# ML-Analysis-of-Resource-Exports-and-HDI-Trends

# Abstract

In the greater realm of macroeconomics, the precise factors dictating growth is a continuing field of research and exploration even hundreds of years after the publication of *The Wealth of Nations (1776)* filled with uncertainty and unquantifiable variables. However, it is widely acknowledged that it is far easier to quantify detracting variables that take away from the productive energies of a country, than to quantify variables that contribute. In this paper, we take a dive into a field of personal passion, corruption. Corruption actively syphons resources away from productive measures and leads to negative impacts ranging from the development of crony capitalism (*rent seeking*) to the rise of state capture. One relevant form of corruption to this study is that incurred by the *resource* curse in *rentier states*—where the rise of corruption is largely ignored due to a large dearth of natural resource production. Growth produced by primary sector natural resource production often comes easier than that generated by secondary sector manufacturing or tertiary sector service industries, which tend to be much more sensitive to global economic trends (although examples such as the Oil Crisis of 1973 should be studied as well). We explore potential hypothesis, including the *resource curse* but also competing *resource-driven-growth* hypotheses, for correlations between HDI and resource exports across countries and continents.

# Introduction

Corruption has been endemic to humanity since the dawn of time. Even Plato himself advised that philosophers "shelter behind a wall" when it came to corruption due to its ironically incorrigible nature. However, it has been proven time and time again by reformers that its entrenched presence can be ridden from societies. What concerns this study is whether exports of certain types of natural resources are or are not correlated with the expected increase in human HDI in a naïve assumption. This naïve assumption is that the large extraneous amounts of sudden wealth accumulated through natural resource exports often raise a country’s growth above a natural growth rate and should lead to large improvements in quality of life, lifespan (healthcare), and education (the three primary benchmarks used in calculating HDI) corresponding to increasing personal and government wealth. This assumption is characterized as naïve because many real-world instances of extraneous wealth gained from resources exports often fall into the wrong hands or are used for efforts other than improving the country to which it belongs. Of course, it is possible to increase HDI without large resource exports— we just suppose that the large revenue produced *if* such exports were to exist should increase a country’ HDI. This study aims to firstly explore whether the *resource curse* hypothesis holds; that is, if more exports immediately correlates to increased corruption and doesn’t stimulated expected growth; and secondly explores whether resource exports are absolutely correlated to corruption and whether a metric utilizing HDI / resource export ratios can be used as a metric to measure corruption. We specifically focus on the export of cereal, oil, lumber, rare earth metals, and ores from countries worldwide during the period 2010-2020.

# Methods

Analysis was performed on the same, uniform dataset of exports-per-capita / HDI data across 2010-2020 for all countries. Manual adjustments of hyperparameters was used for all methods, as well as filtering.

## Data

All data was sourced from the UN Comtrade database for broad export types: all mineral spirits (crude & refined oil), all nonorganic mined resources (rare earth metals), ores (particularly steel of note), wood (forestry), and wheat. Population data used for per-capita comparison was sourced from the World Bank database and HDI data was sourced from the UNDP, which produces the index.

## Method A: Regression Trends

### Oil

The sheer magnitude of oil exports make it notable— in the range of $10000, when cereals are in the range of $500.

Oil perhaps was the most interesting out of all of our findings with this method, with two instead of one distinct curves upward and some of the highest R2 values in nonlinear regression fitting. Instead of the expected singular pattern expected, two distinct lines emerged with different intercepts. Historically, it has been shown countries could have high HDI without exports, but a low reasonable low HDI would be correlated with small material wealth (exports) and a country with high exports of oil would be expected to have high HDI from development. This does not appear to be the case, with Gulf states forming the separate line with a lower intercept and other oil exporters (i.e. Norway) forming the upper line. This seems to suggest two different theories of resource-driven exports: that where it may have been used to fuel economical development in otherwise unfavorable environments (i.e. Norway) or where it was used in less productive measures (i.e. Gulf States), such as regime-building, defense, or embezzled.

### Ores

Exports of ores (such as raw iron) saw the most stereotypical fit with a pattern, suggesting a lack of the *resource-curse* phenomenon— instead a *resource-driven* hypothesis seems more likely for these industrializing countries.

### Cereals

Cereal exports fit into a linear trend with extremely low R2 values even when compared to other exports, suggesting that exports of such foodstuffs had nothing to do with development.

### Rare Earth Metals

Rare earth metals were the exception to any trend, with a resounding *negative* correlation between HDI and export levels, suggesting that exporting rare earth metals was something more developed countries quickly abandoned (environmental damage, for example), or something forced upon lesser developed countries by necessity (*pollution haven hypothesis (PHH)*).

## Method B: Clustering

Clustering for *n* variable clusters for each resource was performed on plots of all data from 2010-2020 simultaneously. The amount of clusters for each individual resource was manually adjusted as a hyperparameter to achieve relevant clusterings supporting our hypothesis. Of particular note are clusterings in the lower half or left of graphs indicating low HDI with medium to high resource exports, which would be one possible indicative sign of a resource curse. Also interesting are patterns shown by distributions of extremely high resource exports (>$5000 per capita).

### Oil

It would be expected that with such massively profitable export (with outliers going to $50000 per capita) should immediately improve the quality of life, but it appears not so, especially with Cluster 0 and Cluster 1 (Fig. 1a). After further analysis, it was further revealed that Cluster 0 represented a cluster of oil-rich Gulf countries and Cluster 1 represented a series of highly corrupt or unstable countries (Fig 2). A particularly emblematic country representative of Cluster 1 was Angola, which can be singled out for its rife corruption. Despite the state-owned oil Sonangol making massive revenues in excess of $10 billion on the monopoly it enjoys on petroleum and natural gas exports, equating to over $1000 per capita, much of the country outside of Luanda is still in poverty and practices subsistence farming.

### Wood

Clustering of wood export data indicate a relatively normal trend, except for outliers in Cluster 1 and 3 (Fig. 1b). Cluster 3 shows that extremely high lumber exports tend to correlate to a *lower* HDI index, perhaps indicative of how anti-deforestation environmental awareness takes place at higher HDIs. Cluster 1 also displays a few higher export countries stuck at a relatively low HDI, but it is crucial to remember the scale of the exports. Wood exports per capita never exceeded $1400 per capita in any case, which would render its significant in development rather limited given the small amount of derived revenue.

### Rare Earth Metals

Apart from its notable *negative* trend overall, specific clusters are notable for skewing the trend further towards negative or outliers. Cluster 1 shows a series of rather undeveloped countries (HDI ~0.7) exporting large amounts of ore, suggesting specific countries impacted by the *pollution haven hypothesis (PHH)*. Similarly, extremely high exports of rare earth metals in Cluster 3 similar to the Gulf States of Oil Cluster 0 have extremely middling HDIs (~0.8). However, unlike even Oil, larger exports of rare earth metals resolutely lead to lower HDI. Possible hypotheses include the PHH, but also that the fact that rare earth metal mining is an extremely polluting and dangerous activity often cost-prohibitive in more developed countries.

Figure 1a, b, c, d, e: clusters and various fitted nonlinear/linear regressions overlaid upon resource export per capita in dollars against HDI.

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Figure 2: table of selected cluster data from oil exports.

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| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Cluster 0 | | | | | Cluster 1 | | | | |
| Year | Country | HDI | Exports per C. ($) | Year | | Country | HDI | Exports per C. ($) |
| 2013 | Brunei | 0.835 | 26870.93 | 2013 | | Congo | 0.6 | 1629.37 |
| 2013 | Bahrain | 0.839 | 8121.1 | 2013 | | Angola | 0.555 | 2541.71 |
| 2013 | Kuwait | 0.813 | 30788.14 | 2013 | | Gabon | 0.678 | 4483.35 |
| 2013 | Oman | 0.814 | 10820.48 | 2013 | | Iraq | 0.648 | 2538.39 |
| 2013 | Saudi Arabia | 0.831 | 11656.53 | 2014 | | Angola | 0.565 | 2110.99 |
| 2013 | UAE | 0.847 | 17028.4 | 2014 | | Gabon | 0.687 | 4033.12 |
| 2014 | Bahrain | 0.839 | 11394.55 | 2014 | | Iraq | 0.651 | 2309.43 |
| 2014 | Brunei | 0.834 | 23335 | 2015 | | Angola | 0.591 | 1132.72 |
| 2014 | Kuwait | 0.816 | 25785.54 | 2015 | | Gabon | 0.692 | 2189.95 |
| 2014 | Oman | 0.818 | 9632.86 | 2015 | | Iraq | 0.656 | 1312.48 |
| 2014 | Saudi Arabia | 0.836 | 10067.37 | 2016 | | Gabon | 0.696 | 1397.37 |
| 2014 | UAE | 0.853 | 12780.04 | 2016 | | Iraq | 0.661 | 1137.73 |
| 2015 | Brunei | 0.832 | 13989.83 | 2017 | | Angola | 0.597 | 1093.17 |
| 2015 | Kuwait | 0.829 | 12643.81 | 2017 | | Gabon | 0.699 | 1666.76 |
| 2015 | Qatar | 0.852 | 27507.31 | 2018 | | Angola | 0.598 | 1243.08 |
| 2016 | Brunei | 0.83 | 10020.23 | 2018 | | Congo | 0.603 | 1672.66 |
| 2016 | Kuwait | 0.832 | 10352.23 | 2018 | | Gabon | 0.699 | 2074.18 |
| 2016 | Qatar | 0.853 | 18868.44 | 2019 | | Angola | 0.597 | 1031.26 |
| 2017 | Brunei | 0.829 | 11528.97 | 2019 | | Gabon | 0.702 | 1866.24 |
| 2017 | Kuwait | 0.835 | 11932.87 | 2020 | | Gabon | 0.704 | 1673.52 |
| 2017 | Qatar | 0.862 | 22320.92 |  | |  |  |  |
| 2018 | Brunei | 0.826 | 13663.28 |  | |  |  |  |
| 2018 | Kuwait | 0.836 | 15124.58 |  | |  |  |  |
| 2018 | Qatar | 0.866 | 28336.14 |  | |  |  |  |
| 2019 | Brunei | 0.827 | 14484.66 |  | |  |  |  |
| 2019 | Kuwait | 0.838 | 13211.52 |  | |  |  |  |
| 2019 | Qatar | 0.869 | 23724.86 |  | |  |  |  |
| 2020 | Brunei | 0.827 | 12039.49 |  | |  |  |  |
| 2020 | Kuwait | 0.826 | 8146.67 |  | |  |  |  |
| 2020 | Qatar | 0.863 | 15080.78 |  | |  |  |  |

## Method C: Ratios