


# Classifying toxic memes with Al

Group 4: Nesara Eranna Bethur, Janak Sharda, James Read, Nicholas Zhang

#### Modern communication through memes










#### Toxic memes can influence the masses






From [2] From [4]


# Classifying toxic memes can combat hate speech and improve mental health



#### Input data is Multimodal





Both text and image are necessary to classify



Various fusion techniques like early and late fusion can be used.

#### Feature extraction through Pre-trained models





[5] ResNet

[6] BERT

# Unsupervised Learning

BERT Layer	Homogeneity score
Layer-1	0.0056
Layer-7	0.0078
Layer-11	0.0169
Layer-12	0.0147


	Text only	Image Only	Fusion
FC,Layer11	0.0169	0.016	0.022

# Unsupervised Learning

	Early(Layer-1)	Middle(Layer-7)	Late(Layer-11)
Early(Layer -2)	2.38e-5	2.1e-5	2.91e-6
Late(Layer-10, FC)	0.0070	0.0103	0.022

Layers	Homogeneity score
11	0.0169
11,12,13	0.0157
11,12	0.0167

#### Visualization




# Supervised Learning

Layer (type)	Output Shape	Param #
dense_40 (Dense)	(None, 256)	452608
leaky_re_lu_32 (LeakyReLU)	(None, 256)	0
dense_41 (Dense)	(None, 256)	65792
leaky_re_lu_33 (LeakyReLU)	(None, 256)	0
dense_42 (Dense)	(None, 256)	65792
leaky_re_lu_34 (LeakyReLU)	(None, 256)	0
dense_43 (Dense)	(None, 256)	65792
leaky_re_lu_35 (LeakyReLU)	(None, 256)	0
dense_44 (Dense)	(None, 256)	65792
leaky_re_lu_36 (LeakyReLU)	(None, 256)	0
dense_45 (Dense)	(None, 1)	257

Total params: 716,033

Trainable params: 716,033 Non-trainable params: 0




Best AUROC Score: 0.706

# Regularization

Layer (type)	Output	1.50	Param #
dense_46 (Dense)	(None,		452608
leaky_re_lu_37 (LeakyReLU)	(None,	256)	0
dropout_15 (Dropout)	(None,	256)	0
dense_47 (Dense)	(None,	256)	65792
leaky_re_lu_38 (LeakyReLU)	(None,	256)	0
dropout_16 (Dropout)	(None,	256)	0
dense_48 (Dense)	(None,	256)	65792
leaky_re_lu_39 (LeakyReLU)	(None,	256)	0
dropout_17 (Dropout)	(None,	256)	0
dense_49 (Dense)	(None,	256)	65792
leaky_re_lu_40 (LeakyReLU)	(None,	256)	0
dropout_18 (Dropout)	(None,	256)	0
dense_50 (Dense)	(None,	256)	65792
leaky_re_lu_41 (LeakyReLU)	(None,	256)	0
dense_51 (Dense)	(None,	1)	257
Fotal params: 716,033	======		=======

Non-trainable params: 0




Best AUROC Score: 0.7174

# Skip connections

	Output Shape	Param #	Connected to
input_13 (InputLayer)	[(None, 1767)]	0	[]
dense_64 (Dense)	(None, 256)	452608	['input_13[0][0]']
leaky_re_lu_52 (LeakyReLU)	(None, 256)	0	['dense_64[0][0]']
dropout_27 (Dropout)	(None, 256)	0	['leaky_re_lu_52[0][0]']
dense_65 (Dense)	(None, 256)	65792	['dropout_27[0][0]']
leaky_re_lu_53 (LeakyReLU)	(None, 256)	0	['dense_65[0][0]']
dropout_28 (Dropout)	(None, 256)	0	['leaky_re_lu_53[0][0]']
add (Add)	(None, 256)	θ	['dropout_27[0][0]', 'dropout_28[0][0]']
dense_66 (Dense)	(None, 256)	65792	['add[0][0]']
leaky_re_lu_54 (LeakyReLU)	(None, 256)	0	['dense_66[0][0]']
dropout_29 (Dropout)	(None, 256)	0	['leaky_re_lu_54[0][0]']
add_1 (Add)	(None, 256)	0	['dropout_27[0][0]', 'dropout_29[0][0]']
dense_67 (Dense)	(None, 256)	65792	['add_1[0][0]']
leaky_re_lu_55 (LeakyReLU)	(None, 256)	0	['dense_67[0][0]']
dropout_30 (Dropout)	(None, 256)	θ	['leaky_re_lu_55[0][0]']
add_2 (Add)	(None, 256)	0	['dropout_27[0][0]', 'dropout_30[0][0]']
dense_68 (Dense)	(None, 256)	65792	['add_2[0][0]']
leaky_re_lu_56 (LeakyReLU)	(None, 256)	0	['dense_68[0][0]']
dropout_31 (Dropout)	(None, 256)	0	['leaky_re_lu_56[0][0]']
add_3 (Add)	(None, 256)	0	['dropout_27[0][0]', 'dropout_31[0][0]']
dense_70 (Dense)	(None, 256)	65792	['add_3[0][0]']
leaky_re_lu_58 (LeakyReLU)	(None, 256)	0	['dense_70[0][0]']
dense 71 (Dense)	(None, 1)	257	['leaky_re_lu_58[0][0]']

Total params: 781,825 Trainable params: 781,825 Non-trainable params: 0




Best AUROC Score: 0.7460

#### Fusion results

Metric\Model Late-Early		Late-Middle	Late-Late	
Max AUROC score	0.7172	0.7172	0.7460	
Precision	0.6068	0.5882	0.6319	
Recall	0.5504	0.5943	0.5633	


#### Bagging

- 1. 10 models, 3 layers text features + last layer image features.
- 2. Improvement in total score.
- 3. Improvement quantifies the relevant new information added by other layers
- 4. Best AUROC Score: 0.7624



tSNE plot of features

#### CLIP




[7] Summary of CLIP approach

# CLIP

Text-Only	Text-Only
Accuracy (%)	AUROC
50.3	0.49


Internal Image Encoder	Image-Only Accuracy	Image-Only AUROC
Modified ResNet-50	51.1	0.29
Custom Vision Transformer	51.6	0.20



CLIP classification on Hateful Memes dataset

#### Bagging results on CLIP

- 1. 10 models, 3 layers text features + last layer image features from both networks.
- 2. Decrease in total score.
- 3. Degradation quantifies the new unimportant information added by other layers
- 4. Best AUROC Score: 0.7638 with bagging vs 0.7744 with just one good combination.



tSNE plot of features

#### Conclusion

- Using one set of features is insufficient for hateful meme classification
- Fusing encoded text and image features can solve this problem
- Training a dense neural network with late-late fusion provides best results
- Employing bagging like technique for choosing feature embeddings can provide relevance of features from different layers.
- With further fine-tuning, such a network could assist moderators to filter out hateful content on social media websites

# Leaderboard

#### Hateful Memes: Phase 2

HOSTED BY FACEBOOK

	(a)	Muennighoff	2	0.8310	0.6950	2020-10-31 23:34:40	1
	-0-	HateDetectron	3	0.8108	0.7650	2020-10-16 23:02:31	1
	:0:	kingsterdam	4	0.8053	0.7385	2020-10-31 23:20:27	3
	(ab)	burebista	5	0.7943	0.7430	2020-10-30 09:38:08	3
		naoki	6	0.7886	0.7305	2020-10-31 04:43:28	3
		MemeLords	7	0.7884	0.7450	2020-10-31 23:39:13	3
	(ab)	AiTingting	8	0.7848	0.7295	2020-10-31 12:56:43	3
	(B)	mobot	9	0.7832	0.7320	2020-10-28 02:46:48	3
		james005	10	0.7814	0.7280	2020-10-31 20:28:47	3
		hate-alert	11	0.7808	0.7270	2020-10-26 13:13:22	3
	(B)	mrsio	12	0.7806	0.7430	2020-10-20 16:30:18	3
	(B)	letsgo	13	0.7801	0.7285	2020-10-28 12:51:03	3
	÷	QMUL-NUAA	14	0.7784	0.7300	2020-10-28 05:46:55	3
	(B)	хухуххху	15	0.7780	0.7270	2020-10-28 05:17:36	3
_	(T)	slawekbiel	16	0.7767	0.7320	2020-10-31 20:21:56	-2
\	101	curvefitters	17	0.7731	0.7285	2020-10-31 00:59:48	-2
	(B)	nickyi	18	0.7654	0.7195	2020-10-31 22:50:22	3

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- [1] Pramanick, S., et al. "MOMENTA: A Multimodal Framework for Detecting Harmful Memes and Their Targets." arXiv preprint arXiv:2109.05184 (2021).
- [2] Dimitrov, D., et al. "Detecting propaganda techniques in memes." arXiv preprint arXiv:2109.08013 (2021).
- [3] Kiela, D., et al. "The hateful memes challenge: Detecting hate speech in multimodal memes." Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 33 (2020): 2611-2624.
- [4] Sharma, S., et al. "Detecting and Understanding Harmful Memes: A Survey." arXiv preprint arXiv:2205.04274 (2022).
- [5]He, K., et. al. "Deep Residual Learning for Image Recognition", arXiv preprint arXiv: 1512:03385
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- [9] Radford et al. "Learning Transferable Visual Models From Natural Language Supervision." International Conference on Machine Learning (2021).