*Safeguarding Personally Identifying Information While Aggregating and Querying Medical Data*

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Project Problem

Our goal for this project is to be able to aggregate and query non-private information while protecting the secure information.

One of the most sensitivetypes of personally identifying information (PII) databases are medical records. In the digital age, we are now able to aggregate patient data and compare it with other relational databases to determine intelligent disease clusters and anomaly detection.

Therefore it would be highly inefficient to protect patient PII through purely carbon data storage but even with the most sophisticated network security; PII is vulnerable to exposure when it is being pulled by databases and mixed with other datasets.

Research Methodology

Our goal for this project is to be able to aggregate and query non-private information while protecting the secure information. We will aggregate specific non-identifiable information such as diagnosis, date and location from two separate secure databases that hold this in combination with the secure patient data.

The initial steps require us to flesh out encryption offerings and databases to ensure we have free/test offerings for all of the moving pieces. While all substantial databases have some form of native encryption to protect it from external threats, we anticipate that aggregation between disparate databases may require a standardized encryption solution. Then we will create a data model that would reflect a simplified medical record for a patient, including a subset of data we will seek to protect. We will then define, for this project, what data is necessary to identify disease clusters or patterns and to establish the line between PII and that data.

We must also define basic security roles that allow for differentiation of the information (private versus non-private) to be viewed directly within each database. We will then define the aggregation methods and architecture for the query-able data. As part of this question, we also need to establish the timeliness required for the data to be fresh and relevant for disease clusters or other patterns we seek beneficial enough to identify.

We will install these databases and implement the same patient record schema in both. We will internally be able to change between a secure, all seeing view versus a secure non

Related Works

Mohammed, Noman, et al. "Secure and private management of healthcare databases for data mining." *2015 IEEE 28th International Symposium on Computer-Based Medical Systems*. IEEE, 2015.

Dubovitskaya, Alevtina, et al. "Secure and trustable electronic medical records sharing using blockchain." *AMIA Annual Symposium Proceedings*. Vol. 2017. American Medical Informatics Association, 2017.

Guo, Cheng, et al. "Fine-grained database field search using attribute-based encryption for e-healthcare clouds." *Journal of medical systems* 40.11 (2016): 235.

Tang, Huanrong, Ning Tong, and Jianquan Ouyang. "Medical Images Sharing System Based on Blockchain and Smart Contract of Credit Scores." *2018 1st IEEE International Conference on Hot Information-Centric Networking (HotICN)*. IEEE, 2018.

## IOM (Institute of Medicine). 2010. Clinical data as the basic staple of health learning: Creating and protecting a public good: *Workshop Summary*. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press

Boris Lubarsky , “Re-Identification of “Anonymized” Data,”1 *GEO. L. TECH*. REV. 202 (2017)

Research Plan and Schedule

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| Date | Milestone |
| June 9 | Complete Initial Research - Group meeting to compare notes on initial articles and identify additional roadblocks. |
| June 10 | Finalize Database Selection and Encryption Methodology Selection |
| June 14 | Design and Create data model for patient - including separation of private versus needed data |
| June 16 | Databases Installed  Encryption Installed |
| June 19 | Schemas Created, Data Loaded, Roles Created |
| June 20 | Establish Slide Overview for initial presentation |
| June 23 | Complete Deck for Project Initial Presentation |
| June 25 | Project Initial Presentation |
| June 30 | Data Encryption Checkpoint -  Is this working between databases? |
| July 6 | Cross Database Query Established |
| July 14 | Project Draft |
| August 6 | Project Presentation |
| August 18 | Project Final Paper |

Resources Needed:

Our first step requires us to flesh out encryption offerings and databases to ensure we have free offerings that work together. Of course we would appreciate input here. The access to various licenses through our program, or even through SMU, isn’t always obvious.

Other questions:

We must determine the amount of data needed, horizontally and vertically, to prove the point. Laws establish (and change) what qualifies as *Personal Information*. Ideally, our solution is easy to change, but it isn’t yet clear how authentic our data needs to be. Could Generic columns of information work? At the most basic level, we have columns to share and columns to hide, so authenticity may not matter.

On the other hand, Identifying a disease cluster might rely on, at least, a diagnosis, a timestamp range (100 cases of the flu is more pressing if the time period is 1 day versus 1 year), and some approximation of a zip code. Being able to replicate a data buildup of diagnosis within a time period sounds like a fun show to put on, but seems like a lot of work that misses the overall point of data security.

Other Interesting Article:

Christina Farr, “Why tech companies keep hitting the same wall when they try to get into health care” CNBC, MAY 30 2019

Allow for for the aggregation and query of select, non-personal information from disparate databases without exposing personally identifiable information.

Kakon, Yarden Z. "“Hello, My Name is User# 101”: Defining PII Under the VPPA." *Berkeley Technology Law Journal* 33.4 (2019): 1251.

Manheim, Karl M., and Lyric Kaplan. "Artificial Intelligence: Risks to Privacy and Democracy." *Yale Journal of Law and Technology* (2018).

Houser, Kimberly A., and W. Gregory Voss. "GDPR: The End of Google and Facebook or a New Paradigm in Data Privacy." *Rich. JL & Tech.* 25 (2018): 1.