


In the wake of violence:
Investigating the effect of intrastate conflict on party
systems in post-civil-war states



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Abstract:

In observing the historical synchronicity between the contemporary trend of civil war as the most persistent form of armed conflict, and Huntington's thesis on the 'third wave of democratisation, this paper seeks to shed light on the relationship between intrastate conflict and party systems in post-civil-war countries. In doing so, this dissertation will focus on electoral volatility and dominant-party emergence as polar measures of party competitiveness – ascertaining the predictive effect of civil war onset both as a general trend, as well as a product of its conditions and outcomes. To this end, results demonstrate no evidence to support a statistically significant relationship between civil war and higher rates of electoral volatility nor on the likelihood of dominant party emergence. When discriminating between conditions of intrastate conflict however, two significant results were found. Firstly, internationalised civil wars were shown to exhibit a strong, positive causal link on the likelihood of dominant party emergence in post-civil-war countries. And secondly, peace settlements demonstrated a negative predictive effect, lowering rates of electoral volatility ex post facto. The paper concludes by highlighting the limitations of its investigation and provides several avenues for further research.

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1. Introduction

As affirmed by scholarly consensus, party systems are defined as “the pattern of interactions among major parties”¹ and stand as the fundamental bedrock of representative democracy² – functioning as mechanisms that “regulate social conflict, formulate policy alternatives, hold officials accountable to the public, and legitimise the political regime”³. In turn, this structural component of political competition has received particular scrutiny following Samuel L. Huntington’s seminal thesis on the ‘Third Wave of Democratisation’ – which surveyed the transition, and consolidation to multiparty systems across much of the developing world since 1974⁴. As affirmed by Reilly and Nordlund, there has never been a time where multiparty politics have featured so prominently across the globe, with the number of political parties contesting elections having increased many times over the last thirty years⁵.

Nevertheless, much of the academic discourse surrounding the development of competitive party structures has largely focused on the normative and descriptive – affirming that multiparty systems serve as the ‘best arrangements’ to ensure democratic durability⁶. This is corroborated by Mainwaring, who identified the three established typologies of party systems dominating scholarly debate as follows. The

¹ Macdonald, Stuart Elaine, Ola Listhaug, and George Rabinowitz. "Issues and party support in multiparty systems." *The American Political Science Review* (1991): 1107.

² Ibid.

³ Newman, Edward, Per Nordlund, and Benjamin Reilly. "Political Parties in Conflict-Prone Societies: Encouraging Inclusive Politics and Democratic Development." (2008).

⁴ Mainwaring, Scott. "Party systems in the third wave." *Journal of democracy* 9, no. 3 (1998): 67-81.

⁵ Newman, Edward, Per Nordlund, and Benjamin Reilly. "Political Parties in Conflict-Prone Societies: Encouraging Inclusive Politics and Democratic Development." (2008).

⁶ Ishiyama, John. "Civil wars and party systems." *Social Science Quarterly* 95, no. 2 (2014): 427.

first being Sartori's seminal writings in *Parties and Party Systems* – positing that the degree to which multiparty systems are institutionalised exerts a causal effect on the stability of party competition⁷. The second school of thought originates from Lipset and Rokkan and their acclaimed article, *Cleavage Structures, Party Systems and Voter Alignments*; expounding on the way in which party systems are moulded and shaped based on social cleavages⁸. On the other hand, alternative scholars contend the impact of both institutional and cleavage-based explanations – instead, highlighting the agency of political elites in forming and manipulating party systems through state structures and the machineries of government⁹.

However, as noted by Ishiyama, what is indubitably lacking in contemporary discourse regarding party systems, is the catalytic effect of intrastate conflict on party development¹⁰. This discrepancy proves particularly surprising when one considers the parallel timeframes under which 'The Third Wave of Democratisation' and intrastate conflicts set in the context of the post-Cold War international order coincide. As argued by Hippler, this relationship rightly deserves greater scrutiny – with the political status quo numerous developing countries across Africa, Asia and Latin America forged in the wake of their respective civil conflicts¹¹. Curiously enough, policymakers and academics alike have largely failed to emphasise this link, with the scholarship frequently compartmentalising discourse on civil war from the prescriptive

⁷ Sartori, Giovanni. *Parties and party systems: A framework for analysis*. ECPR press, 2005.

⁸ Lipset, Seymour Martin, and Stein Rokkan. *Cleavage structures, party systems, and voter alignments: an introduction*. Free Press, 1967.

⁹ Ishiyama, John. "Civil wars and party systems." *Social Science Quarterly* 95, no. 2 (2014): 426.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Hippler, Jochen. "Democratization after civil wars–Key problems and experiences." *Democratisation* 15, no. 3 (2008): 552.

policy-based frames of peace-making and humanitarian intervention¹². From this perspective, the explanatory chasm that exists as a result of the scant literature presents a sorely missed opportunity to scrutinise the “the impact of political violence on the overall contours of party systems emerging afterwards”¹³.

As expressed by Pelizzo and Nwokora, in order to facilitate for an understanding of the interactions among political parties, these patterns need to be “treated as proper units of analysis”¹⁴ – studied through empirical measures that can adequately survey party system change and transition. Here, Pedersen’s electoral volatility index proves useful, mapping “the degree of change in voting behaviour between elections”¹⁵. This measure proves especially noteworthy in the context of post-civil-war societies, as conflicting sides of scholarly debate have characterised intrastate conflicts as ‘stabilisers’, ‘maximisers’ or ‘nullifiers’ of party competition¹⁶. In light of this, a holistic assessment should also seek to provide insight into party systems characterised by the diminution of electoral volatility, or in other words, dominant-party emergence. Characterised as “a political system in which a single party persistently dominates election results”¹⁷, hegemonic party development has defined the status-quo of many post-civil-war states – from the likes of the ZANU-PF in Zimbabwe to the Moldovan National Liberal Party. As corroborated by Bogaards, the tendency of dominant-party

¹² Ishiyama, John. "Civil wars and party systems." *Social Science Quarterly* 95, no. 2 (2014): 427.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Pelizzo, Riccardo, and Zim Nwokora. "Party system change and the quality of democracy in east Africa." *Politics & Policy* 46, no. 3 (2018): 524.

¹⁵ Ascher, William, and Sidney Tarrow. "The stability of communist electorates: evidence from a longitudinal analysis of French and Italian aggregate data." *American Journal of Political Science* (1975): 482.

¹⁶ Modelski, George. "Party Systems." In *Long Cycles in World Politics*, pp. 161-193. Palgrave Macmillan, London, 1987.

¹⁷ Ostroverkhov, Alexander. "In Searching for Theory of One-Party Dominance: World Experience of Studying Dominant-Party Systems (II)." *Politeia-Journal of Political Theory Political Philosophy and Sociology of Politics* 87, no. 4 (2017): 133.

emergence in developing countries poses “far-reaching implications” for the success of these ‘third-wave democracies’ and should thus be the subject of study with equal ardour¹⁸.

All in all, there are two main objectives of this dissertation. Most generally, I will seek to gain a substantive understanding on the effect of civil war on electoral volatility and likelihood of dominant party emergence in developing ‘third wave’ democracies. Additionally, I also aim to investigate the nature of this relationship further by identifying the diverse range of conditions which actively shape the intrinsic character of every civil conflict – identifying instances whereby regime type, intensity, foreign state-actor interference and civil war outcome facilitate for greater explanatory depth. In the subsequent chapters, this paper will familiarise the reader with a comprehensive view of research on the subject – noting points of convergence and divergence between scholars for greater insight. Firstly, Chapter 2 will discuss the theoretical perspectives presented by social science scholarship with regards to the general and conditional effect of civil war on electoral volatility and dominant-party emergence. Following this, Chapter 3 expounds on the methodology employed to conduct the empirical research of this dissertation. Subsequently, Chapter 4 will present the results while Chapter 5 provides the analysis and discussion in reference to the expectations imparted by the literature. In conclusion, this paper will highlight the limitations of its research and suggest recommendations for future analysis.

¹⁸ Bogaards, Matthijs. "Electoral systems and the management of ethnic conflict in the Balkans." *Nationalism after communism: Lessons learned* (2004): 249.

2. Literature Review

In this chapter I will outline the various stances presented in the literature of civil war scholarship regarding the former's effect on post-war electoral volatility and conversely, dominant party emergence. After presenting the theories which feature most prominently in these subjects of discourse, I will also outline the expectations for my own research – advancing the arguments which I find to be the most cogently expressed.

2.1 Occurrence of Civil War

In discussing the general effect of civil conflict on post-war party systems, the literature places equal weight on two conflicting theoretical frameworks.

In this regard, research spearheaded by Allison et al. stipulates that the former has a positive effect on the latter – with civil war increasing both the competitiveness and size of party systems¹⁹. Here, the idea of intrastate conflict as a catalyst for the creation of 'alternative sovereignties' proves especially pertinent. As explained by Tilly, civil wars require opposition groups to mobilise their own popular bases of support to challenge those of governing parties²⁰. In turn, these mobilisation efforts call for rebel cohorts to create a network of resource distribution to supply dissenting groups with essential services to sustain their armed struggle²¹. These networks provide

¹⁹ Allison, Michael E. "The transition from armed opposition to electoral opposition in Central America." *Latin American Politics and Society* 48, no. 4 (2006): 137-162.

²⁰ Tilly, Charles. "From Mobilization to Revolution Reading MA." (1978), 36.

²¹ *Ibid*, 37.

opposition factions with the opportunity to exploit their organisational platforms not only in the sphere of violent conflict, but that of electoral competition when the fighting ceases²². Allison's analysis of El Salvador's post-civil war electoral landscape largely corroborates this premise²³. In the case of the Central American nation, the degree to which territorial control was achieved by the rebel Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMNL) had a direct impact on the electoral success it achieved after the Chapultepec Peace Accords of 1992²⁴. Contextual narratives such as the one in El Salvador characterise civil conflict as a disruptive catalyst for party systems – fractionalising constituents into their respective partisan blocs; and politically galvanising them further through the crystallised memory of inter-group violence²⁵.

On the other hand however, contending research advanced by Reilly and Nordlund present a starkly counterposing image. One where, “the continued threat of renewed violence, large amounts of internally-displaced persons (IDPs) and general lack of infrastructure occurring after civil wars, stand as major impediments to opposition party-building efforts”²⁶. Under these circumstances, it is difficult to imagine the prospects for successful electoral campaigning in the form of polling and constituent outreach – especially in cases where opposition campaigners are hindered by the sustained threat of violence away from their constituency strongholds²⁷. In corroborating this argument, Ibrahim highlights the configuration of political economy

²² Ibid, 39.

²³ Allison, Michael E. "The transition from armed opposition to electoral opposition in Central America." *Latin American Politics and Society* 48, no. 4 (2006): 106.

²⁴ Ibid, 110.

²⁵ Ibid, 117.

²⁶ Reilly, Benjamin, and Per Nordlund. "Introduction [to Political Parties in Conflict-Prone Societies: Regulation, Engineering and Democratic Development]." In *Political Parties in Conflict-Prone Societies: Regulation, Engineering and Democratic Development*. United Nations University Press, 2008.

²⁷ Ibid.

in post-civil-war societies – asserting that assets and reserves are “generally not available outside of governing parties or warring groups that control resources and capital”²⁸. Unsurprisingly, this diminishes the prospects of political competitors and perpetuates the existing hegemony of parties already situated at the apex of power.

In considering the fierce debate on this subject, I will advance two formalised hypotheses to reflect both sides of the literature.

Hypothesis 1_a – Electoral Volatility

H₀ – There is no significant relationship between the occurrence of civil war and electoral volatility in post-war multiparty systems.

H_a – There is a significant relationship between the occurrence of intrastate conflict and electoral volatility in post-civil war multiparty systems.

Hypothesis 1_b – Emergence of a Dominant Party

H₀ – There is no significant relationship between the occurrence of intrastate conflict and the emergence of a dominant party in the post-war political system of a country.

H_a – There is a significant relationship between the occurrence of intrastate conflict and the emergence of a dominant party in the post-war political system of a country.

2.2 Presence of an External Actor

²⁸ Ibrahim, Jibrin, F. Okoye, and T. Adambara. "Nigeria: Country Report based on Research and Dialogue with Political Parties." International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, Stockholm (2006).

Additionally, as voiced by Grimm and Weiffen, the study of politics in post-conflict societies cannot be accurately studied without considering the interactions of domestic elites and rebels vis à vis external state actors²⁹. In consonance with Cunningham, “external states often become involved in civil war to pursue an agenda which is separate from the goals of the internal combatants”³⁰. In advancing their own interests, they do not only prolong the duration of war but can additionally exert pressure on peace settlements; favouring a certain belligerent while opposing another³¹. In sum, the sway of an external ‘third actor’ – whether such influence is garnered through economic and military aid, or alternatively comes a result of the international community vesting it with the political legitimacy to act as ‘mediator’ between parties – can significantly mould the terms of peace, and thereby alter the landscape of party competition in the outset of civil war³².

Accounts of France’s interventionary role in many of Chad’s protracted civil conflicts proves pertinent in illustrating this reality. While Chad had been independent since 1960, the government regime still heavily relies on France’s military and economic assistance in the sparse yet highly ethnically-diverse country³³. This was made evident when the French military intervened in supporting Hissène Habré’s bid for power against the head of the transitional government, Goukouni Oueddei³⁴. As maintained

²⁹ Grimm, Sonja, and Brigitte Weiffen. "Domestic elites and external actors in post-conflict democratisation: mapping interactions and their impact." (2018): 257.

³⁰ Cunningham, David E. "Veto players and civil war duration." *American Journal of Political Science* 50, no. 4 (2006): 877.

³¹ *Ibid*, 878.

³² *Ibid*, 879.

³³ Powell, Nathaniel K. "Battling instability? The recurring logic of French military interventions in Africa." *African security* 10, no. 1 (2017): 51.

³⁴ Utley, Rachel. "The sacred union? French intervention in Lebanon and Chad under François Mitterrand." *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 10, no. 3 (1999): 10.

by Uteley, the aftermath of this coup, along with France's unilateral support of Habré's government led to the "massacre of political opponents" and the marginalisation of Chad's civilian voices in their struggle for self-determination³⁵. In turn, this status quo remained in place for approximately a decade and cemented Habré's rebel faction as the dominant partisan actor in government³⁶.

In considering Grimm and Weiffen's argument, I am of the opinion that the presence and involvement of external state actors in episodes of intrastate conflict will lead to emergence of dominant parties in the post-war political systems of developing countries. In advancing this claim, I will subsequently present my formalised hypothesis.

Hypothesis 2_a – Presence of an External State Actor(s) on the Emergence of a Dominant Party

H₀ – There is no significant relationship between the presence of an external state actor(s) in intrastate conflicts and the emergence of a dominant party in post-civil war countries.

H_a – There is a significant relationship between the presence of an external state actor(s) in intrastate conflicts and the emergence of a dominant party in post-civil war countries.

³⁵ Ibid, 11.

³⁶ Ibid, 12.

2.3 Regime type

Furthermore, while research into the circumstantial aspects of intrastate conflict such as duration, fatality count and outcome have proven significant in determining the relationship between civil war and competitive party system formation, discussions on the matter would be incomplete without acknowledging the effects posed by the belligerents themselves. Here, Gurses and Mason emphasise that countries displaying 'previous democratic experience' are more likely to "see higher levels of democracy in the post-civil-war era", stimulating the political landscape to favour competitive partisanship³⁷. Conversely however, the literature indicates that countries suffering through repressive, authoritarian regimes significantly experience lower levels of party competition as the democratic institutions needed to ensure the integrity of multiparty politics are absent or deficient³⁸.

Anecdotal evidence of this is abundantly displayed in the civil war scholarship and notably illustrated in the case of North and South Korea. Prior to and during the internationalised civil conflict of the Korean War of 1950 – whereby North and South Korean forces fought to integrate the country under their respective ideological camps, the peninsula's administration was split into the Allied-backed democratic republic of southern Korea – led by Syngman Rhee, and the Soviet-sponsored communist regime of Kim-II-Sung³⁹. As each side sought to conquer the other across the 38th parallel, the democratic republican system of the south starkly juxtaposed the centralised one-

³⁷ Gurses, Mehmet, and T. David Mason. "Democracy Out of Anarchy: The Prospects for Post-Civil-War Democracy." *Social Science Quarterly* 89, no. 2 (2008): 315-336.

³⁸ *Ibid.*

³⁹ Stokesbury, James L. *Korean Short History*. Harper Perennial, 1990, 26.

party system of the north⁴⁰. In turn, this is a legacy that has persisted in the present day – with EIU ranking South Korea a “full competitive democracy” while its northern counterpart has consistently been ranked by Freedom House with a dismaying score of 3 out of 100⁴¹. In accounting for this difference, Park highlights that the diverging political histories of both the North and the South seem to play a causal role on the contrasting development of party politics across the peninsula⁴².

Thus, in considering both the literature and anecdotal evidence, I am of the view that instances of civil war fought in countries with autocratic regimes will diminish electoral volatility in the successive political structures that follow. In advancing this claim, I will present my formalised hypothesis.

Hypothesis 2b – Regime type

H₀ – There is no significant relationship between civil wars in countries with autocratic state regimes and lower levels of post-war electoral volatility.

H_a – There is a significant relationship between civil wars fought in countries with autocratic state regimes and lower levels of post-war electoral volatility.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ "South Korea: Freedom In The World 2021 Country Report | Freedom House". 2021. *Freedom House*. <https://freedomhouse.org/country/south-korea/freedom-world/2021>; "North Korea: Freedom In The World 2021 Country Report | Freedom House". 2021. Freedom House. <https://freedomhouse.org/country/north-korea/freedom-world/2021>.

⁴² Park, Hong-Kyu. "American involvement in the Korean war." *The History Teacher* 16, no. 2 (1983): 251.

2.4 Civil War Outcome

However, the aforementioned narratives still present fundamental explanatory gaps when considering the historical development of multiparty systems across the world. In this regard, Wantchekon notes that 40% of all civil wars taking place between 1945 and 1993 were conducive to the eventual democratisation of post-conflict countries⁴³. Understandably, this raises important questions which have been echoed by social scientists such as Licklider; which have struggled to understand how war-torn states could form common governments when segments of their societies have openly committed atrocities against their counterparts⁴⁴. In clarifying this dilemma, Wood et al. have duly noted that outcomes in intrastate wars play an integral role in shaping the political system that arise as a result⁴⁵. Here, they suggest that the likelihood of competitive party systems emerging after an instance of intrastate conflict is higher in cases where fighting is protracted and outcomes prove inconclusive – with no warring faction enjoying a decisive victory over another⁴⁶. Based on these conclusions, it is widely theorised that civil wars displaying these features are more likely to end in a negotiated settlement from which a more inclusive and participatory political system can develop⁴⁷. The argument from which this premise takes root follows a distinctly instrumental logic. Faced with higher costs of war and extended periods of fighting, the potential payoffs presented by civil war decrease, while the prospect of a stalemate

⁴³ Wantchekon, Leonard, and Zvika Neeman. "A theory of post-civil war democratization." *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 14, no. 4 (2002): 440.

⁴⁴ Licklider, Roy. "Early returns: Results of the first wave of statistical studies of civil war termination." *Civil Wars* 1, no. 3 (1998): 122.

⁴⁵ Wood, Elisabeth Jean. "The social processes of civil war: The wartime transformation of social networks." *Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci.* 11 (2008): 540.

⁴⁶ Mason, T. David, and Patrick J. Fett. "How civil wars end: A rational choice approach." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 40, no. 4 (1996): 547.

⁴⁷ *Ibid*, 550.

proves more likely. As a result, it follows that in such instances, the odds presented by continuing the conflict becomes far less attractive compared to the potential gains which become available through the channels of negotiated peace⁴⁸. In considering Wood's argument, I am of the view that instances of civil war that end through the ratification of peace settlements will be conducive to higher levels of electoral volatility in post-war countries. In advancing this claim, I will present my formalised hypothesis.

Hypothesis 2c – Civil War Outcome

H₀ – There is no significant relationship between civil wars that end in peace settlements and higher levels of electoral volatility.

H_a – There is a significant relationship between civil wars that end in peace settlements and higher levels of electoral volatility.

⁴⁸ Ibid, 552.

2.3 Battle deaths

Considering the horrific destruction and bloodshed directly spurred by civil wars, one can certainly understand why, upon first glance, these conditions seem diametrically opposed to the promotion of democracy and competitive party politics. In turn, these assumptions are reinforced further when considering the findings presented by scholars such as Ishiyama – observing that “bloodier instances of intrastate conflict have an especially powerful freezing effect on party volatility”⁴⁹. In this regard, the logic is elaborated as follows. Civil wars that are prone to higher rates of battle-related casualties, such as ethnic-based intrastate conflicts have observably led to “a hardening of positions that are likely to transcend partisan issues of ideology or program”⁵⁰. As corroborated by Kaufmann, “bloody civil wars crystallise hostilities to the point that inter-group political appeals are unlikely to be made and even less likely to be heard”⁵¹. Thus, in view of the faultlines created by high-intensity conflicts, the capture of votes by belligerent groups across the political aisle proves largely unfeasible.

In considering this theoretical framework, I am of the opinion that violent high-intensity conflicts, will lead to the emergence of dominant party systems. In advancing this claim, I will subsequently present my formalised hypothesis:

⁴⁹ Ishiyama, John. "Civil wars and party systems." *Social Science Quarterly* 95, no. 2 (2014): 430.

⁵⁰ *Ibid*, 440.

⁵¹ Kaufmann, Chaim. "Possible and impossible solutions to ethnic civil wars." *International security* 20, no. 4 (1996): 137.

Hypothesis 2_d – Effect of Battle Death on the Effect of Dominant Party Systems

H₀ – There is no significant relationship between civil wars with higher casualties and the emergence of a dominant party system in post-war countries.

H_a – There is a significant relationship between civil wars with higher casualties and the emergence of a dominant party system in post-war countries.

3. Research Design and Methodology

This dissertation will examine the general effect of civil wars on the post-war configuration of party systems. To this end, my investigation will comprise of two parts – the first will consider civil wars as a general phenomenon, while the second will delve deeper into the different modalities of intrastate conflict. To begin, I will explore how civil wars affect the electoral volatility and the emergence of dominant parties.

In the second section however, I will focus on key distinguishing factors which have produced a significant degree variance in the vast literature regarding intrastate conflict. Namely, the effects posed by the presence of an external state actor, the number of battle deaths, the outcome of the civil war, as well as the type of regime acting as state belligerent. In turn, these variables will be analysed extrinsically from the general trend of intrastate conflict in order to determine whether they present an independently significant impact on the aforementioned dependent variables.

3.1 Data:

Case selection

Data for this investigation was primarily based on the list of civil war cases included in Ishiyama's paper, *Civil Wars and Party Systems*⁵². From here, data were collected from a sample pool of 92 states, 44 of which experienced civil wars between 1975 and 2008 – representing the treatment group. As this dissertation is focused on the effect of civil war on aspects of democratisation during the 'Third Wave', case selection was primarily centred on party system development LEDCs⁵³, with observations entirely consisting of middle-to-low-income countries as defined by the World Bank⁵⁴.

To ascertain whether instances of civil war have had a significant effect on the features of multiparty systems in their outset, the remainder of observations acted as the control group and included countries that had not experienced intrastate conflict, but qualified as democratising countries between 1975 to 2008. In sum, the treatment group and the control group were coded as '1' and '0' respectively. Furthermore, the chronological parameters of this study were derived from Virginia Fortna's 2008 research regarding civil war duration and their respective outcomes⁵⁵. 1975 was selected as the opening parameter as this coincided with the commencement of Huntington 'third wave of democratisation' theory – a period marking the rapid

⁵² Ishiyama, John. "Civil wars and party systems." *Social Science Quarterly* 95, no. 2 (2014): 425-447.

⁵³ 'Less Economically Developed Countries'

⁵⁴ "World Bank Country And Lending Groups". 2021. datahelpdesk.worldbank.org.

<https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/906519-world-bank-country-and-lending-groups>.

⁵⁵ Fortna, Virginia Page. *Does peacekeeping work?: shaping belligerents' choices after civil war*. Princeton University Press, 2008.

expansion of multiparty systems across the globe⁵⁶. Conversely, 2004 was chosen as a closing point as there had been no democratising countries which had experienced a civil war in 2004 and held two consecutive legislative elections by 2008 – which stood as the cut-off year for Fortna's findings⁵⁷.

Moreover, it is crucial to note that the units of analysis were the states experiencing intrastate conflict, and not the cases of civil war themselves. Thus, this study delineates no distinction between countries that have experienced multiple instances intrastate conflict and those that have only suffered one civil war.

3.2 The variables

Independent variables

In the first section of the investigation, the independent variable will determine whether a country has experienced at least one civil war. In the second section however, the explanatory variables will measure the presence or absence of an external state actor in an intrastate conflict, the general outcome of the civil war, the type of regime characterising the state belligerent as well as number of battle deaths suffered.

The data compiled in relation to the regressors were all sourced from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program - with the first four deriving from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict

⁵⁶ Huntington, Samuel P. *Political order in changing societies*. Yale University Press, 2006.

⁵⁷ Fortna, Virginia Page. *Does peacekeeping work?: shaping belligerents' choices after civil war*. Princeton University Press, 2008.

Dataset⁵⁸, and data from the latter originating from the PRIO Battle Deaths Dataset presented by Lacina⁵⁹.

Occurrence of Civil War

The qualifying criteria upon which civil wars were selected are based on Doyle and Sambanis' operational definition⁶⁰ – asserting that civil wars are “major episodes of political violence involving at least 500 directly related fatalities and reach a level of intensity in which political violence is both systematic and sustained”⁶¹. Observations were sourced from the UCDP/PRIO Dataset and selected if they satisfied the chronological and definitional criteria.

As indicated in the aforementioned section, the treatment group, comprising of countries experiencing at least one instance of civil war between 1975 and 2008 were coded as ‘1’, while the control group, comprising of countries with no prior history of intrastate conflict within the chronological parameters were coded as ‘0’.

Regime type of state belligerent

Four broad regime type categories were delineated according to Coppedge et al.'s dataset on the ‘Varieties of Democracy’⁶². These were the labels of ‘closed autocracy’, ‘electoral autocracy’, ‘electoral democracy’ and ‘liberal democracy’. In turn, the

⁵⁸ Gleditsch, Nils Petter, Peter Wallensteen, Mikael Eriksson, Margareta Sollenberg, and Håvard Strand. "Armed conflict 1946-2001: A new dataset." *Journal of peace research* 39, no. 5 (2002): 615-637.

⁵⁹ Lacina, Bethany. "Battle Deaths Dataset 1946–2008: Codebook for Version 3.0." *Np: CSCW/PRIO* (2009).

⁶⁰ Sambanis, Nicholas. "What is civil war? Conceptual and empirical complexities of an operational definition." *Journal of conflict resolution* 48, no. 6 (2004): 814.

⁶¹ *Ibid*, 816.

⁶² Lindberg, Staffan I., Michael Coppedge, John Gerring, and Jan Teorell. "V-Dem: A new way to measure democracy." *Journal of Democracy* 25, no. 3 (2014): 159-169.

observations selected for this study have been manually coded using the same markers.

To determine the categorisation of state belligerents according to regime type, the first year of civil war onset was selected for each case in the treatment group – using the country's corresponding label from Coppedge et al's data as a reference point. Furthermore, while the chart ascribes these labels to the 'political regime of the country', this paper will infer that these will correspond to the regime type of the state belligerent, given that it is the former that is predicated on the latter.

Battle deaths

In determining the battle deaths for each observation of this study, data was sourced from PRIO's Battle Death Dataset⁶³. As asserted by Lacina, battle-deaths are defined as "deaths resulting directly from violence inflicted through the use of armed force by a party to an armed conflict during contested combat"⁶⁴. Limiting the casualty figures in line with the chronological parameters of this investigation, only casualties incurred during between 1975 and 2008 were considered. Furthermore, where PRIO's Battle Death Dataset fails to state the exact number of battle deaths incurred in an instance of civil war, a mean average was manually calculated between the 'high estimate' and 'low estimate'.

⁶³ Lacina, Bethany. "Battle Deaths Dataset 1946–2008: Codebook for Version 3.0." *Np: CSCW/PRIO* (2009).

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

Civil War Outcome

Data providing the outcome of the civil war in the treatment group were sourced from PRIO's Armed Conflict Dataset⁶⁵. In this regard, the categories specified by Gleditsch et al. are 'Peace Settlement', 'Rebel Victory', 'Government Victory' and 'Stalemate'. In turn, the observations selected for this study have been manually coded using the same markers.

Dependent variables

The response variables of this paper will broadly encompass the fundamental features of multiparty political systems – focalising on the measures of electoral volatility, party fractionalisation and in contrast, dominant party emergence.

Electoral Volatility

The first dependent variable that I will examine will be that of electoral volatility – derived from Pedersen's widely-used volatility index as shown below:

$$Volatility = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^n |p_{it} - p_i(t+1)|}{2},$$

⁶⁵ Gleditsch, Nils Petter, Peter Wallensteen, Mikael Eriksson, Margareta Sollenberg, and Håvard Strand. "Armed conflict 1946-2001: A new dataset." *Journal of peace research* 39, no. 5 (2002): 615-637.

Ishiyama explicates the terms employed in this measure as follows. "Where n is the number of parties, p_i represents the percentage of seats held by party i in the lower house of the legislature"⁶⁶. In employing this index, each observation considered two or more election cycles directly following episodes of intrastate conflict as well as in the control group. From this, an average score was calculated.

Dominant-party emergence

The final output variable chosen for this dissertation will be that of dominant-party emergence. As iterated by Marwell and Oliver, dominant party systems often emerge in societies where a certain partisan actor enjoys greater links to a large, homogenous segment of the populace, for example, a major religious or ethnic group, or a large hegemonic social movement⁶⁷. As iterated by Dunleavy, this proves particularly poignant in post-civil war societies, where oftentimes, rebels mobilise supporters on the national level in order to effectively dismantle the political structures of oppressive state elites⁶⁸. The trend of dominant-party system development after civil war has been particularly relevant in the context of the African decolonisation era of the 1960s to 1980s, and is most pertinently illustrated by Uganda under the rule of Yoweri Museveni. In this case-study, Vasher argues that Museveni "exploited his position as the rebel ouster of the unpopular Milton Obote regime to fortify his political legitimacy

⁶⁶ Ishiyama, John. "Civil wars and party systems." *Social Science Quarterly* 95, no. 2 (2014): 437.

⁶⁷ Marwell, Gerald, and Pamela Oliver. *The critical mass in collective action*. Cambridge University Press, 1993.

⁶⁸ Dunleavy, Patrick. "Rethinking dominant party systems." *Dominant political parties and democracy: Concepts, measures, cases and comparisons* 69 (2010): 23.

– subsequently postponing the enactment of promised democratic reforms for a decade after his position in government was secured⁶⁹.

To measure the emergence of a dominant-party system, Van de Walle and Butler's criteria were followed – arguing that “a one party system is one where the largest party holds 60 percent of legislative seats in the lower house of government”⁷⁰. From here, I followed suit with Ishiyama's methodology and analysed “a minimum of the first two, and a maximum of the first five legislative elections”⁷¹ following the first year after civil war in the treatment group. For the control group, a maximum of five legislative cycles were observed between the years of 1975 and 2008 – opting first to analyse the most recent legislative data if available. Furthermore, the definitional criteria for this variable will be based on Matlosa and Karume's definition positing that a dominant-party system “is a system in which despite the multi-party situation, only one party is so dominant that it directs the political system and is firmly in control of state power over a fairly long duration of time that even opposition parties make little if any dent on the political hegemony of a dominant ruling party”⁷².

Cases in both the treatment and control group were manually coded as dummy variables, with ‘1’ representing the emergence of a dominant-party system and ‘0’ marking the absence of a dominant party system.

⁶⁹ Vasher, Nathan. "Museveni's Centralization of Power: The Political Economy of Development in Uganda." (2011).

⁷⁰ De Walle, Nicolas Van, and Kimberly Smiddy Butler. "Political parties and party systems in Africa's illiberal democracies." *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 13, no. 1 (1999): 14-28.

⁷¹ Ishiyama, John. "Civil wars and party systems." *Social Science Quarterly* 95, no. 2 (2014): 426.

⁷² Matlosa, K. and Karume, S. 2004. 'Ten years of Democracy and the Dominant Party System in South Africa', Election Update 2004: South Africa, no 5, 30 March, EISA

4. Results

Section 1 – Investigating the General Effect of Civil War on Multiparty Systems

4.1 Effect of Civil War on Electoral Volatility

Table 1: Mean electoral volatility dependent on presence/absence of civil war

	Mean Electoral Volatility Score
Civil War	28.92
No Civil War	27.72

While post-civil war states are characterised by higher levels of mean electoral volatility than countries with no previous history of intrastate conflict, the disparity between the two groups proves inconsequential in determining the effect of civil war as a significant predictor. This is illustrated by the very slight difference in means between the two categories, amounting to a total of 1.2 score points. From this, we can ascertain that the difference in means between groups is not statistically significant.

Thus, the results infer that the associative relationship between civil war as a general predictor of electoral volatility is positive but weak in nature.

Linear Regression Model and Analysis

Table 2: Linear Regression output of '*electoral volatility*' against '*civil war occurrence*'

Dependent variable:	
Electoral Volatility Score	
Civil War	1.199 (3.709)
Constant	27.723*** (2.565)
Observations	92
R2	0.001
Adjusted R2	-0.010
Residual Std. Error	17.769 (df = 90)
F Statistic	0.104 (df = 1; 90)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 2 displays the regression output for electoral volatility regressed against civil war occurrence, holding countries that have not experienced intrastate conflict as the reference group.

As shown by value of the constant, represented by the figure of 27.72, we can deduce that this is the estimated average score of electoral volatility without the effect of civil war (holding all other variables constant). From the coefficient of the regressor, we can see that, given all other variables are held constant, in countries that have experienced an episode of civil war, the electoral volatility score was likely to increase by approximately 1.20 points in relation to countries with no history of intrastate conflict. However, as demonstrated by these results, civil war is not statistically significant at the 90%, 95% and 99% confidence level. Thus, from the data gathered, we can conclude that there is no evidence of a predictive relationship between the general trend of civil war occurrence and the electoral volatility of countries. In turn, we can claim that within the frame of the current data and model specifications, the null hypothesis (1_a) is maintained.

4.2 Effect of Civil War on the Emergence of a Dominant Party




Figure 1: Proportion of countries where dominant party system have emerged depending on the occurrence of civil war

Figure 1 is a stacked bar-graph illustrating the relationship between the occurrence of civil war and the subsequent emergence of dominant party systems in post-civil war countries. Here, the first category represents the control group – constituting the proportion of countries where civil war did not occur, while the second represents the test group – illustrating the proportion of states experiencing intrastate conflict.

While the results demonstrate that dominant party systems emerged more often in post-civil war states than in the control group, this finding proves inconclusive in determining the actual significance of the effect produced by civil war in predicting the likelihood of dominant party emergence. This is substantiated by the lack of variance in the difference in proportions between the test group and the control group. Here, the results for the latter produced a nine percentage unit difference between the proportion of states where dominant party systems were present and absent. Similarly, a four percentage unit difference was found in the test group. Thus, these results infer that while dominant party systems featured more frequently in post-civil war states, the strength posed by the effect of intrastate conflict itself proved weak in observed cases.

While these results do not clash with the established literature on dominant party emergence and intrastate conflict, they certainly deflate the strength of the relationship between the measured and explanatory variable.

Logistic Regression Model and Analysis

Table 3: Logistic Regression output of '*dominant party emergence*' against '*civil war occurrence*'

Dependent variable:	
Emergence of Dominant Party	
Civil War	0.528 (0.449)
Constant	-0.990*** (0.325)
Observations	92
Log Likelihood	-57.388
Akaike Inf. Crit.	118.776
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 3 displays the regression output for dominant party emergence regressed against civil war occurrence, holding countries that have not experienced intrastate conflict as the reference group. As shown by value of the constant, represented by the figure of -0.99, we can deduce that this is the estimated log odds of a dominant party emerging in countries where civil war did not occur (holding all other variables constant).

When considering the predictive value of the independent variable however, it becomes evident that civil war is not statistically significant at the 90%, 95% and 99% confidence level. This is because the p-value for the regressor is not lower than the alpha levels of 0.01, 0.05 or 0.1. Thus, from the data gathered, we can conclude that

there is no evidence of a predictive relationship between the general trend of civil war occurrence within countries and the emergence of dominant party systems. In turn, we can claim that within the frame of the current data and model specifications, the null hypothesis (1_b) is maintained.

Section 2 – Investigating the Conditions of Civil War and its Effect on Multiparty Systems

4.3 Effect of International Third-Party Actor(s) on the Emergence of Dominant Party Systems




Figure 2: Number of post-civil war countries with dominant parties that have emerged after an intrastate conflict with a third actor present

Figure 2 is a stacked bar-graph illustrating the relationship between the presence of international third-party actors in civil wars and the subsequent emergence of dominant party systems in post-civil war countries.

As shown by this graph, countries that underwent internationalised episodes of intrastate conflicts were more likely to experience the emergence of dominant party systems *ex post facto*. In turn, this is substantiated when comparing the distribution of dominant party systems in countries that have had at least one external third-party actor during civil war to the control group (i.e.: countries with no international actor present). In analysing the graph, roughly 64% of internationalised episodes of intrastate conflict led to the development of dominant party systems, while only 22% in the control group demonstrated the same result.

Thus, the stacked bar-plot suggests that there is a positive correlation between the involvement of external states in instances civil war and the monopolisation of political power by a single party actor in the successive post-war landscape.

Logistic Model and Analysis

Table 4: Logistic Regression output of '*dominant party emergence*' against '*internationalised civil war*'

Dependent variable:	
Emergence of Dominant Party	
Internationalised Civil War	2.128*** (0.705)
Constant	-1.435*** (0.498)
Observations	44
Log Likelihood	-24.186
Akaike Inf. Crit.	52.371
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

Table 4 displays the regression output for dominant party emergence regressed against the presence of international 'third actors' in civil war, holding countries that have not accommodated an external state actor in episodes of intrastate conflict as the reference group.

In this model, the constant represents the log odds of a dominant party emerging in countries where civil wars did not feature an external third-party state actor. Here, the figure represented is -1.44, indicating that in the reference group, dominant party emergence is unlikely.

On the other hand, as shown by the results for the regressor, holding all other variables constant, in civil conflicts where external third-party state actors are present, the log odds of a dominant party emerging within a state's political structure increase by approximately 2.13. This suggests that internationalised civil wars are more likely to lead to political systems where one partisan actor dominates the sphere of electoral competition.

In addition to this, the variable *Internationalised Civil War* hold p-values less than the alpha level of 0.01, inferring that there is a strong relationship between the presence of a foreign state in a civil war and the emergence of dominant party systems within countries' political landscapes.

Table 5: Confidence interval range for significant variables

	5%	95%
Intercept	-1.6937371	-0.6248408
Internationalised Civil War	0.9175809	2.8057486

As stated by Ramsey and Thompson, regression coefficients are subject to sampling uncertainty⁷³. This will make it impossible for us to “exactly estimate the true value of these parameters from sample data in an empirical application”⁷⁴. Nevertheless, “we

⁷³ Ramsey, Michael H. "Measurement uncertainty arising from sampling: implications for the objectives of geoanalysis." *Analyst* 122, no. 11 (1997): 1257.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

may construct confidence intervals for the intercept and the slope parameter”⁷⁵. From Table 4 we can estimate that in 95% of all samples, the true value of the coefficient is likely to be between 0.92 and 2.81. Moreover, given that these intervals do not include 0 as a value, we can claim that within the frame of the current data and model specifications, the null hypothesis (2_a) is conclusively refuted.

⁷⁵ Ibid, 1258.

4.4 Effect of Regime Type and Outcome on Electoral Volatility




Figure 3: Number of countries experiencing the presence/absence of intrastate conflict depending on regime type

Figure 3 is a stacked bar plot displaying the varying levels of civil war outbreak and as determined by regime type, in absolute terms.

Upon analysing this graph, the first observable trend is the decreasing occurrences of civil war from the autocratic to the democratic regime categories. While a large majority of closed autocracies in the dataset experienced civil outbreak (18 out of 19 cases), roughly 75% of electoral autocracies suffered episodes of intrastate conflict – with that figure slumping even further in electoral democracies (5 out of 21 cases). In further reinforcing this tendency, no cases of civil war were found in the category of liberal democracies – presenting a juxtaposing spectrum of cases found across regime types.

In turn, these results suggest that the likelihood of civil war onset is directly proportional to the extent to which state regimes politically repress their populations.




Figure 4: Varying levels of electoral volatility based on regime type of countries during the outbreak of civil war

Figure 4 is a bar plot showcasing the mean levels of electoral volatility as predicated by the three respective regime categories of 'closed autocracy', 'electoral autocracy' and 'electoral democracy'. In this regard, observations belonging to the 'liberal democracy' class are absent as cases of intrastate conflict in liberal democracies satisfying the chronological and methodological parameters were found.

In interpreting the results of this chart, one can observe an inverse relationship between regime openness and electoral volatility – substantiated by the downward trend of scores featuring closed autocracy with the highest levels of mean volatility (31.34), and electoral autocracy (28.70) and democracy (21.18) following in decreasing suit.

Thus, from these results one can infer that there is a correlation between the degree of political repression exercised by a state and the subsequent levels of electoral volatility of countries' party systems. When considering the literature, these results unequivocally contradict the aforementioned claims made by Gurses and Mason – stipulating that regime openness acts as the central factor determining the level of competition in the political sphere of post-civil war society⁷⁶.

⁷⁶ Gurses, Mehmet, and T. David Mason. "Democracy Out of Anarchy: The Prospects for Post-Civil-War Democracy." *Social Science Quarterly* 89, no. 2 (2008): 321.




Figure 5: Distribution of electoral volatility scores in countries having experienced varying outcomes in instances of intrastate conflict

Figure 5 is made up of a series of box-and-whisker plot mapping the distribution of electoral volatility scores of countries according to their respective outcomes in preceding instances of intrastate conflict.

In comparing the various regime categories, median electoral volatility are demonstrably similar across the board, converging around the score of 20-30 on the Pedersen volatility index. Furthermore, the observations comprising the outcomes of the control group ('N/A'), Government Victory and Peace Settlement and Rebel Victory

displayed a positive skew – with the medians of both situated closer to the bottom quartile. This demonstrates that the data in these categories “constitute a higher frequency of high-valued scores” – meaning that in the aforementioned groups, the majority of observations displayed were closer to the 75th percentile than the 25th percentile.

Despite these similarities however, the distribution of values within each regime category differed greatly. This is most notably illustrated by the disparities between the plots of Peace Settlement and Government Victory – with the latter’s minimum and maximum values extending far above those of the former. The same can be said for the interquartile range of the Government Victory boxplot, indicating that the middle 50% of observations in this group possessed higher electoral volatility scores than the middle 50% of countries whereby civil war ended in peace agreements.

Interestingly, these results contradict the arguments posited by Gurses and Mason – stipulating that negotiated peace settlements introduce the balance needed between domestic actors to democratise society after civil war⁷⁷. Following from this rationale, we would expect Figure 5’s Peace Agreement boxplot to display higher electoral volatility – yet it stands as the category with the lowest median score on the Pedersen index. This relationship will be further scrutinised in the subsequent regression analyses.

⁷⁷ Gurses, Mehmet, and T. David Mason. "Democracy Out of Anarchy: The Prospects for Post-Civil-War Democracy." *Social Science Quarterly* 89, no. 2 (2008): 332.

Linear Regression Model and Analysis

Table 6: Linear Regression output of '*electoral volatility*' against '*pre-war regime*' and '*civil war outcome*'

Dependent variable:	
Electoral Volatility Score	
Closed Autocracy	5.048 (8.201)
Electoral Autocracy	2.762 (6.826)
Electoral Democracy	-0.852 (6.617)
Government Victory	-0.298 (5.785)
Peace Settlement	-12.077* (7.078)
Rebel Victory	5.734 (5.951)
Stalemate	-11.794 (10.930)
Constant	27.070*** (5.567)
Observations	92
R ²	0.085
Adjusted R ²	0.009
Residual Std. Error	17.603 (df = 84)
F Statistic	1.116 (df = 7; 84)

Note:

Coefficient for baseline category in *civil war outcome* – ‘liberal democracy’ (-5.05)

Coefficient for baseline category in *prewar regime* – ‘N/A’ (11.79)

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 6 displays the regression output for *electoral volatility* regressed against the *pre-war regime type* and *outcome of the civil conflict*, holding countries that have not experienced intrastate conflict and liberal democracies as the reference groups.

As shown by value of the constant, represented by the figure of 27.07, we can deduce that this is the estimated average score of electoral volatility in liberal democracies – where no cases of civil war were documented within the constraints of the chronological parameters (holding all other variables constant).

When analysing the coefficient values for the *pre-war regime* regressors, the results indicate that none of the categories are statistically significant. This is demonstrated by the fact that none of the p-values are lower than the alpha levels of 0.01, 0.05 or 0.1. This indicates that the model does not provide us with any evidence that there is an associative relationship between the regime type of a state before the outbreak of civil war and the electoral volatility of the political structure that succeeds it. Based on this finding, the null hypothesis (2b), stipulating that there is no causal link between autocratic regimes and lower electoral volatility is maintained.

Similarly, most of the categories under the regressor of *civil war outcome* fail to offer much insight – with no statistically significant results for cases of government victory,

rebel victories and stalemates. On the other hand however, the category of *peace settlements* has a p-value less than the alpha-level of 0.1, suggesting that there is a statistically relevant relationship between electoral volatility and the civil war outcome of a peace agreement between belligerents. In holding all other variables constant, having a peace settlement as the outcome of civil war is likely to decrease the score of electoral volatility by 12.07 points.

Table 7: Confidence interval range for significant variables

	5%	95%
Intercept	17.811474	36.3285262
Peace Settlement	-23.848261	-0.3048782

Table 7 displays the confidence interval range for the significant variable of peace settlement. From here, we can estimate that in 95% of all samples, the true value of the coefficient is likely to be between -23.85 and -0.30. Moreover, given that these intervals do not include 0 as a value, we can claim that within the frame of the current data and model specifications, the null hypothesis stipulating that peace settlements do not increase levels of electoral volatility in post-civil-war societies (2c) is refuted.

Effect of Battle-Death on Electoral Volatility

Effect of Battle Death on Electoral Volatility of Post-Civil War Countries




Figure 6: Scatterplot illustrating the relationship between battle-deaths suffered in civil wars and electoral volatility

Figure 6 is a scatterplot displaying the relationship between battle-related casualties suffered during incidents of intrastate conflict and the subsequent electoral volatility of these states, post-civil war.

In investigating this graph, the scatterplot appears amorphous and non-structured in appearance – with no discernible positive or negative pattern to be observed. While

the concentration of observations with higher scores of electoral volatility on the left extremity of the X-axis might sway one to infer that there is a weak negative correlation between the dependent and independent variables, it is important to note that this is because that the dataset disproportionately represents civil wars of lower intensity – reflecting the natural tendency of intrastate conflict. As a result, this weak relationship should be prudently overlooked.

In sum, these trends suggest that there is no associative relationship between the number of battle-fatalities suffered during instances of intrastate conflict and the electoral volatility of states after civil war.

Linear Regression and Analysis

Table 8: Linear Regression output of Electoral Volatility regressed against battle-death

Dependent variable:	
Electoral Volatility	
Estimated Battle Deaths	-0.00005 (0.00004)
Constant	29.248*** (1.985)
Observations	92
R2	0.018
Adjusted R2	0.007
Residual Std. Error	17.623 (df = 90)
F Statistic	1.607 (df = 1; 90)
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

Table 8 showcases the output for electoral volatility regressed against the variable of estimated battle-deaths – mapping the average number of conflict-related casualties in a civil war.

Here, the constant value of 29.25 represents the estimated average score of electoral volatility for countries that did not experience battle-deaths, constituting the control group of states with no instances of intrastate conflict. With regards to the main regressor, the findings demonstrate that there is no statistically significant relationship between battle-deaths and electoral volatility at the 90%, 95% and 99% confidence level. Thus, no predictive relationship between the number of casualties incurred in a civil conflict and the subsequent post-war volatility of party systems within countries. As a result, we can claim that within the frame of the current data and model specifications, the null hypothesis (H_0) is maintained.

5. Analysis and Discussion

Overall, in conducting a cross-country study of civil war between 1975 and 2008, the expectations of this dissertation encompassed the varying arguments purported by scholarship on democratisation and intrastate conflict. These were mainly driven by the wide array of empirical findings and research in the literature.

Part 1 – Effect of Civil War Occurrence on Electoral Volatility and Dominant Party Emergence

In the first section of this dissertation, which focused on the general effect of civil war occurrence on electoral volatility and dominant party emergence, results proved inconclusive in both regards. This was illustrated by the lack of statistically significant findings to suggest that intrastate conflict has any predictive power in relation to the volatility of party systems in post-war countries, as well as the likelihood of dominant party formation. Thus, these results uniformly fail to determine the directionality of civil war as a positive force for electoral volatility, or the inverse opinion that the destruction and displacement caused by civil conflicts stunt the political networks of opposition groups, leading to the establishment of dominant parties.

In interpreting the explanatory impotence of civil war as a general trend, one may turn to Lynch's crucial delineation between intrastate conflicts triggered by a struggle over

state power, and instances where fighting is over “the fundamental idea of the state”⁷⁸. While belligerents in the former are often driven by the desire to maximise their control over state apparatus, rebels in the latter are motivated by separatist ambitions that do not envision control over “the metropolitan state as the primary objective, but to exit and engage with it as an equal unit”⁷⁹. Building from this logic, it proves difficult to discount that the establishment of competitive party politics in these distinct scenarios will impact the prospects of electoral volatility and dominant party emergence very differently. Anecdotally, a comparative assessment of the diverging political paths demonstrated by Nicaragua and Ethiopia following their respective civil wars prove useful in illustrating these realities.

In the case of the latter, while the ethnic-based coalition of EPRDF⁸⁰ fighters managed to overthrow the communist Derg regime in 1991, the separatist ambitions which characterised many of its rebel groups presented a threat to the territorial integrity that any future government would exercise over the Ethiopian state⁸¹. As a result, this saw the emergence of the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) as the increasingly dominant political party – repressing its former allies’ demands for secession in order to maximise its influence over the country. Up until the decline of the TPLF in 2018, this ‘separatist threat’ was largely used by the party as a political tool to justify dominant-party rule, along with the marginalisation of opposition in Ethiopia⁸².

⁷⁸ Lynch, Dov. "Separatist states and post-Soviet conflicts." *International affairs* 78, no. 4 (2002): 834.

⁷⁹ Ishiyama, John. "Civil wars and party systems." *Social Science Quarterly* 95, no. 2 (2014): 430.

⁸⁰ Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front

⁸¹ Berhe, Aregawi. "The EPRDF and the Crisis of the Ethiopian State." (2001).

⁸² Ibid.

On the other hand, the violent ousting of the Nicaraguan Somocista regime by the FSLN did not feature the same secessionist elements – but was rather focused on reconstituting the country's political power base away from the US-backed government⁸³. Thus, as asserted by Jonas and Stein, while the FSLN enjoyed a privileged political role as the ouster of Somoza's dictatorship, this did not permanently secure its position as the leading party in government⁸⁴. To the contrary, since 1984, the enfranchisement of all anti-Somocista groups, has even seen the transfer of power from far-right contra affiliated party such as the National Opposition Group, to centre-democratic groups such as the Constitutionalist Liberal Party⁸⁵. In part, this electoral volatility can be understood as the natural progression of domestic politics where the capture of office, and not secession, stands as the primary objective of former belligerents.

Part 2 – Conditions of Civil War on Electoral Volatility and Dominant Party Emergence

In the second section of the dissertation, which focused on scrutinising the relationship between characteristic features of intrastate conflict in relation to the same dependent variables, the results once again deviated from most of the expectations set out in the literature – with four out of five statistical models failing to negate the plausibility of their respective null hypotheses.

⁸³ Miranda, Roger, and William E. Ratliff. *The civil war in Nicaragua: inside the Sandinistas*. Transaction Publishers, 1992.

⁸⁴ Jonas, Susanne, and Nancy Stein. "The construction of democracy in Nicaragua." *Latin American Perspectives* 17, no. 3 (1990): 10-37.

⁸⁵ *Ibid*, 24.

Firstly, in investigating the varying typologies of state regimes during episodes of civil conflict, and their respective effects on the electoral volatility of countries' subsequent election cycles, the regression model presented in the findings affirm that there is no causal relationship between the former and the latter. Thus, the results do not only refute the hypothesis that civil wars fought against autocratic regimes would increase the likelihood of lower levels of electoral volatility *ex post facto*, but they also negated the significance of any other regime category.

Secondly, with respects to the effect of battle-death on dominant party emergence, research advances the view that a higher number of casualties in civil conflicts produces a powerful 'freezing effect' on countries' successive party systems. However, the results of this dissertation prove inconclusive in supporting this view – with no substantive evidence to determine the directionality or the very presence of an associative relationship at all.

Thirdly, in exploring the relationship between intrastate conflict termination and electoral volatility, the empirical findings showcased in this study identify peace settlements as the only civil war outcome with a predictive effect on electoral volatility in post-war countries. Here, a negative trend was observed – strengthening the claim that peace agreements between belligerents in intrastate conflicts weaken the degree of competition in successive post-war electoral cycles. While the literature advanced by Wood et al. initially guided this dissertation's expectations towards a more positive conclusion – namely, that negotiated resolutions promote the participatory spirit

necessary to the development of competitive multiparty systems after civil war – the results of the regression model contradicted this hypothesis and supported contending empirical research. In this regard, the literature advanced by Fakhouri et al. on Lebanon's Ta'if Agreement sheds light on the political pitfalls of peace settlements⁸⁶. Here, his argument points to the fact that power sharing arrangements between warring factions often allow domestic elites to monopolise political representation of their respective groups – weakening both the scope of electoral competition and democratic institutions⁸⁷.

In solidifying 1943's National Pact, the Ta'if Agreement instituted a rigid consociational agreement along sectarian lines to put an end to a fifteen-year-long civil war. Officially, this allocated the positions of President, Prime Minister and House Speaker to a Maronite Christian, Sunni Muslim and Shia Muslim respectively⁸⁸. However, while successfully putting an end to civil bloodshed, the Ta'if agreement also damaged the prospects of political choice for Lebanese voters beyond the country's main political players – namely, the Maronite Christians led by Aoun's Free Patriotic Movement, the Shi'ites led by Berri's Amal Movement and the Sunnis spearheaded by Hariri's Future Movement⁸⁹. As asserted by Hudson, this has created a neopatrimonial dynamic between confessional parties and Lebanese constituents – whereby representation of the sect is valued above all else and ethnoreligious elites run very low-risk of being voted out of power⁹⁰. Thus, from a normative standpoint, these findings also challenge

⁸⁶ Fakhoury, Tamirace. "Debating Lebanon's power-sharing model: an opportunity or an impasse for democratization studies in the Middle East?." *The Arab Studies Journal* 22, no. 1 (2014): 230.

⁸⁷ Ibid, 233.

⁸⁸ Ibid, 230.

⁸⁹ Ibid, 246.

⁹⁰ Hudson, Michael C. "The breakdown of Democracy in Lebanon." *Journal of International Affairs* (1985): 280.

commonly-held views advanced by many Western-led intergovernmental bodies; promoting peace settlements as a fundamental factor in rebuilding the political institutions of post-civil-war countries. As shown by the empirical evidence presented in this dissertation, these efforts often prove antithetical to the objectives of democracy and pose negative consequences for multiparty competition.

Lastly, the only statistical model to support the hypothesis theorised in the dissertation was that scrutinising the relationship between the development of dominant party systems and internationalised civil wars. In this regard, the results strongly indicate a positive relationship between intrastate conflicts impacted by the interference of foreign states, and the ensuing centralisation of political power by individual partisan actors in the post-war electoral landscape.

In demonstrating this, the regression model effectively reiterates Cunningham's arguments stipulating that foreign states alter power balances between belligerents in order to aid, or conversely punish one of the domestic factions in a civil war⁹¹. By reconfiguring belligerents' capabilities and exacerbating power asymmetries in this manner, it strikes as no surprise that many intrastate conflicts characterised by 'third actor' involvement have subsequently led to the electoral success and dominance by the championed faction. A notable example of this is illustrated in Tajikistan's civil war of 1992⁹². While rebel forces of the United Tajik Opposition could rely on the support of foreign Islamic militant groups such as the Taliban and Al Qaeda, the government

⁹¹ Cunningham, David E. "Veto players and civil war duration." *American Journal of Political Science* 50, no. 4 (2006): 877.

⁹² Lynch, Dov. "The Tajik civil war and peace process." *Civil Wars* 4, no. 4 (2001): 54.

of Emomali Rahmon enjoyed state-sanctioned support from countries across the Eurasian sphere, including Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Russia⁹³. The aid from the latter proved particularly critical as the Russian military provided much-needed arms and the deployment of its Spetsnaz special forces troops to suppress the insurgency⁹⁴. In sum, while the Tajik government still had to offer concessions in order to end the conflict, the power asymmetries created by foreign state support ultimately worked to its advantage, and allowed Rahmon's state to persist well into the post-war period.

6. Concluding Remarks and Future Considerations

In sum, this dissertation has sought to determine the answer to two principal questions. Firstly, assessing the extent to which civil war as a general trend has affected the electoral volatility of political systems in developing countries as well as the prospects they pose for the emergence of dominant parties. Secondly, this paper has also investigated the effects posed by the particular conditions of civil war itself – namely, the presence of an external state actor, battle casualties, state regime type and outcome.

In this regard, the empirical research advanced by this paper, conducted on developing countries democratising in the 'third wave' as determined by Samuel L.

⁹³ Ibid, 55.

⁹⁴ Ibid, 58.

Huntington's thesis, has established that the onset of civil war does not produce an observably significant effect on electoral volatility, nor on the likelihood of dominant-party emergence.

In the second section however, the dissertation affirmed the significantly predictive effect of internationalised civil war and its prospects for post-war hegemonic party formation. Here, a positive relationship was noted – stipulating that civil wars in developing countries, whereby external state actors played a role, were conducive to relatively higher levels of electoral volatility than intrastate conflicts with no 'third party interference'. Furthermore, the research demonstrated an associative relationship between peace settlements as an outcome of intrastate conflict and electoral volatility. From this, it is understood that there is a strong likelihood that developing countries whereby civil wars are resolved through negotiated settlement, as opposed to other outcomes, will experience relatively lower levels of electoral volatility in the post-war political system.

Considering further study on this subject, greater attention should be dedicated to researching the variance in effect between different types of civil war – namely distinguishing between *coup d'états*, separatist and ethnoreligious forms of intrastate conflict. Moreover, in investigating the nascent development of countries democratising in the 'third wave', a factor that has not been mentioned in this paper is the role of economic capacity. In this regard, the predictive power of civil wars and its conditions on electoral volatility and dominant party emergence could be more

accurately assessed when analysed in tandem to the barriers and opportunities that economic growth and decline present to the post-civil-war period.

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Appendix

