Bob

Alice

|	Y	Z
W	1,3	2,4
X	5,3	1,7

Bob 3

Alice 1 2 5

① $(W, Y) \Rightarrow (X, Y)$

$(X, Y) \Rightarrow (X, Z)$

$(X, Z) \Rightarrow (W, Z)$

$\boxed{W, Z}$?

② (X, Y) and (X, Z)

③ $(W, Z), (X, Y), (X, Z)$

④ $8 - 6 = 2$

⑤

Wed — Parag Pathak

Thur — HW #1 due

Fri — deadline to form project teams + submit preferences.

Practical aspects that separate stable matching theory from practice

① actual stable matching setting
  — schools, residencies
② metaphor ~~of~~ of matching in
  online marketplaces.

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① Is the platform incentivized to be
  a "fair" player?
  => "Credible auctions"

② preferences are not fixed
  Do I know my preferences?

③ Do I want to fill out a form
  that's soo long?
  "up to 12" schools.
  => no longer strategy proof.

→ ⓐ School-side.
  ⓑ how this intersects w/ equity
    issues.

  ⓐ instead of test scores,
    prioritize top students from
    each middle school
  ⓑ how much to prioritize geography

④ interviews

pre-covid:

① students apply to schools

② schools decide subset to interview

③ · interviews in ~~person~~ zoom
   · not reimbursed

④ each side submits ranking to the algorithm

⑤ run stable matching