

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The Study of Intelligence in Theory and Practice

LEN SCOTT and PETER JACKSON

This essay surveys the various approaches scholars have employed to study the role of intelligence in national and international politics. It considers the various methodological and epistemological strategies that have characterized the study of intelligence over the past fifty years and argues that from its inception intelligence studies has been characterized by its inter-disciplinary character and openness to different conceptual approaches. Historians, political scientists, sociologists and practitioners have all contributed to the growing body of research on intelligence issues. The authors conclude that this is one of the great strengths of this sub-field and argue for a further broadening and deepening of the intelligence studies agenda.

The first few years of the twenty-first century have witnessed a transformation in the role of secret intelligence in international politics. Intelligence and security issues are now more prominent than ever in Western political discourse as well as the wider public consciousness. Public expectations of intelligence have never been greater, and these demands include much greater disclosure of hitherto secret knowledge. Much of this can be attributed to the shock of the terrorist attacks of September 2001. These events drove home the vulnerability of Western societies and the importance of reliable intelligence on terrorist threats. But debates over the role of intelligence in the build-up to the Second Gulf War have played an equally important role in transforming the profile of the 'secret world' in Western society. As Christopher Andrew points out in his contribution to this collection 'In the space of only a year, the threats posed by Osama bin Laden and Saddam Hussein had succeeded in transforming British government policy on the public use of intelligence'.[1] The relationship between political leaders and their intelligence advisors came under unprecedented public scrutiny in both Britain and the United States. Both Prime Minister Tony Blair and President George W. Bush were widely charged with purposefully distorting intelligence information in

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order to justify their decision to make war on Iraq in April 2003. The need for a better understanding of both the nature of the intelligence process and its importance to national and international security policy has never been more apparent.

Understanding Intelligence in the Twenty-First Century draws upon the views of academics, journalists and former practitioners to consider the nature of intelligence and its evolving role in domestic and international politics. It also examines the development of intelligence as an area of academic study and assesses its emerging contribution to the study of international relations. It aims to explore the way the subject is studied, for what purpose and with what consequences.

It is nearly five decades since intelligence first emerged as a subject of serious academic study with the publication of Sherman Kent's *Strategic Intelligence for American Foreign Policy*.[2] It is some 20 years since two eminent British historians invoked Sir Alexander Cadogan's description of intelligence as the missing dimension of international affairs.[3] The development of intelligence studies as a sub-field of international relations has continued to gather momentum ever since. Initially the terrain of political scientists, the role of intelligence in domestic and international politics now attracts the attention of an ever larger number of historians. The subject is firmly established in centres of teaching and research in both Europe and North America. As a result, the study of international security has been increasingly influenced by a better understanding of the role of intelligence in policy making – although Christopher Andrew maintains that intelligence 'is still denied its proper place in studies of the Cold War'.[4] And, as Andrew argues persuasively in this collection, the specific and potentially crucial subject of signal intelligence remains almost wholly neglected in Cold War historiography.[5]

The rapid growth of intelligence as a focus of academic enquiry will surely continue. Recent progress in archival disclosure, accelerated by the end of the Cold War and by changing attitudes towards official secrecy and towards the work of the security and intelligence services, has further facilitated research, understanding and debate.[6] Newly released documents, along with a range of other sources, provide an opportunity to reconsider long-standing assumptions about the motives of policy makers and the institutional character of foreign and security policy making. The events of September 11 and the war on Iraq have focused attention on all aspects of the subject. In light of these developments, the time seems right to take stock of what has been accomplished in this relatively new area of scholarly enquiry, to reflect upon the various methodological approaches used by scholars as well as the epistemological assumptions that underpin research and writing about intelligence.

SCOPE AND FOCUS: WHAT IS INTELLIGENCE? HOW DO WE STUDY IT?

Popular perceptions and general understanding of the nature of intelligence and its role in international relations leaves much to be desired. A starting point is the question: what is intelligence? The way intelligence is defined necessarily conditions approaches to research and writing about the subject. Sherman Kent's classic characterisations of intelligence cover the 'the three separate and distinct things that intelligence devotees usually mean when they use the word'; these are: knowledge, the type of organisation that produces that knowledge and the activities pursued by that organisation.[7] In most contemporary analyses, intelligence is understood as the process of gathering, analysing and making use of information. Yet beyond such basic definitions are divergent conceptions of exactly what intelligence is and what it is for. This is perhaps because, as James Der Derian has observed, intelligence is the 'least understood and most ''undertheorized'' area of international relations'.[8] David Kahn, one of the most eminent scholars in the field, similarly laments that '[n]one of the definitions [of intelligence] that I have seen work'.[9] A brief survey of various approaches to the study of intelligence illuminates the difficulties inherent in any search for an inclusive definition.

Many observers tend to understand intelligence primarily as a tool of foreign and defence policy making. Others focus on its role in domestic security. Still others concentrate on the role intelligence services have played as mechanisms of state oppression.[10] One interesting divergence of views pertains to the basic character of intelligence. Michael Herman (a former practitioner) treats it as a form of state power in its own right and this conceptualisation is at the heart of the analysis in his influential study *Intelligence Power in Peace and War*.[11] John Ferris (an historian) proffers a different view, judging that 'Intelligence is not a form of power but a means to guide its use, whether as a combat multiplier, or by helping one to understand one's environment and options, and thus how to apply force or leverage, and against whom.'[12] Whichever formulation one adopts and whatever the quality of intelligence on offer, it is the judgement of political leaders and their grasp of the value and limitations of intelligence that is most crucial.[13]

So how do we define intelligence work? Should we make a distinction between 'secret' and 'open source' information? Does the internet change how we evaluate 'open source' information? What distinguishes the intelligence process from the information gathering activities of other government agencies? Michael Herman has offered a solution to this problem by identifying 'government intelligence' as 'the specialised organizations that have that name, and what they do and produce'.[14] This distinction can

become problematic, however, when it comes to analyzing the impact of intelligence on decision making. Assessments drafted by intelligence agencies are usually based on a combination of 'secret' and 'open' source information. And a substantial percentage of the information from open sources is quite often drawn from material acquired and processed by other government departments, the popular media and even work that has been contracted out to non-government agencies. Since all of these areas cannot reasonably be defined as intelligence activity, this suggests that the essence of intelligence lies at the level of analysis or assessment.[15] The problem is that assessments are only one element in the decision-making process, and the illumination that they provide may only complement information provided by other government agencies or other sources of information at the level of decision. It therefore remains difficult to make confident judgements about exactly what intelligence is and precisely how it influences decision making. Should scholars accept this level of imprecision as inevitable? Or, conversely, should we continue to strive to come up with a definition of intelligence that resolves this uncertainty?

A good illustration of the difficulties inherent in defining intelligence is the controversial question of secret intervention in other societies (most commonly referred to as 'covert action'). Scholars have frequently ignored covert action in their analyses of intelligence. As Elizabeth Anderson has argued: 'the specific subject of covert action as an element of intelligence has suffered a deficiency of serious study'. She further observes that

> while academics have developed different theoretical concepts to explain other instruments of international relations – for example, weapons, trade and diplomacy – the separation of covert action from 'traditional' foreign policy instruments means that these same concepts have not been applied to covert action.[16]

There is a clear need to locate 'covert action' within the study of international relations in general and within intelligence in particular. This may also pose an interesting challenge for theorists of intelligence because considering covert action as intelligence work means that intelligence might be better understood as a tool *for the execution* of policy as well as a tool *to inform* policy. Since September 11 the political context, both national and international, has changed. Amid widespread calls for intelligence reform in the United States there are those who argue for a radical new conceptualisation of the role of intelligence in national security policy. In this collection Charles Cogan, a former senior officer in the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), advocates, *inter alia*, a change in the orientation of US intelligence from gathering information to hunting the United States' adversaries. Such a

transformation may require a new conceptual architecture for intelligence reflecting its changed role in the exercise of US military power.

There is also substantial, if rarely articulated, divergence in approaches to studying intelligence. Scholars tend to approach the subject from three relatively distinct perspectives, in the pursuit of relatively distinct objectives. The first approach, favoured among international historians in particular, but also characteristic of theoretical approaches that seek to explain the relationship between organisational structure and policy making, conceives of the study of intelligence primarily as a means of acquiring new information in order to explain specific decisions made by policy makers in both peace and war. Close attention is paid by these scholars to the process of intelligence collection, to the origin and nature of individual sources of intelligence, and to the precise use that is made of intelligence as it travels up the chain of decision. A thorough understanding of the organisational structure of government machinery, and of the place of intelligence within this machinery, is crucial to this approach. This literature overlaps with journalistic endeavours that focus on particular cases of espionage and biographies of individual officials and agents.

A second approach strives to establish general models that can explain success and failure in the intelligence process. Characteristic of political science approaches to the discipline, it focuses almost exclusively on the levels of analysis and decision. Decisive importance is attributed by adherents of this approach to structural and cognitive obstacles to the effective use of intelligence in the policy process. The aim is to identify and analyse the personal, political and institutional biases that characterise intelligence organisations and affect their performance in the decision-making process. The emphasis is on the role of preconceptions and underlying assumptions in conditioning the way intelligence is analysed and used. The result has been a range of insights into the nature of perception and misperception, the difficulty in preventing surprise, and the politicisation of the intelligence process.[17] Both of the first two conceptual approaches focus primarily on intelligence as a tool of foreign and defence policy making.

A third approach focuses instead on the political function of intelligence as a means of state control. The past decade, in particular, has seen the appearance of a range of historical and political science literature on this subject. If the Gestapo has long been a subject of historical study, recently released archival material has enabled scholars to study the role of state security services in political and social life in the USSR and Eastern bloc states after 1945. This has provided a stimulus for a new wave of scholarship on state control since 1789. Historians are now working on a wide range of topics from the role of British and French intelligence services in maintaining

imperial control overseas to the activities of security services such as MI5 or the FBI and their impact on political culture in Britain and the United States.[18] Many of the scholars engaged in this research would not consider themselves as contributing to 'intelligence studies'. Their focus is instead the use of intelligence sources to understand better the role of ideology and state power in political, social and cultural life. Yet there are strong arguments for embracing this scholarship under a broader definition of 'intelligence studies' and no reason to remain confined by disciplinary boundaries that are porous and arbitrary. One area of contemporary social science that has clear relevance to intelligence studies is the concept of surveillance. The potential of this area of enquiry is demonstrated in this volume by Gary Marx in his analysis of the new forms of surveillance in both official and private contexts. Marx explores an 'empirical, analytic and moral ecology' of surveillance and demonstrates how the evolution of information technology poses serious challenges to existing conceptions of individual liberty and security.[19]

The best writing about intelligence incorporates all three of the above approaches in different ways. But there are nearly always differences in emphasis even in the seminal works that have been crucial in pushing research forward. At the heart of these divergences, arguably, is disagreement concerning the extent to which political assumptions and political culture shape the intelligence process at all levels. Few would deny that the process of identifying threats is inextricably bound up with political choices and assumptions. The same is true for the gathering, assessment and dissemination of information on these threats. Yet how we understand political processes and political culture is crucial. Scholars vary in the importance that they attribute to political culture and to ideology. Christopher Andrew, for example, argues in this collection that, 'For the conceptual framework of intelligence studies to advance further, it is essential to make a clearer distinction than is usually made at present between the roles of intelligence communities in authoritarian and democratic regimes.'[20] It is interesting to note, for example, that the first two lines of enquiry tend to pay less attention to the importance of ideological assumptions in the business of gathering, analysing and using intelligence than does the third.

One notable area where differing approaches converge is research into the role of Soviet and other Communist intelligence organisations, whose study has been facilitated by (some) declassification in former communist states. One especially fascinating area that has begun to be illuminated is nuclear threat perception. It now seems clear that in the early 1960s and in the 1980s Soviet authorities became genuinely concerned about the prospect of imminent US nuclear attack.[21] The role of Soviet intelligence in generating these perceptions was crucial and study of this issue offers fertile ground for exploring the role of cognitive, bureaucratic and ideological obstacles to the

effective assessment of intelligence. Moreover, such revelations have cast new light on the nature of the Cold War in general and the danger of inadvertent nuclear war in particular.

Another crucial set of questions concerns the methodological and epistemological assumptions underpinning the way the subject is studied. There has been insufficient consideration of these issues on either side of the Atlantic. Richard Aldrich has cautioned against interpreting the official records of the Public Record Office 'as an analogue of reality'.[22] He has argued persuasively that British archives are a highly manipulated source of evidence for historians. The British government's success in controlling knowledge of its wartime achievements in signals intelligence and strategic deception is a good example of official policy shaping the parameters of historical enquiry. There are almost certainly other such cases that have yet to come to light. One does not need to embrace a conspiratorial view of contemporary politics to appreciate the ramifications of this state practice for the generation of knowledge. These questions are especially important to consider in light of criticisms of studies of Soviet security and intelligence services that have been based on partial and controlled access to Soviet records.[23] When advancing such criticisms, we are obliged to consider whether recent archive-based histories of British or US intelligence are based on a more comprehensive and reliable sample of the documentary record.

And what of other sources, in particular oral testimony and interviews? Many journalists have written authoritative and well-researched accounts of intelligence-related issues, which rely on extensive contacts with official-dom.[24] Are these accounts more or less reliable than those based on the written archival record? Are they more or less prone to manipulation? And what of memoirs? And spy fiction? In his essay on 'Fiction, Faction and Intelligence' Nigel West demonstrates that behind the supposedly impene-trable veil of British official secrecy, many former intelligence officers have written accounts (factual, fictional and factional) of their experiences. While this material cannot take the place of greater transparency and oversight, it does provide an interesting perspective on how various former members of the secret services choose to represent the world of intelligence to the wider public. The extent to which British intelligence memoirs and spy fiction can function as propaganda for the secret services remains an open question. While this material must be used with care, it should not be ignored by scholars of British intelligence. There are areas, such as the role of women in espionage/intelligence and the perspective of gender where so far the study of the subject has often been dependent on such sources.[25]

Questions about the manipulation of intelligence have been underlined by September 11 and by allegations that the British government 'sexed up' intelligence to mislead the public about Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction

(WMD). It was through the media that details of al-Qaeda operations and plans were made known to Western populations. For the student of intelligence – as for the practitioner – the provenance and credibility of the source remains central to understanding. Yet where the dissemination of knowledge accords with discernable agendas, how we deal with the problem of knowledge is crucial. Claims made about contacts between Mohammed Atta and Iraqi intelligence officers in Prague have now been shown to be false. Yet they were of potential importance in helping prepare the public and political ground for an attack on Iraq. The same is true of claims about Iraqi attempts to acquire uranium from Niger. Whether the claim about al-Qaeda represents misinformation or disinformation, it underlines the fact that we learn of some events because those in control of relevant information wish us to learn of them, and what we learn may inform broader political perceptions. Michael Smith's paper in this collection is a reminder of the tension between disclosing intelligence and risking sources, and how different leaders in different political cultures view their options and responsibilities differently.[26] These issues are of central importance to any attempt to establish the methodological foundations necessary for the effective study of intelligence.

INTELLIGENCE AND THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

A further objective of this volume is to assess both the influence and importance of intelligence studies in broader debates concerning the history and theory of international relations. Intelligence has attracted limited interest from scholars of political philosophy and International Relations (IR) theory. Tsun Tsu is much quoted for the importance he attaches to military intelligence, but later thinkers on war were less interested and less impressed. Von Clausewitz held that knowledge of 'the enemy and his country' was 'the foundation of all our ideas and actions'.[27] Yet much of the knowledge or 'information' obtained in war is 'false' and 'by far the greatest part is of a doubtful character'. How the information was acquired and processed did not detain Clausewitz, who looked to officers with a 'certain power of discrimination' to guide their analysis.

Clausewitz's omissions are shared by many political and international theorists, including classical realists and contemporary neo-realists. Machiavelli, for example, demonstrates understanding of, and enthusiasm for, what the twentieth century would come to know as strategic deception: 'Though fraud in other activities be detestable, in the management of war it is laudable and glorious, and he who overcomes an enemy by fraud is as much to be praised as he who does so by force.' Yet elsewhere in the Discourses, when reflecting on conspiracy, he shows no understanding of the opportunities for espionage and counter-espionage in dealing with the conspiracies of coup

plotters.[28] On the other hand, Toni Erskine makes clear in her essay in this collection that Thomas Hobbes, writing in the seventeenth century, understood the potential importance and value of espionage.[29]

Writing in 1994 Michael Fry and Miles Hochstein observed that, while intelligence studies had developed into an identifiable intellectual community, there was a noticeable 'failure to integrate intelligence studies, even in a primitive way, into the mainstream of research in international relations'.[30] In Britain the academic study of intelligence has developed overwhelmingly within international history, and thus reflects the methodological predisposition towards archive-based research characteristic of this sub-discipline. Common methodological cause between British and US historians has not prevented robust and fruitful exchanges and debates on the subject.[31] In North America, however, political scientists have played at least as prominent a role as historians in the study of intelligence in international relations. Their contributions have provided students of intelligence with a range of theoretical reflections on the nature of intelligence and its role in decision making. But interest in intelligence within the political science community has been confined mainly to those scholars working on theories of decision making. Intelligence is all but absent, conversely, in the work of most international relations theorists, and does not figure in key IR theory debates between realist, liberal institutionalist, constructivist and post-modernist approaches. It is interesting to note that, while there exists an implicit (and sometimes explicit) assumption that the study of intelligence falls within the realist camp, contemporary neo-realist writers have largely ignored intelligence in their reflections. The literature on US covert action for example, is ignored by leading neo-realist theorist, Stephen Krasner, in his analysis of the systematic violations of sovereignty in world politics. Although he advances trenchant arguments about the 'organised hypocrisy' of international discourse on sovereignty, he does not explore the potential role of intelligence as a source of both evidence and theoretical insight.[32]

The neglect of intelligence is apparent in other areas of international relations. Although one prominent item on the post-Cold War agenda was the role of intelligence in support of the United Nations and its agencies, the role of intelligence has not engaged the attention of those writing about humanitarian intervention, even though it is clear that intelligence has various roles to play, not least in providing evidence in war crimes tribunals. The role of intelligence services in promoting (or retarding) human rights is an area particularly worthy of exploration. Similarly, in debates about the democratic peace (whether democracies are less likely to engage in military operations against other democracies), attempts at regime change by clandestine means are an important dimension illuminated by the history of

US covert action in various democracies (Chile, Italy, Iran and so forth). How far the events of September 11 and the war on Iraq may help change academic attitudes and research agendas in these areas remains to be seen.

If international relations theory has shown limited interest in intelligence, to what extent have students of intelligence engaged with international relations theory? It seems clear that different theoretical perspectives are beginning to permeate the sub-field of intelligence. The journal *Intelligence and National Security* has carried important theoretical contributions which reward Fry and Hochstein's optimistic assertions that international relations and intelligence studies can fruitfully search for common ground. One notable example is Andrew Rathmell's essay on the potential importance of post-modern theorizing to the practice of intelligence.[33] Rathmell argues that intelligence services must make radical changes in terms of both conceptual approach and organizational structure to adapt to the social, cultural and technological conditions of the twenty-first century. He posits that existing state-based intelligence agencies are products of modernity, but that the political and economic conditions of the modern era are disappearing. Capital intensive modes of mass production in highly urbanised nation-states are giving way, in the age of the world-wide web and digital technology, to 'knowledge intensive, dispersed globalized systems'. The end result is what Rathmell calls the 'fragmentation' of threat. What is needed, he argues, are different conceptual approaches to understanding the nature of security threats and radical changes in the way intelligence agencies collect and process knowledge on these threats. Obvious questions arise about how these new approaches might be implemented in practical terms. What is also necessary is greater awareness of the political role of the analyst in the construction of threats and threat assessments for makers of security policy of all kinds.[34]

The need to engage constructively with post-modernist thinking on security will surely increase, and this includes identifying areas where post-modernists themselves need to reflect further on existing approaches. The history of intelligence before the onset of the Cold War, for example, is often neglected. One resulting misconception is that open sources have only recently risen to prominence. The reality is that open sources have nearly always provided the majority of information for intelligence services during peacetime. It is also misleading to describe the emergence of 'globalised' threats as a 'post-modern' phenomenon. Imperial intelligence services faced such challenges throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Information technology has changed many aspects of intelligence work, but the intellectual challenges of dealing with security problems across immense spaces and over different cultures are by no means exclusively 'post-modern'. This is admirably demonstrated by the fascinating recent work of

Martin Thomas.[35] It is also the case that the threat from non-state actors did not arrive with the end of the Cold War, as the history of the Anarchists and the Fenians well testifies.

An important argument made by Rathmell is that intelligence communities must become less hierarchical and more based on the concept of information 'networks' with a greater focus on 'open' sources of information. Here, the challenges identified by Rathmell and others have stimulated rather different diagnoses and prognoses. Writing before September 11, and from a very different ontological perspective, Bruce Berkowitz also argues the case for breaking down 'hierarchies and stovepipes' that restrict information flows within the intelligence community.[36] Berkowitz's article is notable for his analysis of the litany of what he terms US intelligence failures. The pressure to reform structure and culture in the US intelligence community is strengthened, and in some cases even driven, by advances in information technology. These trends and pressures are critically examined by John Ferris in his article in this collection. Where post-modernism rejects the notion of an absolute truth, the epistemological goal of those who proselytise the revolution in information warfare is perfect battlefield knowledge. Ferris casts doubt on their various assumptions and moreover reminds us that concerns with hierarchies and structures are crucial in communications security and counter-intelligence. He rightly observes that web-based nets within the US intelligence community are the 'richest treasure ever for espionage' and a grave potential vulnerability.[37]

Other theoretical innovations may well have something to offer. Recent constructivist theorising about the importance of identity and political culture in shaping both elite and public perceptions of international politics is a case in point. Its focus on identity as a central factor in the process of threat identification has obvious relevance to the study of security and intelligence. The same is true with the emphasis on cultural–institutional contexts of security policy. Intelligence services certainly have their own institutional cultures and a focus on the rules and norms which govern intelligence work in different national contexts has much to offer intelligence studies.[38] Reluctance to engage with this and other currents in international relations theory will not help efforts to expand the conceptual parameters of intelligence studies. In addition, a reluctance to engage with different strains of social theory may also comply with the intentions of those who seek to configure and inform public understanding of intelligence through the control of information. The way we choose to study the subject informs our analysis and our conclusions. As Aldrich warns, taking the archive as analogue of reality is a methodological and epistemological trap that can inadvertently legitimise activities that merit a much more critical approach.

SPEAKING 'TRUTH UNTO POWER' OR 'POWER UNTO TRUTH'?

Much of the study of intelligence concerns the relationship between power and knowledge, or rather the relationship between certain kinds of power and certain kinds of knowledge. A sophisticated exponent of this view has been Michael Herman, writing on the basis of 25 years' experience at Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) and the Cabinet Office. Herman has received wide acclaim for his expositions of the process of intelligence and has been described as 'an historian and philosopher of intelligence'.[39] Although an advocate of broadening the scope of the subject, Herman's primary aim is to promote greater public understanding of intelligence. Yet, it is also undeniable that, in engaging with critical issues about the practice of the intelligence process, Herman seeks to legitimise that process. The same goals of education and legitimisation may also be ascribed to other intelligence mandarins who have written about intelligence after their retirement, notably Sir Percy Cradock, former Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC).[40] The work of both Herman and Cradock epitomizes the prevalent self-image of the intelligence mandarin as providing objective, 'policy-free' analysis to decision makers. Sir Percy Cradock's characterisation of the JIC and its staff as 'having an eye always to the future and to British interests, and free from the political pressures likely to afflict their ministerial masters' reflects the self-image of the intelligence community as guardian of the national interest against transient and feckless politicians.

The role of the intelligence official in the British context is therefore represented as 'speaking truth unto power'. This self-image, so central to the identity of the public servant, has been the cornerstone of both the structure and the culture of British intelligence. It is represented as the fundamental safeguard against the politicisation of intelligence, which is often alleged to be a defining characteristic of autocratic and totalitarian regimes. Clearly this image of an independent and apolitical intelligence community has been called into serious question by the 'Iraq Dossier' affair.

In the summer of 2003 the British government and intelligence community became embroiled in one of the most serious political controversies in recent memory amid charges that intelligence on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was politicised in order to bolster support for the government's bellicose posture towards the regime of Saddam Hussein. The publication of an intelligence dossier, written by the chair of the JIC, John Scarlett, included both Joint Intelligence Committee assessments and raw human intelligence obtained by the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS). The aim was to strengthen support both at home and abroad for war with Iraq. It was claimed in the dossier that 'The Iraqi military are able to deploy [chemical and biological]

weapons within 45 minutes of a decision to do so.'[41] When introducing the dossier in the House of Commons, Prime Minister Tony Blair explained that it concluded

> that Iraq has chemical and biological weapons, that Saddam has continued to produce them, that he has existing and active military plans for the use of chemical and biological weapons, which could be activated within 45 minutes, including against his own Shia population, and that he is actively trying to acquire nuclear weapons capability.[42]

In this instance, intelligence was clearly employed to gain public support for government policy rather than as a guide for policy makers. Intelligence information was selected and presented in such a way as to emphasise the need to deal forcefully with the Iraqi regime. As Michael Handel observed nearly two decades ago, the closer the relationship between intelligence assessment and policy making, the greater the likelihood that the whole process will become politicised.[43] Indeed, a former Chairman of the JIC, Sir Rodric Braithwaite, has criticised his successors with the observation that JIC members went 'beyond assessment to become part of the process of making and advocating policy. That inevitably undermined their objectivity.'[44] At the same time, contemporary concern with use of intelligence should not obscure the fundamental reality that intelligence informs but rarely drives policy: Joint Intelligence Committees propose and Prime Ministers dispose. Another serious indictment of the Blair government policy concerns its commitment to counter-proliferation. If the Iraqi state possessed WMD, the destruction of that state means that ownership and control of these weapons are dispersed. These events could hasten the nightmare scenario of terrorist use of WMD against centres of population.

As Christopher Andrew points out in his contribution to this volume, the publication of Joint Intelligence Committee assessments is unprecedented. It is unlikely to remain so rare, however. Changes in the international system will likely make the public use of intelligence common practice. The decline of the Westphalian principle of non-intervention in the affairs of other states, along with the effects of September 11 and the 'war on terror', has led to the emergence of the doctrine of 'pre-emptive self defence' in the United States. This has introduced an important new dimension to the role of intelligence in international relations which students and practitioners have yet fully to comprehend. In this context it will be essential to establish the existence of a threat before public opinion in order to provide legitimacy for pre-emptive interventions. Despite the political problems created by the public use of intelligence to justify the invasion of Iraq, intelligence will remain central to debates about future pre-emptive action. Pressure on governments to disclose

secret intelligence will lead to pressure on intelligence services to meet public needs. This was almost certainly the case in the months leading up to the Second Gulf War. It is a trend that will surely grow as long as the doctrine of pre-emptive intervention holds sway in Western foreign policy.

All this means that we need to evaluate critically this image of the intelligence official as apolitical interpreter of the real world for political decision makers. The dangers of not doing so are clear. The case of government deception over the role of British intelligence during the Second World War is just one example of the state's willingness to intervene in an effort to shape the conceptual horizons of intellectual enquiry. An uncritical acceptance of official or semi-official representations of the intelligence process as singularly free of ideological assumptions and political biases leaves the intelligence scholar open to the familiar charge that she or he is merely legitimising and perpetuating the ideology of the state. These issues are of central concern for all scholars interested in the relationship between power and knowledge. Again it seems clear that intelligence studies and international relations theory would both benefit from greater engagement with one another.

The idea of speaking truth unto power also has clear relevance to debates over the proper relationship between government and academia.[45] Among academics, notions and theories of truth and power are more explicitly contested. Claims of objectivity run counter to concern with developing multiple rather than unitary narratives of the past. This, of course, is the very antithesis of Whitehall's immaculate conception of a Joint Intelligence Committee. At the same time, official practice and academic study exercise an undeniable attraction to one another. But there are obstacles in the way of sustained engagement between the government and the academy. Intelligence is probably the field of academic enquiry over which the British government has been most anxious to exert control. Despite a recent trend toward more openness, particularly on the part of the British Security Service (MI5), access to archival material remains tightly regulated, though the National Archives (formerly the British Public Record Office) and the Lord Chancellor's Advisory Council on Public Records have endeavoured to engage British historians in the development of declassification policy. Yet it should be noted that, although the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) will be fully enacted in January 2005, the intelligence agencies are specifically exempt from its provisions.[46]

In the United States the relationship between academics and government has always been much more porous. Since the formation of the first centralised US intelligence agency, the Office of Strategic Services, during the Second World War, academics have played a prominent role in the evolution of US intelligence policy. The study of intelligence is often

informed by quasi-official links, and the CIA has been keen to promote the academic study of the subject. Both the National Security Agency and the CIA each employ their own team of full-time professionally trained historians. Each has also invited 'scholars in residence' to spend extended periods working within the agencies. Such links have at times generated debate about the proper limits and intellectual integrity of such endeavours.[47]

But the overall benefits of these relationships are widely acknowledged. In Britain it has long been difficult to discern any comparable relationship. A greater distance has generally been maintained between 'academics' and 'practitioners'. And, as Wolfgang Krieger demonstrates in this volume, the situation in Germany, as elsewhere in Europe, shows even less engagement.[48] There have been important exceptions to this general trend, most notably the scholars who were given privileged access to official records in order to write the official histories of the Second World War. Another notable exception is Christopher Andrew, whose collaborations with KGB defectors Oleg Gordievsky and Vasili Mitrokhin have illuminated KGB activities as well as British (and particularly SIS) successes in the espionage war. But it is only recently that a culture of greater openness has led to greater engagement between Britain's intelligence community and its universities. A good illustration of this trend was the willingness of Sir Stephen Lander, then Director-General of MI5, to attend academic meetings and conferences on the study of intelligence over the past few years. Further evidence of greater openness, at least on the part of the Security Service, is MI5's recent appointment of an academic historian, Christopher Andrew, to write its centenary history. Yet there are those who would argue that this kind of engagement is not without costs. For some academics the Ivory Tower should remain a sanctuary from the compromises of officialdom and provide a panorama (or, a *camera obscura*) on the world outside. For others, academics are there to tell the world about the world. Yet, while many academics aspire to policy relevance, intelligence is one area where officialdom may remain sceptical about the value of engagement with the academy.

DARK SIDES OF MOONS

Reflecting on the work of the JIC, Sir Percy Cradock has observed that 'it has a predilection for threats rather than opportunities, for the dark side of the moon'.[49] Certainly the issues of strategic surprise and of intelligence failure have loomed large in the evolution of the study of intelligence. This is unlikely to change significantly. Providing warning against surprise is central to both official and public perceptions of the fundamental role of intelligence services. The events of September 11, 2001 have clearly

reinforced this trend. Desmond Ball has described September 11 as 'the worst intelligence failure by the US intelligence community since Pearl Harbor'.[50] Yet such judgements also raise questions about the meaning we give to the term intelligence failure as well as to how we explain and assign responsibility for what happened. Historians and political scientists will continue to study Pearl Harbor, the Tet offensive, the Yom Kippur War, Argentina's seizure of the Falklands/Malvinas, Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, and, of course, the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. But they will also need to revisit from time to time the conceptual foundations of their studies.

Recent developments in the study of security in international politics have attempted to broaden predominant conceptions of security to provide a more sophisticated understanding of the problem of instability in international society. The study of intelligence, with its focus on the identification and interpretation of threat, and on the architecture of threat perception, has much to offer and much to gain from greater engagement with new approaches to security. Contemporary intelligence agendas (both official and academic) range from economic security to environment to health to organised crime, as well as to more traditional areas of arms transfers, proliferation of WMD, and UN peace keeping and peace enforcing. Changes in world politics since the end of the Cold War have created greater awareness of the importance of these issues. The fact that the CIA has primary responsibility for the HIV/AIDS threat suggests that official thinking in Washington has responded to these trends in ways that have not always been acknowledged. Intelligence communities must play closer attention to the many dimensions of global insecurity, not least so that policy makers can better understand the need to alleviate social and economic conditions that are one source of disaffected recruits for extremist groups. In short, the practice of intelligence will change and adapt to new political problems facing world politics, as well as to more long-standing concerns with injustices that lie at the heart of much global instability. The same is true of the study of intelligence. The aim of this collection of essays is to stimulate reflection upon what new directions might be taken.

The role of threat perception in the policy process is bound to remain a central concern in the study of intelligence. The same is true of the relationship between 'producers' and 'consumers'. But it is important to remember that many intelligence services do more than just collect and process information. Many internal security agencies in democratic as well as non-democratic states possess powers of arrest and thus function as tools of state power. Indeed the Gestapo, the KGB and the Stasi are only the most notorious examples of the potential threat to individual freedom posed by domestic security and intelligence services. Yet another controversial and

problematic area of intelligence activity is that of secret intervention in the affairs of other states (and non-state actors). As noted above, the case of 'covert action' provides an interesting perspective on the role of intelligence and intelligence services in the exercise of power. Over the past half-century, covert action has often undermined the legitimacy of Western intelligence services both domestically and internationally. A fundamental question is therefore: to what extent and in what ways should covert action be considered a function of intelligence and intelligence services. One answer is provided by Sherman Kent in his arguably tautological observation that intelligence is what intelligence services do. A variation on this might be to say that intelligence knowledge is power, and other exercises of power by intelligence services fall within the same ambit. A rather different view would be to suggest that secrecy, rather than power or knowledge, is the unifying theme of intelligence discourse. This is the line of argument pursued by Len Scott in this collection; a more radical perspective on secrecy is proffered by Robert A. Goldberg who argues that secrecy plays a crucial and perfidious role in sustaining conspiracy theories.[51]

The distinction between gathering intelligence and intervening in the internal affairs of other states, and thus the distinction between intelligence as a guide to policy rather than a tool of policy, can be misleading. This is particularly true in the realm of human intelligence, where the idea of an agent of influence, for example, challenges a simple distinction between gathering knowledge and taking action. It is interesting to compare the British and US literature on covert action. In the United States there has been long-standing awareness of the subject that has generated both public and scholarly debates. More recently, systematic declassification of files dealing with covert action has made a significant contribution to understanding the origins and dynamics of the Cold War. The declassification of CIA records has more clearly revealed the scope and scale of operations from Cuba to Chile to Indonesia to Guatemala. Indeed, in the view of some scholars, the history of covert action compels revision of the historical and political accounts of the Cold War, and fatally weakens the view that the US policy was simply concerned with containment.[52] These issues have not received the attention they deserve in the study of British intelligence so far. Although recently published studies by Richard Aldrich and Stephen Dorril have illuminated a great deal, British covert action in both Cold War and post-imperial contexts is an area that requires further study. Here the endeavours of senior intelligence mandarins to divert the focus to the sanitised and cerebral contexts of Whitehall analysis may reflect a conscious (or unconscious) attempt to divert attention away from the more dramatic and controversial question of covert action. It may be that such activities are marginal to the primary missions of the British

intelligence services. Yet the fact is that this question remains shrouded in uncertainty.

INTELLIGENCE AND ETHICS

One contribution of the (largely US) study of covert action has been to bring together ethics and intelligence studies. There is a significant literature which has been largely ignored by scholars working on the role of intelligence in policy making.[53] The ethical and legal dimensions of intelligence are rarely analysed, particularly in historical accounts – although in the United States ethical issues have frequently been explored within debates over intelligence accountability. The need for an explicit concern with moral issues has been identified by Michael Herman, who has begun to explore ethical dimensions of intelligence in a broader sense.[54] Herman has argued that intelligence requires 'a similar ethical foundation' to the use of armed force. An equally telling and compelling observation is his view that 'Ethics should be recognized as a factor in intelligence decisions, just as in anything else.'[55] Such a view compels attention not least given its provenance. This is not an entirely new concern. Abram Shulsky has also contended that an ethical case for conducting intelligence operations can be found in Tsun Tsu as early as the fifth century BC.[56]

In his famous essay on 'The Profession and Vocation of Politics', Max Weber observes that 'No ethics in the world can get round the fact that the achievement of ''good'' ends is in many cases tied to the necessity of employing morally suspect or at least morally dangerous means.'[57] This dilemma is a central concern for all those interested in the role of intelligence in politics. To what ends should the 'morally suspect' means of intelligence be put? For whose 'good ends' should these means be employed? To whom, or to what, should they be ultimately responsible? Can their responsibilities ever be to the universal or will they always be to the particular? The crux of the issue, according to Weber, is a crucial dilemma of politics: that the interests of particular communities or polities will not always be compatible with the wider interests of humanity. Weber rejects the universalist assumptions of the 'ethics of principled conviction' for their disregard of the consequences of political choice. He argues instead that the first responsibility of those involved in politics must be to their own community.[58] These questions are addressed by both Michael Herman and Toni Erskine in their contributions to this volume. Michael Herman reflects further on the ethical justifications for intelligence and explores the opportunities for doing so in the wake of September 11.[59] In her contribution, Toni Erskine locates emerging ethical reflections on intelligence gathering within the traditional frameworks of realist, consequentialist and deontological traditions.[60] Such

an approach offers new vistas for potential research and has obvious relevance to efforts to combine intelligence and security concerns with an 'ethical foreign policy'.

Hitherto ethics has remained an under-explored area in intelligence studies. A former permanent secretary at the Ministry of Defence, Sir Michael Quinlan, who played a key role in British thinking about the morality of nuclear deterrence and was also responsible for an official overview of British intelligence in the post-Cold War era, has remarked upon the lack of a conceptual structure for studying the morality of espionage. Quinlan has lamented the absence of a doctrine for what he terms 'Just Espionage'.[61] On the other hand, Quinlan fascinatingly refers to ethical problems as a 'cost' of intelligence. The tension between these two positions suggests that intelligence may often be situated at the fault-line between the theory and practice of international politics. In any case, this is a fascinating and important aspect of intelligence that bears further reflection and research.

Ethics are not only relevant at the level of high-policy. The ethical ethos of an intelligence organisation is of great importance to understanding it as an institution. Studying that ethos remains a significant methodological hurdle. How intelligence services and intelligence officers view their responsibilities to their agents and to others, for example, is a potentially fascinating question. How far intelligence agencies will go to protect their sources is an ethical and operational matter that has surfaced for example in accounts and allegations concerning British security activities in Northern Ireland. The codes of conduct – both written and unwritten – of intelligence services provide one potential avenue for exploring the ethical constraints and dilemmas involved in human intelligence gathering as (to a lesser extent) do the ethical views of the individual agents. This is an aspect on which there has been little systematic study, though memoirs and other accounts of operations, including authoritative accounts by journalists, provide vignettes and insights.[62]

Debate about a range of ethical issues concerning the conduct of intelligence in war extends to legal questions about whether prisoners should be taken and how they should be treated. In the United States and elsewhere there has been serious public discussion about the use of torture in extracting information from terrorist suspects, reflecting the dramatic impact of events on public debate. US debates about the use of assassination as an instrument of statecraft have been rekindled.[63] Ethics seems destined to be ever more closely entwined with public debate and discourse concerning intelligence. Yet public perceptions of what intelligence is and what it does owe as much to fictional representations as to public debate in the 'real' world of international politics.

POPULAR CULTURE AND INTELLIGENCE

At least since the aftermath of the Franco-Prussian war in 1871, popular culture has often played an important role in shaping both official and public attitudes towards intelligence. Michael Miller has demonstrated the way fears of foreign espionage and national insecurity gripped the French imagination during this period. The Dreyfus Affair, which had such grievous consequences for French intelligence, unfolded in an atmosphere of spy mania over the machinations of an imaginary army of German spies in France controlled by the notorious spymaster Wilhelm Stieber. The fact that there was no army of spies and that Stieber was a police chief rather than a master of espionage, did not matter. Through to the outbreak of war in 1914 spy mania was created and sustained by memories of France's defeat in 1871 and by a spy literature which played on national anxieties about France's vulnerability to foreign espionage.[64] The British public demonstrated a similar appetite for espionage stories and invasion scares, of which some of the most widely read were produced by William Le Queux. It was in the context of a wave of greatly exaggerated official and popular concern over the threat of foreign espionage that a British security service was established in 1909.[65]

Fictional representations of international politics as a struggle for survival between national intelligence services thus played an important role in the evolution of both French and British intelligence before the First World War. Between the two World Wars, spy adventures stories, and even spy films, became a permanent fixture of Western popular culture. This trend continued through the Cold War era. Graham Greene, John Le Carré, Ian Fleming and Tom Clancy are only the most prominent of several generations of novelists who used intelligence as both medium and metaphor when interpreting the era of superpower rivalry for the reading public. For most of the twentieth century, representations of intelligence in popular culture were far and away the most influential factors shaping public attitudes and perceptions. Yet, with a few notable exceptions, scholars have been reluctant to reflect upon the implications of this in their analyses of the relationship between intelligence and politics. Once again, there is potentially interesting work being done in the cognate field of cultural history which could enrich the study of intelligence. Cultural historians, especially those interested in Cold War popular and political culture, have begun to pay careful attention to the role of film and fiction in shaping both elite and popular attitudes towards international politics. The intersection between this work and the study of intelligence has not received the attention it deserves.

Jeremy Black provides an interesting perspective on the issue of popular culture in his exploration of the geopolitics of James Bond. Of particular

interest is his analysis of the way Anglo-American relations are represented in the Bond genre.[66] Fictional representations of intelligence form the basis of much public understanding. As Nigel West observes, no less an authority than former SIS Chief, Sir Colin McColl, considered Bond 'the best recruiting sergeant the service ever had'[67] – perhaps the converse view of intelligence critic Philip Knightley who complained that the 'fictional glorification of spies enables the real ones to go on playing their sordid games'.[68] A more perplexing if intriguing relationship between reality and fiction is illustrated by the occasion recounted by Jeremy Black when the Soviet Politburo issued instructions to the KGB to acquire the gadgetry displayed in the latest Bond film.

Fiction provides a range of ethical representations of intelligence.[69] Jeremy Black observes that 'the world of Bond is not characterized by ambiguity … there is good (including good rogues …) and bad'.[70] Other representations convey a very different moral reality. One of Le Carré's characters, Connie Sachs, characterizes Cold War espionage as 'half angels fighting half devils'.[71] This can be read as Le Carré's own perspective on intelligence and intelligence work. It stands in contrast to the self-image of Western intelligence officers proffered by a former senior member of the Secret Intelligence Service: 'honesty inside the service, however much deception might be practiced outside it, and never descend to the other side's methods'.[72] Fiction also illustrates specific ethical problems and dilemmas. How far an intelligence organisation is prepared to risk or sacrifice its own 'side' in pursuit of a 'higher' objective is a popular theme, well illustrated in Le Carré's *The Spy Who Came in From the Cold*.[73]

Other representations of intelligence go further in this regard. In the 1975 film *Three Days of the Condor*, for example, the CIA assassinates its own officers to protect its designs for global control of oil resources. The film illustrates various themes commonly found in conspiracy theories, not least that intelligence services are malign, all-powerful and all-pervasive. This manner of representing the ethics of intelligence services is very common in both literature and in film. A more recent example is the 2002 film version of Robert Ludlum's *The Bourne Identity* – which depicts the CIA as both omnipotent and utterly immoral.[74] The extent to which these types of cultural representations are influenced by public disclosure of intelligence activities would be an interesting avenue for further research.

Fictional conspiracy theories frequently accord with the genuine kind in giving meaning to events. As Robert Goldberg argues in his essay for this volume:

> Despite their weaknesses, conspiracy theories offer much to believers. If slippery in their logic and often careless of facts and assumptions,

> they order the random and make consistent the paradoxical. In the face of national crisis and human failure, conspiracy theorists rush to find purpose in tragedy and clarity in ambiguity. They also respond to the traumatized who cry for vengeance and demand the identities of those responsible. Conspiracy thinking thus becomes an antidote to powerlessness.[75]

Some of these observations resonate with James Der Derian's analysis of Hollywood's representation of conspiracy when he writes of:

> the conspiratorial aesthetic, which produces and is sustained by the tension between fear and desire. The world system might, on the face of it, be speeding out of control, yet we cling to metaphysical faith and find perverse pleasure in cinematic confirmation that somewhere under the table, in the highest corporate or government office, someone is pulling the strings or at the very least is willing with the best technology, fastest speed and longest reach to intervene secretly, if sinisterly, when necessary. It then makes sense to find in coeval events, synchronicities, even odd accidents, the intellectual evidence and psychological comfort of the hidden hand.[76]

Yet, merely because there are individual or collective psychological needs in a hidden hand does not mean that hidden hands do not exist. One reason why there are conspiracy theories is because there are conspiracies. Indeed the history of covert action is the history of conspiracy. While it would be simplistic to suggest that the former begat the latter, covert action is nevertheless the sturdy twin of conspiracy theory. The suggestion, for example, that the British state undertakes the murder of its citizens for political purposes is a familiar trope in popular representations of intelligence activity. The suggestion that Hilda Murrell, an elderly anti-nuclear protester, was killed by the security service in an operation against nuclear protesters gained surprising currency. MI5's website currently proclaims that 'We do not kill people or arrange their assassination.'[77] Yet it is now clear that there was collusion between British officials and loyalist paramilitaries in murders and other crimes in Northern Ireland.[78] As Sir John Stevens has commented: 'the unlawful involvement of agents in murder implies that the security forces sanction killings'.[79]

Fictional representation thrives on the plausibly implausible. Had the events of September 11 been crafted by a script writer, they may well have been dismissed as incredible and fanciful (even if they would have gained attention for transgressing Hollywood's devotion to happy endings). In the aforementioned *Three Days of the Condor*, the CIA analyses books to check,

whether they depict actual CIA operations. After September 11 there are indications of new-found interest in how fiction writers conceptualise and represent threat. Conspiracy and conspiracy theory will remain inextricably linked with intelligence in popular perception and cultural representation. Disentangling the two remains an essential part of the enterprise. Michael Smith's defence of Prime Minister Churchill's use of intelligence on Nazi atrocities in the Soviet Union is a good illustration of how this can be done.[80] The issue of how far fiction corresponds to reality is linked to questions concerning the way we perceive and construct reality. Le Carré's novels are widely accepted as authentic depictions of the techniques and tradecraft of espionage – though his representation of the ethics of the service provoked anger from within.[81] More recently, the film *U-571* was criticised for depicting the seizure of the German naval Enigma by US rather than by British forces.[82] There is of course a long tradition of changing or manipulating historical 'events' for dramatic effect. But to what extent do such fictional representations actually shape popular attitudes? This is a question that awaits systematic exploration. How far fictional representations are *intended* to frame popular understandings has received rather more attention – particularly in the recent boom of studies of the cultural history of the Cold War.[83] The events of September 11 and the 'war on terror' have given these questions a new saliency and urgency. How Hollywood will now depict intelligence services and how it will represent the US government will be issues to watch carefully.

A FINAL 'MISSING DIMENSION': NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL INTELLIGENCE CO-OPERATION

One other relatively neglected aspect in the study of intelligence is co-operation between different intelligence services at both the national and international levels. At the national level, efficient co-operation between secret services is crucial to the effective exploitation of intelligence. The importance of a rational system of inter-service co-ordination was highlighted, once again, by the events of September 11, 2001. Insufficient co-operation between various US security and intelligence services is consistently cited as a central factor in the failure to prevent the successful attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. The 858-page Congressional Report on these events published in July 2003 severely criticised both the CIA and the FBI for failing to develop an effective system for sharing intelligence on terrorist activity inside the United States with one another and with other departments concerned with national security.[84] Yet, despite the valuable start made by pioneers, this is a field that has not received systematic study by either political scientists or

historians.[85] A comparative study, examining different national approaches to solving this problem, would be particularly valuable and policy relevant.

The question of intelligence co-operation at the international level has received more attention, particularly from historians. The origins, development and functioning of Anglo-American 'intelligence alliance' since 1940 have been the subject of relatively intense study from a range of perspectives.[86] Important research has also been done on such diverse subjects as intelligence sharing between the West and the Soviet Union during the Second World War, on intelligence collaboration within the Soviet bloc during the Cold War and between Soviet and Cuban intelligence, and between Western intelligence and former Nazi intelligence officers.[87] We also have a very useful collection of essays on the subject of 'Knowing One's Friends' that provides fascinating insights into the ambiguous role of intelligence between friendly states.[88]

Michael Herman and Richard Aldrich have both provided useful reflections on the nature of international intelligence co-operation.[89] This will assist the growing number of scholars now researching the potential role of intelligence in international organisations such as NATO, the European Union or the United Nations.[90] Important work has also been undertaken on the role of intelligence in international police work. The changing parameters of intelligence collaboration after September 11, and increased public awareness of this co-operation, suggest that this will be an area of great potential growth in the field. When a British arms dealer was arrested in August 2003 attempting to sell a surface-to-air missile to FBI agents posing as terrorists, news of the role of SIS and MI5 was immediately made public, illustrating changing attitudes towards disclosure as well as in practice.[91] One neglected aspect identified by Len Scott in this collection is the role of intelligence services in conducting clandestine diplomatic activities with adversaries, both states and non-states.[92]

All of this augurs well for opening new avenues for students of intelligence and security in contemporary international relations. Yet the research trends outlined above remain disparate. There are still few monographs or collections of essays devoted to the specific question of co-operation and collaboration between national intelligence services. Nor has sufficient research and reflection been given to the delicate relationship between intelligence and political relations between states. The successful prosecution of the present 'war on terror' depends largely on the ability of national intelligence services to collaborate with one another effectively in rooting out international terrorist cells. The relationship between politics and intelligence has never been more important. There is a clear need for more systematic study of this area.

CONCLUSION

The publication in 1946 of the lengthy and detailed Congressional Report on the Pearl Harbor attack provided the primary raw material for one of the founding texts in the intelligence studies canon.[93] Roberta Wohlstetter's marriage of communications theory with detailed historical research in *Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision* demonstrated the rich potential of an interdisciplinary approach to the study of intelligence and policy making.[94] Whether or not the recently published Congressional Report on the surprise attacks of September 11 produces another seminal text, the events of the past three years are bound to have profound implications for the study of intelligence.

Michael Herman has argued that, 'Governments' and people's views of intelligence will be permanently affected by the events of September 11.'[95] While this is debatable, it is undeniable that intelligence occupies a more prominent place in the public sphere than ever before. Quite apart from the publication of secret intelligence on Iraq, debates about the practice of intelligence now take place on a scale and at a level that would have been inconceivable three years ago. Issues such as the relative importance of human intelligence as against 'technical assets', the importance of international intelligence collaboration and the cognitive obstacles to effective analysis and warning have all been debated. As Wesley Wark is surely right to argue: 'Learning to live with an open-ended ''war on terrorism'' will mean learning to live with intelligence.'[96] These developments will doubtless provide both challenges and opportunities to scholars interested in the study of intelligence.

Should the terror attacks in New York and Washington force us to rethink the subject we are studying? Will they change the nature and conduct of intelligence operations forever? If so, how will this affect the study of intelligence and its role in world politics? These are questions that bear further reflection in any exercise aimed at establishing a future agenda for intelligence studies. The evidence so far suggests that, while the role of intelligence in international politics has certainly evolved, and scholars will have to adjust to its evolution, the changes may not be as revolutionary as they at first appeared. As in other areas of world politics, the immovable object of change confronts the irresistible force of continuity.

It is true that there was no Pearl Harbor precedent for the debates about the ethical restraints on intelligence activity. Nor was there much public discussion of the need for trans-national intelligence co-operation. These differences reflect changes that have taken place in world politics since the Second World War. International norms have evolved and now place greater limitations on the exercise of power than those that existed during and after

the Second World War. Globalisation, and in particular advances in information technology, have thrown up new challenges that require new solutions. But there are nonetheless remarkable parallels between debates over Pearl Harbor and the aftermath of September 11. In both instances, predictably, the overwhelming focus was on learning lessons and prescribing policies. Many of the themes are very similar: the inability to conduct effective espionage against a racially or culturally 'alien' adversary; the failure to organise and co-ordinate inter-service intelligence collection and analysis; the lack of resources for both gathering, translating and analysing intelligence and, finally, the failure of political leaders to understand the value and limitations of intelligence. The surprise attack on United States territory in December 1941 killed over 2,000 people and precipitated the United States' entry into war in Europe and Asia. Pearl Harbor portended a transformation in the US role in world politics, and indeed in world politics itself. The surprise attack on United States territory on September 11, 2001 killed a similar number of people (though these were not military personnel and included many hundreds of non-Americans). It too precipitated US wars – in Afghanistan and Iraq. How far it has transformed world politics will remain open to debate. The context in which intelligence is conducted and studied continues to change. This collection will hopefully provide some guidance and illumination along the dimly lit pathways that lie ahead.

NOTES

We are grateful to Tim Dunne and Toni Erskine for comments on earlier drafts.

1. Christopher Andrew, 'Intelligence, International Relations and ''Under-theorisation''', this volume, pp. 29–30.
2. Sherman Kent, *Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 1949).
3. Christopher Andrew and David Dilks (eds), *The Missing Dimension: Governments and Intelligence Communities in the Twentieth Century* (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press 1984).
4. Christopher Andrew, 'Intelligence in the Cold War: Lessons and Learning', in Harold Shukman (ed.), *Agents for Change: Intelligence Services in the 21st Century* (London: St Ermin's Press 2000), pp. 1–2.
5. Andrew, 'Intelligence, International Relations', pp. 29–41. For recent research on signals intelligence, see Matthew Aid and Cees Wiebes (eds), *Secrets of Signals Intelligence during the Cold War and Beyond*, Special Issue of *Intelligence and National Security*, 16/1 (2001).
6. An important recent development in the evolution of more liberal classification and declassification policies in the United States is the implementation of Executive Order 12958 'Classified National Security Information' in April 1995, although the significance of this has been contested. The Blair government has been largely unsuccessful in its attempts to establish a similar regime in Britain. For an interesting perspective on US attitudes towards government secrecy see the report of the 'Commission on Protecting and Reducing Government Secrecy' established in Washington in 1995: *Secrecy: Report of the Commission on Protecting and Reducing Government Secrecy* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office 1997); and Daniel Moynihan, *Secrecy* (New Haven, CT: Yale

University Press 1998). On the British side see David Vincent, *The Culture of Secrecy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1998).

7. Kent, *Strategic Intelligence*, p. ix.
8. James Der Derian, *Antidiplomacy: Spies, Terror, Speed and War* (Oxford: Blackwell 1992); see also Michael Fry and Miles Hochstein, 'Epistemic Communities: Intelligence Studies and International Relations' in Wesley K. Wark (ed.), *Espionage: Past, Present, Future?* (London: Frank Cass 1994), pp. 14–28 (also published as a Special Issue of *Intelligence and National Security*, 8/3 (1993)).
9. David Kahn, 'An Historical Theory of Intelligence', *Intelligence and National Security*, 16/3 (2002), p. 79. For a thoughtful comparative analysis of the concept of intelligence in different national contexts see Philip H.J. Davies, 'Ideas of Intelligence: Divergent National Concepts and Institutions', *Harvard International Review* (Autumn 2002), pp. 62–6. For an earlier valuable collection of essays dealing with these issues see Kenneth G. Robertson (ed.), *British and American Approaches to Intelligence* (Basingstoke: Macmillan 1987).
10. Examples of the last approach include Richard Thurlow, *The Secret State: British Internal Security in the Twentieth Century* (Oxford: Blackwell 1994), Amy Knight, *Beria: Stalin's First Lieutenant* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 1993), Robert Gellately, *The Gestapo and German Society: Enforcing Racial Policy 1933–1945* (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1990).
11. Michael Herman, *Intelligence Power in Peace and War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1996).
12. John Ferris, 'Intelligence' in R. Boyce and J. Maiolo (eds), *The Origins of World War Two: The Debate Continues* (Basingstoke: Palgrave 2003), p. 308.
13. For an excellent analysis of US presidents and their use of intelligence see Christopher Andrew, *For the President's Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency from Washington to Bush* (London: HarperCollins 1995).
14. Michael Herman, 'Diplomacy and Intelligence', *Diplomacy & Statecraft*, 9/2 (1998), pp. 1–2.
15. For discussion see Herman, *Intelligence Power* and Abram Shulsky, *Silent Warfare: Understanding the World of Intelligence* (London: Brassey's US 1993).
16. Elizabeth Anderson, 'The Security Dilemma and Covert Action: The Truman Years', *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence*, 11/4 (1998/99), p. 404.
17. See, for example, Michael I. Handel, *The Diplomacy of Surprise* (Cambridge, MA: Center for International Affairs, Harvard University 1980), idem, 'Intelligence and Military Operations' in idem (ed.), *Intelligence and Military Operations* (London: Frank Cass 1990), pp. 1–95; Richard Betts, 'Analysis, War and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures are Inevitable', *World Politics*, 31/1 (1978), pp. 961–88; and Robert Jervis, 'Intelligence and Foreign Policy', *International Security*, 2/3 (1986/87), pp. 141–61.
18. See Martin Thomas, 'French Intelligence Gathering and the Syrian Mandate, 1920–1940', *Middle Eastern Studies*, 38/2 (2002) and his forthcoming, *Intelligence and Empire: Security Services and Colonial Control in North Africa and the Middle East, 1919–1940* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, forthcoming). See also Richard J. Popplewell, *Intelligence and Imperial Defence: British Intelligence and the Defence of the Indian Empire, 1904–1924* (London: Frank Cass 1995).
19. See Gary Marx, 'Some Concepts that may be Useful in Understanding the Myriad Forms and Contexts of Surveillance', this volume, pp. 78–98. For an authoritative overview of the concepts and context of surveillance in social and political theory see Christopher Dandeker, *Surveillance, Power and Modernity* (Oxford: Polity Press in association with Blackwell 1990).
20. Andrew, 'Intelligence, International Relations', p. 34.
21. See in particular Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, '*One Hell of a Gamble': Khrushchev, Castro, Kennedy and the Cuban Missile Crisis 1958–1964* (London: John Murray 1997); Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, *KGB: The Inside Story* (London: Hodder & Stoughton 1990); and Benjamin B. Fischer, *A Cold War Conundrum: The 1983 Soviet War Scare* (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, Center for the Study of Intelligence 1997).

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23. See Sheila Kerr, 'KGB Sources on the Cambridge Network of Soviet Agents: True or False', *Intelligence and National Security*, 11/3 (1996), pp. 561–85, and 'Oleg Tsarev's Synthetic KGB Gems', *International Journal of Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence*, 14/1 (2001), pp. 89–116; see Nigel West's rejoinder, 'No Dust on KGB Jewels', *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence*, 14/4 (2001–2002), pp. 589–92.
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