


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## Homework 2

Lab01-01.exe:



1. I can see both in PView and Dependency Walker, it has only one import that is ExitProcess imported from kernel32.dll. In strings, apart from exitprocess and kernel32.dll, it also have url [www.practicalmalwareanalysis.com](http://www.practicalmalwareanalysis.com) , vmx32to64.exe and two more path that might be used to save or kill.




```
x<w
#%li
>>*K
40j
QQUP
ucj
jjjjjj
advpack
hk?
~Pj
<2f
StubPath
SOFTWARE\Classes\http\shell\open\commandU
Software\Microsoft\Active Setup\Installed Components\
test
www.practicalmalwareanalysis.com
admin
VideoDriver
WinUMX32-
vmx32to64.exe
SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
Ph?
U5h
U>U
SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Shell Folders
PWj
AppData
jCh
UQj
Uil
U%X_

C:\Strings>a_
```

2. Trying to find host-based indicators. I used ApatDNS. I found that, after running the malware, it sends a request to find DNS of [www.practicalmalwareanalysis.com](http://www.practicalmalwareanalysis.com) in every 65 seconds. And furthermore, in process monitor, as mentioned in problem 1, i find a string named vmx32to64.exe, the malware open a process in which the file is copied to C:\Windows\System32 and a column is written in regedit which is VideoDriver autostart. The behavior above also explains the path string we found in question 1. Related pictures are shown below.




3. The ip of [www.practicalmalwareanalysis.com](http://www.practicalmalwareanalysis.com) look like 10.0.2.2 as this malware will request this ip once starts, and after it sends request to DNS, i get packages from wireshark. It seems that it is trying to build a tcp link.



Lab03-02.dll:

1. Open it in IDA pro, check exports.



Install it using command `rundll32.exe Lab03-02.dll, installA`.

2. As we get from regshot, after running dll file, the changes the did to register is that it add several new keys. They all plugged down below IPRIP service.





```

C:\WINDOWS\system32\cmd.exe
cmd.exe                2456 N/A
tasklist.exe           2488 N/A

C:\Documents and Settings\cai>tasklist /svc

Image Name                PID Services
=====
System Idle Process        0 N/A
System                     4 N/A
smss.exe                   364 N/A
csrss.exe                  588 N/A
winlogon.exe               612 N/A
services.exe              656 Eventlog, PlugPlay
lsass.exe                  668 PolicyAgent, ProtectedStorage, SamSs
VBoxService.exe           824 VBoxService
svchost.exe                876 DcomLaunch, TermService
svchost.exe               956 RpcSs
svchost.exe               1048 AudioSrv, CryptSvc, Dhcp, dmserver, ERSvc,
                        EventSystem, FastUserSwitchingCompatibility,
                        helpsvc, LanmanServer, lanmanworkstation,
                        Netman, Nla, RasMan, Schedule, seclogon,
                        SENS, SharedAccess, ShellHWDetection,
                        srsservice, TapiSrv, Themes, TrkWks, W32Time,
                        winmgmt, wscsv, wuauserv, WZC SVC, IPRIP
svchost.exe               1100 Dnscache
svchost.exe               1180 LmHosts, RemoteRegistry, SSDPSRU
explorer.exe              1596 N/A
spoolsv.exe               1684 Spooler
VBoxTray.exe              1900 N/A
ctfmon.exe                1908 N/A
svchost.exe               232 WebClient
alg.exe                   1736 ALG
wscntfy.exe               2028 N/A
wuauc.lt.exe              556 N/A
svchost.exe               948 stisvc
cmd.exe                   2456 N/A
cmd.exe                   2712 N/A
tasklist.exe              3092 N/A
wmiprvse.exe              2096 N/A

C:\Documents and Settings\cai>

```

4. As the IPRIP service is started by svchost, we can set a filter to see the PID 1048, this filter contains lots of other processes so it can be hard to distinguish the malware.

5. This malware installs a service named 'Intranet Network Awareness (INA+)' to 'HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\IPRIP', and it claims it will collect and store network configuration and location information.


```

HKLM\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Services\IPRIP\ObjectName: "LocalSystem"
HKLM\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Services\IPRIP\Description: "depends INA+, Collects and stores network configuration and location
information, and notifies applications when this information changes."
HKLM\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Services\IPRIP\DependOnService: 52 00 70 00 63 00 53 00 73 00 00 00 00 00
HKLM\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Services\IPRIP\Parameters\ServiceDll: "C:\Lab03-02.dll"
HKLM\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Services\IPRIP\Security\Security: 01 00 14 80 90 00 00 00 9C 00 00 00 14 00 00 00 30 00 00 00 02 00 1C 00
01 00 00 00 02 80 14 00 FF 01 0F 00 01 01 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 02 00 60 00 04 00 00 00 00 14 00 FD 01 02 00 01 01 00 00
00 00 00 05 12 00 00 00 00 00 18 00 FF 01 0F 00 01 02 00 00 00 00 05 20 00 00 00 20 02 00 00 00 00 14 00 8D 01 02 00 01 01 00 00
00 00 05 0B 00 00 00 00 00 18 00 FD 01 02 00 01 02 00 00 00 00 05 20 00 00 00 23 02 00 00 01 01 00 00 00 00 05 12 00 00 00
01 01 00 00 00 00 05 12 00 00 00
HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\IPRIP\Type: 0x00000020
HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\IPRIP\Start: 0x00000002
HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\IPRIP\ErrorControl: 0x00000001
HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\IPRIP\ImagePath: "%SystemRoot%\System32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs"
HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\IPRIP\DisplayName: "Intranet Network Awareness (INA+)"
HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\IPRIP\ObjectName: "LocalSystem"
HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\IPRIP\Description: "depends INA+, Collects and stores network configuration and location
information, and notifies applications when this information changes."
HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\IPRIP\DependOnService: 52 00 70 00 63 00 53 00 73 00 00 00 00 00
HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\IPRIP\Parameters\ServiceDll: "C:\Lab03-02.dll"
HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\IPRIP\Security\Security: 01 00 14 80 90 00 00 00 9C 00 00 00 14 00 00 00 30 00 00 00 02 00
1C 00 01 00 00 00 02 80 14 00 FF 01 0F 00 01 01 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 02 00 60 00 04 00 00 00 00 14 00 FD 01 02 00 01 01
00 00 00 00 05 12 00 00 00 00 18 00 FF 01 0F 00 01 02 00 00 00 00 05 20 00 00 00 20 02 00 00 00 00 14 00 8D 01 02 00 01 01
00 00 00 00 05 0B 00 00 00 00 18 00 FD 01 02 00 01 02 00 00 00 00 05 20 00 00 00 23 02 00 00 01 01 00 00 00 00 05 12 00 00 00
00 00 01 01 00 00 00 00 05 12 00 00 00
HKU\S-1-5-21-842925246-2111687655-1343024091-1003\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\FileExts\hivu\openWithList\{a:
"Regshot-x86-Unicode.exe"
HKU\S-1-5-21-842925246-2111687655-1343024091-1003
\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\FileExts\hivu\openWithList\MRUList: "a"
HKU\S-1-5-21-842925246-2111687655-1343024091-1003\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\ComDlg32\LastVisitedMRU\{a: 52
00 65 00 67 00 73 00 68 00 6F 00 74 00 2D 00 78 00 38 00 36 00 2D 00 55 00 6F 00 69 00 63 00 6F 00 64 00 65 00 2E 00 65 00 78 00 65

```

6. By checking the Wireshark and apatedns, nothing shows on apatedns. But we can find a HTTP GET request and the host is practicalmalwareanalysis.com, also we can find some

information about the website which uses a nginx server and the html page is 301 moved permanently. And we can still find this malware trying to find 10.0.2.2 and keeps sending broadcast.




64	313.525887	10.0.2.15	192.168.1.16	BROWSER	225 Browser Election Request
65	600.109512	CadmusCo_a4:c2:37	Broadcast	ARP	42 who has 10.0.2.2? Tell 10.0.2.15
66	600.110062	RealtekU_12:35:02	CadmusCo_a4:c2:37	ARP	60 10.0.2.2 is at 52:54:00:12:35:02

Lab03-03.exe:

1. It created a new svchost.exe process.






3. From strings we can see there's a file named 'practicalmalwareanalysis.log', so we search this filename in process monitor, we can see the fake svchost.exe created this practicalmalwareanalysis.log file in the directory where the malware sits.

2:41:23.2338...	svchost.exe	1052	WriteFile	C:\WINDOWS\Prefetch\VERCLSID.EXE-3667BD89.pf	SUC
2:41:23.2339...	svchost.exe	1052	CloseFile	C:\WINDOWS\Prefetch\VERCLSID.EXE-3667BD89.pf	SUC
2:41:25.2343...	svchost.exe	2348	CreateFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Xin Yang\Desktop\Chapter_3L\practicalmalwareanalysis.log	SUC
2:41:25.2354...	svchost.exe	2348	QueryStandardInform...	C:\Documents and Settings\Xin Yang\Desktop\Chapter_3L\practicalmalwareanalysis.log	SUC
2:41:25.2355...	svchost.exe	2348	WriteFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Xin Yang\Desktop\Chapter_3L\practicalmalwareanalysis.log	SUC
2:41:25.2356...	svchost.exe	2348	WriteFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Xin Yang\Desktop\Chapter_3L\practicalmalwareanalysis.log	SUC
2:41:25.2357...	svchost.exe	2348	WriteFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Xin Yang\Desktop\Chapter_3L\practicalmalwareanalysis.log	SUC
2:41:25.2357...	svchost.exe	2348	CloseFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Xin Yang\Desktop\Chapter_3L\practicalmalwareanalysis.log	SUC
2:41:25.5286...	svchost.exe	1052	CreateFile	C:\WINDOWS\system32\CatRoot2\vedb.chk	SUC
2:41:25.5287...	svchost.exe	1052	OpenInformationVolu...	C:\WINDOWS\system32\CatRoot2\vedb.chk	SUC

4. After open the .log file we found, we conclude this malware is a keylogger. It creates a fake svchost.exe and records the current window and what the user types. In this case this program records my operations in process monitor to find this file.





#### Lab03-04.exe:

1. When you run this file, a command line interface shows up and then disappear, then the Lab03-04.exe file is gone. We can no longer see this process in task manager and it's not hidden, so we guess it's likely to be deleted. From Process Monitor, we can see when we run this malware, there're a bunch of operations to the Registry, and by using regshot, we can see after running this malware, 104 values are added and 14 values are changed. Also we can see from Process Monitor that it's registering itself to registry and looking for files whose names are related to itself.

2:03:52.9824961 PM	Lab03-04.exe	2500	RegCloseKey	HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server	SUCCESS	
2:03:52.9825140 PM	Lab03-04.exe	2500	RegOpenKey	HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\Lab03-04.exe	NAME NOT FOUND	Desired.
2:03:52.9878152 PM	Lab03-04.exe	2500	ReadFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Xin Yang\Desktop\Chapter_3L\Chapter_3L\Lab03-04.exe	SUCCESS	Offset: 4
2:03:53.0701176 PM	Lab03-04.exe	2500	RegOpenKey	HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\SideBySide\AssemblyStorageRoots	NAME NOT FOUND	Desired.
2:03:53.0702192 PM	Lab03-04.exe	2500	QueryOpen	C:\Documents and Settings\Xin Yang\Desktop\Chapter_3L\Chapter_3L\Lab03-04.exe.Local	NAME NOT FOUND	

Then it looks for the location of cmd.exe try to open windows command line.

2:03:53.1083922 PM	Lab03-04.exe	2500	RegCloseKey	HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\User Shell Folders	SUCCESS	
2:03:53.1084562 PM	Lab03-04.exe	2500	QueryOpen	C:\Documents and Settings\Xin Yang\Cookies	SUCCESS	Creation
2:03:53.1084674 PM	Lab03-04.exe	2500	RegCreateKey	HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Shell Folders	SUCCESS	Desirec
2:03:53.1084842 PM	Lab03-04.exe	2500	RegSetValue	HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Shell Folders\Cookies	SUCCESS	Type: F
2:03:53.1085032 PM	Lab03-04.exe	2500	RegCloseKey	HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Shell Folders	SUCCESS	
2:03:53.1085803 PM	Lab03-04.exe	2500	QueryOpen	C:\WINDOWS\system32\cmd.exe	SUCCESS	Creation
2:03:53.1085965 PM	Lab03-04.exe	2500	CreateFile	C:\	SUCCESS	Desirec
2:03:53.1086076 PM	Lab03-04.exe	2500	QueryDirectory	C:\WINDOWS	SUCCESS	Filter: \
2:03:53.1086283 PM	Lab03-04.exe	2500	CloseFile	C:\	SUCCESS	
2:03:53.1089228 PM	Lab03-04.exe	2500	CreateFile	C:\WINDOWS	SUCCESS	Desirec
2:03:53.1089510 PM	Lab03-04.exe	2500	QueryDirectory	C:\WINDOWS\system32	SUCCESS	Filter: s
2:03:53.1089865 PM	Lab03-04.exe	2500	CloseFile	C:\WINDOWS	SUCCESS	
2:03:53.1090471 PM	Lab03-04.exe	2500	CreateFile	C:\WINDOWS\system32	SUCCESS	Desirec
2:03:53.1090837 PM	Lab03-04.exe	2500	QueryDirectory	C:\WINDOWS\system32\cmd.exe	SUCCESS	Filter: c
2:03:53.1091289 PM	Lab03-04.exe	2500	CloseFile	C:\WINDOWS\system32	SUCCESS	
2:03:53.1092063 PM	Lab03-04.exe	2500	QueryOpen	C:\WINDOWS\system32\cmd.exe	SUCCESS	Creation
2:03:53.1092767 PM	Lab03-04.exe	2500	QueryOpen	C:\WINDOWS\system32\cmd.exe	SUCCESS	Creation
2:03:53.1093460 PM	Lab03-04.exe	2500	QueryOpen	C:\WINDOWS\system32\cmd.exe:Zone.Identifier	NAME NOT FOUND	

At last this malware will delete itself and clean up the mess, but sometimes it won't work mostly when Process Monitor is turned on and you have to run it several times to see it deletes itself, but when you quit Process Monitor, this would delete itself immediately.

Process Name	PID	Operation	Path	Result	CreationTime: 2/12/2018 7:25:54 AM, LastAccessTime: 2/12/2018 2:03:53 PM, LastWriteTime: ...
03-04.exe	2500	QueryOpen	C:\Documents and Settings\Vin Yang\Desktop...	SUCCESS	
03-04.exe	2500	Process Create	C:\WINDOWS\system32\cmd.exe	SUCCESS	PID: 3720, Command line: "C:\WINDOWS\system32\cmd.exe" /c del C:\DOCUME~1\VINYAN...
03-04.exe	2500	CloseFile	C:\WINDOWS\system32\cmd.exe	SUCCESS	
03-04.exe	2500	RegCloseKey	HKCR\exe\file\shell\open	SUCCESS	
03-04.exe	2500	RegCloseKey	HKCR\exe	SUCCESS	

We can't see this malware call any functions or import any libraries related to network or sockets, but when run strings command, we can however see something related to HTTP and "http://www.practicalmalwareanalysis.com". We extract this program to different directories and we find that it only deletes the file which are clicked and runned, the other copies are still safe on the disk and not detected by the malware.

2. This malware can delete itself after opened, which can cause a problem for the analysis. We need to pause this malware before it delete itself so we can better analyze and figure out what it really did.
3. Tools like Ollydbg, which can pause the malware and analyze step by step can run this program, also the best way is to use IDA Pro and find out what reasons lead to the branch and prevent it.