Soft Prompts Go Hard: Steering Visual Language Models with Hidden Meta-Instructions

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Abstract

We introduce a new type of indirect, cross-modal injection attacks against language models that operate on images: hidden "meta-instructions" that influence how the model interprets the image and steer the model's outputs to express an adversary-chosen style, sentiment, or point of view.

We explain how to create meta-instructions by generating images that act as soft prompts. In contrast to jailbreaking attacks and adversarial examples, outputs produced in response to these images are plausible and based on the visual content of the image, yet also satisfy the adversary's (meta-)objective.

We evaluate the efficacy of meta-instructions for multiple visual language models and adversarial meta-objectives, and demonstrate how they can "unlock" capabilities of the underlying language models that are unavailable via explicit text instructions. We describe how meta-instruction attacks could cause harm by enabling creation of malicious, self-interpreting content that carries spam, misinformation, and spin. Finally, we discuss defenses.

1 Introduction

Large language models (LLMs) operating on third-party content—webpages, wikis, forums, social media, emails and messages, and user-generated content in general—are vulnerable to *indirect prompt injection* [14]. By hiding prompts in content under their control, adversaries can try to influence outputs and actions generated by LLMs when processing this content.

Many modern LLMs accept inputs in multiple modalities. We refer to LLMs that operate on images as Visual Language Models (VLMs). Multi-modal LLMs are known to be vulnerable to adversarial examples [12, 40, 41], but injection attacks in non-text modalities are a new, yet-to-be-explored area of LLM safety research.

We introduce and evaluate a new class of indirect, cross-modal attacks against visual language models: adversarial **meta-instructions** that enable creation of **malicious**, **self-interpreting content**. We define a meta-instruction to be a stealthy image perturbation that steers outputs produced by a VLM to satisfy some adversarial meta-objective.

For example, a meta-instruction may steer the VLM to generate outputs that express a style, sentiment, or point of view chosen by the adversary. See an example in Figure 1: meta-instructions hidden in image perturbations change how the VLM answers the question about a stock performance chart depicted in the image. In all cases, the answer is based on the image, but, depending on the meta-instruction, the interpretation changes to positive or negative, or includes adversary-chosen spam, or specific URLs.

Figure 2 is another example—motivated by our prior experience with conference reviews obviously generated with the help of an LLM—where we steer the model's interpretation of an image of our own paper to positive or negative, depending on our choice of the meta-instruction.

Meta-instructions are an indirect attack. An adversary applies a perturbation with a hidden meta-instruction to a legitimate image, then plants the modified image in a webpage, social media post, or personal message (see Figure 5). When the user asks a VLM about the image, the VLM's entire conversation with the user will follow the meta-instruction and satisfy the adversary's meta-objective.

Adversarial meta-instructions can be "weaponized" to produce misinformation, propaganda, or spin [3] when untrusted images are processed by LLM-augmented search engines, news and social-media summarizers, or personal assistants. There is already evidence that real-world adversaries use generative AI to rewrite legitimate news with explicit instructions to express certain political stances or slanted interpretations [27]. Hidden meta-instructions increase this attack surface. They enable the creation of "self-interpreting" images that automatically generate misinformation when processed by VLM-based systems—see an example in Figure 3.

Differences from jailbreaking attacks and adversarial examples. Jailbreaking attacks (see Section 2.3) use text or image perturbations to cause models to generate toxic or unsafe outputs, even if the same models refuse to generate such outputs in response to normal text prompts. The user is the attacker who submits adversarial inputs into the model.

The threat model of meta-instructions is different (see Sec-




Figure 1: Stock or stonk? (model: LLaVA)

tion 3). In meta-instruction attacks, users are *victims* of adversarial third-party content that they ask the model to process.

By design, jailbreaking causes models to produce toxic or harmful outputs that are contextually incoherent and would not have been produced in response to normal prompts. Adversarial examples, too, produce outputs that contradict humanperceived semantics of input images. Neither jailbreaking, nor adversarial examples are stealthy, thus neither can be used for indirect attacks. A user who is not an attacker would notice that the model's outputs are obviously wrong given the conversation context and the visual semantics of input images.

By contrast, meta-instructions are stealthy attacks. They use small image perturbations to produce outputs that are plausible given the user's prompt and the visual content of the image—yet also satisfy the adversary's objective.

Our contributions. We design, implement, and evaluate a method for creating a new type of image perturbations that act as cross-modal *soft prompts* for a language model while preserving the visual semantics of the image.

Soft prompts [17] are embedding vectors (see Section 2.2) that are concatenated to input embeddings to steer or influence a language model's response to its inputs. While highly effective, soft prompts cannot be used for prompt injection because they are embeddings (i.e., input encodings), not actual inputs. The adversary cannot submit embeddings to the model directly or indirectly. They can only submit inputs, which are then encoded into embedding vectors using the model's encoder that is not controlled by the adversary.

Given an image and an arbitrary meta-instruction, our method creates an image perturbation that acts as a soft prompt. Our method optimizes for two objectives: the outputs of the VLM should correctly describe the visual content of the image *and* also follow the meta-instruction. Our method is not specific to a particular meta-objective (such as toxicity, in the case of jailbreaking), nor to the prompts used by the victim to query the target model about the perturbed image. It is limited only by the model's ability to follow instructions.

We evaluate our method on the available open-source

VLMs with various meta-instructions corresponding to different meta-objectives. We demonstrate that image perturbations encoding our hidden meta-instructions are as effective in steering models' outputs as explicit instructions. In several cases, meta-instructions are *stronger*. For example, they successfully steer LLaVA to talk in Spanish or French (see Section 5.2) or like Harry Potter (see Figure 4), even though LLaVA does not follow equivalent text instructions. We conjecture that our image perturbations, acting as soft prompts, recover capabilities of the underlying LLM (Llama) that are not available in the instruction-tuned, Llama-based VLM (LLaVA).

We also demonstrate our meta-instruction perturbations preserve image semantics (unlike jailbreaking attacks and adversarial examples). We use several metrics, including embedding and structural similarity and oracle LLM evaluation, to show that target VLMs' responses are indeed based on the visual content of input images. Our methods for measuring preservation of semantics can be potentially applied to other injection attacks (see Section 2.4).

We evaluate stealthiness by measuring the effect of perturbation size on the attack success rate. We also consider transferable and black-box variants of the attack. Finally, we discuss and evaluate defenses.

To facilitate research on adversarial machine learning, We released our code and models.¹

2 Background and Related Work

2.1 Visual Language Models

We focus on *visual language models* (VLMs) that accept text and image inputs. These models typically combine a pretrained generative language model such as Llama [36] with a text encoder and an image (visual) encoder [18].

VLMs are intended to accurately respond to prompts about their input images and maintain contextually coherent conversations with users regarding these images.

Let θ be a VLM that contains the text encoder θ^{T}_{enc} , the image encoder θ^{I}_{enc} , and the language decoder θ_{dec} . The text of the prompt $p \in P$, e.g., "describe the image", is fed into the text encoder θ^{T}_{enc} , and the image $x \in X$ is fed into the image encoder. Their respective embeddings produced by the encoders are concatenated and fed into the language decoder:

$$\theta(p, x) = \theta_{dec} \left(\theta_{enc}^{T}(p) \oplus \theta_{enc}^{I}(x) \right) = y \tag{1}$$

An instruction-tuned VLM generates text outputs in response to prompts and images, i.e., $(P,X) \rightarrow Y$.

2.2 Soft Prompts

Brown et al. [6] demonstrated that prompt design can significantly impact the behavior of language models. Creating effective prompts is costly, however, because it requires substantial human effort. Furthermore, automatically optimizing prompts is inefficient because text prompts are discrete.

Lester et al. [17] introduced the concept of a "soft prompt" as a parameter-efficient fine-tuning method. In Equation 1, the language model takes prompts p and encodes them into $\theta^T_{enc}(p)$. The text of p is the "hard prompt", its embedding $\theta^T_{enc}(p)$ is the "soft prompt". Hard prompts are discrete and thus challenging to fine-tune with gradient descent, whereas soft prompts are continuous. Lester et al. [17] show that $\theta^T_{enc}(p)$ can be treated as model parameters and optimized via gradient descent. They find that even with a small number of parameters, soft-prompt tuning is competitive with full parameter tuning in models with billions of parameters.

There is prior research that explored prompt tuning from an adversarial perspective. Qi et al. [25] observed that image inputs in Equation 1 are projected and fed into the VLM as soft prompts. Image perturbations they generate by prompt tuning achieve a particular meta-objective (evasion of the target model's safety alignment) for a single, contextually incoherent response, which is unrelated to the image—see the discussion in Section 2.3.

2.3 Jailbreaking and Adversarial Examples

There are multiple examples² of adversarial images that "jail-break" VLMs by causing them to generate outputs that violate their safety guardrails, e.g., toxic text.

Shayegani et al. [34] generate adversarial images that look like noise and have no semantics.

Qi et al. [25] generate jailbreak images by maximizing the similarity between (1) the model's output given the image and a fixed text prompt (e.g., "describe the image") and (2) fixed text sequences drawn from a dataset of known harmful outputs. The resulting images cause the model to generate a harmful response in the first turn, but the rest of the conversation does not appear to be affected. While the induced responses are harmful (they satisfy the "toxicity" meta-objective, in our parlance), they tend to be unrelated to the input image.

Schwinn et al. [31] generate jailbreak images by targeting soft prompts in the embedding space. They maximize the similarity between (1) the model's output given the embedding of input tokens and the adversarial embedding perturbation (i.e., soft prompt), and (2) fixed harmful text sequences, similar to [25]. The resulting images evade safety alignment in open-sourced LLMs.

In general, training soft prompts on a dataset of fixed text sequences induces VLM responses that may satisfy a given meta-objective (such as toxicity) but do not match the context of the conversation, i.e., the user's prompts and visual semantics of the image. Such responses are implausible and thus not stealthy. They do not meet the requirements of our threat model (see Section 3) and cannot be used for indirect attacks.

Several papers show that VLMs [12,41] and multi-modal embeddings [40] are vulnerable to adversarial examples. The purpose of adversarial examples is opposite to the attacks

 $^{^{1} \}verb|https://github.com/Tingwei-Zhang/Soft-Prompts-Go-Hard|$

 $^{^2 \}verb|https://github.com/WhileBug/AwesomeLLMJailBreakPapers|$




Figure 2: Accept or reject? (model: LLaVA)




Figure 3: Terrorists or freedom fighers? (model: LLaVA)

considered in this paper. By definition, adversarial examples do not preserve image semantics. Instead, these attacks aim to create images (as well as inputs in other modalities) that are interpreted by VLMs in a way that is completely different and unrelated to how these images are perceived by human users. By contrast, we develop a new type of adversarial perturbations that preserve the visual content of the image (both to human users and to the VLM operating on the image) while steering the VLM to produce *plausible*, *contextually coherent* responses that follow adversarial meta-instructions.

2.4 Prompt Injection

Indirect prompt injection attacks were introduced in [14]. In an indirect attack, the attacker adds his prompt to some content (e.g., a webpage or an email) that another user, the

victim, uses as part of their prompt (e.g., they may ask the LLM a question about the attacker's webpage). The attacker's prompt then controls the LLM's responses to the victim.

There are several proof-of-concept examples of hiding prompts in images³ that add pixels explicitly spelling out the prompt to the image, typically in an imperceptible shade or color which is not noticeable to a human. This approach only works against VLMs that are capable of optical character recognition (OCR). In our experiments, this technique did not work against MiniGPT-4, LLaVa, nor InstructBLIP, the three VLMs considered in this paper, because they fail to recognize words in input images even when these words are not stealthy (e.g., black text on a white background). By contrast, the soft-

³https:
//simonwillison.net/2023/Oct/14/multi-modal-prompt-injection/




Figure 4: "Talk like..." meta-instruction (model: MiniGPT-4). Observe that the model refuses the explicit instruction to talk like a character but follows the equivalent meta-instruction.

prompt method introduced in this paper works regardless of the target model's OCR capabilities.

The closest related work is a proof of concept by Bagdasaryan et al. [2]. They give several examples, without systematic evaluation, of adversarial images that cause multimodal LLMs to generate arbitrary fixed strings chosen by the attacker. These strings may contain instructions. If and only if the string output by the LLM is consumed by the same LLM as part of its context for subsequent autoregressive generation, the LLM follows the instruction contained in the string. This attack is not stealthy because the adversary's instruction is always visible in the target model's first text output generated from the adversarial image. In this paper, we design and systematically evaluate a different method for injecting instructions into images. It does not rely on forcing the VLM to output a fixed text string, nor does it assume that the VLM adds its own outputs to the generation context.

Liu et al. [21] developed a benchmark for prompt injection attacks. In contrast to the meta-instructions presented in this paper, attacks in [21] cause LLMs to produce fixed outputs pre-determined by the adversary. This is suitable only for a narrow range of contexts (e.g., questions that can be answered with "yes" or "no"). Because fixed outputs do not preserve conversational coherence, they are less persuasive. For example, they can cause an LLM to tell an employer to hire a candidate, but cannot steer it to generate plausible reasons for the suggested decision.

In our experiments, we show that the success rate of metainstruction attacks is comparable to—and, in some cases, significantly *higher* than—explicit text instructions. Since the latter do not aim for stealthiness, they represent the upper bound on the success of prompt injection attacks. The evaluation methodology in [21] focuses on prompts with "Yes"/"No" answers and searching for predefined strings in the model's outputs. Our methodology for measuring the preservation of input semantics (see Section 5.1) can potentially help evaluate a broader range of injected prompts.

2.5 Model Spinning

Meta-instructions are an inference-time equivalent of training-time "model spinning" attacks introduced by Bagdasaryan and Shmatikov [3]. In those attacks, an adversary re-trains or fine-tunes a language model so that its outputs satisfy some adversarial meta-objective (conditionally, only if the input contains certain words chosen by the adversary). The meta-objectives in our work are similar: for example, adding an adversary-chosen sentiment, style, or spin to the outputs of a language model. They are achieved, however, not via training but via instructions hidden in inputs that unlock the adversary-chosen behavior in unmodified models at inference time.

3 Threat Model

The main proposed application of visual language models is to answer questions about images [18]. For example, a user may ask the model to explain an image or analyze the depicted scene. Visual language models can also be deployed as components of content-processing and content-generation systems, where their outputs are used to summarize and/or present information to human users.

When images on which VLMs operate come from websites, social media, and messaging apps, they should not be trusted. User-generated content can originate from anywhere, including adversaries pursuing a particular agenda or objective (we use the term "meta-objective" to distinguish from training objectives in machine learning). Such an adversary could attempt to craft an image that will cause VLMs to generate outputs satisfying the adversary's meta-objective.

It is possible to create an image perturbation that forces the VLM to respond with a predefined text sequence [2,4]. In general, however, the adversary does not know the context in which the VLM will be queried about the image, nor the specific prompts that will be used. The fixed sequence is likely to be incorrect, implausible, or incoherent in a given context.

We consider adversaries who aim to steer models to generate contextually coherent outputs that satisfy their metaobjectives [27]. Again, note the difference with jailbreaking, where the adversary's goal is to produce harmful or toxic outputs regardless of the context or visual content of the image.

To this end, an adversary can exploit the following observation. Whereas in classification tasks each input has a single correct output, there is a large range of "correct" or at least plausible answers that a generative model can produce in response to a given prompt. The model can thus be steered to generate a response that is contextually coherent (i.e., plausible and based on the visual content of the image) but also has some property or "spin" chosen by the adversary [3]. Exam-




Figure 5: Threat model.

ples include positive or negative sentiment and political bias (Figure 6 shows an example of the latter).

Meta-instructions. We say that t^* is a meta-instruction if it causes the model to generate text $y^z \in Y$ that satisfies a meta-objective $z \in Z$ (we use "meta-objective" and "spin" [13] interchangeably). For example, suppose an adversary chooses a meta-instruction that adds positive sentiment. This instruction tells the model to produce outputs that (a) respond to the user's prompts about the image and (b) are positive.

It is important that output y^z preserve input semantics, i.e., actually responds to the user's question about the image, otherwise the victim will notice the attack.

Formally, we define a predicate α : $Y \times Z \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ that holds when output $y \in Y$ satisfies the meta-objective $z \in Z$ and a "semantics preservation" predicate β : $P \times X \times Y \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ that holds when output $y \in Y$ is an appropriate response to question p about image y. Output y follows the meta-instruction t^* and answers question p about image x if $\alpha(\theta(p,x),z) = \beta(p,x,\theta(p,x)) = 1$. In practice, evaluating whether the output satisfies either predicate can be done using a separate evaluator model or an oracle language model—see Section 5.

Adversary's capabilities. Figure 5 schematically depicts our threat model. The adversary controls and can modify an image. The victim obtains the adversary's image from a website, messaging application, etc. and submits it to the VLM either directly, or via some application with its own prompt.

We assume that the adversary has access to a VLM, but not necessarily the same VLM that the victim will use (see Section 5.5). They can query the model either in a white-box (with access to the model's gradients) or black-box (only using API access) fashion but cannot modify it.

The adversary does not know the victim's text prompt, other than it will be some query about the adversary's image. Images are provided to models as actual inputs in a supported modality (i.e., the adversary cannot directly or indirectly submit embedding vectors).




Figure 6: Donkey or elephant? (model: LLaVA)

Adversary's goals. The adversary perturbs an image x by creating $x_{\delta} = x + \delta$, where the perturbation δ encodes a meta-instruction t^* . The adversary's first goal is that the VLM's output $\theta(p, x_{\delta}) = y^z$ on this image satisfy the adversary's meta-objective, i.e., $\alpha(\theta(p, x_{\delta}), z) = 1$. The adversary's second goal is that the output correctly respond to the user's question, i.e., $\beta(p, x_{\delta}, \theta(p, x_{\delta})) = 1$. The adversary's third goal is stealthiness: the perturbed image x_{δ} should be within some distance ϵ of the original image x, i.e., $|x - x_{\delta}| < \epsilon$. Many metrics are available for ϵ ; full discussion is outside the scope of this paper. Furthermore, the perturbed image should appear similar to the original image to a human.

4 Images as Soft Prompts

Figure 7 schematically depicts our method for generating images that act as soft prompts.

Generating question-answer pairs. We start by creating a synthetic dataset. We use the public API of OpenAI's Chat-GPT, specifically the GPT-4 models (GPT-4 Turbo and GPT-4o), for the experiments conducted between February 2024 and August 2024. Given an image x and its label l, we provide them to ChatGPT and prompt it to "generate N questions about l in the image." Let P be the resulting set of prompts, simulating natural user queries.

We then provide a meta-instruction t^* and request ChatGPT to answer each query $p \in P$ according to this meta-instruction with the prompt "answer the following questions about the l in the image with a z spin". In general, z could be any adversarial meta-objective. For the purposes of this paper, we use $z \in \{Positive, Negative, Neutral, Formal, Informal, Spam, \}$ URL injection}. A variant of this prompt is "answer the following questions about the l in the image in z", where $z \in \{English, Spanish, French\}$, or "answer the following questions about the l in the image with z", where $z \in \{Republican\ bias, Democratic\ bias\}$. For $z \in$ {Spam, URL in jection}, we append the sentence "Explore Bitconnect for potential investment opportunities" or "To find out more about this image, visit <maliciousurl>" to the output generated when z = English. Let the resulting answers be the $Y^z = \{y^z\}$. We use evaluator models (see Section 5.1) to check if y^z follows the meta-instruction (except for the spam and URL-injection meta-instructions). If answers don't follow the meta-instruction, we repeat generation until at least 80% of the answers pass the evaluator check.

By construction, text sequences in Y^z answer the prompt p about the image (with a spin prescribed by the meta-instruction). Image perturbations generated by our method thus preserve the semantics of the original image. By contrast,




Figure 7: Generating images that act as soft prompts.

jailbreak perturbations [25] are tuned to produce toxic outputs, which have no relation to the original images. Consequently, they do not preserve image semantics. We measure the preservation of image semantics for both methods in Section 5.3.

Our method for synthesizing question-answer pairs simulates a natural distribution of user queries and the corresponding responses, creating a realistic dataset for both training and evaluation. We use the entire set, including answers that fail the evaluator check described above. We use some pairs for training the adversarial mask, while the remaining pairs are used to evaluate whether the outputs follow the injected meta-instructions. More details can be found in Section 5.1.

Training image soft prompts. We use a standard technique from the adversarial examples literature, Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) [24], to search for a constrained perturbation $\delta < \epsilon$ to the input x that, when combined with P_i , will make the model output Y_i^z :

$$\min_{\delta} \mathcal{L}\left(\theta\left(\theta_{enc}^{T}(P) \mid \theta_{enc}^{I}(x+\delta)\right), Y^{z}\right)$$

We use cross-entropy for \mathcal{L} to compare the model's output with the target y^Z . We employ PGD in L_{∞} norm for most training and also consider PGD in L_2 norm when discussing stealthiness of perturbations in Section 5.4.

5 Evaluation

5.1 Experimental Setup

Target models. We evaluate our method on MiniGPT-4 [42], LLaVA [19], and InstructBLIP [11], three commonly used, open-source, multi-modal, instruction-following language models that are publicly available at the time we perform these experiments. The underlying VLMs used in MiniGPT-4 and InstructBLIP are Vicuna 13B, while LLaVA uses Llama-2 13B. We consider different versions and model sizes in our transferability experiments (see Section 5.5).

Meta-objectives. We select the following twelve meta-objectives: (1) Sentiment: positive, negative and neutral; (2) Formality: formal and informal; (3) Language: English, French and Spanish; (4) Political bias: republican bias and democratic bias; (5) Attack: spam and URL injection.

We pick these meta-objectives because they are amenable to systematic evaluation. For each objective from this list, it is possible to automatically check whether a given output satisfies it, using either an evaluator model or another LLM.

We employ the following models for our evaluation.

- (1) **Sentiment analysis.** We use the "twitter-roberta-base-sentiment-latest" library, ⁴ a pre-trained sentiment analysis model used in [8, 23] to capture sentiment-specific nuances in tweets. This model was trained on an extensive dataset of approximately 124 million tweets and fine-tuned for sentiment analysis with the TweetEval benchmark [5].
- (2) *Formality classification*. We use the "roberta-base-formality-ranker" library,⁵ a pre-trained classifier that determines whether English sentences are formal or informal. This model was trained on the biggest available dataset, Grammarly's Yahoo Answers Formality Corpus (GYAFC) [26], and its quality was evaluated in [1].
- (3) *Language detection*. We use the "xlm-roberta-base-language-detection" library⁶, a version of the XLM-RoBERTa base model [20] fine-tuned on the language identification dataset⁷. It is currently capable of detecting 20 languages.
- (4) **Political bias classification.** To create a synthetic dataset (see Section 4), we use the "distilbert-political-tweets" library, 8 which classifies short snippets of text as having either Democratic or Republican political bias. This model is a version of the DistilBERT base model (uncased) [30], fine-tuned

⁴https:

^{//}huggingface.co/cardiffnlp/twitter-roberta-base-sentiment-latest

https://huggingface.co/s-nlp/roberta-base-formality-ranker

⁶https:

^{//}huggingface.co/papluca/xlm-roberta-base-language-detection

⁷https://huggingface.co/datasets/papluca/language-identification

 $^{^8}$ https://huggingface.co/m-newhauser/distilbert-political-tweets

on the tweets (51.6% Democrat, 48.4% Republican)⁹ made by U.S. senators in 2021.

To evaluate whether VLM outputs contain political spin following the corresponding meta-instructions, we query Chat-GPT with the following prompt: "evaluate if there's left-wing bias, right-wing bias or no bias in the output".

(5) Attack classification. To evaluate whether VLM outputs satisfy the spam meta-objective, we query ChatGPT with this prompt: "evaluate whether the output promotes Bitconnect." For the URL-injection meta-instruction, we search for the exact match of "<maliciousurl>" in the output.

Data. We randomly select 5 images (and their labels) from ImageNet [29]. For each image, we generate 60 questions as described in Section 4. For each question and meta-instruction, we generate the response that satisfies the corresponding meta-objective by explicitly instructing the model. The question-answer dataset associated with each meta-instruction is split into 40 for training and 20 for testing.

Baselines. We compare our attack with two baselines.

- (1) *No instruction.* A clean image and a text question (prompt) about it, no additional instructions.
- (2) *Explicit instruction*. A clean image, a text prompt about it, and an explicit text instruction instructing the VLM to generate outputs satisfying a given meta-objective (e.g., "talk positive"). We use the same prompts that we use to generate the training data in Section 4.

Preservation of image semantics. To evaluate whether our perturbations preserve the visual content of images, we employ the following methodology.

(1) We use two similarity metrics to compare images: cosine similarity of their respective embedding vectors (computed using the target VLM's image encoder) and the structural similarity index (SSIM) [38]. SSIM is a method for measuring similarity between images, defined in the literature for assessing image quality. It is computed by comparing the luminance, contrast, and structure of images.

We compute these similarity metrics between the original and perturbed images and compare them with (a) similarity between the original image and an unrelated image randomly selected from the training dataset (see Section 4), (b) similarity between the original image and its augmentations, since augmentations are expected to preserve image semantics, and (c) similarity between the original image and images perturbed with the jailbreak method [25].

- (2) Query the target VLM whether the label accurately represents the content of the perturbed image, using the prompt "with yes or no, does l describe the content of x_{δ} ?"
- (3) Query an auxiliary oracle model, ChatGPT, whether the VLM's output generated with image soft prompts is relevant to the text prompt and the content of both the original and perturbed images. We use the following query: "with yes or

no, determine if [output of the model on inputs p and x_{δ}] is relevant to the l in the image and answers the question p?"

Hyperparameters. Unless specified, image soft prompts are trained at maximum perturbations of L_{∞} : $\epsilon = 32/255$, T = 2,000 iterations, step size $\alpha = 1/255$, and batch size of 8. We use the default hyperparameters for the target VLM during inference and evaluation.

Hardware setup and image generation time. We use a single A40 or A6000 48G GPU to train and evaluate each image soft prompt on MiniGPT-4 and InstructBLIP, which take approximately 3.5 hours and 1 hour per image, respectively. We use two A40 or A6000 48G GPUs for the same task on LLaVA, which takes approximately 1.5 hours per image.

5.2 Satisfying Meta-objectives

Table 1 reports our attack success rates—, i.e., how well the responses induced by our images follow the corresponding meta-instructions—against MiniGPT-4, LLaVA, and Instruct-BLIP. These results show that all twelve meta-instructions achieve results comparable to explicit instructions.

For some meta-objectives, such as political bias and informal text, spam, and URL injection, even explicit text instructions do not achieve a high success rate. We attribute this to the limitations of our target VLMs' instruction-following.

Interestingly, in some cases (indicated in bold in Table 1), images with hidden meta-instructions achieve significantly higher success than explicit instructions. For example, none of the models consistently follow explicit instructions to produce outputs that contain adversary-chosen spam or specific URLs, yet when equivalent meta-instructions are added to images trained as soft prompts, Minigpt-4 includes spam (respectively, adversary's URLs) in the outputs for 56% (respectively 30%) of the images. LLaVA includes spam (respectively, adversary's URLs) in the outputs for 91% (respectively 67%) of the images. InstructBLIP includes spam (respectively, adversary's URLs) in the outputs for 76% (respectively 41%) of the images. As mentioned in Section 1, we conjecture that instruction-tuning of these models on image-description prompts suppressed some of the instruction-following capabilities of the underlying LLM. Our images, acting as soft prompts, "unlock" these capabilities.

5.3 Preserving Image Semantics

In Table 2, we measure the similarity between clean and perturbed images using the cosine similarity of the image-encoder embeddings and SSIM.

First, we calculate the average similarity between unrelated images randomly selected from the training dataset. This is the lower-bound baseline for the similarity metrics. Second, we compute the average similarity of an image to its augmented versions (which we assume have the same visual semantics) using various techniques: JPEG compression, Gaussian Blur, Random Affine, Color Jitter, Random Horizontal Flip, and Random Perspective. Third, we compute the

 $^{^9 {\}tt https://huggingface.co/datasets/m-newhauser/senator-tweets}$

Table 1: **Results for meta-instruction following.** We compare the success rate of our attack with the no-attack baseline and explicit text instructions. Arrows indicate the improvement relative to the no-attack baseline. Bold numbers indicate where our attack works as well as or better than explicit instructions.

			MiniGPT-	4	LLaVA			InstructBLIP			
Meta-Objectives		No attack	Explicit instruction	Our attack	No attack	Explicit instruction	Our attack	No attack	Explicit instruction	Our attack	
Sentiment	Positive	0.23	0.53 (0.30↑)	0.62 (0.39↑)	0.39	0.85 (0.46↑)	0.66 (0.27↑)	0.37	0.35 (0.02\1)	0.55 (0.18↑)	
	Negative	0.11	0.35 (0.24↑)	0.34 (0.23↑)	0.03	0.63 (0.60↑)	0.47 (0.44†)	0.04	0.13 (0.09↑)	0.30 (0.26↑)	
	Neutral	0.66	0.66	0.70 (0.04↑)	0.58	0.57 (0.011)	0.60 (0.02↑)	0.59	0.70 (0.11†)	0.69 (0.10↑)	
ge	English	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.96 (0.041)	0.99 (0.011)	
Language	Spanish	0.00	0.84 (0.84↑)	0.71 (0.71↑)	0.00	0.02 (0.02↑)	0.34 (0.34↑)	0.00	0.03 (0.03↑)	0.42 (0.42↑)	
La	French	0.00	0.74 (0.74↑)	0.70 (0.70↑)	0.00	0.02 (0.02↑)	0.54 (0.54↑)	0.00	0.01 (0.01\(\gamma\))	0.22 (0.22↑)	
ality	Formal	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.97	0.10 (0.871)	1.00 (0.03↑)	
Formality	Informal	0.00	0.08 (0.08↑)	0.28 (0.28↑)	0.00	0.23 (0.23↑)	0.54 (0.54↑)	0.03	1.00 (0.97↑)	0.41 (0.38↑)	
olitical bias	Republican	0.00	0.16 (0.16↑)	0.17 (0.17↑)	0.00	0.30 (0.30↑)	0.32 (0.32↑)	0.00	0.04 (0.04↑)	0.24 (0.24↑)	
Political bias	Democrat	0.00	0.13 (0.13↑)	0.48 (0.48↑)	0.00	0.21 (0.21↑)	0.22 (0.22↑)	0.00	0.00	0.21 (0.21↑)	
	Spam	0.00	0.02 (0.02↑)	0.56 (0.56†)	0.00	0.22 (0.22↑)	0.91 (0.91↑)	0.00	0.02 (0.02↑)	0.76 (0.76↑)	
Attack	URL injection	0.00	0.04 (0.04↑)	0.30 (0.30↑)	0.00	0.17 (0.17↑)	0.67 (0.67↑)	0.00	0.00	0.41 (0.41↑)	

similarity between a clean image and its perturbed version produced by the jailbreaking method [25], as described in Section 2.3. This method aims to maximize the similarity between LLM outputs and a set of harmful outputs, irrespective of the image content.

Results in Table 2 show that our method preserves image semantics, whereas the jailbreaking method does not.

Cosine similarity results show that similarities between the embeddings of clean and perturbed images (MiniGPT-4: 0.601, LLaVA: 0.332, InstructBLIP: 0.235) are slightly lower than those between clean and augmented images (MiniGPT-4: 0.809, LLaVA: 0.362, InstructBLIP: 0.430). This suggests that our perturbations lose some of the semantic content of the images. We also include similarities between clean images and, respectively, visual jailbreaking and unrelated images, all of which are lower than our perturbed images.

SSIM is an independent metric that measures image similarity at the pixel level. SSIM results are similar to the embedding-similarity results. SSIM values for perturbed images (MiniGPT-4: 0.316, LLaVA: 0.337, LLaVA: 0.313) are close to those of augmented images (MiniGPT-4: 0.432, LLaVA: 0.432, LLaVA: 0.476) and higher than for unrelated (0) and jailbreaking (MiniGPT-4: 0.173, LLaVA: 0.188, InstructBLIP: 0.181) images, further confirming that our perturbations maintain quality and structural integrity of images.

Table 3 shows the results of LLM-based measurement of

image preservation. The first, fourth, and seventh columns show how often the target VLM responds that the label accurately represents the content of the perturbed images, as described in Section 5.1. For MiniGPT-4, this value averages 46%, compared to 88% for LLaVA and 67% for InstructBLIP. These values are similar to those for clean images (43% and 100%, respectively). We attribute this to the differences in models' inherent capabilities to describe images.

The other columns in Table 3 show the percentage of responses deemed by the oracle LLM as relevant to the prompts and the corresponding clean and perturbed images, respectively. For all three models, these values are very high, averaging 97%. This indicates that the models' outputs are contextually accurate for our perturbed images.

By contrast, jailbreaking images force the model to generate harmful outputs that are irrelevant and unrelated to either clean or perturbed images, even though they use the same ϵ as our perturbations and appear visually similar to clean images. This demonstrates that **small** ϵ is insufficient to preserve the **semantics of images** (as interpreted by the LLM) and highlights the necessity to train with text sequences that answer questions about the image, as described in Section 4.

Overall, Tables 2 and 3 suggest that while there are some variations in how VLMs interpret images, our method creates image soft prompts that preserve the visual content of images.

Table 2: Image preservation analysis for MiniGPT-4, LLaVA, and InstructBLIP by comparing embedding similarity and SSIM between clean and perturbed images under different meta-objectives. We include three baselines: unrelated images, augmentations, and visual-jailbreaking images. Average values are calculated across the perturbations for all ten meta-objectives.

		MiniGPT-4		LLaVA		InstructBLIP	
		Embed Sim	SSIM	Embed Sim	SSIM	Embed Sim	SSIM
Baselines	Unrelated image Augmentation Jailbreaking	0.535 0.809 0.393	0.000 0.432 0.173	0.259 0.362 0.311	0.000 0.432 0.188	0.187 0.430 0.162	0.000 0.476 0.181
Meta-Objectives	Sentiment Language Formality Political bias Attack	0.617 0.673 0.644 0.599 0.474	0.317 0.318 0.316 0.317 0.312	0.358 0.323 0.313 0.332 0.334	0.339 0.340 0.337 0.336 0.335	0.252 0.231 0.284 0.217 0.237	0.313 0.313 0.312 0.314 0.312
	Average	0.601	0.316	0.332	0.337	0.235	0.313

Table 3: Image preservation analysis for MiniGPT-4, LLaVA, and InstructBLIP using oracle-LLM evaluation. The table includes two baselines: clean images and visual-jailbreaking images. Average values are calculated across the perturbations for all twelve meta-objectives, using the metrics "Label Depicts Image" (LDI), "Output Relevant to Clean Image" (ORCI), and "Output Relevant to Perturbed Image" (ORPI).

Baselines and Meta-Objectives			MiniGPT	-4	LLaVA			InstructBLIP		
		LDI	ORCI	ORPI	LDI	ORCI	ORPI	LDI	ORCI	ORPI
Baseline	Clean image	0.43	0.92	NA	1.00	1.00	NA	1.00	1.00	NA
Daseille	Jailbreak	0.10	0.00	0.00	0.30	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	Sentiment	0.55	0.97	0.96	0.90	0.98	0.98	0.73	1.00	0.97
	Language	0.37	0.97	0.99	1.00	0.96	0.97	0.53	0.98	0.97
Meta-Objectives	Formality	0.47	0.97	0.98	0.89	0.98	0.98	0.70	1.00	0.96
	Political bias	0.58	0.93	0.94	0.81	0.92	0.93	0.80	0.97	0.96
	Attack	0.32	0.95	0.94	0.78	0.94	0.94	0.60	0.98	0.97
	Average	0.46	0.96	0.96	0.88	0.96	0.96	0.67	0.99	0.97

5.4 Making Perturbations Stealthy

Table 4 shows the results for the sentiment meta-instruction under different perturbation norms: L_{∞} ($\epsilon = 16/255, 32/255$) and L_2 ($\epsilon = 6, 12, 24$). Figure 8 shows examples of image soft prompts with different perturbations.

Sharif et al. [33] demonstrated that perturbations with L_2 norm of 6 are less noticeable to humans than perturbations with L_∞ norm (16/255). Results in Table 4 show that applying perturbations with L_2 norm or lower L_∞ norms (e.g., 16/255) creates less-perceptible changes while still steering the model to follow the meta-instruction. The meta-instruction following rate (i.e., the percentage of outputs for which the meta-objective is satisfied) for L_2 perturbations with ϵ = 6 (Positive: 41%, Negative: 22%, Neutral: 77%) is similar to perturbations with ϵ = 12 (Positive: 49%, Negative: 18%, Neutral: 72%). Although there is a slight drop compared to explicit instructions and image soft prompts generated with L_∞ norm and ϵ = 32 (Positive: 62%, Negative: 34%, Neutral: 69%), we achieve a good balance between stealthiness of the perturbation and inducing outputs that satisfy the meta-objective.



Figure 8: Image soft prompts with different perturbation norms and bounds.

Table 4: Results for sentiment meta-instruction following on MiniGPT-4 with different perturbation norms and ϵ .

Perturbation norm	_	Sentiment				
Perturbation norm	ε Positive		Negative	Neutral		
No attack	-	0.23	0.11	0.66		
Explicit instruction	-	0.53	0.35	0.66		
	6	0.41	0.22	0.77		
L_2	12	0.49	0.18	0.72		
	24	0.63	0.47	0.64		
T	16/255	0.51	0.29	0.56		
L_{∞}	32/255	0.62	0.34	0.70		

Table 5: Success rates of attacking different target VLMs with image soft prompts trained on MiniGPT-4 (Vicuna V0 13B).

Target Model	Attack	Positive	Negative	Neutral
MiniGPT-4	No Attack	0.17	0.09	0.74
(Vicuna V0 7B)	Transfer	0.44	0.42	0.85
MiniGPT-4	No Attack	0.25	0.05	0.70
(Llama2 7B)	Transfer	0.53	0.29	0.81
LLaVA	No Attack	0.39	0.03	0.58
(Llama2 13B)	Transfer	0.52	0.10	0.63
InstructBLIP	No Attack	0.37	0.04	0.59
(Vicuna V0 13B)	Transfer	0.53	0.21	0.64

5.5 Transferability

Table 5 presents the success rates of image soft prompt transfer attacks trained on MiniGPT-4 (Vicuna V0 13B) when applied to different target visual language models (VLMs), including various versions and sizes of MiniGPT-4, LLaVA, and InstructBLIP.

To mitigate low transfer rates due to overfitting, we evaluate 10 different checkpoints of each soft prompt and select the one that achieves the highest success rate in meeting the metaobjective. These results demonstrate that the transfer attack is effective across VLMs of varying sizes and architectures. Specifically, image soft prompts trained on MiniGPT-4 (Vicuna V0 13B) successfully transfer to MiniGPT-4 (Vicuna V0 7B), MiniGPT-4 (Llama2 7B), LLaVA (Llama2 13B), and InstructBLIP (Vicuna V0 13B), compared to their performance on clean images. The average success rates for achieving positive, negative, and neutral sentiment meta-objectives are 51%, 26%, and 73%, respectively.

These robust transfer results demonstrate that the attack can be effective even if the adversary does not know which specific architecture (or even specific VLM) the victim will be applying to the adversary's images. Therefore, meta-instructions can potentially be used to generate malicious, self-interpreting content for realistic scenarios described in Section 3.

Table 6: Effectiveness of the JPEG compression defense on MiniGPT-4. We compare attack success rates of image soft prompts with and without this defense, as well as the rate on clean images (no attack).

	Positive	Negative	Neutral
Clean Images	0.23	0.11	0.66
Our attack	0.62	0.34	0.70
Our attack+JPEG defense	0.41	0.07	0.56

6 Defenses

There is a large body of research on training adversarially robust models [24, 32]. For better or for worse, little of this research has found its way to real-world LLMs, whether production models or available research prototypes. Implementors of LLMs have not been interested in adversarial robustness, with a few exceptions, such as protecting models from jail-breaking [9, 10, 28] and prompt injection [37]. One of the reasons could be the negative impact of adversarial robustness on model performance, which is especially pronounced for multi-modal models. For example, adversarially robust contrastive learning significantly reduces accuracy even on basic tasks such as CIFAR [39].

Inference-time defenses aim to filter adversarial inputs and/or outputs. Llama Guard [15] is an LLM-based model that detects unsafe content in LLM inputs and outputs. Lakera [16] provides an API service to detect malicious inputs to LLMs. These defenses are independent of the model and don't affect LLM performance. The types of adversarial inputs and outputs tackled by these defenses are different from those considered in this paper.

We focus on practical inference-time defenses that can be implemented as wrappers around existing models, primarily via input pre-processing.

6.1 Feature Distillation

Defenses of this type apply transformations that preserve visual features of the image while destroying adversarial features [22]. JPEG compression is an example of such a transformation. In our case, adding a JPEG compression layer before encoding input images significantly reduces the efficacy of meta-instructions hidden in image perturbations.

Table 6 shows that when JPEG compression is applied to the perturbed images, success of the attack, i.e., percentage of outputs that satisfy the adversary's meta-objective (sentiment, in this case) drops significantly. This indicates that JPEG compression disrupts adversarial features while maintaining the visual content of the image. Note that attack success rates are non-zero even on clean images because responses to clean images occasionally satisfy the meta-objective without any instructions from the adversary.

This aligns with findings from prior research, which demonstrated that applying JPEG compression can significantly lower the effectiveness of adversarial perturbations against

Table 7: Anomaly detection against image soft prompts. Cosine similarity between the embeddings of unperturbed inputs x
(respectively, image soft prompts x_{δ}) and those of their augmentations. Standard deviations are reported.

Augmentation method	Minio	GPT-4	LLa	LLaVA InstructBLIP		
- Tugmentation method	x	x_{δ}	$x x_{\delta}$		x	x_{δ}
JPEG	0.805 ± 0.097	0.503 ± 0.115	0.414 ± 0.068	0.446 ± 0.137	0.521 ± 0.070	0.279 ± 0.037
GaussianBlur	0.624 ± 0.195	0.490 ± 0.114	0.520 ± 0.113	0.442 ± 0.124	0.576 ± 0.025	0.265 ± 0.044
RandomAffine	0.764 ± 0.170	0.544 ± 0.120	0.391 ± 0.140	0.278 ± 0.067	0.392 ± 0.067	0.214 ± 0.031
ColorJitter	0.881 ± 0.059	0.705 ± 0.114	0.362 ± 0.089	0.461 ± 0.136	0.542 ± 0.072	0.290 ± 0.050
RandomHorizontalFlip	0.961 ± 0.074	0.817 ± 0.233	0.355 ± 0.082	0.296 ± 0.045	0.414 ± 0.064	0.236 ± 0.032
RandomPerspective	0.996 ± 0.009	0.844 ± 0.192	0.618 ± 0.351	0.576 ± 0.354	0.749 ± 0.347	0.636 ± 0.406
Average	0.839 ± 0.101	0.651 ± 0.148	0.443 ± 0.141	0.424 ± 0.143	0.532 ± 0.108	0.320 ± 0.100

multi-modal encoders [40].

Defenses of this type can usually be evaded by an adaptive adversary who incorporates the defense into the perturbation generation process. For example, Zhang et al. demonstrate JPEG-evading multi-modal embedding attacks [40]. We follow the same technique and add a differentiable approximation of JPEG compression [35] to our perturbation method, aiming to train a more robust image soft prompt that could evade JPEG defenses.

In our case, this evasion failed. Even in the absence of the defense, images trained using this method induce VLM outputs that do not follow the meta-instruction, thus failing the primary (meta-)objective of the attack. This finding indicates that image soft prompts are somewhat brittle and difficult to train robustly. We leave evasion of feature-distillation defenses and countermeasures to future work.

6.2 Anomaly Detection

By design, image embeddings are intended to preserve essential visual features of images. These features are also preserved by various augmentations (flips, jitter, etc.). Therefore, a plausible defense is to compare the embedding of an input image with the embeddings of its augmentations. For normal images, the embeddings should be similar; for images with adversarial perturbations, there may be significant differences.

Table 7 shows our evaluation of this defense. We use all twelve meta-instructions for this evaluation.

For MiniGPT-4 (respectively, InstructBLIP), the average cosine similarity between the embeddings of unperturbed images and their augmentations is 0.839 (respectively 0.532), whereas for perturbed images, it is lower at 0.651 (respectively 0.320). For LLaVA, however, the average cosine similarity between the unperturbed (respectively, perturbed) images and their augmentations is 0.443 (respectively, 0.424). The confidence intervals of these values overlap, indicating that the defense may not be effective for LLaVA.

7 Discussion and Future Research

We introduced a new type of attack that enables adversaries to add stealthy "meta-instructions" to images that influence how visual language models respond to queries about these images. Meta-instructions keep responses contextually coherent and relevant to the visual content of the image while steering them to satisfy some adversary-chosen meta-objective or "spin" (e.g., positive or negative sentiment or political bias or spam). In instruction-tuned visual language models such as LLaVA, meta-instructions can be more powerful than explicit instructions and unlock capabilities of the base LLM that are not available via explicit prompts in the VLM.

We designed, implemented, and evaluated a novel method for creating images with meta-instructions. This method generates adversarial perturbations that act as "soft prompts" for the target model. In general, efficacy of meta-instructions is limited by the capabilities of the target VLM's decoder model. We demonstrated that image soft prompts generated with our method transfer across VLMs, including models using different architectures. This demonstrates that meta-instructions can be a viable method to create self-interpreting adversarial content even if the creator does not know the specific VLM that will be used to process their content.

Smaller, stealthier perturbations reduce efficacy of metainstructions. Furthermore, the current version of the attack is defeated by simple defenses such as JPEG compression. An interesting direction for future research is to investigate local soft-prompt perturbations, akin to adversarial patches [7], that can be applied to any image.

Another question for future research is measuring, with various prompts about the original and perturbed images, how much semantic information about the image is lost due to applying soft-prompt perturbations.

In this paper, we investigated image soft prompts, but similar techniques can also be used (and potentially prove more powerful) for inputs in other modalities, such as audio.

Future user-oriented research can study whether humans find VLMs responses to meta-instructions plausible and persuasive for various adversarial meta-objectives.

On the defense side, developers of multi-modal language models should understand how their models can be used as conduits for attacks, and how untrusted content can expose model users to risks such as phishing and misinformation.

Societal Impact and Ethical Considerations

Visual Language Models have been proposed for applications, e.g., personal assistants, that mediate users' access to information by explaining images, figures, and articles. Understanding how an adversary could attempt to influence users by manipulating inputs to VLMs and how to protect users from these threats are important steps toward safely deploying these models in the real world.

This research was conducted with a focus on ethical responsibility, particularly concerning the potential misuse of indirect prompt injection attacks. We emphasize the importance of defensive strategies and have outlined measures to prevent unethical use of our findings in Section 6.

Open Science Policy

To support transparency and facilitate further research in adversarial machine learning, we have released our code and models (see Section 1).

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