

# Community-Based Violence Prevention

An Assessment of Pittsburgh's  
One Vision One Life Program

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## Preface

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In 2006, more than 6 million individuals were victimized by violent crimes in the United States. Although violence is below levels of the early 1990s, it remains high. The extent of violence and its impact highlight a critical need to develop and implement effective programs to reduce violence and victimization. Communities have initiated a wide range of such programs, and scholars have conducted numerous evaluations of varying quality of them. Reviews have found certain types of strategies and specific programs to be promising, but additional critical evaluations are needed to plan violence-reduction programs.

This monograph assesses the implementation and impact of the One Vision One Life violence-prevention strategy in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. In 2003, Pittsburgh witnessed a 49-percent increase in homicides, prompting a “grassroots” creation and implementation of the One Vision One Life antiviolence strategy. This initiative used a problem-solving, data-driven model, including street-level intelligence, to intervene in escalating disputes, and seeks to place youth in appropriate social programs. Analysis of the program, which is modeled on similar efforts elsewhere, can help inform other efforts to address urban violence.

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ing violence and understanding the dynamics of a violence-prevention initiative. The opinions, findings, and conclusions expressed in this monograph are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Justice or of the Richard King Mellon Foundation. This research builds on previous RAND work pertaining to community-based violence-prevention efforts. Those interested may wish to review these publications:

- Jeremy M. Wilson, John M. MacDonald, and George E. Tita, “Localized Homicide Patterns and Prevention Strategies: A Comparison of Five Project Safe Neighborhood Sites,” *Victims and Offenders*, Vol. 5, No. 1, January 2010, pp. 45–63
- George Tita, K. Jack Riley, Greg Ridgeway, Clifford A. Gramlich, Allan Abrahamse, and Peter W. Greenwood, *Reducing Gun Violence: Results from an Intervention in East Los Angeles*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, MR-1764-NIJ, 2003
- Jeremy M. Wilson and Amy G. Cox, *Community Policing and Crime: The Process and Impact of Problem-Solving in Oakland*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, TR-635-BPA, 2008
- Jeremy M. Wilson, Amy G. Cox, Tommy L. Smith, Hans Bos, and Terry Fain, *Community Policing and Violence Prevention in Oakland: Measure Y in Action*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, TR-546-BPA, 2008
- John MacDonald, Ricky N. Bluthenthal, Daniela Golinelli, Aaron Kofner, Robert J. Stokes, Amber Sehgal, Terry Fain, and Leo Beletsky, *Neighborhood Effects on Crime and Youth Violence: The Role of Business Improvement Districts in Los Angeles*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, TR-622-CDC, 2009.

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## Summary

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In 2003, a record 125 homicides in Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, including 70 in the city of Pittsburgh, raised concerns among community leaders regarding the level of violence in the area. In response, local leaders created the Allegheny County Violence Prevention Initiative, later called One Vision One Life.

One Vision was similar to violence-prevention programs in Boston, Chicago, Baltimore, and other cities. Among other strategies, these problem-solving approaches use street-level work and intelligence to become aware of and intervene in potentially violent disputes. One Vision was modeled on successful initiatives in other cities, with staff meeting with those on a similar Chicago project to learn how best to implement the program.

Programs such as One Vision seek to address the violent “code of the street” prevalent among many inner-city youth, a code developed in response to a lack of legitimate, successful role models. One Vision’s basic focus was a six-point plan to stop local shootings, including mediation and intervention in conflicts, provision of alternatives for persons most at risk for violence, strong community coalitions, a unified message of no shooting, a rapid response to all shootings, and programs for youths at risk for violence. One Vision work is conducted by an executive director, a program director, five area managers, and more than 40 community coordinators, and supported by a data manager. Most staff members were raised in the inner city and therefore are intimate with inner-city street life and the “code of the street.”

RAND and Michigan State University researchers assessed the effects of the program in three areas of Pittsburgh: Northside, the Hill District, and Southside. All three have per capita incomes below the national average, and two of the three have homicide rates above the city average (Table S.1). Northside is the largest of the three and features a critical hub of legal and illegal activities in the city. It is also undergoing gentrification, a process leading to some community conflict. The Hill District, once a thriving, prosperous, and influential black neighborhood, has suffered a precipitous decline, and now has issues with guns, drugs, and individual or group disputes. Southside

**Table S.1**  
**Characteristics of One Vision One Life Target Neighborhoods**

Characteristic	Northside	Hill District	Southside <sup>a</sup>	Nontarget	City
Total population	48,102	18,276	27,054	233,555	331,223
Population density per square mile (average %)	8	11	7	6	7
Black (%)	36	71	12	22	27
Per capita income (average)	15,901	11,072	12,771	17,353	15,775
Households on public assistance (average %)	11	14	6	7	8
Female head of household with children under 18 (average %)	14	19	12	9	12
Vacant housing (average %)	17	22	19	12	15
Homicides	15	8	1	33	59
Homicide rate per 100,000 residents	31	44	4	14	18

<sup>a</sup> Excludes Beltzhoover and Saint Clair Village.

NOTE: All figures are 2000 estimates except for homicide, which is 2003. The homicide rate reflected here is four less than what was reported in the Uniform Crime Report figures illustrated in Figure 1.1 in Chapter One.

does not have a homicide rate as high as those of Northside and the Hill District, but its geography and topography help shelter many illegal activities, including drug dealing.

Within the target communities, community coordinators worked with clients who were typically male, black, about 18 years old, and in need of a wide variety of assistance and services. Fifty percent did not have a job and 30 percent had a substance-abuse problem, but most were not at high risk for violence, having not been violent recently, in a gang, or in the criminal justice system. In response to their perceptions of community risk for violence, community coordinators would undertake actions ranging from conflict mediation to outreach to community rallies against violence.

To measure the effect of the program on local violence, the research team used a propensity-score analysis enabling team members to compare One Vision neighborhoods with others in the city. They also compared the effects of the program with neighborhoods suggested by One Vision staff members as being most similar to the analysis areas. Finally, they tested for any “spillover” effects of the program, either displacing violence or extending crime-suppression benefits from the target communities to surrounding ones. (Because Northside is largely isolated within the city by the Ohio and Allegheny Rivers, the researchers did not test for spillover effects there.)

One Vision had two primary goals: to reduce homicides and shootings in its areas. Because the Pittsburgh Bureau of Police changed how it tabulated shooting incidents, the researchers were not able to assess program effects on the number of shootings over time. Rather, they measured changes in homicide, aggravated assaults, and gun assaults before and after the intervention.

Following implementation of the program, the average monthly number of homicides increased in Northside but not in the Hill District or Southside. The average number of aggravated assaults and gun assaults also increased in all three areas (Table S.2).

These effects were also evident in a propensity-score analysis of One Vision effects controlling for neighborhood attributes, seasonal effects, and trends over time. Specifically, the propensity-score analysis found no significant change in homicide rates but statistically signifi-

**Table S.2**  
**Homicide, Aggravated Assault, and Gun Assault Frequencies Pre- and Postimplementation of One Vision One Life**

Neighborhood	Homicide		Aggravated Assault			Gun Assault			
	Pre	Post	Change	Pre	Post	Change	Pre	Post	Change
Northside	0.04	0.06	0.02	1.10	1.59	0.48	0.33	0.62	0.29
Hill District	0.09	0.09	0.00	1.72	2.02	0.30	0.55	0.94	0.39
Southside	0.02	0.02	0.00	1.12	1.66	0.55	0.29	0.46	0.17

SOURCE: Incident data provided by the Pittsburgh Bureau of Police.

cant changes in aggravated assault and gun assault rates in Northside, the Hill District, and Southside (Table S.3).

The researchers also found that One Vision had some “spillover” effects into areas bordering the Hill District and Southside. (Because Northside is largely isolated within the city, the researchers did not conduct spillover analysis in the areas bordering it.) Specifically, they found, controlling for neighborhood characteristics, no effect on homicide rates in neighboring areas but a statistically significant increase in gun assaults in the Hill District spillover area, a statistically significant decrease in aggravated assault in the Hill District spillover area, and a statistically significant increase in the Southside spillover area (Table S.4).

**Table S.3**  
**Test of One Vision One Life Intervention Effects, Propensity Score–Weighted Counterfactual Neighborhoods**

Outcome	Predicted Monthly Rate Change	P-Value
<b>Northside</b>		
Homicide	0.0219	0.7432
Aggravated assault	25.2095	0.0000
Gun assault	9.2824	0.0000
<b>Hill District</b>		
Homicide	-0.6710	0.3374
Aggravated assault	7.7365	0.0255
Gun assault	5.2893	0.0012
<b>Southside</b>		
Homicide	-0.2540	0.6976
Aggravated assault	25.3953	0.0000
Gun assault	4.9865	0.0015

NOTE: The counterfactual neighborhoods comprised nearly all other Pittsburgh neighborhoods, with characteristics weighted to reflect One Vision neighborhoods.

**Table S.4**  
**Test of Spillover Effects, Propensity Score–Weighted  
 Counterfactual Neighborhoods**

Outcome	Predicted Monthly Rate Change	P-Value
<b>Hill District</b>		
Homicide	−0.5546	0.6483
Aggravated assault	−14.2040	0.03785
Gun assault	6.1647	0.0979
<b>Southside</b>		
Homicide	−0.8695	0.8012
Aggravated assault	28.7132	0.0000
Gun assault	5.5715	0.0072

It is difficult to explain why a program did not have desired effects, much less effects opposite of those intended. Nevertheless, the researchers offer some explanations why the program might not have had its intended effect, or at least why there is no quantitative evidence of its intended effect.

First, all evaluations of this sort face difficulties in identifying best comparison areas, measuring program delivery and performance, and isolating program effects. Truly random design and analysis is generally not possible for such analyses. Quasi-experimental design can approach the rigor of random design but cannot control for all variables that might affect levels of violence.

Second, the implementation of One Vision deviated in several ways from ideal implementation. One Vision lacked consistent documentation, and its staff rarely used the documentation it had in any systematic way to guide program actions. Community coordinators focused more on persons in need of services than those at risk of violence. This and the difficulties in program and evaluation design might be related. One Vision, by providing youth programming, might have some long-term success by helping youths avoid violence. The program design and evaluation, however, were focused on a more immediate reduction of violence, a reduction the researchers did not observe.

Third, the program did not do much to address any group or gang structure generating violence. The Chicago program on which the Pittsburgh program was partially modeled explicitly focused on gangs. The Boston program and similar programs in several other cities had a group accountability component lacking in the Pittsburgh program. It might be the case that the gang structure in Pittsburgh is more fluid and would in any case require a different approach from that used in Chicago. It also might be the case that difficulties in comparing the degree to which individuals are at risk for violent behavior in these cities limits analyses such as this.

Still other study limitations might have affected these findings. While One Vision's focus, as noted, is on reducing homicides and shootings, only direct measures of homicides were available. Homicide itself is a rare occurrence; detecting measurable changes in it is therefore difficult, as measuring gang-related and non-gang-related incidents would also be. The control measures, based on 2000 census data, cannot measure demographic and socioeconomic changes that have occurred in the neighborhoods in recent years.

Nevertheless, these findings raise several critical issues for similar and future initiatives. Among others, these include the transferability of success in programs elsewhere and elements missing in the Pittsburgh implementation. Successful results from Chicago and Baltimore programs suggest the promise of these programs, while the Pittsburgh results suggest the need for continued rigorous evaluation.



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graph, and Robert Davis and the anonymous peer reviewers for providing comments that helped to strengthen it.

## **Abbreviations**

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GBM	generalized boosting method
NIJ	National Institute of Justice
PSN	Project Safe Neighborhoods
SACSI	Strategic Approaches to Community Safety Initiative



## Introduction

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Despite recent reductions (FBI, 2009a), violent crime remains among the most important social problems affecting the quality of life in communities throughout the United States. Aggregate reductions also mask the variability in violence among and within communities. The total number of persons annually victimized by violence remains high. In 2008, more than 9,000 persons were murdered with guns (FBI, 2009b). In 2006, 71,000 persons suffered nonfatal gunshot wounds, and 2.1 million persons sustained an injury requiring emergency-room treatment as a result of a violent incident (CDC, 2010). All together, more than 6 million individuals were victimized by crimes of violence in 2006 (BJS, 2007). One comprehensive review of gun research indicated that firearms play a significant role in violence, and that young persons are particularly vulnerable to violence, and death, from firearms (Wellford, Pepper, and Petrie, 2005).

The impact of violent crime on individuals, families, and communities is substantial. Recent estimates indicate that the annual costs of gun violence are about \$100 billion (Cook and Ludwig, 2000). The annual costs of all personal victimization by violence, including intangible losses, such as pain, suffering, and reduced quality of life, are more than \$450 billion (NIJ, 1996). Indeed, Cook and Ludwig (2000, p. 138) suggests that “the costs of violence are so great that effective interventions essentially pay for themselves.”

The extent of violence and its impact highlight a critical need to develop and implement effective programs to reduce it. Many communities have initiated a wide range of responses to violent crime,

firearm-related violence, and drug crimes. These interventions cover a wide range of approaches, including public health, media publicity, technology, community-driven, and criminal-justice initiatives. Scholars have produced an overwhelming number of studies on these initiatives using data and methods of evaluation that range greatly in quality. While previous evaluations indicate that there are certain types of strategies and specific programs that are promising, there is still a great need for additional critical evaluations. As the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) (2002, p. 19), after compiling and analyzing a representative selection of NIJ research on gangs, notes, there remains “a need to know ‘what works’ . . . too little is known about the relative merits of comprehensive, broad-based interventions.” In short, there remains a critical need for researchers to rigorously evaluate promising strategies, to broaden understanding of promising strategies by replicating them and their evaluations at other sites, and to identify why and what about such programs work.

## **Objective**

In this monograph, we assess a Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania–based violence-prevention strategy known as One Vision One Life (or One Vision). One Vision seeks to prevent violence using a problem-solving, data-driven model to inform how community organizations and outreach teams respond to homicide incidents. It also uses street-level intelligence to intervene in escalating disputes and seeks to place youth in appropriate social programs. One Vision shares information with law-enforcement officials, but it is truly a grassroots effort. Its evaluation has both practical and theoretical value.


This assessment of One Vision builds in two ways on evaluations of violence-reduction strategies. First, although there is a rich literature evaluating various types of violence-reduction strategies, there have been few quality studies of community-initiated and community-led actions. Most evaluations have focused on interventions led by the criminal-justice community. Second, the intervention is modeled after (but does not mirror) a similar strategy implemented in Chicago that

was evaluated by an NIJ-sponsored project team. In fact, personnel involved in the Pittsburgh program visited Chicago in late 2004 and early 2005 and attempted to model the intervention and their data collection after CeaseFire in Chicago. An additional evaluation of this type of intervention can yield new lessons about the promise and possible pitfalls of such a strategy. Exploring the program's effectiveness relative to variation in implementation, local dynamics, and community characteristics is helpful for assessing the likelihood that this program could succeed elsewhere. Such lessons would be a useful resource for policymakers, practitioners, communities, and researchers.

## Background

In 2003, Pittsburgh had a record-setting 70 homicides, a 49-percent increase over 2002, with the homicide rate that year increasing from 14 per 100,000 to 22 (Figure 1.1). The homicide rate in Pittsburgh in recent years has been higher than that elsewhere in the nation and, since 2001, than in other cities with 250,000 to 500,000 residents.

**Figure 1.1**  
**Homicide Rates, 1997–2007**



This rise in violence rallied a coalition of community leaders who formed the Allegheny County Violence Prevention Initiative, which became One Vision One Life. Real increases in certain types of crime, as observed in Pittsburgh, as well as perceptions that a type of crime is “getting out of control,” can often lead communities and their leaders to adopt well-meaning but not always well-considered responses. One Vision staff, however, planned their response carefully by systematically examining the nature of violence, considering best practices from other communities across the nation, coordinating with key community partners, communicating with law enforcement, and adopting a strategy they felt was appropriate for responding to the problem and consistent with the goals of the initiative. In the next section, we discuss several elements of the strategy and the research that supported it.

### **Problem Solving, Homicide Incident Reviews, and Collaborative Partnerships**

One of the most significant developments for initiating change within criminal-justice organizations is the application and adoption of problem-solving approaches. There are many examples of criminal-justice officials systematically collecting data to examine a crime problem more completely, to develop and implement innovative responses, and to assess the impact of these responses. New York City’s CompStat program is probably the best-known example of formulating this process into everyday organizational decisionmaking (Silverman, 1999). Top officials from the New York City Police Department convened twice-weekly crime-analysis meetings in which precinct commanders were questioned about crime patterns in their areas, their strategies for addressing these problems, and their evidence that their strategies were having an impact. No longer was a purely reactive approach to crime acceptable. Police managers were held accountable for knowing the nature of crime, developing and assessing strategies for addressing it, and, ultimately, reducing it.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Although the problem-solving model has significant promise and has produced impressive successes, researchers have noted their frustration with the overall commitment to the model. That is, its potential has not been fully realized because of often-narrow implementation (see Capowich, Roehl, and Andrews, 1995; Scott, 2000).

Linked most directly to problem-oriented policing and its role in community-oriented policing (see Goldstein, 1990; Eck and Spelman, 1987), the theory behind the approach has been widely adopted and used successfully in multiagency collaborative partnerships (Dalton, 2003). One such intervention was the Boston Gun Project. Beginning in early 1995, a multiagency working group of officials and researchers began to meet biweekly to engage in problem-solving processes of research and analysis, strategy design, implementation, and assessment (Kennedy, 1997, 1998; Kennedy, Piehl, and Braga, 1996; NIJ, 2001). The working group comprised local officials (including police, probation and parole, prosecution, school police, and outreach workers), federal agencies (including the U.S. District Attorney and Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives), and researchers from Harvard University. These parties worked together to study crime patterns and used the results to craft strategic interventions. The initiative focused first on youth firearm violence rather than all types of crime. In response to analysis indicating that gang activity was the principal cause of violence, it later narrowed its scope to gang homicides and criminal activities.

Analyses of this intervention found several benefits (see Wellford, Pepper, and Petrie, 2005). Violent gang offending slowed dramatically, and youth homicide in Boston fell by two-thirds after the strategy was put into place (Kennedy, 1998, p. 3). The intervention also led to a 63-percent decrease in the monthly number of youth homicides, a 25-percent decrease in assaults with firearms, and a 32-percent decrease in shots fired. Boston experienced a larger (statistically significant) decrease in youth homicide than did 39 other comparison cities (Braga, Kennedy, Waring, and Piehl, 2001; see also Braga and Pierce, 2005). Minneapolis also experienced sharp reductions in homicide after implementing a similar strategy (Kennedy, 1998; Kennedy and Braga, 1998).

This success led NIJ to support efforts to replicate similar Strategic Approaches to Community Safety Initiatives (SACSI) in ten other cities, ultimately leading to national deployment of the Project Safe Neighborhoods (PSN) initiative by the Department of Justice (Coleman et al., 2009; PSN, undated). Although the deployment of this

model elsewhere has not been examined as closely as it was in Boston, there is some evidence of similar promise. For example, the Indianapolis Violence Reduction Partnership helped reduce homicides from 155 in 1997 to 101 in 2000, making Indianapolis the only city among six comparison cities to experience a statistically significant change in homicide frequency (Chermak and McGarrell, 2004; McGarrell, Chermak, Wilson, and Corsaro, 2006). A national evaluation of ten SACSI sites concluded that, when the SACSI approach is implemented effectively, it “is associated with reduction in targeted violent crime in a community, sometimes as much as 50%” (Roehl et al., 2006, p. 2). Similar positive results are emerging from select PSN sites that have implemented the problem-solving model (Papachristos, Meares, and Fagan, 2007; McGarrell, Hipple, and Corsaro, 2007; McDevitt et al., 2007; McGarrell et al., 2009).

One of the intriguing elements of the Pittsburgh One Vision approach to violent crime is that, although it is only loosely linked to law enforcement, it embraced the problem-solving model. Concerned officials and community leaders completed a systematic review to better understand the nature of the problem before acting. They discovered an important and familiar pattern: A small group of chronic offenders in just a few neighborhoods accounted for a large share of all homicides. They also found that young black males living in several high-crime neighborhoods were significantly more likely to be homicide victims and that more than 60 percent of the homicides in Pittsburgh occurred in just four neighborhoods. The homicide rate for black males living in just a few areas was 423 per 100,000—more than 50 times the U.S. rate (One Vision One Life, 2005). These areas became part of the four target neighborhoods chosen for a strategic response. Violence data continue to guide the program’s intervention strategies, as they did when One Vision expanded its Pittsburgh Southside target area when it became clear that incidents in its original target neighborhood were spilling into adjacent neighborhoods.

## **Conflict Intervention and Mediation: Street Workers and Street Intelligence**

One Vision community coordinators use street-level intelligence to become aware of and then intervene in potentially violent disputes. The coordinators, selected because of their familiarity with and connections to the targeted neighborhoods and knowledge about rival groups, were trained in dispute resolution, conflict mediation, and culturally sensitive outreach. They work to prevent violence in three direct ways: (1) They attempt to defuse disputes, such as a petty dispute or turf battle, before such disputes escalate; (2) they coordinate public and behind-the-scenes responses to every homicide (and shooting, when awareness of the incident is timely) that occurs in the targeted neighborhoods; and (3) they connect individuals and specifically youths to critical services. Responses to homicides include gathering intelligence about the situation; talking with key actors (e.g., the victim's family, the perpetrator, or others who might be involved in any ongoing dispute) to mediate or minimize the violence; and disseminating a general antiviolence message by providing resources, materials, and information to residents.

This is similar to the underexamined role that street workers and community organizations played in contributing to the success of the Boston Gun Project. Boston street workers identified at-risk youth and worked to provide them with critical services, such as job training and substance-abuse counseling. They mediated disputes between rival gangs and worked with law enforcement to prevent violent outbreaks (Braga and Kennedy, 2002). These street workers also worked closely with the Boston TenPoint Coalition—a group of activist black clergy that also tried to link youths with social services and worked with law enforcement to resolve disputes. Few data exist on the work of street workers and community organizations, which was not measured in any substantive way. This is unfortunate, especially given contentions that the TenPoint Coalition was critical to the decreases in youth violence through its creation of an “umbrella of legitimacy,” providing balance to the inner-city community and law enforcement that did not exist (Winship and Berrien, 1999). Other cities, such as Indianapolis and Rochester, New York, have also implemented a clergy or street-

worker coalition as part of a larger violence-reduction strategy. Yet, we have little understanding of whether or how these are effective and how they might be transferred to other cities and programs. Evaluation of the Pittsburgh program can help fill this gap.

### **Community Mobilization and Outreach**

One Vision coordinates broadly and to varying degrees with other community and social service agencies, businesses, and law enforcement. Much of the violence in the areas it targeted stemmed from illicit drug trade. In its broad approach, it is similar to effective programs that addressed neighborhood drug problems from multiple perspectives with a diverse array of resources and that were connected to broader neighborhood quality-of-life issues (Weingart, Hartmann, and Osborne, 1994; Corsaro, Brunson, and McGarrell, 2009). By contrast, failing neighborhood efforts have tended to focus narrowly on drugs. Better understanding is needed of how broader efforts, such as that in Pittsburgh, can harness community capacity to combat both relatively narrow problems, such as drug trade, and broader problems, such as crime.

Macro-level variables, such as economic inequality, politics, racism, and demographics, certainly have a greater impact on neighborhood crime, disorder, and quality of life than anything law enforcement or community organizations do (see Duffee et al., 2006; Skogan, 1990; Spergel, 1976; W. Wilson, 1987). Yet, community organizations or law enforcement can still mediate the impact of these broad social forces on residents (Byrum, 1992; Cortes, 1993; Grogan and Proscio, 2000; Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls, 1997; Spergel, 1976). As Duffee et al. (2006, p. 2.7) note, “There are numerous actions that can be and are taken within neighborhoods and between neighborhoods and outsiders that are an effective component of a larger, more encompassing community improvement strategy.” For One Vision, these actions included working in the community to build broad-based sustainable partnerships, significantly increasing the community’s commitment to its most troubled neighborhoods, reducing the isolation of the residents living in these neighborhoods, and linking residents to social service organizations as well as organizations to each other.

Although the focus of this study is how One Vision affected violent crime, the rich process data we collected for this project can provide insight into community change processes, including building social capacity (Duffee et al., 2006; Mattessich and Monsey, 1997) or collective efficacy (Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls, 1997).

## Approach

We seek to answer two questions about One Vision. First, we seek to determine how and to what extent One Vision has been implemented. Second, we examine what impact, if any, One Vision has had on violence in the targeted and surrounding communities. We assessed implementation by analyzing project records; interviewing and conducting focus groups with agency staff, community stakeholders, and law enforcement; and observing program activities. We examined the impact of One Vision on violence using a quasi-experimental design that compares violence trends in the program's target areas before and after implementation to (1) trends in Pittsburgh neighborhoods where One Vision was not implemented through a propensity-score analysis and (2) trends in specific nontarget neighborhoods whose violence and neighborhood dynamics One Vision staff contended were most similar to those of target neighborhoods. As part of the outcome analysis, we also explore the extent to which violence or violence-suppression benefits "spill over" into neighborhoods that are adjacent to the target areas. One Vision's primary goals were to reduce homicide and shootings. Consistent with One Vision's first goal, we drew on existing data to incorporate homicides as an outcome variable. Unfortunately, changes in how Pittsburgh police recorded incidents precluded us from directly measuring progress toward the second goal of reducing shootings. For proxy variables, we gathered data on aggravated assaults and aggravated assaults with a gun. While these categories of violence include shootings and might indicate program effects, they also include other forms of violent acts and hence are not a precise measure of One Vision's success in reducing shootings. We discuss this limitation again in the concluding chapter.

In conducting our impact analyses, we attempted to minimize type I and II errors. To minimize the probability of rejecting a null hypothesis when it is true (type I error), we used a 0.05 alpha level, a standard benchmark, as the criterion to determine statistical significance. This means that there is only a 5-percent chance that we would conclude that One Vision was associated with some change in the violence measures when in fact it was not. The probability of not rejecting the null hypothesis when it is false (type II error) relates to the ability to detect whether One Vision was associated with some change in the violence measures when it actually was. Such error is a function of sample size. We attempted to minimize it by expanding our sample as much as possible. As we discuss in Chapter Four, we compiled longitudinal data on each neighborhood in our analysis. This yielded at least 3,036 observations (and as many as 10,512 observations) for each of our impact models.

## Outline

The following chapters summarize the One Vision program, our evaluation, and the implications of our findings. Chapter Two outlines the structure of the program and how it is designed to function. Chapter Three describes program operations and activities. Chapter Four presents our formal outcome assessment, including the program's impact on violence in target and surrounding neighborhoods. Chapter Five discusses our process assessment, highlighting similarities and differences in the implementation of One Vision relative to its theoretical design and how these might have affected its outcomes. Chapter Six compares the results of our evaluation with others and presents lessons on maximizing the effectiveness of community-based violence-prevention interventions.

## Structure and Function of One Vision One Life

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In 2003, a record 125 homicides in Allegheny County, including 70 in Pittsburgh, caused community leaders to become increasingly concerned about the level of violence and call for action. The number of homicides was high, but Pittsburgh had experienced variation in homicide rates in the past. For example, homicide rates were relatively stable in the 1980s, but, after the emergence of crack cocaine in the late 1990s, they increased sharply, spiking in 1993 (see Cohen and Tita, 1999).

Nevertheless, the record number of homicides spurred community action—specifically, the creation of the Allegheny County Violence Prevention Initiative, later named One Vision One Life. One Vision first focused on violence in three Pittsburgh communities: Northside, Hill District, and Southside. Although it has since expanded to other neighborhoods, the initiative initially targeted these communities for two reasons. First, data analysis indicated that these were the most violent neighborhoods in the county. Second, many One Vision staff, long-time residents of Pittsburgh, had insight on the areas in most need, as well as who there might be interested in working for the initiative. Given sufficient support staff within the three target communities, One Vision leaders were confident that they could effect immediate change.

In this chapter, we describe in more detail the context of the One Vision initiative and its communities and then review its structure and programs.

## The Context

Initiatives like One Vision seek to address the violent “code of the street” Anderson (1999) identifies among many inner-city youth. A product of alienation and racism, an oppositional culture emerges and becomes alluring for many African Americans who find the conventional culture to be unreceptive (Anderson, 1999, p. 287; see also Stewart and Simons, 2009). Many times, young inner-city African Americans grow up without legitimate role models. They see that legal hard work does not pay off, given that many elderly in impoverished neighborhoods are still working hard but struggling to survive. These youths often hear stories about racism and have themselves experienced prejudice and discrimination in some form or another (Anderson, 1999, pp. 287–288). At the same time, “through street-oriented role models, a thriving underground economy beckons to them, promising enormous sums of money along with a certain thrill of getting over in a system that denies them respect” (Anderson, 1999, p. 288).

As respect for the conventional culture and more formal criminal-justice system erodes in many neighborhoods, the social behavior of the public becomes increasingly organized around the “code of the street” (Anderson, 1999, p. 109). Anderson (1999, p. 33) defines this code as follows:

A set of informal rules governing interpersonal public behavior, particularly violence. The rules prescribe both proper comportment and the proper way to respond if challenged. They regulate the use of violence and so supply a rationale allowing those inclined to aggression to precipitate violent encounters in an approved way. The code is a way of survival on the inner-city streets.

Interviews by Stewart and Simons (2009) among 800 African American adolescents further document the “code” and its functions. Serving as an organizing mechanism, a sort of policing system, or what Stewart and Simons (2009) call a “lifestyle guide,” the code encourages individuals to trust one another with a certain amount of respect or otherwise face the consequences (Anderson, 1999, p. 104). Respect

is the core tenet of the code, and, in an environment known for deprivation, it becomes difficult to attain and maintain it (Anderson, 1999, p. 128). Individuals campaign for respect in many different ways. Some will adopt a certain protective macho demeanor, by stealing others' possessions or even by striking back with violence in retaliation for some prior wrongdoing or disrespectful gesture (Anderson, 1999). As Anderson (1999) notes, the issue of respect is closely tied to violence. Many will risk their lives when they feel that respect they deserve is under attack.

One Vision must engage, understand, and find ways to change this context. Although its model might well reflect existing research, obstacles for success can still be formidable. One Vision must seek to quell the many community strains contributing to violence.

The case of Tayo (a pseudonym), a 16-year-old African American youth in one of the targeted communities, helps illustrate the number of problems One Vision must address in work for its neighborhoods and clients. Tayo lives with his crack-addicted mother and younger sister in the Homewood North neighborhood. Tayo and a group of his friends were known around the neighborhood for their lucrative drug smuggling and dealing. He was one of the leaders of this group. One evening, on his way home, he "got caught" alone. A car full of young men pulled up and opened fire, hitting him four times at close range and injuring him in the shoulder, stomach, hip, and leg.

Tayo had been a One Vision client for some time (as described in subsequent sections) for whom community coordinators attempted to provide various forms of assistance and services. Although One Vision staff members helped him complete multiple employment applications, no employers had called him. After he was shot, they helped him cope with his injuries, buying and bringing food to him and his family and, for his own safety, offering to find alternative housing for him. His mother, however, refused to let him leave. She suggested that, no matter where her son was, shooters would find him. She thought a more appropriate response was to go back to "how things used to get done around here"—that is, to retaliate.

Given the code and the family's background, this preference did not surprise One Vision staff members. Sympathizing with Tayo's

mother, a community coordinator pleaded with her to consider other options, such as relocation, as well as the safety and education of her children, rather than a foreseeable cycle of viciousness and despair. Yet, the mother continued to insist that there was nowhere to run and that they would have to confront this issue through retaliation, “even if I have to drive ‘em.”

This situation was one of many that community coordinators would monitor. Each such incident and case presented its own variety of challenges and potential for dangerous consequences.

One Vision has slowly but continuously expanded. Although this expansion might be relevant to understanding the impact of the organization on violence (see discussion section), the focus of this evaluation was on the three original communities. We describe these in the next sections.

### **Northside**

Northside is the largest of the three communities. It has 18 neighborhoods and just over 48,000 residents, 36 percent of whom are black, with a per capita income of just under \$16,000 (Department of City Planning, 2006). Although the Northside homicide rate is not the highest of the three communities (Table 2.1), One Vision staff considered the area to be especially dangerous.

The critical hub of legal and illegal activities in Northside is the Central Northside neighborhood. Two major roads meet in the heart of Central Northside, and, during daytime working hours, this intersection is flooded with traffic. Within walking distance of this intersection is a set of rejuvenated old homes that has attracted a diverse group of middle-class residents to the neighborhood. The website for the City of Pittsburgh (undated) describes these homes as “carefully restored rowhouses (that) reflect Greek revival doorways, Gothic turrets, stained glass and Richardsonian stonework.” The unique architectural style of these homes, coupled with their vibrant colors, contrasts noticeably from most of the older resident-owned homes. Within a short walking distance of these restored and older homes is an area of public housing and dilapidated housing units.

**Table 2.1**  
**Characteristics of One Vision One Life Target Neighborhoods**

Characteristic	Northside	Hill District	Southside <sup>a</sup>	Nontarget	City
Total population	48,102	18,276	27,054	233,555	331,223
Population density per square mile (average %)	8	11	7	6	7
Black (%)	36	71	12	22	27
Per capita income (average)	15,901	11,072	12,771	17,353	15,775
Households on public assistance (average %)	11	14	6	7	8
Female head of household with children under 18 (average %)	14	19	12	9	12
Vacant housing (average %)	17	22	19	12	15
Homicides	15	8	1	33	59
Homicide rate per 100,000 residents	31	44	4	14	18

<sup>a</sup> Excludes Beltzhoover and Saint Clair Village.

NOTE: All figures are 2000 estimates except for homicide, which is 2003. The homicide rate reflected here is four less than what was reported in the Uniform Crime Report figures illustrated in Figure 1.1 in Chapter One.

The worlds of these two very distinct groupings of residents often meet at the major intersection of Central Northside. While this intersection appears safe during daytime hours, nearby is a very busy open-air drug market. Also during the evenings, local residents congregate near bars or around street corners to buy or sell drugs or sex.

Central Northside, like much of the larger Northside community, is one of the more spacious target communities in which One Vision is involved. The violence, particularly shootings and homicides, stems mostly from feuds between Northside neighborhoods, but also on occasion from outsiders entering Northside. Northside is known for drug trafficking, gang disputes, and drive-by shootings. While much

of these activities take place at night, disputes between neighborhood groups are volatile and can erupt at any time during the day.

### Hill District

The Hill District includes six neighborhoods. It differs from Northside in several ways (as shown in Table 2.1). First, it is much smaller and economically disadvantaged, with a population of just over 18,000 and per capita income of just over \$11,000 (Department of City Planning, 2006). Second, it is more densely populated, has a higher vacant housing rate, and has higher proportions of households on public assistance and headed by females with children. Third, it is more homogeneous, with a black population of more than 70 percent (Department of City Planning, 2006). Fourth, its rates of violence generally and homicide specifically are much higher, with a homicide rate of 44 per 100,000 residents in 2003, about 42 percent higher than that in Northside.

The Hill District borders the downtown. Centre Avenue, a primary artery for the Hill District, includes small businesses, project housing, and the One Vision office, as well as a direct route downtown. Centre Avenue today has but a few reminders of its time as a cultural hot spot. From the 1930s to the 1950s, the Hill District was a thriving, prosperous, and influential black neighborhood. Great jazz musicians, such as Lena Horne, George Benson, and Oscar Peterson, were drawn to the Hill to play at The Old Hurricane Lounge, a local jazz club (City of Pittsburgh, undated). The Hill District was also home to the Pittsburgh Crawfords of the Negro National League, with such great players as Satchel Paige, Josh Gibson, and James Thomas “Cool Papa” Bell. The *Pittsburgh Courier* and steel industry provided many employment opportunities, and other residents were able to open small businesses, such as convenience stores and barbershops (City of Pittsburgh, undated).

Public housing projects and an urban renewal project that displaced businesses and more than 8,000 residents for a civic arena have adversely affected the area (City of Pittsburgh, undated). In the 1960s, the Hill District was hit hard by racial tensions, riots, and heroin trafficking. In the 1980s, economic declines, due in part to problems in the

steel industry, helped spark the crack epidemic in Pittsburgh generally and the Hill District specifically. Since the 1950s, the area population has plummeted from 50,000 to just over 15,000 (City of Pittsburgh, undated).

Today, many residents of the Hill will gather along the sidewalks and small grass patches between or beside the old buildings along Centre Avenue. The once colorful and vibrant murals on these old buildings are now faded, a mere memory of the community that once existed. As we observed, men in Muslim and African garb set up makeshift shops selling incense, perfume, watches, and cheap jewelry. Others stand or sit in the shade drinking liquor straight from the bottle. In the crowd, there are addicts desperately begging for a few dollars.

The Hill District, particularly along Centre Avenue, has a more evident drug economy than either Northside or Southside. Like Northside, the Hill District has issues with guns, drugs, and individual or group disputes, but One Vision staff consider the Hill District to be more neutral territory for groups or gangs. Violence stems primarily from clashes within the community concerning drugs or personal disagreements that escalate, and is not necessarily due to disputes between neighborhoods or gangs.

### **Southside**

The Southside community is quite different from Northside or the Hill District. It has a population of about 27,000, of whom 12 percent are black (Department of City Planning, 2006). Per capita income is just less than \$13,000 (Department of City Planning, 2006). Its population density and proportion of households headed by a female with children under 18 are on par with the city as a whole. The proportion of households on public assistance is less than the city average, but its vacancy rate is higher. Southside's annual homicide rate in 2003, four per 100,000 residents, is lower than that in the other target areas and those in the nontarget areas and the city as a whole (Table 2.1).

One Vision began working within two feuding Southside neighborhoods, Beltzhoover and Saint Clair Village, in May 2004. Within a year, it had expanded to eight more contiguous neighborhoods. (It does not include Mount Oliver Borough, in the middle of the area but

not part of the city of Pittsburgh.) The bulk of businesses, retail shops, bars, and leisure activities in the area are at its north end, comprising a major venue for residents throughout Pittsburgh and a primary hangout of local university students. Just south of this strip, Southside geography is rugged, consisting of an abundance of trees, rock formations, and narrow, winding roads. The geographic variations of the area mean that its residential sections are small, with dense concentrations of houses and project units. This geography also shapes the local drug market.

Southside street blocks are small and enclosed. Southside is not as spacious as the other target areas. Nevertheless, side streets, alleyways, and, in some places, thick brush provide necessary cover for drug dealing and using and other illegal activities. Southside violence typically occurs between neighborhood groups or gangs over drugs, respect, or retaliation for past incidents.

### **Summary Comparison**


In sum, Northside, Hill District, and Southside present three distinct areas and sets of challenges for One Vision to address. Northside is the largest of the three and suffers gang violence and community conflict, including that resulting from a collision between gentrification and illegal drug markets. The Hill District is the most geographically compact of the three (see Figure 2.1) and has frequent violence over drugs and other personal disputes. Southside has a topography shaping its illegal activities and some long-standing community disputes. We next consider how One Vision organized and implemented work to help these communities.

## **General Program Description**

### **The Mission**

As noted, One Vision arose in part because of citywide concern about what appeared to be a substantial and growing violence problem. The violence problem was particularly disconcerting because it appeared to indicate that crime rates in Pittsburgh were increasing in contrast

**Figure 2.1**  
**One Vision One Life Target Areas**



RAND MG947-2.1

with those in the nation and many other urban areas. To the credit of the community as well as political and law-enforcement leadership, Pittsburgh did not respond to this problem haphazardly but devised an evidence-based plan of action.

The individuals who designed and implemented One Vision took three actions to help make their program effective from initiation. First, they relied on their own experience and successes working in communities and responding to community-level problems. The leaders of One Vision had organized and worked for many community change agencies and were quite familiar with the political and community structure of the city. This knowledge was crucial for securing

substantial funding for the program. Second, they relied on promising practices as identified in existing criminal justice, community change, and public health literatures. Third, they networked with other national leaders and groups. One Vision staff visited staff at the Chicago Project for Violence Prevention's CeaseFire initiative (for more on the Chicago Project, see Skogan et al., 2008). They adapted several elements of this initiative and copied (with Chicago staff approval) several forms used to document program activity.


One Vision's basic mission is to reduce crime and violence. In particular, as one staff member said, "We know that we will have to handle the one shooting (with an injury) or homicide, but we will not tolerate the retaliation that comes afterwards." This work requires the use of community coordinators (called *violence interrupters* in the Chicago program) to gather street-level intelligence, mediate brewing disputes, and intervene in long-standing gang and turf conflicts, among other tasks.

One Vision found it necessary to provide several options to persons seeking to free themselves from community violence. It sought to focus its efforts on those persons most at risk of committing or being a victim of violence in high-crime neighborhoods. One Vision not only works in and with the targeted communities but also with other, external organizations to provide members of its communities with opportunities to pursue another way of life. In short, One Vision strives to secure external organizational resources, link individuals to these resources, and thereby stabilize or change conditions in its neighborhoods.

To accomplish its mission, One Vision follows a six-point plan:

1. Mediate and intervene in conflicts.
2. Conduct outreach to provide alternatives for most at-risk persons.
3. Build strong community coalitions.
4. Communicate a unified message: No shooting.
5. Provide a rapid response to all shootings.
6. Provide programs for at-risk youth.

**Figure 2.2**  
**One Vision One Life Logic Model**



RAND MG947-2.2

### The Six-Point Plan to Stop the Shooting

The logic behind the expected effects of each of these points, and some of their interactions, is schematically portrayed in Figure 2.2. The model is a heuristic device based on our observations and interviews with key informants. We present it to help the reader better understand how One Vision sought to reduce violence. Each point leads to intermediate results, some with feedback to others, and all supporting the

ultimate goal of increasing community capacity and reducing crime and violence.

The first point in the plan is to *mediate and intervene in conflicts*. One Vision staff are on the streets seeking knowledge of potential community, neighborhood, and interpersonal conflicts. They work in many ways to build trusting relationships through mediation, to become visible within the targeted communities, and to otherwise anticipate and intervene in conflicts before another shooting or homicide incident occurs.

This element of the plan focuses on those individuals who One Vision has identified as potential threats for being involved in violence. Its intermediate result is to engage them in such a way that they increase concern and respect among themselves and for the community and reconsider how they respond to specific conflicts, and to encourage them to seek out alternatives to violence.

The second point is *outreach to provide alternatives for most at-risk persons*. One Vision provides personal outreach by selecting high-risk individuals for case management over time, particularly to help these individuals establish and attain positive goals. As we explain later, selection of clients is largely discretionary and based on community coordinator perceptions of those at greatest risk for committing or becoming a victim of violence. The most basic assistance includes linking high-risk persons with job training, employment, substance-abuse counseling, housing, education, and recreation services. This, in turn, helps increase concern and respect among these individuals and encourages them to consider alternatives to violence. Community coordinators meet local community members and youths at their homes, on popular streets, and at schools. Outreach might also include emergency services offered in a home or hospital, such as those we saw earlier offered to Tayo to relocate him away from danger.

The third point of the plan is building *strong community coalitions*. One Vision works with individuals and community groups and collaborates with external organizations and agencies, such as the police, jails, and public and private funders. This collaboration is done through strategic planning with external organizations. In addition, One Vision staff organize and participate in community events, including cook-

outs and sports leagues in each of the target neighborhoods, in order to bring people together and establish credibility in the community. One Vision works to initiate contacts at all levels (individuals, community groups, external organizations, and agencies) to generate support within and for the community for (1) building purposeful and trusting relationships, (2) working to fill the basic gaps and needs of individuals and their families, and (3) sending and implanting a new and unified message of no shooting. This can also support the intermediate goal of helping citizens get jobs, services, and housing.

The fourth point is a *unified message of no shooting*. One Vision regularly delivers this message through flyers, posters, brochures, T-shirts, and personal outreach efforts. As an exercise of informal social control, One Vision believes that an overt message of protest and a shaming of gun violence is warranted and necessary for safety. One Vision is attempting to make the people who live in these neighborhoods and those involved in violence understand that great harm occurs when violence is a primary means for resolving disputes. One Vision hopes that understanding this will lead community residents to take action to stop the violence. Such work can also support the intermediate goal of increasing concern and respect among area residents and encouraging alternatives to violence. Similarly, encouraging alternatives to violence can involve increasing understanding of how violence affects the community and taking action to reduce it.

The fifth point of the plan is a *rapid response to all shootings and homicides* in target areas. One Vision is committed to responding to every shooting incident and requires that all staff members be available to attend its response. Within 72 hours of a shooting or homicide, One Vision staff mobilize themselves, local community members, and other interested agencies, such as police and local clergy, to join them where the shooting occurred to protest the violence and promote its no-shooting message. The purpose is to show support for the community and its members, gather information, and make connections to people in the neighborhoods. One Vision also uses the response as an opportunity to help the victim, the victim's family and friends, the offender, and any concerned community member in any way they can. This might mean providing transportation to the victim or others, counsel-

ing family members, or encouraging offenders not to seek retaliation. Additionally, the response incorporates a nonpublic effort that includes an attempt to gather information about an incident and to mediate conflicts that are at the root of or might result from the incident. The purpose of such a rapid “behind-the-scene” response to all shootings is to deter further shooting, prevent retaliation, promote truces, and promote a message of no shooting. This generally occurs prior to the public response and supports One Vision’s work to mediate and intervene in conflicts. Such work can also help One Vision increase concern and respect in the community, encourage alternatives to violence, and increase understanding of how violence affects the community.

The sixth point of the plan is *programs for at-risk youth*. One Vision works to generate and create support for after-school and summer programs and to ensure safe daily passage to and from them. It has initiated a program in collaboration with community schools, allowing community coordinators to “post up”—that is, to routinely stand watch on school grounds both before and after school. Community coordinators do so to ensure that there are no unauthorized adults on the premises and that youth can enter and exit school grounds safely.

One Vision also generates local and external resources and works to organize and create summer programs, such as basketball camps, sports leagues, and dance clubs, for both boys and girls. The purpose of these activities is to keep children away from daily activities on the streets. Such activities and programs also give the children a purpose and something to anticipate. During these programs, One Vision staff work to interact with the children and to have them interact with each other in a positive and safe atmosphere. Such efforts to provide alternatives to youth can also help them in getting jobs, services, or housing. These programs result in important connections, build staff awareness of community needs, and provide opportunities for interaction that allow staff to assess how well the programs are received.

### **Implementation Chaos**


Although the model illustrates a systematic approach to implementation, it also shows considerable overlap and interaction between aspects of the six-point plan. Management and line-level staff might implement

various aspects of the plan at various times, resulting in a more chaotic implementation process than is depicted. Nevertheless, the model does depict critical elements of the plan to reduce violence, elements that focus on altering the informal social control capacity of these communities. These communities suffer incredible disadvantage, and residents have naturally adapted in a way that defines the nature of community interactions. One Vision's six-point plan focuses on interacting with individuals involved in violence and providing opportunities for them and others to reshape the culture of the community and reduce crime and violence. In the next section, we discuss in more detail One Vision staff responsible for carrying out the work of this organization.

### Organizational Actors and Roles

A team headed by an executive director carries out the mission, vision, and goals of One Vision One Life. The executive leads a team of about 50 employees, including a program director, administrative assistant, data manager, five area managers, and more than 40 community coordinators (Figure 2.3). We describe in this section the background and roles of these individuals in the organization.

**Figure 2.3**  
**Organizational Structure of One Vision One Life**



### **Executive Director**

The executive director grew up in inner-city Philadelphia. Moving many times as a youth from place to place throughout the city, he became familiar with inner-city streets, dangers, and culture. He began dealing drugs, such as marijuana, crack cocaine, and heroin, at an early age (J. Taylor, 2004). He also became a user as a teenager but vowed never to “get caught slipping” out on the streets (J. Taylor, 2004).

The executive director would spend nearly 23 years of his life in prison. While in the penitentiary, he began reading philosophy, discussing religion, and boxing for sport. He quit his drug habit and began representing and working on behalf of other prison inmates, heading and leading various inmate organizations (J. Taylor, 2004). After being released, he attained baccalaureate and graduate degrees and worked his way up many organizations before becoming the executive director of One Vision One Life.

The executive director’s position requires that he be like a chameleon, able to appear both professional and “street.” He must build, mold, and guide a dedicated team of nearly 50 employees. This includes staff development efforts to help area managers and community coordinators become community leaders. He must constantly be aware of and concerned for the communities he serves.

One of his primary responsibilities is to secure and allocate nearly \$1.6 million in annual funding from multiple public (state and local) and private (e.g., foundations) sources in the target areas and across the city for the organization (OVOL, 2007). Working with these organizations requires open communication and considerable flexibility. His decisionmaking skills are constantly tested, as he must choose not only what functions to attend but how funding should be allocated. This requires information from community residents regarding their needs.

The executive director must also generate support from local citizens and citizen groups. To do so, he works directly with his staff to create and implement new community programs in the three target communities. Such programs serve multiple purposes for the executive director. In addition to keeping children off the streets and away from activities, such as drugs and prostitution, the programs serve as mech-

anisms for gathering information or intelligence from those directly linked with the neighborhood.

The executive director opens his door to citizens and citizen groups for scheduled and unscheduled meetings and phone calls. He listens to their ideas and concerns and, when possible, will link individuals to specific social service agencies, such as those providing rehabilitation and counseling, or provide information to citizen groups on how to collaborate and generate resources from other similar external organizations. Outside the office, he attends and speaks at community meetings and events. When warranted, he works with individuals and their families in the community and their homes. This task serves multiple functions, providing support for an individual or a family and generating support for the community and the organization.

Much of this community outreach is done by area managers and community coordinators with whom the executive director must keep in close contact, working to develop trust and respect along with responsibility and accountability. In addition to fostering accountability, which can take time and patience, the executive director critically reviews the motives and decisionmaking processes of both his area managers and community coordinators. Aware of the individual stories, backgrounds, and basic circumstances of his employees, the executive director constantly works to assess the commitment, strengths, and weaknesses of each. To facilitate this assessment, the executive director and his staff have established a system requiring area managers to write weekly and monthly summaries of their activities with local agencies, noting the progress of their community coordinators. Community coordinators in turn must track their caseload of high-risk individuals over an extended period of time and document their activities through a variety of reports.

The One Vision paperwork expectations are significant. Reports that community coordinators are to submit include conflict mediation forms, caseload-related documents, violence response forms, and community risk forms (discussed in more detail later). This paperwork is required for several reasons. First, the executive director feels that it would help staff be more professional. The executive director often stresses that One Vision is working not only to change communities but

also to help its workers grow through mentoring. Second, the paperwork is an attempt to gather reliable information on the community, possible dangers or conflicts arising, the solutions used to solve these problems, and the impact of the program. In theory, the paperwork is a critical element of effective problem solving. The data generated from the paperwork is used to distribute resources, decide where to intensify efforts, and document the progress being made by the organization. Third, the paperwork is an accountability mechanism, to ensure that community coordinators are carrying out the mission of the organization as intended.

### **Program Director**

The program director grew up in inner-city Pittsburgh. He, too, moved frequently as a young man but never beyond Pittsburgh city limits. He lived and learned the street culture by peddling and consuming drugs. His habits led him to nearly 11 years in prison; there, he met the current executive director of One Vision. Today, he lives in one of the target communities for One Vision. Along with the executive director, the program director has been with One Vision since its inception.

The program director is critical to the success of the organization. Above all, he is the executive director's "go-to guy" because he has a good understanding of the components of the organization as well as the roles of the executive director, external organizations, local citizens and citizen groups, and One Vision employees. When the executive director cannot attend a meeting with another external organization, a group of citizens, or area managers or community coordinators, he will turn to the program director. The executive and program directors have established a trusting relationship. Both are strongly committed to the success of One Vision.

Beyond helping the executive director, the program director has his own ongoing projects and concerns. These projects primarily advance the community mobilization, outreach, and youth components of the six-point plan. The program director's tasks include conceptualizing, creating, developing, and implementing programs, such as midnight basketball leagues and a three-part program that takes young adults into the county jail, the coroner's office, and a cemetery.

While having no direct authority over them, the program director also delegates tasks to area managers and their community coordinators, assisting and advising whenever possible. The program director and One Vision staff often encounter new or unexplored problems in implementing new programs. The program director mentors staff in implementing a few simpler programs, such as local cookouts and sports activities, and then in developing other multipurpose programs.

The program director is responsible for coordinating the public violence response. Within 72 hours of either a homicide or shooting, the executive director and the program director will (1) develop a plan with area managers and community coordinators to gather, give, and receive information on the incident; (2) plan how One Vision will respond in the neighborhood where the incident occurred; (3) initiate contacts with citizens and citizen groups through flyers and direct contacts to gather intelligence and mobilize citizens toward action; (4) contact the media and local political representatives to inform them about the response; and (5) coordinate a rally and give a short presentation at the location of the incident, usually lasting about one hour.

There is also a lot of behind-the-scenes work to respond specifically to an incident. Staff coordinate efforts to speak with individuals, families, groups, and gangs on both sides of the incident to gather more information about possible retaliatory violence. This post-response debriefing is the intervention and prevention stage of the violence response. The program director, area manager, and community coordinator might show up together at the home of the person from whom they seek information, doing so discreetly if that individual is in mourning or even hiding with friends or family.

The program director involves himself in this process as much as possible. He first ensures that his staff is safe so that he can concentrate on the individual (victim or perpetrator) of interest. He seeks as much firsthand knowledge and information as possible in order to develop a proper intervention. The ultimate purpose of the intervention is obvious but not as tangible as one might think. The situation might require problem-solving skills learned in a classroom or on the streets. No matter, such problems still exist, and each requires a comprehen-

sive understanding and careful response by the program director and his staff.

### **Area Managers**

One Vision has five area managers (this includes the additional areas that are beyond the scope of the study). Three of the five area managers are black males, all of whom grew up in inner-city Pittsburgh. The two female area managers also live in Pittsburgh, one of whom has become part of a new component of the program called Women Against Violence Everywhere. The area managers are responsible for specific communities targeted by One Vision. Two area managers supervise workers in the three target communities of concern for this evaluation.

Area managers identify, train, develop, and manage a team of community coordinators. One area manager oversaw 11 Northside community coordinators, while another worked with three Southside and four Hill District community coordinators.

Area managers, under the guidance of the executive director, take part in the orientation and training of newly hired community coordinators. It was difficult to determine the exact number of hours of training, but the training covered all aspects of the organization. For example, the first week focuses on the One Vision mission and goals. An area manager will teach the steps of the six-point plan. Another area manager will lead a discussion on One Vision rules, such as those requiring drug abstinence and testing. The second week of training explains the community coordinator's position and how it fits within the mission, goals, and vision of the initiative. During this week, area managers will begin teaching the newly hired community coordinators the value, necessity, and fundamentals of the documentation process. The third week of training focuses on both the documentation process and testing of trainees. Area managers challenge and test their community coordinators through quizzes and role-playing activities. The area manager will lead the group in a discussion of the various situations One Vision staff have previously encountered. The primary goal at this point is to teach community coordinators violence prevention. This includes providing the community coordinators with mediation techniques and information on services available to them and their target

communities. The fourth week of orientation is dedicated to on-the-job training. Area managers might be in the targeted community with coordinators or could communicate with them over the phone and meet during the week at the One Vision office. This is done to ensure that a community coordinator begins the process of working to engage his or her community, that a caseload is being developed, and that the necessary paperwork to document the caseload is being completed.

Once the orientation and training process is complete, the area manager becomes responsible for acquiring from the community coordinator knowledge, information, and documentation of ongoing events and conflicts occurring in the target neighborhoods. This includes ensuring that the community coordinators comply with all data-reporting requirements. This requires effective communication, both formal and informal, with community coordinators. Informal communication might include phone calls, text messaging, and site or neighborhood visits. Formal communication includes weekly meetings and the ongoing documentation process. Area managers seek information to learn of and intervene in potentially violent disputes. Communication between area managers and community coordinators is therefore critical to the success of the initiative in preventing violence.

On the streets in the target neighborhoods, the primary responsibility of the area manager is to continue to train, mentor, and be a resource for the community coordinator. The area manager serves as a bridge between the community coordinator and the executive and program directors. The area managers assist community coordinators in accomplishing the mission and goals of One Vision. Area managers help community coordinators manage their caseloads of at least ten high-risk individuals and to provide these individuals with alternatives—such as employment, treatment, or education—to violence.

Area managers help obtain community partners and mobilize citizens. This includes training community coordinators to go out into their target neighborhood and get local individuals and organizations involved in community events. Once a community has accepted One Vision, area managers can be more effective in helping community coordinators reinforce its message.

Area managers also help educate the public about One Vision programs. They work with community coordinators to disseminate information on the streets through hand-to-hand and door-to-door delivery of brochures, flyers, and posters. These materials are also available in storefronts, at correctional institutions, and in local hospitals. The flyers list a toll-free number for requesting help from One Vision staff, including their involvement in volatile situations. The flyers also list available neighborhood services.

Area managers help organize presentations at the juvenile detention center, the jail, schools, and social service organizations. Area managers often speak at these events and encourage community coordinators to do the same.

Area managers vary in how they disseminate information to community coordinators. One drives into the neighborhood to drop off brochures, posters, and other material and information to the community coordinators at a designated location. Another sets weekly meetings with their community coordinators to review and discuss neighborhood events and possible conflicts. Another area manager feels that it is the responsibility of the community coordinator to come to the One Vision office to collect the necessary materials and information.

Area managers also help create, develop, and implement programs for high-risk individuals. The primary focus for area managers in programs is program delivery and staffing. While area managers might sometimes write grant applications or obtain other funding sources, they often work with established programs needing staffing and management skills. This might require partnering with local organizations.

### **Community Coordinators**

The primary agent of change for One Vision is the community coordinator. The community coordinator's role is to bring together the One Vision mission and goals by managing, directing, organizing, and involving him- or herself (the vast majority are male) in numerous programs and activities. One Vision has a range of programs by which the community coordinator might not only strengthen his or her skills and legitimize his or her status but also reach out, provide opportunities, and help build a stronger and safer community. The community

coordinator's knowledge of the community and its key actors is critical to responding to violence incidents. This makes the community coordinator a unique asset for controlling crime in the community.

The theoretical premise of the need for community coordinators lies in Bursik and Grasmick's (1993) assumption that socially disorganized neighborhoods have fewer public resources. Within these highly disorganized neighborhoods, there is little guardianship or formal police presence (Bursik and Grasmick, 1993). This allows offenders and victims to come together and increase the opportunities of offending (Eck and Weisburd, 1995). Feelings of disorder and fear of crime lead to withdrawal and thus more perceived crime and disorder (Bursik and Grasmick, 1993; Skogan, 1990). In part, this is because residents in these neighborhoods have trouble organizing for improvement and because informal social control processes are quite limited (Silver, 2000). In theory, community coordinators can build collective efficacy and social capital, linking mutual trust and willingness to intervene for the common good, and can mediate the association between concentrated disadvantage and violence (Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls, 1997). Without social cohesion, efficacy, or capital, a community will find its informal social controls weakening. One Vision community coordinators seek, through programs of the initiative, to reverse the spiral of decay in the Northside, Hill District, and Southside communities.

One Vision has 40 community coordinators. These community coordinators are long-term residents of the targeted neighborhoods. After receiving the training from area managers described earlier, community coordinators begin working for One Vision from 20 to 30 hours per week.<sup>1</sup> These working hours might be at day or night and consist of tasks, such as attending One Vision training, meetings, program activities, and violence responses, or attending to community needs, such as intervention, prevention, and mentoring of high-risk individuals. The community coordinator is paid \$1,000 to \$2,000 monthly.

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<sup>1</sup> There are opportunities to move from part-time to full-time employment. Nevertheless, to date, only one community coordinator has been promoted to a full-time managerial position.

One of the valuable assets of these community coordinators is their status, or what some academics and even One Vision staff members have labeled “the juice,” within these communities (Anderson, 1999). Many community coordinators were, at one time, victims, perpetrators, gang members, prisoners, or addicts. Community coordinators are products of—but also, with the inception of One Vision, change agents for—their community. Having spent much of their lives within the community, they understand its complicated dynamics. For One Vision, they garner, or sometimes must work to garner, respect. One Vision seeks to spin the knowledge, skills, understanding, and respect the coordinators command in a positive direction.

Community coordinators join One Vision for different reasons. Some are seeking a job; others see One Vision as a way to get off the streets; and still others do it to help family, friends, and the community.

The success of One Vision depends on the ability of community coordinators to work the streets. Specifically, community coordinators must accomplish two goals for the organization. First, they must systematically collect and use street-level intelligence to intervene in disputes, turf battles, and gang or group incidents before they become shootings and homicides. Second, they must reach out to those at high risk for violence with services, jobs, and other assistance (Dalton, 2006). Community coordinators are not just the “eyes and ears” of the neighborhood but also resources and potential mentors for it.

Community coordinators build a caseload of at least ten high-risk individuals or clients. These individuals might include drug dealers, gang members, addicts/fiends, alcoholics, or prostitutes. They add individuals to their caseload largely at their own discretion. The community coordinator acquires his or her caseload by using his or her knowledge and understanding of his or her neighborhood and, more specifically, of the individuals who might be at high risk of committing or being victimized by violence. Community coordinators may use their own personal knowledge, ties, and friendships, as well as those of their families, friends, and neighbors, to help identify potential clients.

Caseworker approaches will vary by client but have many common elements. Each week, community coordinators work to set and attain goals with their clients. They also document the successes,

failures, and, primarily, the processes of each week. The purpose of this work is to connect clients with the appropriate services, assistance, programs, or activities that will reduce that client's risk of violence or victimization. In building a caseload, community coordinators seek to fulfill organizational goals. They continuously work to build trusting relationships and to acquire and use street-level intelligence for dispute intervention and prevention. One Vision also seeks to involve community coordinators in other formal activities, ideally enabling them to generate further support.

Much of the work of a community coordinator is based in procedural justice (Tyler and Huo, 2002). The community coordinator interacts with residents in a way that appeals to them by treating them in ways they feel are fair, and that thereby might encourage stronger feelings of obligation to the community coordinator and his or her values and beliefs. Theoretically, the community coordinator is in a position to plant the seeds of self-regulation and a process-based approach to regulation. With each personal contact, a favorable spiraling effect might begin by which the community coordinator gains respect, furthers his or her legitimacy, and ultimately implements effective process-based regulation. Eventually, this process might lead residents to internalize certain values and beliefs and to weaken the overall resistance to authorities in the community.

Beyond building a caseload, community coordinators must work to acquire local partners, such as businesses, social service agencies, officials, clergy, residents, or any other interested party willing to help One Vision. The purpose of developing these partnerships is similar to that of the caseload: to build trusting relationships and reinforce the mission of One Vision with the partner and coordinator. Community coordinators are to visit community partners monthly and inform them of One Vision activities.

### **Support Staff**

A small support staff supports the work of the executive director, program director, area managers, and community coordinators. One Vision One Life has a full-time administrative assistant and other staff to collect and input data on program activities, including forms com-

pleted by community coordinators and provided to data managers. In the next chapters, we assess data on program results as well as how program activities might have contributed to these results.

## One Vision One Life Operations

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To gain a better understanding of how One Vision worked in the streets, we conducted field observations of program work. We present some descriptive findings here and additional findings in Chapter Four in discussing program effectiveness. (For more on our field observation strategy, see Appendix A.)

One Vision staff members were open and forthcoming about the program, giving our field observer good access to the executive staff and most of the community coordinators working in the targeted neighborhoods. All together, our field observer spent more than 500 hours on this evaluation. The observations provided us with not only a sound understanding of the program structure and its implementation, as discussed earlier, but also offered insight into many of the issues discussed here.

Many of our findings in this chapter are also based on program data provided to us by the organization. Each community coordinator was asked to complete a variety of documents, including a summary of work activities, assessments of the targeted neighborhoods, and outcomes related to their conflict mediation interactions with community members. Other findings we present stem from interviews we conducted with various stakeholders, including police executives, representatives from community and social service organizations, and One Vision executives, as well as information we gleaned from ride-alongs we completed with Pittsburgh law-enforcement officers.

## Stopping Violence

The community coordinators acknowledged that there was a wide availability of guns often used to resolve disputes. Their opinion was that most persons used guns to protect themselves or found it “better to get caught with it than without it.” Guns are not carried all the time, but, for some local residents, they are always accessible. This was evident in a confrontation that our field observer saw with a community coordinator between a teenager and an older man. The youth and older man were yelling at and confronting each other as the community coordinator stood by and observed. The argument ended, but the teenager yelled, “It ain’t over.” He then turned and began briskly walking away and around a storefront corner. The community coordinator said to the field observer, “You see that? That little dude’s going to get some friends and probably a gun too.” Soon after, the youth returned with a friend, walked straight to the older man, shot his hand toward his waist, and pulled up his shirt to flash a gun. The older man turned away, got in his car, and drove away angrily. Here was a random confrontation that could have ended with gun violence but instead defused itself. Even without violence, however, the incident illustrates how guns are used to attempt to resolve disputes.

Community coordinators were asked to record what might have occurred if they had not intervened to resolve a dispute. They indicated that 38 percent of the incidents reported on conflict mediation forms were very likely or likely to have resulted in further violence if not for the intervention. This concurs with our field observations: Because the coordinators were often walking the street, they would get intelligence about a brewing conflict and step in to mediate it. A few of these conflicts involved potentially violent circumstances, but most were nonviolent and noncriminal. The tactics used by the coordinators varied by the seriousness and nature of violence. For a minor incident, such as a physical fight, a coordinator would confront the participants directly and mediate the conflict on the street. Coordinators would not always confront possible participants or instigators of more extreme forms of violence. For example, if discovering that someone had a gun in a bar, the coordinator would simply warn potential victims and not always

confront the individual. Similarly, if observing guns on the street, the coordinator would not intervene immediately but instead focus on resolving the conflict afterward. Community coordinators reported contacting the police for only 13 percent of conflicts. Upon learning that an AK-47, MAC-10, or SKS was hidden in a certain location, they would tell their area manager or somebody else in the organization about it. Executive staff would then contact the police to retrieve the gun.

## Identifying Clients

Data on One Vision clients are available from a client intake form community coordinators were to complete. Very few coordinators completed this form consistently. Only 155 client intake forms were completed between October 2005 and June 2007. Data that were collected indicate that individuals were referred to community coordinators in many different ways:

- Thirty-three percent were self-identified—that is, they reached out to a coordinator and requested specific help or services.
- Twenty-four percent were referred by a family member.
- Twenty-three percent were identified by a One Vision staff member.
- Ten percent were referred by a school official.
- Nine percent were referred by a community member.
- Two percent were referred by a church official.
- One percent were referred by a police or court official.

These data also indicate that almost half of client interactions occurred on the street and were one-time contacts. That is, a community coordinator would be asked to solve a specific problem or provide guidance but would not likely follow up that single contact.

Table 3.1 provides data by target area as reported by clients. Clients were typically male, black, and about 18 years old. Clients needed a wide variety of assistance and services. Fifty percent did not have a

**Table 3.1**  
**Characteristics of Clients by Target Area**

Characteristic	All (N = 155)	North (N = 78)	Hill (N = 32)	South (N = 45)
Age (mean)	17.3	17.5	14.9	18.6
Male (%)	84.2	80.6	100.0	79.1
Black (%)	98.1	96.5	100.0	100.0
Violent status (%)				
Has been a victim recently	13.9	14.3	12.5	14.3
Has been violent recently	16.8	12.7	15.6	23.8
Has not been violent recently	57.7	60.3	68.8	45.2
Voices violent thoughts	11.7	12.7	3.1	16.7
School status (%)				
In school	63.9	60.3	90.6	50.0
Dropped out	12.9	16.4	3.1	14.3
Finished high school	14.3	16.4	3.1	19.0
In college	2.0	0.0	0.0	7.1
In GED®	6.8	6.8	3.1	9.5
Employment status (%)				
Has job	14.5	19.7	7.1	9.8
Has illegal job	2.1	2.6	0.0	2.4
Looking for a job	26.9	31.6	17.9	22.0
No job	49.7	35.5	71.4	61.0
Not known	7.6	10.5	3.6	4.9
Criminal-justice status (%)				
Arrested	12.6	5.6	45.5	15.8
Charged	8.4	11.3	0.0	5.3
Convicted	23.5	28.2	9.1	18.4
Not applicable	55.3	54.9	45.5	60.5

**Table 3.1—Continued**

Characteristic	All (N = 155)	North (N = 78)	Hill (N = 32)	South (N = 45)
Probation status (%)				
Complying	30.5	32.4	11.1	35.7
In violation	7.6	8.5	11.1	4.8
Not on probation	61.8	59.2	77.8	59.5
Gang status (%)				
Hard-core member	1.4	1.4	0.0	2.6
Gang member	14.6	20.5	3.1	12.8
Gang association	13.9	16.4	6.3	15.4
Wants to get out	7.6	5.5	9.4	7.7
Not in gang	55.6	50.7	65.6	56.4
Unknown	6.9	5.5	15.6	5.1
Caring adult (%)				
Has no contact	5.7	2.8	6.9	9.8
Has regular contact	63.1	66.2	72.4	51.2
Has someone to depend on	31.2	31.0	20.7	39.0
Health status (%)				
Receiving treatment	19.4	20.0	16.1	20.9
Sick, not receiving treatment	0.7	1.4	0.0	0.0
Healthy	53.5	51.4	54.8	55.8
Don't know	26.4	27.1	29.0	23.3
Living status (%)				
Has stable residence	52.8	51.3	50.0	46.5
Has some support	31.6	38.2	34.4	37.2
No stable residence	7.6	3.9	12.5	4.7
Severe stress	8.0	6.6	3.1	11.6

**Table 3.1—Continued**

Characteristic	All (N = 155)	North (N = 78)	Hill (N = 32)	South (N = 45)
Substance abuse (%)				
Has substance-abuse issues	19.4	18.4	15.6	39.5
In treatment	5.0	17.1	0.0	2.3
No issues	36.8	31.6	56.3	37.2
Unknown	38.8	32.7	28.1	20.9
Attitude to change (%)				
Clear plans and goals	22.7	24.0	46.9	16.7
Unclear goals, but changing	38.1	42.7	9.4	35.7
Struggling	33.8	32.0	40.6	40.5
Not interested	5.4	1.3	3.1	7.1

job; nearly 25 percent had a substance-abuse problem or were in treatment; and nearly 35 percent were struggling with their attitude toward change. Yet, many were not at high risk for violence. Fifty-eight percent had not been violent recently, 56 percent were not in a gang, and most had not been in the criminal-justice system. Client characteristics were generally similar by target area, but with a few exceptions. Hill District clients were younger than those elsewhere, more likely to be in school, and less likely to be employed. Northside and Southside clients were far less likely to have been recently arrested than those in the Hill District.

The observations confirmed these results and, especially, that most community coordinators chose their clients by convenience or opportunity. They typically identified persons for case work using their knowledge of the streets, when walking the streets, and when participating in outreach efforts. The persons on the caseloads were certainly in need but varied widely in their circumstances. They included young dealers or troublemakers, older individuals without jobs or with substance-abuse problems, and some persons just trying to survive.

Among those just trying to survive, one community coordinator sought to assist a couple who were trying to make a living by selling bootlegged CDs and DVDs for \$5 to \$10. Both were former addicts, and the coordinator checked on them to see what they needed to avoid relapse. Many coordinators sought to help certain individuals get a job. This might mean collecting job application forms, having clients complete them, and then submitting them to potential employers. A few coordinators would also buy or let individuals borrow clothes and drive individuals to potential employers for interviews.

Community coordinators would also check on drug addicts, helping them meet their needs as they could. One such client was Mike, a heroin addict in his 50s, tall, and in decent physical condition. The coordinator asked Mike whether he was ready for rehab. Though Mike said he would start next week, the coordinator noted that Mike was not, in fact, ready—it was the summer season, when addicts prefer to stay out and high as much as they can. Instead, Mike might be ready for rehab when the weather turned colder. As the coordinator explained,

I've known Mike all my life. Things have changed though. He used to watch out for all of us kids out here when we were real young. Now, I've grown up, and am looking after him and some of these other guys who should be taking care of themselves and families. It's like they are now the children and I'm the adult; man, it's all just backwards out here you know.

Mike is one of ten to 15 individuals on this coordinator's caseload. Most contacts this coordinator makes with addicts are made on the street. Because this coordinator is well known in the neighborhood and had been working for One Vision for a while, many persons stop him to ask for advice, money, a job, rehab, or even schooling. Many of these persons are not on his caseload, but he helps when he can.

## Problem Solving and Assessing Community Risk

The One Vision model in many ways builds on best practices of law enforcement and other government agencies that seek to implement evidence-based strategies. As such, not only does it ask community coordinators to submit paperwork for monitoring individual activities, but it also seeks to use the collected data to identify the types of work being done, transform this understanding into setting priorities, and identify gaps in service coverage. Among information the program sought to collect from coordinators was their assessment of a community's risk for violence.

Table 3.2 presents results from the 412 community risk-assessment documents submitted by community coordinators from July 2006 to June 2007. On these forms, coordinators denote a risk level, briefly describe the “temperature” of the neighborhood, and note actions taken in response to the concern. A green risk level noted a calm neighborhood: No shootings had occurred, the streets were quiet, and there was little or no violent criminal activity. A yellow risk level indicated no violent criminal activity in the neighborhood, but also some disturbing signs, such as gunshots (with no injuries or deaths), a sense that violence could erupt at any time, or a specific incident that could yet lead to violence. Orange and red risk levels were similar, with community coordinators noting that violence was out of control, gunshots were

**Table 3.2**  
**Risk Level by Target Area**

Risk Level	All	North	Hill	South
Green (%)	28.3	28.4	24.2	46.0
Yellow (%)	24.4	23.5	48.5	19.5
Orange (%)	25.6	34.3	19.7	20.7
Red (%)	21.7	13.7	7.6	13.8
Number of assessments <sup>a</sup>	412	204	66	87

<sup>a</sup> Not all assessments listed the area or neighborhood, so the sum of the number of assessments by area differs from the total number of assessments.

frequent, and a homicide had occurred in a “hot” neighborhood where more gunfire was likely.

Overall, the assessments were evenly distributed by levels of risk, with about one-fourth at each level. There was more differentiation in assessments by neighborhood. Southside coordinators were more likely to note green risk levels, and Northside coordinators were more likely to note orange or red ones. This coincides with the differences in the frequency of homicide in these areas (see Table 2.1 in Chapter Two).

Northside coordinators were also more likely to use the risk assessments in their work. The Northside area manager met with community coordinators weekly (in contrast to the one for Southside and the Hill District, who met coordinators ad hoc rather than on a scheduled basis). During these mandatory Friday morning meetings, he would distribute paperwork and discuss the latest news he had heard. He would then ask each community coordinator what he or she had heard or seen in the neighborhoods. The area manager’s last question was about the risk level: “Where you at on the chart, how’s the neighborhood for the weekend?” If aware of an ongoing “beef” and able to monitor those who had it, the coordinator might say the neighborhood was “warm.” If a shooting had recently occurred and if the coordinator did not know the likely reaction, the coordinator might say the area was “hot” and should be monitored for possible retaliation.

Table 3.3 presents the types of actions that community coordinators reported taking on the community risk document. Coordinators could record as many as eight actions, but most noted taking only one or two actions. In fact, on more than 30 percent of the assessments, the coordinators reported taking no action. If they took an action, it was one or two specific actions, providing a range of neighborhood services. The most common first response was mediating conflicts. The most common second response was community outreach, while the most common third response was a shooting response.

Table 3.4 examines how the actions varied by reported risk level. Actions appear to have increased as the level of risk increased. Coordinators reporting a green risk level took no action about half the time. Those reporting a red level took action about 90 percent of the time. Mediation specifically increased at every level of risk. Outreach activi-

**Table 3.3**  
**Actions Taken in Neighborhood**

Type of Action Taken	Percentage of Situations in Which Action Taken							
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
No action	32.3	63.1	77.4	86.2	92.2	96.6	97.1	97.8
Mediation	38.8	2.7	0.0	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Outreach	17.7	22.3	0.5	0.0	0.2	0.2	0.0	0.0
Law enforcement	4.1	3.6	7.3	8.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Community event	3.6	3.6	3.2	3.4	2.9	0.2	1.9	0.0
Shooting response	2.9	3.9	10.4	0.2	0.2	0.0	0.2	0.0
Hospital intervention	0.2	0.2	0.7	0.5	0.7	2.7	0.2	0.0
Weapon retrieval	0.2	0.0	0.2	1.0	0.7	0.2	0.5	1.2
Relocation	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.7	0.0	0.0	0.0
Referral	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.0

ties also increased with each level of risk, but as second or later activities (data not shown). Community events were more common actions at lower levels of risk. This suggests that coordinators, when reporting such levels, were more likely to focus on a more generalized response and not on helping individuals or mediating specific conflicts.

Area managers asked community coordinators who reported a red risk level or hot neighborhood temperature to follow the situation and keep One Vision management informed. Sometimes, coordinators would report that they were already working on an incident, like a shooting, and that the group or family did not want to talk to anyone immediately. In such situations, the coordinator would stay in contact with the group or family as well as the area manager to monitor conditions and eventually try to mediate the larger conflict.

In some shootings or even domestic disputes, community coordinators would report talking with police to get information about the incident. Hospital interventions, gun retrievals, or relocations were

**Table 3.4**  
**Action Taken by Level of Risk**

First Action Taken	Risk Level (%)			
	Green	Yellow	Orange	Red
No action	53.4	33.0	27.6	10.1
Mediation	21.6	35.0	46.7	56.2
Outreach	10.3	17.0	20.0	24.7
Law enforcement	4.3	8.0	1.9	2.2
Community event	6.9	5.0	1.0	1.1
Shooting response	3.4	2.0	2.9	3.4
Hospital intervention	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.1
Weapon retrieval	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.1
Relocation	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Referral	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0

handled primarily by one of the directors. A relocation request would be made directly to a director, who would follow up with the individual and make all the calls to initiate the relocation. Similarly, when a gun was found or given up, especially a highly powerful or automatic weapon, one of the directors would actually handle the gun and bring it to the police station, thus calling ahead and collaborating with the police on the matter.

Table 3.5 shows how actions varied by target area. Southside community coordinators were most likely to report that they mediated conflicts in response to community risk. Hill District coordinators also often turned to mediation first but, for subsequent (and all) actions, were more likely to undertake community outreach (data not shown). Northside coordinators also turned to mediation and outreach first but, for first and later actions, were more likely to turn to law enforcement than were coordinators elsewhere.

**Table 3.5**  
**Action Taken by Neighborhood**

First Action Taken	Neighborhood (%)		
	Northside	Hill District	Southside
No action	40.3	27.3	32.2
Mediation	33.5	36.4	41.4
Outreach	13.1	33.3	8.0
Law enforcement	8.3	0.0	0.0
Community event	2.4	1.5	10.3
Shooting response	1.9	1.5	8.0
Hospital intervention	0.0	0.0	0.0
Weapon retrieval	0.5	0.0	0.0
Relocation	0.0	0.0	0.0
Referral	0.0	0.0	0.0

## Community-Building Strategies

The One Vision mission included neighborhood change. Interviews with the directors found a keen understanding of the multilayered and complex challenges to changing these communities and ensuring that any resulting benefits persisted. They understood that these communities were severely depressed, that the underground markets in them were rational responses to dire conditions. They also had a keen understanding of what pushed individuals toward violence. They preached to their staff the importance of working to create opportunities for change. They devoted significant time and efforts to improving neighborhood conditions, creating programming that might increase opportunities for residents, and seeking funding to bring additional support services into their areas.

One Vision leadership did most of the community-building work of the organization. The directors focused on ensuring that the organization was connected with other key stakeholders in the community. They attempted to coordinate with small, key organizations (R. Taylor,

1997). They also coordinated with specific organizations, such as the medical center, coroner's office, and local business groups, for specific initiatives. As discussed earlier, One Vision leadership would often be called to the hospital to assist gunshot victims. They also networked with executive leaders of various organizations and funders to garner support for the goals of the organization.

Field observations and interviews with One Vision staff and key community stakeholders found that the initiative had led to several impressive programs for educating and responding to community violence, albeit with little understanding of what impact the programs had. The connections of the directors were quite exhaustive. They included medical, educational, social service, community, political, and law-enforcement agencies.

Medical center personnel were particularly impressed with how One Vision handled gun-violence victims. Eventually, they chose to work only with One Vision, and no other similar organization, on such cases. Once a patient is admitted for a gunshot wound, one of the medical staff members directly contacts one of the two One Vision directors. A One Vision staff member then goes to the hospital to meet with the victim and the victim's family and tries to determine how the incident unfolded and what to do next. If the victim were giving medical personnel problems (which often occurred), then the One Vision staff member would help resolve the situation. For example, one youth injured by gunfire refused to bathe and eat. After a half-hour visit from One Vision staff, he was ready for a bath and would later eat.

One Vision directors have worked slowly to get coordinators in detention and youth centers. In the Shuman Juvenile Detention Center, community coordinators and, sometimes, a One Vision director meet with youths to talk about the destructive nature of violence and the problems associated with drugs. Some coordinators tell their own stories and ask the youths to think about them and their own. This sometimes causes a youth to "open up." On occasion, somebody attending one of these sessions will become a One Vision client.

One Vision operates a youth recreation center, Pleasant Ridge. Community coordinators operate and maintain Pleasant Ridge and

have secured a few PlayStation®2 systems, a music machine, and virtual golf, and organize other activities and sports.

One Vision has established a good working partnership with the coroner's office for information sharing and community education. The coroner's office faxes details of homicides to One Vision, which, if it had not previously known of the death, then plans its response to the violence. One Vision directors bring youths to the coroner's office, where they learn about the effects of drugs and the harm that violence, especially gun violence, can cause. Youths also tour the morgue with the coroner.

Community coordinators, as noted earlier, often spend time at schools, interacting with youths after school and attempting to intervene if any conflicts arise. One Vision management also work with the schools to keep them informed about activities and programs of the organization. One Vision has worked with an alternative school for youths who were not doing well in school or who needed to get out of their neighborhood school for any reason. This alternative school often works one on one with high school-age students.

One Vision has a multidimensional relationship with the Pittsburgh Bureau of Police. One Vision leaders and the police work closely together, directly collaborating on issues inside and outside the targeted neighborhoods. On occasion, police leaders ask the One Vision directors to help calm a neighborhood. Similarly, when an incident occurs or a risk level is high in a target area, One Vision directors might turn to police leadership to request some limited police presence near a high-traffic intersection. The bureau has sent as many as six officers to the requested block for a shift or two. On one occasion, the police chief, the One Vision directors, and two community coordinators appeared together for 45 minutes on public television. They discussed Pittsburgh and its crime and violence issues, promoting the ideas of the chief and One Vision on providing summer jobs to youth at a time when the homicide rate was climbing.

The community coordinators who work the street have a much different relationship with police personnel. The coordinators have very little interaction or negative interaction with the police, although Northside coordinators would collaborate with law enforcement on

some cases. This lack of interaction with police is not surprising, given the background of many coordinators as former perpetrators in these neighborhoods. On our ride-alongs, it was clear that police line-level staff knew very little about the efforts of One Vision. Furthermore, while the police chief and some command staff supported One Vision, other commanders expressed reservations about the organization and its approach. Our discussions with the Pittsburgh Bureau of Police did not reveal any specific intervention that complemented the work of One Vision or that might influence the findings of the evaluation.

Area managers also contribute to the community-building mission. They receive information from other individuals with whom they work in their neighborhoods, including representatives of professional and grassroots organizations, about programming and other support services. They coordinate meetings with local elected officials and neighborhood leaders. Area managers also coordinate with attorneys and court officials on specific cases or when requesting incident-based information. There are limits to the coordination activities of area managers. One Vision programs, for example, were often developed by community coordinators and hence reflect the interest of the coordinators rather than a systematic evaluation by area managers or others of what was needed. Nevertheless, area managers coordinate programs at schools and elsewhere. One area manager, for example, regularly attends school meetings and coordinates activities with school officials to ensure that community coordinators are present outside the school at the afternoon release.

## **Violence Response**

One Vision responds to all shootings in two ways. First, it attempts to gather information about an incident and to mediate conflicts that are at the root of or might result from the incident. The purpose of such a rapid “behind-the-scene” response is to deter further shooting, prevent retaliation, promote truces, and promote a message of no shooting. Second, One Vision attempted to raise local public awareness about the impact of violence in many ways. Executive staff frequently speak at

community meetings and with reporters for interviews. Through these efforts and the violence response campaigns, they seek to communicate a message of “Stop the Killing, Stop the Violence.”

One Vision staff organize violence response rallies after a shooting. These are typically held at about 4:30 p.m. a day or so after the incident. After selecting a date, One Vision staff create and print flyers about the event, giving them to community coordinators to distribute in the community.

The executive director or program director leads the violence response, collaborating with the area manager to ensure that community coordinators are present. The number of area managers and coordinators who actually attend a violence response varies considerably; during the summer of 2007, as few as four coordinators or as many as 14 would attend a response. The Hill District had more trouble with attendance.

Response rallies are usually held near a high-traffic intersection close to where the incident occurred. One of the directors begins the rally, preaching a “no-violence” message by bullhorn, while community coordinators talk with local residents (when possible) and hand out flyers. Community coordinators vary by their activity at these rallies; some appear to be uncertain about what to do, but most appear to be willing to help as needed. Others attending the rally often include clergy, government officials, police officers, and local news reporters.

On several occasions, some local residents stop to wave or honk their car horns to support One Vision in its efforts. On some occasions, local residents offer to distribute flyers to others passing by car or on foot. On one occasion, a woman stopped her car to talk with a community coordinator and the director; she then left to bring back a carload of other women and children to help pass out flyers. Overall, attendance during the months of May through July 2007, counting residents and One Vision staff, ranged from four to 30 persons.

In the next chapter, we turn to a quantitative analysis of program success in achieving its goal: reducing violence in target neighborhoods.

## One Vision One Life's Impact on Violence

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Analyzing the effect of One Vision poses several challenges. Chief among these is that the implementation of the program was not random but was based on levels of violence and expert opinion of the areas most suitable for it. This creates the possibility that something particular about the neighborhoods chosen, aside from the One Vision program, would account for any change in levels of violence—or, specifically, in homicides, aggravated assaults, and aggravated assaults with a gun—after implementation.

To control for the possibility of such selection bias, we used the statistical method of propensity scores (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983; Rosenbaum, 2002) to find the most appropriate (simulated counterfactual) neighborhoods to compare to the One Vision neighborhoods. For sensitivity analysis, we used expert opinions in a subsequent analysis to select a second set of counterfactual neighborhoods and compared them to the One Vision neighborhoods. Finally, to assess whether One Vision had an impact beyond the target areas and into the neighborhoods surrounding them, we conducted a spillover analysis. In this chapter, we summarize our approach to these analyses and present the results of them.

### Defining One Vision One Life's Target Areas

As noted earlier, One Vision was implemented in three target neighborhoods: Northside, Hill District, and Southside. (Table 2.1 in Chapter Two presented characteristics of these areas, and Figure 2.1 in Chap-

ter Two provided a map of the target areas. Appendix B lists each neighborhood in Pittsburgh used in our target, counterfactual, or spillover area analyses.) One Vision began operating in its Northside and Hill District target areas as well as two neighborhoods of its Southside target area in May 2004; it expanded to eight other Southside neighborhoods in May 2005. Given that the onset of One Vision's activities in the Southside occurred at two different time periods and the implementation in the first period included only two neighborhoods, which would be difficult to model, for our analysis of the Southside, we selected the eight neighborhoods receiving One Vision services beginning in May 2005. This also enables us to assess the impact of One Vision at two unique intervention points, strengthening the validity of our analysis and reducing the chance that some other unseen variable was the true cause of any program effects. (Because the Southside neighborhoods of Beltzhoover and Saint Clair Village received services from One Vision that could have affected violence, they are also inappropriate to use as counterfactual neighborhoods. We therefore excluded them from our analyses altogether.)

## Designing the Simulated Counterfactual

### Comparison Areas

Assessing the impact of a violence-prevention strategy, or any social program, requires comparing the actual experience of an area where a program was implemented to some benchmark on what likely would have occurred there without it. One of the greatest challenges to gauging a strategy's effectiveness is choosing or designing a comparison or counterfactual that best represents what a target area would experience without any sort of intervention. Ideally, an intervention would be randomly assigned to a large number of areas so that the intervention and nonintervention areas are statistically equivalent, meaning that any preexisting differences would be simply due to chance. This standard is very difficult to attain in field settings. In the case of One Vision, for example, community leaders chose target areas based on their assessment of which neighborhoods had the greatest propensity for violence

and highest likelihood for One Vision to work effectively. So researchers instead select for comparison areas that are similar or are somehow matched to the target area on key dimensions related to the outcome variables (in this case, measures of violence). As a quasi-experiment, such a design cannot rule out every threat to validity (i.e., the ability to link outcomes to the intervention). Nevertheless, when conducted properly, quasi-experiments represent the best available option for assessing program effectiveness.

In a first step of evaluating the One Vision program's effect on violence, we weighted the neighborhoods in nontarget areas based on how well they match the target neighborhoods. These nontarget neighborhoods collectively form the comparison group, a simulated counterfactual for the target neighborhoods without the intervention. All non-target areas are used in the analysis so we lose no cases in the matching process. For this step, we used the method of propensity scores (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983; Rosenbaum, 2002) to reduce selection bias. This strategy was successfully employed in a recent evaluation of a gun violence intervention in Los Angeles (Tita et al., 2003). The method of propensity scores can produce causal estimates using observational data by weighting or matching different neighborhoods in a way such that target and nontarget areas have similar characteristics, thereby reducing selection bias in the process of comparison.<sup>1</sup> The propensity score for a neighborhood is the probability that a neighborhood with a particular set of features is a member of a target area. We estimated the propensity score, the probability of being in a target area, with logistic regression controlling for different neighborhood characteristics potentially correlated with the violence rate in a neighborhood. When fitting this model, the outcome was an indicator of whether a neighborhood was a target neighborhood, and the covariates are the neighborhood features. The features on which we matched neighborhoods include

- homicide, aggravated assault, and gun assault rates in 2003 (just prior to One Vision's introduction)

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<sup>1</sup> See Apel and Sweeten (2010) for an overview of the propensity-score methodology and its use in criminology.

- population per square mile
- percentage of population 15 to 24 years old
- percentage of population black
- percentage of residents at least 25 years of age without a high-school diploma or equivalency
- percentage of employed residents in a professional occupation
- percentage of households with annual income less than \$25,000
- percentage of households with public assistance income
- percentage of individuals in poverty with children less than 18 years of age
- percentage of housing units vacant
- percentage of residents at least five years of age who had a different residence five years previously.

(See Appendix C for a technical discussion of the propensity-score method and a list of all neighborhood attributes from which we selected the above for propensity-score weighting.)


The Pittsburgh Bureau of Police provided the violent-crime data, which we aggregated into monthly counts. The Pittsburgh Department of City Planning provided all remaining variables, extracted from the 2000 census (Department of City Planning, 2006). We used the resulting model to predict the probability of intervention assignment for every neighborhood in the sample.<sup>2</sup> Figure 4.1 illustrates that all nontarget neighborhoods formed the basis of the simulated counterfactual or comparison area.

The most important result of this process is that comparison neighborhoods resemble target neighborhoods. Table 4.1 summarizes the results of the matching process and illustrates the extent to which

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<sup>2</sup> A common method for selecting comparison neighborhoods among all candidate nontarget neighborhoods involves matching every target neighborhood with the nontarget neighborhoods with the most similar propensity score. This eliminates nontarget neighborhoods that are dissimilar to the target neighborhoods. The nontarget neighborhoods matching a target neighborhood are combined to form a simulated counterfactual neighborhood without the One Vision program. In our analysis, we used an improved version of the propensity-score method called *doubly robust* (Robins and Rotnitzky, 2001; Kang and Schafer, 2007) because it can yield more consistent estimates.

**Figure 4.1**  
**Map of Propensity Score–Adjusted Comparison Neighborhoods**



RAND MG947-4.1

the features are indeed similar. Before the propensity-score analysis was conducted, for example, the average percentage of vacant housing units in the neighborhoods comprising the target area was 18.97, compared to 11.97 in the neighborhoods comprising the nontarget areas, a statistically significant difference ( $p \leq 0.05$ ). After matching, or doubly robust weighting, the average percentage of vacant housing units in the neighborhoods comprising the target area was 18.97, compared to 17.11 in the nontarget areas, a statistically insignificant difference. In all, the test statistics show eight neighborhood characteristics for which

**Table 4.1**  
**Neighborhood Characteristic Comparison Between Target and Nontarget Areas**

Characteristic	Target Areas			Nontarget Areas Before Propensity Weighting			Nontarget Areas After Propensity Weighting		
	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.	P-Value	Mean	Std. Dev.	P-Value	
Homicide rate in 2003	0.41	0.56	0.61	2.43	0.38	0.63	1.59	0.90	
Aggravated assault rate in 2003	13.95	26.41	9.25	31.18	0.01 <sup>a</sup>	18.60	46.27	0.94	
Gun assault rate in 2003	5.18	9.82	2.31	5.37	0.01 <sup>a</sup>	4.65	7.68	1.00	
Population density	8.22	9.26	6.33	4.41	0.42	6.35	3.83	0.94	
% population age 15–24	14.97	9.23	16.60	12.36	0.37	16.06	10.22	0.57	
% no high-school grad	24.90	9.81	20.39	11.77	0.04 <sup>a</sup>	24.27	9.29	0.61	
% black	45.47	35.00	29.13	32.71	0.06	47.11	36.39	0.92	
% of professionals	0.25	0.12	0.34	0.16	0.00 <sup>a</sup>	0.27	0.12	0.87	
% income <\$25,000	53.95	17.76	45.50	14.93	0.03 <sup>a</sup>	51.49	13.17	0.74	
% in poverty with child	11.27	13.40	6.34	7.06	0.01 <sup>a</sup>	9.50	7.75	0.77	
% public assistance	10.55	9.63	6.76	8.37	0.00 <sup>a</sup>	9.31	6.68	0.60	
% vacant housing unit	18.97	14.49	11.97	8.61	0.01 <sup>a</sup>	17.11	8.89	0.76	
% moved in 5 years	42.67	13.55	38.19	11.94	0.11	39.73	9.88	0.74	

<sup>a</sup> Statistically significant at  $p \leq 0.05$ .

there are statistically significant differences between target and non-target areas; adjustment with the propensity-score method eliminated these.

A second way we tested for an impact of One Vision was to compare changes in the outcome variables in the target areas to a set of neighborhoods One Vision staff advised were most like the target areas. One Vision staff suggested 17 neighborhoods for this (also listed in Appendix B). We used these neighborhoods to create another comparison area, which permitted an additional test of impact that had face validity, as determined by local experts. Figure 4.2 illustrates the nontarget neighborhoods suggested by One Vision staff for counterfactual comparison.


### **Spillover Areas**

In addition to intervention effects in the target neighborhoods, it is possible that the One Vision program produces displacement effects in nearby neighborhoods. The program might shift violence from neighborhoods where outreach and other program activities are focused to surrounding neighborhoods where they are not. Conversely, some researchers (Clarke and Weisburd, 1994; Weisburd, et al., 2006; Eck, 1993) contend that interventions might extend crime-suppression benefits. Accounting for such possible “spillover” effects is necessary to gauge the true benefits, or possible drawbacks, of the program.

We analyzed possible spillover effects for the Hill District and Southside. We did not do so for Northside because it is largely surrounded by the Ohio and Allegheny Rivers, which, local experts contended, largely separate the area from the rest of the city. Our methods for the spillover analysis were similar to those for our counterfactual comparison analyses. We determined the extent of a spillover effect through change in violence in the neighborhoods adjacent to the Hill District and Southside relative to all other nontarget neighborhoods at the time One Vision was implemented. Figure 4.3 shows the location of the spillover neighborhoods, other nontarget neighborhoods, and target areas. (Appendix B also lists these neighborhoods.)

Table 4.2 summarizes the results of the matching process for propensity scores. Without adjustment, the only statistically significant

**Figure 4.2**  
**Map of One Vision One Life–Suggested Counterfactual**



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
difference between the spillover area and the nontarget areas not in the spillover area was in proportion of population 15 to 24 years of age. Propensity-score adjustment reduced this difference and others as well.

**Table 4.2**  
**Neighborhood Characteristic Comparison Between Spillover and Nontarget Nonspillover Areas**

Characteristic	Spillover Areas			Nontarget Nonspillover Areas Before Propensity Weighting			Nontarget Nonspillover Areas After Propensity Weighting		
	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.	P-Value	Mean	Std. Dev.	P-Value	
Homicide rate in 2003	1.66	5.11	0.31	0.59	1.00	0.31	0.61	1.00	
Aggravated assault rate in 2003	23.62	66.11	5.24	5.49	0.90	5.45	5.35	0.84	
Gun assault rate in 2003	4.19	10.63	1.78	2.47	0.83	1.67	2.32	0.95	
Population density	6.15	5.38	6.38	4.17	0.52	7.33	5.16	0.60	
% population age 15–24	24.20	16.96	14.47	10.00	0.02 <sup>a</sup>	17.37	12.30	0.18	
% no high-school grad	24.87	17.67	19.14	9.44	0.80	19.19	9.55	0.89	
% black	18.96	20.74	31.97	35.00	0.48	31.06	35.20	0.55	
% professionals	0.36	0.14	0.33	0.17	0.60	0.36	0.19	0.89	
% income <\$25,000	48.91	11.01	44.55	15.83	0.23	47.13	15.18	0.78	
% in poverty with child	4.39	4.59	6.88	7.56	0.68	7.12	9.03	0.89	
% public assistance	9.02	14.74	6.12	5.59	0.91	6.10	5.54	0.95	
% vacant housing unit	14.74	8.73	11.20	8.52	0.12	13.38	9.74	0.64	
% moved in 5 years	41.01	13.56	37.41	11.51	0.26	42.12	12.35	0.89	

<sup>a</sup> Statistically significant at  $p \leq 0.05$ .

**Figure 4.3**  
**Map of Spillover Neighborhoods and Other Nontarget Areas for Comparison**



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### The Impact of One Vision One Life on Violence in the Target Areas

We examined the impact of One Vision on community violence using three measures: homicides, aggravated assaults, and aggravated assaults with a gun (a subset of aggravated assaults—we generally refer to these as gun assaults). The Pittsburgh Bureau of Police provided incident-level

data for homicides occurring between January 1, 1997, and December 31, 2007, as well as for aggravated assault and gun assaults between January 1, 1996, and December 31, 2007. We aggregated these data into monthly counts. Table 4.3 summarizes the number of monthly observations by target area.

To examine the impact of One Vision on rates for these offenses, we employed an untreated control group design with multiple pretests and posttests (Shadish, Cook, and Campbell, 2002). This is a widely used quasi-experimental design that accounts for most threats to internal validity except selection bias or the chance that something “unique” and unobserved about the target or comparison areas influenced levels of violence in them and, hence, measurements of program effectiveness. Fortunately, our ability to examine the impact of One Vision in multiple target areas with multiple start dates using two sets of comparison neighborhoods helps limit selection bias.

For our statistical analysis, we employed Poisson regression. We could not use a simple linear regression because the outcome of interest, the count of violent incidents in each month, cannot be considered continuous. The Poisson distribution provides the most appropriate regression framework for the question at hand. Because data are col-

**Table 4.3**  
**Monthly Observations by Target Area and Measure**

Measure	One Vision Implementation Date	Number of Observations or Months of Observations		
		Pre-implementation	Post-implementation	Total
Northside and Hill District	May 2004			
Homicides		88	44	132
Assaults <sup>a</sup>	May 2005	100	44	144
Southside				
Homicides		100	32	132
Assaults <sup>a</sup>		112	32	144

<sup>a</sup> Months of observation for aggravated assault and aggravated assault with a gun.

lected in multiple months, we controlled for neighborhood effects as well as year-and-month effects on crime rates. Because the neighborhoods differ in size, we modeled for violence rates, or the number of incidents per 100,000 residents. We provide a more technical summary of our modeling in Appendix C.

Our research design assesses the extent to which any change in violence subsequent to One Vision implementation in target neighborhoods differs from that in comparison areas. This results in a difference-in-differences test measuring the intervention effect as the difference between the change in violence in the target area and that in the comparison area. Because the Poisson regression coefficients can be interpreted only logarithmically, we converted the regression estimates to the estimated number of incidents per 100,000 persons using the method of predictive margins (Graubard and Korn, 1999).

### **General Violence Trends**

Before exploring the empirical impact of One Vision, we review the general trend of violence in the target and comparison areas. Table 4.4 shows average monthly neighborhood counts of homicides, aggravated assaults, and aggravated assaults with a gun (or gun assault) in the three target areas and their comparison areas.

Table 4.4 shows that the average monthly number of homicides increased in Northside but not in the Hill District after implementation of the program. The average number of Northside homicides increased more quickly than in all comparison areas but not as quickly as in the comparison area suggested by One Vision.

The average number of aggravated assaults and gun assaults also increased after One Vision was implemented in Northside. Over this same period, aggravated assaults increased in all the nontarget neighborhoods and the neighborhoods suggested by One Vision staff, but at a smaller rate. The increase in gun assaults in Northside was greater than the increase in all the nontarget neighborhoods and the increase in the One Vision–suggested comparison areas.

Aggravated assaults and gun assaults in the target area increased at rates higher than the corresponding rates of all the nontarget neighborhoods and the One Vision–suggested comparison neighborhoods.

**Table 4.4**  
**Homicide, Aggravated Assault, and Gun Assault Frequencies in Target and Comparison Areas Pre- and Postimplementation of One Vision One Life**

Area	Homicide			Aggravated Assault			Gun Assault		
	Pre	Post	Change	Pre	Post	Change	Pre	Post	Change
Northside	0.04	0.06	0.02	1.10	1.59	0.48	0.33	0.62	0.29
Hill District	0.09	0.09	0.00	1.72	2.02	0.30	0.55	0.94	0.39
Northside and Hill District comparison, all	0.04	0.05	0.01	1.35	1.50	0.16	0.36	0.50	0.14
Northside and Hill District comparison, One Vision	0.08	0.11	0.03	2.35	2.55	0.20	0.84	1.07	0.23
Southside <sup>a</sup>	0.02	0.02	0.00	1.12	1.66	0.55	0.29	0.46	0.17
Southside comparison, all	0.04	0.05	0.01	1.38	1.43	0.04	0.38	0.48	0.10
Southside comparison, One Vision	0.08	0.12	0.04	2.41	2.42	0.00	0.88	1.02	0.14

<sup>a</sup> One Vision was implemented one year later in the Southside area we examine than in the Northside or Hill District. Therefore, the comparison areas for the Southside, while geographically identical to those for the Northside and Hill District, differ by time periods they cover as well as by rates calculated for the periods before and after implementation.

NOTE: Numbers, including those for change, are rounded to two decimal places.

The average monthly number of homicides in the Hill District was about the same before and after One Vision's implementation, whereas it increased in both comparison areas.

The changes in violence before and after the initiation of One Vision's activities in Southside and its comparison areas are somewhat different from the corresponding areas examined for the Northside and Hill District. The difference in the comparison areas is due to the fact that One Vision was implemented in Southside one year later (May 2005) than elsewhere, changing the before and after periods examined. The average monthly count of homicides in Southside remained stable after implementation, while increasing in both comparison areas. The monthly average of aggravated assaults in Southside increased after One Vision was implemented. This rate was higher than the increased rate in all the nontarget comparison neighborhoods. Aggravated assaults in the One Vision–suggested counterfactual neighborhoods remained relatively stable between these periods. Gun assaults increased in Southside and both comparison areas, but the increase in the target area was greater than in the comparison areas.

### **Impact Relative to the Propensity-Based Comparison**

While the One Vision initiative was implemented during a time of increasing violence, we remind the reader that its effect is best assessed by comparing changes in crime in the target areas with those in the comparison areas. Such analysis must control statistically for other variables that could explain changes in violence, including time period of observation and neighborhood conditions (see Appendix C).

Table 4.5 summarizes the outcomes of the models used to assess the impact of One Vision on violence in all three target areas compared to nontarget neighborhoods. The nontarget neighborhoods have been weighted by propensity scores on how closely they match the target neighborhoods. The sample sizes, calculated by multiplying the number of neighborhoods in the particular analysis by the number of months for which we have data, varied from 8,316 to 10,512 (see Appendix D for the sample size corresponding to each model). The results show that One Vision was not associated with any change in homicide rates relative to the comparison area comprising nearly all

**Table 4.5**  
**Test of One Vision One Life Intervention Effects, Propensity Score–Weighted Counterfactual Neighborhoods**

Outcome	Predicted Monthly Rate Change	P-Value
Northside		
Homicide	0.0219	0.7432
Aggravated assault	25.2095	0.0000
Gun assault	9.2824	0.0000
Hill District		
Homicide	-0.6710	0.3374
Aggravated assault	7.7365	0.0255
Gun assault	5.2893	0.0012
Southside		
Homicide	-0.2540	0.6976
Aggravated assault	25.3953	0.0000
Gun assault	4.9865	0.0015

Pittsburgh neighborhoods outside the target area. They further show aggravated assault and gun assault rates increasing in the target areas relative to the comparison areas after program implementation. The table presents effects in predicted change in a monthly rate of occurrence per 100,000 residents. These data suggest that the rates of aggravated assault increased similar amounts in Northside and Southside (about 25 per month), but by a smaller rate in the Hill District (about eight per month). Similarly, gun assault monthly rates also increased more in Northside (about nine) than in Southside and the Hill District (about five each). Appendix D contains the results of the full outcome models.

### **Impact Relative to the One Vision One Life–Suggested Comparison**

As a second way to assess the impact of One Vision, we examined changes in violence in the target areas compared to neighborhoods that One Vision staff suggested were most similar based on their inti-

**Table 4.6**  
**Test of One Vision One Life Intervention Effects Relative to Comparison Neighborhoods Suggested by One Vision One Life Staff**

Outcome	Predicted Monthly Rate Change	P-Value
Northside		
Homicide	0.2845	0.7588
Aggravated assault	26.7970	0.0000
Gun assault	14.6100	0.0000
Hill District		
Homicide	-0.9174	0.2681
Aggravated assault	6.4579	0.1922
Gun assault	9.4346	0.0016
Southside		
Homicide	-0.6288	0.7438
Aggravated assault	25.0327	0.0000
Gun assault	4.8154	0.0057

mate familiarity with them. Table 4.6 highlights these results, again controlling for time period and differing neighborhood characteristics. The number of observations for each of these models (as indicated in Appendix D) ranged from 3,036 to 5,040. With one exception, the assessment of the program's impact on violence is essentially the same as shown in Table 4.5. This analysis showed that One Vision did not have an effect on homicide rates. It showed that One Vision was associated with increases in the monthly rate of aggravated assaults in Northside (about 27) and Southside (about 25) but was statistically unrelated to changes in the rate of aggravated assaults in the Hill District. This comparison with areas suggested by One Vision staff also showed increased gun assault rates in the target areas relative to the other areas. Appendix D provides the results of the full outcome models based on the comparison neighborhoods suggested by One Vision staff.

## The Impact of One Vision One Life on Violence in Contiguous Neighborhoods

To account for potential spillover effects of One Vision's implementation, either displaced-violence or violence-suppression benefits, we used impact analyses to assess change in violence in the neighborhoods adjacent to the Hill District and Southside relative to all the remaining nontarget neighborhoods in the city (matched to the spillover neighborhoods by propensity scores). As Table 4.7 shows, the models detected no spillover effects for homicide as a result of One Vision's implementation (see Appendix D for the results of the full models used to test for spillover effects, including the sample sizes of the models, which varied from 6,486 to 7,050). By contrast, the table does show that One Vision was associated with spillover effects in aggravated and gun assaults. After One Vision was introduced, neighborhoods adjacent to the Hill District saw a reduction in aggravated assaults relative to other comparison neighborhoods. The neighborhoods surrounding Southside experienced increases in both aggravated and gun assaults. The suppression benefit to the neighborhoods contiguous to the Hill District was about 14 aggravated assaults per 100,000 residents per month. The increased rate of this offense in the

**Table 4.7**  
**Test of Spillover Effects, Propensity Score–Weighted Counterfactual Neighborhoods**

Outcome	Predicted Monthly Rate Change	P-Value
<b>Hill District</b>		
Homicide	-0.5546	0.6483
Aggravated assault	-14.2040	0.03785
Gun assault	6.1647	0.0979
<b>Southside</b>		
Homicide	-0.8695	0.8012
Aggravated assault	28.7132	0.0000
Gun assault	5.5715	0.0072

neighborhoods next to Southside was nearly 28 per 100,000 residents. The detrimental spillover effect of One Vision on gun assault rates per month was about six incidents per 100,000 residents in the neighborhoods adjacent to Southside.

## The Overall Impact of One Vision One Life

Using two forms of comparison, each of which controlled for neighborhood attributes, seasonal effects, and trends over time, we found no quantitative evidence that One Vision helped reduce violence. We found no effect of the program on homicide rates. We did find that the onset of One Vision efforts was associated with increases in aggravated assaults and gun assaults in all three target areas (excepting the comparison of aggravated assaults in the Hill District and the comparison area suggested by One Vision staff).

Our spillover analyses also indicated that the introduction of One Vision was associated with no change in homicide rates. We did find introduction of One Vision associated with an increase in aggravated assaults in the Southside spillover neighborhood and a decrease in such assaults in the Hill District spillover area. We found that the program was associated with increases in gun assaults in the Southside spillover area but not the Hill District spillover area.

## Explaining the Results

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It is quite a challenge to explain why a program did not produce any effect, but an even greater test to discuss why a program had a negative effect. Not only are the results different from what we anticipated; they are also inconsistent with the results from other evaluations of similar programs (Skogan et al., 2008; Webster, Vernick, and Mendel, 2009). Nevertheless, one does not have to search very far within the academic literature to find examples of programs that fail to produce the intended effect.

In this chapter, we seek to explain why One Vision produced no effect in reducing violence but rather was associated with some increases in violence. We focus on critical limitations of the program model as administered in Pittsburgh and discuss how these limitations might explain some of the counterintuitive findings on program effectiveness. We contrast features of the Pittsburgh program with similar ones in Chicago (Skogan et al., 2008) and Baltimore (Webster, Vernick, and Mendel, 2009). We also contrast the One Vision street-worker program with the original Boston Gun Project that involved street workers as part of a broader violence-reduction strategy.

We begin with an analysis of conflict mediation by One Vision, based on information we also analyzed in Chapter Three on program operations.

## Conflict Mediation

One promising aspect of a violence-reduction program involving former gang members and individuals savvy to the code of the street is their ability to use their street knowledge and credibility to learn about neighborhood conflicts that might result in violence. Such neighborhood street workers presumably know the key players and could bring feuding parties together to resolve a dispute before it results in criminal violence.

There are three critical elements for successful intelligence gathering and conflict mediation by street workers. First, they must focus their efforts on potentially violent disputes and helping individuals from these neighborhoods most directly involved in violence. Second, the street workers must be well connected and have strategic access to specific individuals in order to have knowledge of the early stages of an escalating dispute. Third, they must have credibility among the residents so that any alternative solutions to conflicts and attempts to reconstitute the informal social control capacity of these neighborhoods will be accepted.

Results from the observations and two of the organizational forms completed by community coordinators are helpful for understanding these three critical elements. All community coordinators are asked to complete a conflict mediation form identifying the types of conflicts to which they respond. In addition, each was also to maintain a working caseload and to monitor clients and their progress using a client intake form.

The observations illustrated that the contacts that community coordinators have are critical for gathering and processing “actionable intelligence.” The key to intelligence-gathering strategies was connection to troubled offenders. Community coordinators know the troubled offenders (especially those recently released from prison or jail), prostitutes, and hustlers. Their intelligence gathering and communication occur mainly on the streets. Many community coordinators kept their distance from some key contributors to neighborhood violence but still knew of them and their business. Community coordinators would interact with and attempt to help all types of people

on their block—spending the most time with whom they felt most comfortable (generally, children, addicts, and the needy). One Vision also attempted to position community coordinators to maximize connections and relationships with persons who could provide key intelligence. This has included instituting community-building programs in jails, schools, and community centers, programs that also appeared to help community coordinators gather intelligence on disputes, albeit often nonviolent ones.

Table 5.1 provides information on the types of conflicts in which community coordinators intervened. Only a relatively small number of these forms were available for analysis overall, including just 11 for the Hill District and 18 for Southside. Dates of completed forms ranged from January 2005 to December 2007 for Northside and from January 2005 to June 2007 for Southside and the Hill District.

Forty-one percent of the reported disputes involved gang activities. Given that gangs and affiliated individuals are responsible for much of the violence and homicides in these target areas, we might have expected the number and proportion of mediated gang conflicts to be higher. Moreover, as noted earlier, a critical component of the One Vision mission is responding to conflicts that might result in

**Table 5.1**  
**Conflict Mediation Issues by Target Area**

Issue	All	Northside	Hill District	Southside
Gang (%)	41.3	50.7	18.2	16.7
Argument/dispute (%)	25.0	17.3	18.2	61.1
Drugs (%)	9.6	9.3	9.1	11.1
Domestic (%)	8.7	10.7	9.1	0.0
Other crimes (%)	7.7	4.0	27.3	11.1
Homicide and other gun offenses (%)	5.8	6.7	9.1	0.0
Other (%)	1.9	1.3	9.1	0.0
Number of forms completed	104	75	11	18

retaliatory violence. Yet, the data produced on these forms indicate that only 1.8 percent of the conflict mediations were in response to a potential retaliatory event (not shown). These results were consistent with findings presented earlier that showed that only 1 percent of referrals were from the police.

Our observations yielded additional critical information about the conflicts mediated by the community coordinators. We found that, while community coordinators did interact with gang members, they did not necessarily intervene in gang conflicts. Many simply focused on protecting specific gang-affiliated individuals. For example, one coordinator got a call from a young gang member who asked for a ride home from his girlfriend's house. The coordinator knew that, because of his affiliation and his active involvement in the drug market, the youth was not safe. The coordinator discussed how giving a ride to the youth allowed him to get some information while keeping the youth safe.

The observations also found that community coordinators responded to conflicts unsystematically. Coordinators typically mediated a conflict when coming into contact with involved individuals in the regular course of their day. That is, coordinators typically responded in an ad hoc manner to violent conflicts they came across on the streets. They rarely focused on systematically identifying key violence threats and developing responses to them. Community coordinators reported that only about 36 percent of the conflicts in which they mediated were ongoing disputes (not shown), including 26 percent of conflicts that coordinators reported resolving and 11 percent that they said required no further actions.

Two incidents documented by our field observer illustrate the approach that community coordinators took to incidents. In one, during an evening with a Northside community coordinator, the field observer and the coordinator encountered a scuffle between about a half-dozen males and females who had been drinking. One of the females was hitting one of the males. The coordinator jumped between her and the male and broke up the fight. He talked about the consequences for fighting "on the block," noting that the police would likely arrive and their night would be over because someone would go to jail.

He suggested that the group split up and take it home. The group dispersed. In another incident, a community coordinator, when driving to meet somebody in Northside, received a phone call about a domestic dispute between two women. The police had just arrived. Upon arriving, the coordinator talked to a police officer and was allowed to enter the building to talk to one of the women involved in the incident and her family. After talking with the women, he talked with the police and told them he would stay around to keep things quiet. The police then left.

A major concern for One Vision is being able to respond effectively to potential gun violence. Although Table 5.1 shows that only a small percentage of mediated incidents involved a gun—that is, the *primary* reason for a conflict in which a coordinator intervened—other data show that guns were still a significant concern. Specifically, coordinators noted that there was a gun connected to 35 percent of the conflicts and that a gun was discharged in 19 percent of them. Coordinators would frequently spot and point out individuals to the field observer who were carrying guns. This occurred both during the day and night. During daytime hours, for example, the coordinators would help watch and manage children, some of whom might have guns, at a local pool, a potential hotspot located between three rival gangs.

## **Comparing One Vision One Life with Other Initiatives**

There have been two other rigorous evaluations of the specific street-worker programs like the one evaluated here. Both studies found effects differing from what we discovered in Pittsburgh. In this section, we compare One Vision to these. We also compare it to the original Boston Gun Project, which included the street-worker component and other violence-reduction efforts. We seek to contrast these programs to understand the promise and obstacles for them.

### **CeaseFire Chicago**

As noted earlier, the individuals involved in the creation of One Vision were significantly influenced by a program administered by the Chi-

cago Project for Violence Prevention called CeaseFire Chicago (Skogan et al., 2008). CeaseFire Chicago began in 1999 and underwent a rigorous NIJ evaluation, led by Wesley Skogan, in 2005. The process evaluation included surveys of staff, interviews with clients and collaborators (e.g., community, clergy, business, police, and school representatives), and observation of meetings. The impact assessment compared changes in violent crime, hot spots, and gang-related changes that occurred in seven CeaseFire sites to those that occurred in other matched areas. We review, in this section, the Chicago program structure, implementation, and impact.

**Structure of the Program.** The design of CeaseFire Chicago reflected research documenting the success of various public health strategies. The goals of this program include disrupting the cycle of violence and changing attitudes and norms about specific behaviors. The program invested considerable resources in communicating, particularly to high-risk individuals, the costs of being involved in violence; in connecting individuals to services that might provide an alternative to violence; and in directly confronting individuals (usually gang members) who might resort to violence to resolve a conflict. CeaseFire used various community mobilization, education, and mentoring strategies to communicate the dangers of violence. A critical aspect of the program provided “on-the-spot” alternatives to violence and intervention before a conflict escalated in violence. The program also sought to influence perceptions about the risks and costs of involvement in violence.

**Implementation of the Program.** Several key individuals and groups were critical to implementation of the Chicago program.

First, the program employed outreach workers in each targeted community. Each outreach worker had a caseload of about 15 clients identified and assessed as being in need. These workers lived in or knew the neighborhoods where they worked and thus had both street credibility and a good sense of individuals who were in need. Outreach workers worked the streets by talking with individuals, identifying clients, and then counseling and connecting these clients to needed services. It appears that working with clients was their primary task, but they were also expected to distribute information about the program

and its “stop the violence” message to groups and individuals. Outreach workers mediated conflicts as well. Skogan et al. (2008) conclude that the outreach workers succeeded at identifying and working with high-risk clients. In fact, interviews with the clients indicated that, “after their parents, their outreach worker was typically rated the most important adult in their lives” (Skogan et al., 2008, p. 8-1). Nevertheless, it is difficult to assess comparable levels of risk clients had in Chicago, Pittsburgh, and other cities with similar programs.

Second, the program employed another group of street-savvy individuals that focused specifically on conflict mediation. These individuals, called violence interrupters, were former gang members, who, because of their past, also had street credibility. They were expected to use their understanding of the individuals and groups living in a neighborhood to prevent violence. The violence interrupters identified brewing conflicts or reacted to shootings that occurred and would then gather intelligence about these conflicts and attempt to mediate non-violent solutions. They talked with gang members, as well as friends and families of gang members and shooting victims, focusing “on affecting risky activities by a small number of carefully selected members of the community, those with a high chance of either ‘being shot or being a shooter’ in the immediate future” (Skogan et al., 2008, p. 8-1). A significant amount of their time focused on responding to retaliatory shootings. Skogan et al. (2008) estimate that “40 percent of intervener’s mediation efforts concerned potential shootings that would have been in retaliation for an earlier imbroglio” (p. 8-11).

Third, other key contributors to CeaseFire Chicago included community members, social service organizations, and clergy. The program attempted to build and enhance community partnerships. These partnerships were valuable for many reasons, including the access to jobs and services they offered to clients and the legitimacy partners gave the program and its antiviolence message.

Fourth, police and prosecutors were frequent collaborators with CeaseFire Chicago staff. Indeed, the evaluators reported that the “police turned out to be one of CeaseFire’s most frequent collaborators” (Skogan et al., 2008, p. ES-16). The role of police and criminal-justice partners in changing the perceived risk of illegal gun carrying was a

formal part of the Chicago CeaseFire logic model. Additionally, police shared information with the program after an incident so that staff could calculate a response. Police also assisted with traffic and crowd control for marches and vigils and with the hiring of program staff.

**Impact of the Program.** The researchers found that the program contributed to statistically significant decreases in shootings and attempted shootings, the size and intensity of hot spots, gang homicide density, reciprocal killings, and gang homicides in many of the research areas evaluated relative to the comparison sites (Skogan et al., 2008). The researchers examined the impact of the program in seven of 25 program areas, comparing the results to matched areas. Although violence in Chicago was generally down in all areas during the evaluation period, the study indicates that the program pushed key violence indicators down even further. Specifically, shootings and attempted shootings decreased in four of the seven areas between 17 and 24 percent. Analysis of hot spots in the program areas indicated that six of the seven sites were safer, and “there was evidence that decreases in the size and intensity of shooting hot spots were linked to the introduction of CeaseFire in four of these areas” (Skogan et al., 2008, p. 8-15). A critical component of the analysis was examining the impact on gang-related activities and homicides. The findings indicate that gang homicide density, reciprocal killings, and gang involvement in homicides decreased in about half of the areas examined.

### Baltimore Safe Streets Program

To date, there has only been an interim evaluation of Baltimore Safe Streets (Webster, Vernick, and Mendel, 2009). This program was modeled after Chicago CeaseFire. Its initial implementation was in three high-crime neighborhoods—McElderry Park (East Baltimore), Union Square (South Baltimore), and Ellwood Park (East Baltimore)—in mid-2007 and early 2008. Safe Streets, like the programs in Chicago and Pittsburgh, attempted to decrease violence by communicating to residents and high-risk individuals the impacts of violence on their communities; reaching out to persons, especially high-risk youth, in need; and identifying and then intervening in potentially violent conflicts.

The interim evaluation focuses on the first 14 months of program implementation. It discusses implementation of the program and its effects on attitudes toward gun violence as well as on the number of homicides and shootings. Two different community groups implemented the program model in Baltimore. Implementation in Union Square was abbreviated; problems caused the program to cease after five months. Each implementing group was to collect data on the ratio of outreach workers to clients and the number of face-to-face contacts with clients, referrals for services, mediations of disputes, flyers distributed, and violence responses initiated.

The results indicate that the number of clients and face-to-face contacts increased as expected following the implementation of the program. Outreach workers made 450 face-to-face contacts in McElderry Park and just under 100 contacts in Ellwood Park in August 2008. Outreach workers also made a large number of referrals to various services, an average of 26 per month. Most referrals were for employment issues. There was “considerable month-to-month variation” in the number of conflicts mediated (Webster, Vernick, and Mendel, 2009, p. 6). Between August 2007 and August 2008 in one target area, the number of mediations ranged from six to eight in some months to less than two in others.

The analysis focused on differences between attitude changes and program effects on violence in the target areas and a comparison area. The analyses indicated that participants’ views on gun violence were much different in one of the target areas. The analysis found, even after controlling for other variables, significantly reduced support for gun violence to settle disputes in McElderry Park but no significant change in Ellwood Park. (The program did not persist long enough in Union Square for measurements.) Controlling for various indicators, the results indicated that being a resident in McElderry Park reduced support of gun violence to settle disputes.

The reduced support for violence in McElderry Park was coupled with overall positive results for the program there. The area had seen “an average of 0.31 homicides per month (3.7 per year) during the months prior to the implementation of Safe Streets in August 2007, but no homicides during the 14-month follow-up period,” a reduction that

was also statistically significant (Webster, Vernick, and Mendel, 2009, p. 9). There was some diffusion of benefits to surrounding communities, where homicides also decreased. The program also led to a reduction of youth homicides in McElderry Park. The evaluation found no effect of the program in Ellwood Park and an upturn in homicides in Union Square, where implementation was not completed. The evaluation found an association with the program and fewer nonfatal shootings in Ellwood Park but with more such shootings in McElderry Park and Union Square.

### **One Vision One Life Versus Chicago and Baltimore**

What might account for the differing results found for the One Vision program in Pittsburgh and for similar programs in Chicago and Baltimore? Although the amount of information on the Baltimore program is somewhat limited given that it has only an interim evaluation, there appear to be five noteworthy differences between One Vision and the Chicago and Baltimore programs that might also help in understanding the contrasting findings.

First, while it is difficult to detect dosage of such programs, the organizational documents we have reviewed point to some limitations in the administration of the program model in Pittsburgh. Specifically, it does not appear that One Vision used the documentation of activities in any systematic way to select actions for the targeted neighborhoods or to monitor the performance of the community coordinators. In contrast, the Chicago program in particular appeared to rely on the information of these documents as an accountability mechanism. The Chicago Project for Violence Prevention essentially supported local organizations to administer the model and then monitored the activities and coordinated with these local programs. Completed forms were a key source of accountability in Chicago. Moreover, Skogan et al. (2008, p. 2-25) reports,

During the evaluation period we saw a tightening of policies and procedures on the part of CPVP [the Chicago Project for Violence Prevention] that reflected the adoption of a more centralized management role. CPVP took a more active role in regu-

lating program activities and reviewing site records. CPVP staff made an increasing number of site visits to ensure better program implementation, and new central office positions were created to handle program implementation and documentation issues. Sites were held more accountable to meeting standards regarding shooting responses, client caseload size, and other program activities. CPVP also became more assertive about the hours that sites were to be open, to parallel the hours when violent crime actually occurs.

Second, both the observations and the organizational documents to some extent reveal that the community coordinators were involved in a variety of important activities and worked to help people in dire need. Nevertheless, the clients with whom the Pittsburgh community coordinators worked and the types of conflicts mediated appeared to be different from those in Chicago or Baltimore. Specifically, Baltimore and Chicago workers focused almost exclusively on the activities of and conflicts between high-risk violent individuals. Indeed, in Chicago, the clients of CeaseFire workers had very extensive criminal histories, consistent with those most at risk for being involved in homicides as both victims and offenders (Skogan et al., 2008, p. ES-10). Similarly, in Baltimore,

outreach workers logged hundreds of contacts with these high-risk individuals during which they encouraged alternatives to violence, mediated conflicts, provided informal mentoring, and made referrals for services that could decrease risks. The outreach workers interfaced with dangerous gangs with access to guns that operated under circumstances where the odds of lethal altercations are alarmingly high (Webster, Vernick, and Mendel, 2009, p. 14).

In McElderry Park, a site that did not have any homicides for the 14-month evaluation period, outreach workers intervened in 53 high-stakes disputes and altercations. In Chicago, violence interrupters estimated that 40 percent of the conflicts mediated could have resulted in retaliation shootings (Skogan et al., 2008). In contrast, as we noted earlier, very few of the conflicts mediated in Pittsburgh were specifically

directed at retaliations. In our field research, we found that One Vision staff, especially the executive staff, would attempt to assist shooting victims and discourage retaliations, but they had fewer contacts and interventions with active gang members and specific conflicts.

Third, Pittsburgh community coordinators had a variety of responsibilities that made it very difficult to manage their workload. The community coordinators were the heart and soul for program implementation, expected to intervene and mediate conflicts, assist clients, attend violence responses, and participate in community programming. Each of these tasks required different skills and training. As a result, many coordinators might have emphasized what they enjoyed doing and those things at which they were most effective and ignored other responsibilities. The Chicago model, in which outreach workers focus primarily on working with clients and mentoring individuals, and violence interrupters focus on responding to gang conflicts and responding to shootings, has much more potential for allowing workers to specialize and perhaps become more effective with specific tasks. Responding to and managing potentially violent conflicts—from identifying to understanding to searching for solutions to them—requires full-time and concentrated attention. Such specialization also helps the organization better monitor activities critical to the success of the program. It was clear that being close to the street and “in the game” is required to get good intelligence, but being so forces the street worker to walk a very fine line. How much standing should one have? Too little and the worker might be ineffective and in danger. Too much and the worker might become corrupt. We discussed many problems with program staff as community coordinators were involved in drive-by shootings, caught in possession of drugs, and were shot or injured.

Fourth, one of the difficult challenges of quasi-experiments is the inability to control for other variables that might have contributed to program outcome. Communities with high violent-crime rates might have multiple simultaneous programs and strategies. In the McElderry Park area of Baltimore, there were other law-enforcement initiatives, including “close monitoring of individuals with histories of gun offending, increased police presence in areas with the highest numbers of shootings, and efforts to suppress illegal gun possession and sales”

(Webster, Vernick, and Mendel, 2009, p. 15). Similarly, there were several other initiatives, such as PSN, occurring in Chicago at the same time as CeaseFire (see subsequent discussion). Additionally, in Chicago CeaseFire, the police and related criminal-justice partners were an explicit component of the logic model. Specifically, the police and criminal-justice system were considered key components in changing the perceived risk and costs for illegal gun possession and use (Skogan et al., 2008). Pittsburgh police were certainly not absent in the targeted neighborhoods during the study period. Nevertheless, there was not the type of coordination between One Vision and the police that Chicago enjoyed. We were unable to identify any specific, evidence-based policing initiative that was implemented in the Pittsburgh target areas focusing on gun violence. By contrast, coordination with the police and other policing programs might have complemented the street-worker antiviolence message and thus provided such benefits to the Baltimore and Chicago areas.

Fifth, preceding conditions in Pittsburgh might have contributed to the iatrogenic effects we saw in some of the violent-crime measures. Other unique social conditions might also have contributed to these results. Violence was increasing prior to the implementation of the program in the targeted neighborhoods. It is possible that One Vision simply did not work as intended (to reduce crime and violence) and the target areas did in fact realize a marked increase while the comparison areas did not (or at least less of an increase). The analysis might then suggest what we found—although there were some other areas that One Vision staff thought would be problematic as well, and they were in the comparison areas.

It is also possible that the presence of outreach workers increased the cohesion of gangs, making some groups more organized, in turn leading to increased violence. Comparisons of programs like those implemented in Pittsburgh, Chicago, and Baltimore might vary the nature and type of gang structures that exist in a particular community. For example, the gang networks in Chicago and Baltimore might be very stable, making it straightforward to identify and mediate conflicts. There are many important studies that explore the evolving gang structure in Chicago, which might best be described as a “chronic gang

city" (Tita and Ridgeway, 2007, p. 233; see also Venkatesh, 1997). The gang structure in Pittsburgh, by contrast, consists of loose conglomerations of groups and would be better described as an emerging gang city (Tita and Ridgeway, 2007). It is possible that the intervention might have actually increased the cohesion within specific groups and tensions across gangs, and contributed to the emergence of gangs and gang beefs. This would not have been a novel phenomenon. Klein (1971, 1995) has suggested that, because gangs are generally not very cohesive entities, street workers might increase cohesiveness and, thus, levels of violence between and among them. Given the little interaction we observed in Pittsburgh between community coordinators and gangs, we do not suspect that One Vision inadvertently contributed to greater gang cohesion and subsequently violence. Nevertheless, perhaps future research should explore how a program might function differently depending on the nature of gang conflicts in the community.

### **One Vision One Life Versus Comprehensive "Pulling Levers" Programs**

In the original Boston Gun Project, street workers were part of a broader antiviolence strategy that was driven by a multiagency criminal-justice task force. The overall mission, reducing homicide and gun violence, was consistent with One Vision, but the tactics included a comprehensive effort to change the perceived risk of groups of chronic offenders from both violent victimization and incarceration. Like those in One Vision, street workers sought to convince at-risk individuals not to carry guns and to avoid conflict and retaliation. Unlike those in One Vision, Boston street workers were backed by direct communication from police, district attorneys, and federal prosecutors on the consequences for illegal gun possession and use. This strategy, known as *pulling levers*, had a significant impact on homicide and gun violence in Boston (Braga et al., 2001; NIJ, 2001; but also see Rosenfeld et al., 2005) and in cities that have attempted to replicate the Boston model. These include Indianapolis, Indiana; Lowell, Massachusetts; Stockton, California; and Los Angeles, California (McGarrell, Chermak, et al., 2006; McDevitt et al., 2007; Braga, 2008; Tita et al., 2003). They also include Chicago, where the pulling-levers strategy was a key aspect of a

PSN program, which led to a 37-percent reduction in homicide (Papachristos, Meares, and Fagan, 2007).

In evaluations of complex interventions, it is difficult to identify what elements are critical to success or failure. Like the One Vision strategy, pulling levers as implemented in Boston and other locations consisted of many different elements, making it difficult to identify the elements that produced changes in violent offending behaviors. There were multiple parts of the strategy, including a communication campaign, the work of ministers, home visits, and other police strategies.

Both Chicago and Baltimore had active PSN programs at the time of their street-worker programs. These included efforts to communicate a message aimed at felons against carrying firearms and to increase the federal prosecution of felons possessing or using firearms. While there was also a PSN program in Pittsburgh, there is no evidence of coordination between the police, the PSN task force, and One Vision. We do not have evidence of such coordination in Baltimore or Chicago. Nevertheless, the fact that Chicago CeaseFire was occurring during a time when Chicago's PSN initiative was holding face-to-face offender notification meetings with high-risk individuals, albeit in targeted neighborhoods, might indicate that the street-worker intervention is more powerful when supported by the credible threat of prosecution for illegal gun carrying and use. It is interesting to note that PSN offender-notification meetings were also occurring in Baltimore during its street-worker program, although we do not have evidence of coordination between PSN and the program.

In sum, although following very similar logic models, there appear to be differences between One Vision and the similar programs in Baltimore and Chicago. Foremost among these differences are targeting the populations at greatest risk, dosage, and coordination with criminal-justice officials in communicating a credible and congruent message.



## Lessons for Improving Violence-Prevention Programs

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Innovative programs are critical to addressing the major issues facing our most disadvantaged cities. Anderson's important work (1999) describing the code of the streets demonstrates how individuals living in these neighborhoods are affected by their environment. The people who live in these neighborhoods adapt to their environment in different ways. The code of the streets becomes a guide to living their lives (see Stewart and Simons, 2009)—adopting a lifestyle that, for many, includes violent criminal activities. There have been many attempts to inject programs into these communities. One Vision represents one of the strategies implemented in Pittsburgh to address concerns about violence. Based on the observations and review of other project files, it seems clear that the individuals involved in One Vision One Life made contributions in the lives of individuals in violent and disadvantaged neighborhoods. In many respects, they made heroic efforts to intervene in the lives of people threatened by violence and in need of social support. The heroic nature of this work becomes apparent when one reads about the shooting of street workers in the Baltimore program (Fenton, 2009). Yet, our evaluation did not find an impact on the level of violence in these Pittsburgh neighborhoods.

We have found several general reasons that the One Vision program might not have reduced violence in its target areas. All these point to lessons for improving violence-prevention programs and their evaluations. In concluding this work, we briefly review these reasons, then offer more general recommendations for future work.

First, the implementation of the One Vision program deviated in several ways from ideal implementation. One Vision lacked consistent documentation; completion of documentation was sporadic and varied by areas. One Vision staff appeared to rarely use the documentation in any systematic way to guide program actions. Community coordinators focused more on persons in need than on those at risk. This contributed to community coordinators having a broad variety of tasks and workloads that were difficult to manage. Finally, program actions were neither as frequent nor as focused on gangs and drugs as had been expected. In particular, it does not appear that One Vision routinely focused on the most serious offenders and highest-risk individuals.

The focus on persons in need, particularly young persons in need, might have contributed to long-term violence prevention. Efforts to keep youths in school, to promote more effective conflict mediation skills, to provide more positive adult role models, and similar interventions might improve the long-term prospects for these youths and help them over time to avoid violence. The current evaluation was not intended nor designed to measure such long-term effects. The program design, and this evaluation, focused on a more immediate goal of reducing neighborhood violence.

Second, the program did not intervene with the group or gang structure generating violence. It appears that Chicago CeaseFire, likely reflecting the prevalence of gangs in Chicago, did explicitly focus on gangs. The original Boston Gun Project and the successive programs in Indianapolis, Lowell, and Stockton included a group accountability component. Gangs, cliques, or groups of chronic offenders were told that they would be held accountable for the continued violence of any of their members. This suggests that One Vision, focused more on individuals, did not influence the social networks associated with violence risk. As evident in other programs, this form of intervention calls for a greater law-enforcement component.

A related but alternative explanation is that the gang structure in Pittsburgh might require a different approach. Gangs in other cities where similar initiatives have apparently succeeded have more stable and persistent structures than are evident in Pittsburgh. Pittsburgh gangs appear to be far less cohesive, perhaps making it more difficult

to identify and mediate conflicts among them. Outside Los Angeles and Chicago, such a fluid gang structure appears to be the norm (NIJ, 2002; Weisel, 2002).

Among the key components of the Chicago and Baltimore programs are the following:

1. Change the norms about the acceptability of violence.
2. Increase the perceived costs of involvement in behaviors associated with violence (e.g., illegal gun carrying).
3. Increase the perceived legitimacy and fairness of antiviolence interventions.
4. Hold groups of offenders accountable for continued violence.
5. Increase linkages to a variety of social supports and legitimate opportunities (“widen decision alternatives”; Skogan et al. 2008, p. ES-2).

The questions raised about One Vision relate to target populations, dosage, and comprehensiveness. One Vision emphasized the first, third, and fifth components listed above. It is not clear whether its work with the highest-risk groups was intense enough to help reduce overall violence. That is, while One Vision might have had some success in working with individuals in the target areas, these successes might not have been on a scale sufficient to change levels of violence as measured in this evaluation. One Vision did not partner with local police and prosecutors to communicate a consistent and credible deterrent message that might have changed the perceived risk associated with illegal gun carrying and use, nor did it explicitly focus on influencing social networks of at-risk individuals. The lack of a systematic and integrated law-enforcement component to complement One Vision’s activities might, in part, explain its inability to demonstrate a measurable reduction in violence.

One also cannot help but to wonder to what extent community conditions matter in the selection of target areas. The three areas chosen and studied in this evaluation were thought by community leaders to have significant violence problems and attributes conducive to the activities One Vision sought to implement. However, our exami-

nation of the violence data suggested, for example, that the frequency of homicide in Southside was substantially less than in Northside and the Hill District. While it raises the question as to whether One Vision could have had a measurable impact on violence in Southside due to its amount of observed violence, the answer is further obscured given that we did not detect violence reductions in the target areas with more per capita violence.

One Vision One Life was established to address the serious problem of lethal violence in particular neighborhoods of Pittsburgh. The program leaders looked to CeaseFire Chicago to follow a “promising practice” model for implementation in Pittsburgh. The program staff were trained in the CeaseFire approach. The finding that One Vision did not have an impact on violence in the target areas raises a number of critical issues for a field attempting to move toward evidence-based practices. Are the CeaseFire Chicago results stable over time? Are they transferable to other communities that differ from Chicago in gang structure or parallel systems (such as community policing) coordinating with CeaseFire? If the results are stable and not unique to Chicago, then what was missing in Pittsburgh?

We have speculated on some of the potential differences in the One Vision program, yet these are post hoc observations. The results from the Baltimore evaluation will be important in addressing these questions. The results from Chicago and the initial results from Baltimore suggest the promise of street-worker programs. The results from Pittsburgh suggest the need for continued rigorous evaluation. Taken together, there appears to be enough promise for continued programmatic experimentation but also enough questions that future programs should be coupled with continued evaluation. This research is needed to further assess the efficacy of this type of program in reducing community violence as well as to identify program components associated with violence reduction.

## Study Limitations

All studies have limitations that should be considered in interpreting their findings. Evaluations of this sort face difficulties in identifying best comparison areas, measuring program delivery and performance, and isolating program effects from other effects. True random designs are generally not possible for such social programs. Quasi-experimental designs can approach the rigor of random selection and experimental analysis. Nevertheless, they cannot control for some variables, such as other ongoing initiatives or community changes, that might contribute to program outcome. It is possible that the rise in violence we observed was due to some other change in the target communities that we could not identify and separate from the assessment of program effects. Given that One Vision has been operating only since 2004 and the latest data we could gather are from 2007, the evaluation could at best capture only shorter-term effects associated with One Vision's implementation. Any long-term success that One Vision might have in reducing violence would not be evident in this evaluation.

Similar to design challenges, there are several measurement limitations. First, as noted earlier, One Vision's main focus has been on reducing homicide and shootings in its target areas. While we had data on homicides, changes in the Pittsburgh Bureau of Police's reporting policies precluded us from gathering and assessing longitudinal shooting data. As a consequence, we analyzed the broader categories of aggravated assaults and aggravated assaults with a gun. While it is possible that these measures could detect changes in shootings, they include other forms of violence whose changing levels might mask program effects on shootings. Second, our data did not permit us to assess gang and group violence and how One Vision's efforts have affected it. Third, homicide is a rare occurrence. Detecting measurable changes in variables with low frequency and variation is generally very difficult. Further distinguishing these offenses to examine only those that are gang- or group-related would make analysis even more problematic. Finally, our control measures are not as precise as we would like. Necessarily, we drew on U.S. Census Bureau data for socioeconomic and demographic data of the neighborhoods in our analysis. These data

illustrate variation among the neighborhoods in 2000 but do not identify changes in them since then.

## The Observational Strategy

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Our research design had two levels: an implementation/process assessment and an impact assessment of the One Vision initiative. One element of the process evaluation was to observe and report on activities occurring within the targeted neighborhoods. To conduct this field observation, a Michigan State University graduate student was in the field with One Vision as a participant observer from early May 2007 to late July 2007.

Lofland and Lofland (1995, p. 18) defines *participant observation* as “the process in which an investigator establishes and sustains a many-sided and long term relationship with a human association in its natural setting for the purpose of developing scientific understanding.” We discuss in this appendix our observational methodology.

### Participant Observation

Observation of program activities helped us better understand program implementation. The field observation not only answered questions we had beforehand about the program but also raised additional issues of interest. These data also complemented the other types of data collected. They influenced the types of questions we asked in the interviews and focus groups and were useful in interpreting the results of the impact analysis.

The field observer was able to watch, listen, and learn about One Vision One Life, spending six to eight hours nearly every day in the field with program staff. Our initial research plans called for 100 hours

of field observation. Once we were in the field, however, it became clear that One Vision was involved in many different activities related to violence reduction. It was also adding staff and neighborhoods to the program. We therefore revised our research plan and expanded our data collection. Ultimately, the field observer spent 500 hours in the field.

The field observations had four components. First, the field observer familiarized himself with the neighborhoods by walking and driving through them. During his first weeks in the field, he spent about two hours each day taking in the physical setting, riding public transportation, and interacting informally with individuals who lived in these communities. Waiting for and then riding public transportation into and through the target neighborhoods was an important point of contact for informal conversations with all types of community members, including drug dealers, gang leaders, and prostitutes.

Second, the field observer spent a considerable amount of time at the offices of One Vision, attending weekly staff meetings, other formal and informal meetings, and unofficial gatherings that took place there. This helped the field observer establish relationships with staff and to glean information about program events, activities of the organization, the office setting, and the relationships among the executive director, program director, and five area managers. Typically, the office was a good starting point at which to make contact with a community coordinator or other staff members who would then escort the field observer to the neighborhoods. It was also an effective place in which to have many informal conversations with One Vision staff.

Third, the field observer shadowed One Vision personnel, including the executive director, program director, the five area managers, and numerous community coordinators in their target communities. He spent more than 80 hours riding with staff to meetings with community partners, leaders, and potential project funders. This also introduced him to local officials, such as the medical examiner, chief trauma surgeon, and chief of police. The field observer saw presentations given by staff directors to a local class of university students, youths in a juvenile detention center, and a group of parents concerned about their community.

Spending time with the staff directors helped the field observer learn of other meetings concerning the area managers. Altogether, he spent more than 150 hours with the five area managers. Much of this time was spent participating in informal conversations but also included attending and observing staff meetings and training sessions, community events, and violence responses. The field observer also went with area managers to behind-the-scenes mediations and interactions with community coordinators.

Most of the field observer's time was spent with the community coordinators. For nearly 250 hours, he shadowed the coordinators during community events, programs, and violence responses. He also participated in night outreach efforts, which included shadowing community coordinators on the streets and into bars and neighborhoods at high-risk times. Some days he spent as many as 12 hours with the coordinators. He spent most of this time in Northside and the least in Southside. Altogether, he spent time with eight of the 11 Northside coordinators, one of the four Hill District coordinators, and two of the four Southside coordinators.

Fourth, the field observer attended community meetings, activities, and violence responses and participated in outreach efforts. He observed a local meeting concerning the dangerous threats posed by the opening of a new alternative school in Northside. He also attended a televised discussion panel with One Vision staff and the chief of police. Other meetings included visits to shooting victims' homes and presentations to local community members about One Vision and its expansion to new neighborhoods. He observed community plays and participated in local cookouts in the targeted communities. He also took part in eight violence responses: five in Northside, two in the Hill District, and one in Southside.

## **Establishing Rapport**

Although some One Vision staff members were very approachable and went out of their way to assist the field observer, it was clear that many, especially the community coordinators, had significant reservations. It

was important to establish a good rapport to overcome these concerns. During the early period of his work, the field observer found and established rapport with several guides (see Berg, 2004, for more on guides in field work), asking questions and establishing additional relationships through “snowballing.” These guides were critical to providing access to community coordinators and other staff.

Having established relationships and rapport with several guides and, in particular, with some One Vision community coordinators, the field observer was free to begin learning more about One Vision (Berg, 2004). This was done by tracking, observing, eavesdropping, and asking questions. Berg (2004, p. 172) defines *tracking* as “following the guides around during their usual daily routines and watching their activities and the other people they interact with.”

It took about a month for the field observer to establish sufficient rapport for expanding the number of his relationships with various staff. Such rapport helped not only in establishing relationships with community coordinators but also in finding opportunities to interact with community members and to have informal conversations with a coordinator’s clients. The community coordinators generally provided full access, allowing the field observer to accompany them wherever they went, including into victims’ homes, bars, nightclubs (critical locations for defusing a string of violent incidents), and late nights on the streets in the targeted communities.

## Data-Collection Strategies

The field observer compiled data through typewritten field notes completed immediately following every field experience. Bailey (1996, pp. 80–81) states that field notes initially consist of “mental notes collected while interacting in the research setting. These are then transformed into jotted notes, or brief reminder notes written down to jog the researcher’s memory when he or she writes more complete field notes.” Following any meeting or chance occurrence, the field observer wrote short notes to jog his memory when later writing more complete field notes. The field notes included detailed descriptions of the field

observations, replicating the appearance of the participants, what they said, and what they did during their daily routine (see Berg, 2004, for more on such field methods). In addition to describing the setting and its participants, the observer recorded comments and analytic notes. Berg (2004, p. 174) explains that “analytic notes may be linkages between people in the study, theories that might serve to explain something in the field, or simply a judgmental observation about a participant.” These ideas and reflections were made in addition to the descriptive field notes. The field notes were shared and discussed with senior project staff.

## Limitations

Although the field observer spent considerable time with the organization and its staff and in the targeted neighborhoods, there are several limitations to our field observations. Many of these stem from having spent just three months of a 24-month project in the field.

First, much of the abbreviated fieldwork time was spent establishing relationships, rapport, and simply getting access. Almost a month was spent building relationships with office staff and community coordinators. Second, it was difficult to spend equal periods of time in the targeted neighborhoods. Ultimately, the field observer spent most of his time in Northside, the largest of the three targeted communities. Third, because there was only one observer in the field, and many activities were occurring in each neighborhood every day, our field observations missed many events, outreach efforts, and summer program activities. Fourth, although focusing the data collection in summer months helped capture many significant activities, these dates meant that the field observations excluded some critical programs. For example, many of the summer programs had started, but a few, like a midnight basketball league, had yet to begin.



## APPENDIX B

## Designation of Target, Spillover, and Counterfactual Neighborhoods

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**Table B.1**  
**Categorization of Neighborhoods**

Neighborhood	Target Area	Target Counterfactual		Spillover Counterfactual, Propensity Adjusted
		Propensity Adjusted	One Vision Suggested	
Allegheny Center	Northside			
Allegheny West	Northside			
Allentown	Southside			
Arlington	Southside			
Arlington Heights	Southside			
Banksville		x		x
Bedford Dwellings	Hill District			
Beechview		x		x
Bloomfield		x		x
Bluff	Hill District			
Bon Air	Southside			
Brighton Heights	Northside			
Brookline		x	Southside	

**Table B.1—Continued**

Neighborhood	Target Area	Target Counterfactual		Spillover Counterfactual, Propensity Adjusted
		Propensity Adjusted	One Vision Suggested	
California-Kirkbride	Northside			
Carrick	Southside			
Central Business District		x		Hill District
Central Lawrenceville			x	x
Central Northside	Northside			
Central Oakland		x		x
Chartiers City		x	x	x
Chateau	Northside			
Crafton Heights		x	x	x
Crawford-Roberts	Hill District			
Duquesne Heights		x		x
East Allegheny	Northside			
East Carnegie		x		x
East Hills		x	x	x
East Liberty		x	x	x
Elliott		x	x	x
Esplen		x		x
Fairywood		x	x	x
Fineview	Northside			
Friendship		x		x

**Table B.1—Continued**

Neighborhood	Target Area	Target Counterfactual		Spillover Counterfactual, Propensity Adjusted
		Propensity Adjusted	One Vision Suggested	
Garfield		x	x	x
Glen Hazel		x		x
Greenfield		x		x
Hays		x		Southside
Hazelwood		x	x	x
Highland Park		x		x
Homewood North		x	x	x
Homewood South		x	x	x
Homewood West		x	x	x
Knoxville	Southside			
Larimer		x	x	x
Lincoln Place		x	x	x
Lincoln-Lemington-Belmar		x	x	x
Lower Lawrenceville		x		x
Manchester	Northside			
Marshall-Shadeland	Northside			
Middle Hill	Hill District			
Morningside		x		x
Mount Oliver	Southside			
Mount Washington		x		Southside

**Table B.1—Continued**

Neighborhood	Target Area	Target Counterfactual		Spillover Counterfactual, Propensity Adjusted
		Propensity Adjusted	One Vision Suggested	
New Homestead		x		x
North Oakland		x		Hill District
North Shore	Northside			
Northview Heights	Northside			
Oakwood		x		x
Overbrook		x		Southside
Perry North	Northside			
Perry South	Northside			
Point Breeze		x		x
Polish Hill		x		Hill District
Regent Square		x		x
Ridgemont		x		x
Shadyside		x		x
Sheraden		x	x	x
South Oakland		x		Hill District
South Shore		x		Southside
South Side Flats		x		Southside
South Side Slopes	Southside			
Spring Garden	Northside			
Spring Hill	Northside			
Squirrel Hill North		x		x
Squirrel Hill South		x		x

**Table B.1—Continued**

Neighborhood	Target Area	Target Counterfactual		Spillover Counterfactual, Propensity Adjusted
		Propensity Adjusted	One Vision Suggested	
Stanton Heights		x		x
Strip District		x		Hill District
Summer Hill	Northside			
Swissheilm Park		x		x
Terrace Village	Hill District			
Troy Hill	Northside			
Upper Hill	Hill District			
Upper Lawrenceville		x		x
West End		x	x	x
West Oakland		x		Hill District
Westwood		x		x
Windgap		x	x	x

NOTE: x indicates a neighborhood that served as a counterfactual for the analysis corresponding to its column label. Beltzhoover and Saint Clair Village are excluded from the analysis because One Vision began working in these Southside neighborhoods earlier than the other Southside neighborhoods, and there were not enough neighborhoods on which to conduct a separate analysis for them.



## Technical Detail on the Outcome Analysis

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### Propensity-Score Matching and Weighting

Propensity-score matching has become a useful tool for evaluating criminal-justice programs. Apel and Sweeten (2010) summarize the method and its use in criminal-justice applications. While more commonly used to match individuals to test for changes in individual behavior, Apel and Sweeten document how the method can be used to estimate aggregate-level effects. One area of development has been the use of propensity scores to help identify effects at the neighborhood level, as Tita and Ridgeway (2007) and Tita et al. (2003) have done. We use this approach in our analysis, thereby contributing to this growing body of knowledge and practice. We note, however, the possibility that whatever changes individuals make as a result of One Vision's activities could not be detected at the neighborhood level if the dosage is rather low.

The method of propensity scores can produce causal estimates using observational data by weighting or matching different neighborhoods so as to give target and nontarget areas similar characteristics, thereby reducing selection bias in the process of comparison. For a particular treatment ( $Treat_i$ ) of interest, whether it is the One Vision program in the target areas or its effect in the spillover areas, the propensity score equals the probability that  $Treat_i = 1$  for a neighborhood with given values for background variables  $X_i$ ,  $p_i = \text{Prob}(Treat_i = 1 | X_i)$ . Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) show that conditioning on this propensity score can balance all the covariates. Robins and Rotnitzky (2001) show that weighting by the inverse of the propensity score can also

balance the distributions of covariates. As in the case of fully randomized experiments, if all potential confounders to One Vision effects are balanced among neighborhoods, then any differences in neighborhood violence can be attributed to One Vision effects. Consequently, if all potential confounders are observed and balanced by the propensity-score weights or matching, the simple weighted or matched averages can provide unbiased estimates of One Vision effects without any complex statistical or econometric modeling.

The first step of any propensity-score analysis is to estimate propensity scores. The propensity score is the probability of an area being chosen as a target neighborhood (or spillover neighborhood) based on known neighborhood characteristics. The most common method to estimate propensity score is logistic regression with variables selected ad hoc. This method can be problematic. Logistic regression can result in somewhat extreme weights, leading to imprecision in weighted means and estimates of causal effects (Kang and Schafer, 2007). There is also no evidence that ad hoc variable selection yields accurate propensity scores.

Kang and Schafer (2007) suggest robust logistic regression as an alternative to reduce the imprecision in weighted means. Following McCaffrey et al. (2004), we used generalized boosting methods (GBMs) to estimate propensity scores. GBM is a flexible nonparametric approach to modeling  $\log(p_i/(1-p_i))$  that handles a large number of variables in an automated and systematic manner. Ridgeway and McCaffrey (2007) have shown that it provides estimated propensity scores that yield better estimates of effects than other approaches do. In particular, GBM automatically selects parameters for inclusion in the model and does not arbitrarily exclude potentially important predictors. It also allows for interaction and nonlinearity in the propensity scores. With  $p_i$  estimated for each neighborhood, we used  $w_i = 1/p_i$  as the weight to be used in the Poisson regression model.

We sought to control for as many neighborhood characteristics as possible, yet we were sensitive to our sample size and the available power to detect statistically significant differences. We therefore employed logistic regression using the backward selection method to

identify variables for inclusion in the GBM model. We initially modeled the neighborhood attributes of

- homicide, aggravated assault, and gun assault rates in 2003 (just prior to One Vision's introduction)
- population density per square mile
- the proportion of the population 15 to 24 years old
- the proportions of black and white residents
- the proportions of population 25 years of age and over without a high-school diploma (or equivalency) or with a college degree
- the proportion of employed residents in a professional occupation
- the proportion of households with an annual income less than \$25,000
- the proportion of households with public assistance income
- the proportion of individuals in poverty with children under 18 years of age
- the proportion of housing units that were vacant
- the proportion of residents age 5 or older who lived elsewhere five years previously
- the proportion of households that were headed by a female with children less than 18 years of age
- the proportion of housing units that were renter-occupied
- the proportion of the civilian labor force that was unemployed
- the proportions of households heated by gas or electricity
- the proportion of housing units with five or more units in the structure
- the proportion of the population born in the United States
- the proportion of the population at least 15 years of age that was married
- the proportion of renter-occupied housing with rent less than \$400 per month
- the numbers of families in poverty, with income less than \$10,000, or with any income
- the number of females employed in the labor force
- the institutionalized population
- total population size.

Based on the backward selection process, we retained 13 neighborhood attributes for use in the GBM analysis. Table C.1 lists these variables and the results of the final propensity-score model.

**Table C.1**  
**Outcome of Propensity-Score Model**

Parameter	DF	Estimate	Std. Error	Wald Chi-Square	Pr > ChiSq	Std. Estimate
Intercept	1	0.18	1.65	0.01	0.92	
Homicide rate in 2003	1	-0.19	0.44	0.19	0.66	-0.21
Aggravated assault rate in 2003	1	-0.05	0.03	1.71	0.19	-0.74
Gun assault rate in 2003	1	0.17	0.15	1.33	0.25	0.72
Population density	1	0.13	0.09	1.96	0.16	0.46
% population age 15–24	1	-0.06	0.04	1.91	0.17	-0.36
% no high-school grad	1	0.04	0.07	0.33	0.57	0.23
% black	1	0.00	0.01	0.02	0.87	-0.04
% professionals	1	-9.59	3.86	6.17	0.01	-0.80
% income <\$25,000	1	-0.08	0.04	2.90	0.09	-0.69
% in poverty with child	1	0.00	0.05	0.00	0.99	0.00
% public assistance	1	0.04	0.08	0.22	0.64	0.18
% vacant housing unit	1	0.06	0.04	2.13	0.14	0.41
% moved in 5 years	1	0.10	0.04	5.42	0.02	0.67

## Impact Assessment

Poisson regression is often used to model information on counts, such as the number of homicides in a neighborhood, where lower-bound values are truncated at zero and upper-bound values have no limit. For the outcome  $Y_{it}$ , the number of homicides (or aggravated assaults or gun assaults) in a given month or year  $t$  in neighborhood  $i$ , for example, the probability of observing any specific number of crimes depends on a unique parameter, the mean number  $\lambda_{it}$  of crime, which, for this distribution, turns out to be the same as the variance of the distribution. We model the count of incidences using the regression

$$\log\left(\frac{\lambda_{it}}{N_{it}}\right) = \mu_i + \alpha_1 Treat_{it} + \alpha_2 Post_{it} + \alpha_3 (Treat_{it} \times Post_{it}) \\ + \beta_1 Months_i + \beta_2 Years_i + \beta X_{it}, \quad \mu_i \sim N(\theta, \tau^2),$$

where  $X_{it}$  represents neighborhood characteristics including the density of the neighborhood, the labor force indicators, the age and income level of the neighborhood population, the number of persons receiving public assistance, the percentage of housing units that are vacant, and the proportion of the population that moved to their current residence in the previous five years.  $Treat_i$  represents the treatment of interest, taking a value of 1 for target areas and 0 for nontarget areas. With monthly homicide data collected from January 1997 through December 2007 and monthly aggravated assault and gun assault data collected from January 1996 through December 2007 by neighborhood, an indicator ( $Post_{it}$ ) of the crime data before and after implementation is also included, as well as an interaction between the treatment and the postimplementation that allows for an estimation of the change in crime between treatment and nontreatment areas, a difference in difference.

This model assumes a month and year effect as well as a random neighborhood effect  $\mu_i$  normally distributed with mean  $\theta$  and standard deviation  $\tau$ . Because some neighborhoods are more populated than others, the population size  $N_{it}$  in a neighborhood at time  $t$  is used as

offset. It allows for the estimation of rate of crime per person.  $e^{\alpha_1}$ , the exponential of the treatment regression estimate  $\alpha_1$ , the main effect, is the ratio of the rate of crime between target and nontarget areas (when the treatment of interest is the One Vision program). Because our interest is in  $\alpha_3$ , the interaction effect, which will be a straightforward difference of difference in the case of a linear model, and because we are using a Poisson regression, we used the method of predictive margins (Graubard and Korn, 1999) to turn our estimates into the expected count of crime per 100,000 persons in a neighborhood. This yields a difference-in-difference equivalence to the interaction effect. From the Poisson regression model, we estimated an average count of crime hypothetically assuming that all the neighborhoods were non-target areas. We then estimated an average if, hypothetically, One Vision was implemented in all neighborhoods. The difference between those obtained crime counts will be equivalent to the main effect,  $\alpha_1$ . We did a similar transformation for the pre-post effect as well as the interaction (i.e., the difference in difference).

The number of observations used to estimate each model is a function of the number of neighborhoods in the particular analysis and the number of months for which we have data. For example, the model used to estimate the impact of One Vision by comparing homicides in Northside to those in all other nontarget neighborhoods is 9,636. This is calculated by multiplying the number of neighborhoods in the analysis, 73 (18 target plus 55 nontarget), by the number of months for which we have data, 132 (11 years of 12 months each). The numbers of observations used to estimate the model are provided in the corresponding tables in Appendix D. We had full data for each neighborhood, so we lost no cases in the analysis. Census-derived socioeconomic-demographic variables are constants and not adjusted or interpolated in any way.

## Outcomes of Full Models Used to Test for Intervention and Spillover Effects

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**Table D.1**  
**Northside Homicide Model, Propensity Score–Weighted Counterfactual Neighborhoods (N = 9,636)**

Effect	Estimate	Standard Error	DF	t-Value	Pr >  t
Intercept	-11.5272	0.9282	66	-12.42	<0.0001
target_North	0.0875	0.2883	9,538	0.3	0.7615
post1	-0.6727	0.5069	9,538	-1.33	0.1845
postxtar1	0.09008	0.2749	9,538	0.33	0.7432
density	-0.01628	0.01561	9,538	-1.04	0.2972
pct_professional	0.3135	1.5359	9,538	0.2	0.8383
pct_vacant	0.08696	0.01861	9,538	4.67	<0.0001
pct15_24	-0.02719	0.01862	9,538	-1.46	0.1442
pct_moved	-0.00654	0.01828	9,538	-0.36	0.7208
pct_pub_ass	0.0406	0.02349	9,538	1.73	0.0839
pct_inc_lt25k	0.007689	0.0155	9,538	0.5	0.6198
month2	-0.2582	0.3244	9,538	-0.8	0.426
month3	-0.5025	0.3488	9,538	-1.44	0.1497
month4	-0.413	0.3394	9,538	-1.22	0.2236
month5	-0.3849	0.3464	9,538	-1.11	0.2666

**Table D.1—Continued**

<b>Effect</b>	<b>Estimate</b>	<b>Standard Error</b>	<b>DF</b>	<b>t-Value</b>	<b>Pr &gt;  t </b>
month6	0.3469	0.2879	9,538	1.21	0.2282
month7	0.04853	0.308	9,538	0.16	0.8748
month8	-0.1497	0.324	9,538	-0.46	0.6442
month9	0.007087	0.3111	9,538	0.02	0.9818
month10	0.04633	0.3081	9,538	0.15	0.8805
month11	-0.433	0.3515	9,538	-1.23	0.2179
month12	-0.2514	0.3333	9,538	-0.75	0.4506
year1997	-0.7897	0.5625	9,538	-1.4	0.1604
year1998	-1.8877	0.6323	9,538	-2.99	0.0028
year1999	-1.6374	0.61	9,538	-2.68	0.0073
year2000	-1.3093	0.5872	9,538	-2.23	0.0258
year2001	-1.1739	0.5796	9,538	-2.03	0.0428
year2002	-1.1203	0.5768	9,538	-1.94	0.0521
year2003	-0.4671	0.5521	9,538	-0.85	0.3976
year2004	-0.6192	0.3612	9,538	-1.71	0.0865
year2005	0.08459	0.2612	9,538	0.32	0.7461
year2006	-0.3711	0.2951	9,538	-1.26	0.2086

**Table D.2**  
**Northside Aggravated Assault Model, Propensity Score–Weighted Counterfactual Neighborhoods (N = 10,512)**

Effect	Estimate	Standard Error	DF	t-Value	Pr >  t
Intercept	-9.3868	0.4004	65	-23.45	<0.0001
target_North	-0.3043	0.187	10,414	-1.63	0.1037
post1	-0.163	0.08431	10,414	-1.93	0.0533
postxtar1	0.3428	0.04952	10,414	6.92	<0.0001
density	-0.01498	0.01077	10,414	-1.39	0.1643
pct_professional	-2.1084	0.7593	10,414	-2.78	0.0055
pct_vacant	0.0651	0.01013	10,414	6.43	<0.0001
pct15_24	-0.01743	0.008333	10,414	-2.09	0.0364
pct_moved	0.03355	0.009459	10,414	3.55	0.0004
pct_pub_ass	0.02282	0.0131	10,414	1.74	0.0816
pct_inc_lt25k	0.004792	0.008598	10,414	0.56	0.5773
month2	-0.1905	0.06206	10,414	-3.07	0.0021
month3	-0.06338	0.05999	10,414	-1.06	0.2908
month4	0.1195	0.05735	10,414	2.08	0.0372
month5	0.2128	0.05685	10,414	3.74	0.0002
month6	0.2096	0.05689	10,414	3.68	0.0002
month7	0.2703	0.05616	10,414	4.81	<0.0001
month8	0.1693	0.0574	10,414	2.95	0.0032
month9	0.06905	0.05874	10,414	1.18	0.2398
month10	0.01302	0.05953	10,414	0.22	0.8269
month11	-0.1029	0.06128	10,414	-1.68	0.0931
month12	-0.1207	0.06157	10,414	-1.96	0.05
year1996	-0.4563	0.102	10,414	-4.47	<0.0001

**Table D.2—Continued**

Effect	Estimate	Standard Error	DF	t-Value	Pr >  t
year1997	-0.5029	0.1025	10,414	-4.91	<0.0001
year1998	-0.2382	0.09969	10,414	-2.39	0.0169
year1999	-0.2668	0.09996	10,414	-2.67	0.0076
year2000	-0.07211	0.09823	10,414	-0.73	0.4629
year2001	-0.1906	0.09925	10,414	-1.92	0.0548
year2002	0.158	0.09655	10,414	1.64	0.1018
year2003	0.01922	0.09752	10,414	0.2	0.8438
year2004	0.1823	0.05791	10,414	3.15	0.0017
year2005	-0.06506	0.05556	10,414	-1.17	0.2416
year2006	-0.01931	0.05491	10,414	-0.35	0.7252

**Table D.3**  
**Northside Gun Assault Model, Propensity Score–Weighted Counterfactual Neighborhoods (N = 10,512)**

Effect	Estimate	Standard Error	DF	t-Value	Pr >  t
Intercept	-10.0594	0.5325	65	-18.89	<0.0001
target_North	-0.4103	0.2291	10,414	-1.79	0.0733
post1	-0.3567	0.1375	10,414	-2.59	0.0095
postxtar1	0.4378	0.08349	10,414	5.24	<0.0001
density	-0.00790	0.01282	10,414	-0.62	0.5376
pct_professional	-2.4712	1.0093	10,414	-2.45	0.0144
pct_vacant	0.06894	0.01276	10,414	5.41	<0.0001
pct15_24	-0.02260	0.01105	10,414	-2.05	0.0409
pct_moved	0.02247	0.01185	10,414	1.90	0.0579
pct_pub_ass	0.03458	0.01794	10,414	1.93	0.0539

**Table D.3—Continued**

Effect	Estimate	Standard Error	DF	t-Value	Pr >  t
pct_inc_lt25k	0.01096	0.01092	10,414	1.00	0.3158
month2	-0.5562	0.1125	10,414	-4.94	<0.0001
month3	-0.4140	0.1077	10,414	-3.84	0.0001
month4	0.05361	0.09482	10,414	0.57	0.5718
month5	0.1213	0.09534	10,414	1.27	0.2034
month6	0.07969	0.09626	10,414	0.83	0.4078
month7	0.2093	0.09347	10,414	2.24	0.0251
month8	0.1858	0.09396	10,414	1.98	0.0480
month9	0.05709	0.09678	10,414	0.59	0.5553
month10	-0.1158	0.1010	10,414	-1.15	0.2519
month11	-0.3119	0.1065	10,414	-2.93	0.0034
month12	-0.2499	0.1047	10,414	-2.39	0.0170
year1996	-0.7992	0.1668	10,414	-4.79	<0.0001
year1997	-1.3236	0.1804	10,414	-7.34	<0.0001
year1998	-0.8957	0.1689	10,414	-5.30	<0.0001
year1999	-0.8257	0.1673	10,414	-4.93	<0.0001
year2000	-0.7648	0.1661	10,414	-4.60	<0.0001
year2001	-0.7189	0.1652	10,414	-4.35	<0.0001
year2002	-0.06358	0.1558	10,414	-0.41	0.6831
year2003	-0.2924	0.1584	10,414	-1.85	0.0650
year2004	0.03925	0.09302	10,414	0.42	0.6731
year2005	-0.03542	0.08560	10,414	-0.41	0.6791
year2006	-0.2410	0.09044	10,414	-2.66	0.0077

**Table D.4**  
**Hill District Homicide Model, Propensity Score–Weighted Counterfactual Neighborhoods (N = 8,052)**

Effect	Estimate	Standard Error	DF	t-Value	Pr >  t
Intercept	-10.743	1.1171	54	-9.62	<0.0001
target_Hill	0.2354	0.3638	7,966	0.65	0.5176
post1	-0.3074	0.6404	7,966	-0.48	0.6313
postxtar1	-0.3009	0.3137	7,966	-0.96	0.3374
density	0.01745	0.04888	7,966	0.36	0.7211
pct_professional	-1.7953	1.7054	7,966	-1.05	0.2925
pct_vacant	0.03444	0.01661	7,966	2.07	0.0381
pct15_24	-0.04043	0.01824	7,966	-2.22	0.0267
pct_moved	-0.00062	0.01913	7,966	-0.03	0.9742
pct_pub_ass	0.06311	0.03205	7,966	1.97	0.049
pct_inc_lt25k	0.007854	0.01841	7,966	0.43	0.6697
month2	-0.6999	0.4114	7,966	-1.7	0.0889
month3	-0.4643	0.3814	7,966	-1.22	0.2236
month4	-0.3596	0.3696	7,966	-0.97	0.3307
month5	0.03908	0.3377	7,966	0.12	0.9079
month6	0.2881	0.319	7,966	0.9	0.3664
month7	-0.1715	0.3564	7,966	-0.48	0.6305
month8	-0.09729	0.3495	7,966	-0.28	0.7807
month9	0.1299	0.3304	7,966	0.39	0.6942
month10	0.2641	0.3206	7,966	0.82	0.4101
month11	-0.5157	0.394	7,966	-1.31	0.1906
month12	-0.2128	0.3605	7,966	-0.59	0.555
year1997	-0.6434	0.6945	7,966	-0.93	0.3543

**Table D.4—Continued**

Effect	Estimate	Standard Error	DF	t-Value	Pr >  t
year1998	-1.6076	0.7482	7,966	-2.15	0.0317
year1999	-1.5741	0.7454	7,966	-2.11	0.0347
year2000	-1.1805	0.7185	7,966	-1.64	0.1004
year2001	-0.6264	0.6939	7,966	-0.9	0.3667
year2002	-0.7837	0.6996	7,966	-1.12	0.2627
year2003	-0.4248	0.6877	7,966	-0.62	0.5367
year2004	-0.9095	0.4111	7,966	-2.21	0.027
year2005	-0.2871	0.2988	7,966	-0.96	0.3368
year2006	-0.5282	0.3213	7,966	-1.64	0.1002

**Table D.5**

**Hill District Aggravated Assault Model, Propensity Score–Weighted Counterfactual Neighborhoods (N = 8,784)**

Effect	Estimate	Standard Error	DF	t-Value	Pr >  t
Intercept	-9.2608	0.506	53	-18.3	<0.0001
target_Hill	-0.4331	0.3249	8,698	-1.33	0.1826
post1	-0.06748	0.0963	8,698	-0.7	0.4835
postxtar1	0.1413	0.06323	8,698	2.23	0.0255
density	-0.01962	0.03115	8,698	-0.63	0.5289
pct_professional	-1.5205	0.8672	8,698	-1.75	0.0796
pct_vacant	0.0692	0.01326	8,698	5.22	<0.0001
pct15_24	-0.01996	0.0106	8,698	-1.88	0.0598
pct_moved	0.02555	0.01265	8,698	2.02	0.0434
pct_pub_ass	0.01442	0.01706	8,698	0.84	0.3982
pct_inc_lt25k	0.003032	0.01074	8,698	0.28	0.7778

**Table D.5—Continued**

<b>Effect</b>	<b>Estimate</b>	<b>Standard Error</b>	<b>DF</b>	<b>t-Value</b>	<b>Pr &gt;  t </b>
month2	-0.1899	0.06931	8,698	-2.74	0.0062
month3	-0.1206	0.06803	8,698	-1.77	0.0763
month4	0.07306	0.06478	8,698	1.13	0.2594
month5	0.2113	0.06353	8,698	3.33	0.0009
month6	0.1675	0.06415	8,698	2.61	0.009
month7	0.2545	0.06294	8,698	4.04	<0.0001
month8	0.1841	0.06391	8,698	2.88	0.004
month9	-0.02897	0.0672	8,698	-0.43	0.6664
month10	-0.1023	0.06846	8,698	-1.49	0.1353
month11	-0.1407	0.06915	8,698	-2.03	0.0419
month12	-0.2111	0.07046	8,698	-3	0.0027
year1996	-0.1787	0.1181	8,698	-1.51	0.1302
year1997	-0.1826	0.1181	8,698	-1.55	0.1222
year1998	0.051	0.1157	8,698	0.44	0.6594
year1999	-0.02659	0.1164	8,698	-0.23	0.8194
year2000	0.07206	0.1155	8,698	0.62	0.5328
year2001	-0.03158	0.1165	8,698	-0.27	0.7863
year2002	0.2948	0.1137	8,698	2.59	0.0095
year2003	0.119	0.1151	8,698	1.03	0.3013
year2004	0.2811	0.07018	8,698	4.01	<0.0001
year2005	0.02917	0.06749	8,698	0.43	0.6656
year2006	0.1739	0.06521	8,698	2.67	0.0077

**Table D.6****Hill District Gun Assault Model, Propensity Score–Weighted Counterfactual Neighborhoods (N = 8,784)**

Effect	Estimate	Standard Error	DF	t-Value	Pr >  t
Intercept	-9.9501	0.6342	53	-15.69	<0.0001
target_Hill	-0.3601	0.3562	8,698	-1.01	0.3120
post1	-0.2246	0.1537	8,698	-1.46	0.1440
postxtar1	0.3290	0.1014	8,698	3.24	0.0012
density	-0.00969	0.03724	8,698	-0.26	0.7947
pct_professional	-1.9891	1.0818	8,698	-1.84	0.0660
pct_vacant	0.06734	0.01496	8,698	4.50	<0.0001
pct15_24	-0.02793	0.01312	8,698	-2.13	0.0333
pct_moved	0.01555	0.01476	8,698	1.05	0.2919
pct_pub_ass	0.02774	0.02284	8,698	1.21	0.2246
pct_inc_lt25k	0.006990	0.01278	8,698	0.55	0.5845
month2	-0.4192	0.1215	8,698	-3.45	0.0006
month3	-0.4464	0.1225	8,698	-3.64	0.0003
month4	0.09460	0.1058	8,698	0.89	0.3712
month5	0.1102	0.1074	8,698	1.03	0.3050
month6	0.06241	0.1086	8,698	0.57	0.5656
month7	0.2070	0.1051	8,698	1.97	0.0490
month8	0.2766	0.1035	8,698	2.67	0.0076
month9	0.009978	0.1100	8,698	0.09	0.9277
month10	-0.1402	0.1143	8,698	-1.23	0.2197
month11	-0.3253	0.1202	8,698	-2.71	0.0068
month12	-0.3176	0.1199	8,698	-2.65	0.0081
year1996	-0.4282	0.1927	8,698	-2.22	0.0263

**Table D.6—Continued**

Effect	Estimate	Standard Error	DF	t-Value	Pr >  t
year1997	-0.7602	0.2011	8,698	-3.78	0.0002
year1998	-0.2003	0.1883	8,698	-1.06	0.2873
year1999	-0.1634	0.1876	8,698	-0.87	0.3837
year2000	-0.4786	0.1939	8,698	-2.47	0.0136
year2001	-0.4346	0.1929	8,698	-2.25	0.0243
year2002	0.1761	0.1826	8,698	0.96	0.3350
year2003	-0.05739	0.1859	8,698	-0.31	0.7575
year2004	0.3186	0.1132	8,698	2.81	0.0049
year2005	0.1454	0.1073	8,698	1.35	0.1756
year2006	0.3085	0.1035	8,698	2.98	0.0029

**Table D.7**  
**Southside Homicide Model, Propensity Score–Weighted Counterfactual Neighborhoods (N = 8,316)**

Effect	Estimate	Standard Error	DF	t-Value	Pr >  t
Intercept	-12.338	1.1102	56	-11.11	<0.0001
target_south_late	-0.4245	0.3718	8,228	-1.14	0.2536
post2	0.0308	0.5869	8,228	0.05	0.9581
postxtar2	-0.2031	0.5225	8,228	-0.39	0.6976
density	0.03225	0.03499	8,228	0.92	0.3567
pct_professional	-2.0178	1.7097	8,228	-1.18	0.238
pct_vacant	0.03033	0.01364	8,228	2.22	0.0263
pct15_24	-0.03281	0.01864	8,228	-1.76	0.0784
pct_moved	0.008264	0.01856	8,228	0.45	0.6561
pct_pub_ass	0.0843	0.02873	8,228	2.93	0.0033

**Table D.7—Continued**

Effect	Estimate	Standard Error	DF	t-Value	Pr >  t
pct_inc_lt25k	0.02074	0.01612	8,228	1.29	0.1983
month2	-0.4903	0.4534	8,228	-1.08	0.2796
month3	-0.4466	0.4474	8,228	-1	0.3181
month4	-0.6892	0.4834	8,228	-1.43	0.1539
month5	-0.2491	0.4289	8,228	-0.58	0.5614
month6	0.2872	0.3774	8,228	0.76	0.4466
month7	-0.01879	0.4042	8,228	-0.05	0.9629
month8	-0.00914	0.4033	8,228	-0.02	0.9819
month9	0.1374	0.3897	8,228	0.35	0.7245
month10	0.2546	0.3799	8,228	0.67	0.5027
month11	-0.7054	0.4919	8,228	-1.43	0.1515
month12	-0.2495	0.429	8,228	-0.58	0.5609
year1997	-0.2198	0.6671	8,228	-0.33	0.7418
year1998	-1.4431	0.7658	8,228	-1.88	0.0596
year1999	-1.0677	0.7237	8,228	-1.48	0.1402
year2000	-0.7234	0.6954	8,228	-1.04	0.2983
year2001	-0.6245	0.6888	8,228	-0.91	0.3646
year2002	-0.4693	0.6795	8,228	-0.69	0.4898
year2003	-0.2733	0.6695	8,228	-0.41	0.6831
year2004	-1.1088	0.7277	8,228	-1.52	0.1276
year2005	-0.1821	0.3567	8,228	-0.51	0.6096
year2006	-0.8093	0.3921	8,228	-2.06	0.039

**Table D.8**  
**Southside Aggravated Assault Model, Propensity Score–Weighted Counterfactual Neighborhoods (N = 9,072)**

Effect	Estimate	Standard Error	DF	t-Value	Pr >  t
Intercept	-9.5389	0.5179	55	-18.42	<0.0001
target_south_late	-0.3858	0.2716	8,984	-1.42	0.1554
post2	-0.01989	0.1075	8,984	-0.18	0.8533
postxtar2	0.4625	0.06946	8,984	6.66	<0.0001
density	0.008744	0.0281	8,984	0.31	0.7557
pct_professional	-2.5035	0.8692	8,984	-2.88	0.004
pct_vacant	0.05067	0.01023	8,984	4.96	<0.0001
pct15_24	-0.01923	0.01096	8,984	-1.75	0.0794
pct_moved	0.03809	0.01272	8,984	2.99	0.0028
pct_pub_ass	0.03037	0.01656	8,984	1.83	0.0668
pct_inc_lt25k	0.00093	0.01071	8,984	0.09	0.9308
month2	-0.1721	0.0721	8,984	-2.39	0.017
month3	0.008896	0.06878	8,984	0.13	0.8971
month4	0.1141	0.06705	8,984	1.7	0.0889
month5	0.2142	0.066	8,984	3.25	0.0012
month6	0.2061	0.06611	8,984	3.12	0.0018
month7	0.2803	0.06507	8,984	4.31	<0.0001
month8	0.2252	0.06584	8,984	3.42	0.0006
month9	0.02678	0.0689	8,984	0.39	0.6976
month10	0.03934	0.06869	8,984	0.57	0.5669
month11	-0.03484	0.06995	8,984	-0.5	0.6184
month12	-0.1058	0.07122	8,984	-1.49	0.1375
year1996	-0.1818	0.1281	8,984	-1.42	0.156

**Table D.8—Continued**

Effect	Estimate	Standard Error	DF	t-Value	Pr >  t
year1997	-0.168	0.128	8,984	-1.31	0.1892
year1998	0.05356	0.1256	8,984	0.43	0.6699
year1999	0.01938	0.126	8,984	0.15	0.8777
year2000	0.1477	0.1248	8,984	1.18	0.2366
year2001	0.09578	0.1252	8,984	0.76	0.4444
year2002	0.3747	0.123	8,984	3.05	0.0023
year2003	0.2731	0.1237	8,984	2.21	0.0273
year2004	0.4389	0.1225	8,984	3.58	0.0003
year2005	0.1299	0.07241	8,984	1.79	0.0729
year2006	0.1203	0.0655	8,984	1.84	0.0664

**Table D.9**  
**Southside Gun Assault Model, Propensity Score–Weighted Counterfactual Neighborhoods (N = 9,072)**

Effect	Estimate	Standard Error	DF	t-Value	Pr >  t
Intercept	-10.7927	0.6612	55	-16.32	<0.0001
target_south_late	-0.5346	0.3044	8,894	-1.76	0.0791
post2	0.07919	0.1853	8,894	0.43	0.6691
postxtar2	0.4054	0.1280	8,894	3.17	0.0015
density	0.02655	0.03261	8,894	0.81	0.4155
pct_professional	-3.0166	1.1060	8,894	-2.73	0.0064
pct_vacant	0.05714	0.01136	8,894	5.03	<0.0001
pct15_24	-0.02594	0.01334	8,894	-1.94	0.0520
pct_moved	0.03007	0.01503	8,894	2.00	0.0455
pct_pub_ass	0.04112	0.02280	8,894	1.80	0.0714

**Table D.9—Continued**

<b>Effect</b>	<b>Estimate</b>	<b>Standard Error</b>	<b>DF</b>	<b>t-Value</b>	<b>Pr &gt;  t </b>
pct_inc_lt25k	0.005468	0.01252	8,894	0.44	0.6624
month2	-0.4009	0.1304	8,894	-3.07	0.0021
month3	-0.2948	0.1264	8,894	-2.33	0.0197
month4	0.01979	0.1162	8,894	0.17	0.8648
month5	0.1173	0.1143	8,894	1.03	0.3049
month6	0.06365	0.1158	8,894	0.55	0.5824
month7	0.1756	0.1128	8,894	1.56	0.1197
month8	0.3117	0.1096	8,894	2.84	0.0045
month9	0.01108	0.1172	8,894	0.09	0.9247
month10	-0.06956	0.1196	8,894	-0.58	0.5607
month11	-0.2305	0.1247	8,894	-1.85	0.0646
month12	-0.3010	0.1272	8,894	-2.37	0.0179
year1996	-0.03550	0.2247	8,894	-0.16	0.8745
year1997	-0.3670	0.2328	8,894	-1.58	0.1151
year1998	0.04246	0.2231	8,894	0.19	0.8490
year1999	0.1477	0.2211	8,894	0.67	0.5043
year2000	-0.02485	0.2245	8,894	-0.11	0.9119
year2001	0.03091	0.2233	8,894	0.14	0.8899
year2002	0.6419	0.2140	8,894	3.00	0.0027
year2003	0.4658	0.2162	8,894	2.15	0.0312
year2004	0.7201	0.2132	8,894	3.38	0.0007
year2005	0.3303	0.1258	8,894	2.63	0.0086
year2006	0.3395	0.1148	8,894	2.96	0.0031

**Table D.10****Northside Homicide Model, One Vision One Life–Suggested Counterfactual Neighborhoods (N = 3,036)**

Effect	Estimate	Standard Error	DF	t-Value	Pr >  t
Intercept	-12.4078	0.9575	28	-12.96	<0.0001
target_North	-0.09415	0.2956	4,560	-0.32	0.7501
post1	-0.4723	0.4164	4,560	-1.13	0.2567
postxtar1	0.0745	0.2426	4,560	0.31	0.7588
density	-0.01554	0.01651	4,560	-0.94	0.3466
pct_professional	3.2483	1.9813	4,560	1.64	0.1012
pct_vacant	0.04677	0.02149	4,560	2.18	0.0296
pct15_24	-0.03437	0.03747	4,560	-0.92	0.3589
pct_moved	-0.01442	0.01776	4,560	-0.81	0.4169
pct_pub_ass	-0.00029	0.03144	4,560	-0.01	0.9928
pct_inc_lt25k	0.03699	0.01853	4,560	2	0.046
month2	-0.1967	0.2814	4,560	-0.7	0.4846
month3	-0.3365	0.2928	4,560	-1.15	0.2505
month4	-0.1542	0.2782	4,560	-0.55	0.5795
month5	-0.07069	0.2783	4,560	-0.25	0.7995
month6	0.348	0.2526	4,560	1.38	0.1683
month7	0.07773	0.2682	4,560	0.29	0.772
month8	-0.07069	0.2783	4,560	-0.25	0.7995
month9	0.006271	0.273	4,560	0.02	0.9817
month10	0.2069	0.2603	4,560	0.79	0.4267
month11	-0.245	0.2917	4,560	-0.84	0.4009
month12	-0.1985	0.288	4,560	-0.69	0.4906
year1997	-0.5271	0.469	4,560	-1.12	0.2611

**Table D.10—Continued**

Effect	Estimate	Standard Error	DF	t-Value	Pr >  t
year1998	-1.7127	0.5321	4,560	-3.22	0.0013
year1999	-1.2774	0.501	4,560	-2.55	0.0108
year2000	-1.1662	0.4948	4,560	-2.36	0.0185
year2001	-0.8148	0.4788	4,560	-1.7	0.0889
year2002	-0.9326	0.4836	4,560	-1.93	0.0539
year2003	-0.3494	0.4642	4,560	-0.75	0.4516
year2004	-0.4841	0.2931	4,560	-1.65	0.0987
year2005	0.09764	0.2211	4,560	0.44	0.6588
year2006	-0.3314	0.2477	4,560	-1.34	0.181

**Table D.11**

**Northside Aggravated Assault Model, One Vision One Life—Suggested Counterfactual Neighborhoods (N = 5,040)**

Effect	Estimate	Standard Error	DF	t-Value	Pr >  t
Intercept	-9.9065	0.63	29	-15.73	<0.0001
target_North	-0.2029	0.2163	4,978	-0.94	0.3483
post1	-0.1544	0.07384	4,978	-2.09	0.0366
postxtar1	0.28	0.04553	4,978	6.15	<0.0001
density	-0.0112	0.01104	4,978	-1.01	0.3102
pct_professional	-0.03398	1.4461	4,978	-0.02	0.9813
pct_vacant	0.02687	0.01622	4,978	1.66	0.0976
pct15_24	-0.051	0.02378	4,978	-2.14	0.032
pct_moved	0.02289	0.01152	4,978	1.99	0.0469
pct_pub_ass	-0.01119	0.02445	4,978	-0.46	0.6471
pct_inc_lt25k	0.0394	0.01373	4,978	2.87	0.0041

**Table D.11—Continued**

Effect	Estimate	Standard Error	DF	t-Value	Pr >  t
month2	-0.1783	0.05608	4,978	-3.18	0.0015
month3	-0.03945	0.05406	4,978	-0.73	0.4656
month4	0.166	0.05144	4,978	3.23	0.0013
month5	0.2733	0.05094	4,978	5.36	<0.0001
month6	0.2353	0.05136	4,978	4.58	<0.0001
month7	0.2993	0.05066	4,978	5.91	<0.0001
month8	0.2353	0.05136	4,978	4.58	<0.0001
month9	0.104	0.05289	4,978	1.97	0.0492
month10	0.06969	0.05332	4,978	1.31	0.1912
month11	-0.1094	0.05573	4,978	-1.96	0.0497
month12	-0.08558	0.05539	4,978	-1.54	0.1224
year1996	-0.5009	0.09057	4,978	-5.53	<0.0001
year1997	-0.5582	0.09117	4,978	-6.12	<0.0001
year1998	-0.2953	0.08864	4,978	-3.33	0.0009
year1999	-0.3045	0.08872	4,978	-3.43	0.0006
year2000	-0.1745	0.08767	4,978	-1.99	0.0465
year2001	-0.2774	0.08849	4,978	-3.13	0.0017
year2002	0.1301	0.08564	4,978	1.52	0.1289
year2003	-0.02212	0.08658	4,978	-0.26	0.7983
year2004	0.1683	0.0517	4,978	3.26	0.0011
year2005	-0.03129	0.04906	4,978	-0.64	0.5237
year2006	-0.04483	0.04923	4,978	-0.91	0.3626

**Table D.12**  
**Northside Gun Assault Model, One Vision One Life–Suggested Counterfactual Neighborhoods (N = 5,040)**

Effect	Estimate	Standard Error	DF	t-Value	Pr >  t
Intercept	-10.4825	0.8412	29	-12.46	<0.0001
target_North	-0.4019	0.2866	4,978	-1.40	0.1610
post1	-0.4572	0.1142	4,978	-4.00	<0.0001
postxtar1	0.4093	0.07540	4,978	5.43	<0.0001
density	-0.00572	0.01439	4,978	-0.40	0.6913
pct_professional	-0.3244	1.9016	4,978	-0.17	0.8646
pct_vacant	0.03191	0.02131	4,978	1.50	0.1343
pct15_24	-0.05537	0.03141	4,978	-1.76	0.0780
pct_moved	0.008309	0.01511	4,978	0.55	0.5824
pct_pub_ass	-0.00668	0.03212	4,978	-0.21	0.8352
pct_inc_lt25k	0.04986	0.01817	4,978	2.74	0.0061
month2	-0.4144	0.09475	4,978	-4.37	<0.0001
month3	-0.3773	0.09370	4,978	-4.03	<0.0001
month4	0.1082	0.08232	4,978	1.31	0.1887
month5	0.1909	0.08297	4,978	2.30	0.0215
month6	0.1436	0.08387	4,978	1.71	0.0868
month7	0.2448	0.08199	4,978	2.99	0.0028
month8	0.2331	0.08220	4,978	2.84	0.0046
month9	0.1660	0.08344	4,978	1.99	0.0468
month10	0.02746	0.08620	4,978	0.32	0.7501
month11	-0.2748	0.09333	4,978	-2.94	0.0032
month12	-0.1768	0.09084	4,978	-1.95	0.0516
year1996	-0.9861	0.1430	4,978	-6.89	<0.0001

**Table D.12—Continued**

Effect	Estimate	Standard Error	DF	t-Value	Pr >  t
year1997	-1.3809	0.1518	4,978	-9.10	<0.0001
year1998	-0.9702	0.1427	4,978	-6.80	<0.0001
year1999	-0.8942	0.1414	4,978	-6.32	<0.0001
year2000	-0.9139	0.1417	4,978	-6.45	<0.0001
year2001	-0.9340	0.1421	4,978	-6.57	<0.0001
year2002	-0.1534	0.1321	4,978	-1.16	0.2453
year2003	-0.4031	0.1345	4,978	-3.00	0.0027
year2004	0.01712	0.08160	4,978	0.21	0.8338
year2005	0.01905	0.07377	4,978	0.26	0.7963
year2006	-0.2204	0.07856	4,978	-2.81	0.0050

**Table D.13****Hill District Homicide Model, One Vision One Life—Suggested Counterfactual Neighborhoods (N = 3,036)**

Effect	Estimate	Standard Error	DF	t-Value	Pr >  t
Intercept	-11.1692	0.9976	16	-11.2	<0.0001
target_Hill	0.1076	0.3018	2,988	0.36	0.7215
post1	-0.197	0.4883	2,988	-0.4	0.6866
postxtar1	-0.3165	0.2857	2,988	-1.11	0.2681
density	0.013	0.04402	2,988	0.3	0.7678
pct_professional	-2.7235	2.3298	2,988	-1.17	0.2425
pct_vacant	0.004689	0.0159	2,988	0.29	0.7681
pct15_24	-0.06425	0.02196	2,988	-2.93	0.0035
pct_moved	-0.02539	0.01733	2,988	-1.47	0.1429
pct_pub_ass	-0.07641	0.04612	2,988	-1.66	0.0977

**Table D.13—Continued**

<b>Effect</b>	<b>Estimate</b>	<b>Standard Error</b>	<b>DF</b>	<b>t-Value</b>	<b>Pr &gt;  t </b>
pct_inc_lt25k	0.07677	0.02213	2,988	3.47	0.0005
month2	-0.47	0.3291	2,988	-1.43	0.1534
month3	-0.2877	0.3118	2,988	-0.92	0.3563
month4	-0.08701	0.2952	2,988	-0.29	0.7682
month5	0.2109	0.2788	2,988	0.76	0.4494
month6	0.3094	0.273	2,988	1.13	0.2571
month7	-0.06533	0.2978	2,988	-0.22	0.8264
month8	-0.02087	0.2945	2,988	-0.07	0.9435
month9	0.1017	0.2859	2,988	0.36	0.722
month10	0.37	0.2696	2,988	1.37	0.17
month11	-0.266	0.3143	2,988	-0.85	0.3975
month12	-0.1606	0.3054	2,988	-0.53	0.5989
year1997	-0.3916	0.5392	2,988	-0.73	0.4677
year1998	-1.4902	0.5928	2,988	-2.51	0.012
year1999	-1.1801	0.572	2,988	-2.06	0.0392
year2000	-1.0549	0.5651	2,988	-1.87	0.062
year2001	-0.4224	0.5401	2,988	-0.78	0.4342
year2002	-0.6693	0.5481	2,988	-1.22	0.2222
year2003	-0.3046	0.5369	2,988	-0.57	0.5705
year2004	-0.6505	0.3161	2,988	-2.06	0.0397
year2005	-0.1452	0.2414	2,988	-0.6	0.5476
year2006	-0.4329	0.2621	2,988	-1.65	0.0987

**Table D.14**  
**Hill District Aggravated Assault Model, One Vision One Life–Suggested Counterfactual Neighborhoods (N = 3,312)**

Effect	Estimate	Standard Error	DF	t-Value	Pr >  t
Intercept	-8.9641	0.7012	14	-12.78	<0.0001
target_Hill	-0.3777	0.2524	3,265	-1.5	0.1346
post1	-0.09594	0.08182	3,265	-1.17	0.241
postxtar1	0.07846	0.06016	3,265	1.3	0.1922
density	0.06465	0.03795	3,265	1.7	0.0886
pct_professional	-1.3193	1.831	3,265	-0.72	0.4712
pct_vacant	0.04522	0.01369	3,265	3.3	0.001
pct15_24	-0.07549	0.01865	3,265	-4.05	<0.0001
pct_moved	0.004753	0.01421	3,265	0.33	0.7381
pct_pub_ass	-0.05134	0.03349	3,265	-1.53	0.1253
pct_inc_lt25k	0.03698	0.01509	3,265	2.45	0.0143
month2	-0.1755	0.06126	3,265	-2.86	0.0042
month3	-0.07833	0.0597	3,265	-1.31	0.1896
month4	0.1404	0.05657	3,265	2.48	0.0132
month5	0.2837	0.05558	3,265	5.1	<0.0001
month6	0.2081	0.05649	3,265	3.68	0.0002
month7	0.2927	0.05548	3,265	5.28	<0.0001
month8	0.2586	0.05588	3,265	4.63	<0.0001
month9	0.03717	0.05876	3,265	0.63	0.527
month10	-0.00358	0.05935	3,265	-0.06	0.9519
month11	-0.1408	0.06146	3,265	-2.29	0.022
month12	-0.1468	0.06155	3,265	-2.39	0.0171
year1996	-0.3058	0.1012	3,265	-3.02	0.0025

**Table D.14—Continued**

<b>Effect</b>	<b>Estimate</b>	<b>Standard Error</b>	<b>DF</b>	<b>t-Value</b>	<b>Pr &gt;  t </b>
year1997	-0.3309	0.1015	3,265	-3.26	0.0011
year1998	-0.0926	0.09922	3,265	-0.93	0.3507
year1999	-0.137	0.0996	3,265	-1.38	0.1692
year2000	-0.09428	0.09924	3,265	-0.95	0.3422
year2001	-0.1816	0.1	3,265	-1.82	0.0695
year2002	0.2227	0.09692	3,265	2.3	0.0217
year2003	0.04009	0.09817	3,265	0.41	0.683
year2004	0.2362	0.05985	3,265	3.95	<0.0001
year2005	0.04667	0.05674	3,265	0.82	0.4109
year2006	0.09126	0.05614	3,265	1.63	0.1041

**Table D.15**

**Hill District Gun Assault Model, One Vision One Life—Suggested Counterfactual Neighborhoods (N = 3,312)**

<b>Effect</b>	<b>Estimate</b>	<b>Standard Error</b>	<b>DF</b>	<b>t-Value</b>	<b>Pr &gt;  t </b>
Intercept	-9.4109	0.8270	14	-11.38	<0.0001
target_Hill	-0.4572	0.2936	3,265	-1.56	0.1195
post1	-0.3923	0.1234	3,265	-3.18	0.0015
postxtar1	0.3004	0.09485	3,265	3.17	0.0016
density	0.05033	0.04388	3,265	1.15	0.2515
pct_professional	-2.3697	2.1465	3,265	-1.10	0.2697
pct_vacant	0.04022	0.01595	3,265	2.52	0.0117
pct15_24	-0.07508	0.02169	3,265	-3.46	0.0005
pct_moved	-0.01145	0.01662	3,265	-0.69	0.4908
pct_pub_ass	-0.06279	0.03994	3,265	-1.57	0.1161

**Table D.15—Continued**

Effect	Estimate	Standard Error	DF	t-Value	Pr >  t
pct_inc_lt25k	0.05442	0.01802	3,265	3.02	0.0025
month2	-0.3020	0.1003	3,265	-3.01	0.0026
month3	-0.3927	0.1030	3,265	-3.81	0.0001
month4	0.1468	0.08924	3,265	1.65	0.1001
month5	0.1959	0.09057	3,265	2.16	0.0306
month6	0.1432	0.09166	3,265	1.56	0.1182
month7	0.2494	0.08951	3,265	2.79	0.0054
month8	0.3067	0.08842	3,265	3.47	0.0005
month9	0.1548	0.09142	3,265	1.69	0.0906
month10	0.03745	0.09398	3,265	0.40	0.6903
month11	-0.2778	0.1021	3,265	-2.72	0.0065
month12	-0.2096	0.1002	3,265	-2.09	0.0365
year1996	-0.7669	0.1584	3,265	-4.84	<0.0001
year1997	-1.0138	0.1638	3,265	-6.19	<0.0001
year1998	-0.5094	0.1538	3,265	-3.31	0.0009
year1999	-0.4576	0.1530	3,265	-2.99	0.0028
year2000	-0.7483	0.1580	3,265	-4.74	<0.0001
year2001	-0.7858	0.1587	3,265	-4.95	<0.0001
year2002	-0.00435	0.1475	3,265	-0.03	0.9765
year2003	-0.2624	0.1503	3,265	-1.75	0.0811
year2004	0.2030	0.09395	3,265	2.16	0.0308
year2005	0.1565	0.08649	3,265	1.81	0.0706
year2006	0.1702	0.08622	3,265	1.97	0.0485

**Table D.16****Southside Homicide Model, One Vision One Life–Suggested Counterfactual Neighborhoods (N = 3,300)**

Effect	Estimate	Standard Error	DF	t-Value	Pr >  t
Intercept	-12.5001	1.2494	17	-10	<0.0001
target_south_late	-0.7688	0.4264	3,251	-1.8	0.0715
post2	0.2844	0.4613	3,251	0.62	0.5375
postxtar2	-0.1652	0.5053	3,251	-0.33	0.7438
density	-0.00148	0.04124	3,251	-0.04	0.9715
pct_professional	-2.3445	2.7848	3,251	-0.84	0.3999
pct_vacant	-0.00222	0.01879	3,251	-0.12	0.906
pct15_24	-0.04802	0.08216	3,251	-0.58	0.5589
pct_moved	-0.01985	0.01802	3,251	-1.1	0.2707
pct_pub_ass	-0.02623	0.05341	3,251	-0.49	0.6233
pct_inc_lt25k	0.07787	0.02325	3,251	3.35	0.0008
month2	-0.3054	0.3522	3,251	-0.87	0.386
month3	-0.2364	0.3454	3,251	-0.68	0.4938
month4	-0.1719	0.3393	3,251	-0.51	0.6126
month5	0.06677	0.3212	3,251	0.21	0.8353
month6	0.2803	0.3066	3,251	0.91	0.3605
month7	0.01798	0.3248	3,251	0.06	0.9559
month8	0.01798	0.3248	3,251	0.06	0.9559
month9	0.06677	0.3212	3,251	0.21	0.8353
month10	0.3545	0.302	3,251	1.17	0.2407
month11	-0.3387	0.3563	3,251	-0.95	0.3419
month12	-0.2052	0.3435	3,251	-0.6	0.5504
year1997	0.1714	0.5259	3,251	0.33	0.7446

**Table D.16—Continued**

Effect	Estimate	Standard Error	DF	t-Value	Pr >  t
year1998	-1.1165	0.6059	3,251	-1.84	0.0655
year1999	-0.5569	0.56	3,251	-0.99	0.32
year2000	-0.4879	0.5557	3,251	-0.88	0.38
year2001	-0.1049	0.5363	3,251	-0.2	0.8449
year2002	-0.2002	0.5405	3,251	-0.37	0.7111
year2003	0.06215	0.5297	3,251	0.12	0.9066
year2004	-0.4234	0.5519	3,251	-0.77	0.4431
year2005	0.005231	0.277	3,251	0.02	0.9849
year2006	-0.5754	0.2946	3,251	-1.95	0.0509

**Table D.17**

**Southside Aggravated Assault Model, One Vision One Life—Suggested Counterfactual Neighborhoods (N = 3,600)**

Effect	Estimate	Standard Error	DF	t-Value	Pr >  t
Intercept	-10.2174	0.8387	17	-12.18	<0.0001
target_south_late	-0.3281	0.2258	3,550	-1.45	0.1463
post2	-0.01506	0.09026	3,550	-0.17	0.8675
postxtar2	0.3968	0.06576	3,550	6.03	<0.0001
density	0.05701	0.02818	3,550	2.02	0.0432
pct_professional	-0.6407	2.0635	3,550	-0.31	0.7562
pct_vacant	0.01953	0.009831	3,550	1.99	0.0471
pct15_24	-0.03433	0.05464	3,550	-0.63	0.5298
pct_moved	0.006711	0.01421	3,550	0.47	0.6368
pct_pub_ass	-0.01392	0.03393	3,550	-0.41	0.6817
pct_inc_lt25k	0.04544	0.01562	3,550	2.91	0.0036

**Table D.17—Continued**

<b>Effect</b>	<b>Estimate</b>	<b>Standard Error</b>	<b>DF</b>	<b>t-Value</b>	<b>Pr &gt;  t </b>
month2	-0.1609	0.06317	3,550	-2.55	0.0109
month3	0.02178	0.06025	3,550	0.36	0.7178
month4	0.1746	0.0581	3,550	3.01	0.0027
month5	0.2847	0.05719	3,550	4.98	<0.0001
month6	0.234	0.05781	3,550	4.05	<0.0001
month7	0.3091	0.0569	3,550	5.43	<0.0001
month8	0.2874	0.05715	3,550	5.03	<0.0001
month9	0.0765	0.0599	3,550	1.28	0.2017
month10	0.09822	0.05959	3,550	1.65	0.0994
month11	-0.06284	0.06197	3,550	-1.01	0.3106
month12	-0.07064	0.06209	3,550	-1.14	0.2553
year1996	-0.2647	0.1087	3,550	-2.43	0.015
year1997	-0.2784	0.1089	3,550	-2.56	0.0106
year1998	-0.04885	0.1067	3,550	-0.46	0.647
year1999	-0.05805	0.1068	3,550	-0.54	0.5867
year2000	0.004636	0.1062	3,550	0.04	0.9652
year2001	-0.04155	0.1066	3,550	-0.39	0.6968
year2002	0.3281	0.104	3,550	3.16	0.0016
year2003	0.1996	0.1048	3,550	1.9	0.0569
year2004	0.3578	0.1038	3,550	3.45	0.0006
year2005	0.115	0.06146	3,550	1.87	0.0614
year2006	0.0508	0.05636	3,550	0.9	0.3674

**Table D.18**  
**Southside Gun Assault Model, One Vision One Life–Suggested Counterfactual Neighborhoods (N = 3,600)**

Effect	Estimate	Standard Error	DF	t-Value	Pr >  t
Intercept	-11.1188	1.1696	17	-9.51	<0.0001
target_south_late	-0.7128	0.3228	3,550	-2.21	0.0273
post2	0.1157	0.1459	3,550	0.79	0.4277
postxtar2	0.3356	0.1213	3,550	2.77	0.0057
density	0.05587	0.03912	3,550	1.43	0.1533
pct_professional	-2.1948	2.8763	3,550	-0.76	0.4455
pct_vacant	0.02592	0.01359	3,550	1.91	0.0565
pct15_24	-0.03018	0.07755	3,550	-0.39	0.6971
pct_moved	-0.00568	0.01962	3,550	-0.29	0.7722
pct_pub_ass	-0.03243	0.04771	3,550	-0.68	0.4967
pct_inc_lt25k	0.05844	0.02173	3,550	2.69	0.0072
month2	-0.2782	0.1051	3,550	-2.65	0.0082
month3	-0.2845	0.1053	3,550	-2.70	0.0069
month4	0.1039	0.09515	3,550	1.09	0.2748
month5	0.1692	0.09444	3,550	1.79	0.0733
month6	0.1123	0.09566	3,550	1.17	0.2407
month7	0.1926	0.09396	3,550	2.05	0.0404
month8	0.2953	0.09193	3,550	3.21	0.0013
month9	0.1289	0.09530	3,550	1.35	0.1764
month10	0.05633	0.09691	3,550	0.58	0.5611
month11	-0.2462	0.1047	3,550	-2.35	0.0187
month12	-0.2284	0.1042	3,550	-2.19	0.0284
year1996	-0.2244	0.1799	3,550	-1.25	0.2123

**Table D.18—Continued**

Effect	Estimate	Standard Error	DF	t-Value	Pr >  t
year1997	-0.4631	0.1849	3,550	-2.50	0.0123
year1998	-0.06635	0.1771	3,550	-0.37	0.7079
year1999	0.03374	0.1755	3,550	0.19	0.8476
year2000	-0.1582	0.1787	3,550	-0.89	0.3761
year2001	-0.1907	0.1792	3,550	-1.06	0.2874
year2002	0.5971	0.1689	3,550	3.54	0.0004
year2003	0.3755	0.1711	3,550	2.19	0.0282
year2004	0.5941	0.1689	3,550	3.52	0.0004
year2005	0.2881	0.09867	3,550	2.92	0.0035
year2006	0.1699	0.09239	3,550	1.84	0.0660

**Table D.19**

**Hill District Homicide Spillover Model, Propensity Score–Weighted Counterfactual Neighborhoods (N = 6,468)**

Effect	Estimate	Standard Error	DF	t-Value	Pr >  t
Intercept	-12.4187	1.6273	41	-7.63	<0.0001
Spill	0.4495	0.5554	6,395	0.81	0.4184
post1	-0.05485	0.9456	6,395	-0.06	0.9537
postxspill1	-0.2638	0.5783	6,395	-0.46	0.6483
density	0.008122	0.05494	6,395	0.15	0.8825
pct_professional	-2.4198	1.9998	6,395	-1.21	0.2263
pct_vacant	0.03731	0.03092	6,395	1.21	0.2276
pct15_24	-0.0264	0.02114	6,395	-1.25	0.2117
pct_moved	0.01182	0.02473	6,395	0.48	0.6328
pct_pub_ass	0.1049	0.05036	6,395	2.08	0.0373

**Table D.19—Continued**

Effect	Estimate	Standard Error	DF	t-Value	Pr >  t
pct_inc_lt25k	0.002504	0.02103	6,395	0.12	0.9052
month2	-0.2018	0.6687	6,395	-0.3	0.7628
month3	0.1411	0.6129	6,395	0.23	0.8179
month4	-0.1749	0.6638	6,395	-0.26	0.7922
month5	0.2402	0.6071	6,395	0.4	0.6924
month6	0.4392	0.5828	6,395	0.75	0.4511
month7	0.3297	0.5957	6,395	0.55	0.5799
month8	0.2047	0.6118	6,395	0.33	0.738
month9	0.5783	0.568	6,395	1.02	0.3086
month10	0.0703	0.631	6,395	0.11	0.9113
month11	-0.3869	0.7127	6,395	-0.54	0.5872
month12	-0.07893	0.6547	6,395	-0.12	0.904
year1997	0.2182	1.0824	6,395	0.2	0.8402
year1998	-1.7979	1.4071	6,395	-1.28	0.2014
year1999	-0.04734	1.0997	6,395	-0.04	0.9657
year2000	-0.1714	1.1094	6,395	-0.15	0.8772
year2001	-0.4379	1.1343	6,395	-0.39	0.6995
year2002	-0.1087	1.1043	6,395	-0.1	0.9216
year2003	0.384	1.0736	6,395	0.36	0.7206
year2004	0.007708	0.6489	6,395	0.01	0.9905
year2005	0.3564	0.545	6,395	0.65	0.5132
year2006	0.2708	0.555	6,395	0.49	0.6256

**Table D.20**  
**Hill District Aggravated Assault Spillover Model, Propensity Score–Weighted Counterfactual Neighborhoods (N = 7,056)**

Effect	Estimate	Standard Error	DF	t-Value	Pr >  t
Intercept	-9.4026	0.5038	41	-18.66	<0.0001
spill_hill	0.7319	0.2854	6,982	2.56	0.0104
post1	0.02253	0.1254	6,982	0.18	0.8575
postxspill1	-0.16	0.07706	6,982	-2.08	0.0378
density	0.02051	0.02902	6,982	0.71	0.4798
pct_professional	-2.8235	0.8453	6,982	-3.34	0.0008
pct_vacant	0.08276	0.01752	6,982	4.72	<0.0001
pct15_24	-0.02547	0.01053	6,982	-2.42	0.0156
pct_moved	0.0279	0.01272	6,982	2.19	0.0283
pct_pub_ass	-0.00872	0.02629	6,982	-0.33	0.7403
pct_inc_lt25k	0.001913	0.0103	6,982	0.19	0.8526
month2	-0.1241	0.08941	6,982	-1.39	0.1651
month3	0.04331	0.08567	6,982	0.51	0.6132
month4	0.1204	0.0841	6,982	1.43	0.1522
month5	0.1618	0.08433	6,982	1.92	0.055
month6	0.2766	0.08224	6,982	3.36	0.0008
month7	0.2424	0.08284	6,982	2.93	0.0034
month8	0.1391	0.08476	6,982	1.64	0.1009
month9	-0.07331	0.08922	6,982	-0.82	0.4113
month10	0.07929	0.08595	6,982	0.92	0.3563
month11	-0.173	0.09157	6,982	-1.89	0.059
month12	-0.1682	0.09145	6,982	-1.84	0.066
year1996	-0.1018	0.1546	6,982	-0.66	0.51

**Table D.20—Continued**

Effect	Estimate	Standard Error	DF	t-Value	Pr >  t
year1997	-0.1175	0.1548	6,982	-0.76	0.448
year1998	0.1406	0.1512	6,982	0.93	0.3526
year1999	0.1616	0.151	6,982	1.07	0.2845
year2000	0.3696	0.1487	6,982	2.49	0.0129
year2001	0.2311	0.1502	6,982	1.54	0.1238
year2002	0.384	0.1486	6,982	2.58	0.0098
year2003	0.3591	0.1488	6,982	2.41	0.0158
year2004	0.4121	0.09472	6,982	4.35	<0.0001
year2005	0.1353	0.09147	6,982	1.48	0.1391
year2006	0.1714	0.09071	6,982	1.89	0.0589

**Table D.21**

**Hill District Gun Assault Spillover Model, Propensity Score–Weighted Counterfactual Neighborhoods (N = 7,056)**

Effect	Estimate	Standard Error	DF	t-Value	Pr >  t
Intercept	-10.4789	0.7022	41	-14.92	<0.0001
spill_hill	0.3941	0.3513	6,982	1.12	0.2619
post1	-0.00392	0.2325	6,982	-0.02	0.9865
postxspill1	0.2488	0.1503	6,982	1.66	0.0979
density	0.009601	0.03650	6,982	0.26	0.7925
pct_professional	-3.0890	1.1133	6,982	-2.77	0.0055
pct_vacant	0.07325	0.02138	6,982	3.43	0.0006
pct15_24	-0.02969	0.01344	6,982	-2.21	0.0272
pct_moved	0.02268	0.01599	6,982	1.42	0.1560
pct_pub_ass	0.03419	0.03241	6,982	1.05	0.2915

**Table D.21—Continued**

<b>Effect</b>	<b>Estimate</b>	<b>Standard Error</b>	<b>DF</b>	<b>t-Value</b>	<b>Pr &gt;  t </b>
pct_inc_lt25k	0.007692	0.01296	6,982	0.59	0.5529
month2	-0.3307	0.1766	6,982	-1.87	0.0611
month3	-0.3804	0.1792	6,982	-2.12	0.0338
month4	0.06462	0.1589	6,982	0.41	0.6843
month5	0.1273	0.1586	6,982	0.80	0.4220
month6	0.2799	0.1534	6,982	1.82	0.0681
month7	0.1973	0.1561	6,982	1.26	0.2063
month8	0.01602	0.1627	6,982	0.10	0.9216
month9	-0.2900	0.1762	6,982	-1.65	0.0997
month10	-0.1882	0.1714	6,982	-1.10	0.2720
month11	-0.4140	0.1825	6,982	-2.27	0.0233
month12	-0.3496	0.1791	6,982	-1.95	0.0510
year1996	-0.06929	0.2892	6,982	-0.24	0.8107
year1997	-0.3909	0.3004	6,982	-1.30	0.1932
year1998	-0.1814	0.2928	6,982	-0.62	0.5356
year1999	-0.1805	0.2927	6,982	-0.62	0.5376
year2000	-0.06631	0.2892	6,982	-0.23	0.8186
year2001	-0.08878	0.2898	6,982	-0.31	0.7594
year2002	0.4562	0.2767	6,982	1.65	0.0993
year2003	0.4812	0.2763	6,982	1.74	0.0816
year2004	0.4839	0.1700	6,982	2.85	0.0044
year2005	0.2542	0.1628	6,982	1.56	0.1184
year2006	0.2086	0.1644	6,982	1.27	0.2046

**Table D.22**  
**Southside Homicide Spillover Model, Propensity Score–Weighted  
 Counterfactual Neighborhoods (N = 6,468)**

Effect	Estimate	Standard Error	DF	t-Value	Pr >  t
Intercept	-14.3491	1.5955	40	-8.99	<0.0001
spill_south	-0.05101	0.4454	6,396	-0.11	0.9088
post2	1.0297	1.1081	6,396	0.93	0.3528
postxspill2	-0.1534	0.6093	6,396	-0.25	0.8012
density	0.001373	0.04129	6,396	0.03	0.9735
pct_professional	-1.664	1.5477	6,396	-1.08	0.2823
pct_vacant	0.01222	0.02203	6,396	0.55	0.5791
pct15_24	-0.02365	0.02352	6,396	-1.01	0.3148
pct_moved	-0.00489	0.01928	6,396	-0.25	0.7999
pct_pub_ass	0.08966	0.0194	6,396	4.62	<0.0001
pct_inc_lt25k	0.0388	0.01932	6,396	2.01	0.0446
month2	0.4229	0.6454	6,396	0.66	0.5124
month3	-0.06401	0.7211	6,396	-0.09	0.9293
month4	0.441	0.6431	6,396	0.69	0.4929
month5	0.5175	0.6288	6,396	0.82	0.4105
month6	0.2642	0.6597	6,396	0.4	0.6887
month7	0.3006	0.6548	6,396	0.46	0.6462
month8	0.3337	0.6506	6,396	0.51	0.608
month9	0.5862	0.6215	6,396	0.94	0.3456
month10	0.6495	0.6151	6,396	1.06	0.2911
month11	-0.2579	0.7463	6,396	-0.35	0.7297
month12	-0.1984	0.7346	6,396	-0.27	0.7871
year1997	0.7462	1.2241	6,396	0.61	0.5422

**Table D.22—Continued**

Effect	Estimate	Standard Error	DF	t-Value	Pr >  t
year1998	-0.9846	1.5052	6,396	-0.65	0.5131
year1999	0.1009	1.2838	6,396	0.08	0.9374
year2000	0.6419	1.2315	6,396	0.52	0.6022
year2001	1.1624	1.2009	6,396	0.97	0.3331
year2002	0.8635	1.2166	6,396	0.71	0.4779
year2003	1.1974	1.1994	6,396	1	0.3181
year2004	0.5506	1.2386	6,396	0.44	0.6567
year2005	0.1449	0.5477	6,396	0.26	0.7913
year2006	-0.1719	0.5322	6,396	-0.32	0.7467

**Table D.23**

**Southside Aggravated Assault Spillover Model, Propensity Score–Weighted Counterfactual Neighborhoods (N = 7,056)**

Effect	Estimate	Standard Error	DF	t-Value	Pr >  t
Intercept	-9.5869	0.4197	40	-22.84	<0.0001
spill_south	0.2356	0.2045	6,983	1.15	0.2495
post2	-0.1523	0.1467	6,983	-1.04	0.2992
postxspill2	0.5097	0.08419	6,983	6.05	<0.0001
density	0.0158	0.02319	6,983	0.68	0.4958
pct_professional	-1.8261	0.6975	6,983	-2.62	0.0089
pct_vacant	0.04938	0.01475	6,983	3.35	0.0008
pct15_24	-0.01445	0.00975	6,983	-1.48	0.1384
pct_moved	0.01089	0.0111	6,983	0.98	0.327
pct_pub_ass	0.02358	0.01219	6,983	1.93	0.0531
pct_inc_lt25k	0.02153	0.0089	6,983	2.42	0.0156

**Table D.23—Continued**

<b>Effect</b>	<b>Estimate</b>	<b>Standard Error</b>	<b>DF</b>	<b>t-Value</b>	<b>Pr &gt;  t </b>
month2	-0.1637	0.09674	6,983	-1.69	0.0908
month3	0.03714	0.09186	6,983	0.4	0.686
month4	0.2367	0.08769	6,983	2.7	0.007
month5	0.191	0.08924	6,983	2.14	0.0323
month6	0.282	0.0875	6,983	3.22	0.0013
month7	0.3082	0.08702	6,983	3.54	0.0004
month8	0.205	0.08896	6,983	2.3	0.0213
month9	0.03706	0.09247	6,983	0.4	0.6886
month10	0.1706	0.08964	6,983	1.9	0.0571
month11	-0.111	0.09596	6,983	-1.16	0.2474
month12	-0.09173	0.09549	6,983	-0.96	0.3367
year1996	-0.487	0.1701	6,983	-2.86	0.0042
year1997	-0.4501	0.1695	6,983	-2.66	0.0079
year1998	-0.2184	0.1662	6,983	-1.31	0.1888
year1999	-0.2499	0.1666	6,983	-1.5	0.1335
year2000	-0.09216	0.1646	6,983	-0.56	0.5756
year2001	-0.2032	0.166	6,983	-1.22	0.2208
year2002	0.1328	0.1623	6,983	0.82	0.4132
year2003	-0.1133	0.1649	6,983	-0.69	0.4918
year2004	0.1714	0.1619	6,983	1.06	0.2899
year2005	-0.1602	0.09445	6,983	-1.7	0.0898
year2006	-0.1099	0.08277	6,983	-1.33	0.1843

**Table D.24**  
**Southside Gun Assault Spillover Model, Propensity Score–Weighted Counterfactual Neighborhoods (N = 7,056)**

Effect	Estimate	Standard Error	DF	t-Value	Pr> t
Intercept	-10.6565	0.6312	40	-16.88	<0.0001
spill_south	-0.4802	0.2816	6,983	-1.71	0.0882
post2	-0.1690	0.2698	6,983	-0.63	0.5311
postxspill2	0.5049	0.1878	6,983	2.69	0.0072
density	0.01387	0.03078	6,983	0.45	0.6522
pct_professional	-2.4420	0.9806	6,983	-2.49	0.0128
pct_vacant	0.05833	0.01947	6,983	3.00	0.0028
pct15_24	-0.03009	0.01377	6,983	-2.19	0.0289
pct_moved	0.008175	0.01469	6,983	0.56	0.5780
pct_pub_ass	0.01254	0.02173	6,983	0.58	0.5638
pct_inc_lt25k	0.03307	0.01238	6,983	2.67	0.0076
month2	-0.3518	0.1965	6,983	-1.79	0.0734
month3	-0.1981	0.1881	6,983	-1.05	0.2922
month4	0.2030	0.1702	6,983	1.19	0.2328
month5	0.03959	0.1789	6,983	0.22	0.8249
month6	0.1626	0.1738	6,983	0.94	0.3496
month7	0.2766	0.1696	6,983	1.63	0.1029
month8	0.2564	0.1703	6,983	1.51	0.1323
month9	-0.09215	0.1848	6,983	-0.50	0.6181
month10	-0.00462	0.1808	6,983	-0.03	0.9796
month11	-0.2801	0.1944	6,983	-1.44	0.1497
month12	-0.2715	0.1940	6,983	-1.40	0.1615
year1996	-0.7672	0.3293	6,983	-2.33	0.0199

**Table D.24—Continued**

<b>Effect</b>	<b>Estimate</b>	<b>Standard Error</b>	<b>DF</b>	<b>t-Value</b>	<b>Pr&gt; t </b>
year1997	-0.8446	0.3325	6,983	-2.54	0.0111
year1998	-0.6261	0.3241	6,983	-1.93	0.0534
year1999	-0.5191	0.3206	6,983	-1.62	0.1055
year2000	-0.6885	0.3263	6,983	-2.11	0.0349
year2001	-0.6954	0.3266	6,983	-2.13	0.0333
year2002	0.1364	0.3051	6,983	0.45	0.6550
year2003	-0.02825	0.3082	6,983	-0.09	0.9270
year2004	0.1814	0.3044	6,983	0.60	0.5512
year2005	-0.1135	0.1831	6,983	-0.62	0.5353
year2006	-0.1545	0.1646	6,983	-0.94	0.3478



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