Sri Lanka Institute of Information Technology



Bug Bounty - Report 06HTTP to HTTPS Insecure Transition in Form Post


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IE2062 - Web Security

B.Sc. (Hons) in information Technology Specializing in Cyber Security

Report 06 – mozilla.org/en-US/ (Hackerone)

Main domain – www.mozilla.org/en-US/



I used OWASP ZAP tool to scan the website.

In scope domains

http://mozilla.org/en-US/


https://mozilla.org/en-US/

Out of scope domains

https://shavar.services.mozilla.com/downloads?client=navclient-auto-ffox&appver=115.13&pver=2.2

https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/

https://www.mozilla.org/favicon.ico



Nmap – Network scanning and enumeration

I found all the open ports and detected the running services on the target server using Nmap.

```
(nelushi® kali)-[~]
$ nmap mozilla.org -vv
Starting Nmap 7.95 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2025-05-01 15:19 CDT
Warning: Hostname mozilla.org resolves to 2 IPs. Using 35.190.14.201.
Initiating Ping Scan at 15:19
Scanning mozilla.org (35.190.14.201) [4 ports]
Completed Ping Scan at 15:19, 0.01s elapsed (1 total hosts)
Initiating Parallel DNS resolution of 1 host. at 15:19
Completed Parallel DNS resolution of 1 host. at 15:19, 0.09s elapsed
Initiating SYN Stealth Scan at 15:19
Scanning mozilla.org (35.190.14.201) [1000 ports]
Discovered open port 443/tcp on 35.190.14.201
Discovered open port 80/tcp on 35.190.14.201
Completed SYN Stealth Scan at 15:19, 4.29s elapsed (1000 total ports)
Nmap scan report for mozilla.org (35.190.14.201)
Host is up, received reset ttl 255 (0.0096s latency).
Other addresses for mozilla.org (not scanned): 2600:1901:0:c197::
rDNS record for 35.190.14.201: 201.14.190.35.bc.googleusercontent.com
Scanned at 2025-05-01 15:19:15 CDT for 4s
Not shown: 998 filtered tcp ports (no-response)
PORT STATE SERVICE REASON
80/tcp open http syn-ack ttl 64
443/tcp open https syn-ack ttl 64
Read data files from: /usr/share/nmap
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 4.52 seconds
Raw packets sent: 2005 (88.184KB) | Rcvd: 6 (248B)
```

Amass - Subdomain and DNS mapping

I found all the subdomains related to the target domain using Amass.

```
(nelushi⊕ kali)-[~]

$ amass enum -d mozilla.org

mozilla.org (FQDN) → ns_record → ns1-240.akam.net (FQDN)

mozilla.org (FQDN) → ns_record → ns4-64.akam.net (FQDN)

mozilla.org (FQDN) → ns_record → ns7-66.akam.net (FQDN)

mozilla.org (FQDN) → ns_record → ns5-65.akam.net (FQDN)

mozilla.org (FQDN) → mx_record → alt2.aspmx.l.google.com (FQDN)

mozilla.org (FQDN) → mx_record → aspmx.l.google.com (FQDN)

ns1-240.akam.net (FQDN) → a_record → 193.108.91.240 (IPAddress)

ns1-240.akam.net (FQDN) → aname_record → wp.wpenginepowered.com (FQDN)

riskheatmap.security.mozilla.org (FQDN) → a_record → 35.164.214.130 (IPAddress)

riskheatmap.security.mozilla.org (FQDN) → a_record → 35.82.219.168 (IPAddress)


riskheatmap.security.mozilla.org (FQDN) → a_record → mdn.prod.mdn.prod.webservices.mozgcp.net (FQDN)

addons.mozilla.org (FQDN) → a_record → 151.101.129.91 (IPAddress)

addons.mozilla.org (FQDN) → a_record → 151.101.193.91 (IPAddress)
```

Wafw00f - Firewall Detection

Command used – wafw00f https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/



Whatweb – to identify the technologies used by the site.

Commans used – whatweb https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/

```
(nelushi@ kali)-[~]

$ whatweb https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/

https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/

[200 OK] Content-Language[en-US], Country[SWEDEN][S]], Email[c3ab8514873549d5b3785ebc7fb83c80@01069899.ingest.sentry.io,yourname@examp

le.com], HTML5, HTTPServer[granian], IP[146.75.47.19], Open-Graph-Protocol[website], Script, Strict-Transport-Security[max-age-31536000], Title[Mozilla - Internet for people, not profit (US)], UncommonHeaders[referrer-policy,x-content-type-options,x-backend-server,x-clacks-overhead,content-security-policy,cross-origin-opener-policy,content-security-policy-report-only,x-served-by,x-cache-hits,x-timer], Via-Proxy[1.1 google, 1.1 varnish, 1.1 varnish], X-Backend[bedrock-c9fb76ff8-s8xwd.gcp-us-west1], X-Frame-Options[DENY]
```


Vulnerability 01

Domain

https://basket.mozilla.org/news/subscribe/

Vulnerability title

HTTP to HTTPS Insecure Transition in Form Post



Vulnerability description

The "HTTP to HTTPS Insecure Transition in Form Post" vulnerability exists when a website loads via HTTP and contains a form designed to post information to a HTTPS endpoint.

The form transition from to an HTTP to HTTPS endpoint is dangerous because the initial page is unsecure, opening the door for several types of Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) attacks.

Why is this a Security Risk?

MitM Attack Possibility: Because the page loaded over HTTP, the content of the page could be altered by an attacker. In this case, the real/secure HTTPS form could be modified or spoofed, meaning a user could be led into submitting their username, password or sensitive information to another site.

Trust Risk: Modern browsers will alert users of an insecure form submission reducing the level of trust a user has in the page.

Session Cookies Hijack: If session cookies are not securely protected, an attacker could steal and transfer them to access a user's account.

How does this work?

The security check looks for HTTP pages that contain forms submitting information to an HTTPS endpoint. Since the page is loaded via HTTP, an attacker can overwrite the original form with their own form prior to the user submitting their information.

Affected Components

Web Pages with Forms (Frontend)

Login Pages (login.html, index.php)

Registration Pages (signup.html)

Password Reset Pages (reset-password.html)

Payment Pages (checkout.html)

If these pages load over HTTP but submit data to the HTTPS connection, an adversary might inject a malicious form or modify the request.

• Web Server Configuration (Backend)

Apache, Nginx, IIS - If the web server is misconfigured, the server might allow an HTTP page, thus allowing someone to view the page, but only secure a form submission.

Missing a Redirect from HTTP to HTTPS - If someone is able to access the website via an HTTP connection, that's an issue.

No HSTS (HTTP Strict Transport Security) - Without HSTS, attackers can downgrade the connection to HTTP using an SSL stripping connection.

• Cookies and Sessions

Session Cookies - If cookies do not have the Secure Flag or the HttpOnly flag, they can be transmitted via HTTP, allowing the attacker to steal the cookies.

CSRF Tokens - If CSRF tokens are generated from an HTTP page, then adversaries can steal and leverage those tokens in attacks.

Impact assessment

Severity - Medium

Man-in-the-Middle Attacks

Attackers can capture the HTTP page before submitting the form.

A forgery form can replace an original form secured by HTTPS, resulting in credential information theft.

• Session Hijacking & Account Takeover

If session cookies are sent over HTTP, attackers can take the cookie and reuse it to gain unauthorized access.

• Phishing & Spoofing Attacks

Users could unknowingly submit input to a malicious version of the forms the attacker injected.

This could lead to identity theft, fraud financial transactions, and reputational damage.

• User Trust & Browser Warnings

Modern browsers warn users of insecure submissions, causing damage to a consumer's trust.

Potential loss of customers as a result of security concerns.

Overall Risk: Critical for pages related to authentication and payment.


Steps to reproduce with Proof of Concept (poc)

1. First, I tried to identify an HTTP Page with a Secure Form Submission

I opened the target website in a browser using HTTP and checked the source code to find a form like,


Ex: <form action="https://example.com/login" method="POST">

I confirmed that the page loads over HTTP but the form submits to HTTPS.



2. Then, I checked if there are any security headers like HSTS by opening the developer tools, network tab.

The header is not set.



The site is vulnerable to downgrading attacks, in which an attacker will force the user to send data over HTTP instead of HTTPS.

Sensitive HTTP data can be stolen, tampered with, or intercepted by attackers within the same network.

What is the importance of HSTS?


In HSTS, the browser ensures that ALL HTTP requests are automatically converted into HTTPS requests to mitigate man-in-the-middle attacks.


Without HSTS, it is possible for an attacker to intercept the user's original unencrypted HTTP request, where they can either hijack the session or inject unwanted malicious content into the session.

3. Finally, I tried to intercept the HTTP request using Burp Suite.


I opened burp suite and clicked "interception on" and filled the form.


After submitting the form, I checked the request in burp and sent it to burp repeater,





In there, I started to modify the email address of mine to attackers@gmail.com to see the response of the server.






The response returns a successful status code $(200 \ OK)$ in the response. This means that, I can intercept user details and still get a successful status.

In the case that the form is using HTTP rather than HTTPS, the attacker may intercept the request and alter it while in transit. This could lead to potential man-in-the-middle attacks or modification of the data.

Keys and values of the alert

OWASP_2021_A02 https://owasp.org/Top10/A02_2021-Cryptographic_Failures/


OWASP_2017_A06 https://owasp.org/www-project-top-ten/2017/A6_2017Security_Misconfiguration.html



Therefore, this vulnerability is rated as **OWASP 2021 A02:** Cryptographic Failure because it is transmitting sensitive information (username, password, email, etc.) over HTTP rather than HTTPS, which is vulnerable to Man-in-the-Middle attacks, an attacker can intercept the request and modify it. It is also under **OWASP 2017 A06:** Security Misconfiguration as requiring HTTPS, missing HSTS headers, and not serving secure form submission, all indicate improper security configurations, with the application still being exposed to intercept data tampering.

4. Additionally, I tried to inject a malicious javascript code to the email field to see if the site is vulnerable to XSS attack, but it generated an error, meaning that site is not vulnerable to basic XSS in the email field, because it's blocking the malicious input at this stage.

It provided a 400 bad request status code.



Proposed mitigation or fix

- 1. Use HTTPS to serve all pages (use SSL/TLS).
- 2. Enforce HTTP-to-HTTPS redirection using .htaccess, nginx.conf, or IIS settings.
- 3. Enable HSTS (HTTP Strict Transport Security) to block access via HTTP Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains; preload
- 4. Use Secure Cookies (Secure, HttpOnly, SameSite=Strict).
- 5. Monitor logs to look for mixed-content warnings and HTTP submissions.

Addressing this vulnerability mitigates possible credential theft via MITM.