Sink Hole Attack using RPL in IOT

Software Recommended: NetSim Standard v13.0 (32-bit/ 64-bit), Visual Studio 2017/2019

Project Download Link: https://github.com/NetSim-

TETCOS/SinkHole_attack_in_loT_RPL_v13.0/archive/refs/heads/main.zip

Follow the instructions specified in the following link to download and setup the Project in NetSim:

https://support.tetcos.com/en/support/solutions/articles/14000128666-downloading-and-setting-up-netsim-file-exchange-projects

Introduction:

In sinkhole Attack, a compromised node or malicious node advertises fake rank information to form the fake routes. After receiving the message packet, it drops the packet information. Sinkhole attacks affect the performance of IoT networks protocols such as RPL protocol.

Implementation in RPL (for 1 sink)

- In RPL the transmitter broadcasts the DIO during DODAG formation.
- The receiver on receiving the DIO from the transmitter updates its parent list, sibling list, rank and sends a DAO message with route information.
- Malicious node upon receiving the DIO message it does not update the rank instead it always advertises a fake rank.
- The other node on listening to the malicious node DIO message the update their rank according to the fake rank.
- After the formation of DODAG, if the node that is transmitting the packet has malicious node as the preferred parent, transmits the packet to it but the malicious node instead of transmitting the packet to its parent, it simply drops the packet resulting in zero throughput.

A file Malicious.c is added to the RPL project. The file contains the following functions

1. fn NetSim RPL MaliciousNode()

This function is used to identify whether a current device is malicious or not in-order to establish malicious behaviour.

2. fn_NetSim_RPL_MaliciousRank()

This function is used to give a fake rank to the malicious node.

3. rpl_drop_msg()

This function is used to drop the packet by the malicious node if it enters into its network layer.

Sink Hole attack – The malicious node advertises the fake rank.

fn_NetSim_RPL_MaliciousRank() is the sink hole attack function.


Black Hole attack – The malicious node drops the packet.

rpl_drp_msg() is the black hole attack function


You can set any device as malicious and you can have more than one malicious node in a scenario. Device id's of malicious nodes can be set inside the fn_NetSim_RPL_MaliciousNode() function.

Steps:

1. Open the Source codes in Visual Studio by going to **Your work-> Workspace Options** and Clicking on Open code button as shown below:




2. Set malicious node id and the fake Rank.




3. Add the code that is highlighted in RPL.c file

4. Now right click on Solution explorer and select Rebuild.




- 5. Upon rebuilding, modified binaries will automatically get updated in the respective bin folders of the current workspace
- 6. Go to NetSim home page, click on **Your work**, Click on SinkHole_Attack_in_RPL_Example.



Environment Properties:

- Right click on the Adhoc link icon and select Properties.
- Select the Channel Characteristics and set the parameters accordingly.




Run Simulation for 100 Seconds.

Output

Open **rpllog.txt** file from simulation results window, then you will find the information about DODAG formation.

For every DODAG, 6LoWPAN Gateway is the root of the DODAG

- Root is 1 with rank = 1 (Since the Node Id_1 is 6LoWPAN Gateway)
- Wireless_Sensor_Node_7(Malicious Node)



Packet is **transmitted** by **node 8(Sensor_8)** is **received** by **node 7(Sensor_7)** since the node **7 is malicious** node it drops the packet. So, the **Throughput** in this scenario is **0**.

Open **Packet trace** file from simulation results window and filter the **Control Packet Type/App Name** to **App1_ Sensor _App**.

Check the data packets flow, the **Transmitter_Id and receiver_Id** column. Since the node 7 is malicious node it drops the packet without forwarding it further.

1	PACKET_ID ▼ S	EGMENT_ID PACKET_	TYPE ▼ CONTROL_PACKET_TYPE/AF	P_NAME SOURCE_ID -	DESTINATIO	N_ID TRANSMITTER_ID	RECEIVER_ID ▼
129	2	0 Sensing	App1_SENSOR_APP	SENSOR-8	NODE-3	SENSOR-8	SENSOR-7
153	3	0 Sensing	App1_SENSOR_APP	SENSOR-8	NODE-3	SENSOR-8	SENSOR-7
165	4	0 Sensing	App1_SENSOR_APP	SENSOR-8	NODE-3	SENSOR-8	SENSOR-7
185	5	0 Sensing	App1_SENSOR_APP	SENSOR-8	NODE-3	SENSOR-8	SENSOR-7
196	6	0 Sensing	App1_SENSOR_APP	SENSOR-8	NODE-3	SENSOR-8	SENSOR-7
204	7	0 Sensing	App1_SENSOR_APP	SENSOR-8	NODE-3	SENSOR-8	SENSOR-7
220	8	0 Sensing	App1_SENSOR_APP	SENSOR-8	NODE-3	SENSOR-8	SENSOR-7
239	9	0 Sensing	App1_SENSOR_APP	SENSOR-8	NODE-3	SENSOR-8	SENSOR-7
247	10	0 Sensing	App1_SENSOR_APP	SENSOR-8	NODE-3	SENSOR-8	SENSOR-7
263	11	0 Sensing	App1_SENSOR_APP	SENSOR-8	NODE-3	SENSOR-8	SENSOR-7
276	12	0 Sensing	App1_SENSOR_APP	SENSOR-8	NODE-3	SENSOR-8	SENSOR-7
284	13	0 Sensing	App1_SENSOR_APP	SENSOR-8	NODE-3	SENSOR-8	SENSOR-7
296	14	0 Sensing	App1_SENSOR_APP	SENSOR-8	NODE-3	SENSOR-8	SENSOR-7
304	15	0 Sensing	App1_SENSOR_APP	SENSOR-8	NODE-3	SENSOR-8	SENSOR-7
323	16	0 Sensing	App1_SENSOR_APP	SENSOR-8	NODE-3	SENSOR-8	SENSOR-7
338	17	0 Sensing	App1_SENSOR_APP	SENSOR-8	NODE-3	SENSOR-8	SENSOR-7
346	18	0 Sensing	App1_SENSOR_APP	SENSOR-8	NODE-3	SENSOR-8	SENSOR-7
354	19	0 Sensing	App1_SENSOR_APP	SENSOR-8	NODE-3	SENSOR-8	SENSOR-7
362	20	0 Sensing	App1_SENSOR_APP	SENSOR-8	NODE-3	SENSOR-8	SENSOR-7
373	21	0 Sensing	App1_SENSOR_APP	SENSOR-8	NODE-3	SENSOR-8	SENSOR-7