

Log Sources v1.1 12/2023

| Log Source | Volume ⁹ | IOC Matching | Threat Hunting | Audit Trail ⁷ | APT Detection ⁸ |
|------------------------------|---------------------|-----------------|------------------|--------------------------|----------------------------|
| Antivirus | Low | - | ++ ³ | + | +++ |
| Windows & Sysmon | Medium ⁶ | ++ ¹ | +++ ⁴ | ++ | ++ |
| Cloud | Medium | + | + | +++ | + |
| Proxy | Medium | ++ ² | + ⁵ | ++ | + |
| IdP | Medium | - | + | +++ | + ¹⁰ |
| NIDS/NSM | Medium | + ² | + | + | + |
| DNS | High | ++ ² | + ⁵ | + | + |
| Linux (auditd) ¹² | Medium | + | + | ++ | + |
| Mail ⁶ | Medium | + | - | + | - |
| Firewall | High | + ² | - | ++ | - |

High



Priority

Low

1 - E.g. File hash values (MD5, SHA1, SHA256), file names, C2 IPs, Mutex values

2 - C2 IP addresses or domain names in the logs

3 - see „Antivirus Event Analysis Cheat Sheet“ for detailed information <https://www.nextron-systems.com/?s=antivirus>

4 - Sigma rules can help make sense out of the log data <https://sigmahq.io/>

5 - Patterns (URL, hostname), suspicious TLDs

6 - Volume depends on audit policy (use Microsoft Baseline) and Sysmon configuration

7 - Audit Trail is useful for reconstructing events

8 - APT Detection assesses log utility in identifying persistent threats (reconnaissance, backdoors, lateral movement)

9 - Log volume is primarily dependent on the utilized audit policy, hence it is a rough estimate

10 - With deception technology - honey tokens / credentials

11 - Identity Providers like Okta, Entra, Ping, JumpCloud, etc

12 - Laurel improves the usability a lot with concatenated command lines <https://github.com/threathunters-io/laurel>