Chapter 7

THE MILITARY AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO THE SOCIETY IT SERVES

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INTRODUCTION

THEORIES CONCERNING THE MILITARY–SOCIETY RELATIONSHIP
 (Classic) and Extended Separatism
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CONCLUSION

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Peter G. Varisano   *Dry Goods*   Florida, 1992

Master Sergeant Varisano (US Army, Retired) has depicted Army activities in the Persian Gulf and Somalia, as well as this artwork showing relief efforts after Hurricane Andrew in Florida. Efforts such as these are indicative of the relationship between the military and the society it serves, the focus of this chapter. Available at: http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/art/A&I/AVOP-0698.htm.

Art: Courtesy of Army Art Collection, US Army Center of Military History, Washington, DC.

INTRODUCTION

The question "What is the proper relationship between the military and the rest of society?" has always been of interest to those who seriously think about war and the power inherent in the military. Indeed, historically large but idle peacetime militaries have been seen as a threat to civilian governments. In the past, military establishments were generally allowed to wither soon after war ended. Should new war threats develop, there always seemed to be enough time to reinvigorate them. After World War II, the emergence of communism as a global threat changed the picture so that military establishments came to be powerful not just during war but during peacetime as well. Today, with the availability of a wide variety of fast-strike weapons that take years to develop, build, and deploy, the luxury of not having a strong military in place during peace is no longer affordable. Modern nations have to "come as you are" to war.[1(p5)] And if they are not "dressed" properly, they lose. It's as simple as that.

So to be ready for modern war the military has to be there in strength all the time. Thus, a large part of the question about how the military and the rest of society should deal with one another has to do with the possibility that the military's strength can be aimed not only externally toward potential and actual enemies but internally toward the society that sponsors it. The threat comes not just, or even especially, from a direct military takeover, but also from the tendency the military has to control politics, industry, and even society as a whole in both subtle and not so subtle ways.

THEORIES CONCERNING THE MILITARY–SOCIETY RELATIONSHIP

There are a number of ways to "manage" the military so as to maximize its ability to defend the country while minimizing its influence on civilian affairs. These ways are explored in the discussions of (Classic) and Extended Separatism (isolating the military from the political sphere of the society it serves), Paternalistic Separatism (isolating the military from society in general, but allowing the military leadership to explain military things to a civilian society that it might not otherwise understand), Identicalism (making the military more like the society it serves through vastly increased interaction between the two), and Fusionism (isolating the military in terms of maintaining military values while at the same time increasing conversation and contact between the military and the general society), which form the bulk of this chapter. Maintaining the balance between military and civilian spheres of interest is vital to the survival of any democracy. If the scales tip too heavily to the military side, a society is vulnerable to the forces within itself. But if the scales tip too heavily to the civilian sphere, opportunistic countries will take action. Thus examining these theories about the military–society relationship is not an esoteric exercise for the philosophers among us. Rather it is a necessary requirement for any democracy that wishes to remain so. The remainder of this chapter will first delineate these four theories, then assess their feasibility in a democracy. The discussion begins with Separatism, which is parenthetically described as Classic to distinguish it from a later version.

(Classic) and Extended Separatism

Separatism is one theory about how to keep the military under control, and at the same time make certain it does its job properly. Traditionally, separatists believe that as an institution the military should be isolated from the political sphere of the society it serves, if for no other reason than that it can then devote its full attention to its war-making tasks. The last thing one should want is for the military to be distracted by having it heavily involved with politics and with various social movements and issues.[2(pp723–724)] The issue of distraction aside, separating the military from the political sphere helps keep the latter from becoming militarized. By letting civilians make social and political decisions, and keeping the military busy preparing for and fighting wars, the negative influences the military might have on society are supposedly kept at a minimum. Similarly, the negative influences of the civilian sector interfering with strictly military activities might also be avoided.

Some of the dangers of letting the military play important roles in social policy are expressed by Jerome Slater in the following passage.

> Thus, even if one wished to avoid the pejorative connotations of the term "militarism," it is evident that as a general rule the military, naturally enough, tend to place greater emphasis on military considerations relative to political ones in foreign policy than do their civilian counterparts, and that this structural bias substantially influences policy out-

comes, given the military's control over much of the information and intelligence that form the basis of policy, the extent of the institutionalized participation of the armed forces in the policy-making process within the executive branch, and the weight their presumed expertise has given their views with presidents, Congress, and public opinion.[3(p753)]

There are other dangers that separatists maintain their theory avoids. Suppose, more or less, that the US military had become associated with one of the major political parties. Further suppose that as a result high-ranking officers regularly spoke to political rallies, made other public statements, and openly gave money on behalf of their favorite party. Although the military would flourish during those years when its party was in power, things would be different when the opposition party took over. What was a feast could easily become a famine. But such ups and downs, the argument continues, are neither good for the military nor the nation it serves. Therefore, it is better for the military to maintain strict neutrality when it comes to party politics. According to this separatist doctrine, individuals in the military could still express their preferences in the privacy of their home, amongst friends, and in the polling booth but, as a matter of policy, they should not express these preferences in a public forum.

A related argument gives us the next major reason in favor of separatism, that is, that military folk are not, by and large, trained at playing the political game, especially on the level of making high-policy decisions. Reichart and Sturm speak to this point in their characterization of separatist thinking.

> Normal career patterns do not look towards such a role; rather, they are—and should be—designed to prepare officers for competent command of forces in combat or at least for the performance of the complex subsidiary tasks that such command requires. Half-hearted attempts at irregular intervals in an officer's career to introduce him to questions of international politics produce only superficiality and presumption and an altogether deficient sense of the real complexity of the problems facing the nation. It may be true that experience in helping to make policy would enhance an officer's appreciation of such problems, but the costs and perils of such an education are too great.[2(p724)]

Huntington, in his famous *The Soldier and the State*, summarizes many of these separatist thoughts as follows.

Politics deals with the goals of state policy. Competence in this field consists in having a broad awareness of the elements and interests entering into a decision and in possessing the legitimate authority to make such a decision. Politics is beyond the scope of military competence, and the participation of military officers in politics undermines their professionalism, curtailing their professional competence, dividing the profession against itself, and substituting extraneous values for professional values. The military officer must remain neutral politically. "The military commander must never allow his military judgment to be warped by political expediency."[4] The area of military science is subordinate to, and yet independent of, the area of politics. Just as war serves the ends of politics, the military profession serves the ends of the state. Yet the state must recognize the integrity of the profession and its subject matter. The military has the right to expect political guidance from the statesman. Civilian control exists when there is this proper subordination of an autonomous profession to the ends of policy.[5(pp71–72)]

Before articulating the last major reason in support of separatism, it is useful to speak of the extended version of that position. The position described so far can be called narrow (or classic) separatism. The extended version, in contrast, speaks not just to the military's relationship to the political sphere but to the society as a whole. Extended separatism is more an "ideal" or possible position rather than one that many people hold in all its parts. Still, it is important to articulate what the "ideal" is so as to appreciate certain variations from that ideal that are actually held by some people.

Roughly speaking, extended separatism says that for a variety of reasons the military as an institution needs to separate itself in certain ways not just from the society's political institutions but from all (or most) of its institutions. Consider the following: business/industry, the mass media, law, medicine, academia, religion, and labor. Extended separatism argues for two strategies in dealing with almost all of these institutions. The first is to keep them at arm's length from the military. Recognizing that complete separation is impossible, separatists argue for doing the best we can to keep the points of contact between these institutions and the military at a minimum. The second is to practice a policy of convergence.[6] With this policy the military learns to perform many civilian tasks (eg, bookkeeping, medicine, computer repairs). There is convergence here because both the civilian and the military sectors perform these same tasks.[7] But there is also separatism because once the military masters these tasks, it performs them independently of those who

perform them in the civilian sector. It does them on its own.

Consider in particular how extended separatists in the military might view what the proper relationship should be between the military on the one side and business and industry on the other. From the military's perspective what goes on in business and industry is "foreign affairs." The emphasis in these institutions is not on serving the community although the rhetoric might indicate otherwise ("We are here to serve you" as salespeople often say). Rather, it is on the bottom line, and on the individual. Individuals go into business for themselves to make money, gain power, and perhaps fame. To gain these ends business people must exhibit virtues that to some extent overlap those found in the military. They must be diligent, have perseverance, be knowledgeable, flexible, and imaginative. But the goals of the two institutions, business and industry on the one side and the military on the other, are so different that in reality they generate two different clusters of virtues. Consider a list of military virtues that focuses on just those that business/industrial institutions give only lip service to at best: bravery, loyalty, obedience, cooperation, willingness to sacrifice for the benefit for the group, and honesty.

From the point of view of separatist thinking these differences in ethical outlook suggest the final reason for justifying this position. The argument behind that reason goes like this. It is difficult to inculcate military personnel with the cluster of virtues associated with military activity. Constant attention is required so that these virtues (ie, habits of appropriate behavior and attitude) become internalized by military personnel. More than that, it is necessary that personnel be placed in an environment that supports and encourages proper moral development. Given that the society as a whole, and the institutions of business and industry in particular, do not give strong support to the military virtues, and indeed may directly and indirectly undermine or corrupt many of them, it is best to segregate military personnel from the rest of the society as much as possible.[8]

This same argument applies to contact with some of the other institutions in the society, such as academia. The virtues encouraged within academia may very well be noble in their own way, but they are quite different from those found in the military. Courage, loyalty, and obedience do not have the status of primary virtues in academia as they do in the military. On the other side the primary academic virtues of diversity, curiosity, and independence do not receive "star" status in the military. Academia may not "corrupt" those in the military the way perhaps business and industry sometimes do, but it surely distracts them by discouraging the development of such virtues as loyalty and obedience. It is, of course, impossible to segregate the military completely from academia and the rest of society. But, according to separatist doctrine, a significant amount of such segregation is certainly necessary if military personnel are to stay in focus.

So separatism, especially in its extended version, would approve of those organizational systems and practices that would keep military personnel on all levels separated from the rest of society. Toward its separatist ends it would thus approve of convergence in the form of billeting personnel on base rather than in the community, isolating military personnel on base when they serve overseas, and also having the military develop its own schools, playgrounds, churches, hospitals, shopping facilities, etc. It would encourage the military to do whatever it can to make those in the military feel as if they belong to a tight, narrowly focused *military* community.[7(p55)]

Many of these classic and extended separatist thoughts can be made concrete by imagining that we have access to the musings of an archetypical separatist senior officer. Let us call this imaginative exercise a candid self-portrait because we are to suppose this officer is simply privately reflecting on his views without any concern about what others might think. It is as if he is simply letting his thoughts wander in a free-association exercise. We will call our fictional officer General Separon. These then are the General's thoughts:

> Sherman was right when he spoke after the Civil War about Washington being the center of intrigue, gossip and slander[9] and that we ought to keep aloof from that kind of stuff. We don't know how to play the political game well. But more than that, playing it distracts us from what we are supposed to do. Besides, if politicians see us trying to influence them, they will turn around and think that they can influence us in how to run wars. Scheming politicians should stick to their knitting; we should stick to ours. Actually we ought not to get too close to the rest of society either. Others go to work everyday to make ends meet or to get rich. Either way they are thinking mainly about themselves. We in the military are different. We have an important mission to perform. We have to train so that when a war starts we are ready to fight as a team for the good of society. We can't afford to be too much like them—to get soft and self-indulgent. If we do that, we'll be dead and our mission will not get accomplished.

Paternalistic Separatism

We will return to the separatist position in due time in order to assess it. For now we turn to the second theory that attempts to tell us how the military and the society should relate to one another. It is difficult to know what to call this theory in part because it is not one that many people openly proclaim as their own. It could be called paternalistic separatism or perhaps manipulative separatism. Rather arbitrarily, it will here be labeled paternalistic separatism.

This theory differs from narrow or extended separatism by arguing that the modern military cannot avoid at least some significant contact with the various institutions in the society. Yet it goes on to argue in typical separatist ways that it is still important to keep the military separated from the rest of society as much as possible.

But how can the military be in significant contact with the rest of society and at the same time be separated from it? The version of paternalistic separatism most compatible with the American society does it as follows. It grants, at least officially, that the military is subservient to the will of the society—in particular the will of those elected officials who Constitutionally direct the military. Yet it says that the military has an understanding of military matters that others in a liberal society are not likely to have.

This means that military leadership has a duty to explain to the society such things as the need for a new weapon system or the essence of a serious threat posed by a potential enemy. Further, those in military leadership roles must explain things in ways that will convince the society of the truths understood by the military—but not necessarily understood well by those who do not deal with military matters on a daily and professional basis.

Of necessity these explanations cannot always be "objective." Indeed, they will tend to be more persuasive or even propagandistic. An example of this way of communicating with those in government and the society at large during the Cold War was an annual Pentagon publication titled *Soviet Military Power*[10] (published from 1981 through 1988). These publications consistently portrayed Soviet military power (eg, the quality and number of its missiles, airplanes, submarines, surface ships, tanks, artillery, and so forth) in a "worst case scenario" setting. In fact, they seemed to go beyond such a portrayal insofar as they contained numerous inaccuracies.[11]

Even so, according to the paternalistic separatist theory, the persuasive nature of these and other documents, and still other presentations made by the military, is still appropriate because it always claims to have the interest of the society at heart. What paternalism literally means, after all, is that the father (the military) should care for the needs of his children (the people). According to this doctrine, then, so long as the military has the society's interest at heart, not its own, it is doing its duty in taking the steps necessary to persuade the government leaders to make the "right" decisions.

Other activities of the military also fall into the paternalistic mold. For example, "black (ie, secret) budget" buying of military equipment serves two purposes. It keeps potential enemies from knowing what the United States is doing in the way of future weapon systems. But it also protects the military from premature criticism at home for creating highly controversial but, possibly very useful, military equipment. So the military chooses to prevent the free flow of information for the "good of the nation."

Of course those who do this shielding do not represent the whole of the military. Largely this paternalistic task is left to certain political and business oriented higher ranking officers—a military elite. According to paternalistic separatism this leaves the rest of the military establishment in position to take a classic separatist stance. So the overall paternalistic separatist position is one that realistically allows, and even encourages, some interaction with the rest of society. Still, it keeps these interactive relationships limited to the few; and keeps these relationships at arm's length by the paternalistic stance inherent in the position. That is, those who come into contact with the outside are urged to do so with a certain attitude that supposedly keeps them from getting too close to those with whom they are interacting.

It is as if the private thoughts of General Paterson, who is our fictional archetypical advocate of paternalistic separatism, run along the following path. Notice how his thoughts overlap Separon's only up to a point.

> We military leaders are trying as best we can to ensure the military institution does not become soft and liberal like the rest of the society. That kind of life might be good for the majority. But the military can't afford to live that way. We have our own separate military ethic or way of life to sustain. Without it we would not be ready to fight when war starts. Still, a few of us, certain key members of the military elite, must unfortunately interact

with society. But these contacts should be made only up to a point by the elite few; and only in certain ways. In particular our contacts will be paternalistic in nature so that, if necessary, we will tell benevolent lies to the society for its own good. By doing so we serve the military by protecting the rest of that establishment from the society's 'corrupting' influences. We act like buffers that keep them and us apart. Our carefully nuanced dealings with the society at large free the rest of the military establishment to do its own thing—to do its duty of protecting the society from outside aggression.

Identicalism

On a continuum of the amount of interaction permitted or encouraged, paternalistic separatism, although basically a separatist doctrine, permits more interaction than classic separatism. Before discussing fusionism, the next theory on the continuum, it is useful to discuss identicalism, a theory even more radically interactionist than fusionism. Identicalism is a theory that few if any thinkers within the military are very fond of, but one that needs to be discussed in order to help us better understand fusionism. That is, fusionism is better understood when it is viewed as bracketed by paternalistic separatism on the one side and identicalism on the other.

Identicalism starts with the general insight that we tend to be suspicious of whatever is different from us. If some foreigners move into the neighborhood we tend to keep them at arm's length until we see just how weird they are measured against standards with which we are familiar. If these foreigners *are* different and actually take pride in their differences, our suspicions about them tend to increase. It seems, at least for some, that is how it is with the military. Those in the military show they are different in how they speak about themselves, the language they use, the way they dress, the way they behave, the work they do, and even in terms of where they live. It is no wonder that as an institution the military has an uneasy relationship with the rest of society—an uneasy relationship that becomes evident especially when some military scandal surfaces in the media.

Identicalism aims to change this relationship by making the military more like the society it serves. It can do this by making the society more like the military (eg, as in Sparta) or the military more like the society. Huntington seemed to have the former option in mind in 1957 when he published *The Soldier and the State*. At that time he thought he saw a conservative trend emerging from various influences in our society.

> All these disparate developments hardly made up a coherent intellectual movement. Nonetheless, they were signs of a reexamination of American society and American values from a more conservative viewpoint. Their significance for civil–military relations was that in due course they might result in widespread acceptance by Americans of values more like those of the military ethics. Present in virtually all the strands of the new conservatism were a stress on the limitations of man, an acceptance of institutions as they were, a critique of utopianism and 'solutionism,' and a new respect for history and society as against progress and the individual.[5(pp458–459)]

Although Huntington evidently hoped and thought two or so generations ago that a new conservatism would emerge by the end of the 20th century, his hopes were never realized. It is true that in the 1980s and 1990s there was a reemergence of conservatism focused on an increased sense of family values, a lesser dependence on governmental assistance, and to some extent increased sensitivity to group as against individual values. But there is little to suggest in this renewed trend to conservatism that the society as a whole is giving up on individualism as it manifests itself in the demand for individual rights, career options for the individual, and a sense of the importance of individual identity. It seems, therefore, that although identicalism could in theory become a reality by making the society more like the military, it is more likely to be realized the other way around.

What might the military-joins-the-society version of identicalism look like? And what arguments are there in favor of this theory? This version of identicalism argues that the military fools itself when it insists that it needs a separate "corporate" ethic in order to allow it to function effectively as a military institution. To be sure, some virtues such as courage, loyalty, and obedience need to be emphasized more when people perform military tasks as against when they perform civilian ones. But, identicalism argues, ordinary citizens can be taught these virtues when they join the military without forcing them to change their whole sense of personal identity. That is, they can become effective in doing their work within the military context without foregoing their identity as free citizens of the society. They can serve in the military much as other citizens do when they perform everyday civilian tasks.

According to identicalism, then, what the military should strive for is to make military personnel no different in their outlook toward themselves (and in the outlook people have toward them) from those working for IBM (International Business Machines), General Motors, Prudential, a local grocery store, or for themselves. Indeed, the argument continues, modern "warriors" perform many engineering, computer, electronic, and other tasks that are quite similar to those performed by their civilian counterparts. The jobs an increasing number of military personnel perform are less uniquely militarily professional and more occupational in nature than they were in the past.[12] As the military "tail" (of occupational professionals) grows longer, and fewer and fewer "warriors" actually perform warrior roles, there is less and less reason to pretend that the military needs to be separated from the rest of society to get its various missions performed properly.

In general, then, identicalism encourages vastly increased interaction between the military and the rest of society when compared to the past. This means favoring such policies as having military personnel live off base, having children of military personnel go to public schools, making many military bases more accessible to the public than they are now, sending more military personnel to schools and universities outside the military (even to the point of closing down the military academies), being more open with the mass media, enlarging and improving the reserves (because they have a closer connection to the society than do regular military units),[13] hiring still more civilians to do work on military bases, and so on. It also means involving the military in nontraditional community tasks such as interdicting drugs, building roads, fighting fires, restoring wetlands, and controlling inner-city crime.[14(p146)] In this spirit, Eitelberg comments:

> Indeed, the political advantages of using the military as an agent of social change are clear; if advocates of a larger force can claim that it is a benefit to society, that dollars spent on the military can equally satisfy social needs, they are better equipped to stave off some of the budget cuts.[14(p145)]

According to identicalism, the end result of all these policies is that the society will come to understand, and be more sympathetic with, the military than it is now. The society will see, through familiarity, what the military is up to and thus have a decreased tendency to be suspicious of its intent. A bonus for the military in this regard is that recruiting qualified personnel will be easier. By changing military life so that it is more like civilian life, more young people will likely be attracted to the military. Other kinds of identicalist changes that might be brought about include not mandating the wearing of uniforms in those settings where military personnel perform noncombat related jobs and not mandating the endlessly repetitive ritual of saluting.

The archetypical officer for identicalism is General Iden. Here are his thoughts:

> My idiot fellow officers don't realize how things have changed even since Vietnam. They still don't realize the extent to which the military has to have the approval of the society to operate effectively. Those elitist idiots don't realize how they encourage alienation between the military and the society by isolating one from the other. If we want to be accepted by the society we serve, we can't afford to be seen as a nation within a nation. We need to maximize interaction between us and them. Besides, we gain more with interaction by tapping the skills and resources of the society to help us accomplish our mission. Of course we have to wear uniforms in battle just as doctors have to wear their white uniforms while they do their work. But it is just stupid to make a big deal with uniforms when we are not fighting or training to fight. The main thing it does is tell the rest of society how different we are from them. It is equally stupid to isolate the military geographically in camps and bases. That is what really encourages people to think that we are keeping secrets about how we are spending their money. Yes, some military secrets might get out to a potential enemy if we were more open to our own society; but secrecy harms us more than it helps an enemy. It does so because with lots of secrecy the right hand often doesn't know what the left hand is doing. Too bad my views about the military aren't shared by anybody I know in the military.

Fusionism

As mentioned already, fusionism falls between identicalism and paternalistic separatism. Fusionism is not identicalism because it insists on maintaining a distinct identity for the military from the rest of society. This theory argues that the military needs to maintain its own ethical ideals and traditions; and needs to be separated at least to a certain degree from the rest of society.[15] Yet fusionism is different from both forms of separatism in that it also argues for stronger connections between the military and the society than do separatists.[16]

These connections are stronger, and thus represent points of fusion, because they are what philosophers call conversational in nature.[17] These con-

versational connections are between individuals or groups who, when they discuss things with one another, do so in a free and open manner—where being open means that neither side engages in systematic deception either by means of lies, exaggeration, distortion, and withholding information, or by deliberately using vague, ambiguous, or otherwise deceptive language.[17(pp26–27)] In this regard, an advocate of fusionism would have little sympathy with paternalistic separatism where the linguistic exchange is one-sided because, under that doctrine, the military endeavors to manipulate language rather than use it to foster genuine communication.

One implication of fusionism with respect to the military's relations with the government is that there will be fewer military secrets. Fusionism favors letting the society as a whole know more about the activities of the military so that the excuse of "military secrecy" is not used to hide errors and corruption. Examples of such public knowledge include published articles discussing military misdeeds such as the Air Force spending $200,000 to fly a general home to his new assignment,[18] the cover-up of the massacre of civilians at My Lai during the Vietnam War,[19] discussions of experimentation during the Cold War,[20] and the Tailhook scandal involving naval aviators' misbehavior in a civilian hotel.[21]

When some secrecy is needed, fusionism argues that at least some of the society's objectively minded elected representatives be "in on" the secrets. An example of this point was the movement of weapons-grade nuclear material from a former Soviet republic to the United States for proper disposal, as described in an article in the *New York Times*.[22] It is clear that secrecy was justified in this case because the material had to be moved without the knowledge of terrorist groups that might have wished to seize it. As it is described in the *Times* report, however, it is not clear whether enough elected officials were notified about the movement of the nuclear fuel to satisfy fusionist thinking. Thus, in this sense, fusionism opposes those military secrets where only the military knows about them; or, aside from the military, only co-opted outsiders are in the know.

The idea behind this concern for openness within the doctrine of fusionism can be understood best through an analogy to medicine. Medicine, like military activity, is service oriented.[23] According to the ideal, medicine as a discipline is not in place to serve physicians, but to serve patients—where serving patients means acting in their best interest first and foremost. But to do this, physicians need to

carefully consult with their patients because in a real sense patients know best what they want.[24] Of course, physicians know many things, too. Mainly they are experts concerned with what means are needed in order to arrive at some end. Given that for most patients the end they desire is health, physicians are good at telling people what means they should adopt to achieve that end. But physicians are not specialists about ends. They are not specialists about the sense of health that patients want, or whether patients are even concerned about health at all when they happen to be in a state of great and permanent distress. About ends, then, patients are in the best position to know what is right for them. Given this insight, it is important for physicians to listen to their patients and allow them to make their own decisions (about ends and even to some extent about means). But to do that, physicians need to give their patients information so that their decisions are as rational as they can be. To the extent that physicians hold back information, lie to them, or deceive them in some other way, patients cannot make decisions about their ends because they are not fully informed.[25]

By analogy, if we see the military as a service institution it would be just as important for it to fully inform the society (ie, its patient) so that the society can make rational decisions about how it can best be served. Morris Janowitz expresses the same thought as follows.

> [T]he problems of civilian control consist of a variety of managerial and political tasks. As a requisite for adequate civilian control, the legislature and the executive must have at their disposal both criteria and information for judging the state of readiness and effectiveness of the military establishment in its constabulary role.[26(p420)]

According to fusionism, then, paternalistic separatism advocates policies like those that physicians held to a generation ago when the phrase "doctor knows best" was popular—a phrase that suggests that physicians are specialists not only about means but also about ends. Fusionism would go on to argue that insofar as paternalistic separatism argues for a policy that comes down to "the military knows best," it is advocating policies that come dangerously close to subverting the democratic ideals of a society such as the United States.

Fusionism's basic stance can be extended to apply to the military's relationships with the rest of society. For fusionism, modern military activity is far too related to technological development for classic or paternalistic separatism to make any sense

when, for example, the military has to deal with business or industry. But beyond having regular contact with business and industry, in particular its production facilities and research talents, the military has to be careful not to make its contacts with these institutions too narrow. Just as it would not do for the military to focus on giving its information about its activities just to certain "co-opted" political figures, so its contact with business and industry should not be just with certain favored ("co-opted") businesses. Rather, the avenues of contact need to be broad, probably much broader than they are at present.[27(p205)]

In this connection, consider the distinction between product and process technologies. The former refers to technologies that produce new fighter planes, radar systems, missiles, and the like; the latter to technologies concerned with how to produce higher-quality products in greater numbers and at less cost.[27(p205)]

> It must be emphasized here that the Department of Defense has traditionally devoted all of its R&D [research and development] resources to *product* technologies and *product* development activities. In fact, it is only possible to specifically identify about 1 percent of the over $35 billion of defense R&D that are devoted to process technologies— geared toward cost and schedule reductions. These are the manufacturing technology programs, which run between $200 and $300 million a year. By contrast, world-class corporations in the United States spend something like one-third of their total R&D dollars on process technologies, and Japanese world-class firms tend to spend approximately two-thirds of their total R&D dollars on process technologies.[27(p205)]

But there is change in the air that an enthusiastic fusionist would approve of. In designing its new attack submarine[28] and its next generation destroyer (DD-21)[29] the US Navy is taking process as well as product into account. How these ships are built and the costs of building them are taken into account even in the design of these ships. This means that from the start, those in charge of these programs will, if necessary, reach out beyond the military (ie, resort to outsourcing) to find workers, managers, equipment, and facilities to prepare these ships for war.[30] All of the services are doing, or at least trying to do, the same, that is, they are engaging in a process that is often labeled Total Quality Management (TQM).[31] By their very nature, TQM and its variants are processes that urge everyone involved in producing some product or engaged in some ac-

tivity to look constantly and everywhere for the best way of doing things.

Fusionism's attitude toward academia is similarly open-ended. It argues that when academia is approached by the military on a we-can-learn-from-each-other basis, things go better than they do when the military tries, defensively, to hide all its little and large warts.[3(p754)] Indeed, in this spirit the Air Force, Army, and Navy have a long-standing tradition of sending officers to graduate school at major universities. All of these services also invite civilian faculty to teach at their military academies.

Similarly, fusionism argues for openness with respect to the mass media. Fusionists grant that it is not so easy to make a convincing case for openness here because the media are famous for their "feeding frenzy" when it comes to telling the public about misdeeds and illegalities.

The electronic media, and particularly television, cause another problem. We can call it the CNN (Cable News Network) paradox. The paradox works like this. Television crews from CNN and other television networks visit a scene of human suffering such as a war or nationwide starvation. The suffering is portrayed so vividly by television cameras that a demand arises from the viewing audience that something be done. The demand for a solution is so insistent that eventually military forces are inserted. Unfortunately, the military forces almost always suffer casualties sooner or later and, of course, the cameras dutifully and vividly give us reports about these ugly events. Now the loud-and-clear cry to "Bring the boys home" is heard. So the paradox is that the television camera both encourages decision makers to put military forces at risk and, yet, well before these forces have time to deal with the problems they have come to deal with, encourages them to get out.

In spite of these and other mass media problems, fusionism insists that given the kind of society in which we live, the mass media represent some of the primary ways the society has of informing itself about what the military is doing. Without the media in place, the society at large would simply not be in such a good position to give its consent to what the military should and should not be doing. Here is how Robert Trice expresses some of these and other related thoughts about the relationship between the military and the mass media.

> They [the mass media] serve as the primary link between the Government and the American people by providing information from government decisionmakers to the public and feedback from the

public to policymakers. The mass media are the primary source of information for the professionals about world happenings. The media can support governmental actions by providing favorable analysis and explanations of complex situations and decisions. The media can play the role of adversary to the government by questioning the wisdom or motivation behind policy decisions. In their adversary role, they are most likely to have an observable effect on national security policy.

The media can exert significant nongovernmental influence through the ability to conduct and publicize independent investigations that can trigger more powerful actors like the President or Congress into action. For example, Seymour Hersch's investigation of My Lai, Joseph Treaster's stories on Dr. Frank Olson's fatal overdoes of LSD [lysergic acid diethylamide] given by the CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] and the special cover-up on the "Selling of the Pentagon" [ie, engaging in public relations] set in motion processes that brought the behavior of professionals under close scrutiny.[32(p507)]

Given these thoughts, fusionists argue that it is up to the military to play its cards in the open, thereby keeping the society as fully informed as is possible. It is also up to the military to learn to roll with the punches when it receives criticism.

The first half of the fusionist doctrine, thus, argues for the military to generate and sustain open, broad, and close connections with a variety of institutions. Insofar as it does this, it makes itself different from all forms of separatism. The second half of this doctrine shows itself to be different from identicalism in that in spite of the fusion of the military with the various societal institutions, a certain amount of separatism is necessary. It argues that those in the military represent diverse groups. Some

can be soldier statesmen, others businesslike in their thinking and actions, and still others more academic in their orientation. These people are the ones whose duty it is to fuse the military to one or another part of the society. But diversity in the military is such that there are others whose duties have nothing to do with fusing. Their duties are related to the traditional military fighting roles. According to fusionism, then, the military can both have and eat its cake. Thus, there is room within the military for some to focus their attention on fusing, while others focus on fighting. It is only a prejudice of past thinking to suppose that the whole of the military must devote itself to the ethics of its fighting traditions or be corrupted by outside influences.

General Fution represents the archetypical fusionist officer in our imaginative exercises. Here is how his thoughts run.

> My job in the military is to facilitate communication with the President, his advisers and Congress. I've found that if I am open and honest with those I deal with, I get along better in the long run. Hey, it's the same for me when I try to handle problems I have at home—with my wife and kids. Sometimes it's difficult to tell the truth but if I lie to them, it's worse later—when I get caught. And that's the truth. Because I tell the truth—well most of the time anyway—I'm nobody's "yes" man. If the President says something pertaining to military matters and I think what he says is wrong, I tell him so. If he doesn't like hearing "No," he can fire me. So far I'm still in business. And part of being in business is helping those in the military who are better at fighting wars than I am—and who aren't so good at dealing with Presidents as I am. It is my job to look after their interests and in so doing look after the interests of the nation.

ASSESSING THE MILITARY–SOCIETY RELATIONSHIP THEORIES

With the descriptive account of the four theories about how the society and the military should relate to one another in place, it is time to assess each theory to see if one can be picked as better than the others. Because the descriptive accounts generally emphasized the strengths of each theory, the assessments will focus on their weaknesses.

Is (Classic) Separatism Feasible in a Democracy?

The inspiration for separatism is reflected in General Separon's thought that the military needs a cocoon in which it can safely generate its own special way of life. Such a cocoon supposedly is needed

especially in liberal societies where the regimented life in the military contrasts starkly with life on the outside. Inside the group, discipline and sacrifice are important; while outside, individual freedom and indulgence seem to be the order of the day.

Because separatism in one form or another is a doctrine found in three of the four theories under discussion (all except identicalism), it has some degree of plausibility to it. However, both classic and extended separatism, that is, separatism in its pure form, suffer from three serious flaws. Two of them are closely related and can be thought of as flaws of practicality. The third is more theoretical.

The first practical flaw manifests itself as the result of technological change. There was probably a time in the 19th century when the military in many Western nations became professionalized, and when those military organizations could have been "separated."[33(p106)] In that century, technology was beginning to move forward at an accelerating pace, but the pace was not yet very rapid. As a result, contact with "the outside world" could be kept at a minimum. At that time, military organizations could assign the very few to buy the small arms, the cannon, ammunition, food, and clothing for the very many. The many could, as a result, live inside the military establishment in splendid isolation. But today, with modern technology advancing so rapidly, the military has to spend more time and effort determining whether what it buys is what it needs. But beyond that, more contact with the outside world is required to assess and service the equipment and supplies sent to the military. So modern technology ties the military to the society in such a way that it is impossible for separatism to work in quite the way it is sometimes envisioned by proponents of that doctrine.[27]

The second practical flaw making it difficult to implement separatism is that the society itself has changed. In part, the change is also directly the result of technology. Modern communication and travel make it far more difficult for the military to isolate itself as compared to even the amount of isolation possible during World War II. More than any other technology, the portable camcorder has brought about this change. It is there to record what happens, both good and bad, as it happens or soon after. Think here of how the Gulf War was covered and how, since then, such events as the slaughters in Somalia, Rwanda, and the former Yugoslavia were covered.

However, the change is fed not only by technology but by the desire of the society to know what its institutions are doing. The society far more today than in the recent past insists on accountability. It will not let physicians, lawyers, teachers, ministers, business leaders, and the military do their work as if they were operating in a vacuum. None of these institutions, but especially not the military with its huge tax-funded budgets, is allowed to act as it sees fit without explaining to the society what it is doing. Both recent and past events now come to light that would never have been reported in the past. In this connection consider General Ashby's flight from Europe to the United States in an almost empty C-141B that probably cost taxpayers between $100,000. and $200,000.[18] Then there is the case of the 10 Air Force reservists who "appropriated" another C-141 evidently not just for training purposes but in order to attend two professional basketball games.[34] Or consider the many immoral and secret nuclear experiments done on soldiers early in the Cold War that have now come to light.[20] So again, for practical reasons, it is difficult to imagine how the military can operate in an exclusive or almost exclusive separatist manner, especially in a society like ours that prides itself on its open democratic manner of running the society. Separatism might still be a doctrine that could operate in a dictatorship of the left or right. However, in a democratic society like ours, it appears that such a doctrine is just not in the cards.

But even if somehow the two practical flaws of separatism could be overcome, the third flaw, the more theoretical one, needs to be dealt with. Recall once again that the advantage claimed for separatism is that it allows the military the social space it needs to train its people both with respect to the skills and the ethics of war. Let it be granted for the moment that this claim is valid. Even so, the argument over the validity of separatism is not thereby settled. What needs to be asked in addition is: What are the costs of this doctrine?

Consider an analogy to business, one as recent as the competition for sales of automobiles between American and Japanese companies. It is generally conceded that the Japanese manufacturers have for years been driving the market. Before the Japanese entered the American market, and for some years after that, American car companies continued to suffer from an isolationist mentality and thus continued to produce large and fairly low-quality automobiles. For a while they even made a good deal of money producing these vehicles. But the competition from Japan, and for a time from Germany in the form of the Volkswagen Beetle, caught up with them. In the 1990s, with a less isolationist mentality, American car companies began making a comeback. Across the board, they produced new vehicles that were fully competitive with those produced by foreign companies. They even took the lead in the production of new lines such as the minivan and the sports utility vehicle.

The lesson is obvious. Isolation has its costs. There might be some advantages to turning your head inward, as self-reflection has its rewards. But if Separon and his kind overdo it, they will likely fail to learn from others about how to make and do things right and, more generally, how to live well. They will experience these failures in the form of getting into habits that might have been appropri-

ate in the past, but are no longer so.

The same analogy works in academia. Quality research and creative work in academia are rarely the result of activity performed in isolation. While there is always the case of the idiosyncratic genius who surprises us with how much he or she accomplishes, most good academic work is public. Academic work, even that originally done in isolation, is publicly assessed in the end by one's peers in an objective setting.

The argument here is that military activity also needs the light of day to assess just how good or bad it is, as Fitzgerald has detailed in his discussion of waste and fraud in defense spending, as well as the "code of silence" that keeps embarrassing secrets out of the public view.[35] This is probably more so today with rapid changes in technology. Nineteenth century separatism with technology changing at a more leisurely pace might have made some sense, but 20th and 21st century separatism seems to make less sense, if classic separatism ever made sense at all.

Modern Democracies and Paternalistic Separatism

Paternalistic separatism does not suffer from the obvious isolationist disadvantages of classic separatism. General Paterson and his allies realize that a certain amount of interaction is needed between the military and the society. Unlike classic separatists, they feel that their thinking is thus fully compatible with the conditions found in the 20th and 21st century where the military cannot avoid interacting with many of the other societal institutions on a regular basis. They also recognize that these interactions have to be realistic. It won't do, Paterson says, to interact with society in the idealistic way argued for by fusionists. The military would be rendered impotent if it were naively open in its dealings with Congress, the mass media, and a wide variety of institutionalized critics of the military such as The Center for Defense Information (which rather consistently argues for cuts in military spending far greater than Congress or recent presidents would allow) and Concerned Philosophers for Peace, a pacifist organization.

According to Paterson, then, the very way that politicians and the mass media operate forces the military to adopt persuasive strategies for dealing with the society. That's just the way the game is played. So if the military adopts a paternalistic attitude toward the society by exaggerating and even covering up a bit here and there, no one should really complain too much. In sum, those strategies enable the military to deal as effectively as possible with the society. At the same time, those strategies enable the military to distance itself from the rest of the society so that it can sustain an independent ethic and a life style for dealing with war whenever it comes.

There are at least two flaws with this paternalistic separatist position. The first flaw derives from the effects of playing the game the way other institutions in the society allegedly play it. Paterson and his allies assume that their paternalistic strategies will protect the military. If they are successful, these strategies hide from everybody (the enemy as well as the society the military serves) the existence, numbers, and nature of military equipment. An example of such a strategy, according to Boatman,[36] was the *Q Program*, the development of a secret plane, which never materialized because of high costs and the end of the Cold War. These strategies also hide all sorts of small blunders committed by the military. All this hiding, the argument is, keeps the military insulated from a wide variety of exaggerated criticism and thereby facilitates the proper working of its paternalistic but also separatist ideology.

Thus the first flaw of paternalistic separatism pertains to the side effects of these evasive strategies. The view of those who advocate this ideology is that paternalism protects (separates) more than it exposes. They claim that it does more good than harm overall. But this assumption is highly questionable in part because the other institutions are not so naive as to believe all or even most of the stories the military tells.[35(pp1–6)] It may not take the mass media, academia, committees in the legislative branches, and other groups long to figure out when the military is playing a not overly honest paternalistic game. Even if much of what the military means to keep secret stays that way, uncovering some of what was deceptively covered can prove costly. Once trust is lost, much of what the military says is not likely to be believed. We have already noted that the military as an institution faces groups in the society that are negatively disposed to it. These groups do not need much incentive to trigger criticism of the military concerning waste, corruption, the opportunity costs of military spending, and the almost unstoppable power of the military industrial complex. If, now, the military's paternalistically inspired errors are exposed, as they are likely to be in these days where public awareness via television, computers, and radio is increasing, the paternalistic military may turn out to be its own worst enemy.

It is true, of course, that the rest of society plays games with communication. Those in business and industry and those in politics, just to name two groups, make it a practice of not always speaking honestly and openly. They engage in what we might say are less than ethical practices. Nonetheless, these same people who do not set high standards for themselves insist on setting high standards for the military and other service institutions.

It is apparent, then, that the military cannot rely on stealth policies to protect and isolate itself as a service institution. Once its cheating practices are uncovered, it will be the worse for it. It will be seen as having erred twice—first by making mistakes, second by trying to cover them up. The blown cover-up will encourage politicians to get as much political capital as possible from these mistakes. The cover-up will also encourage the mass media to sensationalize the errors in order to sell television and radio time, newspapers, and magazines. It seems then that contrary to paternalistic separatist doctrine, it might be best as a rule for the military to come clean right from the beginning. It can be argued, at least, that coming clean is not obviously so stupid an option as it might have seemed at first.

The second flaw inherent in paternalistic separatism is also consequentialist in nature. The argument pointing to the first flaw is that, contrary to paternalistic separatist doctrine, it may be that coming clean will in the long run serve the military and the society best. Even in the dog-eat-dog arena of politics and the mass media, it is better to simply be caught making mistakes than be caught making those mistakes and then caught covering them up as well. The second argument now says that a direct consequence of the paternalistic separatist position is that it leads down a very slippery slope. That slope is represented by the degenerate form of this position. Up to now paternalistic separatism has been represented as a doctrine that looks primarily at the society's, and only secondarily at the military's, best interests. But surely, with all its secrecy, it will not be easy to maintain paternalistic separatism in its pure form. The secrecy is supposed to be in place for the good of society. But the judges of just what to keep secret will be largely the military leaders themselves. To make matters worse, there will be few checks on their judgments because they will control most of the information needed for anyone to make sound rational decisions about what the military should be doing.[3(p753)] Given this situation, even if we generously assume that these leaders have the ability to identify just what is and is not in the society's best interest, it is difficult to believe that only information that in fact is in the society's interest will be put in the large bin of "military secrets." The temptation will be to put things there that also have to do with corruption, personal privilege, waste, various other forms of inefficiency, stupidity, and so on.

A famous example of just this sort of corruption is described by Headrace Smith in his book, *The Power Game*.[37] It appears that in the early and middle 1980s the US Army was interested in developing, buying, and deploying a division air defense system called DIVAD. Each of the hundreds of DIVAD units that the US Army wanted to deploy eventually consisted of a tank chassis, multiple cannons, and radar. DIVAD was supposed to defend tanks, troops, and everything else in the field much better than anything available at that time. Aside from being very expensive, DIVAD didn't work very well. The guns didn't have the range needed to deal with modern airplanes and helicopters. Beyond that DIVAD had trouble dealing effectively with targets within its range—especially if they took evasive action. However, the US Army's test results did not reflect these difficulties. Videotapes showed DIVAD firing, and then seconds later "sitting duck" targets exploding and falling from the sky. But it was not DIVAD that was knocking down the targets. Rather, it was the range safety officer who destroyed them as DIVAD was firing. In short, many of the tests were faked. Fortunately the US Army got caught. "Moles" inside the Pentagon leaked information to the press and eventually when DIVAD's deficiencies and the cover-ups related to them were exposed the whole project was cancelled.

The point of the DIVAD story and others like it is that paternalistic separatism seems to be inherently degenerative. It is the kind of doctrine that in its ideal form can be made to sound plausible; but a kind that cannot easily, if at all, be practiced at or near its ideal form. The power the doctrine of paternalistic separatism gives to the military to decide what is and is not good for the society reminds us all of the cliché that power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely.

Can Identicalism Be Implemented?

As we have seen, identicalism is the only major doctrine concerned with the relationship between the military and the society that gives up on all forms of separatism. General Iden argues for a radi-

cal change in how the military is to be conceived. Breaking with a long tradition, he proposes that misunderstandings between the military and the society it serves be ameliorated by making the military as much like the rest of society as possible. For him, there will be fewer misunderstandings caused by the military's isolation, secrecy, being different, and anything of the sort if the military follows his doctrine.

However, one problem with identicalism is that even the modern military, with all its contacts with the society, cannot avoid a certain amount of isolation. In pure physical terms, large numbers of military personnel still need to be isolated from those they serve simply because they serve overseas—either in some foreign land or on ships. Businesses of course similarly send their personnel overseas but they usually send individuals or small groups rather than large units as the military does. So by the nature of the work it does, a need remains for a greater degree of isolation found in overseas military work than that found in the work of the society's other institutions.

But beyond that, military activity demands some isolation even when military work is done at home. Infantry, tank, artillery, and similar training in the US Army demand that the work be done on tracts of land isolated from the rest of society and not in and around major cities. Similarly, various training schedules in the US Air Force and in the US Navy demand isolation. And the need for separating the military from the society does not seem to be diminishing. If anything, intensive training with high-technology equipment demands a certain kind of mastery that takes great time and effort. It requires as well a level of teamwork, among the specialists in the fighting units, that again demands time and effort.

The need for teamwork inherent in modern military organizations suggests another criticism of identicalism. These units need large blocks of time alone to bond together as a team. The bonding is necessary given the nature of the dangerous work military people do. The leaders and the members of each unit need to know what each member of the team can do, which members are interchangeable with one another when there are casualties in battle, and how much trust they can place in one another. Here is how Marlowe expresses it.

> It [modern warfare] requires not only higher technology than that possessed by a prospective opponent, but also the ability to use that technology at its maximum level of technical and tactical effectiveness. Additionally, it requires highly trained and specialized support and service skills that will enable extremely rapid theater buildup using a combination of sea, air and land assets. It also requires that these actions be sustained for days or weeks in the face of the extraordinary psycho-social and psycho-physiological stresses and demands of contemporary continuous operations (eg, twenty-four-hour-a-day warfare). Overall, I believe that these changes define a necessary alteration of many of the US military's past concepts of personnel sustainment. The continuous pipeline of 'interchangeable parts' replacements of World War II, Korea and the Vietnam conflict and the personnel management and utilization policies of past effective operations can no longer optimally sustain new models of warfare in the 1990s.[8(p149)]

If anything, it seems, modern war has enhanced rather than diminished the need for at least a certain amount of isolation.

One concession might be made to identicalism. When military personnel serve in a civilian setting, as they do when they undertake a tour of duty at a university, they might be, as in fact they are, allowed to "go civilian." They are more likely to successfully go about performing their academic mission dressed like the sea of students they are working with rather than sticking out conspicuously in their uniform. However, a further concession to identicalism seems to be out of order. It might be thought that those military personnel who perform civilian-like work in military settings (eg, computer operators, mechanics, lawyers, physicians) should also be allowed to "go civilian." The argument might be that these people have attachments to the civilian side of their field or profession that are just as valid as the attachments they have to the military. And, the argument might continue, no real purpose is served by having them behave "like soldiers" when their work, as such, has nothing to do with soldiering.

But surely one among many objections to such an extension of the identicalist proposal is that it would divide the military into two classes of people—those who dress in uniform and act accordingly, and those who do not. Some in uniform would resent the privileges the civilian-like military have, and some on the civilian-like side would resent the treatment they receive from their uniformed compatriots—who very likely would think of them as not really being a part of the team. It is not difficult to imagine all sorts of morale problems developing

from this dual approach to dress and behavior among the military.

So if, in general, identicalism has some serious objections to it, there seems to be no good reason for conceding to the position even a partial victory. With few exceptions, as when individual military personnel go to university or work in civilian laboratories or factories, and in the process adopt the virtues of these workplaces, the model of military behavior that encourages military personnel to fully identify with the society seems to represent an unfortunate overreaction to classic and extended separatism.

Fusionism and the Future

As we have seen, as a fusionist, General Fution tries to split the difference between paternalistic separatism and identicalism. He does his best to have the military, if not identify, then at least relate with the rest of the society in an open and relatively honest way so as to gain the society's trust. Yet he also argues for some separation. Without some separation, Fution argues that the military cannot build the teamwork necessary to carry out modern military operations.

The main problem with fusionism is its seemingly absurd naiveté. The naiveté is associated more with the activities of the military elite who deal with the political, business, and industrial elites than with the activities of those on the lower levels who tend to do what we think of as traditional military work. "Lower" types are the ones most separated from the society. They have problems of their own with credibility when it comes to reporting to their superiors about levels of preparedness. "Yes," the captain tells his superior, "all our tanks are ready for action" when in fact three of them are not quite in working order. And the superior has a similar problem when he writes a no-fault letter of recommendation for his not always perfect captain. But, by and large, these middle and lower level types do their work in ways that earn them respect from the society. It is these people who, if the military has a positive image within the society, have earned it through hard work and dedication to duty.

It is the opposite with the military elite. Although a few in this elite earn a great deal of respect and honor for themselves and the military when they successfully lead the military in battle,[14(p144)] the vast majority garner suspicion and cynicism especially when they are associated with the Pentagon and other military power centers.

Even so, that elite is seen as leading a machine so powerful that although it bends under social and political stresses, it does not break. The machine always manages to survive, so it seems, because the elite play hardball rather than softball with the rest of society. If the more idealistic softball game played by Fution were adopted by those in charge of the Pentagon, the military would be far less successful than it has been up to now in playing Paterson's game. At least that is the argument of the paternalistic separatists against the fusionists.

Part of the idealism that would contribute to harming the military and the society, they add, can be laid directly at the feet of the fusionism theory of communication. Recall that fusionism's paradigm of how communication should work is something like an open and honest tête-à-tête between two old friends. But clearly, paternalistic separatists say, that sort of relationship is not possible when the military talks to Congress, the mass media, or business and industry. Even if the military favored these institutions with open and honest talk, the favor would not likely be returned in kind. Each of these institutions has its own reasons for being less than candid in the conversational exchange with the military. Those in Congress need to get reelected. So if they see an opportunity to gain votes at the expense of the military, many, perhaps most, would seize it. As to the mass media, their concern is not with a normal conversation where there is an exchange of information and ideas between two parties. Rather, they are interested primarily in a one-directional flow of information. They ask the questions and the military is supposed to give the answers. And, again, answers that hurt the military are favored over those that help. Bad news sells better than good. As to business and industry, the military is for them a "money cow." Conversations between business and industry, on the one side, and the military, on the other, will focus not on an honest and open exchange of ideas but on "milking" the cow.

Fution then is not just naive. Insofar as he advocates a theory of what the relationship between the military and the rest of society should be, he advocates a policy that apparently cannot be implemented. His position rests on an analogy of two friends talking to one another when in fact the military has no friends to talk to. All its so-called friends help the military when the military can help them. But when helping the military hurts them, they will, so the argument goes, turn their backs.

CONCLUSION

Which theory overall is most appropriate for a liberal democratic society such as the United States? (Table 7-1 summarizes the strengths and weaknesses of the four theories.) At best, (classic) and extended separatism has been seen as a doctrine for another time when there simply were fewer connections between the military and the rest of society. So there is no way that this doctrine in its pure form can give an account of the need the modern military has to create and sustain connections with the rest of a society. Separatism also fails to realize that there is a diversity of talent in the military that allows some to engage in the separatist tasks of preparing for war, and yet allows others to pursue a variety of nonseparatist tasks for the military. Finally, separatism is insensitive to the costs of isolationism. Separating oneself from others often leads to a mind-set not open to changes in military thinking—changes that need to take place because of the fast pace of modern technological development. Separatism's flaws are many and serious, and cannot easily be counterbalanced by the advantages of the position. It thus needs to be rejected as a serious option for how the military and the society should relate to one another.

For different reasons identicalism also needs to be rejected. It does not take into account the military's continued need for some separation to succeed in its training program and to give its military personnel a time and place to bond to one another. In its attempt to build a positive relationship between the military and the society, it goes too far. It assumes that this goal can be achieved only by minimizing separation and by, in effect, asking the military to lose its identity as an institution. Given the serious nature of military work, that is too high a price to pay.

So the choice is between paternalistic separatism and fusionism. These two positions at least sense that some combination of interaction and separation is needed to allow the military to best serve the society. But which of the two does this the best? Or perhaps, given the flaws of each, the question should be: which is the least flawed?

In the end, one of paternalistic separatism's flaws is fatal. So it too has to be rejected. That flaw, it will be recalled, is that position's tendency to lapse into a degenerate form. Of course each of the other positions has at least one degenerate form. Separatism can slide gradually into some kind of interactionism by allowing the military to become an overly powerful state within a state. Identicalism, in contrast, can degenerate into some kind of separatism when it discovers that it simply cannot sustain its doctrine in its pure form. Even fusionism can suffer from backsliding when a few of its adherents gradually learn that you can successfully deceive some of the people some of the time.

But paternalistic separatism's tendency toward degeneration is different. The mentality of those who act in the spirit of this doctrine encourages them to make decisions without consulting seriously with others. (An example is the behavior of Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North and his cohorts in the mid-1980s that resulted in the Iran-Contra scandal, in which the stated intentions of Congress were circumvented because these individuals believed that their cause was just and therefore they were above the law.) For them, and others like them, authorization tends to be self-authorization. So there will be fewer checks on their decisions to do what is best for the society. There will be fewer checks on them as well when many of them degeneratively slide into acting not on the society's behalf but on their own; and in effect slide into corrupt practices. So whereas the other positions can suffer from degeneration due mainly to a variety of human weaknesses, paternalistic separatism suffers due to human weaknesses and the deceptive nature of the position itself.

A second fatal flaw of paternalistic separatism is also related to degeneration. In fact the society has not authorized the military to act in paternalistic ways. The military is not authorized to treat others as if they were children the way parents are authorized to treat their children as children. In its pure form, then, paternalistic separatism represents an undemocratic way of dealing with a liberal democratic society. Even in its pure form where the military is acting for the benefit of the society, it is undemocratic for the military, or any institution, to decide for that society what it should want and what is good for it. In this sense paternalistic separatism in its pure form cannot help but gradually undermine democratic societies.

The situation is worse for paternalistic separatism in its degenerative form. By working not for the benefit of the society but for the military, or what is even worse, for the benefit of the corrupters, this position directly destroys the democratic society. Once the society comes to know that those it trusted to defend itself steal, lie, and perhaps even kill for

TABLE 7-1

THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE MILITARY TO THE SOCIETY IT SERVES: SUMMARY OF THE FOUR MAJOR THEORIES

Theory	(Classic) Separatism	Paternalistic Separatism	Fusionism	Identicalism
Argument	Military should be isolated from the political sphere	Military has society's best interests in mind and must shield society from some of what the military does	Military needs to maintain its own ideals and traditions, but should share more of its activities with the society it serves	Military should be more like the society it serves
Strengths	1. Military can then devote full attention to war 2. Keeps political sphere from becoming militarized 3. Keeps military values and virtues strong by isolating military as a group	1. Will keep potential enemies in the dark about military capability 2. Protects military from premature criticism, especially regarding necessary weapons development and procurement	1. Military will benefit from information exchange with a variety of institutions 2. There will be less suspicion of the military if it is more open and candid about activities 3. Only a few would be involved in sharing information; military will still be able to train and fight effectively	1. Soldiers can become effective without foregoing their civilian identity 2. Society will become more sympathetic with the military and better understand its needs 3. Military will assist more with community tasks
Weaknesses	1. Modern technology makes it almost impossible to keep the military separate 2. Society itself has changed due to modern communication and travel technologies, which prevent separation/isolation 3. Isolation results in failure to learn from others 4. Military needs outside assessment of how good or bad it is	1. By seeking to control information flow, military jeopardizes the trust of the civilian sector; cover-ups are more costly than being forthright to begin with 2. One cannot expect to practice paternalistic separatism in the ideal; it is inherently degenerative 3. Society cannot trust military to only protect national security or weapons development secrets; society will assume that corruption, waste, and incompetence are also protected items	1. Open communication is not likely to be reciprocated; the media prefers the bad news to the good news 2. Theory assumes that the military has friends but those friends often put their own interests first	1. Is not practical because the modern military needs more isolation in order to train with more technological weapons 2. Separating military into two groups—those who wear the uniform and those who don't—in order to blend into society would foster resentment and disrupt cohesion
Assessment	**Needs to be rejected** because it fails to understand that isolation is not an option in a democratic society	**Needs to be rejected** because it directly destroys democratic society through the withholding of information	**Needs to be accepted** because it seeks to protect democratic society through honest exchange of information	**Needs to be rejected** because it fails to understand that there must be some separation of military from the society it serves

their own benefit, trust in the system of government its citizens have honored in the past quickly gets lost. Paternalistic separatism simply must be rejected.

At the same time, this criticism of paternalistic separatism points to the strength of fusionism. Although it might be naive in some ways, fusionism at least makes a sincere effort to protect the political institutions of a democratic liberal society. By encouraging honest communication with the rest of government, the mass media, with business and industry, academia, and the other institutions, fusionism plays a supportive role here. Even if it fails in this regard because some members of the military lapse into paternalistic separatism, either in the degenerative or nondegenerative form, it is more likely to gain the respect of the rest of society because the majority of those in the military will be endeavoring to be good fusionists.

There is of course the criticism that fusionism cannot be implemented in its pure form because honest public communication involving the military will be a one-way street. Even if a fusionist military establishment does its best to meet the standards of honesty, there will be no *quid pro quo* on the other side.

But notice that although this is a serious flaw in fusionism, it is not fatal. It is not as if honest communication is literally subverted when one side is not cooperating. Those who communicate honestly do so successfully quite apart from whether their interlocutors speak truthfully or not in response. Nor is it the case that honest speakers lose or suffer because they are taken advantage of by their more manipulative linguistic partners. Indeed, there are times when honest speakers will lose. Some of these losses will occur simply because of their "partner's" deceptive practices. When those who have been lied to act on misleading information, they often will pay a heavy price. That is no surprise. But these losses will take place no matter whether the losers themselves are honest or not. Those who are lied to, or deceived in some other way, simply have to learn to protect themselves from such practices. Honest speakers do not have to trust those who are trying to take advantage of them. They do so only if they are foolish. But foolishness has nothing to do with their fusionism. Thus a military organiza-

tion lied to by a manufacturing firm must learn to monitor that firm more carefully or, if that does not work, must simply decide not to do business with it any longer.

The second way honest speakers suffer is more serious. Those listening to honest speakers may, if they have no scruples, use the information given to them to hurt those speakers. This is the form of harm that makes fusionism seem naive. Good fusionists, because they are honest and open, will inevitably hand over information that those who do not like them or those who have other agendas (eg, selling television time) may use against them. But, as we have seen, this downside of fusionism is only part of the story. Honesty and openness has an upside to it as well. Intelligent fusionists know this. They are not so naive as to not know that these traits help them avoid embarrassing cover-up incidents. Also they are not so naive as not to know that the more trust they generate among those in the society they serve, the more they are likely to be believed in the future when they say something like "We truly need this new weapon system."

So naiveté is not necessarily an intrinsic aspect of the fusionist position. Intelligent fusionists think perhaps that the losses and gains in being honest might come out about even; or perhaps they think that the losses from being taken advantage of are actually less than the gain. Whichever way they view it, it is clear that fusionism is not so stupid a position as it might have seemed initially. But beyond that, fusionism certainly holds the high moral ground when compared to paternalistic separatism. Unlike that position, fusionist policies deliberately attempt to serve the society from within the liberal democratic tradition. By doing so, we can say that when a fusionist military goes to war, it does so by following the will of the people.

In conclusion, we can see that (classic) separatism and paternalistic separatism may have worked to some degree in the past, but the past is gone. Identicalism could not work in any time period because it fails to fathom the true needs of the military. The present and future are best served by fusionism, which blends the needs of the military and the needs of the society it serves to ensure that the society is powerfully protected from its enemies, yet still safe from its powerful protector.

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