

Statistical Tools for Causal Inference

The SKY Community

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Introduction

Tools of causal inference are the basic statistical building block behind most scientific results. It is thus extremely useful to have an open source collectively agreed upon resource presenting and assessing them, as well as listing the current unresolved issues. The content of this book covers the basic theoretical knowledge and technical skills required for implementing statistical methods of causal inference. This means:

- Understanding of the basic language to encode causality,
- Knowledge of the fundamental problems of inference and the biases of intuitive estimators,
- Understanding of how econometric methods recover treatment effects,
- Ability to compute these estimators along with an estimate of their precision using the statistical software R combined with latex using Rmarkdown.

All the notions and estimators are introduced using a numerical example and simulations.

All the code behind this book is written in Rmarkdown and is publically available on GitHub. Feel free to propose corrections and updates.

Part I

The Two Fundamental Problems of Inference

When trying to estimate the effect of a program on an outcome, we face two very important and difficult problems: the Fundamental Problem of Causal Inference (FPCI) and the Fundamental Problem of Statistical Inference (FPSI).

In its most basic form, the FPCI states that our causal parameter of interest (TT , short for Treatment on the Treated, that we will define shortly) is fundamentally unobservable, even when the sample size is infinite. The main reason for that is that one component of TT , the outcome of the treated had they not received the program, remains unobservable. We call this outcome a counterfactual outcome. The FPCI is a very dispiriting result, and is actually the basis for all of the statistical methods of causal inference. All of these methods try to find ways to estimate the counterfactual by using observable quantities that hopefully approximate it as well as possible. Most people, including us but also policymakers, generally rely on intuitive quantities in order to generate the counterfactual (the individuals without the program or the individuals before the program was implemented). Unfortunately, these approximations are generally very crude, and the resulting estimators of TT are generally biased, sometimes severely.

The Fundamental Problem of Statistical Inference (FPSI) states that, even if we have an estimator E that identifies TT in the population, we cannot observe E because we only have access to a finite sample of the population. The only thing that we can form from the sample is a sample equivalent \hat{E} to the population quantity E , and $\hat{E} \neq E$. Why is $\hat{E} \neq E$? Because a finite sample is never perfectly representative of the population. What can we do to deal with the FPSI? I am going to argue that there are mainly two things that we might want to do: estimating the extent of sampling noise and decreasing sampling noise.

Chapter 1

The Fundamental Problem of Causal Inference

In order to state the FPCI, we are going to describe the basic language to encode causality set up by Rubin, and named Rubin Causal Model (RCM). RCM being about partly observed random variables, it is hard to make these notions concrete with real data. That's why we are going to use simulations from a simple model in order to make it clear how these variables are generated. The second virtue of this model is that it is going to make it clear the source of selection into the treatment. This is going to be useful when understanding biases of intuitive comparisons, but also to discuss the methods of causal inference. A third virtue of this approach is that it makes clear the connexion between the treatment effects literature and models. Finally, a fourth reason that it is useful is that it is going to give us a source of sampling variation that we are going to use to visualize and explore the properties of our estimators.

I use X_i to denote random variable X all along the notes. I assume that we have access to a sample of N observations indexed by $i \in \{1, \dots, N\}$. “ i ” will denote the basic sampling units when we are in a sample, and a basic element of the probability space when we are in populations. Introducing rigorous measure-theoretic notations for the population is feasible but is not necessary for comprehension.

When the sample size is infinite, we say that we have a population. A population is a very useful fiction for two reasons. First, in a population, there is no sampling noise: we observe an infinite amount of observations, and our estimators are infinitely precise. This is useful to study phenomena independently of sampling noise. For example, it is in general easier to prove that an estimator is equal to TT under some conditions in the population. Second, we are most of the time much more interested in estimating the values of parameters in the population rather than in the sample. The population parameter, independent of sampling noise, gives a much better idea of the causal parameter for the population of interest than the parameter in the sample. In general, the estimator for both quantities will be the same, but the estimators for the effect of sampling noise on these estimators will differ. Sampling noise for the population parameter will generally be larger, since it is affected by another source of variability (sample choice).

1.1 Rubin Causal Model

The RCM is made of three distinct building blocks: a treatment allocation rule, that decides who receives the treatment; potential outcomes, that measure how each individual reacts to the treatment; the switching equation that relates potential outcomes to observed outcomes through the allocation rule.

1.1.1 The treatment allocation rule

The first building block of the RCM is the treatment allocation rule. Throughout this class, we are going to be interested in inferring the causal effect of only one treatment with respect to a control condition. Extensions to multi-valued treatments are in general self-explanatory.

In the RCM, treatment allocation is captured by the variable D_i . $D_i = 1$ if unit i receives the treatment and $D_i = 0$ if unit i does not receive the treatment and thus remains in the control condition.

The treatment allocation rule is critical for several reasons. First, because it switches the treatment on or off for each unit, it is going to be at the source of the FPCI. Second, the specific properties of the treatment allocation rule are going to matter for the feasibility and bias of the various econometric methods that we are going to study.

Let's take a few examples of allocation rules. These allocation rules are just examples. They do not cover the space of all possible allocation rules. They are especially useful as concrete devices to understand the sources of biases and the nature of the allocation rule. In reality, there exists even more complex allocation rules (awareness, eligibility, application, acceptance, active participation). Awareness seems especially important for program participation and has only been tackled recently by economists.

First, some notation. Let's imagine a treatment that is given to individuals. Whether each individual receives the treatment partly depends on the level of her outcome before receiving the treatment. Let's denote this variable Y_i^B , with B standing for "Before". It can be the health status assessed by a professional before deciding to give a drug to a patient. It can be the poverty level of a household used to assess its eligibility to a cash transfer program.

1.1.1.1 The sharp cutoff rule

The sharp cutoff rule means that everyone below some threshold \bar{Y} is going to receive the treatment. Everyone whose outcome before the treatment lies above \bar{Y} does not receive the treatment. Such rules can be found in reality in a lot of situations. They might be generated by administrative rules. One very simple way to model this rule is as follows:

$$D_i = \mathbb{1}[Y_i^B \leq \bar{Y}], \quad (1.1)$$

where $\mathbb{1}[A]$ is the indicator function, taking value 1 when A is true and 0 otherwise.


Example 1.1 (Sharp cutoff rule). Imagine that $Y_i^B = \exp(y_i^B)$, with $y_i^B = \mu_i + U_i^B$, $\mu_i \sim \mathcal{N}(\bar{\mu}, \sigma_\mu^2)$ and $U_i^B \sim \mathcal{N}(0, \sigma_U^2)$. Now, let's choose some values for these parameters so that we can generate a sample of individuals and allocate the treatment among them. I'm going to switch to R for that.

```
param <- c(8,.5,.28,1500)
names(param) <- c("barmu","sigma2mu","sigma2U","barY")
param
```

```
##      barmu sigma2mu  sigma2U      barY
##      8.00      0.50      0.28 1500.00
```

Now, I have chosen values for the parameters in my model. For example, $\bar{\mu} = 8$ and $\bar{Y} = 1500$. What remains to be done is to generate Y_i^B and then D_i . For this, I have to choose a sample size ($N = 1000$) and then generate the shocks from a normal.

```
# for reproducibility, I choose a seed that will give me the same random sample each time I run the pro
set.seed(1234)
N <- 1000
mu <- rnorm(N,param["barmu"],sqrt(param["sigma2mu"]))
```

Figure 1.1: Histogram of y_B

```
UB <- rnorm(N,0,sqrt(param["sigma2U"]))
yB <- mu + UB
YB <- exp(yB)
Ds <- ifelse(YB<=param["barY"],1,0)
```

Let's now build a histogram of the data that we have just generated.

```
# building histogram of yB with cutoff point at ybar
# Number of steps
Nsteps.1 <- 15
#step width
step.1 <- (log(param["barY"])-min(yB[Ds==1]))/Nsteps.1
Nsteps.0 <- (-log(param["barY"])+max(yB[Ds==0]))/step.1
breaks <- cumsum(c(min(yB[Ds==1]),c(rep(step.1,Nsteps.1+Nsteps.0+1))))
hist(yB,breaks=breaks,main="")
abline(v=log(param["barY"]),col="red")
```

You can see on Figure 1.1 a histogram of y_i^B with the red line indicating the cutoff point: $\bar{y} = \ln(\bar{Y}) = 7.3$. All the observations below the red line are treated according to the sharp rule while all the one located above are not. In order to see how many observations eventually receive the treatment with this allocation rule, let's build a contingency table.

```
table.D.sharp <- as.matrix(table(Ds))
knitr::kable(table.D.sharp,caption='Treatment allocation with sharp cutoff rule',booktabs=TRUE)
```

Table 1.1: Treatment allocation with sharp cutoff rule

0	771
1	229

We can see on Table 1.1 that there are 229 treated observations.

1.1.1.2 The fuzzy cutoff rule

This rule is less sharp than the sharp cutoff rule. Here, other criteria than Y_i^B enter into the decision to allocate the treatment. The doctor might measure the health status of a patient following official guidelines, but he might also measure other factors that will also influence his decision of giving the drug to the patient. The officials administering a program might measure the official income level of a household, but they might also consider other features of the household situation when deciding to enroll the household into the program or not. If these additional criteria are unobserved to the econometrician, then we have the fuzzy cutoff rule. A very simple way to model this rule is as follows:

$$D_i = \mathbb{1}[Y_i^B + V_i \leq \bar{Y}], \quad (1.2)$$

where V_i is a random variable unobserved to the econometrician and standing for the other influences that might drive the allocation of the treatment. V_i is distributed according to a, for the moment, unspecified cumulative distribution function F_V . When V_i is degenerate (*i.e.* it has only one point of support: it is a constant), the fuzzy cutoff rule becomes the sharp cutoff rule.

1.1.1.3 The eligibility + self-selection rule

It is also possible that households, once they have been made eligible to the treatment, can decide whether they want to receive it or not. A patient might be able to refuse the drug that the doctor suggests she should take. A household might refuse to participate in a cash transfer program to which it has been made eligible. Not all programs have this feature, but most of them have some room for decisions by the agents themselves of whether they want to receive the treatment or not. One simple way to model this rule is as follows:

$$D_i = \mathbb{1}[D_i^* \geq 0]E_i, \quad (1.3)$$

where D_i^* is individual i 's valuation of the treatment and E_i is whether or not she is deemed eligible for the treatment. E_i might be chosen according to the sharp cutoff rule of the fuzzy cutoff rule, or to any other eligibility rule. We will be more explicit about D_i^* in what follows.

SIMULATIONS ARE MISSING FOR THESE LAST TWO RULES

1.1.2 The potential outcomes

The second main building block of the RCM are potential outcomes. Let's say that we are interested in the effect of a treatment on an outcome Y . Each unit i can thus be in two potential states: treated or non treated. Before the allocation of the treatment is decided, both of these states are feasible for each unit.

Definition 1.1 (Potential outcomes). For each unit i , we define two potential outcomes:

- Y_i^1 : the outcome that unit i is going to have if it receives the treatment,
- Y_i^0 : the outcome that unit i is going to have if it **does not** receive the treatment.

Example 1.2. Let's choose functional forms for our potential outcomes. For simplicity, all lower case letters will denote log outcomes. $y_i^0 = \mu_i + \delta + U_i^0$, with δ a time shock common to all the observations and $U_i^0 = \rho U_i^B + \epsilon_i$, with $|\rho| < 1$. In the absence of the treatment, part of the shocks U_i^B that the individuals experienced in the previous period persist, while some part vanish. $y_i^1 = y_i^0 + \bar{\alpha} + \theta\mu_i + \eta_i$. In order to generate the potential outcomes, one has to define the laws for the shocks and to choose parameter values. Let's assume that $\epsilon_i \sim \mathcal{N}(0, \sigma_\epsilon^2)$ and $\eta_i \sim \mathcal{N}(0, \sigma_\eta^2)$. Now let's choose some parameter values:

```
l <- length(param)
param <- c(param,0.9,0.01,0.05,0.05,0.05,0.1)
names(param)[(l+1):length(param)] <- c("rho","theta","sigma2epsilon","sigma2eta","delta","baralpha")
param
```

##	barmu	sigma2mu	sigma2U	barY	rho
##	8.00	0.50	0.28	1500.00	0.90
##	theta	sigma2epsilon	sigma2eta	delta	baralpha
##	0.01	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.10

We can finally generate the potential outcomes;

```
epsilon <- rnorm(N,0,sqrt(param["sigma2epsilon"]))
eta <- rnorm(N,0,sqrt(param["sigma2eta"]))
U0 <- param["rho"]*UB + epsilon
y0 <- mu + U0 + param["delta"]
alpha <- param["baralpha"]+ param["theta"]*mu + eta
y1 <- y0+alpha
Y0 <- exp(y0)
Y1 <- exp(y1)
```

Now, I would like to visualize my potential outcomes:

```
plot(y0,y1)
```

You can see on the resulting Figure 1.2 that both potential outcomes are positively correlated. Those with a large potential outcome when untreated (*e.g.* in good health without the treatment) also have a positive health with the treatment. It is also true that individuals with bad health in the absence of the treatment also have bad health with the treatment.

1.1.3 The switching equation

The last building block of the RCM is the switching equation. It links the observed outcome to the potential outcomes through the allocation rule:

$$Y_i = \begin{cases} Y_i^1 & \text{if } D_i = 1 \\ Y_i^0 & \text{if } D_i = 0 \end{cases} \quad (1.4)$$

$$= Y_i^1 D_i + Y_i^0 (1 - D_i)$$

Example 1.3. In order to generate observed outcomes in our numerical example, we simply have to enforce the switching equation:

```
y <- y1*Ds+y0*(1-Ds)
Y <- Y1*Ds+Y0*(1-Ds)
```

What the switching equation (1.4) means is that, for each individual i , we get to observe only one of the two potential outcomes. When individual i belongs to the treatment group (*i.e.* $D_i = 1$), we get to observe Y_i^1 . When individual i belongs to the control group (*i.e.* $D_i = 0$), we get to observe Y_i^0 . Because the same




Figure 1.2: Potential outcomes

individual cannot be at the same time in both groups, we can NEVER see both potential outcomes for the same individual at the same time.

For each of the individuals, one of the two potential outcomes is unobserved. We say that it is a **counterfactual**. A counterfactual quantity is a quantity that is, according to Hume's definition, contrary to the observed facts. A counterfactual cannot be observed, but it can be conceived by an effort of reason: it is the consequence of what would have happened had some action not been taken.

One very nice way of visualising the switching equation has been proposed by Jerzy Neyman in a 1923 prescient paper. Neyman proposes to imagine two urns, each one filled with N balls. One urn is the treatment urn and contains balls with the id of the unit and the value of its potential outcome Y_i^1 . The other urn is the control urn, and it contains balls with the value of the potential outcome Y_i^0 for each unit i . Following the allocation rule D_i , we decide whether unit i is in the treatment or control group. When unit i is in the treatment group, we take the corresponding ball from the first urn and observe the potential outcome on it. But, at the same time, the urns are connected so that the corresponding ball with the potential outcome of unit i in the control urn disappears as soon as we draw ball i from the treatment urn.

The switching equation works a lot like Schrodinger's cat paradox. Schrodinger's cat is placed in a sealed box and receives a dose of poison when an atom emits a radiation. As long as the box is sealed, there is no way we can know whether the cat is dead or alive. When we open the box, we observe either a dead cat or a living cat, but we cannot observe the cat both alive and dead at the same time. The switching equation is like opening the box, it collapses the observed outcome into one of the two potential ones.

Example 1.4. One way to visualize the inner workings of the switching equation is to plot the potential outcomes along with the criteria driving the allocation rule. In our simple example, it simply amounts to plotting observed (y_i) and potential outcomes (y_i^1 and y_i^0) along y_i^B .

```
plot(yB[Ds==0], y0[Ds==0], pch=1, xlim=c(5, 11), ylim=c(5, 11), xlab="yB", ylab="Outcomes")
points(yB[Ds==1], y1[Ds==1], pch=3)
points(yB[Ds==0], y1[Ds==0], pch=3, col='red')
points(yB[Ds==1], y0[Ds==1], pch=1, col='red')
test <- 5.8
i.test <- which(abs(yB-test)==min(abs(yB-test)))
points(yB[abs(yB-test)==min(abs(yB-test))], y1[abs(yB-test)==min(abs(yB-test))], col='green', pch=3)
points(yB[abs(yB-test)==min(abs(yB-test))], y0[abs(yB-test)==min(abs(yB-test))], col='green')
abline(v=log(param["barY"]), col="red")
legend(5, 11, c('y0|D=0', 'y1|D=1', 'y0|D=1', 'y1|D=0', paste('y0', i.test, sep=''), paste('y1', i.test, sep='')),
       plot(yB[Ds==0], y0[Ds==0], pch=1, xlim=c(5, 11), ylim=c(5, 11), xlab="yB", ylab="Outcomes")
points(yB[Ds==1], y1[Ds==1], pch=3)
legend(5, 11, c('y|D=0', 'y|D=1'), pch=c(1, 3))
abline(v=log(param["barY"]), col="red")
```

Figure 1.4 plots the observed outcomes y_i that results from applying the switching equation. Figure 1.4 shows that each individual in the sample is endowed with two potential outcomes, represented by a circle and a cross. Figure 1.3 plots the observed outcomes y_i along with the unobserved potential outcomes. Only one of the two potential outcomes is observed (the cross for the treated group and the circle for the untreated group) and the other is not. The observed sample in Figure 1.3 only shows observed outcomes, and is thus silent on the values of the missing potential outcomes.




Figure 1.3: Potential outcomes




Figure 1.4: Observed outcomes

Part II

Natural Experiments

Chapter 2

Natural Experiments

2.1 Finding Experiments in Nature

2.2 Instrumental Variables

<http://nickchk.com/anim/Animation%20of%20IV.gif>

2.3 Difference-in-Differences

<http://nickchk.com/anim/Animation%20of%20DID.gif>

2.4 Regression Discontinuity

NOLINKYET

Part III

Observational Methods

Chapter 3

The Purpose of Observational Methods

In the previous chapter on Randomized Controlled Trials, we showed that, by randomizing treatment, we could identify causal effects because the random variation sidestepped the impact of omitted variables or sample selection that could drive a non-causal correlation between treatment and outcome. In Natural Experiments, we mimicked that strategy by finding sources of near-random variation in treatment, and isolating the part of treatment that was driven by the near-random variation.

Using Randomized Controlled Trials or Natural Experiments, if they are properly applied, it is possible to ignore *any* confounding variables, whether or not we can measure them in our data or even imagine what they are.

However, it is not always possible to run an experiment or find a natural experiment. In this chapter, we will consider ways of identifying causal effects using *Observational* methods, relying only on the data we have actually collected and observed. Natural Experiments often make use of additional Observational methods, correcting for confounding variables that the design of the natural experiment cannot account for.

This chapter contains four sections: the first two cover multiple regression and matching, respectively, which are two common ways of adjusting for observed variables. The third covers the sufficient adjustment set, which allows you to determine which variables should and should not be adjusted for to identify a causal effect. The fourth covers fixed effects, which is a method that allows you to adjust for some unmeasured confounding variables.

3.1 Multiple Regression

<http://nickchk.com/anim/Animation%20of%20Control.gif>

3.2 Matching

<http://nickchk.com/anim/Animation%20of%20Matching.gif>

Table 3.1: Y over Two Time Periods for Two People

Person	Time	Y	D
Anna	1	4	0
Anna	2	8	1
Bill	1	3	1
Bill	2	1	0

Table 3.2: Within Variation in Y and D

Person	Time	Y	D	Within.Y	Within.D
Anna	1	4	0	-2	-0.5
Anna	2	8	1	2	0.5
Bill	1	3	1	1	0.5
Bill	2	1	0	-1	-0.5

3.3 Sufficient Adjustment Set

3.4 Fixed Effects

3.4.1 Between and Within Variation

Fixed effects is a method that can be applied when you have *panel data*: multiple observations of the same individual over time.

When you have multiple observations per individual, variation in the outcome variable Y comes from two places: *between variation* and *within variation*. Between variation is the difference *between* individuals in their average level of Y . Within variation is the difference *within* a given individual comparing one time period to another.

For example, consider the below data.

Anna's average Y is $(4+8)/2 = 6$, and Bill's average is $(3+1)/2 = 2$. The difference between the 6 and the 2 is the difference *between* Anna and Bill. And Anna's change from 4 to 8, and Bill's change from 3 to 1 are the differences *within* Anna and Bill.

Fixed effects eliminates *all* between variation and uses only within variation. In effect, you are *controlling for individual identity*. For this reason it is also known as the "within estimator".

The reason fixed effects does this is that it in effect controls for *all* differences between people that are constant across time, whether or not we control for them.

3.4.2 Demonstration of Fixed Effects

Fixed effects works by simply removing all the between variation in each variable before performing an analysis of choice.

Using the above example with Anna and Bill, we can subtract all between variation in Y and D by calculating the average of Y and D for Anna and Bill, separately, and subtracting it out. Notice that $\bar{Y}_{Anna} = 6$, $\bar{Y}_{Bill} = 2$, $\bar{D}_{Anna} = .5$, $\bar{D}_{Bill} = .5$.

With this modified data, the relationship between `Within.Y` and `Within.D` will tell us about the effect of D on Y , as long as all confounding variables were a part of the between variation.

This process is demonstrated in animation below.

<http://nickchk.com/anim/Animation%20of%20Fixed%20Effects.gif>

3.4.3 Fixed Effects with Regression

Fixed effects estimation is usually performed using regression. In the below model, each individual i has their own intercept α_i .

$$Y_{it} = \alpha_i + \beta D_{it} + \varepsilon_{it} \quad (3.1)$$

where ε_{it} is an error term. This can also be seen as a regression of Y_{it} on D_{it} and a series of binary variables, one for each individual.

$$Y_{it} = \alpha + \sum_{i=0}^N \alpha_i I(i) + \beta D_{it} + \varepsilon_{it} \quad (3.2)$$

where $I(i)$ is a function equal to 1 for individual i and 0 otherwise.

Either Equation (3.1) or Equation (3.2) will provide identical estimates of β as though you had run the regression

$$Within.Y_{it} = \alpha + \beta Within.D_{it} + \varepsilon_{it} \quad (3.3)$$

Any variable that is *constant within individual* will be controlled for using fixed effects, whether or not it is measured. For example, imagine that i is an index of people, D_{it} is being exposed to a pollution-reduction policy, and Y_{it} is a measure of health. The variable G_i measures a genetic endowment at birth, which may affect health and also whether you live in the area with the policy. Notice that G_i does not have a t subscript, indicating that it is *constant over time* for each person. Even without measuring G_i , it will be controlled for, since G_i is just $I(i)$ multiplied by some constant, and we're already controlling for $I(i)$.

Equation (3.2) also makes clear that we are not controlling for anything that varies within person over time. For example, Inc_{it} is income, which may affect health, and also whether you can afford to live in the area with the policy. Fixed effects alone does not control for Inc_{it} , and so we may need to add it as a control.

Similarly, fixed effects assumes that identity has a linear and constant effect. For example, if genetic endowment G_i has a stronger effect in some years than others, fixed effects will not account for this. Or, if genetic endowment modifies how effective the policy is, fixed effects will not account for this unless G_i can be measured and the nonlinearity can be directly modeled.

However, if all confounding variables are between-individual, linearity holds, and several other assumptions hold (see Treatment Effect Heterogeneity below), then fixed effects will identify the Average Treatment Effect.

Notice that the modeling in this section is very similar to *Random Effects*, not addressed in this chapter, which are similar to fixed effects but combine both between and within variation.

3.4.4 Common Extensions

3.4.4.1 Clustered Standard Errors

The standard approach to calculating standard errors for Equations (3.1), (3.2), or (3.3) makes the assumption that the error term ε_{it} is independent and identically distributed. However, it may be reasonable to assume that ε_{it} is correlated within individual.

Table 3.3: Within Variation in Y and D

Person	Time	Y	D	Within.Y	Within.D
Anna	1	4	0	-2	-0.5
Anna	2	8	1	2	0.5
Bill	1	3	1	1	0.5
Bill	2	1	0	-1	-0.5

Table 3.4: Within Variation in Y and D, where Bill Always Has D = 0

Person	Time	Y	D	Within.Y	Within.D
Anna	1	4	0	-2	-0.5
Anna	2	8	1	2	0.5
Bill	1	1	0	0	0.0
Bill	2	1	0	0	0.0

Under this condition, standard errors will be underestimated. For this reason, it is common to estimate fixed effects regressions using clustered standard errors. See Cameron & Miller 2013 (or the published version Cameron & Mill 2015) for a practitioner's guide to whether clustering is necessary in a given fixed effects context, and how it can be performed.

3.4.4.2 Two-Way Fixed Effects

In many fixed effects contexts, some of the within variation in Y_{it} may not just be specific to person i , but may be shared across all individuals. For example, if the sample includes many individuals in the same economy, the overall health of the economy changes over time and would affect everyone. If the treatment variable D_{it} is correlated with time as well, then these shared time effects will bias our estimate of the causal effect.

In cases like this it is common to include two sets of fixed effects - one for individual, α_i , and one for time, α_t . The regression equation is then

$$Y_{it} = \alpha_i + \alpha_t + \beta D_{it} + \varepsilon_{it} \quad (3.4)$$

3.4.4.3 Treatment Effect Heterogeneity

Under the assumptions discussed above, the estimate produced by a fixed effects regression will be a weighted average of the treatment effect for each individual. To see this, consider a data set that has only two time periods in it, and each individual is treated in exactly one of these periods, like our example above:

Anna sees an increase of 4 when the treatment is applied, and Bill sees an increase of 2. The fixed effects estimate will be $(2+1)/2 - (-2 + -1)/2 = 1.5 - -1.5 = 3$, which is also $(4+2)/3 = 3$, the average treatment effect in the sample.

In this case, Anna and Bill received equal weight. That is because Anna and Bill had the exact same amount of variation in D . Fixed effects will more heavily weight individuals with more variation in D . For example, imagine that Bill always has $D = 0$ and thus no variation in D :

The fixed effects estimate is now $2 - -2 = 4$, which is Anna's treatment effect. Bill has no variation in D and thus receives no weight. We have failed to estimate the Average Treatment Effect.

One way to adjust for this is to use weighted least squares, where each observation is weighted by the inverse standard deviation of treatment within individual $(\sigma_i^D)^{-1}$, where

$$\sigma_i^D = \left(\sum_t (D_{it} - \bar{D}_i)^2 \right)^{1/2} \quad (3.5)$$

While this will not account for observations with no variation in D_{it} , this will otherwise recover the average treatment effect (Gibbons, Serrato, & Urbancic, 2018).

3.4.5 Coding Up Fixed Effects

Each of the following coding examples uses D as a treatment variable of interest, Y as the outcome variable, id as a variable encoding the individual, and t as a variable with the time period. In the R examples, all variables are stored in the data frame `df`.

Fixed effects is easy to implement using regression by simply including a set of dummy variables, one for each individual. This method can be implemented as:

```
#in R:
fe <- lm(Y~D+factor(id), data = df)
summary(fe)

#in Stata:
regress Y D i.id
```

Many statistics packages also allow you to identify the panel structure of the data, and have a specific command for implementing fixed effects.

```
#in R:
library(plm)
df.p <- pdata.frame(df, index=c("id", "t"))
fe <- plm(Y~D, data=df.p, model="within")
summary(fe)
#Add clustered standard errors
library(lmtest)
fe.cluster <- coeftest(fe, vcov=vcovHC(model, type = "HC1", cluster="group"))
summary(fe.cluster)

#in Stata:
xtset id t
xtreg Y D, fe
#Add clustered standard errors
xtreg Y D, fe vce(cluster id)
```

Two-way fixed effects can be handled, as normal, by adding dummy variables for time period. There are also more formal ways of handling two-way fixed effects that work more quickly or handle standard errors in a more accurate way.

```
#in R:
#Just using dummies
fe <- lm(Y~D+factor(id)+factor(t), data = df)
#Using PLM
library(plm)
df.p <- pdata.frame(df, index=c("id", "t"))
fe.twoways <- plm(Y~D, data=df.p, model="twoways")
summary(fe.twoways)
```

```
#in Stata:  
#Using dummies and xtreg  
xtset id t  
xtreg Y D i.t, fe  
#Using reghdfe  
ssc install reghdfe  
#You may also have to install gtools  
#and in some cases do "reghdfe, compile" before use  
reghdfe Y D, absorb(id t)
```