

# Introduction to Cryptography: Assignment 5

Group number 57

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## 1

- (a) Query  $m$  with  $m_1 = m_2$ , then  $T = B_K(m_1) || B_K(B_K(m_1)) || B_K(B_K(m_3))$ .  
We can now make a forgery  $m' = T_1 || m_1 || m_3$  with the corresponding tag  $T' = T_2 || T_2 || T_3$ .  
This verifies correctly because querying  $m'$  results in:

$$B_K(T_1) || B_K(B_K(m_1)) || B_K(B_K(m_3)) = B_K(B_K(m_1)) || B_K(B_K(m_1)) || B_K(B_K(m_3)) = T'$$

- (b) Query  $m$  with  $m_1 = \overline{m_2}$ , then  $T = (B_K(m_2) \oplus B_K(m_2)) || B_K(\overline{m_2} \oplus \overline{m_2} \oplus m_3) = 0^n || B_K(m_3)$ .  
We can now make a forgery  $m' = \overline{x} || x || m_3$  with  $x = \{0, 1\}^n$  and  $T' = T$ .  
This verifies correctly because querying  $m'$  results in

$$(B_K(x) \oplus B_K(x)) || B_K(\overline{x} \oplus x \oplus m_3) = 0^n || B_K(m_3) = T = T'$$

- (c) It is not PRF-secure, because when we query  $m$  with  $m_2 = m_3$ , then we can say that we are interacting with the MAC1 function when the output is  $a || b || c$  and  $b = c$  with  $|a| = |b| = |c| = n$ . And we are interacting with a random oracle if  $b \neq c$ .

## 2

- (a) Query  $m_1$  which results in  $h_1$ . We can now compute a valid forgery tag  $h'$  by using a message  $m_2$  of 128 bits and  $h_1$  in the compression function  $F$ , which results in the valid tag  $h'$  for  $m' = m_1 || m_2$ . This verifies correctly because  $\text{MAC}_K(m') = h(K || m_1 || m_2) = h'$ .
- (b) The inputs of the MAC function should all have a length of 128 bits, as the compression function inside of the MAC function requires two inputs of 128 bits to get a 128 bits answer.
- (c) We can create a forgery  $T_2$  for  $m'_1 || m'_2$  with the following steps:

- first query the compression function with  $m_{2,0}$  and  $T'$ , which results in  $h_0$

- then for each  $m_{2,i}$  from  $i \geq 1$  query the compression function with  $m_{2,i}$  and  $h_{i-1}$  which results in  $h_i$ .
  - the last compression function output will be the forgery  $T_2$ , so  $T_2 = h_{n'-1}$
- (d) It is not secure, because the Tag and the derived key are the same in keyed hashing and we proved that you can generate a new Tag after you obtained an existing Tag, which could be used as a key.