizontal plane

Design rules:

1. The requirements differentiate between a handheld device, an attended device or an unattended device. It must be clearly stated what the intended use of the device is.
2. A handheld device must by weight, size, and shape encourage its handheld operation. The criteria are:
 - a) Weight should be 500 grams or less,
 - b) Width at the '5' key should not be more than three (3) inches or 7.62 cm
 - c) Sum of width and height at the '5' key should not be more than four (4) inches or 10.16 cm, and
 - d) Keypad length should not be more than four (4) inches or 10.16 cm.

If the device's properties clearly fall outside these ranges, it will not be accepted as a handheld device for purposes of this test. A handheld device must by its size and case shape encourage its handheld use. Being small may not be sufficient. Even if the device is small, if the standing and/or mounting support indicate that the PED is to be installed on a swivel arm or a similar apparatus, it will be considered as a desktop device.

3. The privacy screen of the device is to be placed horizontally or slightly tilted ($0 \leq \delta \leq 45^\circ$) and shall provide the following protection angles:

Horizontal angle β	Remark	Vertical angle α
$315^\circ \leq \beta \leq 45^\circ$:	Within this range of β the cardholder deters an observer with her/his body.	N/A
$45^\circ \leq \beta \leq 90^\circ$ $270^\circ \leq \beta \leq 315^\circ$:	Within these ranges visual observation of the keypad is partially blocked by the cardholder. The protection angle α shall be at least 35° . Please note that the front end of the privacy screen must be higher if the PED is tilted.	$\alpha \geq 35^\circ$
$90^\circ \leq \beta \leq 270^\circ$:	The protection angle shall be at least 40° . The display side of the privacy screen may be lowered as the PED is tilted against the horizontal plane.	$\alpha \geq 40^\circ$

The vertical angles given in the table above are with respect to the horizontal plane (see figure above). If by design of the PED the keypad is tilted toward the cardholder, the backside of the privacy screen may be lower.

4. If the device is to be placed vertically or tilted by 45° and more, the requirements under Step 3 will apply accordingly, using the vertical plane instead of the horizontal plane as the reference for the angle α .
5. The protection is based on viewing angles and does not imply a specific technical implementation like physical shields. If the keypad is implemented as a touch screen, the viewing barrier may be implemented by polarizers (e.g., as film on the touch screen surface), which deter the observation from the sides. The up (clerk) side must be implemented as a physical shield.

A.2 Privacy Screen Design Criteria to be Met by the PED's Installed Environment

The following techniques can be employed to provide for effective screening of the PIN-entry keypad during the PIN entry process. These methods would typically be used in combination, though in some cases a method might be used singly.

Note: This option does not preclude the use of privacy mechanisms as defined in A1, but allows less restrictive physical mechanisms, e.g., $\alpha \geq 20^\circ$.

Positioning of terminal on the check-stand in such way as to make visual observation of the PIN-entry process infeasible. Examples include:

- Visual shields designed into the check-stand. The shields may be solely for shielding purposes, or may be part of the general check-stand design, e.g., used as selling area.
- Position the PED so that it is angled in such a way to make PIN spying difficult.
- Installing PED on an adjustable stand that allows consumers to swivel the terminal sideways and/or tilt it forwards/backwards to a position that makes visual observation of the PIN-entry process difficult.
- Positioning of in-store security cameras such that the PIN-entry keypad is not visible.
- Instructing the cardholder regarding safe PIN-entry. This can be done with a combination of
 - Signage on the PED
 - Prompts on the display, possibly with a "click-through" screen
 - Potentially literature at the point of sale
 - A logo for safe PIN-entry process

Other methods are possible as well. The above are examples of some of the methods a vendor can propose to protect PINs during PIN entry. The vendor must provide adequate techniques in the PED documentation and also include a matrix showing which techniques should be used to protect against specific observation corridors. An example matrix follows:

Table A1: Sample Matrix of Observation Corridors and PIN Protection Methods

Method	Observation Corridors				
	Cashier	Customers in Queue	Customers Elsewhere	On-Site Cameras	Remote Cameras
PED Stand A	M	H	L	L	L
PED Stand B	H	H	H	L	M
Check-Stand A	L	M	M	L	H
Check-Stand B	H	H	M	H	H
Customer Instruction	H*	H*	H*	H*	H*

* Customer Instruction methods are less repeatable and therefore should be used in combination with other methods.
L = low, M = medium, H = high.

The matrix must show the purchaser of the PED, the types of methods they may use to protect their customers' PINs. The appropriate methods would be selected in order to ensure an appropriate level of protection from all observation corridors.

Appendix B: Attack Potential Formula (Adopted from JIL)

Calculating Attack Potentials

This section examines the factors that determine attack potentials and provides some guidelines to help removing some of the subjectivity from this aspect of the evaluation process. This approach should be adopted unless the evaluator determines that it would be inappropriate, in which case a rationale is required to justify the validity of the alternative approach.

Identification and Exploitation

For an attacker wanting to exploit a vulnerability, the vulnerability must first be identified. This may appear to be a trivial separation, but it is an important one. To illustrate this, first consider a vulnerability that is uncovered following months of analysis by an expert, and a simple attack method published on the Internet. Compare this to a vulnerability that is well known but requires enormous expenditure of time and resources to exploit. Of course, factors such as time need to be treated differently in these cases.

Factors to be Considered

The following factors should be considered for the analysis of the attack potentials required to exploit vulnerability:

1. Identification

- a) Attack time for the various levels of expertise;
- b) Potential to acquire the required knowledge of the POS PED's design and operation;
- c) Potential for the access to the POS PED;
- d) Equipment required like instruments, components, IT hardware, software required for the analysis;
- e) POS PED specific spare components.

2. Exploitation

- a) Attack time for the various levels of expertise;
- b) Potential to acquire the required knowledge of the POS PED's design and operation;
- c) Potential for the access to the POS PED;
- d) Equipment required like instruments, components, IT hardware, software required for the analysis;
- e) POS PED specific spare components.

In many cases these factors don't depend on each other but might be substituted for each other in varying degrees. For example, expertise or hardware/software can be a substitute for time. A discussion of these factors follows.

The **attack time** is given in the time in hours taken by an attacker to identify or exploit an attack. If the attack consists of several steps, the attack time can be determined and added to achieve a total attack time for each of these steps. Actual labor time has to be used instead of time expired as long as there is not a minimum attack time enforced by the attack method applied (for instance, the time needed for performing a side channel analysis or the time needed for an epoxy to harden). In those case where attendance is not required during part of the attack time, the attack time is to be taken as expired time divided by 3.

For purposes of calculating time, a day = 8 hours; a week = 40 hours; and a month = 180 hours.

Expertise refers to the level of generic knowledge of the application area or product type (e.g., Unix operation systems, Internet protocols). Identified levels are as follows:

- a) **Experts** are familiar with the underlying algorithms, protocols, hardware, structures, etc. implemented in the product or system type and the principles and concepts of security employed;
- b) **Proficient** persons are knowledgeable in that they are familiar with the security behavior of the product;
- c) **Laymen** are unknowledgeable compared to experts or proficient persons, with no particular expertise.

If proficient expertise on various areas of technology is required for an attack, e.g., on electrical engineering and cryptography, an expert level of expertise can be assumed.

The level of **Multiple Experts** allows for a situation where an **Expert** level of knowledge, in multiple areas of technology, is required for an attack. The use of **Multiple Experts** must concern fields that are strictly different, e.g. HW manipulation and cryptography. The **Multiple Experts** level pertains to fields of discipline, not the actual number of individuals required for an attack. Strong justification must be provided for the use of the **Multiple Experts** level.

Knowledge of the POS PED refers to obtaining specific expertise in relation to the POS PED. This is different from generic expertise but not unrelated to it. Identified levels are as follows:

- a) **Public information** about the POS PED (or no information): Information is considered public if it can be easily obtained by anyone (e.g., from the Internet) or if it is provided by the vendor to any customer.
- b) **Restricted information** concerning the POS PED (e.g., as gained from vendor technical specifications): Information is considered restricted if it is distributed on request and the distribution is registered (e.g., like the *PCI POS PED DTRs*).
- c) **Sensitive information** about the POS PED (e.g., knowledge of internal design, which may have to be obtained by “social engineering” or exhaustive reverse engineering).

Care should be taken here to distinguish between information required to identify the vulnerability and the information required to exploit it, especially in the area of sensitive information. Requiring sensitive information for exploitation would be unusual.

Specialist expertise and knowledge of the POS PED are concerned with the information required for persons to be able to attack a POS PED. There is an implicit relationship between an attacker’s expertise and the ability to effectively make use of equipment in an attack. The weaker the attacker’s expertise, the lower the potential to effectively use equipment. Likewise, the greater the expertise, the greater the potential for equipment to be used in the attack. Although implicit, this relationship between expertise and the use of equipment does not always apply—for instance, when environmental measures prevent an expert attacker’s use of equipment; or when, through the efforts of others, attack tools requiring little expertise for effective use are created and freely distributed (e.g., via the Internet).

Access to the POS PED is also an important factor. It is assumed here that the POS PED would be purchased or otherwise obtained by the attacker and that beside other factors there’s no time limit in analyzing or modifying the POS PED. Differences are defined in the status and functionality of the device to be analyzed/tested. **Mechanical samples** are non-functional and are used merely to study the mechanical design or for supplying spare parts. **Functional samples without working keys** might be used for the logical and electrical behavior of the device but aren’t loaded with working keys and are therefore not functional within a payment network or with real payment cards. Such devices might be regularly purchased. **Functional samples with working keys** are fully functional devices, which might be used to verify an attack method or to actually perform an attack. If more than one sample is needed in any category, instead of multiplying the points by the number of samples, the following factors must be used:

Table 1: Multiple Samples Factors

Number of Devices	Factor
1	1
2	1.5
3-4	2
5-10	4
>10	5

Equipment refers to the equipment that is required to identify or exploit vulnerability.

- a) **Standard equipment** is equipment that is readily available to the attacker, either for the identification of vulnerability or for an attack. This equipment can be readily obtained—e.g., at a nearby store or downloaded from the Internet. The equipment might consist of simple attack scripts, personal computers, card readers, pattern generators, simple optical microscopes, power supplies, or simple mechanical tools.
- b) **Specialized equipment** isn't readily available to the attacker, but could be acquired without undue effort. This could include purchase of moderate amounts of equipment (e.g., dedicated electronic cards, specialized test bench, protocol analyzers, oscilloscopes, microprobe workstation, chemical workbench, precise milling machines, etc.) or development of more extensive attack scripts or programs.
- c) **Bespoke equipment** is not readily available to the public as it might need to be specially produced (e.g., very sophisticated software) or because the equipment is so specialized that its distribution is controlled, possibly even restricted. Alternatively, the equipment may be very expensive (e.g., Focused Ion Beam, Scanning Electron Microscope, and Abrasive Laser Equipment). Bespoke equipment, which can be rented, might have to be treated as specialized equipment. Software that has been developed during the identification phase is considered as bespoke equipment; it must not additionally be considered for in the exploitation phase.

Parts refer to components required to hide the signs of an attack; to otherwise replace components that have been broken during an attack, like a case part, a display or a printer; to created data-monitoring or communicating bug; or otherwise are needed to perform the attack. If the same part may be used for identification and exploitation, it must only be accounted for once.

- a) **Standard parts** are readily available to the attacker, either by purchasing them from a supply store or by re-using parts from a mechanical sample of the same device.
- b) **Specialized parts** are not readily available to the attacker but could be acquired without undue effort. These might be parts that can be ordered from the stock but require long delivery time or a certain minimum component count for purchase.
- c) **Bespoke parts** are not readily available and have to be specifically manufactured. It is very unlikely that an attack requires bespoke spare parts.

Multiple Devices

It is intended that the Identification phase of an attack calculation accounts for testing and development of an attack, such that the Exploitation phase of an attack is likely be successful. PCI does not intend multiple devices to be used during the attack phase to account for the probability of success. If multiple devices are included as part of an attack, strong justification must be provided. In all cases, the valid attack scenario(s) with the lowest attack potentials must be presented.

An Approach to Calculation

The above section identifies the factors to be considered. The table below gives guidelines for the individual factors. When a factor falls close to a boundary, the evaluator should consider use of an intermediate value to those in the table.

For a given attack it might be necessary to make several passes through the table for different attack scenarios (e.g., trading off expertise for time or equipment). The lowest value obtained for these passes should be retained. In the case of a vulnerability that has been identified and is in the public domain, the identifying values should be selected for an attacker to uncover that attack scenario in the public domain, rather than to initially identify it.

Table 2: Attack Potential Factors

Factor	Range	Identification Phase	Exploitation Phase
Attack time	< 1 hour	0	0
	≤ 1 day	1	2
	≤ 1 week	2	3
	≤ 1 month	3	4
	> 1 month	5	7
Expertise	Layman	0	0
	Proficient	1	1
	Expert	2	3
	Multiple Expert	5	6
Knowledge of the POS PED	Public	0	0
	Restricted	2	2
	Sensitive	3	4
Access to the POS PED per unit required for the attack. <i>Note: If more than one unit is required, the values must be multiplied by the factors given above.</i>	Mechanical sample	1	1
	Functional samples without working keys	2	2
	Functional sample with working keys and software	4	4
Equipment required for the attack	None	0	0
	Standard	1	2
	Specialized	3	4
	Bespoke	5	6
Specific parts required	None	0	0
	Standard	1	1
	Specialized	2	2
	Bespoke	4	4

An approach such as this cannot take account of every circumstance or factor but should give a better indication of the attack potential. Other factors, such as the reliance on unlikely chance occurrences or the likelihood of detection before an attack can be completed, are not included in the basic model but can be used by an evaluator as justification for a rating other than those that the basic model might indicate.

First Attack Example

The attack aims to insert a PIN-disclosing bug into a PED. The bug is placed at a position in the device where the PIN is handled in clear, for instance at the keypad or at the ICC reader interface. It is assumed that such an attack is possible. A generic attack consists of the following steps:

1. Reverse-engineer the device and develop the attack models. This step requires professional knowledge of electronic engineering and the capability to perform the mechanical and electronic test required. The modules will break during that phase. It is assumed that the device is protected by tamper-response circuits, which prevent undetected opening of the device, but the points of interest are not covered by a tamper-responsive envelope.
2. The tamper-detection measures have to be deactivated.
3. A PIN-disclosing bug is placed into the PED (Exploitation Phase).
4. The sensitive data is collected from the PED.

We assume that more than one sample of the device is needed for the identification phase but only the target device is required for the exploitation phase of the attack. The skill level required is Expert. The same standard equipment is used and required at identification and exploitation time. The following table consists of references to the attack phases.

Table 3: Attack Potential for Inserting a PIN-Disclosing Bug

Aspect	Identifying Value		Exploiting Value	
Attack time	≤ 1 week	2	≤ 1 day	2
Expertise	Expert	2	Expert	3
Knowledge of the device	Restricted	2	Public	0
Access to PED	Two functional samples w/o target keys	3	Functional sample with working keys	4
Equipment	Standard	1	Standard	2
Specific parts	Standard	1	No further parts required	0
Attack potential per phase		11		11
Total Attack Potential		22		

Second Attack Example

The attack aims at the determination of a DES key used for encryption at the device using differential power analysis (DPA). It is assumed that:

- A function of the PED is used which requires a PIN to be entered for every execution of the cryptographic action with the key under attack;
- The data used for DPA can be acquired at an external interface of the PED, e.g., the PED needs not be further physically attacked to get the required test data; and that
- The PED does not have effective countermeasures against DPA.

The attack would consist of the following steps:

1. Determine the method to run DPA on a PED. This consists mostly of analyzing the electrical and logical interface. This step requires professional knowledge of electronic and computer engineering.
2. Develop the attack set-up including the control to run the PED in an automated way. Since a large number of PIN entries are required, which can hardly be performed manually, special mechanics must be developed to perform the PIN entries. This is bespoke equipment, developed specially for this attack, which will be reused at Identification time.
3. Get a PED and perform the measurement. We expect that at least 20,000 PIN entry steps and the following encryption have to be observed. In the identification phase, this may have to be repeated several times. Due to the exhaustive PIN search countermeasure, 20,000 PIN entries need at least 7 days. Since such an amount of transactions cannot be performed in a real live environment, it must be possible to run the device off-line with a simulated host.
4. Analyze the data samples and retrieve the PIN-encrypting key.

The attack potentials are estimated within the following table:

Table 4: Attack Potentials Example for DPA Analysis

Aspect	Identifying Value		Exploiting Value	
Attack time	> 1 month	5	< 1 month	3
Expertise	Expert	2	Expert	3
Knowledge of the device	Restricted	2	Public	0
Access to PED	Functional sample with trial keys	2	Functional sample with working keys	4
Equipment	Bespoke	5	Specialized	4
Specific parts	Standard	1	No further parts required	0
Attack potential per phase		17		14
Total Attack Potential		31		

As can be seen from the table, the attack potential is below the margin of 35 for the attack potential high level. If a key can be attacked which does not require the entry of a PIN at the keypad and the attack time is less than a day, the attack potential is even lower.

Appendix C: Configuration and Use of the sts Tool

The tester should compile and/or install NIST's sts tool (the reference implementation of the SP800-22 test set) and then test this instance of the sts tool tested as per SP800-22, appendix C to verify that the tool is functioning correctly on the testing platform. This configuration guidance is for use with sts versions 1.5 through 1.8.

A note on sts versions: Prior to version of 1.7, the Discrete Fourier Transform (Spectral) test was conducted using the incorrect peak height threshold value (called T in Section 2.6.4 of SP 800-22) and calculated the normalized difference (d) incorrectly. In order to use an older version of the sts tool, the corrections described in [Kim 2004] should be implemented for this test. In versions 1.7 and later, these corrections are already included.

The tester should request and obtain a sample of 2^{30} bits from the vendor. The tester should exercise care to verify that the vendor supplied data is interpreted correctly by the sts tool (the sts tool assumes that binary data is in big-endian formatting on all platforms).

All tests other than the Lempel-Ziv test should be run [0] (for later versions of sts, the Lempel-Ziv test is normally inaccessible).

The sts testing on the data shall be judged as a "pass" if it passes all of the tests, for both the "Proportion of Sequences Passing a Test" interpretation approach and "Uniform Distribution of P-Values" interpretation approach. If the data does not pass all tests, and the failure is marginal, the tester should acquire additional data from the vendor and repeat the testing, including both the initial data and the additional vendor-supplied data.

The sts tool should be configured as per guidance provided in SP800-22, which is summarized below.

The following settings are consistent with the SP800-22 document:

Configuration Item	Setting
Length of bit streams (n)	1,000,000 [1]
Number of bit streams (sample size) (M)	1,073 [2]
Block Frequency block length	20,000 [3]
Non-Overlapping Templates template length	10 [4]
Overlapping Template template length	10 [4]
Universal block length (L), number of initialization steps (Q)	$L=7$, $Q=1,280$ [5]
Approximate Entropy block length	8 [6]
Serial block length	16 [7]
Linear Complexity block length	1,000 [8]

- [0] The Lempel-Ziv test should be excluded due to an error in the test, as described in [Kim 2004]. NIST has acknowledged the error and the Lempel-Ziv test has been dropped from recent versions of the sts tool.
- [1] n must be selected to be consistent with the requirements all of the tests to be run. The Overlapping Templates, Linear Complexity, Random Excursions, and Random Excursions Variant tests all require n to be greater than or equal to 10^6 in order to produce meaningful results. The Non-Overlapping Templates test requires n to equal 10^6 . (See SP800-22 Sections 2.7.7, 2.8.7, 2.10.7, 2.11.7, 2.15.7, and 2.16.7)
- [2] The number of bit sequences (sample size) must be 1,000 or greater in order for the "Proportion of Sequences Passing a Test" result to be meaningful. (See SP800-22 Sections 4.2.1 and 4.3 f.) This value will be 1,073 for the first test, but any additional testing (e.g., further testing to resolve test failures) will necessarily include more bit sequences.
- [3] For the Block Frequency Test, if $n=10^6$, the test block size should be set between 10^4 and 10^6 . (See SP800-22 Section 2.2.7.)
- [4] The two template tests (Non-Overlapping and Overlapping tests) both require selection of a template length of 9 or 10 in order to produce meaningful results. (See SP800-22 Sections 2.7.7 and 2.8.7.)
- [5] The Universal test block length (L) and initialization steps (Q) must be consistent with the table in SP800-22 Section 2.9.7. For $n=10^6$, the only acceptable values are ($L=6$, $Q=640$) and ($L=7$, $Q=1280$).
- [6] For the Approximate Entropy (ApEn) test, SP800-22 Section 2.13.7 requires the block length to be less than $\lfloor \log_2 n \rfloor - 2$, however the sts tool warns if the block size is greater than $\lfloor \log_2 n \rfloor - 5$ (which is consistent with the information in Section 4.3 f). Other analysis [Hill 2004] has shown that for $n=1,000,000$ values block lengths greater than 8 can cause failures more often than expected for large scale testing.
- [7] The Serial Test block length is also set based on n . If $n=10^6$, the block length must be less than 17. (See SP800-22 Section 2.12.7)
- [8] The Linear Complexity Test block length is required to be set to between 500 and 5,000 (inclusive), and requires that $\frac{n}{M} \geq 200$. (See SP800-22 Section 2.11.7.)

References

- [Rukhin 2001] Rukhin, Andrew, et al., "A Statistical Test Suite for Random and Pseudorandom Number Generators for Cryptographic Applications", NIST SP800-22, revisions dated May 15, 2001.
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- [Hill 2004] Hill, Joshua (InfoGard Labs). "ApEn Test Parameter Selection".