

Cryptographic Hash and Integrity Protection

Cryptographic Hash Function

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Module: Cryptographic Hash Function

Hash Function Definitions

Insecure Hash Function Examples

Cryptographic Hash Requirements

Iterative Structure

Functions transforming large input (variable size) to small fixed output

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Deterministic and efficient computation given the input

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Improve by circular shifting message blocks by different amounts before XOR

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Easy to generate collision

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The output of h is <u>pseudo-random</u> and exhibits <u>avalanche effect</u>

One-wayness Difficult to find a input that maps to a given hash output

<u>Collision resistance</u> Difficult to find two inputs mapping to same hash output

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
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3. Strong collision resistance

It is computationally infeasible to find any pair (x,y) such that h(x)=h(y)



Brute Force Attack on Hash Functions

Security depends on the length of h (n)


Attack on preimage resistance or weak collision resistance takes 2ⁿ⁻¹


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
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
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
Attack on strong collision resistance takes 2^{n/2} due to Birthday Paradox (Strong collision resistance is harder to achieve in the defender perspective)











Hash Using Block Ciphers

f can be a block cipher Similar to CBC but with no key

