Sociological Ambivalence

and Other Essays

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(*See p. 109.*)

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Discrimination and the American Creed

A PRIMARY FUNCTION of sociologists is to search out the determinants and consequences of diverse forms of social behavior. To the extent that they succeed in fulfilling this role, they clarify options available to organized social actions in given situations and of the probable outcome of each. To this extent, there is no sharp distinction between pure research and applied research. Rather, the difference is one between research with direct implications for particular problems of social action and research that is remote from these problems.[1] Not infrequently, basic research that has succeeded only in clearing up previously confused concepts may have an immediate bearing upon the problems of society to a degree not approximated by applied research oriented exclusively to these problems. At least, this is the assumption underlying the present paper: the clarification of apparently unclear and confused concepts in the sphere of race and ethnic relations is a step necessarily prior to the devising of effective programs for reducing intergroup conflict and for promoting equitable access to economic and social opportunities.

In an effort toward such clarification, I shall consider first the place of the creed of equitable access to opportunity in American culture; second, the relations of this creed to the beliefs and practices of Americans; third, the diverse types of orientation toward discrimination *and* prejudice, considered jointly; fourth, the implications for organized action of recognizing these diverse types; and fifth, the expectable consequences of alternative lines of action in diverse social contexts.

Reprinted with permission from *Discrimination and National Welfare*, R. M. MacIver, ed. (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1948), pp. 99–126.

1. [Implications of this idea have been elucidated in a paper published 15 years after this one: R. K. Merton, "Basic Research and Potentials of Relevance," *American Behavioral Scientist* 6 (May, 1963), pp. 86–90.]

The American Creed: As Cultural Ideal, Personal Belief, and Practice

Set forth in the Declaration of Independence, the preamble of the Constitution, and the Bill of Rights, the American creed has since often been misstated. This part of the cultural heritage does *not* include the patently false assertion that all human beings are created equal in capacity or endowment. It does *not* imply that an Einstein and a moron are equal in intellectual capacity or that Joe Louis and a small, frail Columbia professor (or a Mississippian Congressman) are equally endowed with brawny arms harboring muscles as strong as iron bands. It does *not* proclaim universal equality of innate intellectual or physical endowment.

Instead, the creed asserts the indefeasible principle of the human right to full equity—the right of equitable access to justice, freedom, and opportunity, irrespective of race or religion or ethnic origin. It proclaims further the universalist doctrine of the dignity of the individual, irrespective of the groups of which he is a part. It is a creed announcing full moral equities for all, not an absurd myth affirming the equality of intellectual and physical capacity of all people everywhere. And it goes on to say that although individuals differ in innate endowment, they do so as individuals, not by virtue of their group memberships.

Viewed sociologically, the creed is a set of values and precepts embedded in American culture to which Americans are expected to conform. It is a complex of affirmations, rooted in the historical past and ceremonially celebrated in the present, partly enacted in the laws of the land and partly not. Like all creeds, it is a profession of faith, a part of cultural tradition sanctified by the larger traditions of which it is a part.

It would be a mistaken sociological assertion, however, to suggest that the creed is a fixed and static cultural constant, unmodified in the course of time, just as it would be an error to imply that as an integral part of the culture, it evenly blankets all subcultures of the national society. It is indeed dynamic, subject to change and in turn promoting change in other spheres of culture and society. It is, moreover, unevenly distributed throughout the society, being institutionalized as an integral part of local culture in some regions of the society and rejected in others.

Nor does the creed exert the same measure of control over behavior in diverse times and places. Insofar as it is a "sacred" part of American culture, hallowed by tradition, it is largely immune to direct attack. But it may be honored simply in the breach. It is often evaded, and the evasions themselves become institutionalized, giving rise to what I have described as the "institutionalized evasion of institutional norms." Where

the creed is at odds with local beliefs and practices, it may persist as an empty cultural form partly because it is so flexible. It need not prove overly obstructive to the social, psychological, and economic gains of individuals, because there are still so many avenues for conscientiously ignoring the creed in practice. When necessary for peace of mind and psychological equilibrium, individuals indoctrinated with the creed who find themselves deviating from its precepts may readily explain how their behavior accords with the spirit of the creed rather than with its sterile letter. Or the creed itself is re-interpreted. Only those of equal endowment should have equal access to opportunity, it is said, and a given race or ethnic group manifestly does not have the requisite capacity to be deserving of opportunity. To provide such opportunities for the inferior of mind would be only wasteful of national resources. The rationalizations are too numerous and too familiar to bear repetition. The essential point is that the creed, though invulnerable to direct attack in some regions of the society, is not binding on practice. Many individuals and groups in many areas of the society systematically deny through daily conduct what they periodically affirm on ceremonial or public occasions.

This gap between creed and conduct has received wide notice. Learned men and men in high public positions have repeatedly observed and deplored the disparity between ethos and behavior in the sphere of race and ethnic relations. In his magisterial volumes on the American Negro, for example, Gunnar Myrdal called this gulf between creed and conduct "an American dilemma," and centered his attention on the prospect of narrowing or closing the gap. President Truman's Committee on Civil Rights, in their report to the nation, and President Truman himself, in a message to Congress, have called public attention to this "serious gap between our ideals and some of our practices."

But valid as these observations may be, they tend so to simplify the relations between creed and conduct as to be seriously misleading both for social policy and for social science. All these high authorities notwithstanding, the problems of racial and ethnic inequities are not expressible as a discrepancy between high cultural principles and low social conduct. It is a relation not between two variables, official creed, and private practice, but between three: first, the cultural creed honored in cultural tradition and partly enacted into law; second, the beliefs and attitudes of individuals regarding the principles of the creed; and third, the actual practices of individuals with reference to it.[2]

2. [Some implications of this threefold distinction are elucidated in a paper published some 10 years later than this one: R. K. Merton, "Social Conformity, Deviation, and Opportunity-Structures," *American Sociological Review* 24 (April, 1959), pp. 177–189. They have been considerably extended by Rose Laub Coser,

Once we substitute these three variables of cultural ideal, belief, and actual practice for the customary distinction between the two variables of cultural ideals and actual practices, the entire formulation of the problem becomes changed. We escape from the virtuous but ineffectual impasse of deploring the alleged hypocrisy of many Americans into the more difficult but potentially effectual realm of analyzing the problem actually in hand.

To describe the problem and to proceed to its analysis, we must consider the official creed, individuals' beliefs and attitudes concerning the creed, and their actual behavior. Once stated, the distinctions are readily applicable. Individuals may *recognize* the creed as part of a cultural tradition, *without having any private conviction of its moral validity or its binding quality*. Thus, so far as the beliefs of individuals are concerned, we can identify two types: those who genuinely believe in the creed and those who do not (although some of these may, on public or ceremonial occasions, profess adherence to its principles). Similarly, with respect to actual practices: conduct may or may not conform to the creed. And further, this being the salient consideration: *conduct may or may not conform with individuals' own beliefs concerning the moral claims of all people to equal opportunity*.

Stated in formal sociological terms, this asserts that attitudes and overt behavior vary independently. *Prejudicial attitudes need not coincide with discriminatory behavior*. The implications of this statement can be drawn out in terms of a logical syntax whereby the variables are diversely combined, as can be seen in the following typology.

A TYPOLOGY OF ETHNIC PREJUDICE AND DISCRIMINATION

	Attitude Dimension:* Prejudice and Non-prejudice	Behavior Dimension:* Discrimination and Non-discrimination
Type I: Unprejudiced non-discriminator	+	+
Type II: Unprejudiced discriminator	+	−
Type III: Prejudiced non-discriminator	−	+
Type IV: Prejudiced discriminator	−	−

* Where (+) = conformity to the creed and (−) = deviation from the creed. For a brief note on the uses of paradigms such as this, see the appendix to this paper.

"Insulation from Observability and Types of Social Conformity," *American Sociological Review* 26 (February, 1961), pp. 28–39, and "Complexity of Roles as a Seedbed of Individual Autonomy," in Lewis A. Coser, ed., *The Idea of Social Structure* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1975), pp. 237–63, esp. at pp. 252–59.]

By exploring the interrelations between prejudice and discrimination, we can identify four major types in terms of their attitudes toward the creed and their behavior with respect to it. Each type is found in every region and social class, although in varying numbers. By examining each type, we shall be better prepared to understand their interdependence and the appropriate types of action for curbing ethnic discrimination. The folk-labels for each type are intended to aid in their prompt recognition.

Type I: The Unprejudiced Non-Discriminator or All-Weather Liberal

These are the racial and ethnic liberals who adhere to the creed in both belief and practice. They are neither prejudiced nor given to discrimination. Their orientation toward the creed is fixed and stable. Whatever the environing situation, they are likely to abide by their beliefs: hence, the *all-weather* liberal.

These make up the strategic group that *can* act as the spearhead for the progressive extension of the creed into effective practice. They represent the solid foundation both for the measure of ethnic equities that now exist and for the future enlargement of these equities. Integrated with the creed in both belief and practice, they would seem most motivated to influence others toward the same democratic outlook. They represent a reservoir of culturally legitimatized goodwill that can be channeled into an active program for extending belief in the creed and conformity with it in practice.

Most important, as we shall see presently, the all-weather liberals comprise the group that can so reward others for conforming with the creed as to transform deviants into conformers. They alone can provide the positive social environment for the other types who will no longer find it expedient or rewarding to retain their prejudices or discriminatory practices.

Although ethnic liberals are a *potential* force for the successive extension of the American creed, they do not fully realize this potentiality in actual fact, for a variety of reasons. Among the limitations on effective action are several fallacies to which the ethnic liberal seems peculiarly subject. First among these is the *fallacy of group soliloquies*. Ethnic liberals are busily engaged in talking to themselves. Repeatedly, the same groups of like-minded liberals seek each other out, hold periodic meetings in which they engage in mutual exhortation, and thus lend social and psychological support to one another. But however much these unwittingly self-

selected audiences may reinforce the creed among themselves, they do not thus appreciably diffuse the creed in belief or practice to groups that depart from it in one respect or the other.

More, these group soliloquies in which there is typically wholehearted agreement among fellow-liberals tend to promote another fallacy limiting effective action. This is the *fallacy of unanimity*. Continued association with like-minded individuals tends to produce the illusion that a large measure of consensus has been achieved in the community at large. The unanimity regarding essential cultural axioms that obtains in these small groups provokes an overestimation of the strength of the movement and of its effective inroads upon the larger population, which does not necessarily share these creedal axioms. Many also mistake participation in the groups of like-minded individuals for effective action. Discussion accordingly takes the place of action. The reinforcement of the creed for oneself is mistaken for the extension of the creed among those outside the limited circle of ethnic liberals.

Arising from adherence to the creed is a third limitation upon effective action, the *fallacy of privatized solutions* to the problem. The ethnic liberal, precisely because he is at one with the American creed, may rest content with his own individual behavior and thus see no need to do anything about the problem at large. Since his own spiritual house is in order, he is not motivated by guilt or shame to work on a collective problem. The very freedom of the liberal from guilt thus prompts him to secede from any *collective* effort to set the national house in order. He essays a *private* solution to a *social* problem. He assumes that numerous individual adjustments will serve in place of a collective adjustment. His outlook, compounded of good moral philosophy but poor sociology, holds that each individual must put his own house in order and fails to recognize that privatized solutions cannot be effected for problems that are essentially social in nature. For clearly, if every person *were* motivated to abide by the American creed, the problem would not be likely to exist in the first place. It is only when a social environment is established by conformers to the creed that deviants can in due course be brought to modify their behavior in the direction of conformity. But this "environment" can be constituted only through collective effort and not through private adherence to a public creed. Thus we have the paradox that the clear conscience of many ethnic liberals may promote the very social situation that permits deviations from the creed to continue unchecked. Privatized liberalism invites social inaction. Accordingly, there appears the phenomenon of the inactive or passive liberal, himself at spiritual ease, neither prejudiced nor discriminatory, but in a measure

tending to contribute to the persistence of prejudice and discrimination through his very inaction.[3]

The fallacies of group soliloquy, unanimity, and privatized solutions thus operate to make the potential strength of the ethnic liberals unrealized in practice.

It is only by first recognizing these limitations that the liberal can hope to overcome them. With some hesitancy, one may suggest initial policies for curbing the scope of the three fallacies. The fallacy of group soliloquies can be removed only by having ethnic liberals enter into organized groups not comprised merely of fellow liberals. This exacts a heavy price of liberals. It means that they face initial opposition and resistance rather than prompt consensus. It entails giving up the gratifications of consistent group support.

The fallacy of unanimity can in turn be reduced by coming to see that American society often provides large rewards for those who express their ethnic prejudice in discriminatory practice. Only if the balance of rewards, material and social, is modified will behavior be modified. Sheer exhortation and propaganda are not enough. Exhortation verges on a belief in magic if it is not supported by appropriate changes in the social environment to make conformity with the exhortation rewarding.

Finally, the fallacy of privatized solutions requires the militant liberal to motivate the passive liberal to collective effort, possibly by inducing in him a sense of guilt for his unwitting contribution to the problems of ethnic inequities through his own systematic inaction.

One may suggest a unifying theme for the ethnic liberal: goodwill is not enough to modify social reality. It is only when this goodwill is harnessed to psychological and social realities that it can be used to reach cultural objectives.

Type II: The Unprejudiced Discriminator or Fair-Weather Liberal

The fair-weather liberal is the man of expediency who, despite his own freedom from prejudice, supports discriminatory practices when it is the

3. [Owing to a recent paper by Paul F. Lazarsfeld in Lewis A. Coser, ed., *The Idea of Social Structure* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1975), pp. 35–66, esp. at pp. 52–53, I am alerted to this "fallacy" being parallel to the "narcotizing dysfunction" of the mass media in which people conscientiously "mistake *knowing* about problems of the day for *doing* something about them." See Paul F. Lazarsfeld and R. K. Merton, "Mass Communication, Popular Taste and Organized Social Action," in Lyman Bryson, ed., *The Communication of Ideas* (New York: Harper & Row, 1948), pp. 95–118, esp. at pp. 105–106.]

easier or more profitable course. Expediency may take the form of holding his silence and thus implicitly acquiescing in expressions of ethnic prejudice by others or in the practice of discrimination by others. This is the expediency of the timid: the liberal who hesitates to speak up against discrimination for fear he might lose esteem or be otherwise penalized by his prejudiced associates. Or his expediency may take the form of grasping at advantages in social and economic competition deriving solely from the ethnic status of competitors. Thus the expediency of the self-assertive: the employer, himself not an anti-Semite or Negrophobe, who refuses to hire Jewish or Negro workers because "it might hurt business"; the trade union leader who expediently advocates racial discrimination in order not to lose the support of powerful Negrophobes in his union.

In varying degrees, fair-weather liberals suffer from guilt and shame for departing from their own effective beliefs in the American creed. Each deviation through which they derive a limited reward from passively acquiescing in or actively supporting discrimination contributes cumulatively to this fund of guilt. They are, therefore, peculiarly vulnerable to the efforts of the all-weather liberals who would help them bring conduct into accord with beliefs, thus removing this source of guilt. They are the most amenable to cure, because basically they want to be cured. Theirs is a split conscience that motivates them to cooperate actively with people who will help remove the source of internal conflict. They thus represent the strategic group promising the largest returns for the least effort. Persistent reaffirmation of the creed will only intensify their conflict but a long regimen in a favorable social climate can be expected to transform fair-weather liberals into all-weather liberals.

Type III: The Prejudiced Non-Discriminator or Fair-Weather Illiberal

The fair-weather illiberal is the reluctant conformist to the creed, the man of prejudice who does not believe in the creed but conforms to it in practice through fear of sanctions that might otherwise be visited upon him. You know him well: the prejudiced employer who discriminates against racial or ethnic groups until a Fair Employment Practice Commission, able and willing to enforce the law, puts the fear of punishment into him; the trade-union leader, himself deeply prejudiced, who does away with Jim Crow in his union because the rank-and-file demands that it be done away with; the businessman who forgoes his own preju-

dices when he finds a profitable market among the very people he hates, fears, or despises; the timid bigot who will not express his prejudices when he is in the presence of powerful men who vigorously and effectively affirm their belief in the American creed.

It should be clear that the fair-weather illiberal is the precise counterpart of the fair-weather liberal. Both are men of expediency, to be sure, but expediency dictates different courses of behavior in the two cases. The timid bigot conforms to the creed only when there is danger or loss in deviations, just as the timid liberal deviates from the creed only when there is danger or loss in conforming. *Superficial similarity in behavior of the two in the same situation should not be permitted to cloak a basic difference in the meaning of this outwardly similar behavior*, a difference that is as important for social policy as it is for social science. Whereas the timid bigot is under strain when he conforms to the creed, the timid liberal is under strain when he deviates. For ethnic prejudice has deep roots in the character structure of the fair-weather bigot, and this will find overt expression unless there are powerful countervailing forces—institutional, legal, and interpersonal. He does not accept the moral legitimacy of the creed; he conforms because he must, and will cease to conform when the pressure is removed. The fair-weather liberal, on the other hand, is effectively committed to the creed and does not require strong institutional pressure to conform; continuing interpersonal relations with all-weather liberals may be sufficient.

This is one critical point at which the traditional formulation of the problem of ethnic discrimination as a departure from the creed can lead to serious errors of theory and practice. *Overt behavioral deviation (or conformity) may signify importantly different situations, depending upon the underlying motivations.* Knowing simply that ethnic discrimination is rife in a community does not therefore point to appropriate lines of social policy. It is necessary to know also the distribution of ethnic prejudices and basic motivations for these prejudices as well. Communities with the same amount of overt discrimination may represent vastly different types of problems, dependent on whether the population is comprised of a large nucleus of fair-weather liberals ready to abandon their discriminatory practices under slight interpersonal pressure or a large nucleus of fair-weather illiberals who will abandon discrimination only if major changes in the local institutional setting can be effected. Any statement of the problem as a gulf between creedal ideals and prevailing practice is thus seen to be overly simplified in the precise sense of masking this decisive difference between the type of discrimination exhibited by the fair-weather liberal and by the fair-weather illiberal.

That the gulf between ideal and practice does not adequately describe the nature of the ethnic problem will become more apparent as we turn to the fourth type in our inventory of prejudice and discrimination.

Type IV: The Prejudiced Discriminator or the All-Weather Illiberal

This type, too, is not unknown to you. He is the confirmed illiberal, the bigot pure and unashamed, the man of prejudice consistent in his departures from the American creed. In some measure, he is found everywhere in the land, though in varying numbers. He derives large social and psychological gains from his conviction that "any white man (including the village idiot) is 'better' than any nigger (including George Washington Carver)." He considers differential treatment of Negro and white not as "discrimination," in the sense of unfair treatment, but as "discriminating," in the sense of showing acute discernment. For him, it is as clear that one "ought" to accord a Negro and a white different treatment in a wide diversity of situations as it is clear to the population at large that one "ought" to accord a child and an adult different treatment in many situations.

This illustrates anew my reason for questioning the applicability of the usual formula of the American dilemma as a gap between lofty creed and low conduct. For the confirmed illiberal, ethnic discrimination does *not* represent a discrepancy between *his* ideals and *his* behavior. His ideals proclaim the right, even the duty, of discrimination. Accordingly, his behavior does not entail a sense of social deviation, with the resultant strains that this would involve. The ethnic illiberal is as much a conformist as the ethnic liberal. He is merely conforming to a different cultural and institutional pattern that is centered, not on the creed, but on a doctrine of essential inequality of status ascribed to those of diverse ethnic and racial origins. To overlook this is to overlook the well-known *fact* that our national culture is divided into a number of local subcultures that are not consistent among themselves in all respects. And again, to fail to take this fact of different subcultures into account is to open the door for all manner of errors of social policy in attempting to control the problems of racial and ethnic discrimination.

This view of the all-weather illiberal has one immediate implication with wide bearing upon social policies and sociological theory oriented toward the problem of discrimination. The extreme importance of the social surroundings of the confirmed illiberal at once becomes apparent.

For as these surroundings vary, so, in some measure, does the problem of the consistent illiberal. The illiberal, living in those cultural regions where the American creed is widely repudiated and is no effective part of the subculture, has his private ethnic attitudes and practices supported by the local mores, the local institutions, and the local power structure. The illiberal in cultural areas dominated by a large measure of adherence to the American creed is in a social environment where he is isolated and receives small social support for his beliefs and practices. In both instances, the *individual* is an illiberal, to be sure, but he represents two significantly different *sociological types.* In the first instance, he is a *social conformist*, with strong moral and institutional reinforcement, whereas in the second, he is a *social deviant*, lacking strong social corroboration. In the one case, his discrimination involves him in further integration with his network of social relations; in the other, it threatens to cut him off from sustaining interpersonal ties. In the first cultural context, personal change in his ethnic behavior involves alienating himself from people significant to him; in the second context, this change of personal outlook may mean fuller incorporation in groups significant to him. In the first situation, modification of his ethnic views requires him to take the path of greatest resistance whereas in the second, it may mean the path of least resistance. From all this, we may surmise that any social policy aimed at changing the behavior and perhaps the attitudes of the all-weather illiberal will have to take into systematic account the cultural and social structure of the area in which he lives.

Some Assumptions Underlying Social Policies for Reduction of Racial and Ethnic Discrimination

To diagnose the problem, it appears essential to recognize these several types of people and not to obscure their differences by general allusions to the "gulf between ideals and practice." Some of these people discriminate precisely because their local cultural ideals proclaim the duty of discrimination. Others discriminate only when they find it expedient to do so, just as still others fail to translate their prejudices into active discrimination when *this* proves expedient. It is the existence of these three types of people, in a society traditionally given over to the American creed, who constitute "the racial problem" or "the ethnic problem." Those who practice discrimination are *not* people of one kind. *And because they are not all of a piece, there must be diverse social therapies, each directed at a given type in a given social situation.*

Were it not for widespread social policies to the contrary, it would be unnecessary to emphasize that there is no single social policy that will be adequate for all these types in all social situations. So far as I know, sociological science has not yet evolved knowledge for application to this problem sufficient to merit great confidence in the results. But it has reached the point where it can suggest, with some assurance, that different social types in different social contexts require different social therapies if their behavior is to be changed. To diagnose these several types, therefore, may not be an "academic" exercise, in the too frequent and dolorous sense of the word "academic." However scanty our knowledge, if action is to be taken, such diagnoses represent the first step toward pragmatic social therapy. The unprejudiced discriminators will respond differently from the prejudiced non-discriminators and they, in turn, differently from the prejudiced discriminators or all-weather illiberals. And each of these will respond according to the social composition of the groups and community in which they are involved.

In setting forth my opinions on the strategy of dealing with ethnic and racial discrimination, I hope it is plain that I move far beyond the adequately accredited knowledge provided by sociology to this point. In 1948, neither the rigorous theory nor many needed data are at hand to "apply" sociological science to this massive problem of American society. But moving from the slight accumulation of sociological knowledge at my disposal, it may be possible to suggest some considerations that it seems wise to take into account. For at scattered points, our knowledge may be sufficient to detect probably erroneous assumptions, although it is not always adequate to set out probably sound assumptions.

It is sometimes assumed that discrimination and its frequent though not invariable adjunct, prejudice, are entirely the product of ignorance. To be sure, ignorance *may* support discrimination. The employer unfamiliar with the findings of current anthropology and psychology, for example, may discriminate against Negroes on the ground of the honest and ignorant conviction that they are inherently less intelligent than whites. But, in general, there is no indication that ignorance is the major source of discrimination. The evidence at hand does not show that ethnic and racial discrimination is consistently less common among those boasting a college education than among the less well educated.[4]

To question the close connection between ignorance and discrimination is to raise large implications for social policy. For if one assumes that ignorance and error are alone involved, obviously all that need be

4. [An obviously dated statement, somewhat misleading even at the time it was put forward.]

done by way of curbing prevalent discriminatory practices is to introduce a program of education concerning racial and ethnic matters, on a scale yet unimagined. Mass education and mass propaganda would at once become the sole indicated tools for action. But there are few who will accept the implications of this assumption that simple ignorance is a major or exclusive source of discrimination and will urge that formal education alone can turn the trick. If some seem to be saying this, it is, I suspect, because they are begging the question; they are using the phrase "education on racial and ethnic matters" in an equivocal sense to mean "eradication of racial and ethnic prejudices." But, of course, that is precisely the question at issue: what *are* the procedures most likely to eradicate prejudice and discrimination?

If the assumption of ignorance as the root source of discrimination is put to one side, then *we must be prepared to find that discrimination is in part sustained by a socialized reward system.* When a population is divided into subgroups, some of which are set apart as inferior, even the lowliest member of the ostensibly superior group derives psychic gains from this institutionalized superiority of status. This system of discrimination also supplies preferential access to opportunity for the more favored groups. The taboos erect high tariff walls restricting the importation of talent from the ethnic outgroups. But we need not assume that such psychic, social, and economic gains are *sufficient* to account for the persistence of ethnic discrimination in a society that has an ideal pattern proclaiming free and equal access to opportunity. To be sure, these rewards supply motivation for discrimination. But people favor practices that give them differential advantages only so long as there is a moral code that defines these advantages as "fair." In the absence of this code, special advantage is not typically exploited. Were this not the case, the doctrine of Hobbes would stand unimpaired: everyone would cheat—in personal, economic, and other institutional relations. Yet the most cynical observer would not suggest that chicanery and cheating are the typical order of the day in all spheres, even where fear of discovery is at a minimum. This suggests that discrimination is sustained not only by the direct gains to those who discriminate but also by cultural norms that legitimatize discrimination.

To the extent that the foregoing assumptions are valid, efforts to minimize discrimination must take into account at least three sets of factors sustaining discriminatory practices. And each of these points toward distinct, though interrelated, lines of attack on the forces promoting discrimination. First, mass education and propaganda would be directed toward the reduction of sheer ignorance concerning the objective

attributes of ethnic groups and of the processes of intergroup relations and attitudes. Second, institutional and interpersonal programs would seek to reduce the social, psychic, and economic gains presently accruing to those who discriminate. And third, long-range efforts would be required to reinforce the legitimacy of the American creed as a set of cultural norms applicable to all groups in the society.

One gains the impression that certain secular trends in the society are slowly affecting each of these three fronts. On the educational front, we find an increasing proportion of the American population receiving higher schooling. And in the course of schooling, many are exposed for the first time to salient *facts* regarding ethnic and racial groups. Preconceptions notwithstanding, higher educational institutions even in the Deep South do not teach discredited myths of race superiority; if race is treated at all, it is in substantially factual terms countering the cognitive errors now sustaining race discrimination. Without assuming that such education plays a basic role, I suggest that insofar as it is at all effective, it undermines erroneous conceptions of racial and ethnic qualities.

On the economic front, secular change moves with geological speed but consistently in the same positive direction. This secular trend is represented in slow shifts in the occupational composition of Negroes and other ethnic groups toward a perceptibly higher average level. Again, the importance of these slight shifts should not be exaggerated. As everyone knows, prejudice and its frequent corollary in action, discrimination, are resistant, if not entirely immune, to the coercion of sheer facts. Yet the white agricultural laborer does recognize, at some level of his self, the improbability of his "superiority" to the Negro physician or university president. *The discrepancy between achieved occupational status and ascribed caste status introduces severe strains upon the persistence of rationalized patterns of social superiority.* As occupational and educational opportunity expands for Negroes, the number of Negroes with class status higher than that of many whites will grow and with it the grounds for *genuinely believing*, no matter what one's protestations, that "any white man is better than any nigger" will be progressively eroded. This secular change is, of course, a two-edged sword: every economic advance of the Negro invites increased hostility and resentment. *But no major change in social structure occurs without the danger of temporarily increased conflict (though it is a characteristic of the liberal to want the rose without the thorn, to seek major change without conflict).* In any event, it seems plausible that the secular trend of occupational change presently militates against the unimpeded persistence of discrimination.

On the third front of the reinforcement of the American creed, the impressionistic picture is not so clear. But even here, there is one massive

fact of contemporary history that points to a firmer foundation for this cultural doctrine. In a world riven with international fears, the pressure for national consensus grows stronger. Ethnic and racial fissures in the national polity cannot so lightly be endured. (Consider the concessions commonly given these groups in times of war.) This tendency is enhanced as Americans become sensitized to the balance of world population and recognize that firm alliances must be built with nonwhite peoples, ultimately, it is hoped, in a world alliance. From these pressures external to the nation, there develops an increasing movement toward translating the American creed from a less than fully effective ideology into a working code governing the actual behavior of men. Slight, yet not unimpressive, signs of this change are evident. In the realm of institutional organizations, there is growing pressure upon government, universities, trade unions, and churches to govern themselves by the words they profess. In the realm of interpersonal relations, one has a marked impression of increasing relations between members of diverse racial and ethnic groups. (This change in the pattern of private relations must remain conjectural, until social research searches out the needed facts. Periodic researches into the frequency of interracial and interethnic friendships would provide a barometer of interpersonal relations [necessarily invisible to the individual observer] that could be used to supplement current information on institutional changes and public decisions.)

These assumptions of the strategic significance of the three major fronts of social policy on race and ethnic relations and these impressions of secular trends now in progress on each front provide the basis for a consideration of social strategies for the reduction of discrimination.

Implications of the Typology for Social Policy

This necessary detour into the assumptions underlying social policy leads us back to the main path laid down in the account of the four main types appearing in our typology of prejudice and discrimination. And again, however disconcerting the admission may be, it is essential to note that we must be wholly tentative in drawing out the implications of this typology for social policy, for the needed sociological theory and data are plainly inadequate to the practical demands of the situation. Yet if we cannot confidently establish the procedures that should be followed, we can perhaps exclude the procedures that are likely to be unproductive. The successive elimination of alternative procedures is some small gain.

In approaching problems of policy, two things are plain. First, these

should be considered from the standpoint of the militant ethnic liberals, for they alone are sufficiently motivated to engage in positive action for the reduction of ethnic discrimination. And second, the fair-weather liberal, the fair-weather illiberal, and the all-weather illiberal represent types differing sufficiently to require diverse kinds of treatment.

Treatment of the Fair-Weather Liberal

The fair-weather liberals, it will be remembered, discriminate only when it appears expedient to do so, and experience some measure of guilt for deviating from their own belief in the American creed. They suffer from a conflict between conscience and conduct. Accordingly, they are relatively easy targets for the all-weather liberals. They constitute the strategic group promising the largest immediate returns for the least effort. Recognition of this type defines the first task for militant liberals who would enter into a collective effort to make the creed a viable and effective set of social norms rather than a ceremonial myth. And though the tactics that this definition of the problem suggests are numerous, I can here allude to only one of these, while emphasizing anew that much of the research data required for fuller confidence in this suggestion are not yet at hand. But passing by the discomforts of our ignorance for the moment, the following would seem to be roughly the case.

Since the fair-weather liberal discriminates only when it seems rewarding to do so, the crucial need is so to change social situations that there are few occasions in which discrimination proves rewarding and many in which it does not. This would suggest that ethnic liberals self-consciously and deliberately seek to draw into the social groups where they constitute a comfortable majority a number of the "expedient discriminators." This would serve to counteract the dangers of self-selection through which liberals come to associate primarily with like-minded individuals. It would, further, provide an interpersonal and social environment for fair-weather liberals in which they would find substantial social and psychological gains from abiding by their own beliefs, gains that would more than offset the rewards attendant upon occasional discrimination. It appears that people do not long persist in behavior that lacks social corroboration.

We have much to learn about the role of numbers and proportions in determining the behavior of members of a group. But it seems that individuals generally act differently when they are numbered among a minority rather than the majority. This is not to say that minorities uniformly

abdicate their practices in the face of a contrary-acting majority, but only that the same people are subjected to different strains and pressures according to whether they are included in the majority or the minority. And the fair-weather liberal who finds himself associated with militant ethnic liberals may be expected to forgo his occasional deviations into discrimination; he may move from category II into category I; this at least is suggested by our current Columbia-Lavanburg researches on ethnic relations in the planned community.

This suggestion calls attention to the possible significance for policy of the composition of a local population with respect to the four types found in our typology, a consideration to which I shall presently return in some detail. But first it is necessary to consider briefly the problems attending policies for dealing with the illiberal.

Treatment of the Fair-Weather Illiberal

Because their *beliefs* correspond to those of the full-fledged liberal, the fair-weather liberals can rather readily be drawn into an interpersonal environment constituted by those of a comparable turn of mind. This would be more difficult for the fair-weather illiberals, whose beliefs are so fully at odds with those of ethnic liberals that they may, at first, only be alienated by association with them. If the initial tactic for the fair-weather liberal, therefore, is a change in interpersonal environment, the seemingly most appropriate tactic for the fair-weather illiberal is a change in the institutional and legal environment. It is, indeed, probably this type that liberals implicitly have in mind when they expect significant changes in behavior to result from the introduction of controls on ethnic discrimination into the legal machinery of our society.

For this type—and it is a major limitation for planning policies of control that we do not know their numbers or their distribution in the country—it would seem that the most effective tactic is the institution of legal controls administered with effectiveness. This would presumably reduce the amount of *discrimination* practiced by fair-weather illiberals, although it might *initially* enhance rather than reduce their *prejudices*.

Despite large libraries on the subject, we have little by way of rigorous knowledge indicating how this group of prejudiced but coercible conformists can be brought to abandon their prejudices. But something is known on a research basis of two methods that are *not* effective, information important for social policy since groups of ethnic liberals do commonly utilize these two apparently ineffectual methods. I refer, first, to

mass propaganda for "tolerance" and second, the formation of interracial groups seeking to promote tolerance among their members.

Available evidence suggests rather uniformly that propaganda for ethnic equity disseminated through the channels of mass communication does not appreciably modify prejudice. Where prejudice is deep-seated, it serves too many psychological and social functions for the illiberal for it to be relinquished in response to propaganda, emanating from howsoever prestigeful a source. The propaganda is either evaded through misinterpretation or selectively assimilated into his prejudice system in such a fashion as to produce a "boomerang effect" of intensified prejudice.[5] Seemingly, propaganda for ethnic tolerance has a more important effect upon the propagand*ist*, who comes to feel that he "is doing something" about diffusing the American creed, than upon the prejudiced people who are the ostensible objects of the propaganda. It is at least plausible that *the great dependence of ethnic liberals upon propaganda for tolerance persists because of the morale function the propaganda serves for the liberals who feel that something positive is being accomplished.*

A second prevalent tactic for modifying the prejudice of fair-weather illiberals is that of seeking to draw them into interethnic groups explicitly formed for the promotion of tolerance. This, too, seems largely ineffectual, since the deeply prejudiced individual will not enter into such groups of his own volition. As a consequence of this process of self-selection, these tolerance groups soon come to be comprised of the very ethnic liberals who initiated the enterprise.

This barrier of self-selection can be partially hurdled only if the ethnic illiberals are brought into continued association with militant liberals in groups devoted to significant common values, quite remote from objectives of ethnic equity as such. Thus, as our Columbia-Lavanburg researches have found, many fair-weather illiberals *will* live in interracial housing projects in order to enjoy the rewards of superior housing at a

5. There is a large literature bearing on this point. For recent discussions, see P. F. Lazarsfeld, "Some Remarks on the Role of Mass Media in So-called Tolerance Propaganda," *Journal of Social Issues* (Summer, 1947); P. F. Lazarsfeld and R. K. Merton, "Media of Mass Communication, Popular Taste, and Organized Social Action," in Bryson, ed., *Communication of Ideas*; M. Jahoda and E. Cooper, "Evasion of Propaganda: How Prejudiced People Respond to Anti-prejudice Propaganda," *Journal of Psychology*, 23 (1947), pp. 15–25. For an appraisal of the inadequate research to date on this problem, see R. M. Williams, Jr., *The Reduction of Intergroup Tensions* (New York, Social Science Research Council, 1947), p. 32 ff. The absence of adequate evidence attesting the *pragmatic* (not statistical) significance of tolerance propaganda suggests that propaganda programs now represent an act of faith on the part of propagandists.

given rental. And some of the illiberals thus brought into personal contact with various ethnic groups under the auspices of prestigeful militant liberals come to modify their prejudices. It is, apparently, only through interethnic collaboration, initially enforced by pressures of the situation, for immediate and significant objectives (other than tolerance) that the self-insulation of the fair-weather illiberal from rewarding interethnic contacts can be removed.

But however difficult it may presently be to affect the *prejudicial sentiments* of fair-weather liberals, their *discriminatory practices* can be lessened by the uniform, prompt, and prestigeful use of legal and institutional sanctions. The critical problem is to ascertain the proportions of fair-weather and all-weather illiberals in a given local population in order to have some clue to the probable effectiveness or ineffectiveness of anti-discrimination legislation.

Treatment of the All-Weather Illiberal

It is, of course, the hitherto confirmed illiberal, persistently translating prejudices into active discrimination, who represents the most difficult problem. But although he requires longer and more careful treatment, it is possible that he is not beyond change. In every instance, his social surroundings must be assiduously taken into account. It makes a peculiarly large difference whether he is in a cultural region of bigotry or in a predominantly "liberal" area, given over to verbal adherence to the American creed at the very least. As this cultural climate varies, so must the prescription for his cure and the prognosis for a relatively quick or long delayed recovery.

In an unfavorable cultural climate—and this does not necessarily exclude the benign regions of the Far South—the immediate resort will probably have to be that of working through legal and administrative federal controls over extreme discrimination, *with full recognition that, in all probability, these regulations will be systematically evaded for some time to come.* In such cultural regions, we may expect nullification of the law as the common practice, perhaps as common as was the case in the nation at large with respect to the Eighteenth Amendment, often with the connivance of local officers of the law. The large gap between the new law and local mores will not *at once* produce significant change of prevailing practices; token punishments of violations will probably be more common than effective control. At best, one may assume that significant change will be fitful, and excruciatingly slow. But secular changes in the economy may in due course lend support to the new legal framework of

control over discrimination. As the economic shoe pinches because the illiberals do not fully mobilize the resources of industrial manpower nor extend their local markets through equitable wage payments, they may slowly abandon some discriminatory practices as they come to find that these do not always pay—even the discriminator. So far as discrimination is concerned, organized counteraction is possible, and some small results may be expected. But it would seem that wishes father thoughts, when one expects basic changes in the immediate future in these regions of institutionalized discrimination.

The situation is somewhat different with regard to the scattered, rather than aggregated, ethnic illiberals found here and there throughout the country. Here the mores and a social organization oriented toward the American creed still have some measure of prestige and the resources of a majority of liberals can be mobilized to isolate the illiberal. In these surroundings, it is possible to move the all-weather illiberal toward Type III—he can be brought to conform with institutional regulations, even though he does not surrender his prejudices. And once he has entered upon this role of the dissident but conforming individual, the remedial program designed for the fair-weather illiberal would be in order.

Ecological Bases of Social Policy

Where authenticated data are few and scattered and one must make *some* decision, whether it be the decision to act in a given fashion or not to take action at all, then one must resort to reasonable conjecture as the basis for policy. That is what I have done in assuming throughout that policies designed to curb ethnic discrimination must be oriented toward differences in the composition of a population with respect to the four types under discussion. It is safe to assume that communities and larger areas vary in the proportion of these several types. Some communities may have an overwhelming majority of militant liberals, in positions of authority and among the rank-and-file. Others may be short on ethnic liberals but long on fair-weather illiberals who respond promptly though reluctantly to the pressure of institutional controls. It would seem reasonable to suppose that different social policies of control over discrimination would be required as these ecological distributions of prejudice–discrimination types vary.

This assumption is concretized in the conjectural distributions of these types set forth in the following charts. Consider the same legislation aimed at curbing job discrimination against the Negro as this might operate in a community in the Far South and in New England. Since it runs counter

to the strongly entrenched attitudes of the large majority in the one community and not in the other, we may suppose that the same law will produce different results in the two cases. This must be put in a reasonable time perspective. Conceivably, the short-term and the long-term effects may differ widely. But with respect to both the long and the short term, it matters greatly whether there is a sufficient local nucleus of ethnic liberals in positions of prestige and authority. The ecological and social distribution of the prejudice–discrimination types is of central importance in assessing the probable outcome. Whether a law providing for equitable access to jobs will in fact produce this result depends not only on the law itself as on the rest of the social structure. The law is a small, though important, part of the whole. Unless a strong economic and social base for its support exists in a community, the law will be nullified in practice.

Charts C and D set forth, again conjecturally, the distribution of the prejudice–discrimination types with respect to the Jew among middle-

HYPOTHETICAL CLASS AND REGIONAL PROFILES AND CULTURAL CLICHÉS FOR THE PREJUDICE-DISCRIMINATION TYPOLOGY

Chart A. Deep South Community

(Distribution of Attitudes and Practices with respect to *the Negro*)

TYPES	LOCAL CULTURAL CLICHÉS IDENTIFYING TYPE
I	– "Nigger lover"
II	– (Clandestine liberal conformist)
III	– (This type virtually non-existent here)
IV	– "Any white man's better than any nigger."

Chart B. New England Community

(Distribution of Attitudes and Practices with respect to *the Negro*)

I	– "All men are created equal . . ."
II	– "Some of my good friends are Negroes . . ."
III	– "A Negro's dollar's as good as a white's."
IV	– "They're all right in their place."

Chart C. Middle Class "Strainers" for "Success"

(Distribution of Attitudes and Practices with respect to *the Jew*)

I	– "All men should be judged as individuals."
II	– "But he was just too pushy, too aggressive."
III	– (The well-bred anti-Semite)
IV	– "Like to out-Jew a Jew"

Chart D. Industrial Workers

(Distribution of Attitudes and Practices with respect to *the Jew*)

I	– "We'll unite to fight our *real* enemies."
II	– "Maybe you're right, but some Jews are O.K."
III	– "You can't afford to step on a Jew . . ."
IV	– "The Jews have got all the money."

class "strainers" and industrial workers. Should research find that the industrial worker stratum indeed has a larger proportion of militant ethnic liberals than the middle classes, then initial support of an active anti-discrimination policy might most effectively be sought there. But whatever the actual facts might show, policy-makers attuned to the realities as well as the objectives of the problem would do well to take these into account in the design of programs.

If makers of policy are to escape utopianism on the one hand and pessimistic inaction on the other, they must utilize diverse procedures for modifying attitudes and behavior according to the distribution of these prejudice–discrimination types.

Finally, though action cannot, perhaps, wait upon continued research, it is suggested that the following kinds of information are needed as a basis for effective anti-discrimination policy:

1. An inventory to determine the relative proportions in various areas of the four prejudice–discrimination types;
2. Within each area, an inventory of these proportions among the several social classes, major associations, and nationality groups;
3. Periodic audits of these proportions, thus providing a barometric map of ethnic attitudes and practices repeatedly brought up to date and marking the short-run and secular trends in diverse areas and groups;
4. Continuing studies of the consequences of various programs designed to promote ethnic equities, thus reducing the wastage presently entailed by well-intentioned, expensive, and ineffectual programs.

This is a large research order. But the American creed, as set down in the basic moral documents of this nation, seems deserving of the systematic exercise of our social intelligence fully as much as it is deserving of our moral resolution.

Appendix: A Note on the Use of Paradigms in Qualitative Analysis

Something should be said of the purposes of paradigms, such as the prejudice–discrimination typology, which set out the interrelations of

qualitative items. Otherwise, the paradigm will be mistaken for simply a notational device rather than taken for what it is, a logical design for analysis, implicitly present even when it is not explicitly set forth. I believe that paradigms such as this one and others which have been developed for functional analysis in sociology, for the sociology of knowledge, and for the analysis of deviant behavior,[6] have great propaedeutic value. They bring out into the open the array of assumptions, concepts, and basic propositions employed in a sociological investigation. They thus dampen the inadvertent tendency to hide the hard core of analysis behind a veil of logically unconnected though possibly illuminating observations. Although there are some preliminary efforts to assemble propositional inventories of sociological knowledge, the discipline still has few formulae—that is, highly abbreviated symbolic expressions of stable relationships between variables. Sociological interpretations tend to be discursive. The logic of procedure, the key concepts, and the relationships between them and observation often become lost to view. When this happens, the critical reader must laboriously fend for himself in trying to identify the tacit assumptions of the author. The paradigm serves to reduce this tendency for the theorist to employ tacit concepts and assumptions.

Paradigms for qualitative analysis have at least five closely related functions.

First, paradigms have a notational function. They provide a compact, parsimonious arrangement of the central concepts and their interrelations as these are utilized for description and analysis. Having one's concepts set out in sufficiently brief compass to permit their *simultaneous* inspection is an important aid to self-correction of one's successive interpretations, a result difficult to achieve when one's concepts are scattered and hidden in page after page of discursive exposition. (This, it appears, as may be seen from the work of Cajori on its history, is one of the major reasons for the importance of mathematical symbolism: it permits the simultaneous inspection of terms entering into the analysis.)

6. For these examples of what I understand by qualitative paradigms in sociology, see R. K. Merton, "Paradigm for Functional Analysis in Sociology," and "Paradigm for the Sociology of Knowledge," in *Social Theory and Social Structure* (New York: The Free Press, [1949] 1968), pp. 104–109, 514–15; and for delimited paradigms, "Social Structure and Anomie," *ibid.*, p. 195. and "Intermarriage and the Social Structure: Fact and Theory," *Psychiatry* 4 (1941), pp. 361–74 (reprinted as the following paper in this volume). For apposite logical analyses, see C. G. Hempel and P. Oppenheim, *Der Typusbegriff im Lichte der neuen Logik* (Leiden: A. W. Sijthoff, 1936), esp. pp. 44–101; P. F. Lazarsfeld, "Some Remarks on the Typological Procedure in Social Research," *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung* 6 (1937), pp. 119–39.

Second, the explicit statement of analytic paradigms lessens the likelihood of inadvertently importing hidden assumptions and concepts, since each new assumption and each new concept must be either *derivable* from the previous terms of the paradigm or explicitly *incorporated* in it. The paradigm thus supplies a pragmatic and logical guide for the avoidance of *ad hoc* (i.e., logically irresponsible) hypotheses.

Third, paradigms advance a *cumulation* of theoretical interpretation. In this respect, we can regard the paradigm as the foundation upon which the house of interpretations is built. If a new story cannot be built directly upon the paradigmatic foundation, i.e., if it is not derivable from it, then it must be treated as a new wing of the total structure, and the foundations (of concepts and assumptions) must be extended to support the new wing. Moreover, each new story that *can* be built upon the original foundations strengthens our confidence in their substantial quality just as every new extension, precisely because it requires additional foundations, leads us to suspect the soundness of the original substructure. To pursue the figure further: a paradigm in which we can justifiably repose great confidence will in due course support an interpretative structure of skyscraper dimensions, with each successive story testifying to the substantial and well-laid quality of the original foundations, whereas a defective paradigm will support only a rambling one-story structure, in which each new set of observations requires a new foundation to be laid, since the original cannot bear the weight of additional stories.

Fourth, by their very arrangement, paradigms suggest modes of systematic cross-tabulation of putatively significant concepts and thus sensitize the investigator to empirical and theoretical problems that might otherwise be overlooked. Paradigms promote analysis rather than continued description of concrete details. They direct our attention, for example, to the components of social behavior, to possible strains and tensions between these components, and so to social sources of deviation from socially prescribed behavior.

Fifth, paradigms make for the codification of qualitative analysis in a way that approximates the logical if not the empirical rigor of quantitative analysis. The procedures for computing statistical measures, like their mathematical foundations, are codified as a matter of course; the procedures and assumptions are readily open to critical scrutiny. By contrast, the sociological analysis of qualitative data often resides in a private world of inquiry in which the often interesting results cannot be reproduced by others. Discursive interpretations not based upon paradigms are of course often perceptive and evocative. As the phrase has it, they are rich in "illuminating insights." But it is not always clear just which op-

erations and analytical concepts were utilized in arriving at those insights. In some quarters, even the suggestion that these private experiences must be reshaped into publicly certifiable procedures is taken as a sign of impiety or downright ignorance. Yet the use of concepts and procedures for investigation by even the most qualitative-minded sociologists must be reproducible if they are to be given credence. Science, and this includes sociological science, is public, not private. It is not that we ordinary sociologists wish to cut all talents to our own small stature; it is only that the contributions by the great and small alike must be reproducible and codifiable if they are to advance sociological knowledge.

All virtues can easily become vices merely by being carried to excess and this applies to the sociological paradigm. It can become a temptation to mental indolence. Equipped with a paradigm, the sociologist may shut his eyes to strategic data not expressly called for by the paradigm. It can thus be transformed from a sociological field-glass into a sociological blinker. Misuse results from absolutizing the paradigm rather than from using it as a tentative point of departure. But if they are recognized as provisional and changing, destined to be modified in the immediate future as they have been in the recent past, these paradigms are preferable to sets of tacit assumptions.

Upon proposing this conception of paradigms in sociology back in the 1940s, I discovered that it was regarded as an unusual, not to say bizarre, usage. One candid friend went so far as to inform me that the notion of a "paradigm" was "really appropriate" only as an exemplar for declension or conjugation that exhibits all the inflectional forms of a class of words. In rebuking me, he of course managed to put aside Plato's idea of paradeigmata as well as centuries-long usage of the word in the extended sense of pattern or exemplar. Over the past quarter-century, the notion of paradigm in the indicated sense became thoroughly domesticated, not alone in sociology and psychology but in other social and behavioral disciplines as well.

With the appearance in 1962 of Thomas S. Kuhn's vastly consequential book, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, the term "paradigm" has acquired a substantially different set of meanings and far wider usage. In a recent overview,[7] Raymond Firth instructively summarizes the dif-

7. Raymond Firth, "An Appraisal of Modern Social Anthropology," in *Annual Review of Anthropology* 4 (1975), pp. 1–25, at pp. 12–15. For other recent discussions of related kind, see Robert W. Friedrichs, "Dialectical Sociology: An Exemplar for the 1970s," *Social Forces* 50 (1973), pp. 447–55; Raymond Boudon, "Notes sur la Notion de Théorie dans les Sciences Sociales," *Archives Européennes de Sociologie* 11 (1970), pp. 201–51; S. B. Barnes, "Paradigms—

ferences and, to some degree, the conceptual relations between the two usages, in a passage which can be instructively quoted at length:

> Some might characterize the present situation in social anthropology as the paradigmatic phase. Paradigm has become the key word for a lot of interpretation. Paradigm, a word derived from classical sources, has been in use in English since at least the seventeenth century to mean a pattern to follow, an exemplar. It also has a hint of providing the basic components underlying any variation which a phenomenon might assume. In this sense the term was used by Robert Merton long ago when he was arguing for stricter methodology and greater awareness of the theoretical framework of sociological analysis. Merton used what he called the device of the analytical paradigm to present in a succinct way "codified materials" on concepts, procedures, and inferences over a range of problems from the requirements of functional analysis to social pressures leading to deviant behavior. Merton pointed out that any sound sociological analysis inevitably implies some theoretical paradigm, and he held that an explicit statement of such analytical model allows assumptions which would otherwise be hidden to be brought to the surface and laid open to scrutiny. He also argued that such analytical paradigms suggest systematic cross-tabulation of concepts, help to give more rigor in codifying qualitative data, and generally aid the symbolic expression of relationships between sociological variables. (The synoptic charts used by Malinowski for study of Trobriand agriculture or African culture change are examples of analogous paradigms primarily directed to research in the field.)
>
> Modern social anthropologists use the notion of paradigm rather differently, borrowing it not from Merton but from de Saussure and Thomas Kuhn. Moreover, one tendency is to attribute the paradigm not to the analytical observer but to the people whose behavior and ideas are being analyzed. In this setting a paradigm is a framework of ideas which the people have for envisaging and dealing with a specific set of circumstances and problems relating thereto—a kind of mental map of a sector of the natural and social world. Hence actors may

Scientific and Social," *Man* 4 (1969), pp. 94–102; James T. Duke, *Conflict and Power in Social Life* (Provo, Utah: Brigham Young University Press, 1976), pp. 305–13; Derek L. Phillips, "Paradigms and Incommensurability," *Theory and Society* 2 (1975), pp. 37–61; Don Martindale, "Sociological Theory and the Ideal Type," in Llewellyn Gross, ed., *Symposium on Sociological Theory* (Evanston: Row, Peterson, 1959), pp. 77–80. See also the pages in Chapter 7 of this volume on the multivalent meanings of "paradigm" and, in particular, the reference to Margaret Masterman, "The Nature of a Paradigm," in Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave, eds., *Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge* (Cambridge: University Press, 1970), pp. 59–90.

be spoken of as encoding those circumstances in terms of preexisting paradigms.* It is not easy to determine how far we are confronted here with a new mode of anthropological analysis or only with a new language. It is my impression that when the analysis can come down to actual cases, much of it is congruent with what has formerly appeared as treatment of social structure or social norms. More specifically, much of what I have described as "attitudes," that is, intellectual and emotional patterns, of the Tikopia about suicide, or of what Fortes has described as "ideological landmarks" of totemic and other ritual symbols that keep an individual Tallensi on his course, could be put easily into paradigm language. But much modern anthropological use of paradigm has an extra component, overtly stressed as of critical importance, namely, its basis in metaphor or analogy.

The history of the rise of analogy to the surface of anthropological analysis would be interesting to trace, including such diverse threads as McLennan's interest in legal symbolism and Evans-Pritchard's interest in the famous equation of Nuer twins with birds. Since analogy is the process of reasoning whereby recognition of similarity of attributes in different objects is presumed to indicate other similarities also, examination by anthropologists of the objects and attributes concerned can be very revealing about thought processes in various social contexts. This is particularly so when analysis of behavior is linked with the study of analogic thought process as exemplified in language—hence the many fruitful recent expositions of relations between symbol, ritual, and myth. Yet one should not forget *Kunapipi* and *Djanggawul* by R. M. Berndt, or *Chisungu* by Audrey Richards, rich contributions to the study of symbolic ideas and behavior in initiation and allied cults, which appeared 20 or so years ago. In the modern field the powerful analyses of Victor Turner have emerged in the concept of the "root paradigm." This is not only a set of rules from which many kinds of social actions can be generated, but also a consciously recognized cultural model of an allusive metaphorical kind, cognitively delineated, emotionally charged and with moral force, so impelling to action. Notions of such loaded images lift the anthropologist's interpretation from the mundane level of social relations on to a metaphorical, even metaphysical plane. So Turner sees "root paradigms," insofar as they are religious in type, as involving some element of sacrifice of self in favor of survival of the group.

Thus paradigms tend to be concerned with type rather than with instance, with thought rather than with action. Paradigmatic structures

* Terms such as code and encode are used metaphorically and loosely. They indicate the tendency of many modern social anthropologists to use primarily linguistic analogies, even to refer to nonlinguistic phenomena.

are essentially structures of ideas rather than structures of social relationships. As such, they can be conceived as having creative power for the actor. For the analyst, they can appear to have a higher power of comparison and prediction through their more abstract, analogic quality. But sharp-edged instruments need more care in handling. Sometimes the notion of paradigm is used in almost a mechanistic sense: one is given the impression of people being fitted out with portfolios of paradigms which encode their circumstances and experiences—pulling out the appropriate blueprint for use as occasions present themselves. And the notion of collectivity inherent in most definitions of paradigm carries with it the well-known difficulties of abstraction—in the last resort, whose paradigm is it, the actor's or the analyst's? Long ago, Merton pointed to some of these dangers of possible abuse of the sociological paradigm. He called it roundly a temptation to mental indolence, to shutting one's eyes to strategic data not expressly called for in the paradigm, to using it as a sociological blinker rather than a sociological fieldglass. "Misuse results from absolutizing the paradigm rather than using it tentatively, as a point of departure." Fortes & Dieterlen made a parallel point by implication when they indicated how in studies of ritual and symbolism French anthropologists who began with accounts of cosmological beliefs, doctrines, and myths were able to display conceptual systems with all-embracing interpretative powers, while British anthropologists who started with an analysis of the structure of social positions tended to find conflict and discrepancy as well as consistency and cooperation. But Fortes & Dieterlen continued to make the significant suggestion that this could reveal a basic difference between the symbolic and the pragmatic, the ritual and the secular spheres of life. So, granted the interpretative value as well as the intellectual excitement of analysis in terms of paradigm and allied concepts, there is also a good case for analysis in more direct behavioral and social terms. A focus on the world of ideas should complement, not replace, a focus on the world of action.[8]

8. Reprinted, with permission, from *Annual Review of Anthropology*, Volume 4.