

War in England 1642-1649

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CHAPTER

6 Knowledge and Confusion

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Abstract

This chapter discusses army intelligence during the English civil war. The war both facilitated and complicated intelligence gathering and analysis — a process that revealed again the distinctive intimacy of this war in which language formed no barrier, troops were volatile, prisoners were regularly exchanged, and clothing was a shaky guide to affiliation, and in which civil society, with its poor transients, messengers, and travelling civilians coexisted alongside armies, as did family links and friendship between enemies. The blurred boundaries between civil and military society aided information gathering, while the technological limits of communications and the confusions of war reinforced the need for it. Intelligence, once obtained, had to be translated into purposive military action. Generals and their councils of war made the best plans they could on the basis of information received, and as needs changed they dispatched aides de camp with revised orders.

Keywords: English civil war, army intelligence, spies, military action, civil society, military society

Subject: Early Modern History (1500 to 1700), Pre-20th Century Warfare, British History

Collection: Oxford Scholarship Online

> 'Intelligence, as ever, was less than perfect.'[1]

Knowledge in war is of multiple kinds. Some is public and open, available to all those interested enough to seek it in print, manuscript, or verbal report. Some is private, specialized, and—if possible—protected from penetration by the enemy. Some is directly military in application, some is part of the general world of contemporary information that, through its effects in civilian politics, has consequences for the conduct of war. Some is sought in order to shape future events—to know, for example, where to send troops to forestall an enemy strike—and some records and draws morals from those that have already happened. Some is acquired and disseminated by 'legitimate' agents, by army scouts or news reporters; some is a clandestine affair of spies and turncoats. Some is freely offered by local populations; some is extorted. Some is true, and some is false. All these strands were interwoven in the information world of the English civil war.

The circumstances of civil war both facilitated and complicated intelligence gathering and analysis. The process revealed again the distinctive intimacy of this war in which language formed no barrier, troops were volatile, prisoners regularly exchanged, and clothing a shaky guide to affiliation, and in which civil society, with its poor transients, messengers, and travelling civilians coexisted alongside armies, as did family links and friendship between enemies. Commercial, legal, and social communication between royalists and parliamentarians continued despite hostilities. The blurred boundaries between civil and military society aided information gathering, while the technological limits of communications and the confusions of war reinforced the need for it. When the renegade, the spy, or the disloyal civilian was only certainly identifiable by his actions, not by speech, manner, or clothing, suspicion was easily aroused. Readiness to suspect and condemn spies is a common enough form of war hysteria; public revulsion against spying and subversion, of the kind expressed in the heated denunciations and terminal punishments of the 1640s, has had a long life, as has the odium against
p. 95 the spy's breach of personal and professional honour and affront to social ↳ norms. Civil war, while it made many things easier for the spy and the turncoat, also fostered anxiety about their subversive presence. This made for caution even among the apparently committed. The security of Fairfax's council of war itself could not be taken for granted: before a letter from a spy in the royalist camp was read, 'first the name was torne out'.[2]

Finding Out

We have already seen that the weapons with which the war was fought reinforced its intimacy and enhanced the sense of vulnerability to the unpredictable common to all wars. Bungled intentions and failures of information and control compounded uncertainties. How could commanders and their soldiers know where they were? In battle, how could they act with knowledge and according to plan? How could they identify friend or foe? Problems of intelligence joined the material means of waging war and the character and professional abilities of officers and men in shaping its nature. We shall return to the soldiers, but first we shall look at two aspects of intelligence: at the ways in which knowledge was acquired, and at some of the difficulties of translating it into action. Sources of information ranged from 'public' items reported in the wartime flood of print news or available in pre-existing maps and descriptions to reports from a very mixed bag of human agents. Its acquisition and application demonstrated yet again the ad hoc, provisional elements of the English civil war, but here too similarities to modern wars persist. For all their technological aids to navigation and identification modern armies too offer plentiful examples of erroneous intelligence and of troops who get lost or fail to distinguish friend from foe.

Armies needed many kinds of information but the most basic related to their physical environment. They needed to know where they were going and where the enemy was, and they needed to understand the topographical strengths and weaknesses of positions and details of military fortification. Information came from direct observation, printed or manuscript representation, and local knowledge. Direct observation was a relatively simple matter, although it was subject to vagaries of weather, smoke, or eyesight (the latter sometimes supplemented by the use of telescopes or 'perspective glasses'). The other two sources of knowledge have been little explored, but they were crucial in the design and execution of military plans. The ability to use maps and plans was a basic military skill. The human informants have a shadowy survival on the military margins, but they were valued if not honoured in their day.

The use of maps and plans is rarely specifically documented, but it was part of the arcana of the professional
p. 96 officer. In 1639, for example, the old soldier ↳ Sir Jacob Astley, surveying the military defences of the north of England, sent 'cards' of Berwick and Carlisle to London to demonstrate their strategic importance.[3] If the new officers of the war years did not already possess some skill with maps, they rapidly acquired it. Familiarity with schematized representation of topographical space was already common among the educated, who had both general geographical interests and long-standing acquaintance with maps and plans of property for estate and

legal purposes. A more specialized recent development was the market for manuals full of diagrams of fortifications and military formations. Sophisticated 'carto-literate' map- and plan-readers probably made up no more than a subclass of the literate, but representations like the 'True Mapp' of Plymouth that accompanied the *True Narration* of its siege in 1644 or the overview of Colchester that formed part of a broadsheet *Diary* of events there in 1648, with their skilled depictions of the towns and their topographical settings, their fortifications and troop dispositions, argue for the existence of a popular familiarity with maps and their meanings.[4] The habit of abstraction and visualization, of mental connection between pictorial representation, place, and movement, did not need to reach a cartographically sophisticated level to be militarily useful.[5]

England already had a distinguished cartographic tradition. The maps of Saxton, Norden, and Speed were frequently reprinted before the war. Saxton's wall map of England and Wales was a favoured decoration in great houses by the late sixteenth century, a fashion that made publicly visible the topographical articulation of the country, and there was a market for large tapestry wall maps of English counties. Statesmen, soldiers, and gentlemen were familiar with maps for business and pleasure. It is not surprising to find that the 'Great Chamber' of Essex's house at Chartley held thirteen maps at his death, for he was a soldier with European as well as English experience; it is more notable that an obscure William Fiske of Pakenham, Suffolk, bequeathed his 'globe, mapps, … and the great mappe' to his son in 1648.[6] Saxton's county maps had even appeared on a set
p. 97 of playing cards in 1590, while the banner of Sir Richard Grenvile, in his ↳ brief parliamentary phase, depicted a map of England, its counties marked and identified by initials, with the legend, 'England Bleeding'. The practical ability to visualize the relations between parts of the country, between villages within a county, and between streets within a town, was as significant as the symbolic, metaphorical, and literary implications of these maps to which much attention has been drawn.[7] The military use of maps and civilian concern to follow the course of war probably enhanced the English sense of a national topography.

Travellers' guides had an overtly practical intent. Jacob Van Langeren's *Direction for the English Traviller*, which had three editions in 1635 and 1636, was 'the earliest English road book with maps'. The purpose was to enable the traveller 'to Coast about all England and Wales', to inform himself of his present location and future direction, to establish the orientation of towns, and to find the distances between towns in each county by means of detailed distance tables. The county maps in the first three editions remained tiny, simple, and basic, but in 1643 a revised edition was issued with new, larger, more detailed maps, and in 1644 a significant addition was made to the title-page: 'Usefull for Quartermasters, Brief-Gatherers, and all such as have to doe the Shires of England.' These books were small, roughly 6½ by 5½ inches; the quartermaster's edition was even more pocket-sized, 5 by 2¼ inches. Their modern rarity, it has been suggested, is evidence of their constant use in the seventeenth century.[8] The deficiencies for war use of the maps in the *Direction* were compensated for not only by reissues of Speed's and Saxton's maps in standard forms, but by their adaptation to war needs. In 1644 Saxton's large wall map of England appeared, shorn of decorations, in an 8½ by 3¾ inch format 'Portable for every Mans Pocket', bound in calf and containing six folded map sheets, 20 inches wide and from 10¾ to 16 inches high. Its title-page claimed that it was 'Usefull for all Comanders for Quarteringe of Souldiers, & all sorts of Persons, that would be informed, Where the Armies be.'[9] Its publisher was a London parliamentarian, but Wenceslas Hollar, a royalist, had worked on its plates, while an Oxford bookseller revised Saxton's county atlas
p. 98 and published it in 1645. Cartographic ↳ knowledge was bipartisan. 'Saxton's maps … fought on both sides', as did travellers' guides and more restricted and local maps and 'descriptions'.[10]

The value of such knowledge was described by an old soldier and quartermaster, Henry Hexham, in 1636:

> [W]hat Generall is there, which conducts his armies through passages, over Rivers, Brookes, Mountaines or Woods, quarters or lodges them, or besieges any Citty, Towne or fort, but he must have continually a Topographick description, and Map of that Countrie, town or place in his hand, to advance his intended designe.[11]

That such knowledge extended a long way below generals and was part of daily military life in the civil war is evident from the record of John Syms, the refugee puritan minister who became deeply engaged in the defence of Plymouth. In the course of his many detailed accounts of new defence-works, he noted that one was 'called in the map, Lipson-Mill-Work', an indication that maps were progressively updated to reflect new conditions. Ability to 'read' and produce a diagrammed representation of the physical world among those who were not military professionals was also reflected in Syms's quick, crude sketch maps of Portland castle and Weymouth.[12]

Maps and guides were detailed and informative. Maps showed rivers, hills, and woods, houses, forts, ruins, and assorted items of interest. They indicated market towns, and made it possible to find 'the smallest Village ... *Henxey* or *Botley* as well as *Oxford*'.[13] Printed guides indicated distance and orientation. Many local and specialized maps were part perspective view, and their incidental charms—such as the inclusion of a maid milking her cow in a field—do not disguise their practical usefulness for they sometimes provided astonishing detail, naming lanes, fields, and gates and showing the houses that lined the streets. Some dated from well before the civil war, but Speed's 1610 maps of Reading and Leicester, for instance, gave precisely the 'Topographick description' and the representation of roads, streams, churches, houses, gateways, and bridges that Hexham advocated, for two towns that were later to suffer much attention from soldiers.[14]

p. 99 Topographical information, then, was not strange or esoteric, for many were accustomed to the diagrammatic abstraction of maps and plans and could conceptualize relationships of space and distance. What this meant to Rupert's or Fairfax's soldiers as they marched 'up and down in England' remains conjectural. What they did know were roads that were often bad and muddy. And roads were strikingly absent from most of the county and national maps, although they were meticulously detailed on local plans. Neither of the pocket-sized books specially targeted at the needs of quartermasters and other soldiers showed roads; they were not added to the 'Quartermaster's Map' until 1671.[15] Hence the importance of human guides who, together with scouts and spies, provided armies with information.

All three had important parts to play in an army's information system, as Richard Elton acknowledged when he grouped guides, scouts, and spies together in *The Compleat Body of the Art Military*, a book that had the imprimatur of 'diverse ... most experienced commanders'. 'Intelligences' were a standard item among the 'charges incident' to maintaining an army; in Sir John Gell's claim for reimbursement, for example, expenses for horses, arms, and intelligence were lumped together. The informants who earned this money were various. When parliament authorized £10 in payments to Colonel Venn's regiment at Windsor, some went to official agents such as scouts, and some to unofficial sources who provided supplementary information, such as 'Mr. Wilson a minister', who received £1 'for intelligence'.[16] Armies could not in fact dispense with the help of such local civilians, and the value of information freely volunteered by a sympathetic, or at least benevolently neutral, local population was acknowledged in a revealing comment by Sir Edward Walker. When the king's army moved into Cornwall in 1644 they suddenly found themselves surrounded by a loyal populace, while the parliamentarians were 'utterly deprived' of information. '[N]ot till now', wrote Walker, 'were we sensible of the great and extraordinary Advantage the Rebels have over His Majesties Armies throughout the Kingdom by Intelligence (the Life of all warlike Actions).' In Cornwall, instead, it was the royalists who received 'hourly
p. 100 Notice' of the enemy's movements.[17] Nevertheless, ↳ although local people were useful auxiliary informants even when not formally employed by an army, civilians were unpredictable commodities, and armies had greater control over men who were formally enrolled for service and therefore subject to the rigours of military law.[18] The articles of war of both sides legislated penalties for delinquent guides, spies, and scouts.[19]

Elton's analysis of the roles of an army's intelligence gatherers reflected his own civil war experience, and much of it retains a remarkably modern ring. The first category, the guides, were not normally regular, long-term soldiers but were employed as needed for their local expertise. Their work complemented the printed materials described above, for although Elton acknowledged that '*Maps* with the right use and knowledge of them, are great helps towards the finding out of the best and most convenient ways', he immediately added a requirement

for '[s]kilfull and expert Inhabitants of the Countrey' as guides. It was the wagon-master's responsibility to screen them, to ascertain their knowledge of

> all passable *By-paths, Crosse-ways, &c* … of the distance of places, of the evennesse, and streightnesse of them, whether they be plain, or crooked, hilly or stony, and difficult of passage; what *Rivers, Hedges, Ditches*, and *Bridges*, lye in the way, and which way (if there shall be severall ways) is the safest and shortest.

The guide was also responsible for information about water and forage supplies and practicable routes for baggage. This degree of dependence had its risks, for guides could wilfully mislead or be mistaken. When conflicting advice was offered, it fell to officers and others with local knowledge to adjudicate. Faithful service deserved a reward, but it must never be forgotten that guides could also lead soldiers into 'danger and great hazards, if not utter ruine'—as at Colchester in 1648 when 'good Guides' enabled one party of horse to escape from the blockaded town but another was forced to retreat, 'misled' by guides who ran away. As a general warning, 'they [were] many times caused to ride halter'd about the neck to put them in mind of capitall punishment, if they shall mislead … for the terrour of others'.[20]

The case of one of the earl of Essex's Staffordshire tenants demonstrates how justified this nervousness was and how easily an army might be misled. Civilians were vulnerable to military demands for help and information, but a guide's coerced cooperation was not always reliable. Ralph Baxter, after being plundered to the point of ruin by the royalists, was ordered to guide the king's army to Essex's manor of Chartley. Parliament
p. 101 condemned him for collaboration but ↳ fellow-tenants, petitioning on his behalf, said that instead he had risked his life to save the house and its park and deer, and had also 'by [his] provident care' preserved their own estates, 'All of which had been lost and destroyed if the said Ralph had not guided the army another way.'[21] Ralph survived to receive a modest reward, but such defiance by misdirection could be dangerous. Royalist articles of war mandated death without mercy for a guide 'found false in [his] charge'.[22]

Unlike guides, who were employed according to need, scouts were regular members of the army, sent out to reconnoitre and report. They were therefore unambivalently subject to its discipline, but Elton's insistence that they should be incorruptible as well as courageous, and that a scout's performance reflected on the reputation of his officer, suggested similar anxiety about treachery or incompetence. Commanders needed scouts to warn of possible enemy attack and to improve their own 'infesting of [the] Enemy'. Brave, trustworthy, discreet, observant scouts were to move by highways and by 'private unsuspected passages', reconnoitring all 'accessible' places, and to report 'nothing but what they can give *ocular* proof of'—for error could lead 'the whole *Army* possibly … into an irreparable ruine'.[23]

The civil war provides ample evidence of Elton's scouts in action as they sought to discover the enemy's whereabouts and facilitate action by their own side, and to report on militarily significant developments such as large-scale troop movements. The scale of this activity is revealed in the vast correspondence of the parliamentarian scoutmaster Sir Samuel Luke and in the tireless comings and goings of his agents. A good and lucky scout did not mislay the enemy, did not reveal his own presence, and enabled his army to remain undiscovered. The secrecy of an army concentration was a credit to the scouts who made it possible, as was prevention of surprise to their own forces. Essex urged that scouts be sent out continually to prevent surprise by Hopton at Wareham in 1644, and a few months later Waller's scouts were so 'diligent' that the royalists were unaware of the concentration of his forces and their secret approach to Alton, for Waller's men took prisoner anyone likely to pass on news of the parliamentary army's presence, while captured royalist scouts became themselves supplementary sources of information.[24] Not all operations were so fortunate, for a success for the scouts of one side usually entailed a failure for those of the other. They could also be incompetent, like the 'straggling scouts' observed before Hawarden in 1645. The relevant royalist article of war ordered discretionary punishment for scouts who were merely sluggish in their duties, but if their failings were due to sleep, drink, or
p. 102 intentional misdirection they became, like drunk or sleeping ↳ sentinels, subject to the death penalty.[25] Scouts

were also vulnerable to capture. The parliamentarian Walter Erle, lamenting the earl of Caenarvon's success in Dorset in 1643 and noting his 'sudden and private' arrival, added a self-justifying marginal note: 'I had 2 scouts upon the way that he came but they were both intercepted.'[26] When action seemed imminent, forlorn hopes were deployed for advance reconnaissance to supplement the efforts of the scouts, but despite their fallibility scouts remained the basic and irreplaceable element in planning military movements. Some of the abrupt and apparently random changes of direction and backtracking of army marches can be explained as reaction to news suddenly received from scouts.

Finally, there were spies, 'at all times necessary for an *Army*, and ... of all men they ... deserve to be most certainly and liberally rewarded' for, as Elton recognized, their willingness and trustworthiness in this dangerous trade depended on generous and reliable payment. Spies, he said, were of three kinds. First were selected soldiers, preferably cavalry because of their wider opportunities to gather intelligence, who under pretence of discontent or lack of pay crossed to the enemy, whence they were to report on plans and events. The more of such spies the better, although they should be unknown to one another; they were to be fully briefed, and drops for exchange of information and orders carefully set up: only in emergencies should face-to-face meetings be necessary. Second (and in real life probably more important), there were 'Cursary Spies', bringing current intelligence. Transients 'of meanest rank, and quallity' were best fitted to act as these mobile messengers and observers: '*Peasants, Pedlers, Sellers* of *Strong-waters*, or *Tobacco*, and the like'. The civil war's women spies seem largely to have fallen into this humble category. Lastly, there were 'Doubles', who after their trustworthiness had been fully established, might be allowed to feed true information to the enemy in order to '*insinuate* ... themselves into the private service of ... Prime Officers'.[27] Elton's analysis of spying was not novel; it merely provided an unusually lucid account of traditional wisdom, applied to English conditions. As it makes clear, many of the practices of espionage are timeless, from autonomous cells and management by spy-handlers to moles. Other aspects of the civil war experience, however, such as the assumption of a large, homogeneous pool of side-changing soldiers to provide cover, were peculiar to Elton's circumstances. The nature of the war provided fertile ground both for the spy's deceptions and for pervasive suspicions about his undetected presence.

p. 103 The 'ordering [of] ... Scouts and spies' to acquire reliable intelligence remained a major duty of commanders, but if guides and scouts had sensitive, risky jobs, a spy's danger, if caught, was even greater.[28] His fate, once guilt was established—usually by court martial—was routine. As Richard Symonds noted laconically on Sunday, 30 June 1644, 'Nothing of any moment done all this day. A spy hanged.'[29] The punishment of soldiers who proved double agents or who were suborned into giving intelligence to the enemy was a simple matter of military law. Nevertheless the cases of many spies were less clear-cut. They might claim to be messengers protected by passes, or officers on parole, or innocent civilians. If their claims had any technical defects, these protections were worth little, as the unfortunate Richard Smith discovered when he was captured by the parliamentarians four miles from Arundel Castle. He claimed that he was a messenger from the castle, sent to seek aid from Sir Ralph Hopton, but his inability to corroborate his story—he said he had lost the letter—was taken as proof of guilt: 'So that it appearing that he had been an arch Spie in our Army, and was now going to betray it into the hands of the Enemy, he was condemned to be hanged upon the Bridge in the view of the Castle'.[30] Justice was sometimes tempered by discretionary mercy, but even then the message as to what a spy could expect remained clear. In 1648 John Goforth escaped hanging, but only after the terror of reprieve as he stood on the ladder with the rope around his neck.[31] A parliamentary ordinance of August 1644 prohibited unauthorized civilian as well as military communication with the enemy, but civilians suspected of spying were already at risk. A Mistress Spurwill, for example, had been seized as a traitor at Plymouth and confined to the castle for 'correspondency' with the royalists. It is not clear whether she escaped a traitor's fate, but the puritan John Syms looked forward with pleasure to the heavy 'shame & doom' he foresaw for her partner in crime, 'the other virago'.[32]

When siege lines were porous, when soldiers lived and fought among civilians, when men, women and goods still travelled the roads, and when the party affiliation of fellow countrymen was not apparent unless they chose overtly to signal it, the mark of Cain was invisible and the kind of quarantine of information that
p. 104 parliament's ordinance hoped to impose was impossible. The suspicions ↳ nurtured by the identity problems of civil war meant that soldiers and civilians were constantly alert for betrayal or transmission of dangerous intelligence, while employers were quick to suspect their own agents of duplicity. Hence the doubts implicit in Sir Arthur Aston's letter from Reading shortly before its fall in 1643: 'I think some evil fate hangs over our designs, for no sooner is a business spoke of but either by information, or inspiration, the enemy hath notice thereof.'[33] That such suspicions were not unreasonable is suggested by the parliamentarian spy who, signing himself only 'Your very humble & careful servant', wrote somewhat uncarefully from Oxford, 'I am now lodged at the Maidenhead over against Lincoln College'; he hoped shortly to move to Christ Church, to 'the court itself'. He was, he reported with satisfaction, 'taken for a high cavalier', and he confidently expected 'opportunity for effectual service in due time'.[34] Yet if infiltration was easy, accusers were quick to act, however slight the evidence. In one case a captain and a soldier of Waller's army were court-martialled for spying on evidence so thin that the court peremptorily dismissed the charges and ordered restitution of their confiscated property. Once aroused, however, suspicion died hard. Years later the story was still being repeated that the royalist Colonel Fielding, although ultimately pardoned for his surrender of Reading, had been seen going surreptitiously into Essex's tent and that nothing was more certain than that the garrison had been betrayed.[35] As we shall see in the account of the siege of Boarstall, in this internecine war the claims of old friendship conflicted with caution lest one be thought a traitor, and a careful man might ask to have his most innocuous letters burnt. Communication and surrender were always likely to arouse suspicion of treachery, of being the action of a long-planted mole or a new renegade.

Yet once an intelligence source had been placed or found it was likely that he or she would have access to useful information and that its dispatch would not be effectively monitored. When an ingenious and determined man devoted his full energy to spying, it was even more difficult to withhold intelligence. Colonel Joseph Bampfield, who spied for Cromwell as well as the king, was one of the war's more dashing spies, at least by his own account. He 'wanted neither means, nor assiduitie', he said, in carrying out his missions for the king, whether gathering intelligence of parliamentary politics, suborning presbyterians, or rescuing the duke of York, by methods that included infiltration, family influence, disguise, and manipulation of gentlemanly and soldierly obligations. On one occasion, after he had been exchanged from a previous imprisonment, he was captured for a second time when he was already acting as the king's agent carrying 'papers of importance and cyfers in [his]
p. 105 clothes and sadle'. He secured his release by ↳ some speedy sleight of hand that persuaded his captors to accept an outdated pass and parole that Essex had previously issued. An ingenious agent could exploit the codes of soldierly honour and reciprocal observance of obligations and conventions, but such slippery practices were seen as endangering a mutually beneficial system.[36]

The number of 'professional' spies like Bampfield was probably fairly small, although the more successful they were the less likely we are to know of them unless they took to print. In general, spying reflected inevitable looseness of security when civilians mingled constantly with soldiers, so that a parliamentarian captain could observe of the Scottish invasion of 1648, 'We had spies amongst their army daily, that brought us true intelligence of their numbers, as near as could be computed, and their postures and demeanours.'[37] Elton's 'Cursary Spies', moving round the country and between armies, were among the most difficult to monitor. Not surprisingly, few names have come down to us. Many, it seems, were women, who often passed with some degree of freedom even through siege lines. Parliament Joan had a long and varied career and Bess, a maidservant, carried many letters from one of the spying 'viragos' of Plymouth. Others remained more anonymous. 'I pray you send the woman that lodges in Capt. Booth's quarter [to] Worcester to gain intelligence', wrote Lieutenant-Colonel Jones to Brereton in November 1645. The terms of the request suggest that she was not a novice, an impression reinforced by her capable report on her return two weeks later. In Worcester and Bridgenorth she had been cross-examined by senior officers, Prince Maurice among them, and successfully

fended off their questions. She relayed purported royalist plans to relieve Chester but noted that she saw no signs of troop movements, while her report on the debriefing of a prisoner newly released by the parliamentarians enabled Brereton to discover the nature of the intelligence the royalists were receiving.[38] Other women may have been less expert but were similarly useful, in part because their movements were so routine that they became invisible unless special vigilance called them to attention. So at Plymouth, women revealed details of a planned attack. At Chester, Thomas Welchman's wife was turned out of town and promptly became a source of intelligence to the parliamentary enemy. At Chester, too, women brought in the news of parliamentarian mining of St Werburgh's (although subsequent royalist countermining was in turn promptly reported to Brereton by one of his own spies). Meanwhile the mayor's maid was able to pass through the lines, gathering information for the royalists as she went.[39]

p. 106 Guides, scouts, and spies were specifically employed to secure intelligence. Other important sources of information were more accidental; they included prisoners, escapers, renegades, and deserters. Waller lumped together 'prisoners, and spies' among the sources on which he based a decision in 1644.[40] In all cases credibility was a problem, as Elton had pointed out. If you knew you had planted renegades in the enemy's ranks, how could you be sure of the sincerity of the deserter who 'came in' to you? Would your prisoner tell the truth? Could you be certain that a returning prisoner had not been turned in his absence? One solution lay in careful, extensive cross-examination; another was to refuse to accept persons of suspect status.

In spite of such doubts, it was conventional wisdom that prisoners could supply valuable information. A pre-war manual, noting that spies were not always available, gave instructions on how to send out parties to take prisoners, 'from whom there may be drawn a relation of the estate of the adverse part, and this exploit is called taking of intelligence' or, by the French, 'prendre langue'.[41] There is little evidence of prisoner-raids in the civil war, but ample evidence of extracting information from those prisoners who came to hand. Examinations were conducted up to the highest levels; on occasion the king himself intervened in questioning. The resulting information might be significant enough to lead to serious action, as in Rupert's decision to attack Newark, or it might be of trifling local value.[42] Returned prisoners were also carefully debriefed, as in the case of the released prisoner whose report to Prince Maurice was, as we have seen, in turn reported back to Brereton by his female spy.[43]

The case of Lieutenant Philemon Mainwaring, a prisoner of the royalists in Chester, shows how useful an observant and ingenious prisoner could be. Mainwaring sent out his letters of information and advice in December 1645 when Brereton's noose was tight around the city. He had earlier been allowed out on parole in an unsuccessful attempt to seek an exchange and had then returned to Chester according to his word as 'gentleman and soldier', but this did not prevent purveyance of clandestine intelligence by routes presumably arranged during parole. It is clear that there was little difficulty in getting his reports out of the city. Indeed, a disillusioned royalist, himself a prisoner in Brereton' quarters, wrote bitterly of the plentiful, certain intelligence received from Chester.[44] As a prisoner in the castle, Mainwaring's sources were ample, for imprisonment rarely entailed isolation. Friends and informants reported to him from market square and council hall, so that news of citizen morale, military expectations, and political divisions mingled with his first-
p. 107 hand report of an alarum that set ↳ the city by its ears: 'I could not sleep in my bed for their crying, Arms, Arms, up and down the streets.'[45] Nor was he the only prisoner-informant in Chester. A letter from the Marshallsea on the state of the city was addressed to friends but included recommendations for transmission to Brereton.[46] Practical everyday needs such as food, laundry, and medical care meant that armies could neither throw a *cordon sanitaire* around their own activities nor quarantine prisoners from civilians. Royalist prisoners at Yarmouth could spread subversion as well as gather information as they talked to their friends in the town.[47]

Prisoners remained tricky properties. While imprisoned they were often in a position to gather useful news and to spread misinformation or disloyalty (like the parliamentarian colonel who tried to suborn his royalist captors to 'come in' to parliament). When they returned to their own armies, however, they might find themselves distrusted, and some commanders saw them as potential Trojan horses.[48] Lord Byron, for example,

flatly refused to take back prisoners who had taken the Covenant while held by parliament, even when they had done so under duress, while Colonel Butler faced trial in London for his suspect conduct after his return from imprisonment just before the collapse at Lostwithiel.[49] Renegades, deserters, and escapers presented similar problems. Their information might be valuable, like that of the foot soldiers who 'came over' to the royalists with news of the parliamentarian cavalry's plan to break out at Lostwithiel.[50] But while such information could not be ignored, it demanded scepticism. Careful cross-examination and, where possible, confirmation from other sources could not always prevent successful deception or simple error.[51]

All intelligence, it is clear, was not equal, and it was not accepted uncritically.[52] Even intelligence provided in good faith could be faulty or misleading. In 1645, faced with conflicting reports of the movement of enemy forces, a royalist was driven to lament 'the king's ill intelligence'.[53] And even a report 'from a very good hand', a
p. 108 trustworthy supplier of 'certain intelligence', was better if supported ↳ by confirmatory evidence. Interpretation was difficult, and commanders had ultimately to back their own judgement, as when Colonel Gerard was told in April 1644 that the enemy was within five miles of Hereford but plausibly concluded that their true objective was the relief of Brampton Bryan. Even information from an apparently impeccable source, such as the letter taken from the pocket of a captured officer of the king's own troop, and 'so be-bloodied over' that the original was 'not fit' to be sent to London, still left uncertainty as to the 'design' and how best to counter it.[54] The importance of confirmation and assessment was characteristically reflected in the royalist attitude to the deserters' information at Lostwithiel: 'This Intelligence was very particular, and being confirmed from other Parts, it was believed.'[55] On the other hand, a boy's news of the landing of Irish troops for the relief of Chester late in 1645 was not supported by other reports, and one of the besieged tartly observed, 'I think the boy babbles.'[56] Even confirmation could not always be trusted. Rupert's precipitate action at Naseby was attributed to the fact that the officer sent to ascertain the truth of intelligence about the disposition of parliamentary forces 'returned with a Lye in his Mouth'. The problems arising from such uncertainties were revealed at a council of war held by Fairfax in 1645. A letter of intelligence from the prince of Wales's army urged speedy advance, but the officers 'had no confidence in him that wrote that letter'; Fairfax overrode their doubts, however, with assurance 'that all was true'.[57] Ultimately much depended on a commander's hunch or judgement.

Fears of subversion, impersonations, false pretences, and the easy spread of rumour all led to wariness about the information that was so assiduously gathered, a wariness increased by persistent, often ingenious, attempts to spread false or discouraging news.[58] Furthermore, the need to keep a watch on the machinations of one's own side did not foster a spirit of trust. Royalist quarrels showed this in its bitterest form. In the course of a feud between Colonel Leveson and Colonel Bagot, fellow royalists, only intelligence received enabled Leveson to move his men out of the way of an attack by Bagot's. And Lord Capel, his friends believed, was intentionally given false information by rivals and only alerted to their duplicity by news from captured scouts. Meanwhile parliamentary commanders in the provinces anxiously maintained links with correspondents in London lest
p. 109 they fall by the wayside of political manœuvre.[59] Colonel Goodwin's warning in 1643 that letters to the general ↳ 'sure are intercepted' can be interpreted as applying to action by friend or enemy.[60]

The methods of transmitting intelligence, like those for obtaining it, were largely traditional and common-sensible. There were few of the exotica beloved of intelligence communities. Messages on occasion were passed by signs—a fire, or blowing one's nose—and at Colchester, in a propaganda exercise designed to hasten surrender, parliamentarians used kites and arrows to spread news that would undermine morale and 'undeceive' the besieged. Nevertheless the enthusiastic pre-war expert who recommended a kind of long-distance planchette table, or an embryo morse code transmitted by torches, or carrier pigeons, found few followers. If his observation that 'the secret conveying of Letters is of great consequence in time of Warre' was generally accepted, his unbreakable codes were not.[61] Instead codes were usually simple numerical or substitution ciphers, many of which could have been read with relative ease, although a few defeated codebreakers; Essex sent up to London a 'letter we cannot decipher'. Often, however, the purpose seems to have

been delay, should a message be intercepted, rather than real concealment, particularly as many were written part en clair and part in code.[62] Alphabetic codes that interchanged letters and numbers were flexible enough for any messages, if laborious, but random substitutions of groups of numbers, letters, or words were restricted in the information they could convey to what their creators had foreseen a need for. In Sir John Gell's case this enabled him to refer to the Scots (201) and martial law (218), to pray to God (260), and to characterize men as religious or debauched (240, 265).[63] Encoding took time that was often not available in emergencies. 'I have not time to write in ciphers. If I had, I should say more', wrote one officer to Rupert in 1645.[64] Codes were also vulnerable not only to being broken but to loss of the key or its acquisition by the enemy. In his imprisonment in 1647 Sir Lewis Dyve was unwilling to 'let the cipher goe out of [his] hand' without the king's express order,
p. 110 refusing it (mistakenly, it proved) to a 'messenger ... being ↳ a young man and a stranger to me'.[65] It seems remarkable that Dyve retained the cipher in captivity; possibly his captors were as able as he to read his ciphered correspondence with the king.

More effort went into securing unintercepted dispatch and delivery of letters than into obfuscation of their content.[66] Army messengers appear to have been significantly well paid; their risks and the opportunities for subornation made it only prudent. A humble but trusty civilian appointed to carry messages between Fairfax and the Scots, who 'faithfully discharged' the 'dangerous designs' entrusted to him, earned a long-term reward out of sequestered Catholic lands.[67] Messengers travelled alone, often through enemy territory, and as we have seen they were open to suspicion of spying. Brereton's 'foot post', taking a message to one of his officers, shared the fate of Richard Smith and was hanged in Chester.[68] Messengers were employed for routine transmission of information, such as that sent to and from Luke, and that between officers, such as the mutually beneficial exchanges agreed on between Brereton and Vermuyden in 1645 that by-passed any central clearing-house. In urgent times the pace of messages became hectic and demands on the numbers and courage of messengers heavy. A late royalist push to relieve Beeston castle in 1645 produced a rush of messages—'this night', '5 at night', '8 at night', 'at night'—of warning, organization, and advice dispatched between parliamentarian officers. In 1643 four messengers in two days turned back because of the 'danger of the way' from Warwick to Lichfield.[69] Besides these official messengers there was a large, amorphous army of unofficial carriers of information—officials, sailors, officers, civilian men and women—travelling English roads with letters on every subject from the course of battle and deficiencies of troops to a grandchild's legacy and care of cattle. There were also purely clandestine carriers, often unnamed for security's sake, like the 'convenient and trusty
p. 111 messenger' who transmitted Mainwaring's spy ↳ reports out of Chester.[70] Finally, even the official envoys between opponents, the drums and trumpets who carried messages of threat or negotiation and were protected by the laws of war, had an unofficial intelligence function, for they were expected to be observant as well as discreet and to pick up what information they could while giving nothing away.[71] Both parties tried to prevent transmission of any unauthorized communication from their own territory, as in parliament's ordinance of August 1644. The victims of severity could be pathetic, like the old yeoman Francis Pit, a 'great Professor' of religion, who was prevailed on by his Catholic landlord to carry a letter offering a bribe to the governor of a parliamentary garrison. Beguiled by the governor into continuing negotiations, Pit was trapped and confessed. Mitigating circumstances were no help, and he was executed at Smithfield.[72]

Attention to the interception of intelligence was not confined to purely military information or authorized messengers. In the 1640s England became to a remarkable degree a country under surveillance. Informers passed on to the authorities the rash and often drunken remarks of the unlettered, and the communications of the lettered were vulnerable to unfriendly seizure. The evidence for parliamentary interceptions is more plentiful than that for their opponents, but the royalists too provided for 'secret service', and it seems safe to assume that they too read suspect correspondence.[73] It was widely recognized that sending letters expressing frank opinions on public issues or persons, or passing on news beyond unexceptionable domestic matters or information that was clearly in the public domain, entailed risk. Although it is obvious from the material cited in this book that the English did not become a close-mouthed race and that the dangerous 'loose talk' of a later war was already familiar, it is also obvious that there was much self-censorship that reflected the state's success

in interdicting unfettered communication and in gathering intelligence from incautious letters. In January 1643 Elizabeth of Bohemia wrote to Sir Thomas Roe in Essex, ‘When you think how subjects′ letters are to be opened you will not wonder you hear no oftener from me.’ Even the use of a cipher would not help, for the sight of an enciphered letter could arouse suspicion that it said ‘something against the parliament’.[74] One correspondent
p. 112 passed on general news from London but added, ‘When I remember my letters never ↳ come to you, I can go no further.’ Another simply declared, ‘News I dare not write.’[75]

Some of these interceptions were carefully organized. In May 1643 parliament ordered that all prisoners in the Tower of London were to be searched for letters and papers, which were then ‘to be perused by such as shall be thereunto authorised’; such authorized analysts included men like Sir Samuel Luke, whose intelligence network is well-known, and the parliamentarian scoutmasters Leonard Watson and Thomas Scott. In less formal quests for intelligence prisoners′ pockets were routinely searched for letters, as were the bodies of the dead. A roster of intercepted letters coming out of Chester in 1645 indicates how valuable an active programme could be.[76] Many interceptions however were more opportunist than systematic. Travellers knew that merely to be found carrying letters could be grounds for suspicion so they sought passes that would enable them ‘to pass quietly’ on their journeys; unfortunately these did not reliably ensure that they would not be stopped by enthusiastic soldiers, who were often energized as much by opportunities to pilfer as by zeal to intercept suspect messages.[77]

Clearly many messages and letters never reached their intended recipients. Others were sent on after reading, in a kind of intelligence double play leaving the recipient in ignorance of the information now held by the enemy. In the best tradition of spy literature, one messenger was made drunk and the letter he carried was opened, copied, resealed, and replaced in his pocket.[78] Yet for all the energy and success of the interceptors, the mass of surviving correspondence from the 1640s makes it clear that caution and inhibition did not silence English letter writers. It is also clear that both soldiers and civilians recognized that letters put them at risk and that, while a rich source of intelligence, they could also be a danger to those who wrote them and those who carried them.

Clandestine and military sources were not the only ones enabling armies to move and plan or inducing betrayals. The steady output of printed newsletter and pamphlet accounts of military and political affairs, published within days of the events they described, were read by soldiers and civilians alike, and were supplemented by private letters in which personal and public affairs mingled. Sir Samuel Luke, notwithstanding his large and sensitive information network, acknowledged their value even as he complained to his London agent and friend Samuel Moore, ‘3 lines of your wise news would have been 100 times more acceptable than your 3 pennyworth of diurnals.’ A week later, however, he was transmitting news from his scouts together with ‘the Aulicus’, with a comment, ‘I send you nothing but what I believe to be true’. Bad news,
p. 113 however, as Luke ↳ recognized, was less likely to appear in London newsletters than good, and here private letters came into their own.[79] The correspondence between Luke and Moore covered political moves in London, the armies′ reconstitution into the New Model, victories and defeats, and orders for wheelbarrows, crowbars, drums, and colours. A weekly letter did not satisfy Luke, whose complaints revealed the level of information he expected. ‘Forgetful Mr. Moore,’ he wrote, ‘I have received your letter of 2 sides of paper written, wherein you answered 5 of mine at once, but not satisfied me in any one particular.’[80]

Luke′s network was exceptional in scale but not in nature. Sir George Gresley′s ‘intercourse of intelligence’ provided Sir William Brereton with detailed news from this Derbyshire landowner. Colonel Edward Seymour′s friends sent letters into Dartmouth filled with jokes, gossip, news of troop movements, and predictions of military actions.[81] Arthur Trevor wrote his own news to Rupert′s headquarters but added, ‘The printed papers will tell you how things stand.’[82] Commanders and officers on both sides clearly had varied and extensive knowledge on which to base their actions. Their troops, too, had access to informative and—allowing for bias—surprisingly accurate newsletters to supplement word-of-mouth fact and rumour. Rumour itself had, as usual, a life of its own, which was particularly robust on the most inflammatory topics such as the Irish. It was

also consciously manipulated, as in the stories of imminent relief that kept Chester soldiers from mutiny in December 1645.[83]

Old ways of disseminating information survived and contributed to knowledge of the war. They spread into the far corners of the country and made it difficult for Englishmen to escape a sense of involvement, however unwilling, in a divisive and destructive process. Messengers talked; taciturn correspondents counted on the bearer to recount what they were afraid to write; carriers, traditionally bearers of news, still travelled the country.[84] Conversations between opposing troops spread news. Distribution of the voluminous pamphlet and newsletter output crossed party lines. Traditional means, often telegraphic and symbolic, transmitted information to civilians and soldiers. Proclamations and ordinances were read aloud, bells warned, drums announced the coming of further news, flags—red for defiance, white for truce—sent wordless messages, and 'cries', whether of 'Arms, Arms' or for a stray horse, alerted local populaces. In Chester the coming of war was announced when 'they drummed in behalf of the parliament'. In Hereford, the 'common bell' called citizens to
p. 114 work on the defences; its ringing ↳ was 'the strictest summons that [could] be given to the citizens, ... upon which they [were] bound by oath to appear'. Significantly perhaps for the royalist cause, it was ineffectual in April 1643 and 'very few came'. Nonetheless the message was plain even if ignored. We should not forget that simple and traditional means of communication persisted even if they seldom entered the records.[85]

Armies gathered information as a basis for military action and sought to disseminate those parts of it that served their purpose. Civilians sought it to understand what was going on in the nation, to know what had happened to friends and kin, and to prepare for the next blow. The variety of means is less important than their demonstration of the ways in which professional and lay contributions to intelligence were inextricably entangled; they were yet another aspect of the interpenetration of military and civil society. Once again the unprofessional civilian and the military expert confronted the uncertainty of war, despite the best efforts to turn armies into bodies so well primed with knowledge that they could predictably take successful action. Even when intelligence did not fail the soldier's venture often did, and he was once again forced to contemplate the puzzling ways of providence, God's foresight, or luck.

From Knowledge to Action

Intelligence, once obtained, had to be translated into purposive military action. Decisions must be reached, understandable orders given and preparations made, but the civil war did not differ from other wars in the probability that the best laid plans would go agley. Generals and their councils of war made the best plans they could on the basis of information received, and as needs changed they dispatched aides de camp with revised orders. For the troops on the ground the means employed to reduce military chaos and achieve military success remained traditional. In retrospect they may appear picturesque, but their survival in seventeenth-century war reflected their continued usefulness in contemporary conditions. So visible and audible signs—colours and drums and trumpets—continued to direct action, to provide focus and coherence, and to bolster morale. Like their more advanced modern counterparts, they were imperfectly effective.

In action and on the march these traditional methods transmitted orders, provided rallying points, and enabled distinction of friend from foe. The better trained troops were, the fewer the orders required for the performance of fundamental manœuvres, but when special commands were needed the strongest human voice
p. 115 had its limits and the drum, aided by the fife for infantry and the ↳ trumpet for cavalry, served as the basic means of communication. Soldiers should be able to respond instantly. The 'posture tune', the 'troop', the 'falling of[f]', played on drums and fifes, had directed the drills of musketeers and pikemen that beguiled pre-war audiences at military displays. In preparation for real action, it was the duty of every soldier to learn 'all the severall beats of the drum', from the call, at which he must repair to the colours, to the tattoo, which gave notice for taking up night stations. Elton listed eight 'beats' in all. The directions for the fifth, the 'Battle' or 'Charge',

reveal how—it was hoped—trained men would automatically respond: on hearing it the soldier was 'undauntedly to move forward, boldly steping in good order into the place of his fellow souldier that shall happen to fall down dead before him'. On the march, drummers were spaced through the regiments and organized so that, instead of beating in unison, they spelled each other. 'The English March', which had once accompanied English armies on the continent before falling into disuse, had been revived by Prince Henry, the king's martial elder brother, and now moved armies through the country, as the other 'beats' transmitted commands in action.[86] Drummers and trumpeters were essential to communications, and careful attention was paid to their needs. Drums, trumpets, and colours were part of the army's working equipment, and only secondarily ceremonial and decorative.[87]

Colours were a practical rallying-point for troops in action as well as symbols of honour whose capture was enumerated and flaunted as evidence of the enemy's humiliation.[88] They enabled soldiers to find their own side in confused situations, and to find that part of the army to which they were attached. At least one royalist disaster was attributed to 'want of colours [the soldiers] being thereby made incapable of rallying when they were dispersed'. The enemy, equally dispersed, had been able to rally to its colours but the royalists, in a classic confusion of war, 'mistaking the enemy for [their] own party', were captured.[89] Great attention was paid to the design, colour, and message of banners, as the roll-call of victory in the Naseby parade through London in 1645
p. 116 indicated, when the trophies extended from the royal standard and the colours ↳ of the king, queen, and Prince Rupert down to those of the cornets of horse. Their designs ranged from Rupert's sky-coloured ensign with a red cross and a cornet's orange damask with uplifting Latin motto to the green flowered damask ensign announcing 'Cuckold we come', directed at the maritally unlucky earl of Essex.[90] Parliamentary banners revealed similar diversity, from the military and secular ('Vincere spero' and 'Sans craindre') and the constitutional ('For king and parliament' and 'Viva el rex y muerra il mal govierno') to the religious, which in turn ranged from the restrained ('Deus Nobiscum' and 'Only in Heaven') to the combative ('Antichrist must downe: if you support him he will fall upon you' and 'Nay but as a captaine of the hoste of the Lord am I now come'). In action the refinements of message and picture, often a detailed representation of a complex idea, must frequently have been no more distinctive than Lord Willoughby of Parham's simple, wordless black and silver brocade, but they contributed to corporate and ideological solidarity.[91] Colours served as symbol, morale-builder, and signal, but the latter capacity could be literally obscured by the fog of war.

Identification of colleagues and enemies also presented problems. Watchwords, as we have seen, were indispensable but fallible guides, subject to appropriation and betrayal.[92] Clothing was equally uncertain. From early in the war regiments wore coats in a colour of their colonel's choice; in October 1643, for example, the earl of Manchester ordered 2,100 'coats of green cloth lined with red'.[93] On the battlefield, however, the resulting rainbow coalitions did not necessarily help to distinguish enemies from friends when regiments on both sides wore green or blue or red. Parliamentarian 'Grey-coats' and Kentish 'Redcoats', Irish 'yellow-coats' and the 'Codlin Colour' of the king's regiment, although helpful, were not an infallible guide to adherence, especially when soldiers on both sides wore the useful, protective leather buff coat. The New Model army brought greater uniformity, for from its inception its men wore red coats with facings of different colours indicating regimental affiliation, but the system was still imperfect and in July 1646 Rainsborough's forces at Pontefract were still only described as 'Most Red coats'. At all times the usefulness of uniforms was diminished by pillage and trade in the clothing of prisoners and the dead, which dispersed ownership among enemies and civilians. It was worthy of remark that, in the procession in London after Naseby, many of the prisoners still had their own clothes and coats.[94] Anecdotes suggest that the absence of visual distinction between enemies was
p. 117 commonplace. So John Gwyn noted without comment that 'a party of the ↳ enemy's horse went amongst us as some of our own', and John Syms related that royalists gained entrance to Wareham simply by telling the sentinel that they were a troop of Fairfax's horse.[95] At Shelford, when Colonel Hutchinson removed his identifiable, musket-proof, 'very good suit of armor' because it was too hot and heavy for action, he was indistinguishable in his buff coat from his royalist opposite number, and nearly paid for this interchangeability with his life.[96] Disguise, when it was attempted, need not be sophisticated. As late as 1648, at the siege of

Colchester, a party of royalist soldiers equipped with spades and posing as workmen passed parliamentarian guards without difficulty, 'they conceiving them to be their own men', and despite the fact that they were accompanied by a body of musketeers. Unfortunately their luck ran out at the next guard post.[97] Nor was conduct an infallible identifier. Parliamentarian troops who harrowed, plundered, and terrified near Whitchurch in 1645 'pretend[ed] themselves to be cavaliers'.[98]

Neither language, clothing, nor demeanour was a sure guide to allegiance. Other aids were needed. In some contexts the civilian and peacetime practice of detailed description for identification of malefactors and property could be turned to war use, for example in pursuit of an escaped prisoner: 'He is a slender black haired man in a grayish suit with a little hair on the upper lip, he hath one club foot being born so, and useth to wear boots fast buckled with leathers about his heels instead of spurs.'[99] In action, however, some more immediate means of identification was needed, whether formal devices like scarves and hatbands or makeshift signs such as a bough in the hat or a white handkerchief tied above the elbow. After Essex had designated 'The Gospel' as the identifying 'word' for his men in one operation, he recognized the need for something more: 'And for distinction, I would have you wear a piece of white tape, ribband, or thread, or paper upon your breasts.' When the parliamentary horse escaped from Cornwall in 1644, their many needs included new scarves because of 'great inconvenience we find that upon service we cannot know one another from the enemy'.[100] The
p. 118 extravagant Sir William Myddelton spent £23 on 'ribbands & scarves for his ↳ regiment'. Scarves and ribbands, however, were an easily appropriated disguise, as royalists demonstrated as they marched from Oxford to relieve Basing House, 'passing through the Country for Parliament Men, with *Orange* Tawny Scarfs and Ribbands in [their] Hats'.[101] Fairfax, in the midst of enemies at Marston Moor, escaped by pulling the signal out of his hat and passing through them as one of their own commanders.[102]

Unfortunately ingenious methods of communication and distinction were not enough to ensure victory in the face of other uncontrollable factors that distorted the plans of commanders and conduct of troops. The chief of these was weather, usually bad, which affected the movements of armies and their ability to come to battle and, once they were in action, might make intrinsic confusion worse confounded. 'February-fill-dike' could be fairly reliably counted on to inhibit campaigning, but it was less predictable that a November night would be 'so sharpe, the soldjers could not Marche', aborting Rupert's expedition to surprise Abingdon in 1644.[103] A 'dark and tempestuous night' allowed the enemy to slip past royalist guards for a successful raid on Ellesmere.[104] The 'glut of rain' and 'most miserable, tempestuous rainy weather' of the late summer of 1643 contributed to royalist failure to take Gloucester and to the fatigue and debilitation of troops who 'lay pickled … all night' in wet clothes. In September 1642 Nehemiah Wharton's regiment, 'wet to the skin' and 'up to the ankles in thick clay', was sustained by a night of psalm-singing, but not all parliamentarian troops were so piously hardy. In the autumn of 1643 Waller wrote to the Speaker of the House of Commons of 'a night so foul that I could not possibly keep my men upon their guard', and added that 'the coldness of the night, with foul weather was a great discouragement to the London Regiments, who were not used to this hardness'. In the summer of 1644 the 'very clothes' of the parliamentary horse were 'worn & rotten upon their backs, with constant service abroad night & day for 6 weeks together in very wet weather'.[105] When 'the weather [was] ill for marching' it not only hindered deployment of troops but sapped their physical strength, increased their disinclination to action and encouraged desertion and mutiny. In the 'extreme and violent, [c]old and wet' November of 1645
p. 119 Brereton, a sensible commander, observed that his mutinous, unpaid soldiers could not be ↳ expected to endure the 'extremity of hardship [of] this weather unless they be well paid'.[106]

When action was joined, wind and light became important. In an age before smokeless powder (a nineteenth-century invention) each side tried to have the wind with them to gain the advantage of visibility. At Naseby, both sides sought 'to gain the Hill and the wind', although the parliamentarians, magnifying their victory, claimed that when battle began the royalists had 'all the points of the wind for them, and their advantage'.[107] Yet although commanders routinely manœuvred for such advantages, action was at any time noisy, smoky, and confusing: in the words of one captain, 'there was nothing but fire and smoke'. To the smoke of gunpowder was

added that of fires, intentional or accidental, although God, riding 'on the wings of the wind', might blow the smoke away from his chosen. God and the weather, indeed, could hardly be separated. Providential explanations abound in accounts of mists that permitted escapes or of clear nights for marching.[108]

Seeing what one was doing was sometimes as much of a problem as knowing where one was going, particularly at night—and night marches and night actions were not the preserve of the 'night owl' general Sir William Waller but were common to all civil war armies. After the second battle of Newbury the royalists were able to march away by moonshine, while a 'very light' night enabled the defenders of Leicester to rake enemy foot with musket and cannon fire as they endeavoured to move a battery up to the town wall. On the other hand, a wet dark night at Plymouth allowed the enemy to build fortifications unobserved, and the setting of the moon enabled a fugitive to slip by enemy guards. A dark misty night let the parliamentary horse pass undetected 'within Pistol Shot' of the royalist guards at Lostwithiel, in spite of the prior intelligence about the planned escape. Only with the coming of daylight were the horse pursued.[109] Battles, too, were at the mercy of light, although most major battles were fought when days were long. The royalists claimed that at Edgehill the tide had turned in their favour, but by then 'it was grown so dark that [their] chief Commanders durst no[t] charge for feare of mistaking friends for foes'. Had there only been enough light, they declared, one more
p. 120 charge would have routed the parliamentary ↳ army.[110] In this as in other matters there was little a commander could do to outwit nature.

The range of factors that could disorder plans and enhance confusion was infinite. They could be as simple as unfavourable terrain, like the hedges and enclosures of Gloucestershire that hampered royalist horse in 1643, or as aggravating as the mutual incomprehension of a French artillery expert and his English gun crews.[111] Timing and coordination were problematic when only some officers had watches. The difficulties of getting forces to the rendezvous at the same designated hour for a planned operation continued to bedevil commanders of both sides, and uncertainties about time compounded those caused by dilatoriness or bad weather or other providential interventions. A prudent commander added 'God willing' as he scheduled any conjunction of forces.[112]

Some disorders were merely wartime versions of timeless muddles that endlessly defy explanation, such as messages delayed or never received or wrong roads taken. Royalists fleeing from Torrington early in 1646, for example, escaped when their parliamentary pursuers, 'mistak[ing] one bridge for another', found themselves entangled in the narrow, enclosed lanes of Devonshire.[113] Some fiascos came close to low farce, as in the case of Major Sanders, who keenly sounded the trumpet and roused his men, 'every man to horse and away', then found his own stable door locked and his friend's empty, so that he finally trudged out on foot. Royalist seizure of Pontefract castle in 1648 was preceded by a comedy of mistaken identity, a drunken corporal, a lost ladder, and guards who left their post to fetch ale with which to drink the health of the enemies they mistook for friends.[114] Some contretemps were peculiar to war. Explosions such as that in Torrington church, caused by 'accident … unknown', led to panic flight and chaos. A covey of recruits vanished in terror after the 'fearful crack … and the sad aspect' when a bargeload of men and munitions was blown up; the accidental firing of a guard's bandolier in the nervous period just before dawn produced 'incredible confusion … being so near day'; a carelessly fired musket was enough to betray a planned ambush.[115] Unthinking attachment to routine could be equally dangerous, offering opportunities to enemies with luck and an eye for opportunity. It is perhaps not
p. 121 very surprising that in August 1642, ↳ when the war had barely begun, Colonel Sandys could seize Upnor castle in Kent because most of the defenders were 'forth' at the harvest and the captain was playing bowls. It is more surprising to find Brereton being advised in 1645, in the middle of the siege of Chester, that he could profitably attack at 6 p.m. because there was then a hiatus in the defence, when the halberdiers had not been brought to the walls for the night watch and commanders and cavalry were at supper. Even the routines of virtue did not always bring their own reward: attendance at church delayed soldiers' response to a successful royalist raid at Plymouth.[116] At other times errors of judgement were so inexplicable that they must be due to

divine intervention, as when 'god … besott[ed] the enemies ould Souldiers' so that they were 'engaged contrary to their intentions' at Langport.[117]

Shock, habit, and negligence all opened the way for the breakdown of discipline and for flight, dangers that were never far away. Officers tried to counteract them by building up the morale of their own troops while breaking down that of the enemy. The intimidating effect of the psalm-singing advance of the New Model army is well-known, but the other side employed variations on this technique. It was traditional wisdom that 'The use of *Musicke* in the warres, is partly to direct the *Souldier*, partly to encourage him.'[118] A royalist raiding party laid successful plans to attack Waller's rearguard at Marlborough, 'all to march in order and unanimously to sing a brisk lively tune (being a great part of the design) and so to fall on singing as they did'. The words may have differed—although psalms too were often sung to popular tunes—but intent and effect were similar, and were consciously reinforced by shouts so vociferous that the fleeing, demoralized parliamentarians were convinced that the whole royalist army was in pursuit.[119] The effect of the ancient practice of '*Shouting to* the Battel' was both well understood and a national speciality. 'The English are … much inclined to it', wrote an experienced commander, adding that 'such shoutings bring … a kind of Terror' as evidence of the 'great joy' of the attackers, 'but also it stirs up the blood and spirits before, and heats them during the Fight'.[120] Stirring and heating were necessary, for the tendency to flight and panic was ever present in the minds of military planners. It was to be exploited against the enemy and countered among your own but it was a common and understandable failing.

Like flight and panic, wounds and sickness were a normal part of war that nonetheless destabilized and overturned the best of plans. Epidemics periodically threatened the armies of both sides, affecting capacity to
p. 122 act and command. When ↳ Maurice and two of his senior officers 'fell all three at one time dangerously sick, [it] caused disorder and delay', while in December 1645 Fairfax and his army were criticized for inaction when in fact his officers were dying of 'the *New Disease*', half his foot was sick, and he was forced to move his headquarters away from an infected town where soldiers and civilians were dying daily.[121] Wounds and death similarly affected outcomes, and not only in the obvious correlation between casualty rates and ability to undertake action. Sir Arthur Aston's head wound, from a roof tile dislodged by a cannon shot, put him in a coma and ultimately led to the surrender of Reading. The effect of Hopton's injuries from exploding gunpowder has already been noted, while the death of an officer in action could trigger the rout of his men.[122]

In the course of this chapter, we have moved from investigation of the means by which participants in the civil war attempted, with some success, to shape their actions in accordance with knowledge and reason, to a reassertion of the inevitable presence of chance and confusion. The effort to control has always coexisted in war with the irruptions of chance, but in the civil war the response to this conjunction was distinctive in two ways. First, providential explanations of victory and defeat flourished bipartisanly. They were characteristic of royalist as well as parliamentarian apologists, but the power of the belief of many parliamentarians that they were God's agents and his special care endowed them with a force and confidence that significantly strengthened their military actions and, given the adaptability of such doctrines, lent resiliency in coping with disasters.[123] Cromwell and the godly officers and men of the New Model provide the most famous example of the alliance of faith, morale, and victory, but commanders like Waller and Brereton equally drew strength from their conviction that God was not only on their side but intimately concerned in their every action. Second, unpredictable disasters, if not providential or the consequence of stupidity, were often seen as conspiratorial. This remains a familiar reaction, but in the circumstances of civil war it sowed suspicion even among allies and potentially embittered relations with civilians, prisoners, and other suspected sources of betrayal. It strained social bonds in ways that did not occur in more straightforward combat with a foreign enemy. It intensified the quarrels among officers that were so damaging to the royal cause and, among parliamentarians, it hastened the creation of the New Model army. Readiness to suspect contained the seeds of dangerous divisions.

War remained uncontrollable in spite of the best professional efforts to impose a connection between intent and outcome by the exercise of mind and will. Sir Thomas Aston noted in 1643, 'The intelligence failed not, but

p. 123 was seasonable', ↳ but the remark came in a recital of defeat.[124] Marston Moor was a famous victory, but an eye-witness account revealed the chaos that lurked near the military surface, the shared experience that distinguished little between winners and losers, and conduct by troops that was common to both sides:

> [I]n the fire, smoke and confusion of that day, I knew not for my soul whither to incline. The runaways on both sides were so many, so breathless, so speechless, and so full of fears, that I should not have taken them for men, but by their motion which still served them very well; ... both armies [were] mingled, both horse and foot; no side keeping their own posts.
>
> In this horrible distraction did I coast the country; here meeting with a shoal of Scots crying out *Weys us, we are all undone*; and so full of lamentation and mourning, as if their day of doom had taken them, and from which they knew not whither to fly: and anon I met with a ragged troop reduced to four and a Cornet; by and by with a little foot officer without a hat, band, sword, or indeed any thing but feet and so much tongue as would serve to enquire the way to the next garrisons, which ... were well filled with stragglers on both sides within a few hours, though they lay distant from the place of fight 20 or 30 miles.[125]

It is now time to turn to the laws that endeavoured to impose order on these armies and to the officers and men who, in these intractably chancy circumstances, experienced victory and defeat, whose conduct shaped much
p. 124 of the civilian experience of the war, and who, if they survived, remained fellow-countrymen when peace came. ↳

Notes

1 R. W. Apple, 'A New Way of War', *New York Times* (20 April, 2003), B1.

2 'The Proceedings of the New-moulded army from … 1645, till … 1647. Written by Col. Edward Wogan, till then an Officer of the Army', in Carte, *Letters*, 1. 139.

3 *CSPDom. 1638–1639*, 384.

4 'A True Mapp and description of the towne of Plymouth and the Fortifications thereof, with the workes and approaches of the Enemy, at the last Seige; Ao 1643' is a large sheet folded to fit a pamphlet-sized publication, *A True Narration Of the most Observable Passages, in and at the late Seige of Plymouth, from the fifteenth day of September 1643, untill the twenty fist [sic] of December following* (1644); *A Diary of the Siege of Colchester by the Forces under Command of his Excellency the Lord Generall Fairfax* (1648). And see J. B. Harley, 'Meaning and Ambiguity in Tudor Cartography', in Sarah Tyacke (ed.), *English Map-Making 1500–1650* (1983), 45 n. 103. For a discussion of the increasing use of maps by 'statesmen, landowners, military engineers and others' from the mid-16th cent., see Sarah Tyacke, 'Introduction', ibid. 16–18, and note pls. 3–11, 20–9, 35, 44.

5 Such 'visualization' was not new, nor was it confined to landed property or war: see e.g. the 'Plot' of Mendip lead mines (probably dating from the late 1650s) made for the virtuoso and entrepreneur Thomas Bushell. BL Add. MS 5207.A, fos. 70, 77–8.

6 *Wills and Inventoriues from the Registers of the Commissary of Bury St. Edmunds*, ed. Samuel Tymms, Camden Society, 49 (1850), 209. At his death in 1637 Sir Thomas Puckering owned twenty-four maps of towns and cities. Ann Hughes, *Politics, Society and Civil War in Warwickshire, 1620–1660* (Cambridge, 1987), 36. The Victoria and Albert Museum displays a fragment from a tapestry map showing features of Surrey and Middlesex; such maps were a speciality of the Sheldon workshops.

7 R. A. Skelton, *Saxton's Survey of England and Wales, With a facsimile of Saxton's wall-map of 1583* (Amsterdam, 1974), 10, 12; R. A. Skelton, *County Atlases of the British Isles 1579–1850*, 1 (1970), 16–17 and *passim*; Harley, 'Meaning and Ambiguity', 27; Victor Morgan, 'The literary image of globes and maps in early modern England', in Tyacke, *English Map-Making*, 46–56; Richard Helgerson, 'The Land Speaks: Cartography, Chorography, and Subversion in Renaissance England', *Representations*, 16 (1986), 51–85; for Essex and Grenvile, see HEH HA Inventories Box 1 (20), and BL Sloane MS 5247, fo. 73.

8 Skelton, *County Atlases*, 63–6, 68–70, and see pls. 20a and b; Van Langeren's book was preceded by John Norden's *England: An Intended Guyde, for English Travailers* (1625), which printed distance tables without maps. See Box, 'Kent in

Early Road Books', *Archaeoligica Cantiana,* 44 (1932), 1–2, 8–9, and pls. I and II.

9 Skelton, *Saxton's Survey*, 12, 14–15, 22. I am grateful to Richard Helgerson for drawing my attention to the Quartermaster's Map.

10 Skelton, *Saxton's Survey*, 12. It has been suggested that the order in which maps were revised reflected the movements of the armies.

11 Henry Hexham, quoted in Skelton, *Saxton's Survey*, 12. Monro, in his 'Practicall Observations' for the 'Younger Officer', took a commander's use of 'his land mappe' for granted, merely commenting that it should be confirmed by peasant informers (by 'the Boores intelligence'). Monro, *Expedition*, 2. 201.

12 BL Add. MS 35,297, fos. 9, 179–83^{v}. For plans of Oxford's fortifications, of varying degrees of sophistication, see R. T. Lattey *et al*., 'A Contemporary Map of the Defences of Oxford in 1644', *Oxoniensia*, 1 (1936), 161–6.

13 Skelton, *Saxton's Survey*, 17, and see the facsimile plates of Saxton's wall-map; Skelton, *County Atlases*, pl. 30.

14 For Speed's maps of Leicester and Reading, see Basil L. Gimson and Percy Russell, *Leicestershire Maps: A Brief Survey* (Leicester, 1947), [7], pl. 3, and Charles Coates, *The History and Antiquities of Reading* (1802), pl. 6; for familiarity with detailed local topographical representations, see 16th-century examples in Tyacke, *English Map-Making*, pls. 5 and 7.

15 Skelton, *Saxton's Survey*, 22; Box, 'Kent in Early Road Books', 7. Maps showing roads existed, like Norden's for Essex, but unlike Saxton's, and Van Langeren's *Direction*, they were not converted and distributed for military use. The large, regular pre-war network of carriers, 'foot-posts', waggons, hoys, etc., for transmission of passengers, letters, and goods, was presumably another source of information about routes, even if the network was intermittently disrupted by war. See John Taylor, *The Carriers Cosmographie; or A Brief Relation of The Innes, Ordinaries, Hosteries, and other Lodgings in, and neere London, where the Carriers, Waggons, Foote-posts and Higglers doe usually come, from any ports, townes, shires and countries* (1637); this brief but comprehensive work, an embryo timetable, is all text and contains no maps or diagrams.

16 Firth and Rait, *Acts and Ordinances*, 1. 399; PRO SP 28/126, fos. 22, 35; Derbys. RO, Gell MSS, D258, 30/16; Elton, *Compleat Body of the Art Military*, 185–6. Soldiers from a locality or who had spent enough time there to know the country were also valuable sources of information. Hutchinson, *Memoirs*, 129.

17 Walker, *Historical Discourses*, 50.

18 At Langport in 1645, Fairfax knew the enemy's intentions through 'Scouts and other countrymen'. *An Exact and Perfect Relation of the Proceedings of the Army under … Sir Thomas Fairfax … near Langport* (14 July 1645), 2.

19 *Military Orders … Established by his Maiesty* (1643), 16, nos. 116–17; *Laws and Ordinances of Warre … Essex* (1643), [A^{v}], 'Of Duties in generall', no. 1.

20 Elton, *Compleat Body of the Art Military*, 185–6; HMC, *Fourteenth Report, Appendix. Part IX* (1895), 'Round MSS', 287–8.

21 BL Add. MS 46,189, fo. 131.

22 *Military Orders … Established by his Maiesty* (1643), [11], no. 77.

23 Elton, *Compleat Body of the Art Military*, 186.

24 BL Add. MS 29,319, fo. 11; *Narration of The great Victory, (Through Gods Providence) Obtained by the Parliaments Forces Under Sir William Waller, At Alton* (n.pl., [1643]), 3.

25 BL Add. MS 11,331, fo. 18^{v}; *Military Orders … Established by his Maiesty* (1643), [11], nos. 76, 78.

26 Bodl. Tanner MS 62/1B, fo. 218. See Ludlow, *Memoirs*, 1. 66, for a scout's 'turning' of a friendly enemy soldier to transmit information that he could not deliver himself.

27 Elton, *Compleat Body of the Art Military*, 186; for pre-war views, see e.g. Monro, *Expedition*, 2. 201–4, on intelligence, reconnaissance, and prisoners as sources of information; [Cruso], *Militarie Instructions for the Cavallerie*, 57–8.

28 Hutchinson, *Memoirs*, 68.

29 Symonds, *Diary*, 24.

30 [Daniel Border], *A Wicked Plot against the Person of Sir William Waller* (1644), A3. For a messenger taken for a spy in the nervous summer of 1648, see Essex Record Office D/DQ s18, fo. 39^{v}. A case in which a countryman recruited as a guide was given a soldier's red coat may indicate an attempt to give him protection as a military agent. [Wharton], 'Letters from a Subaltern Officer', *Archaeologia*, 35 (1853), 2. 322.

31 PRO ASSI 44/3; and see Rushworth, 5. 749–51 (misnumbered for 750): in Apr. 1644 one spy was hanged in the Palace Yard at Westminster, 'he having been once before Pardon'd by the General', but another was 'brought to the Gibbet, but being his first Attempt in that kind, Reprieved'.

32 Firth and Rait, *Acts and Ordinances*, 1. 487–8; BL Add. MS 35,297, fos. 26–27^{v}; and see the case of Sybell Meese, committed to the Marshallsea of Dartmouth for giving information to the king's enemies, HMC, *Fifteenth Report, Appendix 7*, 'Manuscripts of the Duke of Somerset' (1898), 80.

33 William Salt Library, Salt MSS 477, 1 March [1643]. The speed with which news of Aston's injury in Apr. was later disseminated gives some support to his suspicions. Ibid. 564 (20 Apr. [1643]).

34 Bodl. MS Carte 103, fo. 138.

35 Adair, 'Court Martial Papers', *JSAHR*. 44 (1966), 219; BL Add. MS 11,810, fo. 16.

36 *Colonel Joseph Bamfeild's Apologie*, 10, 12; *DNB*, 'Joseph Bampfield'.
37 Hodgson, 'Memoirs', in Slingsby, *Original Memoirs*, 113–14.
38 BL Add. MS 11,333, fos. 12^{v}–13; see also Add. MSS 11,332, fo. 105^{v} and 35,297, fos. 27–27^{v}.
39 BL Add. MSS 11,331, fo. 146; 11,332, fos. 49, 75^{v}; 35,297, fo. 38^{v}. See also Hutchinson, *Memoirs*, 93–4; William Salt Library, Salt MS 544.
40 *CSPDom. 1644*, 301.
41 [Cruso], *Cavallrie*, 57–8.
42 BL Add. MSS 11,331, fos. 59–59^{v}; 11,810, fo. 23; Bodl. MS Tanner 303, fo. 121; Sprigge, *Anglia Rediviva*, 28; Thomas Bailey, *Annals of Nottinghamshire. History of the County of Nottingham including the Borough,* 4 vols. ([1853]), 2. 719.
43 BL Add. MS 11,333, fo. 13; William Salt Library, Salt MS 482.
44 BL Add. MS 11,333, fos. 4, 80–80^{v}, 89^{v}.
45 Ibid., fos. 80–80^{v}.
46 BL Add. MS 11,332, fos. 75–75^{v}.
47 Bodl. Tanner MS 62/1B, fo. 213, and see fo. 220 for a similar complaint about prisoners at Cambridge.
48 *The Bloody Treatie: or, Proceedings between the King and Prince Rupert* (1645), 8.
49 Bodl. Tanner MS 62/1B, fo. 213; BL Add. MSS 11,332, fo. 75; 11,333, fo. 4; *The Kingdomes Weekly Intelligencer*, 74 (24 Sept.–1 Oct. 1644); *The London Post*, 7 (1 Oct. 1644); Rushworth, 5. 710–11. Another colonel, whose regiment fled at Lostwithiel, was suspected of pretending to be taken prisoner although in fact he 'went willingly to the King's Forces'. He too faced trial when he returned to London. Ibid.
50 Walker, *Historical Discourses*, 70; and see Bailey, *Nottinghamshire*, 2. 719.
51 For information from 'escapers' and turncoats, see BL Add. MSS 11,331, fo. 157; 11,333, fos. 27, 35^{v}, 64. For reasons for scepticism about their intelligence, see Hodgson, 'Memoirs', in Slingsby, *Original Memoirs*, 150, on the Scottish campaign in 1650: 'We had spies sent out amongst them … pretending to run away from us, and they were coming in continually with intelligence.'
52 See Mrs Hutchinson on the superiority of her husband's intelligence network to Sir John Gell's: the 'chiefe commanders', she implies, weighed reports from both and found Gell's wanting. Hutchinson, *Memoirs*, 68.
53 Symonds, *Diary*, 244.
54 William Salt Library, Salt MSS 477 (23 June 1643); 518 (12 Apr. 1644); 550/1, 550/14; BL Add. MS 11,331, fos. 139^{v}–140.
55 Walker, *Historical Discourses*, 70.
56 BL Add. MS 11,332, fo. 80, and see Dore (ed.), *Letter Books*, 2. 81, 83; Bailey, *Nottinghamshire*, 2. 709, 719; *Narration of the Siege and taking … of Leicester*, 3; BL Add. MS 11,332, fo. 80.
57 Walker, *Historical Discourses*, 130; Wogan, 'Proceedings of the New-moulded army', in Carte, *Letters*, 1. 139.
58 BL Add. MSS 11,332, fo. 85^{v}; 11,333, fo. 24; Walker, *Historical Discourses*, 62.
59 William Salt Library, Salt MS 546 (reprinted in 'Some letters of the civil war', *Historical Collections. Staffs*. [1941], 143); HMC, *12th Report. App. Pt. IX. Manuscripts of the Duke of Beaufort* (1891), 'Beaufort MSS', 40; BL Egerton MS 787, fo. 74; and see Brereton's letter to John Glyn at Westminster defending himself and his officers against the false 'aspersions' of an informer. BL Add. MS 11,331, fos. 19^{v}–20^{v}.
60 Bodl. MS Carte 103, fo. 91.
61 Ward, *Anima'dversions of Warre*, 1. 143–6; for assorted signals see BL Add. MS 11,331, fo. 59; Ludlow, *Memoirs*, 1. 71; *Diary of the Siege of Colchester*, 25 July 1648; HMC, *Twelfth Report. App. Pt.9*, 'Beaufort MSS', 30.
62 Bodl. MS Nalson, 3, fo. 244; and see William Salt Library, Salt MS 517, for a letter to Rupert in June 1645 concerning troop strengths and movements; the interpretations of the coded passages have been written above in a different hand. For the relative simplicity of interpretation, note that 15, 23, 23, 28; 28, 30, 23; 13, 26, 10, 16, 23, 23, 22, equals *foot*; *two*; *dragoon*; i.e. *a*=9 or 10. See also BL Add. MS 11,331, fos. 80^{v}; and Dore (ed.), *Letter Books*, app. V, 1. 530–3, for discussion of Brereton's ciphers and the limited secrecy they provided.
63 Derbys. RO, Gell MSS, D258, 44/39; and see 42/29 (d) for a more subtle and comprehensive code.
64 Eliot Warburton, *Memoirs of Prince Rupert, and the Cavaliers* , 3 vols. (1849), 3. 60.
65 'The Tower of London letter-book of Sir Lewis Dyve, 1646–47', ed. H. G. Tibbutt, *Publications of the Bedfordshire Historical Record Society*, 38 (1958), 75–6. In Jan. 1649 William Legg still had Rupert's cipher but wrote to him en clair, 'doubting you have lost the copy'. William Salt Library, Salt MS 544.
66 Ingenuity intended to make messages secure could be self-defeating. In 1644 two messengers sent out by the royalist governor of besieged Banbury castle were captured. The governor had 'writ a letter in a shred of paper close written and cut in the middest, that if but one of them had beene taken we had not known what to have made of it'—but the message would have been equally opaque to Prince Rupert had only one messenger got through. C. D. and W. C. D. Whetham, *A History of the Life of Colonel Nathaniel Whetham: A Forgotten Soldier of the Civil Wars* (1907), 80.
67 Christopher O'Riordan, 'Thomas Ellison, the Hixson Estate and the Civil War', *Durham County Local History Society Bulletin*,

39 (1987), 4–5. See also *CSPDom. 1660–1661*, 153.

68 BL Add. MSS 11,331, fo. 146. In Manchester's army in 1644, a messenger was paid £2 a week; in a foot regiment, a lieutenant's pay was £2. 2s. 0d., an ensign's £1. 1s. 0d., a common soldier's under 5s. PRO SP 28/26, fos. 22, 319, 455, 486; 28/25, fos. 140, 228, 230. For the peril incurred by messengers, see ERO D/DQ s18, fo. 39^{v}; *CSPDom. 1660–1661*, 153.

69 BL Add. MSS 11,331, fos. 154^{v}, 164^{v}–165; 11,332, fos. 101^{v}–102^{v}; Derbys. RO, Gell MSS D258, 31/30 (j).

70 BL Add. MS 11,333, fos. 80–80^{v}. Although Mainwaring was confident of the bearer's trustworthiness, he still urged Brereton to 'encourage' him—presumably financially.

71 Elton, *Compleat Body of the Art Military*, 177; Thomas Venn, *Military Observations or Tacticks put into Practice for the Exercise of Horse and Foot, Military & Maritime Discipline in Three Books; Book I* (1672), 5. Venn's work, although finished in the 1660s, drew on material from 1641–2 as well as from Sir Francis Vere's much earlier experience. Cf. BL Add. MS 11,332, fo. 75^{v}, for the assumption that a drummer would expand verbally on the written report he carried; and see Wharton, 'Letters from a Subaltern Officer', 2. 330, for Rupert's trumpeter 'led blindfold' through Worcester to Essex's presence.

72 Rushworth, 5. 777–8, 781–2; Firth and Rait, *Acts and Ordinances*, 1. 487, and see 1. 327–8.

73 *CSPDom. 1641–43*, 504.

74 Ibid. 436.

75 *CSPDom. 1641–43*, 507; BL Add. MS 29974.2, fo. 388.

76 *CSPDom. 1641–43*, 463; BL Add. MS 11,331, fo. 18^{v}; BL Add. MS 11,332, fos. 80–5, 96–7^{v};William Salt Library, Salt MS 550/14.

77 Derbys. RO, Gell MS D 258, 31/10 (qa); BL Add. MS 11,331, fo. 22.

78 *CSPDom. 1641–1643*, 415, 473.

79 BL Egerton MS 787, fos. 16, 27^{v}, 36^{v}, and see *The Letter Books 1644–45 of Sir Samuel Luke, Parliamentary Governor of Newport Pagnell*, ed. H. G. Tibbutt, Publications of the Bedfordshire Historical Record Society, 62 (1963), *passim*.

80 BL Egerton MS 787, fos. 3, 36^{v}, 52–3.

81 BL Add. MS 11,332, fo. 112; Devonshire RO, Seymour MSS 1392 M/L 1644/9, 24, 47.

82 William Salt Library, Salt MS 600.

83 BL Add. MS 11,333, fos. 47 (the Irish are landed 'for certain'), 80^{v}.

84 BL Add. MS 29974.2, fo. 388; Taylor, *Carriers Cosmographie*, *passim.*

85 For communication by conversation, signal, and drum, see BL Add. MSS 11,332, fo. 94; 35,297, fo. 4; BL Harl. MS 2155, fo. 108. For the bell's failure to produce action, see Duncumb, *Hereford*, 1. 249–50; for a charge of 6d. 'For crying [a stray] horse', see PRO SP 28/23, fo. 129.

86 Magdelene College, Cambridge, Pepys MS 2874, fos. 591–2; Barriffe, *Mars, His Triumph*, 9–10, 15; Elton, *Compleat Body of the Art Military*, 176–8; G. Derbridge, 'A History of the Drums and Fifes 1650–1700', *JSAHR* 44 (1966), 50–1, and 53 for a suggestion that parliamentary armies banished the fife. For use of the drum to call civilian labourers to work on fortifications and 'to encourage the workers at the Work' during the day, see Bodl. MS Add. D.114, fos. 22, 87.

87 BL Egerton MS 787, fo. 53, for dispatch of a drum to the painter for decoration with arms: honour, identification, and communication came together; PRO SP28/18, fos. 386–386^{v}; SP 260, fos. 7–8, for the purchase of sixteen drums from Mr Tench of Hounsditch at 23s. each; SP 28/26, fo. 672, for a new drum at 30s.; Derbys. RO, Gell MSS D258, 31/30 (aa), for expenditure on drums and colours; *Chirk Castle Accounts*, ed. Myddelton, 32, for 1651 repair of drumheads at 2s. per parchment per drum.

88 Ian Gentles, 'The Iconography of Revolution: England 1642–1649', in Ian Gentles, John Morrill, and Blair Worden (eds.), *Soldiers, Writers and Statesmen of the English Revolution* (Cambridge, 1998), 91–113.

89 Bodl. MS Clarendon 34, fo. 26^{v}.

90 *The Kingdomes Weekly Intelligencer*, 105 (17–24 June 1645), 840–1.

91 BL Sloane MS 5247, fos. 7, 14, 15, 19, 20^{v}, 28^{v}, 37, 64, 71.

92 '[T]he designe and the word (*now or never*) were betrayed', lamented a royalist of a plan to take Abingdon in 1646. 'Journal of Prince Rupert's Marches'. *EHR* 13 (1898), 740.

93 HMC, *Seventh Report* (1879), 'Lowndes MSS', 565.

94 BL Add. MSS 35,297, fos. 38^{v}, 46^{v}; 11,810, fos. 22^{v}, 26; Townshend, *Diary*, 1. 170; *The Kingdomes Weekly Intelligencer*, 105 (17–24 June 1645), 841; Ludlow, *Memoirs*, 1. 72; Firth, *Cromwell's Army*, 231–3. In Sept. 1642 Nehemiah Wharton already spoke generically of 'a soildier's red coate', of 'the blew coats of Colonell Cholmley's regiment', and of 'a soildier's sute for winter' for himself (its colour was not specified, but it was to be edged with gold and silver lace). Wharton, 'Letters from a Subaltern Officer', 2. 323.

95 BL Add. MSS 11,810, fo. 22; 35,297, fo. 106; for similar incidents in 1648, see Bodl. MS Clarendon 31, fo. 214^{v}; 34, fo. 27^{v}. Fleeing royalists at Marston Moor nearly strayed into the clutches of parliamentarian horse, 'For they only knew them … to be the Parliament soldiers by their singing of Psalmes. A blessed badge and cognisance indeed.' Quoted in Firth, *Cromwell's Army*, 330–1.

96 Hutchinson, *Memoirs*, 163.

97 *Diary of the Siege of Colchester* (31 July 1648); *Mercurius Elencticus*, 40 (23–9 Aug. 1648), 329.

98 BL Add. MS 11,331, fo. 34^{v}.

99 BL Add. MS 11,331, fo. 43; note also descriptions of horses as means of identifying riders, ibid., fo. 22^{v}, and note the common formula 'X saw Y on a black horse at Z', *Calendar of the Proceedings of the Committee of Compounding, &c. 1643–1660*, 1 (1889), 260.

100 Bodl. MS Tanner 61, fo. 149; Bodl. MS Carte 103, fo. 98; Walker, *Historical Discourses*, 92; *The Coppie of a Letter from Sir Thomas Fairfax his Quarters to the Parliament, concerning the great Battell … at Langport* ([1645]), i2–3 (*sic*). For a scarf and a hatband as gifts, see Wharton, 'Letters from a Subaltern Officer', 2. 323.

101 PRO SP 28/18, fo. 386; 28/260, fos. 7–8; Derbys. RO, Gell MSS D258, 31/30 (aa); Walker, *Historical Discourses*, 91.

102 Fairfax, *Memoirs*, 85–6.

103 *Swedish Intelligencer*, ii. 104; 'Journal of Prince Rupert's Marches', *EHR* 13 (1898), 738. See also the abrupt revocation of the orders for a march in Dec. 1645 because of a sudden cold change and consequent hardship to the troops. BL Add. MS 11,333, fos. 63^{v}–64.

104 HMC, *12th Report. App. Pt.9*, 'Beaufort MSS', 41.

105 BL Add. MS 11,810, fos. 20–1; Wharton, 'Letters from a Subaltern Officer', 2. 325–6; Bodl. MS Nalson, 3, fo. 159; Bodl. MS Tanner 61, fo. 149; see also Luke, *Letter Books*, 30–1.

106 BL Add. MSS 11,332, fo. 77^{v}; 11,333, fo. 24^{v}.

107 *A Relation Of the Victory obtained by Sr. Thomas Fairfax … neer Harborough, on Saturday, June 14. 1645* (1645), 2; *The Weekly Account*, XXIII week, 4–11 June 1645, A2^{v}; [G. Bishop], *A More Particular and Exact Relation of The Victory obtained by the Parliaments Forces under … Sir Thomas Fairfax* (1645), A2. Cf. the account of Langport: 'the Enemy had a Hill, and the Winde, we another Hill', *Exact and Perfect Relation of the Proceedings of the Army … near Langport*, 5.

108 Fairfax, *Memoirs*, 99, 116; 'Memoirs of Captain John Hodgson', in Slingsby, *Original Memoirs*, 113; Waller, *Recollections*, 112; see also Bamfeild, *Apologie*, 8, on his successful march to take Arundel, 'being favoured by a great mist, without any discovery'.

109 BL Add. MSS 11,810, fo. 26; 35,297, fos. 9^{v}, 22^{v}; *Narration of the Siege and taking … of Leicester*, 5; Walker, *Historical Discourses*, 70–1. For Waller's night marches, see e.g. *Narration of The great Victory … Under Sir William Waller, at Alton*, 3–4.

110 *Relation of the Battaile lately fought between Keynton and Edgehill*, 4.

111 William Salt Library, Salt MSS 477, 19 [June 1643], 7 Aug. 1643.

112 Bodl. MS Carte 103, fo. 98; Adair, 'Court Martial Papers', 215–16.

113 HMC, *12th Report. App. Pt.9*, 'Beaufort MSS', 4; Walker, *Historical Discourses*, 7, for royalist horse who 'took the wrong way in their retreat' from Alresford in 1644. For delayed messages, see William Salt Library, Salt MS 518, 20 Oct. 1644: Rupert's commands came too late for Gerard to send forces to Hereford by the time required.

114 Derbys. RO, Sanders MS 1232 M/025; Bodl. MS Clarendon 34, fos. 25–25^{v}.

115 HMC, *12th Report. App. Pt.9*, 'Beaufort MSS', 43; *A most true Relation Of divers notable Passages of Divine Providence … in … Devon* (1643), 4; BL Add. MSS 11,332, fos. 92^{v}, 94; 11,810, fos. 12, 22; 35,297, fo. 39.

116 *Perfect Diurnall of … our late journey into Kent, … 1642*, 3; BL Add. MSS 11,332, fo. 49; 35,297, fo. 39^{v}.

117 *Exact and Perfect Relation of the Proceedings of the Army … near Langport*, 7.

118 Leech, *Trayne Souldier*, second dedication.

119 BL Add. MS 11,810, fo. 28.

120 Orrery, *Art of War*, 186; 'deep silence' was of course necessary up to the moment of attack; otherwise commands were inaudible. See also the intimidating pursuit of fleeing royalists after Alton in 1643, when Waller's troops 'made the woods ring with a shout'. *Narration of The great Victory, … Under Sir William Waller At Alton*, 5.

121 Bamfeild, *Apologie*, 7; Sprigge, *Anglia Rediviva*, 155.

122 BL Add. MSS 11,810, fos. 13–14; 35,297, fos. 7^{v}–8.

123 For royalist providentialism, see e.g. an interpretation of Chester's fate as a manifestation of God's judgements, mercies, and warnings. BL Harl. MS 1944, fo. 99.

124 BL Harl. MS 2135, fo. 103^{v}.

125 Arthur Trevor to Ormonde, 10 July 1644, Carte, *Original Letters*, 1. 56.